..

. . .. ; . '~'
, •

XXI BOMBER COMMAND

,

ANALYSIS OF
8-29 LOSSES
Cl••Woation c~e21001~ ~ffeCt1ve 28 Nov. Sa
IlOD DIIlD:'l'rB 10." .•

PREPARED BY

33RD STATISTICAL CONTROL UNIT

•
• • • •
STATISTICAL STUDY OF &-29 LQSSES

INrRODUCTION
The success of aqy combat unit may best be evaluated through a cOlllparlson

• of its target destruction with the cost of achieving this destruction. Target
destruction is the primarY objective, but the selection of • plan to secure th.ls
objective 1s based upon minimizing the cost 1n terms of men and materials. B,y
8xI1!Jlining the 105ses which this comman:i has experienced, it is hoped that this
study "ill at least clarify somo of the problE:;ms concerned, if not aid in their
solution.
The bUlk of this study is concerned with an examination of 162 losses on
bombing am mining rll1ssiol19 which tho cOlllllllmi had sustained up to 30 April 1945.
As discussed in greater detail on the following pagse, severll1 cOlI:lusions lIllly
be drnwn from the statistical data thtlt has been cxamined:
• r~~,.,_i 1. The 1050 r~te per airborne aircraft, which averaged 3% - 5% for NoVl~­
!(' O·lI. beT _ February, has drOPljed to less than 2'f, during March um April.

2. A reduction in cembot operational losses*has been chiefly the result

of (a) lower bombii'€ flltitude, (b) availability of 1'/1"0 as an emergency lan:Ung
field, and (c) correction of specific malfunctions.
3. A reduction in losses caused by enemy action am unknown reasons has
been chiefly the result of (a) less enemy air op~osition, (b) utilizing a larger

•
percent of the c=nd's effort against lesD heavily deft:!ooed targets, (e) the
availability of 1'11'0, and (d) greater striking force over the target .

4. For daylight missions, los see to enel!lY aetion am Uflknol'ln reasons have
concentrated in the first groups over the target. For night misslol'l8. losses
have been spread throughout the force.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This stu:l.y covers a totnl of 194 8-29 losses whieh had he,n sustained by
this COIllIll&nd from the start of operations to 30 April 1945. This total ls CCIIl-
prised of the followlllil
No. Ale Percent of Total
TYpe Qf Loss

Lost On Or As The Re,ult Qf COIlIbtt QperatiollB

162 .).~
BOlIlblf1i am Ifln1f1i If1ssiorlll
other Type Iflssiorlll • •
6
4.!J
).!J
training am Ad.minbtrative Flights

