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Monthly Review
The Convex Asia Fund PF Ltd, Class ‘A’ was down -1.69% net (based on Trading Level) and down -3.38% net
(based on NAV) for the month of February 2017.*
Performance attribution
CAF Net Outright Net RV Net
Outright -1.66% REHEDGE 0.00% Carry -0.01%
Relative Value 0.02% VAR -0.44% Skew 0.00%
Other -0.04% Vol 0.00% Delta 0.00%
-1.69% Tail -1.21% Curve 0.00%
CVX 0.00% Spread 0.00%
Tact -0.02% VARSPREAD 0.00%
-1.66% Term 0.00%
Corr 0.00%
Tact 0.02%
Vol 0.00%
0.02%
*Reflects Convex Asia Fund PF Ltd – Class ‘A’ net investor returns.
Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns, and an investment in the Fund could lose value. Performance attribution is based
on the Trading Level of the Fund. Trading Level is defined as the product of the fund’s NAV multiplied by the Funding Factor. The
Funding Factor is 1x for Convex Asia Fund Ltd, while the Funding Factor is 2x for Convex Asia Fund PF Ltd. Fees and expenses are
allocated pro rata with the absolute gross return of each strategy in order to arrive at the net performance figures.
Source: City Financial, internal data
Market Review
Interest Rates
Two words that our readers will be accustomed to hearing from us are “Imbalance” and “Asymmetry”. When
we look at fixed income markets worldwide, despite the obvious notable imbalances within most regions,
only Japan and South Korea truly stand out as a really interesting mix of imbalance versus asymmetry, and
this is particularly true of Japan. The combination of extended experimentation with monetary policy easing,
blended with the huge supply of structured products, makes it a very interesting market to us. The addition
of Yield Curve Control (YCC) at the 10-year point complicates the market yet further. Negative Interest Rate
Policy (NIRP) prompted some volatility in the market, but YCC has anchored the curve, causing volatility to
collapse. The net result is that we expect much higher volatility levels as and when there is a sharp
normalisation of the skew, should interest rates increase, with Japanese lifers inherently short high strike
vega from their selling of single premium policies. Speaking to structured trading desks in Tokyo, their
estimate is total exposure would double if rates rise 1% across the curve.
Despite Japanese lifers buying foreign assets aggressively for high yields (for example, French Government
Bonds), Japanese Governments Bonds (JGBs) cannot be so easily disposed of as Lifers are tied to Japanese
yen (JPY) denominated liabilities. Pension funds (mainly GPIF) have rebalanced significantly away from
bonds and asset allocations are now aligned with global peers. Going forward, the only likely seller of JGBs
are city banks, who have around 11% of total assets in JGBs. Theoretically, they could look to sell down a
further ¥ 100trillion worth of JGBs to reduce their holding ratio to ~5%, as Japanese banks have increased
loans and foreign assets to compensate for loss of carry on JGBs.
Diving into market structuring, historically, tails on 20-year tenors at-the-money (ATM) implied volatility are
lower than tails on 10-year tenors on a volatility ratio of 1-year expiry on 10-year or 20-year ATM implied
volatility/3-month expiry on 10-year or 20-year ATM implied volatility. The chart below is interesting in the
fact that during periods of stress 2008/9, 2011, 2013, NIRP, YCC, the ratio expands beyond 1.0.
1.40
1.30
1.20
1.10
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
Aug-07 Aug-08 Aug-09 Aug-10 Aug-11 Aug-12 Aug-13 Aug-14 Aug-15 Aug-16
ATM Vol Ratio (JPY JPY 1y10y bpv/3m10y bpv) ATM Vol Ratio (JPY JPY 1y20y bpv/3m20y bpv)
ATM 1y expiry / 3m expiry = 1.0
Source: Bloomberg
However, what is really interesting is the current underperformance of the ratio on 20-year tenors. This is
likely due to issuance of callable notes for yield enhancement. If we look at individual ATM implied volatility
in the next chart we can see that issuance has compressed 3y20y ATM volatility to post crisis lows.
70
60
50
40
30
20
Aug-09 Aug-10 Aug-11 Aug-12 Aug-13 Aug-14 Aug-15 Aug-16
3y20y for example comprises low outright level of volatility, flat skew, small roll costs and high asymmetry
due to the vega selling from dealers which has compressed convexity in skewness and ATM volatility.
The below chart shows the changes of JPY 10-year Swap Term Structure for the Period of 1 July 2016 – 28
February 2017 and the change through the same time period on the underlying JPY 5y10y swap.
