Target.: Nagoya.. Fram. landfall to IP, AA was light) meager, and inaCCtU'8}e On the bomb run, altitudes of A/c ranged from 5000 to 8000 feet. There were some heavy J inaccurate, barr?g'A'J and ships in the harbor fired heavy, mOderate,' accurate continuo~sly po::':'l::'ecl M.. Medium AA was predominant although it was ·s::a.t terc,d, meager J and ~_nacc urat e. Two Ajc were damaged by IJ..
in this area at altitudes of 5,200 and 5,600 feet.
Over the target altitudes were the sarne as above. Heavy AJ~ was mostly continuously pointed, moderate and inaccurate. One heavy, intense, ina.ccurate barrage was reported over northwest Nagoya. The medium M Was moderate and inaccurate.. Phosphorns AA was seen by several crews. It was- (;\. pinkish purple color, came down in streamers, and. seemed to stick together. One possi:ble ground to air rocket was observed • Nine Ale were damaged by AA in the targe.t area at an average altitude of 5500 fe0t. This makes a total of 11 Ale damaged out of 128' which flew over the target.
Searchlights were effective on this mission. Several Ale were picked up immediately J indiceting radar. One Groupe reported that out of 313 A/c over the target, IB were carried by S/L for a minimum of five minutes each, S/L went out of action when fired at by lower turrets.
All crews agreed the.t new see.rchlights had been added to the Nagoya.. defenses. Foll.owing is a list of approximate numbers and locations of searchlights!
It will be noted that the Japanese have increased the numb€lr of lights on both sides of Lse Bq.y. This is the most effective disposition for defense against the axis ofatteck which we have been using against Nagoya.
Twobarras€ balloons were definitely identified at approximately 4000 feet altitude. One was over Nagoya. Castle, the other in central Nagoya. In both cases the cable was seen. Ot.her barrage balloons were reported at lower altitudes over N:...._,0J8. Castle •. Two crews saw what they believed to be a barrage balloon at 34045 I N - 136°50 lE, at 6000 feet. Another crew reported a barrage balloon at 6000 feet over Na.::,oya Castle. In the latter two cases, definite identification was not possible because a £1ecting glance was all
either crew had. .
is. OUR :EACTI.GS VERSUS M:
ChallBes of aJ.titudQ and turns a£tal' bombs o.w~.
SECRET
----,--
BECRET
_'-""""'!-,._-
AA & Air to {Ur Bomb I ". cont ' d
\, ""'
19. AIR TO lIIR BOMBlNG lIND ROCKETS:
One doubtful instance of rockets fired by an mVING was reported lJy ene crew. The IRVING made a lead approa.chat eleven o ' clock, fh'Qd unidentifi·e1 projectiles from below both wings and broke away below. The observer believed these were rockets but neit.her tr.ail nor explosions were seen.
A yellowish color from an explOSion 500 feet above and a good distance ahead and to the left of their AIC was reported by one crew. This was believed to be an air-to-air bomP but poor visibility, due to s!!lokein the ares. prevented further observation, No Elf was observed at the time.
SECRET
----.,...-
,e :7J.-~ /- h )-f: /-<'161 /-rJO ) -t::t 71
Headqu&.ir'ters
73rd Bombal'dment ~ang
Mission No. 33 Field Order No. 66 19 March 1945
CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT
COMBAT DATA
20. ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS BY ENEMY Alc TOTAL ATTACKS
CLOCK POSITION "--""A:EoVE'""---- L3vEt- --- ---- -
--BELO~-{ --- _-+-<:_+--+..z_.
TOTALS 5 1 i 4
CLAIM> - none
21.. YARDS AT HHICH ENEMY AIRCRAF.'" OPENED FIRE:
EIA Opened Fire 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 unknown Total
No. of Attacks
2
10 13
2
1
5
Comments
The average distances at which enemy aircraft are estimated to have opened fire, correlated with directions and angles of approach are shown below. (Allowance must be made in view of the fact that this was a night mission and that information was not obtained on five attacks.)
Directions Above Level Below (in yards
10:30 to 1:30 300 J90 none
1:30 to 4:30 none 490 none
4:;30 to '7:30 none 500 none
7 :30 to 10 :30 1000 470 none 22. TYPES OF ENEMY .'..IRCR.t,.FT ATTACKING:
Approximately 30 enemy aircraft were encountered during this mission. The 33 separate attElcks are shewn below according to location, altitude, number, and type of enemy aircraft attacking:
33
Combat.Data, Page 2 Par 22, cont'd
Locltions
IF to Bomb release
Target area to after bombs away
No. & Type E/A 1 Unidentified
8 TIE Unident, 9 Unident 1 IRVING
2 unlidentified 12 T/E Unident
,iii •.
Altitude 60001. 5,500-60001
At landis end 18,0001
il.fter lanai send (30 mi W of Tori Shima) 80001
23. TYPE AND ACCURACY OF ENEMY FIRE AND TYPE OF PROJECTILE:
Reports indicate that the type of fire was machine gun as indiceted by tracers observed. One group which received four attacks reported no tracers used but one fighter, believed to have been an IRVING, fired rockets. The position of release of the projectile from under the wings of the IRVING led to the belief that it waB rocket fire.
None of our aircraft sustained battle damage from enemy fighter opposition,
The average number of yards to which enemy aircraft are estimated to have pressed their attacks, correlated with direction and angle of approach, are shown below:
Direction
10 :30 to 1 :30 1:30 to 4:30 4:30 to 7:30 7:30 to 10:30
Level
)OQ"
275 300 270
~
none
none none none
Above 100 none none 500
24. ENEMY AIRCRAF'I' MARKINGS:
Markin!s on E/A were not discernable, however, 15 were observed to have wing and landing lights on, 4 with wing lights only. One A/C had wing lights. plus a white light on top of the fuselage and one observed with wing and landing lights burning plus a blinking wh:\.te light on the top of the fuselage.
25. ENEMY TACTICS:
Four unidentified Ale were picked up by radar and later observed visually b,y one B-29, 75 miles before landfall. These E/A did not attack, but made several sweeps around the B-29 following it almost to the coast.
'lirpe of Attacks
Most of the attacks on the B-29's were made over the target are?. Searchlights were employed more effectively on this mission than on the previ.ous Nagoya mission. E/A generally attacked when our Ale were in the searchlights.
One possible attempt at ramming was reported. 1'.n E/A with landing lights and wing lights passed within 25 feet of the top of B-29 without firing. The B-29 was illuminated at the time by 8/L and E/A landing lights. Another Elf.. attacked a B-29 which was ~Al1qr.t, ~., its landing lignts and in the searchlights
but a short burst of fire from the B-29 caused it to turn off its lights and discontinue the attacks.