On The Ground Due To Eneml Agtion 12 6.'-

liar han Aircraft -! ~
T<1tAL 194 lllO.OII
* Combnt operationoJ. losse. ure deCiDed as all 10.15e. as a re.ult ~ or ,.....
OM oth.r than anomy ooUon (_ _ . - "...1 ......).
 .
The 10sles frOlll ere:lY .',' ~
,.'.. .
• ·ccurred in 1944 \ hen Suipan "18
the t.arget for enemy rdders from Iwo. One encDIY attack wnll particulllrly of-
,feet.1ve, that of HovaDlber 27 when 8 B-29's were lost. The other 4 aircraft Woru
lOlt on raids of December 7 and December 25.
or the 105ses on traln1ne and administrative flights, three were the reBult
: of crash landings while the other three aircraft either croshed or ditched at
soa. Tho details on these aircraft are as rollo"81
4 alrcruft - Engine trouble; 1 crash landed.
1 aircraft - Pilot error on crash landing.
1 aircraft - Lardl~ gear collapsed upon Iandinc.
Nar Weary aircra!t include 5 olrcraft which were returned to the U.S. dur-
lr1i lIo.rch ud April an:! 1 loirer,,!t which has been redeslgf\ll.ted to TB-29,1..
decision to return an aircraft to tho U.S. involves tho problem of whether the
time required to lIlLke the aircraft fully opero.tional Ill1ght bett.er be spent on
repairing other aircraft. The Guam Air Depot has set. limit of ap~rox1matoly
6000 lIlfI.n-hoUI's or 45 days of repair on
II. sillile aircraft beyoR:!. which it is more
prcctical to return the aircraft. t.o the U.S. Although the mabel' of aircraft in
this cateipry is dXpected to increue, at the present time they MVIl constituted
only a small percent of the Comman:!.ls toto.l losses.
Thll aircraft lost on other type missions aN the followina:
IYPe Of M!ssion No. Of AircrAft An:!. Cause
Shnkedown 1 Alc - Engine failure enroute to turget.
Weatter Strike J Alc - Bad weather, poor navigation rusulted
in exhausted fuel supply.
1 Alc - Hieh winds and exhausted fuel supply;
ditched 0 nroute fre/ll turget to base.
1 Ale - Engine fallure enroute from target to
buse.
I Alc - Crash landing with 2 enginas out.
Search lAIc - Ercine ard .,ing caught firo; Aircraft
crashed at sea.
It s~ould be noted that I'Dne of the above lossus werc the result of anomy
action. rhese losses constitute a small percentage of the total airborne on
these missions. For exumplb, the six aircraft lost on w~ather strike rnis~ions
are 1.5% of the total WSM Borties.
None or the losses in .~ of the above categories, on ground by eneDlY ac-
tion, on training or administrative flights, war-weary, or on other missions,
repreflents an W'Ullually high figure consideril1i the operation of the Comman:!. as
11 "'hole. !l«oreover, the losses are eo few that any further examlnaticm of the
figurcs 1Iould not be statistically sound.
AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON MIssIOt§
The problem of annly~ins aircraft losses is complic~ted by the number oC
fUltors Yary1ng from mission to mission which influence thf,t vulnerability of alr'
croft to loss. AIlIo,. th(!se, the followi,. predaal1nate:
• •
1.. Target Area. - Type an! stNngth of enemy opposition will Vary with
siCnif1c"rce of tt.rget.
2. Altitude Of Attack - This will affect type and accuracy of flak .nd a-
bJ.llty of anemy fighters to attack. Thu chance for mechanical failure I'Dmally
incrc~ses with increase in bombine altitude.
• J. Pro" Or Night Att!ck - Ene~ fight.or opposition is less and flak accur-
acy ttll'ds to decrease for night attacke, depending on the effectivoness of the
enemy rOOar system.
4. Time Exposed To Enemy Action - Route to an:!: from target all well us tar-
get area itself will influence this factor. By reducing spread between first
and lust aircraft, losses from enemy action cen be minimized.
The
5. Weather - Bad weather by interfering with fighter interception and flak
accuracy may Illore than offset effect of such ueather on our aircraft.
The effect of each of these factors on aircraft losses cannot be measured,
but thrO\lih a careful examimtion of them we should be able to a ... lyze with Ca:l-
parativo accurncy the tremn of the COllII:landls loos ratos.
Table I am Chart I present a s\Jlllll8ry by Co.uso of the aircro.ft losses on
bombing em llIinlne tdssiol'lB.
From an examil1!l.tion of this table, it is evident that the loss rete during
Uarch an:.l April is auhatnntially below the Decembor - Febrl.lllrY rato. Moreover,
this tren:!. holds for all t.hree gemra! categories of loss: Kl'lOlI'n enelllY action,
com"ba.t operational, an.! unknown.
•
The following is a more detailed analysis rolating tho factors noted above
to these loss rates. The comba.t operational lossee will be considered first.
CQMBAT QPEllATIOlaL LOSSES
The reduced 1085 rute for combat operationnl reasons is the rf sult of the
follOWing factors: (I) Specifio remedies for certD.in 1IIIl1functions have been
perfected an:!. installed. (Example - Fuel tr~n5fer system).
(2) As combat crew personml have become more experienced,
105see from personnel error ha.ve declined.
(J) The reduction in bombing altitude has put less etrain
on i l l mochnnical aspects of B-29 operation ae well as on the combat crew.
(4) The availo.bility of Iwo Jima as an emereency landing
field hQS meant that ma~ aircraft ill difficulty, particular~ those short of
fuel, no longer hnvo to ditch.
Listoo belOit UTe the 1Il0re specific causes for tho c08lbat operational lossfIB
of this COJnmam:
CaUDe
I&ochanical
No. Ale .......
Enginto Failure 20 2 Alc attellpttld early retour.J craahtd at
bue. 8 JlC crll.ahtll1 OD t&Ice-ott or Mc:trt1T
"thereo.1'ter. 1· Ale cr. .b laldld ..to no JUa.
2 Ale craah.ed CID returD.
 Cause
f' Remarks
• •
that the rate will rise ogain to the December - February level.

