RULE 37

Vikings Industrial Corporation vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 143794 July 13 2004

Facts:

Petitioner extended to respondent Jose L Luison Jr. a loan amounting to 2,000,000 secured by a
promisory note and a real estate mortgage. Two years after, petitioner demanded from the respondent
the payment of 19 , 102,96.39. Respondent disputed said claim thus filed for a petition for prohibition
and declaratory relief before the RTC of Quezon city.

RTC- in favor of respondent and ruled in default of the petitioner.

CA- Dismissed for lack of merit

SC- Certiorari but was dismissed.

Undaunted, petitioner resorted to a second round, and filed with the RTC a motion for new trial on the
ground of Honest Mistake that before filing a responsive pleading, the name “ Viking Trading
Corporation” must first be corrected.

RTC- granted the motion because of “Honest Mistake” Respondent moved for reconsideration but was
denied

CA- reversed the decision of the RTC

Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether petitioner filed its motion for new trial seasonably.

Held:

We find no cogent reason why we should review the above findings of the Appellate Court which are
sustained by the records. At any rate, even if the motion for new trial was filed on time, still, the same
should not have been granted by the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it committed an “honest mistake” in
not filing an answer to respondent’s petition for prohibition and declaratory relief because of its belief
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. We are not persuaded.

Petitioner’s “honest mistake” hardly qualifies as a ground for a new trial. Section 1 of Rule 37 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

“SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration. —Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or
final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and because of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or”

Petitioner’s reliance on “honest mistake” is misplaced. The mistake referred to above is one which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake
of law. Its lawyer believed that he should not file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded.
Had petitioner’s counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
particularly Section 4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have committed a mistake which,
unfortunately, binds his client.

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

461 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 141973 June 28, 2005

Facts:

Philphos is a domestic corporation registered with the EPZA. It manufactures fertilizers for domestic and
international distribution and as such, utilizes fuel, oil and other petroleum products which it procures
locally from Petron. Petron initially pays the BIR and the Bureau of Customs the taxes and duties
imposed upon the petroleum products. Petron is then reimbursed by Philpos when Petron sells such
petroleum products to the Philpos. Philpos sought a refund of specific taxes paid on the purchases of
petroleum products from Petron pursuant to the incentives it enjoyed by virtue of its EPZA registration.
Since the two-year period within which petitioner could file a case for tax refund before the CTA was
about to expire and no action had been taken by the BIR, Philpos instituted a petition for review before
the CTA against the CIR. During the trial, to prove that the duties imposed upon the petroleum products
delivered to petitioner by Petron had been duly paid for by Philpos, Philpos presented a Certification
from Petron; a schedule of petroleum products sold and delivered to petitioner detailing the volume of
sales and the excise taxes paid thereon; photocopies of Authority to Accept Payment for Excise Taxes
issued by the CIR pertaining to petroleum products purchased; as well as the testimony of Sylvia Osorio,
officer of Petron, to attest to the summary and certification presented. The CIR did not present any
evidence to controvert the ones presented by Philpos nor did it file an opposition to petitioner’s formal
offer of evidence.
On August 11, 1998, the CTA promulgated its Decision finding that while Philpos is exempt from the
payment of excise taxes, it failed to sufficiently prove that it is entitled to refund in this particular case
since it did not submit invoices to support the summary of petroleum products sold and delivered to it
by Petron. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Philphos filed another motion for
reconsideration with motion for new trial praying that it be allowed to present an additional witness and
to have invoices and receipts pre-marked. Philphos went to CA but denied outright reasoning that the
"AFFIDAVIT OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING" was executed by Philphos’s counsel, when under Adm. Circular
No. 04-94, the Philphos should be the one to certify as to the facts and undertakings as required.

Issue:

Whether or not the CTA erred in denying the petition for new trial.

Ruling:

Yes. It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that:

(a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;

(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence;

(c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and

(d) it is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As pointed out
by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner could fall under mistake or excusable negligence.
The “mistake” that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against. Negligence to be “excusable” must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been
impaired. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while
transacting important business. In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary
prudence in claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases with the CTA which did not
require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of CTA Circular No. 1-95.

We reiterate the fundamental principle that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but
are primarily designed to aid in the administration of justice. And in cases before tax courts, Rules of
Court applies only by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient
shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. The quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an
absolute. It should not bar the courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination
of a controversy. This is because, after all, the paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of
truth. Section 8 of R.A. No. 1125 creating the CTA also expressly provides that it shall not be governed
strictly by technical rules of evidence.
Since it is not disputed that petitioner is entitled to tax exemption, it should not be precluded from
presenting evidence to substantiate the amount of refund it is claiming on mere technicality especially
in this case, where the failure to present invoices at the first instance was adequately explained by
petitioner. As we pronounced in BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals: . . . Technicalities and
legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to
it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to
observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in
refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor,
dignity and uprightness.

G. R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009

MULTI-TRANS AGENCY PHILS. INC., vs.

ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORP.,

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Oriental Assurance Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money against
petitioner and Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd. Due to breach of contract of carriage. With this, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. However,
said motion was denied.

Counsel of petitioner was notified regarding the said denial but did not do anything to act upon
the matter. Due to counsel's inaction, petitioner was declared in default and an adverse decision was
rendered. Petitioner, upon learning the order of default consulted their counsel, but the latter
misrepresented himself that he have already filed the appropriate motions and pleadings to remedy the
adverse decision of the Court.

Upon learning their counsel's negligence, petitioner hired a new lawyer and upon submission of
appearance before the court, the latter also filed a motion to admit the attached Motion for New Trial
on the ground of former counsel's negligence. Said motion was denied even on appeal on the ground
that the motion was filed out of time and that the counsel's negligence binds his or her client.