££ordinated Attacks
Twelve of the attacks were coordinated, six over'the target and six 30 miles west of Tori Shima. One crew reported that over the target three simultaneous attacks were made by two aircr~ft at 6 and 9 a I clock. Breakaways consisted of sliding back past the tail.
Combat Data, Page 3 Par 25, cont t d
Thirty miles west of Tori Shima, four E/A made twelve coordinated attacks on a B-29 'which was partially illuminated by the fighters' landing lights. E/A attacked in pairs at II and 1 0' clock and at 3 and 9 0' clock.
26. ENEMY FORMATIONS:,
Other than those mentioned under coordinated attacks, paragraph 25, no enemy formations were observed.
27. OUR TACTICS AND FlREPOHER VERSUS ENEMY AmCRAFT:
In only six instances was fire returned by our a/c. In one of these, as mentioned in paragraph 25, the s/a turned off its lights and broke off the attack.
Changing course and flying at high speeds enabled the B-29's to loss attacking e/a. Gaining altitude, after bombs away, was also felt to be helpful in avoiding e/a.
28. RESULTS OF HITS ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT:
None.
28A. CLAIMS BY GUN POSITION AND TYPE E/A:
None.
Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing
APO #237, % Postmaster San Francisco, California
Mission No. 33 Field Order 66 Date of Mission 19 March 1945
OONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT BOMB INIPACT DATA
Paragraphs 48 through Sl
No. of A/e Attacking Target:
128 A/e bombed the primary target (urban area Nagoya).
Bomb Load
9015 x M47-A2 IBs 2147 x M76 IBs
82 x M64 GPs 403 x Ml7-Al lEs )10 x E46 lBs
2 x T4E4 Frag 115 x E36 IBs 281 x E28 IBs
Varied from 50T to 430T 35010'10"N,1)6°S4'20"E for 497th, 499th and SOOth Groups 35010'OO"N,l)60S5'50"E for 498th Gp
Direction of Attack
Aiming Point
Photographic Q,uality and Coverage
As this was a night mission, ano. no photo flash bombs were carried, only fires were visible on strike Vhotos.
Strike photographs showed several large and numerous smaller fires. As no ground detail was visible, the exact location and
size of these fires could not be determined. Reconnaissance photographs taken the day after the mission showed 19,9'0,000 square feet, or .65 square miles of Nagoya destroyed. At the time of photography, several fires were still burning, and smoke obscured a large portion of the city. .The visi ble damage was located south of the castle and to the southeast and southwest of the castle. A residential area covering some 4,730,000 square feet wns destroyed immediately west of the railroad station. Approximately 2,700 feet wes~ of this area, about 820.000 square feet of a residential section were gutted. Southeast of the railroad station, 1,850,000 square feet of small shops and residences were destroyed. An area covering 3,0$0,000 square feet was destroyed south of Nagoya castle.
About 1,300 feet southeast of the castle, ~n area of 2,960,000
square feet was destroyed. East of this area, two areas covering
l, 470 J 000 and 1,230, 000 square feet were completely' destroyed. Six other destroyed areas totaling some 1,760,000 square feet were visible in this same general area. The Toyo Cotton Mill, whioh is reported as the Sumitomo Eleotric Manufacturing Company, was the only industry which showed any damage. The plant sustained major
damage. .
(NOTE: All estimates of damage both of area and individual industries were taken from XXI Bomber Command's Flash Photo Interpre~a~ion Heport )PRM 89, aa~ea 191800Z.)
Bomb Impaot Data. Mis at on 33, pa ge2
CONCLUSION
Since the total damage to the 01 ty by all Viings was approxi.mat ely .65 square miles, bombing results were oonsidered poor.
S E 0 R E 'l'
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Consolidated statistical Summary
Table
FlJEL CON"stCJ?nOH :; FUc.r-ff DA'i'A
--~--
G R 0 U n S
TOT.I\L ~
WING 497 490 1199 500
A/c ComDleting .!ission
....
Weight Data: (Averar;:-ln) .iI
Basic r;eight of !\.irr.raft 7LKYJ
:ruel loaded (Gals.) -'1 ~ • sr».
Gross \"ieight at Take-Off l,\"'\~
'Flight nata: (Averages)
Time at Lo.r 1'1.1 ti tude
Time of Climb to Sombing Alt ~
Time at Bombing Altitude 7.1~~
Flyinf, Time 1't.':tf'l
Distance- Nautical Air ?;iles ~N\,
FUel Consumption:
To Target - Average '2~~
~"..,
?'aximum '2~L
.-
- - ''inimum
.,~
FrOP.l Target j Average ." ..
to l3ase
(Ale ITj,thout ~'aximwn ,,£,,10
!:alfunc~on ) Einil!TllJ!! l~O
-
From Target Average
to Base Ma:x:ir:rur.,
(Ale With
?"alfunction) _tinimur.l
-
Total Used - Average
. '>'An
.:'laxilnUill -
_._-- 6l.2.l
?;inimum
AU..'ln
Total Remainine - Avera~e
~
!}aximum
.l2Q1.. .
~'inimum tal
Total Ga~oline Consurrled r~ Lostl ! iill.210 _..1 I
I • • •
/V//jS/ON .No. "
F. o. IY,c. DATE
.'
e~'NSOLII~ATF) f'vIBsION, ~~./.._O._N_O.~---"!
[- .. '.,'.,' r=0. .. rr.'_"'I~ ,- 66
j .. ; ""', ,- ~f ~,,) ~
._ .. _ I .... ' .L'II j
r
§:~QB.!~::t
, GROUP OR wnm
1+'97th- •
-lli-ii:-QF 'i~~ION j ·18 19 Mer 45
Captain, A.C.
------~
1. The Target
Field Order No. 66 of the 731'd Bcmbardment Wing directed that this group particip~\te with maximum effor;t in an incendiary attack on the CHy, of NAGOYA, JAPAN. The ur1.:an area o~ N.AGOY1L was designated primary taJ:"get.
No othsr targets were assigned. '
2. Take Off
Thirty-nine C.3 9) eirora,if't wer~ scheduled fer th l.e m.:.ssion all ofwb.ich :?'Ook off. The first aircraft took; off at 181101Z and the last at 181140Z.
~lIcmb Load.ing
Six (6) different bomb load.s were c,arried on this mission as follows:
Six (6) aircraft carried 37 M~17Al· incendiary olusters. Two (2) aircraft oarried 36 M-17~\1 I.C. and 0['1.$ (1)' T4E4 fragmentation clUster., Twelve (12) aircraft Cl;!l'ried 184 M-47A2 incendiary bemea. T;'1o (2) car-r aed 40 'E~46 incendiary clusters. Thirteen (1,3) aixcraft carried 34 M-76 incendiary bo;n'Qs. and two (2) M~64 general purpose 'bombs. Four (lj.) aircraft carried 36 M-76 I.B.