LOSSES FROM EIID!Y ACTION AND UNKOO\\'N CAUSES

2 oc..:urred in December 1944. ani 1 oc-
Fuel 7ransfer Failure 3
curred in January 1945.
Landing gear collapsed damnging fuse_
Laming Gear Failure 1 night missions.
lage.
Acdd('.!ll-.
lie:, ~h r Coli!itions 4 3 Ale ditched on return ard 1 Ale
after returning to base.
Perso~l Error
Collision 7 2 aircraft collided over target; 2 air-
craft collided at assembly point; 2 air-
craft collided enroute to targot on
night mission. 1 1ircrart was parked
when struck by a damaged plune returnill;
from mission. . From the tablb it cnn be seen thrt loss l"ut<1S hr,ve varied in soverity
Navig!ltion Error 4 1 occurred in November, 1 occurred in
December, 1 occurred in llllrch j am
April.
Poor Judgment am Technique 3 2 aircraft solvocd loads which damaged
planes. later surv€:yed. 1 aircrnft
crashed beeouse of poor judgment on ;Jart
As un aid to understanding the voricus factors affecting the Command's
loss rates, Table II and Chart II have been prc..pare:d clussifyil1i the eremy ac-
tion nnd unkllO',m losses accordi~ to target area, bombing nltitu:l.e, and day or
•
Losses listed as due to unknown reasons have be~n included in this tebulu-
tioh because it is believed that the substantial cajority wore actually caused
crashed by enemy nction. Of c. total of 43 unknownlosses, 29 occurred on night incend-
iary attacks Oil Japanese cities while 14 occurred on daylight high altitude
raids. It seems likely that the cause for the majority in the former cater;ory
waS ~J1(-t1y anti--e.ircraft I1nd in the; latter category clle:ny aircraft. However,
for cOllvmience, the known enemy uction losses are totaled sepurately.
The 108s rates in Table II un. expreesed as u po::rccnt of the aircraft bomb--
ing Jupaoose mainland targets ruth(.r than aircraft airborne. This is considered
a mor~ accurate ratio when considering los~es from enemy uction.
(from 4% to less than 1%) ani in composition (oneny aircraft vs l.i.nti-ll.ircraft)
1 in dep",ming onthe target, altitude, end time of attack. It !:lust be noted thnt
this table should be utilized with cnutlon. In some cases, the figures may
reflect only one or two attacks ani therefore uny c0!lCIUbioDS cornerning ti":am
would have to be considered tentative.