Hence, this recourse

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners former counsels failure to
file an answer and to act after receipt of the declaration of default merely constituted simple negligence
binding the petitioner and not entitling it to a new trial

HELD:

YES. One of the grounds for the granting of a new trial under Section 1 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure is excusable negligence. It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against the client. Hence, the Honorable Court carved out exceptions to this rule; as where the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; or where the
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the
interests of justice so requires and relief ought to be accorded to the client who suffered by reason of
the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

In order to apply the exceptions rather than the rule, the circumstances obtaining in each case must be
looked into. In cases where one of the exceptions is present, the courts must step in and accord relief to
a client who suffered thereby.

G.R. No. L-63397 April 9, 1985

ALEX LINA, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HONORABLE GREGORIO PINEDA, as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI at Pasig; and NORTHERN MOTORS, INC.,
respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS:

On April 22, 1982, petitioner Alex Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint.
On May 8, 1982, when no answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, private respondent
Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default which the CFI granted. Herein petitioner
opposed the same claiming that he had filed a motion for extension to file an answer(received by court
on May 19). Thereafter, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint. Respondent court rendered its
decision in favor of respondent (May 26). Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the same decision but it
was denied. He subsequently filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari/prohibition,
which was also denied. The CA affirmed: when the respondent court declared the defendant in default,
it is a clear and inevitable implication, without the need of an express statement to that effect, although
it would have been more desirable, that the motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading was
denied. In other words, the Order of May 26, 1982 had the necessary and logical implication that the
petitioner's opposition to the motion to declare defendant in default, based upon the ground that he
had asked for extension of time to file responsive pleading, was disapproved or denied by the court.
Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
whether certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered without an order of
default being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to
evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this case.

Held:

No. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. "While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of
policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law,
the defense should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for
extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief (Naga Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 105)." In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or two (2) days before the
expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary period given to defendant to file his responsive pleading
when petitioner moved for an extension of twenty (20) days from May 7 within which to file his answer.
Upon motion of private respondent and over the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an
order declaring petitioner in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) are: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious
defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
A petition for relief, a remedy in the ordinary course of law, could have been just as plain, adequate and
speedy as certiorari. Such a remedy could have been granted by the respondent court. And if the
respondent court still denies the petition, then petitioner can take an appeal on the order denying the
petition, and in the course of such appeal petitioner can also assail the judgment on the merits upon the
ground that it is supported by the evidence, or it is contrary to law.

CANSINO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125799. August 21, 2003

FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by respondents against
petitioners. The said complaint alleged that petitioners, by strategy and stealth, unlawfully constructed
their respective houses inside respondent’sparcel of land. On their defense, petitioners averred that
their possession was premised upon their honest belief that the lot was a public land and that they had
been in possession of the subject premises ever since 1977. During the trial, the MeTC treated the case
as ejectment and not unlawful detainer hence, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of proving prior
physical possession of the property. Respondents failed to discharge the burden.

Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto decision of the MeTC. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration where they appended more documentary evidence showing their ownership over the
subject property, as well as the ownership and possession of their predecessors-in-interest. The RTC
reversed its prior decision by reason of the newly added evidence which proved the respondent’s prior
ownership of the property.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in considering the documentary evidence attached in the motion
for reconsideration

RULING: YES. As a rule, the court has an inherent power to amend their decisions to make them
conformable to law and justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not
contemplate amendments that are substantial in nature. They merely cover formal changes or such that
will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will
violate due process if they make substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other
party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration.
Republic of the Philippines vs Marlilyn Peralta et al.

G.R. No. 150327

FACTS: On September 26,1994 Marilyn Peralta et al. filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership of real property with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against the Republic of the
Philippines, DENR and the conservation officer in said region. Their allegations were that they are the
heirs of Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted a Homestead Patent by the then
Secretary of DENR over a lot located at Guiang, Davao City. However, sometime in 1969, officers of the
Bureau of Forest Development sought for the permission to use the portion of said property and caused
the construction of a big concrete building. After sometime, the owners of the said land sought for the
vacation of the BFD howecer no response was received. With this, Plaintiffs filed for an action for the
vacation of the defendants on the said property.

RTC- Ruled in favor of the Plaintiff

Upon the order of the Trial court, before the expiration of the reglementary period,Defendant sought
for a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied because of the failure to provide for the Notice of
Hearing that it was just a mere scrap of paper.

CA- Affirmed the Ruling of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the Defendant now the Petitioners is tantamount to the dismissal of
the Appeal.

HELD: Yes, Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a
motion for new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of
which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of
hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties concerned at least three days
before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be
directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The
requirements, far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital
elements of procedural due process.

However, The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner’s
reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules
and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant’s brief. Petitioner’s appeal
presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due
course.
RULE 40

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

This landmark case holds the long standing procedural doctrine on “Fresh Period Rule”.

FACTS: This case stems from petition for review under Rule 45 filed by the petitioners assailing the ruling
of the Court of Appeals when it affirmed the decision of the RTC on the ground that their action had
already prescribed:

Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration] which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late.

ISSUE: The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have
filed their notice of appeal.

RULING:

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are;
or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

Petitioners argue that the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration should be construed as the final
order not the earlier order that dismissed their complaint.

The High Court agreed with this contention and states that:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules
42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

NOTE: To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Villena vs. Rupisan

G.R. No. 167620. April 3, 2007

Facts: Respondents, through counsel Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo (Atty. Guillermo), filed a Notice of
Appeal dated 5 October 2002.

However,o n 22 November 2002 the RTC issued an Order denying respondent’s appeal due to late
payment of appellate docket fees.