A total of 294 (73.5 tons) M.17Al I.C.! 80 (13~33 tons) E-4' I.C.; 2208 (76.)-3 tons) M··47A2 I.E.; ,586 (146.5 tons) M-76 I.Bo; 2 (.4 ton) T4E4 F.G. and 26 (6.5 tons) M-64 G.P. was carried.
4. Floute Out
As directed, aircraft proceede9 individually to tile target iJithout special incident. One (1) aircraft returned early due to machanical difficulty"
-r--, 5. Bcmbing Data
Thirty-eight (38) aircraft bombed the primary target droPpi.ng 294 (73.5' tons) M-I7 Ai I.0",j 80 (13.33 tons) E-46 LC. j 2208 (76. 13 tons; M-47 A2 I. B. ; 552 (138 tons) M-75 I.B.; '2 (.4 ton) T4E4 F.C. and 24 (6 tons) M-64 G.P, Aircraft bombed bet':veen 181825Z and lS1920Z at III ti tude s from 5,000 to 7.300
feet. .
''Ihe aircran returning early jettisoned its bombs.
6. EnemY Air Opposi t Lon
With the exception of one (1) B-29 which sustained nineteen (19) at~6cl£s; enemy air oppos'~ion was very sl~ht, only five (5) other attacks having been reported. The one B-29 received seven (7) attacks over the terget and twelve (12) coordinated attacks about thirty (30) miles due west of TORI SHIMk..
7 ~ Enemy Attack Data
The majority of the attacks were well coordinated and well executed.
Accuracy of fire Was poor. Enemy aircraft took advantage of 6earchl1gh~s, '.llumination !tan fires in the City and theiJ;' own landing lights.
Anti-aircraft Fire
tight to medium, !lI3ager and generally inaccurate flak was encountered fran landfall to target. Four (4) phosphorus bursts .wsre noted and a small number of br:r!'8['\ balloons at 2,000 feet over ~.GOY.ol. Castle were reported. <U'cb.l18btl:l were employea eI!ec1;1vely by tile enemy on this mission.
\ ltlf{t§~ttdiii"
20 Mat
,
(.CNSOLI [,AT~J. IVIISSION I_F._O_" _NO_, _66----1 r ~ P0. P T a,.Ir.: ~R i1'. it.ISSJON N°"33
1--------:-::
~OJt1~QN
(cont'd.)
~ ,-- -- -~--
'9; Route Beck and Land.ing Date
After bomhing, aire·raft proceeded homeward individually. One (l)aircraft landed at 1.,0 JIM! , having lost two (2) sogines. Another landed at TINL.N. Tbe remainder landed at lSELY FIELD. The first aircraft landed ,at 182355Z and the last at 190151Z.
10. Bamb Damage i.sse SSIllBnt
I
Vlhile strike photographB indicate many large and SJJ'u11 fires', damage
assesSment is 1lqpossible due to lack of ground detail.
11. Own Lessee an~ ."-ircraft Damage '
No aircraft ,,'ere lost. TIlere were no peraonnel casua1t:i,es. Two '(2) aircraft were damaged I one by flak and one unknown.,
12. Claims
None
13_ Weather
Enroute to Terge tand Return I Base conditions to 16°N. Ct.uilulus in ..
creased to ten tenths 1500 ~ 8000 'feet; three tenths -altostratul3 8000 - 10000feet~ and eight tenths cirrostratus 25000- 27000 feet in Frontal ,Zone IB'N to 23°N~ Light to moderate sb.o'i'l9rs •. moderate turbulerlCe thru Front. Visibility- was one to five miles thru c!ou(is and rain. North of Front. con .. tinuOllsbroken and bVercaststratocumuluB to 330N. gradually dec,reased to one tenth cumu.Iue 2000 .. 6QOO feet at Coast of J~"p.JiI and cleared over land. Visibili ty averaged ten to fifteen mile.so, Light to m.oderate turbulen.ce in clouds. Light to moderate icing '!'IllS encountered above 600Q feet in tops of clouds north 0,£ 27~.
Terget I C.lear t Visibility twenty maes. Heavy smoke i'ii til smoke ,
colUlIlllS to 8000 feet. Moderate to severa turbulence in smoke. Wind at 5,$00.'
- 0
feet was .310 • 30 knots.
14. , Fa.ctors Affecting the ~ccess or Failure of the Mis.sion
ILl one (1) eJreraft, J\"30 (385S),. lost its #2 engine on the bcmb run jUl!!t
before the terget, Theai.rc.r,aft continued on three engines, however. dropped its bcimbs on the "erget and turned 00. course to basa. Shortly 1;herea:fter.
its #4 engine 8uffecrad loss of power believed to have been caused by a .s\'i'aUowed valve. In spite of this difficulty the aircraft was flown successfully
back to base and landed safely.
&mY A. srE'WAAT. Cap tain ,Air Corps r .\88 I t.G-roup S .. 2.
F. O. NO. "
MISSIOl'J NO. "
DAil oF MlsSIbN
19 au- ~ 20. Analysis of Attacks by Enemy A/O.
TOTAL ATTACKs
AHEAD RIGHT BEHHID LEFT
CLOOK POSlTlON 11 12 1 2 -)- 4 5--r7 8 ~ 10 TOTAlS .
" - I. I.
ABOVE -
- -~---:- .-.,- ,
LEVEL " 'l J , I I' t .,
BELO'N
TOTAlS r , , a. t ., 1 ..
~, TIE E!A AT.1'iCKS ),.
This Bomb Group had thirty nine (39) A/e t • chedul.sd fer thi..> Thil't~' l1ir:8 (39) were airborne.
a. Thirty eight (38) A/e bombed the primary target.
b, One A/C, A-la, aborted because of Bl'!gine trouble.
c. The disposition of bombs not dropped on the primary target are as follows:
A-IO jettisoned 3~r6 and 2XP-N-M64 after aborting.
All .'ther A/e dropped on the tlJrget. Ther-e wer-e four A/e; A-32, A-H" A-:12 and A-44 that had bombs hang up that had to t,,~ salvoed but they 'II ez-e aJ 1 sal voed on or near the ta r gr.;t.,
3. a, Lev.~ettons from the plan:
There were still some A/e tha~· bombed 1>.t a htgher .. L.itude and greater air speed than briefed. No exr.ianation was given for these deviations.
It was necessary for four (1;.) hie to drop bombs .Iithout the
. a.id of radcr ,
b. Difficulties encountered:
Two A/C; A-16 and A-29 had trouble getting the. bomb bay doors
closed.
A-16 has pneumatic doors. Cause for thi~ failure is unknown, A-29 ha~l one door that did not get all the way closed because of a \~ire coming off: a pulJ.ey.