Source: Bloomberg
For now, it appears that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is committed to YCC, but that does not prevent some
opaque comments along the way. Should the BoJ reduce purchases of bonds dated longer than 25 years, as
has been rumoured, it would be similar to the move in December last year when it increased the absorption
of super-long bonds only to be followed by a reversal just ten trading days after. We believe this reflects
policymakers’ intent not to peg super-long yields at levels, and to remain committed to normalising the yield
curve (steepening). We believe that the obvious risk lies in changes to the YCC target at 10 years, which is
the explicit fixed point on the yield curve. Volatility pricing today does not reflect any potential change soon.
The below chart shows the reshaping of the yield curve post YCC and the expansion of swap rates at the
long end of the term structure versus the front end of the term structure. Current correlation between bond
and swap rates suggests that only a 10bp move in the 10-year target from the BoJ within the next year would
be enough for ATM payer swaptions to break even.
JPY Interest Rate Swaps from the lows of July 2016 to February 2017
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Nov-16 Dec-16 Jan-17 Feb-17
Source: Bloomberg
Going forwards, the markets will continue to look to the BoJ as to the way they adjust their JGB purchasing
operations for guidance and direction around its interest rate policy. If the BoJ announces a plan to reduce
the absorption of intermediate bonds in March, the market would likely consider this as evidence that
policymakers are looking to prevent yields from falling further, not just in intermediate tenors, but along the
curve in general.
FX
The compression of volatility across FX markets has been little short of astonishing, particularly in the Asian
emerging market space where the volatility of some of the most illiquid and volatile currencies has
compressed the most. Looking at the chart below, we can see that on an indexed basis over the last year US
dollar vs Indonesian rupiah implied volatility has compressed the most, followed by US dollar/Indian rupee,
followed by Taiwan, Singapore and Korean currencies.
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17
USDJPYV6M BGN Curncy USDPHPV6M Curncy USDTWDV6M Curncy
USDINRV6M Curncy USDIDRV6M Curncy USDKRWV6M Curncy
USDSGDV6M Curncy
Source: Bloomberg
Consensus appears to accept that the Fed rate rises will be controlled and gradual, and central banks will
skilfully engineer an uptick in inflation to their desired levels whilst controlling interest rates. This appears to
have sparked renewed interest to sell FX volatility across the banking community, and we have seen interest
from dealers to sell almost any type of FX volatility to us lately, in markets and structures that we find very
interesting.
The following chart is of the JP Morgan Emerging Markets FX volatility Index. This index is calculated based
on a 3-month expiry ATMF implied FX volatility in a set fixed weight basket. This underscores the current
complacency, especially given the strong upticks in inflation data, and an almost entirely overlooked debt
ceiling debate in mid-March. It could be argued that, given US debt is at historical highs, renegotiating the
overall ceiling is becoming more complex and so we could expect risks of volatility increasing as deadlines
draw near.
30
25
20
15
10
Source: Bloomberg
FX spot/volatility correlations throw up some interesting results currently and we highlight the Philippines
below. The currency has been weakening for some time. In fact, the Peso is at a decade low as the rate to US
dollar broke 50.0 in February. However, 6-month implied PHP volatility has fallen from 8% to 5.5% in recent
months. The below regression study over a 2-year and 3-year data series show how the spot/volatility
relationship has broken to the point that ATM implied volatility is cheap across the whole volatility term
structure. In the “risk-on” environment, we have seen large rallies versus the dollar in Asia, particularly South
Korean Won (given substantial inflows from foreign institutional investors YTD approaching ~US$8 billion)
and Taiwan dollar, where volatility has naturally eased.
Source: Bloomberg
Equities
World stock markets continued their march up in a non-volatile fashion. US and Singapore stock markets
have led gains since the US election in November, in both local currency and US dollar terms. India,
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and China markets have all seen big gains, at an average of 8.5% in dollar terms.
Source: Bloomberg
As we see moves higher in market interest rates, it is possible to think that we may have seen the lows in
rates this cycle, which would have implications for asset markets in general. Looking back to the previous
cycle and comparing 3-month realised volatility (RV) in the SPX and HSI between 2007-2017 and 1997-
2007, you can see that SPX realised volatility is currently hitting new 20-year lows, perhaps confirming over-
positioning and maximum bullishness that could be associated with late cycle attitudes. The RV in SPX and
HSI had ‘coincidentally’ hit decade lows back in 2007 at the peak in the previous credit cycle.
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
Long term investors in long VIX products, like VXX, are familiar with the difficulty that such long periods of
low volatility cause. But, as if to emphasise the point about the cycle, short VIX strategies, using XIV and
SVXY ETF etc., have outperformed the underlying long index around three times over, and the most popular
short-VIX ETF, XIV, has quadrupled (from $16 to $63) in the past year. Perhaps ‘irrational exuberance’ is
alive and well in the short volatility market right now.
Normalised Returns of XIV ETF (Short VIX) versus SPX since 2011
Source: Bloomberg
The short volatility trade does not end at shorting VIX, which is ultimately only playing at the short-end of
the volatility term structure. Selling the longer end of the SPX volatility term structure has also proven to be
very popular in recent years, usually through selling puts, variance swaps and even corridor variance swaps.
In spite of it being the deepest equity volatility market in the world with a natural demand for insurance-led
put buying, we see increasing suppression of volatility in SPX.
Most readers understand why we have the keenest interest in the structured product markets in Asia. The
desire for yield in a region with consistently negative real interest rates has created a dynamic that
encourages investors to sell volatility for income. The same appetite for yield-chasing has now taken hold in
the US. One of the most popular trades since the Bernanke/Yellen put has been in place has been to sell
S&P500 puts against any Asia long put position, either as a ‘hedge’ or in a ratio to ensure a positive carry
while having a presupposition of a hedge (since Emerging Market Asia tends to get sold off first with a
greater impact in a correlated shock). With SPX outperforming all other markets in each subsequent
correction since 2008, this resilience in the US markets reflexively translated to more selling of US put
options. It also dawned on sell-side trading desks that marketing “Long SPX vs Asia” variance swaps would
be a good way to get their long skew positions that they bought from the Korea and Japan auto-callable
structured product flow (a specific type of reverse convertibles) off their books. The demand for these
variance swap spread trades has since overtaken the supply. Clients, including pension funds, insurance
companies, relative value volatility funds, macro funds and some tail risk funds, all got on board this SPX
versus Asia variance spread ‘gravy train’. Anecdotally, there is around $100-$150 million vega of these
spreads outstanding in the market. Herein lies the risk of short convexity and different forms of basis risk.
However, this is not the end to “The Big SPX Vol Short” narrative. Further leverage is being hidden in the
widespread use of:
These estimates sum up to a total of around US$1.2 trillion (unlevered). These popular strategies converge to
a primary reaction function, to sell or de-lever in the face of an increase in realised volatility (either implicitly
or explicitly). Looking at these strategies a little more closely, risk parity essentially translates into a short
volatility and short correlation portfolio. Similarly, trend following strategies have benefitted from the
declines to historical lows in realised volatility, stock, sector and regional market correlations.
Credit
It seems like we are nearing a point of maximum market bullishness, with volatility, convexity and correlation
all hitting lows of the past ten years. Little by little, bears have been taken out to the wood shed, and a glance
across global CDS indices in the US, Japan and Asia show that they are all trading at or close to the lows of
the past decade.
The moves in credit are not surprising, with hindsight. The global economy has enjoyed maximum monetary
easing and historical low cost of borrowing over the past eight years. Much of the liquidity created over that
time has ended up in financial assets and property markets, and emerging markets seemingly attracting
more than their fair share of the monetary largesse. Total credit relative to non-financial sector has increased
massively around the world and the growth rate in financial assets has greatly diverged from GDP growth
rates, presumably a result of money printing on an epic scale.
However, the GFC in 2008 showed that leverage is a knife that cuts both ways. The US property index
doubled from 2000-2008 before suffering a 35% correction. The property boom across the globe in the last
eight years has been on an unprecedented scale, presumably fuelled by record low levels of interest rates.
This is not to say that the sky must be falling very soon. However, once borrow cost starts to rise and money
printing starts to slow, the ‘tide’ will recede. And as Warren Buffett once said ‘only when the tide goes out do
you discover who’s been swimming naked.’
Normalised returns (2010) of the US Corporate HY, EM Corporate HY, Global IG and Sovereign Bond Index,
MSCI World and S&P 500
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
US, HK, Australia, Singapore, London Property Index (in local currency) normalised to year 2000
Source: Bloomberg
US, HK, Australia, Singapore, London Property Index (in USD) normalised to year 2000
Source: Bloomberg
US, HK, Australia, Singapore, Britain Property Price Index from The Economist
Source: Bloomberg
Total Credit to Non-Financial Sector sorted by percentage increase from BIS data
Source: Bloomberg
Total Credit to Non-Financial Sector sorted by the increase in the Debt to GDP Ratio from BIS data
Source: Bloomberg
Total Credit to Non-Financial Sector sorted by USD amounts from BIS data
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
Credit Benchmarks
Source: Bloomberg
Risk Update
February was another month of fairly significant “risk on” behaviour. Across the spectrum, risk assets
continued to rally hard, and volatility supply through structured product issuance continued at or near record
pace. The investment world seems very much onboard with the “reflation” trade. A common theme we hear
goes something along the lines of “reflation is the theme - just be long equities and hope that interest rates
don’t go up too fast and destabilise things”. We have been saying for some time that, based on the
asymmetry we see in our book, the risk in the system seems to be rising interest rates, and the potential
breakdown of the correlation between rates and equities. Oddly, for us, this is far from an uncommon view
nowadays.
Our long held premise that rates would likely go up once they stopped going down, has turned out to be fairly
accurate. Even without policy rate hikes (ex the Fed) we have seen market after market where yields have
started to rise once central banks stopped pushing them lower. Someday we may be able to look back at July
2016 as the cyclical (if not all time?) lows for many a yield curve.
Source: Bloomberg
Also, as we have long suspected would be the case, inflation has turned around almost simultaneously with
interest rates, much like it continued down in parallel with the policy rate measures. We remain unconvinced
whether policy makers actually are clear on the correlation/causation relationship between the two.
Source: Bloomberg
All of this leads us to the inevitable question around the confidence that markets hold for policy makers’
abilities calmly and smoothly to manage the normalisation of their unprecedented extreme monetary
accommodation. Will they, as broadly expected, manage to raise rates in a gradual manner, avoiding any
pricking of unsuspected asset bubbles? History tells us no. Will they be able to provide the traditional
backstop to any unexpected equity market instability? They may have proven that there is no such thing as a
zero bound, but they likely learned that there is a bound not too very far away from zero. Will they ever be
able to wind down their massively expanded balance sheets? It is hard to see how.
A nice way to see the challenge, and where various central banks are in the process, is to take a look at how
they all compare to simple Baseline Taylor Rule Estimates.
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
And just because they are our favourites for their unprecedented history of currency debasement, we throw
in the Bank of England’s picture. What was Carney thinking?
Source: Bloomberg
A simple reading of those charts could be summed up as the central banks are potentially “behind the curve”,
or in the case of the last one, completely lost sight of the curve. It may not be much of an over simplification
to say this is the story for 2017. Call it the year of normalisation. At what pace will the Fed hike? To what
extent will other central banks, just as they did on the way down in rates, be forced to follow US rates back
the other way? To what extent can a given central bank, e.g. the Bank of Japan, ignore the actions of other
markets and stick to their own independent policy settings, e.g. 10-year bond yields pegged at around
0.00%? And how do potentially significant relative changes in discount rates impact other asset markets?
For something that seems to be at the core of market uncertainty, some might be it surprised to learn that we
continue to find some of the most attractive asymmetry in protection against just these sorts of concerns. Of
course, given the massive levels of volatility supply, there is an attractive asymmetry across a wide range of
opportunities, and getting better day after day.
CONVEX ASIA FUND PF LTD - CLASS B (TRADING LEVEL) NET INVESTOR RETURNS
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec YTD
2017 -2.67% -1.67% -4.30%
2016 2.90% 1.77% -3.12% -0.12% -1.27% 0.32% -1.76% -1.66% -1.46% -0.84% 3.68% -0.63% -2.39%
2015 0.79% -0.91% -0.49% -0.43% -0.39% 0.06% -0.23% 3.16% 0.29% -3.19% -0.71% -0.71% -2.85%
2014 -0.14% -0.76% 0.27% -0.53% 0.03% -0.13% -1.26%
DISCLOSURE
This document is intended for professional use only; it should not be relied upon by private clients. It is provided for information purposes only and should not be
interpreted as investment advice. It does not purport to be an inducement, recommendation or offer to invest in any fund. Any offering is made only pursuant to the
relevant offering document, together with the current audited financial statements of the relevant fund, if available, and the relevant subscription/application, all of which
must be read in their entirety. No offer to purchase securities will be made or accepted prior to receipt by the offeree of these documents and the completion of all
appropriate documentation. Whilst the information contained in this document has been prepared in good faith, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is
given by City Financial Investment Company Limited or any of its Directors, partners, officers, affiliates or employees. Past performance is not a guide to future
performance. City Financial Investment Company Limited (Registration No. 020473901) is incorporated in England and Wales and the registered office is at 62 Queen
Street, London EC4R 1EB. The company is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The representative of the Fund in Switzerland is Hugo Fund
Services SA, 6 Cours de Rive, 1204 Geneva. The distribution of Shares in Switzerland must exclusively be made to qualified investors. The place of performance for
Shares in the Fund distributed in Switzerland is at the registered office of the Representative.