Issue: Whether non payment of docket fees is a ground for dismissal of the case

Held: A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a
discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal.

This Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed
period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in the same vein, recognized that the existence of
persuasive and weighty reasons call for a relaxation of the rules.

There are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the
rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided
by all the attendant circumstances.

ROUEL AD. REYES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PEPITO and MARTA TORRES, HON. ELIEZER R. DELOS
SANTOS, Executive Judge, RTC, Angeles City, respondents.

FACTS: This petition for certiorari originates from a case for ejectment with damages concerning a parcel
of land located in Mabalacat, Pampanga. MCTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City and filed the required supersedeas
bond. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8746. On September 18, 1997, the RTC dismissed the
appeal for failure to pay docket and other legal fees. Thus they filed for MR, stating that they paid legal
fees. That the Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Mabalacat and Magalang who neglected to attach the said
receipts to the records of the case. The motion for reconsideration was set for hearing at 2:00 in the
afternoon of October 3, 1997 in Branch 59.

Oct. 2, 1997 - Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with Branch 62 of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City. Respondents assailed the writ of execution issued by the MCTC on
September 30, 1997 despite their filing of the supersedeas bond to stay execution of judgment pending
appeal. Nevertheless, the sheriff executed the writ and demolished respondents house and other
structure on the subject property.

Respondents failed to appear at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration before Branch 59 of the
RTC. The motion for reconsideration was denied and its earlier order dismissing the appeal was
sustained. Thus, they filed another motion for reconsideration of the order denying their first motion for
reconsideration. They alleged that their counsel arrived late at the hearing on October 3, 1997; that
their counsel was at Branch 62 of the RTC Angeles City awaiting the issuance of a temporary restraining
order in Civil Case No. 8794, which was issued only a few minutes before 2:00 oclock; that he thereafter
rushed to Branch 59 to attend the hearing but was delayed by heavy traffic due to a vehicular accident.

RTC then ORDERED to immediately transmit the entire records of this case to this Court for inclusion in
the raffle.

Petitioner then argues that respondent court had lost jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal and
returned the records of the case to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court; that respondent court erred in
reinstating the appeal without first resolving the motion for reconsideration; that respondent court
erred in not citing private respondents in contempt for forum-shopping; and that respondents motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order was bereft of merit.
ISSUE:

HELD:

Rule 40, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be. (Underscoring ours)

Clearly then, it was the responsibility of the clerk of court to attach respondents proof of payment to the
original record. Respondent courts error in dismissing the appeal after having been inadvertently misled
to believe that respondents had failed to pay the docket fees was rectifiable. Respondents endeavored
to set this right through their first motion for reconsideration.

It cannot be said that respondents second motion is strictly prohibited by the rules for the matters
raised in the first and second motions are not identical, since they challenged two different orders of the
respondent court.

Whenever non-compliance with the rules is not intended to delay the final disposition of the case, nor
to cause prejudice to the adverse party, we have repeatedly held that the dismissal of an appeal on
mere technicalities may be stayed in the exercise of the courts equity jurisdiction. [19] Thus, when
respondent court set aside its earlier dismissal of respondents appeal, it did not do so with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicality. [20] It is the courts policy to encourage hearings of
appeals on the merits [21] so that every party-litigant is afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, unhampered by the constraints of technicalities

THE HEIRS OF CRISTETA DE LA ROSA, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, HEIRS OF SESINANDO MILLARE, ROSALINA M. COSEP, CARMELITA

M. DAMASO, MERCEDES M. ESPIRITU, and FELICITA M. SAN FELIPE, respondents

G.R. No. 147939 July 6, 2007

FACTS:

The present petition stems from a forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction case decided by
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanay, Rizal. The court rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondents.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. MTC ordered the transmittal of the records to the RTC. The records
of the case was immediately transferred to the RTC of Morong, Rizal.

Private respondents filed a Motion for Dismissal of Appeal alleging that petitioners had not filed the
required memorandum.

Petitioners filed an Opposition and averred that they had not received the Notice of Appealed Case and
they only became aware of the notice of appealed case upon their receipt of respondent’s motion for
dismissal.

RTC content that it shows on the record that the petitioner’s staff have received the said notice, hence
the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the petitioners to file the required memorandum as well as
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of such.

CA affirm the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of notice of appeal.

HELD:

Yes.

Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that receipt of the letter of transmittal and of the notice of
appealed case is the reckoning point for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over their appeal.

Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, filing of the notice of appeal in due time and the
payment of the appropriate fees by the petitioners perfected their appeal in the RTC without need of
any further act. As a necessary consequence thereof, the MTC was divested of jurisdiction over their
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
BANTING V. MANGLAPUZ

August 2006

FACTS:

An ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC by Sps. Manglapuz against Sps. Reyes and Banting
(partner for the operation of a grocery store on the subject property).The MeTC rendered judgment in
favor of Spouses Maglapuz which Spouses Reyes and Banting appealed to the RTC. It dired the parties to
file their respective memoranda on appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Sps. Manglaouz
complied but Sps Reyes did not. Thus RTC dismissed the appeal. Sps. Reyes' counsel filed MR and to
admit the late Memo. The RTC rebuffed the motion for reconsideration. Spouses Reyes and Banting
received copy of this Order on January 20, 2003.On that same day, they filed with the RTC a Notice of
Appeal.The RTC, in an Order dated January 23, 2003, disapproved the Notice of Appeal for failure of
Spouses Reyes and Banting to pay appellate court docket fees. The latter received copy of this Order on
January 27, 2003. On the next day, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that appellate
court docket fees were actually paid on January 21, 2003 as shown by copies of receipts attached to the
motion. The RTC granted said Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated January 30, 2003, in effect
giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to the CA. However, RTC ruled that the Notiuce of Appeal is
misplaced. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review which was dismissed by the CA. MR was also dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Review filed by the petitioners

HELD:

YES. Petition for Review was filed out of time and fatally defective. An order of the RTC dismissing an
appeal from a decision of the MeTC for failure of appellant to file a memorandum on appeal is one such
final order. It is appealable by petition for review under Rule 42. In Neypesv. Court of Appeals, we fixed
a uniform period for appeals filed under Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45. Specifically, we set the period to appeal
at 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is seasonably filed from the said decision or final order, within a fresh period of 15 days
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or reconsideration.

Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, petitioners should have filed the Petition for Review on
February 5, 2003. Filing of Notice of Appeal under Section 2 (a) of Rule 41 was faulty. It is axiomatic that
a fatally defective or erroneous appeal or motion will not toll the running of a period to appeal. A detour
from the proper course of an appeal will not earn for the errant party a fresh start.

The Petition for Review was directed at both the August 13, 2002 Decision of the MeTC and the January
23, 2003 Order of the RTC. This is odd. The August 13, 2002 MeTC Decision and the January 23, 2003
RTC Order are matters not proper for a petition for review under Rule 42. As correctly declared by the
CA, it has no appellate jurisdiction over the MeTC and it cannot entertain a direct appeal from said
decision.
Gonzales v. Gonzales

G.R. No. 151376; February 22, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Filmeno Gonzales filed an ejectment suit against respondent Quirino Gonzales before MTC QC
Br. 35. During the pendency of the case, respondent passed away and was substituted by his wife,
Eufemia Gonzales.

On April 10, 1997, Respondent moved for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground that she
instituted a case for an annulment of title against petitioner before RTC QC Br. 84. MTC denied such
motion and submitted the case for decision. On August 1, 1997, MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered the respondent to vacate the property and pay for the rentals.

Respondent appealed before the RTC and was ordered by the latter to submit a memorandum
discussing the errors of the MTC. However, instead of filing a memorandum of appeal, she moved for
the consolidation of such case with the annulment of title she filed before the RTC QC Br. 84. RTC denied
the motion for consolidation for lack of merit and ordered the issuance of writ of execution for the
judgment of the MTC.

On November 11, 1997, RTC directed the dismissal of respondent’s appeal for failing to file the
necessary memorandum of appeal. Respondent then filed an Omnibus Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration praying that the counsel be allowed to submit required appeal memorandum or adopt
the respondent’s position in the memorandum filed before the MTC. RTC denied the motion for lack of
merit and for being dilatory. Still, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Honorable
Court praying for the reconsideration of her Omnibus Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. RTC likewise
denied the same for lack of merit and for being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration,
which is a prohibited pleading.

Respondent then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA. CA partially granted the petition
and reversed the order dated November 11, 1997. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing and setting aside the RTC order dismissing the respondent’s appeal
for failure to file the necessary memorandum of appeal.

Ruling:

YES, CA erred in granting such petition filed by the respondent. As provided in Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court, failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of
appeal. Hence, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to submit or file a memorandum of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of order enjoining the filing of said pleading. Even though there is no
prohibition to the adoption of a party’s position paper earlier filed, such option must be manifested
during the period within which to file the required memorandum of appeal. In the case at bar,
respondent failed to file such memorandum of appeal within the allotted period. Respondent’s
manifestation of adopting her position paper in the MTC only came about after the dismissal of the
appeal had already been ordered. Hence, RTC did not err in dismissing the respondent’s appeal.
Fuentes vs. Caguimbal G.R. No. 150305 November 22, 2007 Tenancy

NOVEMBER 9, 2017

FACTS: Honofre Fuentes is the owner of the property being claimed in this case. Said property is located
in Calatagan, Batangas. Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Felomino Caguimbal,
alleging that in 1991, he allowed respondent to occupy the property rent-free, subject to the condition
that the latter will vacate the property when petitioner returns from abroad. However, upon his return,
respondent refused to vacate the property, forcing petitioner to file the case. Respondent denied
petitioner’s allegations, claiming that his father started occupying the property in 1928 as agricultural
tenant until his disability in 1976, after which he (respondent) took over.

ISSUE: Can tenancy be presumed?

RULING:

No. Section 3 of R.A. No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines defines agricultural
tenancy as “the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by another, for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.”

The essential requisites of tenancy are:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties; (4) The
purpose of the relationship is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.

Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to
security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the
land in question. The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in
the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved.Without the essential
elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the
private respondents.

What was established by the evidence in the present case was that respondent and his predecessor had
been planting on the property since 1928. What is wanting, however, is proof showing the sharing of
harvests or that petitioner, as landowner of the subject property ever gave his consent to establish or
maintain a tenancy relationship.
RULE 45

BADIOLA v. CA

GR No. 170691, 23 April 2008

FACTS: Badiola is the Human Resource Management Officer V of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
is designated as the Chief of the Personnel Division. She is likewise the Head Secretariat of the DA
Promotion and Selection Board (DA-PSB) and the DA Search Committee. Private respondent Lerma G.
Abesamis (Abesamis), on the other hand, is a Project Development Officer of the Public Investment
Program Division of the DA Planning Service.

Abesamis filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Badiola with
violating Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), Perjury, and Dishonesty and/or Grave Misconduct.

Badiola filed her Counter-Affidavit in which she denied the allegations that she caused the delay
in the processing of Abesamis's papers and that she had any part in the decision of the DA-PSB to
require the applicants to submit their performance evaluation reports. Badiola also asserted that the
DA-PSB already forwarded its recommendations of short listed applicants to DA Secretary Lorenzo as of
17 June 2003 in compliance with the letter of OP Search Committee Chairman Abes. Regarding the issue
of her Master's Degree, Badiola declared that she belonged to the graduate class of October 1998 as
reflected in the Official Transcript of Records issued by the Pampanga Agricultural College.