Two A/ej A-54~ and A-52 had difficulty with the C-l aut.omat.Lc
pilot.
One Ale, A·-5 complained about bombs peinr: dropped from ab:H€ them and eomf ng very close to their airplane.
The 1--/e having no radar had some clUfical'Ly in dropuing bombs s, Many Ale reported extreme turbul;:;.nce in the sruoke fJ:'0m fires, Also, 8ear,.:_l· shts on t.his mis-sion proved mor= _~.fcctive and r:ade dropping
bombs more dilficult.
~" Many bombardiers reported that e f:" .od portion of the bombs hit too
far to the la.ft on this mission. Even thouteh this was tru61 th,;lre wa.s reported a t~;e fil near the aiming point,
A/e flying at higher air speeds and nltHudeB .would not have bombs on the AP using briefed information and dropping completely by rad~r.
5. A number- of bombardiers suggested t.hat the IP be changed for the next low altitude mission to Nagoya as the approach from IF to target is coyerad with searchlights and AA guns.
6. It is suggested that an attempt be made to :"omb targsts 193 "nd 194 at night using a similar plan of attack.
7" Bombing was done by individual A/C. No forr.tation. Every A/e had some type of camera aboard.
8. Results of bombing ol)alOrved indicated huge fires burning at or near the r;bd.113 p0i nt South of Nagoya castle, Th(j smoke from these fires was not a.s £ at 'on prevdcua ra:i ds to Tokyo, Os ska and Kob«,
Uany bombardiers felt that there ;,c_re still too much sporadic bombing outside: ":rget "rea.
7. Enemy ~anamissions (jamning: intentional ED d non-intentiona.l; use back'Qf page if necessary).
Band Wid th or
Type or Description Frequency
Effectiveness Locati~
·--·-----·-...!.--·--- · __ · ..L.... ... I
I::::=::J
r-
. , .
SECRET
.. C ..... , ,:
•
• 1'.
ECRET
"
. 60<' CO:.:sOi,ID,,'j'J1j[) I>.I33IO·' REPORT .
~ E1p te P""'I\1J1 11 IUCII 194.5 Q 1''''041&. I. _A~ __
~~~~~~~~~----------~~~~&LJjI.~"~~~-.-----r-----
0
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., 2, )0 B • 10 " T J .. ':
•• SO ,a It ,II :LO • T • II
9 40 40 R .- 10 • 1 Y - • I"
U - - 30 a, I It 10 I ! ~ I 'DU
12 '. 10 15, 20- ftl If 20 • I y; t • •
14 , 12 50 ,0 16 It If 10 • ti- • . JL1l,JPC
T
~ , ., 30 30 15, • m I r!- I ......
16 • • ~ 60 '" • 20 I l' - If • •
22 .3 15 45 4' 17 '. I 20 -, I' I! t • •
2J 2 3D IA 50 50 yi lO J :11- I I
29 , 40 11). 16 I 10 II, x:· I I
I XiI
30 Z: s " " ,. :1 10 I I •
j If' ,., ,m • r :r • II
,2 .. ,
3S r
,:6 - 68 ,dO I.J a.l T . I •
',u. ,. 7 IIJ 2S 1~ :1 II - • R
42 2 - as 2S 1, I Y - • Ii
43 - 8 40 20 22 HI y, t •
.,. , , ;g 28 30 TI - I
.. , , to U a Xl ..
47 , ., 50 50 26 I t T II'
'-'. • - ID 20 la, I Y' 't • •
49 I 6 II) '*'111 :, 11 - Iii
so - • " )0 II I - 1"1·
p. I , I
51 i.
~ IP 10 • 7 ,0 ~I
" 2, 15 I' ., 40 Ij -
, )0 15 • 10 '10 T - If
5' I~ I
:3 50 16 • R 10 • • 60 - • 11 CUNBOLID.A..TED lUSSION REPORT RADAR
2. 21J1,~~?;,
s , Tot,al Ale,. radar equipped _ __.::;;.J8~. __ ,.--
b. Total Ale, radar operated in target area_='~' __ .
c , No. of lead Ale, using radar approach to visual bombing 2
No. of lead Alc, using complete procedure for radar bombing
"
No , of lead Ale, using di,Fect or emer-gency Pfocedm-e for
radar bomb.in •
Total ·ISo. of Alc, radar sat.Lsf'o cto rv for ')ombir.g "
~o. of lead Alc, radar satisful·tory for bombing "
,~o. of Ale surrendering. lead due to radar failure __ - _
Will be used for the followine j'urposes:
Interrogation Form - Questions will be asked in the interrogation to permit proper entl'j_es for ir.d:Lyidual Ale on the form.
b. Pr~liminary ~'j_s sian lleport -
(1) F.orm~tion bombing: Complete all colwnns for lead and de~uty lead Ale over target, Complete ite~s ~, £, ~J ~, g_, Q. on Sununary above.
(2) Individual bombing: ComFlete. columns 1, 2, 7) 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22 for all participating Ale and items ~, and f in Summary above.
c. Consolidated Mission Report ,- The form Jvill be filled in completely for all participating Ale correcting and amplify . _ fragrtl':ntary information covered in the preliminary r-eoor-t ,
4. INSTRUGTlCUNS FJR MAKING ElI1l'RIES.
Co Lun> 1 - Omit letter and symbol. ','r-:;.te R next to ar,y A/C
gi ving up lead prior to bomb run due to radar failure
8) Y=:Ye.s, N=No, V"'Visual. If a r-adar approach is made
9 \ to a visual l)ombing begin entry of If's in iirst step 11, of radar procedure omit ted.
13
iL5 ~ Y;:Y6S 20. N=No
21) 23
"
Malfunctions
Inv - Inverter Failure Sens - Low sensitivity
Sens Alt - Loss of. sensitivity a,t high altitude Ant Tilt - Antenna tilt failure
Ant Rot - Antenna Rotation failure
Rng ~~ - 5-mile markers lost
Rlse C - Bomb r~lease circle lost Xtl I - Crystal current lost
Xm I - Transmitter currt!nt lost
Op lnd - up<:JratoT' s indicator failed ~'",v Ind - I~avigator' s indicator faihd
SECRET
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
3. usE.
a. "--"' .. _ ---- -
SECRET
,.
o 66
rt
l.l.$ ion
Urban Area. i.ght, "1", IocendiU'1 i.sion •
•
T ~~1St. Clear, Y11b1l1t.7 t.w_t;y. aU... HeaT7
oo1u.tnns a It. .llodal"a t.. 00
_ft ')lC~
em'out. t.o Tar et with tn • ...-pt.ion
.t1 Y. . h ~ cu,.ws 2.5-2 ft,
• QIo1OWlc...i at lwel.a .rr.. _"_~AA141 )' to lIJo •
6. ;~ IIlt.o.tra~WI"
YU'1a 1. 10 11\ or 0UDmlU8 d r&tQ(! ulua c;hu- landing period. I t.