of pilot.
There wore 14 crash landings during this period, of uhich 7 occurred at
Iwo Ji~. Of these 14, seven were the direct cause of enemy ection and are in-
cluded l.!rder losses caused by eromy action. Of the relllUining 7 aircraft which
crush l~nded because of coabut operational reusons, 2 Rere at Iwo Jiron.
~o ~ircraft crashed on tnke-off and 6 others crn~hed at sea shortly after
take-of I. These eight aircraft constitute less than .1% of the sortios during
thin pelied. However, during the first three ~eeks of May four additio~ rir-
craft clLshcd Oil take-off, a relatively high figure compo.r~d to the record of
the prE'O'ic'us five months.
Weather continues to be ll. serious probl"m and has caused the loss of a l\Ulll-
ber of ~ircraft. It has a two-fold effect on aircraft losses since bad Reather
enroute lIlay cause excessive fuel consunption while bad weather at home base tlSY
result 'n crush landings. On mission 174, 1.4 Llay 1945, inclement wea.ther at
Iwo Ji~ caused the loss of fOlE aircraft. To reduce such losses, a Flight con-
trol Ce:rt.er is being organized in this COlllIlIand. Its duties will inclu:l.e the re-
sponsibility for directing the safe landing of D.11 aircraft returning from a
mission under adverse weather cof¥:litions. The ValUl! of Iwo CUll be best urder- .
stood b7 noting that a total of 310 8-29 aircraft returning from co.":Ibat missio"
landed ~ere during April. For the first fifteen days of May, the figure waS
2)0 air~raft, or a rate of over 15 per day.
In summary, the combat operational l~ss rate is relatively low. AlthOugb
the los; rate for Yay will not 00 as 10..... as that for April, it is not expected
•
It is worthwhile to examino this table in 1l/;i1t. of the: changing operr.tions
of this Comman:l .
During March am April the Bomber Com.~ani's operations "mriad si~nif~c.:l.ntly
frOlll the operations of previous months. The change~ which aff(.cted thp. loss
rate were :;hree in particular: (1) For the first tL-ne tho COllllllf.rd opera-:'ed at
medium level at night. (2) A greater proportion of the Ccmmand1s effort was
thrown against targets in western Ja.pan, pc.rticulurly the daylight raiGs ag.:l.inst
Kyushu airfields. (3) The bombiq: altitu:l.e Ims substantially lOW::lre, for '!:loth
day and night attucks.
The ina\J€Ul"!l.tion of night boabing found the enemy unprepered in term::; of
adequate night fighter defenses. HoWever, the reduced losses from ena~y uir-
craft have been partly offset by increased losses frOL~ enemy anti-aircraft and
unknown causes. This is particularly true lIit.h regard to missions agai:wt
tnrg~ts ~n the Tokyo area. At the present time, it can be stated that it is
more exp<...nsive to bomb the Tokyo area by night than by day. Includ.iDg the
unknown 10~lf)es, the rate for the March alii April Tolcyo night mis810ns was
2.78% of aircraft over the target while the rate for day missions durime the
sam~ period at apprcxiJliately the Sllllle altitude WllS 1.67%. This experience 1s
supported by the losses on the To~ attack of 23 May.
ThtJ relation does not hold true for the H&roya area wbere tu Dilbt ralda
, have been decidedly cM.per than day raids. Durlq: the Marcb bUts, oDlT S
aircraft w~re lost to enemy action or unknown reasons from three nLlbt ra1da
(Missions 41, 4J., and 45) with more than 800 aircraft owr the tarpts. 0.
the night raid of 16 Nay, no tUrcra.tt were lost to GDlItlI1" action or 1IIlkftl*Il
Q.C.US8S.
 Th~l'e 15 insufficient evi~nCe to co6"parc the refO.tive cost of day am
night attacks against other Japanese tlU'ret arel1.5.
the second important factor ..Crectine 10SS5s to enemy action is the target