Several more pleadings and documents were thereafter filed by the parties before the
Ombudsman. Ombudsman issued a Resolution the criminal complaint against Badiola, but grants the
administrative case against him. Badiola filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision, which
the Ombudsman denied.

Badiola subsequently filed a Supplemental Petition for Review, and the CA dismissed Badiola’s
original petition. Thereafter, Badiola, who apparently had not yet received a copy of the foregoing
Resolution dismissing her petition, filed an Urgent Motion (To Resolve Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order).

Badiola filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion praying for (1) reconsideration of its Resolution
dated 20 July 2004 dismissing her petition; and (2) resolution of her Urgent Motion (To Resolve
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order), which were all denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CASE ON
ITS MERITS, AND IN DISMISSING THE APPEALED CASE PURELY ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

RULING: No. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65[44] of the Rules of Court is not the
appropriate remedy.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.

Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross. On the other hand, a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower
court or agency.

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No.
07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated 15 September 2003), significantly provides: In all
other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

From the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the party
aggrieved may file a motion for reconsideration with the same court. Should this motion be again
denied, the case may be elevated to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in any case.

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Facts: Petitioner-spouses own hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur. Public respondent
Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at
P23,485.00 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation
and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Camarines Sur for summary administrative proceedings.

The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank. Petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion.

Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC. The SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the
PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. From the
Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly
before this Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct mode of appeal.

Ruling: At the outset, we rule that the consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible because
petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this
Court.

While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to
this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courtsdesignated as SACs are only appealable to the
Court of Appeals.

We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right
must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its
exercise. The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly
states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction
between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises
questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Case: Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas vs Limbaco

Gr No.: 175291

Date: July 27, 2011

Topic: Rule 45, Where and when to appeal

Facts:

Petitioners purchased 2 lots from Cobarde in 1980 who in turn had purchased these lots from Ouano in
1948. Nothwithstanding the sale, the 2 lots remained registered in the name of Ouano. Ouano was able
to sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation (NAC) in 1952 for its airport expansion
project. NAC promptly had the titles for these properties registered in its name. When the airport
expansion project fell through, respondent and the legal heirs of Ouano succeeded in reclaiming title to
the 2 lots through an action for reconveyance. The titles over these lots were thereafter registered in
their names then they subdivided the lots and sold them to various buyers who registered the titles over
their respective lots in their names.

RTC issued a resolution, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by AWG, Petrosa and UCB, and
dismissing the petitioners complaint.

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal to question the RTC resolution. In response, respondents AWG,
Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the petitioners raised only
questions of law in their appeal; thus, they should have filed an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme
Court, and not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court.

The CA ruled that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court instead of an ordinary appeal since they only raised a
question of law,

Issue:

Whether proper appeal was made

Ruling:

No.

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA
from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.
Doctrine:

Where a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal is not
reviewable by that court.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[13] On the other hand, there is a question of fact
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

BANAAG vs AMS Farming Corp

Facts: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and
production of documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he
sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to
cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be
excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP).

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling
pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store.

Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his marital
status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still
involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone
home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was
afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to present
sufficient evidence to substantiate his petition for habeas data and writ of amparo. The CA likewise
dropped as respondent, for Pres. GMA on the ground of her immunity from suit. Hence, the petition to
SC but it was denied

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the petition was bereft
of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents violated or threatened
petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. Petitioner now files a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court is bound by factual findings of the appellate court

Held: No. Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that questions
of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a
rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the
judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the
instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof
imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of
both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even
threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation
that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat".21

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the surrounding
circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against
his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance
and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a
military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of
amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations
lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on
nebulous grounds.

ESTINOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 150276, 12 February 2008

FACTS:

Sometime in February and March 1986, petitioner, while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to
private several complainants that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that
she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from the said complainants the payment
of placement and processing fees totaling P15,000.00. On the promised date of their departure,
however, private complainants never left the country. They were then informed by petitioner that there
were no available plane tickets and that they would leave by September of that year. Came November
1986 and still they were not deployed. This private complainants to suspect that something was amiss,
and they demanded the return of their money. Petitioner assured them refund of the fees and even
executed promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were mere
pretenses. In the early months of 1987, complainants then initiated formal charges for estafa against
petitioner. On November 9, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA. As aforesaid, the appellate court, in the
assailed April 30, 2001 Decision, affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
 On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for review, petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Motion for Reconsideration. June 28, 2001, the CA, in the challenged Resolution, denied the said motion
pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA.
The appellate court denied the same, on August 17, 2001, in the other assailed Resolution. Displeased
with this series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Rule 65 is the remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances.

HELD:

NO. Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate
court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for
review on certiorari Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she
effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review
and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature
of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is
appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.

Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court
cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in
the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary
period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in
cases before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension
requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to
be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File
a Motion for Reconsideration.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time
and with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision,
the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The
instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal certiorari is not a procedural device to
deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a decision becomes
final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have
the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to
naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

ABALOS v. HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO

GR NO. 175444

December 14, 2011

FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the MTC of
Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar.

Petitioners alleged that respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription wherein they
filed real estate taxes as well.

MTC - in favor of respondents

RTC – in favor of petitioners

CA- Reversed, in favor ot the respondents

ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE PETITIONERS HEREIN ARE
NOW THE ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION

HELD: Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.14 Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Doubtless, the issue of whether petitioners possess the subject property as owners, or whether they
occupy the same by mere tolerance of respondents, is a question of fact. Thus, it is not reviewable.

Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the abovementioned restriction. Among
the recognized exceptions are the following:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

As to the issue of whether the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which
respondents anchor their ownership were not proven, the Court notes that petitioners did not raise this
matter in their Answer as well as in their Pre-Trial Brief. It was only in their Comment to respondents'
Petition for Review filed with the CA that they raised this issue. Settled is the rule that points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be,
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court.26 They cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. To allow this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Atlanta Industries, Inc. V. Sebolino

Facts:

Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment
of wages and other money claims as well as damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status
as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported
apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally
dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired. In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the
workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as
apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them
as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where
they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master
List) prior to their engagement as apprentices. The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with
respect to nine out of the twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the NLRC which
reversed the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They moved for
reconsideration but this was denied. They then brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held
that Sebolino and the three others were illegally dismiised. The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three
others were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second
apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004 then he
entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19,
2004. The second apprenticeship agreement was from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004. However, the
CA found the apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were executed in violation of the law
and the rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements. Also, the positions
occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary
and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business. Sebolino
and the three others were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just
or authorized cause and notice.

Issue:

Whether CA erred in voiding the agreement because petitioners failed to attach a copy of the
production and Work Schedule and a copy of the compromise agreement Costales and Almoite allegedly
entered into—material portions of the record that should accompany and support the petition,
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

No. CA committed no reversible error. In Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J.
Garchitorena35 where the Court addressed essentially the same issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42
of the Rules of Court,36 we held that the phrase “of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record x x x as would support the allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the exercise of
discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to
the petition. The crucial issue to consider then is whether or not the documents accompanying the
petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein.”37

As in Mariners, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support the petitioners’
allegations. The accompanying CA decision38 and resolution,39 as well as those of the labor arbiter40
and the NLRC,41 referred to the parties’ position papers and even to their replies and rejoinders.
Significantly, the CA decision narrates the factual antecedents, defines the complainants’ cause of
action, and cites the arguments, including the evidence the parties adduced. If any, the defect in the
petition lies in the petitioners’ failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents
mentioned, especially several pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect,
however, is not fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly summarized the labor tribunal’s rulings. We,
thus, find no procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the merits.

Republic vs Vega

FACTS:

On 26 May 1995, respondents Vegas filed an application for registration of title. Respondents Vegas
alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn
inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition
to respondents Vegas’ application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or
portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents Vegas presented several
exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents
Vegas’ ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the
testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources for he attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land2 and stated that the
area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there
was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.

During the trial, respondents-intervenors Buhays entered their appearance and moved to intervene in
respondents Vegas’ application for registration. They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision
Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to
their predecessors-in-interest.

The trial court granted respondents Vegas’ application but petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of
the trial court. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republic’s arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition
with this Court.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not petitioner Republic failed to include the pertinent portions of the record that would
support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellee’s Brief
of respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings

2 Whether or not herein petitioner raised questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45
Petition.

HELD:

First, petitioner Republic’s failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief to the instant
Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The
requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by "such material portions
of the record as would support the petition" is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition.8
Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from,9
there are no other records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached before the Court can
take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.

Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes
issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and
character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a
review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into
their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a
question of law is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,10 the Court reiterated the
distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise: We reiterate the distinction
between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when
the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the
evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court’s conclusion that the subject land is alienable
and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the
proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in
their findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of
law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.

RULE 38

Case: Gomez vs Montalban

Gr No.: 174414

Date: March 14, 2008

Topic: Rule 38, Grounds include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

Facts:

Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal
on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez
filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still
failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper
service of summons since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was
not authorized to receive summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent
failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.
Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s
failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for
Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is proper.

Held:

NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is only available against
a final and executory judgment and the grounds include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which
grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which
the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This
does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an
appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,or was used to procure the
judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as
respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her
case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the
party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and
allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and
subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do
is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's
ruling.

Doctrine:

In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief from Judgment:

“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,
and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party
who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to
his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.”
RULE 47

Republic vs technological advocates

Facts:

On November 27, 1995, respondent Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc.
(TAFPA) and DENR, Regional Office (RO) No. IX, represented by its then Regional Executive Director
(RED), Cipriano B. Paet, entered into a contract[2] for community organizing activities, social
investigation, and information education campaign at the San Isidro Tinago Reforestation Sub-Project in
Sergio Osmea, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte.

Petitioner defaulted.

instead of paying respondents claims, the matter was referred to the Program Director, National
Forestation Development Office (NFDO), DENR, seeking its position on whether to impose penalty on
the billings of respondent. On December 1, 1999, the Program Director issued a memorandum[8] stating
that the regional office was correct in its position to impose the contracts penalty clause. He further
stated that the only recourse of the respondent would be to petition the proper court for the equitable
reduction of the penalty imposed by the contract. RED Mendoza forthwith informed respondent of the
Program Directors position.

On December 15, 1999, respondent filed with the RTC, Zamboanga City, a special civil action for
Mandamus with Prayer for Damages, docketed as SPL. CIVIL ACTION No. 459, praying that after notice
and hearing, a writ be issued commanding the RED of the DENR to pay respondent P802,350.64,
representing the latters unpaid claims, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 by way of attorneys
fees and legal interest on the principal sum demanded. The RTC subsequently treated the case as one
for specific performance rather than an action for mandamus, since the allegations in the complaint
clearly reflected that respondents cause of action was based on a contract.

On June 8, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Julie as special counsel to
assist the Solicitor General in the subject case. Atty. Julie was further directed to advise the OSG from
time to time of the progress of the case and furnish the said Office with all copies of orders, pleadings,
and motions.