. :,0 t 0 adlea 'in rnin. ~t. tvbul... in 1_ is. i1 • ..at, "~I·at. it.h lit t t.a.
7
SECRET
•
1945
tt
Ie
a 'Ii !:1
!!l
IT.I .~ ,0
%1 ~ 00
~, ~
V\ G r-l
"" N ...;
"t. ot. ~ •
I. , ~ \ i I I I I
I~,:: 'I,
I I ~ I ....
._ ~i 1
I :"{1::
...:
r .-tCrlrd
-rl 0 0:1
Ii' <II 3
Eo< I
I:
{jJ-
Preliminary Mis si on Rep or t ,
SECRET
- - .... - -.....,.
page 3
\
. . . \
5\ Alc ATTACKING T!~'RGEl'S OF bpPORTUN±TY
>r~~~ ~ __ ~ __ ~ __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ __
" Tail No. Target and If in Form
I of Ale Coor-di.nat es Indicate Pas Altitud::.:e:._,...;T~im=e_
~ A/o;;.¥ P:""!i" 1:;- / /II 1/1 C III/ I rs-- Ott: 14, Po
Flee'S 5l.47Tctet1:D ,,01 C Iry I./t:"rll.tlr ,. 'dO' '1A r; It" r: ApPC-R'o::' 1t!".I,) rc.; Be
a. Primary:
7. ENETlI({ J.IR OPPOSI TION
s
A - ,ressiveness
b. SeQiR&8., (bI±ef stae_tit):
b:li' ... Z," ))t;. )1A V I lu;,;Jl /iJ ClllcSi/t 1" ,)~ tiS
/~ I'1T7A<~.j N£'~A: ""1'b"',.8Jllln ~ N )t ,."'" tJ
/ AI Jlf;1i! e» ..,1;';' ;-4 c: T I V q t. V e-"" ~t) 't tr- b
9. FIGHTER SUPPORT (Brie f st at ement, if non e , so sta te ): .NDNC"- -
\ .
• ,~c.
-~
SECRET
-----r
P~eliminary ltl$sion Report, page 4
$. ANTIAIRCRAFT Fl'RE (Brie r stat ellieht giving 10 ca ti on and us ing sue h t.erms 1))3 intense, odera.tI;l, li:teager, nil.; accuracy GiL fire and types of control should
4. LIFE RAFTS. DINGHJE.3. I CR1JTES. }'TC:
Position TilT~ (z)
5. vss FLf.::H NEVIS R.iW.TOED IN BY DBS i .. /C? Tirr.e (Z)
Group 8-2 IVing A-2 Tj.n;e , (Z)- -------------------"--------------------.------~------------------------------------
B. rOR LIfEGUARD SllBS AND DESTROYERS SEE ANNEX NR 2. (A) FOR DUMBO SEE ANNEX NR 2.
(B) 313TH TAKESOFF PATHfINDERS ZERO HR MINUS 10 MIN, MAX tHORt MAIN FORCE AT ZERO KR. FLItS [NROVTE 2101 FT, BOMBS 6000 10
6800 FT. .
(C> 314TH TAKES orF PATHFINDERS ZERO HR· MINUS ~I MIN, MAX EFFORT MAIN FORCE TAKES OFF ZERO HR MINUS 30 MIN. FLIEstNROUTt 3,001 FT, BOMBS 7,111 FT TO 7,800 FT.
2. 73D IG ATKS URBAN AlEA OF NAGOYA.
METHOD OF BOMBINGs BY INDIVIDUAL Ale ATTACKING 11TH MINIMUM TIME INTERVAL. A DEFINITE RADAR BOMBING RUN WILL BE MADE OVER A RADAR AI~ING POINT BEFORE MAKING A VISUAL CORRECTION.
SCHEME OF MANEUVERs INDIVIDUAL AIC IILLPROCEES ENRODTE TO THE TARGET AT OR BELOW ',III FT. BOMBING AIRSPEED WILL BE 25t CAS. FLY ON COURSE 1 MIN AJ'Ttl BOMBS AWAY, THEN ONE Q.OARTtR NEEDLEWIDTlf RIGHT TURN TO A HEADING OF 1'2 DEGREES. ON VITHDRAWAL DEVIATE TO THE un O.F PRESCRIBED COURSE IF NECESSARY TO AVOID DlEMY DEFENSES.
BOMBING ALTITUDEs ',111 FT TO 5,8" FT.
ROUTE OUT AND BACKI BASE
211 _8N - 1_1 17E (IVO JIM!)
-~: ~~: : ~~: ~~~ UP) ~
35 13 3tN - 136 52 3.E (OAP) TARGET
24 48N - 141 17E (IVO JIMA) BASE
3. A. ""TH rJ GP FLIES SIX PATHFINDER A/C WITH LEAD CREWS, TAKE orr ZERO HI MINUS 1111 MIN. BALANCE OF A/C TAKE orF ZERO KR. AIMING POINT 1721~J
B. 501TH GP TAKES OFF SECOND. AIMING POINT i721~J ~
C. "97TH GP TAKES OFr THIRD. AIMING POINT 0721~3 ~
D. "98TH GP TAKES orr LAST. 498TH GP FLIES TWO A/C AS SUPERDU~BOS, TAKES OFr ArTER MAIN rORCE. AIMING POINT 11~i85.
(C) £-28 AMD E-3C. 2 ••• FT ABOYE THE TA •• ET. CD) "-_7 &2, INSTANTANEOUS NOSE.
CE) a.-M-ll Q, LB_! NO FUSE REQUIRED. INTERYALOKETER S~TIN;'
(A) "-.7 BOMBS. 1., FT.
(I) ALL CLUSTERS. 5. rT.
(C) "-76 LI 5. FT.
CONTAINING. M:69;- BALANCE ·i;:i 7 A-i:·"M-~:;A2AND·'AN::M:13Qfil :"THi:~"BALANCE OF Ale WITH M-76 LB.
(') FUSE SETtINGl
(A) 11-76 LB, INST.ANTANE~lJS NOSE, NON-DELAY TAIL. CB) ~-17 AI, Jfilfilfil FT ABOVE THE TARGET.
ec) E-28 AND £-36, 2fi.1filfil FT ABOVE THE TARGET. (D) 11-ln A2, INSTANTANEOUS NOS.E.
(E) AN-M-13 Q0 LB, NO FUSE REQUIREI},
(6) INTERVALOMETER SETtlNGI CA) M-47 BOMBSI 10fi.1 FT. (8) ALL CLUSTERS, '0 FT. (C) M-76 LB BOMBSI '0 FT.
(7) BO.MBING I NSTRUCT!Ot.rS I CREIi1S WILL BE CAUTIONED TO CHECK POS.ITIQiI CAREFULLY BEfORE RELEASING BOMBS. ON PREVIOUS MISSI0NS BOMBS Ull WERE DROPPED ON FIRES STARTED OUTSIDt OF TARGET AREAS.
A CONCENtRATION OF FIRES !r1ITHIIII ASSIGNED ZONES IS DEFINITELY DESIRED.
(8) PINS .AIIID CAR-a-SEALS WIRE MAY BE REMOVED FROM FUSES PRIOR TO TAKE OFF.
(S) AIMING lURES WILL .BE SAFETY WIRED TO THE SHACKLE: EXCEPT ON 1'1-76 LB. ,
( 121) ALL Ale WI1.L SALVO I MMEll I ATELY AFTER 1 NtERV.ALOMETER HAS BEEN RUN tHROUGH.
(11) ALL AIC CARRYI lIlG A111-i1- 13Q0 L6 CLUSTER WIL L FLY AT LOWEST BRIEFED ALTITUDE.
(12) Al'lt1UNITlON LOAD, MAX LOAD OF 2"0 RDS PER TURRET WILL BE CARRaD IN LOWER FORWARD AND LOWER AFT. NO TRACERS lULL BE LOADED.
(13) GUNNERY INSTRUCTIONS: ONLY SIDE GUNNERS WILL BE PERMITTED TO FIRE L.O\ll£R tURRETS AND GROUND OBJECTS WILL BE THE ONLY TARGETS.
(14) RADAR SETs WILL BE TURNED OFF fOR 1,r,5 MIN IMMEDIATELY lIFTElt
LE.AVING TARGET .•
(15) A BO.RT I NG AIC ON .ROUTE OUT W IL.L, TURN 90 DEGREES FROM PRESCR I BED
. ROUTE HEAD ING AND FLY .5 M.I N BEFORE TURN I IIIG ON RU URN HEAD I NC.
C 1.6) WHEN I.MD.lNG ALL AIC WILL PRACTICE THE INSTRUMENT LANDING
PROCEDURE SPECIFIED IN BASE. REGUUTION 55-7.
4. NO CHANGE.
5. COMMUNICATIONS:, SEE .ANNEX NR 3 •.
ANN.EX IIIR .1 .. INTE.LLIGENCE ANNEX NR 2- AIR SEA RESCUE ANNEX NR 3" COMMUNICATIONS
O'DONNELL Ct; BW 1'3
INTELLIGENCE
SECTION I. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE. AIR.
NO CHANGE.
SECTION II. ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT.
NOTE FOLLOWING CHANGES. THREE BARRAGEIIU,UIfSBALLOONS OBSERVED AT TVO ,HOUSAND FEET AT NAGOYA CASTLE. APPROXIMATELY 25 MOR.E SEARCHLIGHTS REPORTED AROUND NORTHERN END NAGOYA BAY.
SECION III. ENE'MY HELD AND UNOCCUPIED ISLANDS. NAVAL SITUATION.
NOTE FOLLOWING CHANGES. ALL AIRCRAFT EXCEPT FIGHTERS WILL USE CENTRAL AIRFIELD ON IVO JIMA.
SECTION IV. PKOTOCO.RAPHIC.
NO CHANGE.
LIST OF VISUAL TARGET DATA ADD THE FOLLOWINGI
XXI BOMeOI'! LITHO~HOZAIC HR 91.21 NAGOYA CITY. XXI BOKCOM LITKO-MOZAIC Hi 91.28-1'.I!.
XXI BOMCO" T95 "AGOYA URBAN INDUSTRIAL AREA
LIST or IABAR MATERIALS ADD THE FOLLOWIN,.
XXI BOMeOM RS-l' XXI BO t1C OM. RS-1G
73RD BOMBIiING RS PHOTOGRAPH Mill-ROLL .I,r,-q
O'DONNCL\.CG 73 BW
C01'1MUNI C A rr ONS
1. SEE SOPC SERIES 1013 73RD BOMB WING •
. 2. CONTACT REPORTS; CONTACT REPORTS WILL BE SENT COVERING SURFACE VESSELS SIGHTED NORTH OF 28 DEGREES NORT!:!. LATITUDE ONl.Y WHEN RETURNING FROM TARGET. REGULATION 1!IJ"-19 HQS XXI BOMBER COMMAND DAlED 1 MARCH 1945 WILL GOVERN TRANSMISSION OF CONTACT REPORTS.
3. IFFlTlJRN ON FROM TAKEO.FF TO 3"" MILES FROM ENEMY COAST.
TURN ON AGAIN WHENl"" MILES FROM ENEMY COASTLINE ENROUTE HOME. 4. RADIO SILENCE WILL PREVAIl.. ENROUTE To T.ARGET EXCEPT IN CASE OF AN AIRCRAFT IN EXTREME EMERGENCY.
5. GROUPS WILL PRE-DESIGNATE ONE PLANE PER SQUADRON AS THE ONLY PLANE TO TRANSMIT A STRIKE REPORT. .
A. SPECIAL STRIKE REPORT WILL CONSIST or TIME OVER tARGET (GMT) METHOD OF BOMBING, CLOUD COVERAGE, SITUATION AT TARGEt,
t-'-'::.·iiiIIiOP. IT! SITION ..
CLeO CGftRAQE SITUATION AT TARGET
N .. OM
I TO 9 TENTKS x F.. 1./1_
A .. GENUAL C8IIIFLAGRATIOlf
B - SEVERAL LARGE FIRES
C - IlANY FIlES
D - FEW SCATTERED FIRES E ... UNOBSERVED
A- HEA"
B" MODERATE C- I'IEACER D- NONE
FIGBTER OPPOSITIOH
GOING TO SEND
THAT FO
DO s
1'0 SC COOS lJ BW NR 2 to AU. (
TD sc CQ OS V BW NR 2 TO ALL (CONFIRMATION COpy) OP SECRET 18: MAR 45
TIME ON STAtlOl>! 21!IIIllZ .~ C.OMPLETlON 22002 ~ COMPLEtION
CHANNEL "C·, 192.:!lIKC CIJJ (DAY>
POSt'UON
3 ... tI!lN 131-30E 33-0i!1N IJ8-1i.l0.E. 32-00N 138-15E Jl-~0N i38-lt5E (VOICE CALl. FOR ALL LIFEGUARD SUBS
HACHIJO JIMA FROM SOP-;2
4. DESTROYERS VQICE CALL DtSPERADO
REFERENCE PO INT HACHIJO JIMA HA.CHIJO JIMA HACHIJO JIMA
I'IACHIJO JIMA .
CODE NA.ME FOR REFERENCE POINT
POSIT.ION 18-00N . ·llf4-30E
TIME ON STATION ENTIRE MISSION
9'DONNELL tc BW '?
AMENDMENT NR 1 TO FO' 66, HQS 730 aw
1. CHANGE ;5 (Xl (4) BOMB LOAD '1'0 READl
;5 (I> (4) BOMB l.OAD: 17,!1I~'" ·L8 MAX P.ATHFINDER A/CCARRY 500 LB INCENDIARY BOMBS. MAIN FORCE CARRY 500 l.B INCENDIARY CLUSTERS CONTAINING 1'1-69, IlALANCE M-17Al" M-,I&7A2 AND Atv-M-l:5Q!Il. THE.N SALANGE or AIC WITH M-76 ra, IN EV£RY THIRD Ale or MAI.NFORCE 2 X 500 GPwlLL
REPl.ACE TWO OF THE INCENDIARY Cl.USTERS. .
2. AND 3 (X) C5J (F)
.3 (X) (5) (n '.00 LB GP INSTANTANEOUS NOS~E AND NON-DELAY TAIL.
3. CHANGE 3 (X) (1) TO REAIl;
.3 (x> (1) TIME OVER TARGET MAIN FORCEt 1ll400K 1'0 0515K. ZERO HOUR
ow. _. . ..
I
WGDC we TD se CQ DS v BW NR23 4 4 4 5 OP SECRET
19 MARCH .45
FROM COHGEN 73 BW SAIPAN 191111Z
TO COMGEN XXI BC, ATTN A-3 CONTRO, INFO: COMGEN 313 BW
COMGEN 314 BT
CO, 497, 498, 499, 599 BOMGPS. ATTN S~2
PAREN 73 BW ITEM 1392 SGIXXX SIGNED O'DONNELL COMGEN PAREN~
~~igO~R~~~O~~MBER 66 ~;S~~~~HN~~:~R 33 _, ;/'
1. DES I CNATION OF UNIT: 13RD BOMB WING
2. TIME OF TAKE OFF: FIRST - 181-12121Z LAST - 181203Z FIRST - la234~Z LAST - 190218Z
143
3. TIME or IETURN:
4. AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF:
(14121 STRIKE, .3 SUPERDUMBOS>
5. AIRCRAFT ATTACKING PRIMARY TARGET: 129
(106 RADAR, 14 VISUAL, 9 RADAR-VISUAL CORRECTION)
6. AIRCRAFT ATTACKING SECONDARY TARGET: 0
(NONE ASSIGNED)
7. AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LAST RESORT TARGET: (NONE ASSIGNED)
8. AIRCRAFT ATTACKING TARGETS OF , •• OPPORTUNITY' 9. AIRCRAFT WHICH FAILED TO BOMB TARGET:
(11 MECHANICAL, 1 OTHER' LATE,
WOULD BE LIGHT OVER HONSHU)
SUJ~p;DutI,Bis BOMB a
121 11
13. AIRCRAFT LOST BY REASONS UNKNOWN: Ql
14~ TIME OF ATTACK: FIRST - 181753Z LAST - 181948Z
18'. AIRCRAFT BRINGING BOMBS BACK (SAME FUSINGS)1 3 B-29S
16 X M1l1-A2 1 X M16
19, PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: NONE
20. NUMBER ENEMY AIRCRAFT CLAIMED: NONE
21. REMARKS:
Ir. FIGHTER OPPOSITION: APPROXIMATELY 30 ENEMY AIRACRAFT
• ENCOUNT.ERED FROM 75 MILES BEFORE LANDFALL TO LANDSEND,
SOME FOLlOWING 75 MILES WITHOUT ATTACKING, 15 SIGLE AND 6 COORDINATED ATTACKS BETWEEN IP AND LANDSEND,
MOSTLEY OVER NAGOYA. FOUR MORE FIGHTERS MADE 12 COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST ONE B-29 25 MILES WEST OF TORI SHIMA
ONE RETURN. ONE B-29, 75 MILES FEXXXBEFORE LANDfAll, ENCO\JNTERED NON-ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WHICH MADE SEVERAL SIrIEEPS
AROUND THE B-29. THESE FOUR AIRCRAFT HAD WING lIGRTS .
AND LIGRT ON TOP FUSELAGE, ONE ENEMY AIRCRAFT WITH LANDING LIGHTS MADE PASS AT B-29 CAUGHT IN SEARCHlIGHTS,GOING 25 FT OVER TOP WITHOUT FIRING. UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT DROPPED BOMB WICH EXPLODED 52HIIFT ABOVE AREAD
61)" ONE BAa.ACI BA&LOON AT
BARRAGE BALLOONS AT 2 •• 8 FT OVER Hi •
I. AIRCRAFT LOST OR IN DISTRESSI NONE
I. SERIOUSLY DAMGED OR CRASHED ON RETURNa NONt
E.
RED EXPLOSION WITH DEBRIS
REACHING 4510 FT 181912Z 2 MILES EAST OF
MEAN POINT OF OXXX IMPAeT
G. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION: SEVERAL LARGE AND NUMEROUS
SMALL FIRES WERE VIS ISLE ON STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS., OUTLINE
OF STREETS CLEARLY VISIBLE BUT LOCATION OF ,FIRES WITHIN
CITY COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.
H. CREW COMMENTS: COMMENTS ARE BEING ANALYZED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS AND APPROPRIETE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.
I. OTHER COMMENTS: DESIGNATION OF TARGT TIME RATHER THAN TAKE-OFF TIMES RESULTED IN PATHFINDERS REACING TAR-
GET AFTER MANY FIRES WERE STARTED, DUE POSSIBLY TO VARYING OOMPUTATIONS BY WINGS. AMMUNITION IN OTHER THAN
TAIL TURRETS FELT TO BE MORE OF A HAZARD THAN A HELP. SEVERAL REPORTS OF 8-29S EXPLODING OVER THE TARGET THOUGHT TO BE SALVOED M76 BOMBS DETONATING ON EACH OTHER. IWO RANGE AND HOMER USED EFFECTIVELY AS NAVIIATION AIDS
, 84 PERCENT OF ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WERE UTILIZED DURI~G PER IOD or THIS MISSION.
THIS REPORT IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION AND IS NOT TO BE USED FOR OFFICIAL RECORDS.
B. ANTIAIRCRAfT: ON BOMB RUN AND OVER TARGET AA WAS MODERATE AND INACCURATE, MEDIUM AND HEAVY. A HEAVY USED BARRAGES AND CONTINUOUSLY POINTED FIRE. PHOSPHOURS AA
SEEN OVER TARGET. SEARCHCIGHTS INCREASED IN NUMBER OVER LAST RIID. VERY ACCURATE TRACING SEEMED TO INDICATE RADAR CONTROL FOR FIRST TIME. Two AIRCRAFT fIRED LOWER TURRETS AT SEARCHLIGHTS AND LIGHTS WENT OUT. TWO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT 6000 FT OBSERVED IN NORTHWEST NAGOYA. ONE BARRAGE BAlLOON AT 3500 VT IN CENTRAL NAHOYA. TWO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT 2000 1T OVER NAGOYA CASTEL.