attacked. Regardless of the time or altitude of attack, the Tokyo areas has
bCtn ani still remains the costliest target area for the Bomber Command. The
Nagoya area is practically as costly 115 Tokyo for daylight operations but is
less expensive for night operations. This would indicate that the searchlight
am anti-aircraft def~nscs are less effective in the Nagoya than the Tokyo area'"
The lOfs rate for both the Kooo-Qsa\ul. area ani the Kyushu area is very low ohn. Y
the COlllIlaOO has not lost an aircraft in ite raids against targets in the KOl'l_
yams. or Shizuoka areas. The aini1@: lrls51ol1ll, considered sepnTo.tely, hO-ve sus-
tained 11 loss rate of 1.)3%.
PLrt of the reduced loss rate for March and April, therefore, can be as-
cribed to the increased effort on less costly targets, Osaka, Kobe, Koriywna
all1 the Kyushu airfields. ' ing force. Then the mmber of cnelllY nir attacks and the nunber of 8-29's lost
The third significtlnt change in operations d\'rJ.r~ the par,t tIVO :nonth:; has
been the reduction in bombing altitu::le. To stu::lj" the eff"!ct of this cha~e on
the loss rates, it WilS necessury to stOOy a serios ot' attacks at different.. al-
titudes but against the Sll.Cle Wrget at approximately the same time. Only f'Jl'
daylight attacks to the Tokyo area is suffici~nt data available to 5eet these
spec1f~cati('ns. A SIBalal"Y of these attacks is prestonted. in the follo'll':I ng tllble:
TOKYO DAYLIGHT RAIDS
II)ssr.s
AIRCRAFI' % Another important factor affecting the Commandls loss rate is the length
OVER TJ.RGET ENEMY AITJ..CKS A"."TACKS OF J./""lISSI0?i3
NO. O? BOLlB!N:i PER PER pm B-29 OVER liI':'H fl'R
lIISSIO~ ALTITUDE ~ MISSION TarAL MISSION OVER---.1ARGf:.1. A& TJ\@~'I'. ¥oQ')hT.
• •
During this period, fighter escort was flirnished for three missions. The
first Ulission wa.c #58 to Nakajima I~usashino in which the fighters "ere instru-
mental in keeping B-29 losses down to J aircraft in the face of 531 enemy at-
tacks. The second mission for which escort "as prOVided "US against the same
target, but only light en6D1Y opposition was ~ncountored and no 8-29'8 were lost.
Fighter escort was also prOVided for one day's raids against Kyushu when ene~
opposition was very weak. On the mission of April )0, fighter escort was sche-
duled but rendezvous "US not DIflde with the bombers. Up to 21 Iilay, poor weather
prevented fightlOr escort from accvmpanying Ill'\}' Yay missions.
It should be noted that another important factor affecting the loss rate
during recent months is the increasing eize of the B-29 strikll'€ force. III an
attompt to isolate the effect of larGe scale attacks on losses, a study was
llIAdeof the comparative effectiveness of enemy fighter attacks on 8-29 raids.
All daylight missions against Jap~n were listed according to size of the attack-
or dumaged from enemy aircraft w~re listed. It was found that the number of
eDeQY attacks per B-29 lost or damaged from enemy aircraft "as 41 for small scale
missions and )8 for large scale missions. 'i'hus the eneay air force has achiev-
ed tho saoe effectivlness, in terms of nun~r of B-29 aircr~ft lost and dam-
nged, regardlesu of the size of the attacking forc~. However, the increased
size of the attacking force has meant a substantial decrease in B-29 alrcrcft
lost and damaged, in terms of percent of aircraft over the target. The in-
ercaGed size hasnlt reduced the number of 105505, but it has reduced the loss
rate.
of time that the striking force is over enemy territory. In order to measure
this factor on daylight missicns, the following tc,ble was preparcd classifying
the losses according to the order of the afrcr~ft over the target.

24 November - 4 March
.,. 27000 ,)7 71 3063 438 '.7 34 6.3% 0
moo
7 - JO April

4 12000 421 10' 1061 26, 2., 7 1.7% 2

19000
• Exclu::les 3 raids on which weather "as bn.d and no el}E,my opposition IfI\C en-
cowtered.

1his table brines out the changes that have oecu..red in the conditions
roun:l:lng the daylight attacks on tho:! Tokyo area. AlOIl6 ;"lith the chenge in
tu::le t.as come an iooreasc in the striking force am a decline in the enemy
fighttr opposition. Both of these factors have more than balanced the increas
losses frOlll anti-aircraft that resulted from the lewer bombing altitude. Two
other factors effecting the lower 1055 rate were the availability of Iwo and
the protcction of fighter escort on two of the four missions at lower nltitude.
None of these factors can be isolated, but all of them contributtld to the net
result; nEUllely, that bombing at tho:! lower c.ltitu:le has turned out to be lesS
costl~ than at the higher altitude. The loss rates for duylight operatiOns a-
aainst llueoya reflect the S!ll:lC pattern. The two missions flown agsinst this
area It less than 20,000 feet,) cllClNntered rrleq.;ely lecs enemy air oppo:>ition
an::! sustained smaller losses ns at hiEher nltitudes.
J.::
cd
Fran this table it can be seen that a disproportionate shnre of losses are
occurri~ to groups first over the target. Upon examination. it baa been !ourd
that this is particularly true of lozscs frem e~ aircraft. This iDdicmtes
that total til:le over target has not apprcc1abl¥ af'teet.ed 10llSes on d8.7l1cbt
miBsiorw. The fiaures also in:licate the 1JIlportance of eI1Jlloy1Qi t1cbter e.oOl"t
with the first formations over the taraet.
-7-
 ('
- ~
The relation bet"een -me o;e-;'"tariet am losses for night missions is
as clclrly defined as for day missions. In terms of grQups over the target
overall picture 1s the following for 10 and 12 a:roup raids. '
~
~ ----.
•
A.lHGRAfT LOSSES QN BONBltll & MINItll MlSSWK:)
j.--- I ' I
• - TABLE I -

0011.-
l<lV.
I LOSSFS ACCORDIIIl TO GROuP OVER TARGE!' - -'
Ene!IlY Aircraft
NO. or
GROUPS
IN FOR{.E
1ST .illm J!m !ill:l. 2I!! MH 1nl 8TH 2lli 10TH 11TH 12TH .1 Lo:;:::Jes
Percent of Airborne .4'
1
1.69
7 1J
2.75
8
1.09

, Enemy Anti Aircraft

10
12 J
o
4
1
J
o
o
2
1
4
o
2
2
o
o
2
o
1
o
The data on group order over the target are not as significant for night
4--rJ Losses
Percent of Airborne

Enemy Ale & Anti-Aircraft

.24
1 7
.27 .27
9 17
.22

misslots as for day clssions because of the length of tice which each group Losses 2 4 J 11 20
spent ever the target. Because of the cethod of attnck by individuaJ. aircraft . Percent of Airborne .48 .8' .41 .JJ .26
the time eo.ch group Ifas over the target overlaps with the ti..cle of other groups,
Therefore, a lost aircraft of the 6th Group over the turget may actually have I Total Known Enemy Action
Losses 1 10 17 11
passed over the to.rget after the majority of the aircraft in the Inter groups.
The info~tlon aval1nble does indicate Ulo.t losses on night missilns have been I Percent of Airborne .4' 2.41 3.59 1.50
7
.27
Jl
.9J
71
·99
scatterecl throuehout the attacking force.
eON:;LUSION
Mechanical Failure
Losses
Percent of Airborne
, 4 J 7 , 24
1.20 .8' .41 .27 .15 .J1
To conclude, the derivation of a precise course of Bcticn from the above
Weather
study i~ impossible. But if it helps to unrsvel the factors which are inherent
in the ?roblem of aircraft losses it will have servt~ its purpose. It should Losses 1 J 4
be emph3.61zed again that the problellls of l:l1ssitln cost munt be subordil'lllted to • Percent of Airborne ·24 .12 .05
the mniJ objective, which is target destruction. ~the solection of plens to
achieve this result should never overlook their cost. Personnel Error
Losses
Percent of Airborne
1 2
.48
,
.68
2 4 14
·4' .08 .12 .18
Total Combat Operational
Losses
Percent of Airborne
1
.45
I1.93
8 4
.85
I1.098 12
.47
9
.27
42
.'4
Unknown
Losses 2 2 I 6
, 14 14 4J
Percent of Airborne .90 .48 1.27 .68 .'4 .42 .S5

= Losses
Percent of Airborne JJ
1.28
I1.62
54 162
2·09
_.- - - - . !
""'F.S.
-i. The source for the above figures is the reports suta1tted by each will(
UIder Regulation 15-18, "Aircraft Loss Report." This intonation 1s oaretullT
checked with data frClll all other sources iDCll.l!i~ speoillJ.1st, ditohinc, aid
mission reports. Although D:I classification can be cc:apletely acourate, 1t 1.
believed that the above figwoes represent the most n:rliable breaJrdClnlo anUable.

2. Each loss has been listed w:der the month 1n wbieh the abalon ocourred.
An aircraft which i6 surv"yed in Ilarch as a result of ant1-&1rcraft ct...,. 8lI8-
ta1ned in February is listed uo::Ier Febrw,ry.

J. Aircraft transferred to the Guam Air Depot are not COl181deNd 10....,
unless the aircraft is later surveyed.
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XXI BOMBER COMMA Ii)
FROM EmlIX ACTION
AIRCRAFI'
& UfI(WWN CAUSES
• -TABLE !I-

PERCEW;~ ~F., liRCRAFI' OVER TH,ETli..ARJ':;1' AREA

NUIl8E1 aVER Sf EOY ACTION & N

E~ ~~ -I ~ 1Ut«""~ ~f
AREA AND TIME I 01 TARGET
RAIDS AREA EN!lIY
Ale
•
I
I'OKla - (DAI)
Above 25000'
15000-25000'
la
2
975
196
2.26
.a .1a
.51 I 41 2 77
. 1 .9211
•.51 1 1.02 .0 '.&1
1.02
.0 2.22
Below 15000' 2 225 .44 .89 .89 2.22
._-
Total - Day
"
, .,,,t. , ,-"
TOKYO - (NIGHT) 4.00 4.00
15000-25000 1 1 25 .a .a .a .~

Below 15000-
Total··N1,ht
7
8
l22J. .25
.y'-
."
•2
.49 1.06
1.
1.72 2.78
1. 2.89-_
-
_.-_ -
TOTAL - TOKYO.. 22 2645 .98 .30 .49 1.78 1.17 2~,

NAGOYA - (DAY)
I 2.48 I l.a'll ).5a
,
o. ,,
I
Above 25000'
15000-25000'
Below 15000'
--L~ ~W'~
_,:5 1.:0
7 ~8: .21
loa,
.0
-
1.66 .0 1.66

8 667 1.05 .45 .75 2~25 I .7511 '.00

---_._---
Total ~ Dt.y
&OOYA-( NIGHT)
Below 15000' 4 8lB .a .24 .a .24 .'7 .61
12 1485 .47 .)4 .)4 1.14 .54 1.68
, mAL - NACOlA
KOBE&OSAKA (DAY)
Above 25000'
15000-25000'
I
1 I 71
98
11.41
.a
I .a.a I .a.a 11:~ I .a 111.41
.0 .0
Below 15000' a
Total - Day 2 I 1&1 I .59 I .a I ';0' f .59 I .a II .59

KOBE-OSAKA (NIGHT)

H+~
.68
_ _ _ _I
Belo" 15000 1
TOTAL - KOBE-OSAXA 4 757 .13 .66

KORIYA!M - (DAY)
I I I I .a f .a I
-
Below 15000' 2 15a .a .a f .a II .a

MIllING I.lISSrOll5
(NIGItt)
Abova 25000.
Below 15000'
J-4-- 1
6 ;ao
226
6 .0
.a
.a
.a
1.36
1.:33
.a
.a
.0
.a
1.36
1.33
••
.a
.a
.a
1.36
1.33
TOTAL-LIlIUOO r.lr~SIO
.-- 7

KYUSH~HIKOKU
15000-25000 1
Below 1 ,
(DAY)

'l'OTAL-KYUSHU-sHlItOlU
10

12
2
1)17
23
1552
H- .43
.39
.0
.43
.06
.15
.a
.1)
.5)
•85
.58
.a
••
.a
..:~
.58
:
 _ ENEMY AIRCRAFT
% OF AIRCRAFT
~ ANTI - AIRCRAFT
, OVER TARGET
5
1::3 ENEMY AlC ANTI-A/C a
~ UNKNOWN

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ABOVE 15,000- BELOW ABOVE BELOW ABOVE BELOW 15,000- BELOW
25,000 25,000 15,000 25,000 ?5,OOO 15,000 25,000 15,000
AREA n on _
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-