On March 16, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision[12] in favor of the respondent and against the
petitioner.

On May 22, 2001, petitioner, through its deputized counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[15] but
it was denied on September 18, 2001.[16]

On February 19, 2002, the RTC made an Entry of Final Judgment[17] stating, among other things, that
the decision dated March 16, 2001 had, on January 31, 2002, become final and executory, there being
no appeal filed by any party before any appellate court. Respondent thus filed an urgent motion for
execution with the RTC which was granted on March 14, 2002.[18]

Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion[19] asking the RTC to set aside the March 16,
2001 Decision on the ground of lack of due process. On May 20, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[20]
denying the motion.

Undeterred, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal[21] dated July 23, 2002, before the RTC raising the
following issues: (1) whether or not plaintiff has a cause of action against defendant; and (2) whether or
not plaintiff is entitled to be paid his money claim against defendant.[22]

Petitioner appealed to ca for the annulmentbof judgment, eventually dismissed

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground
that notice to the deputized counsel was notice to the OSG. Petitioner maintains that the lawyer
deputized and designated as special attorney-OSG is a mere representative of the OSG, and the latter
retains supervision and control over the deputized counsel. The OSG continues to be the principal
counsel and, as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of the orders,
notices, and decisions. The deputized attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal
should be made. As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel,
acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received
by the latter.

Issue

Is the petition contentious

Ruling:

The petition is devoid of merit.

An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted

indiscriminately by the court. It is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional
cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing
party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory.[29]

Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment
are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment
refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
the claim.[30] It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of
the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

It should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction.[31] In the present case, the CA has put to rest the issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction
over respondents cause of action. The CA was correct when it concluded that:

In the present case, the action a quo is one for mandamus and, under Section 21 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction in the issuance of the
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their regions. The court a quo after evaluating the allegations in the initiatory
pleading concluded that the action is one for specific performance and proceeded to hear it as such. In
doing so, the said court retained jurisdiction. The same law grants the Regional Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and all cases in which the demand exceeds P100,000.00, to which the action a quo
belongs.[32]

In this recourse, petitioner is no longer questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC based on the above
arguments. Petitioner now questions the propriety of the notice sent to the deputized counsel of the
OSG, arguing that notice to its deputized counsel is not notice to the OSG. Hence, absent such notice,
the decision of the RTC did not become final and executory. Moreover, the failure of the RTC to serve
the OSG copies of legal notices, orders, and judicial processes constitutes lack of due process. This Court
disagrees.

What petitioner is seeking is for this Court to nullify the decision and orders of the RTC via the present
petition after petitioner has effectively lost its right to question the said decision and orders, the same
having become final and executory. As aptly found by the RTC in its Order[33] dated May 20, 2002:

Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code specifically enjoins the Office of the Solicitor General to
represent the Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation
proceedings investigation or matters requiring the services of a lawyer. But there is no law or rule which
imposes upon the court to furnish the said Office with judicial processes as a matter of course, except in
specific cases among others, such as land registration and naturalization cases (NPC v. NLRC, 272, SCRA
704) and petition for change of name, (Rule 103, Rules of Court).
Be that as it may, the records of the case show summons was properly served upon respondent DENR,
Region 9 Regional Executive Director through its legal officers, who entered their appearance as counsel
for respondent. Respondent assisted by counsel, participated in the proceedings in the above-entitled
case as evidenced by the fact that through counsel he filed motion/manifestation, pre-trial brief, motion
for reconsideration and other similar pleadings before this Court. He appeared, through counsel during
the pre-trial conference of the case and was subsequently served with copy of the pre-trial conference
of the case and was subsequently served with copy of the pre-trial order. Respondent interposed no
objection to petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings, nor questioned the Courts order of
December 1, 2000, granting petitioners motion. Thus, as held by the Supreme Court, it is not for a party
to participate in the proceedings, submit the case for the decision and accept the judgment if it is
favorable to him, but attack it for any reason when it is adverse. (Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 445.)

People vs. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, 26 June 2007

FACTS:

Traders Royal Bank (TRB), filed a complaint for estafa against Rafael M. Bitanga (Bitanga) before the RTC.
Bitanga pleaded not guilty. He was allowed to post bail. The defense failed to appear, present his case
and adduce evidence. Hence, a warrant of arrest was issued against Bitanga.

RTC: promulgated in absentia a Decision finding Bitanga guilty as charged.

CA: Bitanga filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground that extrinsic fraud
was allegedly perpetuated upon him by his counsel, Atty. Benjamin Razon. CA granted the Petition and
ordered that Decision of RTC be set aside.

Hence, this petition by the People.

ISSUE:

1. WON Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the correct remedy.

2. WON the existence of negligence on the part of the previous counsels does not constitute
extrinsic fraud.
HELD:

1. No. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is limited only to
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. The remedy cannot be
resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The Petition for
Annulment of Judgment of the RTC in said Criminal Case was therefore an erroneous remedy. It should
not have been entertained, much less granted, by the CA.

2. No. The existence of negligence on the part of the previous counsels does not constitute extrinsic
fraud.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy that may be availed of when said judgment was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through proceedings attended by extrinsic fraud. The
particular acts or omissions constituting extrinsic fraud must be clearly established.

In the present case, respondent Bitanga complained that his own counsel perpetrated fraud upon him
by abandoning his cause.

Extrinsic fraud is that perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party's own
counsel.As a general rule, counsels ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment, for the latter's
management of the case binds his client. However, as an exception to the rule, the gross negligence of
counsel should not be accompanied by his clients own negligence or malice. Clients have the duty to be
vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case.