I. AIRCRAFT LOST OR IN DISTRESS: NONE
I. AlRCRIFT SERIOUSLY DAMGED OR CRASHED ON RETURN: NONE E. AIRCRAFT'BATTLE DAMGE: 9
1 READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN 1 DAY 5 READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN 3 DAYS 3 READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN 5 DAYS
F. OBSERVATIONS:
OBSERVATION FIRE
EXPL'OS IONS
3 LARGE EXPLOSIONS FIRES AT IP EXPLOSIONS
TIME 1818462 1818592 1818462 1818482 1818512 1818522
PLACE
20 MILES NORTH OF HAMAMATSU TARGET AREA TARGET ARIA
34 32'N -136 40'E NAGOYA ARS ENAL AREA
BT 1911112
TOD V BiT 18072 ID K R V WG CS K
ROGER V DS 18072 EC K ROGER V CQ 18072 LE K ROGER V SC 18072 DJM K ROGER V TD 18072 AK K AR
19 MARCH 45
TD V BIrl NR5
FROM COMGEN 73 BW S TO COMGEN XXI BC, ATTN A-3 INFOI COMGEN 313 BW
COMGEN 314 BW
CO, 491, 498, 499, 500·BOMGPS, ATTN 5-2
BT
PAREN 13 BW ITEM 1392 SIGNED O'DONNELL tOMGEN PAREN
MISSION NUMBER 33 19 MARCH 1945
MISSION REPORT
FIELD ORDER NUMBER 66
1. DESIGNATION OF UNIT: 2. TIME OF TAKE OFr:
73RD BOMB WING
FlRST- 13H'212 LAST- 1812032 FIRST- 1823432 LAST - 1902182
AND 6 COORDINATED ATTACKS 8ETWEEN IP AND LANDSEND,
MOSTLY OVER NAGOYA. FOURMOREFIGRTERS MADE 12 COORDINA.T'" ED ATTACKS AGAINST ONE 8-29 25 MILES WEST OF TORI SHIMA ON RETURN. ONE 8-29, 75 MILES BEFORE LANDFALL, [NCOUN'" TERED NON-ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WHICH MADE SEVERAL SWEEPS AROUND THE 8-29. THESE rOUR AIRCRAFT HAD WING LIGHTS
AND LIGHT ON TOP FUSELAGE. ONE ENEMY AIRCRAFT WITH LANDING LIGHTS MADE PASS AT 8-29 CAUGHT IN SEARCHLIGHTS, GOING 25 FT OVER TOP WITHOUT FIRING. UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT DROPPED 80MB WHICH EXPLODED 500 ,T ABOVE, AHEAD
AND TO LEFT. MOST FIGHTERS USED LANDING LIGHTS DURING ATTACKS.
8. ANTIAIRCRAFT: ON BOMB RUN AND OVER TARGET AA WAS MODERATE AND INACCURATE, MED1Ut':! AND HEAVY. HEAVY U5EDBARRAGES AND CONTINUOUSLY POINTED FIRE. PHOSPHORUS AA
SEEN OVER TARGET. SEARCHLIGHTS INCREASED IN NUMBER OVER LAST RAID. VERY ACCURATE TRACKING SEEMED TO INDICATE RADAR CONTROL FOR FIRST TIME. TWO AIRCRAFT FIRED LOWER TURRETS AT SEARCHLIGHTS AND L.IGHTS WENT OUT. TW,O BAR" RAGE BALLOONS AT 6000 FT OBSERVED .IN NORTHWEST NAGOYA. ONE BARRAGE BALLON AT 3500 Fl IN CENTRAL NAGOYA. ·TWO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT 2000 Fl OVER NAGOYA CASTLE.
C. AIRCRAFT LOST OR IN DISTRESS: NONE
D. AIRCRAFT SERIOUSLY DAMAGED OR CRASHED ON RETURN: NONE
E. AIRCRAFT BATTLE DAMAGE: 9
1 READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN 1 DAY 5 READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN 3 DAYS :3 READY FOR COMBATWITRIN 5 D.AYS
F. OBSERVATIONS:
_F
OBSERVATION
TIME 181846- 181·8592 1818462 181848Z 1818502 181852Z
PLACE
FIRE EXPLOSIONS
3 LARGE EXPLOSIONS FIRES AT IP EXPLOSIONS
20 MILES NORTH
OF HAMAMATSU
TARGET AREA
TARgET AREA 34DEG32'N-136DEG40'[ NAGOYA ARSENAL
AREA
RED EXPLOSION WITH DEBRIS
BE"A'c-tn-NG iJ.5tlltll 'F'Tg19-02~ 2 MIllES EAST OF'
NEAR POINT OF IMPACT
G. PHOTOGRAPHI~ INTERPRETATION: SEVERAL LARGE AND NUMEROUS SMALL FIRES WiRE VISIBLE ON STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS. OUTLINE OF STREETS CLEA.RLY VISIBLE BUT LOCATION OF FIRES WITHIN CITY COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.
H. CREW COMMENTS: COMMENTS ARE BEING' ANALYZED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS AND APPROPRIATE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.
I. OTHER COMM.ENTS: DES IGNATION OF TARGET TIMES RATijER THAN TAKE-OFF TIMES RESULTED IN PATHFINDERS REACHING TAR-
GET AFTER MANY FIRES WERE STARTED, DUE POSSIBLY TO VARYING COMPUTATIONS BY WINGS. AMMUNITION IN OTHER THAN
TAIL TURRETS FELT TO BE MORE OF .A HAZARD THAN A HELP. SEVERAL REPORTS OF B-29S EXPLODING OVER THE TARGET THOUGHT TO BE SALVOED M76 BOMBS DETONATING ON EACH OTHER. IVO RANGE AND HOMER USED EFFECTIVELY AS NAVIGATION AIDS. 84 PERCENT or ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WERE UTILIZED DURING PERIOD OF THIS MISSION.
THIS REPORT IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION AND IS NOT TO BE USED rOR orFICIAL RECORDS.
BT 1917112 ID
TOD V BW 19552 ID K ROGER V TI 19552 AX K
AR rOR NOW (
MISSION NO_..L'~'--
IS-I, -,," 1
" .- ~.,,-
F.O. NO.~, - DAll -TARGETS: I H._.rA
AI C AP.
NUMBER CMDR.
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c· TIME TIME A
TAKE LANDING ~
OFF ~
BOMB LOAD
NO.
L
2
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