In the present case, the acts and omissions attributed to counsel amounted to negligence only, which
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud. Moreover, said counsels negligence was caused by Bitanga's act of
jumping bail.

On the day of the hearing, counsel waited for the accused to pick him up at his residence in order both
counsel and accused can go to court together, counsel was not even feeling well that morning on
account of his swollen leg, but accused nver showed up. accused moved to a different house and never
contacted counsel so that counsel is left without alternative but to withdraw from the case.
The RTC accepted the foregoing explanation of Atty. Razon and allowed him to withdraw his appearance
as counsel even without the conformity of Bitanga whose whereabouts could not be traced.

It is apparent that Bitanga left Atty. Razon in the dark. While said counsel exerted effort to contact
Bitanga, the latter made himself completely scarce.

There was therefore no factual or legal basis to the conclusion of the CA that extrinsic fraud prejudiced
the right of Bitanga to present his defense. He has only himself to blame for jumping bail and leaving his
case in disarray. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO T.
DE GUIA, RTC JUDGE (Cavite City), BRANCH 16, ALEX L. DAVID, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
PROVINCE OF CAVITE AND PARAMOUNT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Facts:

On February 18, 1994, David filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a petition for
the issuance of owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 to replace the owners
duplicate copies which were allegedly lost. David alleged that he entrusted his owners duplicate copies
of the said TCTs to a friend and member of his staff for the purpose of showing them to a prospective
developer who was interested in developing the subject parcels of land for commercial and/or industrial
use; that the said owners duplicate copies of said titles were misplaced and could not be found despite
diligent efforts to locate the same; and that said owners duplicate copies have not been delivered to any
person or entity to secure payment or performance of any obligation

The RTC granted the said petition in a decision.

Petitioner Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the said Decision of
the trial court on the ground that respondent David allegedly employed fraud and deception in securing
the replacement owners duplicate copies of the subject TCTs; that there was absence of due process;
and, that the decision of the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition of petitioner the appellate court held as
insignificant the contention of petitioner Rexlon that David had misled the trial court in alleging that his
owners duplicate copies of the said TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 were lost. Petitioner claims that it
had acquired the titles of ownership over the said properties from respondent David pursuant to a
perfected contract of sale between them. Refuting this allegation, the appellate court held that:

Said contention is not impressed with merit. It must be remembered that the decision sought to be
annulled concerns the issuance of owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-75237 and T-75238 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. It did not in any manner dwell on the issue of whether or
not the alleged deed of sale in favor of petitioner executed by private respondent has any force and
effect. Hence, this Court may not determine the rights of any of the parties in this case to the said
properties. Any adjudication of rights over the properties in question may only be done by the proper
court where the appropriate action may be filed but definitely, not in the present case.

Issue:

Whether or not the misrepresentation constitute extrinsic fraud

Held:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner.

Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, the
effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. [11] The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1) is
deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of
a co-owner of land which he knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally
conceals facts and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan
the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims;
(5) induces another not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to
notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his
opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision
rendered on the basis of such fraud becomes subject to annulment. In this case at bar, we simply
annulled the decision of the RTC, acting as a land registration court in L.R.C. Record No. 8843, to issue
new owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for lack of jurisdiction. The dispute
between petitioner Rexlon and respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of land will have
to be threshed out or determined in a more appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a
land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land
covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owners
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by
it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a
particular property

Garchitorena v. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-47867, November 13, 1942

Facts:

This action was commenced on June 3, 1932, by Vicente Sotelo, as judicial guardian of the eight minor
children of Asuncion Jarata, against Perfecto Gabriel and Carmen Garchitorena to annul the judgment
obtained by Gabriel in the foreclosure of his mortgage and the subsequent transfers of the mortgaged
property on the ground that said judgment had been obtained through fraud. The property involved in
this litigation is the house and lot situate at 97 Sta. Potenciana Street, corner of Cabildo Street, Manila.
Originally it belonged to Asuncion Jarata, who mortgaged it to Perfecto Gabriel. The latter foreclosed the
mortgage and after buying the property at public auction transferred it to Carmen Garchitorena, who in
turn transferred it to Jesus Pellon in whose name the Torrens certificate of title now stands.

Issue: Whether or not extrinsic fraud exist, as to warrant the annulment of judgment in the foreclosure
proceedings

Held: Yes. The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure suit constituted an extrinsic or
collateral fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in this separate
action. Petitioners vehemently invoke reasons of public policy which favor the stability of judicial
decisions. Suffice it for us to say that such reasons are mute in the presence of fraud, which the law
abhors. The annulment of the judgment entered in the foreclosure suit necessarily carries with it the
annulment of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to said judgment as well as the annulment of the
order of the court approving that sale. The limbs cannot survive after the trunk has perished.
ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005

Facts:

Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the
birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, “ to wit:

1. the surname “Herrera” as appended to the name of the said child;

2. the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr.; and

3. the alleged marriage of private respondent to all child’s mother, Armi A. Alba He averred that
such challenged entries are false.

Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from NSO and
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong. The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the
hearing was set. On the scheduled hearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition,
Armi was not present.

The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification of Live
Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending
that she came to know of the decision of the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was
furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner’s
surname from Herrera to Alba. Armi contended that she and private respondent cohabited and after
their separation, he continued to give support to their son.

CA- dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent
employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate
child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother

ISSUE:

WON the judgment rendered by the trial court may be annulled? NO.

HELD:

Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may be annulled on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.

In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter
jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records
affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in rem,
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is
enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Extrinsic fraud, which was private respondents alleged concealment of Armis present address, was not
proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.

Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial courts decision. In an
action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed
be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled.