Yellow: Required to Read

Green: Not Sure lol

2. Warrantless
a. Search incident to lawful arrest
- Rule 126, sec. 13;

Cf. (1) United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); (Alcheon Rodriguez)

Facts:
After the US Government obtained an arrest warrant for Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez - a Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a leader of an organization that smuggles
narcotics into this country – Verdugo Urquidez was apprehended by Mexican police and transported him to the U.S. border, where he was arrested for various narcotics-related
offenses.
Following his arrest, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, working with Mexican officials searched his Mexican residences and seized certain documents.
The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a U.S. magistrate was ever received. At trial, the district court granted
Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country?
Held: NO
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.
(a) If there were a constitutional violation in this case, it occurred solely in Mexico, since a Fourth Amendment violation is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable
governmental intrusion whether or not the evidence seized is sought for use in a criminal trial. Thus, the Fourth Amendment functions differently from the Fifth Amendment, whose
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.
(b) The Fourth Amendment phrase "the people" seems to be a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution and contrasts with the words "person" and "accused" used in Articles
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating criminal procedures. This suggests that "the people" refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.
(c) The Fourth Amendment's drafting history shows that its purpose was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government and not
to restrain the Federal Government's actions against aliens outside United States territory. Nor is there any indication that the Amendment was understood by the Framers'
contemporaries to apply to United States activities directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.
Summary:
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply where United States agents searched and seized property located
in a foreign country owned by a nonresident alien in the United States.
The court held that "the people" intended to be protected by the Fourth Amendment were the people of the United States, and that the defendant's "legal but involuntary presence" on
U.S. soil (a direct result of his arrest) failed to create a sufficient relationship with the U.S. to allow him to call upon the Constitution for protection
Concurring opinions
Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, contending that the application of the Fourth Amendment in cases such as this would interfere with the ability of the U.S. to engage
in actions designed to protect the nation's interests abroad.
Justice Stevens also authored a concurring opinion, contending that the Fourth Amendment and its accompanying prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does
apply in such cases, but concluding that this search and seizure was reasonable because it was done with the permission and assistance of the government of Me xico and because
no U.S. court would have had the authority to issue a warrant for such a search.
Dissenting opinions
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, contending that the Fourth Amendment was indeed intended by the framers to apply to any action undertaken by the federal
government. They contended that the Constitution grants the government limited powers, and the application of rights is one such limitation. Therefore, no agent of the federal
government could ever conduct a search that was not governed by the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Blackmun also dissented, contending that when a foreign national is charged with a violation of U.S. criminal law, he is being treated as one of the governed.

(2) People v. Padilla, 269 SCRA 402 (1997); (Berna)

FACTS: In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable by
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.1Pending trial, appellant was released on bail.
Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He
appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and ordered his arrest for confinement
at the New Bilibid Prison.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari with an application for bail praying,
among others, to be allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading, appellant moved for the separate resolution of his bail application.

ISSUE: whether or not appellant is entitled to bail. NO

HELD: Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.2 On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. 3Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances4 under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong, bail shall be denied, 5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of
right.6

In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for his bail application for the sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence
is strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court and the appeal before respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear.
Thus: Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit.

- People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999); - (Ces Naga)

Davide Jr., C.J.

Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring, he intercepted a radio call from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to
Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. When the speed boat landed, the male
passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction and broke into a run. They introduced
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. Speaking in English, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand. Cid thus tried speaking tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man
acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. The RTC characterized
the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the metamphetamine hydochlorine as corpus delicti.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.

Held: NO. Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. The Court found that there is no probable cause.

It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that
the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the
Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of
Court. From all indications, the search was nothing like a fishing expedition.

The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him,
how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately,
intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

- Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, 297 SCRA 376 (1998); (Christine Nartea)
Facts:
Judge Barron was designated as Acting Presiding Judge where a civil case was pending. In the said case, Mainit Marine Resources Corporation, Inc (MMRC) is one of the
parties. The retired court employee named Casildo Gabo went to see David Crear the president of MMRC and informed the latter that Judge Barron wanted to see him at Salawaki
Beach Negros Occidental. Sensing that there was more than meets the eye in the message of Gabo, Crear informed the NBI office that he and Barron were to meet at the resort at
3pm. NBI Agent-in-charge conducted discrete surveillance to confirm the veracity of the info communicated to them by Crear.
David Crear met Judge Barron. Thereafter, Crear went back to his office and entered to his computer his recollection of events before and during his talk with Judge Barron.
He stated therein that Judge Barron offered a favorable judgment in exchange of $4,000 (Barron said he will use the money for his child and wife’s travel to US). Crear executed a
sworn statement and filed a complaint sheet with the NBI. NBI drew up an entrapment plan. Since Crear don’t have a cash, NBI agents had to improvise. NBI marked and treated the
11 bundles of cash with fluorescent powder.
The money would be delivered to Judge inside the latter’s car. NBI agents positioned themselves and waited for the pre-arranged signal. Immediately after boarding the car,
Crear gave the pre-arranged signal of opening the door on his side twice, indicating that the money had been handed to and received by Judge Barron.
 The NBI reported the arrest as follows:
"NBI operatives then rushed up towards the car and caught Subject BARRON in flagrante delicto in possession of the marked money in the act of putting the same underneath
the driver's seat from a black leatherette clutch bag. During the arrest, Subject BARRON tried to draw his gun from his shoulder holster but was prevented from doing so.
"Subject BARRON was handcuffed and was informed of the reason for his arrest and was likewise informed of his rights under the Constitution as well as his rights under R.A. 7438.
"Recovered underneath the driver's seat were the eleven (11) bundles of marked money and a black leatherette clutch bag. Confiscated likewise from his possession was 9mm Cal.
Browning Short Pistol with Serial No. 9203338 from his shoulder holster."
Issue: Whether or not the NBI agents in this case are authorized to conduct a warrantless search.
Held: Yes.
Where the arrest of the accused was lawful, having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime as well
as for the body search upon him, the same being incidental to a lawful arrest. There being a lawful arrest upon the person of the respondent judge, the NBI agents were
authorized to conduct a warrantless search. In People vs. De Lara, [236 SCRA 291] the Court held: "A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of
the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made." As previously held, the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer
to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. Moreover, "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the
arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized." As shown on record, a firearm was confiscated on the
person of the respondent judge. There was even an attempt on the part of the respondent judge to draw such weapon. He was only prevented from doing so on account
of the timely confiscation of the firearm by the agents. The search, being merely an incident to the lawful arrest, cannot be stigmatized as unlawful.
Hence, search incidental to a lawful arrest is valid.

- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); (Jerald)

FACTS: Pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the police went to Chimel’s (defendant) home to arrest him for the burglary of a coin shop. Chimel’s wife let the police inside and when
Chimel returned home they arrested him. Without a search warrant and without permission, the police then conducted a complete search of Chimel’s home. The police instructed
Chimel’s wife to remove items from drawers and eventually the police found and seized a number of coins, medals and tokens. Over Chimel’s objection, these items were introduced
at trial. The appellate courts affirmed the decision holding that the search of Chimel’s home was valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest.

ISSUE: Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?"

HELD: In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches
"incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person,
they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks
against government abuse.

- Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987); (Jued)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the RTC Quezon City which held that Search Warrant issued by its Judge Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and TRO
enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained from that Search Warrant are hereby made permanent.
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search Warrant meets the standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context
of the criminal offense of Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which are less susceptible of particularization since the offense does not involve an
isolated act or transaction.

Moreover, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision holding that, insofar as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was incident to her
arrest and could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a warrantless search can be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest and that since
Mila Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a search without warrant could not be made.

Cf. Nolasco v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985); (Kate)

- Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990); (Yana)

Gancayco J.

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges they spotted petitioner (Romeo Posadas) carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition gun, a
smoke (tear gas) grenade,4 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.

They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest and search was valid.

HELD: YES. There was a valid warrantless arrest and search in the case at bar.
RATIO: At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were, the said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
HOWEVER, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search"
without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa:

"Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more,
i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government in the interest of public security.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter
is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures has not been violated."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

- Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159 (1997); (Alcheon Rodriguez)

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Nature:
Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866:
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor
from the proper authorities.

Petitioner: Sammy Malacat y Mandar

Facts:
At arraignment, Malacat, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. At pre-trial Malacat admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," while the Prosecution
admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.

At trial on the merits, the Prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino C. Serapio, the investigating officer; and
Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.

A. Testimonies of Rodolfo Yu
Rodolfo Yu (Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila).
Yu testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised
of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions.

As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside Malaca’s "front waist
line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police
Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza
Miranda.
Yu recognized Malaca as the previous Saturday, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and
other policemen chased Malaca and his companions. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them.
Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade
he allegedly recovered from petitioner.
Josefino C. Serapio (investigating officer) declared that Malaca and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla for investigation. Serapio conducted the inquest of the
two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel.
Despite Serapio's advice, Malaca and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer.
Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession there being no PAO lawyer available. The petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. After, Serapio prepared the affidavit
of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Unit for examination.
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took Malacat’s confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence.

B. Testimonies by Accused-Malacat
Malacat was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27
August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air.
Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched him and two other men, but found nothing in their possession.
However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer.
The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at him "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into his mouth and
said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me."

Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. He was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented.
Issue: Whether there was a lawful arrest and search made against Malaca by the police officers?
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from Malacat's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he
allegedly seized.

 According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim.
  On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer
Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but nearly (7) months later or on 19 March 1991;
 There was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner.
 In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from Malacat. Yu did not, and was not made to,
identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities
failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda,
 Considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers;
 It was then unnatural and against common experience that Malacat simply stood there in proximity to the police officers.
 Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to Malacat in order to discern his eyes "moving very fast." (sings: when you look me in
the eyes, I catch a glimpse of heaven)
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio;
· such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
 Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist
petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available.
 Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it
executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid
GENERAL RULE as regards arrests, searches and seizures:
A warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same, subject to certain exceptions.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest Section 5(a): "in flagrante delicto,"
Section 5(b): a "hot pursuit" arrest
Valid warrantless searches, are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6)a "stop and frisk."
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
"Stop-and-Frisk" - Two-Fold Interest:
 (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer
3 reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
· First - grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any
police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
· Second - there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". This
was an observation which is doubtful since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
· Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malaca was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade
was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was
indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object
in [sic] his person. What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court
and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR
is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
b. Consented search
- People v. Malasigui, 63 Phil. 221 (1936); (Berna)
FACTS:
At about 5:30 o’clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head, on a
path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato, and situated within the property of another Chinese named Yu Enching Sero.

The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was convicted of said crime and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to return the sum of P150 to the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Tan Why in the sum of P1,000, with costs.
The accused appealed therefrom and assigns five errors as committed by the lower court, which may be briefly summarized as follows:

"(1) In not having granted him a period of twenty-four hours to prepare his defense;
"(2) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him during the search of his person, without the corresponding judicial warrant;
"(3) In having admitted Exhibits A, B, C, D, F, L and L-1, as evidence in the case;
"(4) In having denied his petition to dismiss for lack of evidence, filed immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his evidence; and
"(5) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide, instead of acquitting him."

When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was still alive and able to answer laconically "Kagui" when Moro Alamada, was among the first to approach him, asked who
had attacked him. the appellant was known by this name in Cotabato, whereupon Lieutenant A. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered his immediate arrest.

Alamada testified that the deceased, shortly before he died, named Kagui as his aggressor, and the appellant was known by this name in Cotabato. He also testified that on the
morning in question, he saw the appellant, with a club in his hand, pass by the house where he and the deceased lived. The club, then with bloodstains, was found near the place
where Tan Why was wounded. Many other persons testified.
ISSUE: Whether or Not, accused was illegally arrested and that his place was illegally searched for incriminating evidences. –NO.

HELD: "A person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime." Article III, section 1,
paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and said constitutional precept has been interpreted as
not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.

When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be
considered unreasonable, much less unlawful. "In these circumstances of search and seizure of defendant engaged in the commission of a felony, and of which the officers had reliable
information and cause to believe, there is nothing unreasonable within the import of that term in the Fourth Amendment. After the amendment, as before it, the law necessarily sanctions
arrest, search, and seizure of persons engaged in commission of a crime, or reasonably believed to have committed a felony, without any paper warrant. This case is so plain that it
suffices to say so."

The appellant likewise contends that there was error in the admission of the evidence Exhibits A, B, C and D, alleging that they had been taken from him through force and intimidation.
The record shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for the return of said effects (Exhibits A, B, C, and D) to him on the ground that they were
unlawfully taken away from him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the government witnesses,
Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets,
Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least opposition. It follows, therefore, that the lower court committed no error in accepting as evidence
Exhibits A, B, C and D, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof from him when searched, but also because the effects found in the possession of a person
detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto. The facts which we consider as having
been fully established in view of the foregoing considerations, constitute the crime of robbery with homicide defined and punished with reclusion perpetua to death in article 294,
subsection 1, of Revised Penal Code.

- Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 48 (1937); (Ces Naga)

Ponente: Imperial, J.

Facts:
The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board went to respondent Judge Eduardo David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, petitioner kept in his house
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In
his oath, the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon
this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and
the immediate delivery of such to respondent Judge. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and
seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner asks that the warrant issued by CFI Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at
anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him. Petitioner
also claims that the search warrant issued is illegal because upon the affidavit of the agent in whose oath he delivered that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to
serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the search warrant is valid – NO.
2. Can the search warrant be served at night? – NO.
3. Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation, constitutional – NO.
4. Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees made by petitioner – NO.
Held:
1. NO. Section 1, par 3 of Art 3 of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders No. 58, require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but
that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within he personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal.
It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition
of any other witness. The warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based solely on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
2. NO. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well
founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.
As to the description of the books and documents seized, the Court ruled that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been give, particularly because it is difficult
to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
3. NO. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they
were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused
to testify against himself.
4. NO. There was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred but to the
institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the
search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory
furnished him by the agents.

But cf.
(1) peaceful submission not consent to search
- Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938); (Christine Nartea)
Facts:
An agent of the Anti-Usury Board (Mariano Almeda) obtained from the justice of peace of Tarlac a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person,
house or store of petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer.” On the same date (November
10, 1934), Almeda, together with the captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to petitioner’s office in Victoria, Tarlac. After showing the search warrant to petitioner’s bookkeeper
(Alfredo Salas), and without the presence of petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, Almeda proceeded with the warrant’s execution. Two packages of records and a locked
filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized. Said papers and documents were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and were turned
over by it (the Board) to the fiscal who filed 6 separate criminal cases against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
After the seizure, petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. Moreover, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by the petitioner twice (January 7 and
June 4, 1937).
Issue: Whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the present case, there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Held:
No, there’s no waiver by petitioner of her constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (a) it must be issued upon probable cause; (b) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (c) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the applicant may produce; and (d) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized. In the case at bar, the existence of probable cause was determined not be the judge himself but by the applicant.
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied.
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear that: (a) right exists, (b) persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right, and (c) said person had an actual intention to relinquish said right. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his/her behalf.
In the case at bar, she could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon. Moreover, upon knowing of the
seizure of some of her documents and papers, she had sent her lawyers to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return of the documents seized. The failure
on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right, rather it is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
The waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made. However, under the facts stated in the opinion of the court
it was held that the delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.

(2) Effect of voluntary surrender

- People v. Agbot, 106 SCRA 325 (1981); (Jerald)

FACTS: Appellant Antonio Agbot of the Mandayan tribe was charged with murder for the death of his sister, Leona Agbot. According to the prosecution, the victim's husband and
stepson were relaxing at the porch when they heard a gunshot after which the victim came rushing from the kitchen wounded and bleeding on the right breast. She died seconds later.
It was shown that before the shooting, appellant Agbot had threatened the deceased when she refused to return his 12-year old daughter, who had been under her custody since the
child was 2 years old. The accused admitted his guilt before the barrio captain during the investigation at the house of Leona Agbot, and in an extrajudicial confession executed later
before the police authorities and sworn before the municipal judge. The gunshot used by appellant was recovered from his house. Based on these evidence, appellant was convicted
and sentenced to death. On automatic review, appellant disputed the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, there having been no post-mortem examination made nor
a ballistic examination conducted, and denied having made any admission. He claimed that his confession was extracted by force and maltreatment. He further alleged that the
confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search warrant and its use as evidence is not permissible.

The Supreme Court held that appellant's confession which fulfilled all elements of admissibility, supported by evidence of corpus delicti and the finding in appellant's house of the
weapon that undisputably inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the deceased, sufficiently proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Judgment affirmed, but the death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Sec. 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu which entitles him as a member
of the Cultural Minority to life imprisonment instead of death, and also taking into account the length of time he had already been in the death row.

ISSUE: WoN the confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search warrant.

HELD: No.

The verity of appellant's admission of guilt having been firmly established, the contention that the confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search warrant and its
use as evidence is not permissible, clearly becomes devoid of factual or legal basis. With his confession, his voluntarily surrendering the weapon with which he committed the offense
would be but a natural consequence of his having admitted guilt. The taking of the gun from his house was, therefore, with consent and acquiescence that would not constitutes
violation of the constitutional guaranty against the admissibility of illegally seized objects as evidence against the accused.
With appellant's confession fulfilling all elements of admissibility and supported as it is by independent evidence of corpus delicti, which is the fact of the crime having been committed,
together with the finding in appellant's house of the weapon that undisputably inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the deceased, it would be futile to argue against the sufficiency
of the evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as counsel has tried to do, and commendably so, had it not been for his manifest misreading of the evidence. Thus, he would
aver that corpus delicti has not been proven when the fact of death due to foul means has been so undeniably established by the lifeless body bearing wounds that undisputably
caused the death to the victim.

(3) Effect of posting bail

- Rule 126, sec. 14;
Cf. Rule 114, sec. 26;

c. “Stop and frisk”, automobile roadblocks,

and “other less intrusive searches”

- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); (Jued)

Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law: An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may
be armed and dangerous.

Facts:

This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious
circumstances.
Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to the statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in the penitentiary.
The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street.

The officer had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years
and a detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He explained that he had developed
routine habits of observation over the years, and that he would "stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in this case, when I
looked over, they didn't look right to me at the time."

The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature
of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue: Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?

Held: The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a
person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to
be armed.

Dissent: Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate
would not possess.

Concurrence: Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.

Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and
frisk.

Discussion: The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and
if the officer’s suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men
for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.

- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); (Kate)

- Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; (Yana)

FACTS: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by
Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo
and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos
and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the high- voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep
loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes
pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on
15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

HELD: NO. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined
under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. seizure of evidence in plain view;
3. search of moving vehicles;
4. consented warrantless search;
5. customs search;
6. stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
7. exigent and emergency circumstances.

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is
not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.

Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The
fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct
of a search without a warrant.

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search
and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.

The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged
down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police
officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes
that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases
where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched.
And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating
the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

- Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989); (Alcheon Rodriguez)

Ponente: PADILLA, J
Nature: A petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional
Petitioner: Ricardo C. Valmonte - sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila;
Respondent: Renato De Villa and National Capital Region District Command
Facts:
The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court
order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of
the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
Issue:
Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures

Held
No,
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, it was held that individual petitioners
who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e.,
without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there
was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize
the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military
manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

- Manalili v. CA, 280 SCRA 400 (1997); (Berna)

DOCTRINE: In Flagrante Delicto. When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a
search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen
being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to
be such.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. With the agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail
bond. After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision convicting appellant of
illegal possession of marijuana residue.
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral
and disinterested witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of
a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor
moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
ISSUES: Whether or Not the Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate
courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk. Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s): x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule.
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Assessment of Evidence. Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions which did not support
petitioners conviction. We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a
departure from this rule.
Sufficiency of Evidence. The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these
leaves was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked to
show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
The Proper Penalty. The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six
years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty.
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of marijuana: Sec. 8. x x x x The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp. Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one
day to twelve years.

- Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159 (1998); (Ces) Supra.

- People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997); (Christine Nartea)

Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of police officer Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side of
the road in lieu of a police check point. Valenzuela asked permission to search the vehicle- The o'cers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped
in newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the package was opened, Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag
was a “padala of their uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He
however denied knowledge of the contents of the package.
Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away marijuana to another. Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed that Noriel
manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.
Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating that the lower court erred in saying that the act of “giving away to another is not defned under RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware of the contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless arrest and seizure was
violated.
Defense: bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained through illegal search and seizure. Appellant said that he and his co-accused were not committing
any crime at the time of search as they were merely riding a taxicab.
Solicitor General: Warrantless search and seizure allowed where the culprits are riding moving vehicles because warrant cannot be secured in time to apprehend the mobile target
BOTH ARGUMENTS WRONG.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the bricks of marijuana are admissible in evidence in this case.
Held:
Yes, admissible.
One of the exceptions to the rule against warrantless search is search and seizure to moving vehicles. Here the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at the
police checkpoint. It should be stressed as a caveat that the search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to routine checks — visual inspection or flashing a light
inside the car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body searches. A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause. In the
case at bar, probable cause is not evidence. First, the radio communication from General Nazareno, which the arresting officers received and which they were implementing at that
time, concerned possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area. Second, Noriel Lacerna's suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in his seat when PO3 Valenzuela's
car passed alongside the taxicab might have annoyed the latter, or any other law enforcer, and might have caused him to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare acts do
not constitute probable cause to justify the search and seizure of appellant's person and baggage. Furthermore, the Claudio ruling cannot be applied to this case because the marijuana
was securely packed inside an airtight plastic bag and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana odor, was offered by the prosecution.
Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in agrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search.
Valenzuela expressly sought appellant's permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his
consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.
The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no poisonous tree to speak of.

- Caroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (Jerald)

FACTS: The year was 1921 -- the height of the Prohibition Era in the United States. The Volstead Act, which was formally known as the National Prohibition Act, criminalized the
production, sale, and transportation of alcohol, and federal prohibition agents were on the lookout for illegal alcohol sellers, also known as bootleggers.

In Michigan, federal agents were mounting a case against notorious bootlegger George Carroll. The agents strongly suspected that Carroll was transporting and selling liquor, but their
attempts to catch him in the act were proving unsuccessful. One night in December, the agents followed Carroll and his associate, John Kiro, as the pair drove from Detroit to Grand
Rapids. The agents pulled Caroll and Kiro over on the highway and searched the vehicle.

As they searched Carroll's vehicle, agents discovered 68 bottles of illegal liquor concealed in the back seat upholstery. The agents arrested Carroll for violating the Volstead Act.
Carroll appealed his conviction all the way to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does the Volstead Act's exception to the warrant requirement violate the Fourth Amendment? In other words, can law enforcement officers search a vehicle without first
obtaining a warrant?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that law enforcement officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle when the officers have probable cause to believe that evidence of a
crime or contraband will be found as a result of the search.

The Court noted that Congress early observed the need for a search warrant in non-border search situations,[2] and Congress always recognized "a necessary difference" between searches of buildings and vehicles
"for contraband goods, where it is not practical to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."[3] The warrantless search was thus valid.

The Court held, however,

It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.... [T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or
illegal merchandise.[4]
The Court added that where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used. [5] That became known as the Carroll doctrine: a vehicle could be searched without a search
warrant if there was probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the vehicle, coupled with exigent circumstances to believe that the vehicle could be removed from the area
before a warrant could be obtained.

- Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968); (Jued)

ZALDIVAR, J

Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks
left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load
of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods
and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido
Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police
and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment
for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of
Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago.

Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court
in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966,
Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released
as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to
Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00.

On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police
Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action
on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of
the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same
may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever
found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully
effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.

This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question
at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.

Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still
authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search
of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with
law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

- Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973); (Kate)

- Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; (Yana)

MOVING VEHICLES

FACTS: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by
Rudy Caballes. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and
they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos
and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the high voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep
loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Defense of Caballes:
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him
to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to
Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to
proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as backup and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.

After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant’s jeep and covered
with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
case, he was intercepted. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his
explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up in jail for a week.

Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes
pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals armed the trial court decision on
15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of evidence obtained by virtue thereof were valid.

HELD: No. The warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of evidence obtained by virtue thereof were not valid.

Search of moving vehicle

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders
or constructive borders like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion
to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop-and-search” without warrant at military or police checkpoint which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as
it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search BUT IT IS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS. It can be permissible when:

8. Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair rounds;
9. Simply looks into a vehicle;
10. Flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
 11. Where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
12. Where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
13. Where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle. They
had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves which according to the police officers was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not uncommon
for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a search without warrant.

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.

- Asuncion v. CA, 302 SCRA 490 (1999); (Alcheon Rodriguez)

Ponente: MARTINEZ, J.:

Nature:
Petitioner: Jose Maria M. Asuncion
Facts:
Following reports from a confidential informer, the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol at Barangay Taong with specific instruction to look
for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher named Jose Maria M. Asuncion also known as Binggoy and/or Vic Vargas.

While patrolling at midnight of December 6, 1993, along Leoo Street, the informant pointed a gray Nissan car and told the policemen that the occupant thereof had shabu in his
possession.

They immediately flagged down the car and the driver turned out to be herein petitioner known as Vic Vargas in the movies. A consented search in his vehicle was conducted which
yielded a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be shabu.

Another plastic packet containing the same type of substances suspected to be shabu was taken from his underwear when he was frisked at the police headquarters.

On the other hand, the accused denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 1993, between 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening, he was abducted at gun point
in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen
who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was
thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 in the evening as he was then sleeping at the said office.
When charged, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of regulated drugs punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act , R.A. 642. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts ruling. On petition for review before the Supreme Court, petitioner questions the constitutionality of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence against him.
Issue: WON the search upon Asuncion s vehicle is valid.
Held: Yes
The Supreme Court held that the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle -petitioners vehicle was flagged
down by the apprehending officers upon identification.

Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioners automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action. The apprehending officers
even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner
himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
Note:
SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AN EXCEPTION. -- The rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one
of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining
the existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle - petitioner's
vehicle was flagged down by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioner's automobile without a warrant
since the situation demanded immediate action.
VALID IN CASE AT BAR AS PETITIONER CONSENTED THERETO. -- The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter
agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found
as a result were admissible in evidence.
JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. -- First of all, even though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and confirmed the area where he allegedly
was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in the vicinity. Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in, taking
into account reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area. Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the
petitioner, who was then able to evade arrest. Thus, when the police officers suddenly sighted petitioner's gray Nissan Sentra, they obviously no longer had the time to apply for a
search warrant. The dictates of urgency necessitated the flagging down of the vehicle.
EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT RESPECTING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT; CASE AT BAR. --
Time and again, it has been held that the findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. In this case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this time-honored precept. Taken as a whole, the
evidence for the prosecution, particularly the positive testimonies of the apprehending police officers, SPO1 Antonio Advincula, PO3 Enriqueto Parcon and PO3 Rolando Pilapil, more
than met the quantum of proof needed to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court was correct in giving scant consideration of the petitioner's defense,
which consisted of mere denials of the incidents narrated by the prosecution witnesses. Like all other cases involving the possession of prohibited drugs, it was argued by the petitioner
that he had been framed-up. But then, in drug related cases, for this defense to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing.

- Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975); (Berna)

· On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr.,
for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
· On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI set aside its order of 10
April 1964 and granted the company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from
the Philippine Fisheries Commission and the Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ.
· On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case 56701 for failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the Navy to appear on the scheduled
date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of the company.
· On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta.
Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
· On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the
two vessels.
· On 18 August 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels.
· On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of
Tony Lex VI both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal
filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels.
· On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody.
· On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the Commission and the
Navy. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan;
that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery
Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled.
· On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by
the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels.
· On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the ground, among others,
that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in
custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's
losses in case the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime.
· On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without
the requisite licenses. YES
Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives
such as dynamites and the like; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively
implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore
exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as
Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than
P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats,
tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act."
Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption
that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the possession or discover in any fishing boat or
fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew
have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives."
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to
22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or
imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly
responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned:
Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and
Provided, further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
Under Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the
proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to Fishing.
Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD 34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code,
to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the customs and
tariff laws. Herein, when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI,
otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs
Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the
Fisheries Law.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not
practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our
fishery laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

- People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1990); (Ces)

Ponente: Gancayco, J.
Facts:

The Special Operations Group received a tip about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods and gunrunning. As part of the
operations, the recruitment of confidential men and “deep penetration agents” was carried out, One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia.

Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim). Together with Lim, Tia, in one of the meetings in China, was introduced to Lo Ho Wing (Peter Lo) whom Tia found out to be the
person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim. As a “deep penetration agent,” Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate to
Capt. Luisito Palmera. Tia informed Palmera of their return to the Philippines after they left for Hong Kong.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. Lo and Tia boarded the taxicab while Lim followed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of the NARCOM (Narcotics
Command), having been notified by Palmera, stationed themselves in strategic places around the arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia leave the airport, the operatives followed them.

The operatives approached the taxicab and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle.
The operatives requested from Lo and Tia permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red travel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt. Cayabyab, one of the
operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed aluminium
came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its content more closely. He had the three travel bags opened for inspection. From the red travel bag, 6
tin cans were found, including the one previously opened and nothing else was recovered from the other bags. The tea bag contained metamphetamine. The three were charged with
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He contends that the officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the
date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time. Moreover, as claimed by Lo, the fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle
does not automatically make the warrantless search fall within the coverage of exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect search.

Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure on the accused is illegal
Held: No.

The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least 3 well-recognized exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an arrest, (b) a search
of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the search in question, having been made in a moving vehicle, does not need a valid warrant
to effect search. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

The knowledge of the authorities (that the appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the county; that the appellant was a member of the suspected
syndicate; and that they were certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from china) was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

- People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); (Christine Nartea)

Facts:
On August 1988, the Narcotics Division of the Baguio City police received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant, alleging that petitioner Balingan is going to
Manila with a bag full of marijuana. Acting on such information, police officer Obrera conducted surveilance of petitioner in different places, such as her house and at bus stations
around the city. Upon receiving information that petitioner boarded a Dangwa Bus, Obrera immediately swent to the terminal to confirm the said report. He boarded the bus and saw
petitioner carrying a gray maleta. A prior checkpoint along Kennon road was set up by the police in order to apprehend petitioner. Upon arrival at the checkpoint, the bus stopped and
yielded to the police officers. Obrera announced a routine check on petitioner, but petitioner did not respond. The police officers then grabbed the bag in the overhead compartment
of petitioner Balingan and opened it. Just as they suspected, they found approximately 3 kilos of marijuana.
The police officers then requested Balingan to go with them to the police station. However, the petitioner resisted and bit one of the police officers. Eventually, after thirty
minutes, they were able to pull Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City police station and locked her up in jail.
The marijuana confiscated were then submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for a confirmatory test on the said prohibited drugs. The test yielded a positive result. Petitioner
alleged that she is innocent and that the gray bag is not hers. Notwithstanding petitioner’s protestations, the trial court found her guilty of the crime of illegal transportation of prohibited
drugs and has charged with a penalty of life imprisonment.

Issue: Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa bus is valid.

Held:
Yes.
The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division
received an information that Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been previously
monitored by the Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag,
upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless search of Balingan's bag was not illegal.
- Obra v. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (1999); (Jerald)

FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio. On June 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on
behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet,
belonging to Gillies family. On the same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit requesting assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by Sps. Brett in illegal mining. The
next day, Obra wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspection and field investigation and requesting them to be present “so that
all… matters… shall be gathered and collated in order for this Office to take appropriate action.” Elements of RUC under Maj. Densen seized the truck as it was entering “Mamakar”
mining area. It was impounded by the military and prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions. Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages with
the RTC as the truck was seized without due process in violation of their constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were authorized to seize the vehicle in the absence of any finding of probable cause (PC).

HELD: NO. Although petitioners have authority to order seizure and confiscation via PD. 1281. Art IV, S3 of the 1973 Constitution merely validated the grant by law to non-judicial
officers of the power to issue warrants but did not in any way exempt them from the duty of determining the existence of probable cause. Petitioner Obra’s letters to private respondents
and Grybos clearly stated that an investigation was to be held on July 2-5, 1985 to determine the veracity of the allegations of Grybo’s complaint. His only basis was an alleged
certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to the Sps. However, such certification was not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be justified under the
moving vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of probable cause. The doctrine does not give police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming the RTC’s decision that petitioners are liable for damages (P100,000) and attorney’s fees (P10,000) in violation of the Sps.
Rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

e. In plain sight
- Harris v. US, 390 U.S. 234 (1966); (Jued)

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with robbery under the District of Columbia Code. D.C. Code Ann. 22-2901. At his trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner
moved to suppress an automobile registration card belonging to the robbery victim, which the Government sought to introduce in evidence. The trial court, after a hearing, ruled that
the card was admissible. Petitioner was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two to seven years.

On appeal. US CA for District of Columbia Circuit reversed holding that the card had been obtained by means of an unlawful search.

Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery. The car was traced and petitioner was arrested as he was entering it, near his home. After a cursory search of
the car, the arresting officer took petitioner to a police station. The police decided to impound the car as evidence, and a crane was called to tow it to the precinct. It reached the
precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner. At this moment, the windows of the car were open and the door unlocked. It had begun to rain.
A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge to search the vehicle thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and
to attach to the vehicle a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the impounding. Pursuant to a departmental regulation, a police officer searched an
impounded car held as evidence of a robbery. The search completed, the officer opened the car door for the purpose of rolling up a window and thus protecting the car and its contents.
On opening the door, the officer saw, exposed to plain view, the automobile registration card belonging to the victim of the robbery. This card was used as evidence in petitioner's trial.
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals over his contention that the card had been illegally seized following a warrantless search.

ISSUE: WON the officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal search.

HELD: The card was subject to seizure and introducible in evidence since it was not discovered by means of a search in the technical sense, but was plainly visible to the officer who
had a right to be in a position of viewing it. The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case. The precise and detailed
findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to
protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances.

Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.

- Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 472 (1971); (Kate)

- Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986); (Yana)

FACTS: A search warrant was issued by respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales on May 10, 1984. The application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt.. Mauro
Quillosa. Together with Quillosa were two witnesses, Ismael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who presented to respondent judge their respective affidavits taken by police investigator
Pat. Josue Lining. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, as such respondent judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application to ascertain if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and sworn the said application before respondent judge. Roans house was searched two days after the issuance of
the search warrant. The said search was conducted by military authorities. Despite none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who performed the search
found one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy of one person's house

HELD: To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable
cause, as described by judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. Capt. Quillosa was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information
personally known to him as required by settled jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must made his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because there was no valid search warrant and absent of such warrant,
the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right to seize
the pistol and bullets.

- People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993); (Alcheon Rodriguez)

Ponente: ROMERO, J
Nature: The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding
him guilty of selling marijuana
Respondent: Mari Musa
Facts:
Mari Musa was accused and convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana which is an illegal substance and trade. Musa appealed the trial court’s decision. He was
arrested after a buy bust operation conducted by Narcom agents Sgt. Jesus Belarga and Sgt. Amado Ani. Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy
operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989, later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned
over to Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana.
Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day. On December 14, 1989, Sgt. Belarga led a team of Narcom agents who went to Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation. Upon arrival of the Narcom agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City,
Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places.
The appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place (the P20.00 bill for two parcels of newspaper wrapped marijuana). After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the
other Narcom agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand. The Narcom agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The
agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money; they asked him where it was.
The appellant said that he gave it to his wife who was nowhere to be found. The Narcom agents then conducted a search of the whole house in pursuit of the marked P20.00 bill.
During their search they seized a plastic bag in the kitchen, when they asked Musa about the contents of the bag appellant replied he did not know.
The Narcom agents then proceeded to examine the contents of the bag which evidently contained marijuana. The Narcom agents confiscated the bag of marijuana and arrested Mari
Musa. Mari Musa was convicted guilty by the trial courts.
Issue: Was Mari Musa’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures violated? Hence this appeal
Held:
No, Rule 126 Sec 12 of the Rules of court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12 Search incident to lawful arrest – A person Lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offence, without a search warrant.
In a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest
even without arrest and search warrants. In the case at bar, the Narcom agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then
searched the entire house and, in the kitchen found and seized a plastic bag hanging in the corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the “PLAIN VIEW” of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The “plain view” doctrine, may not, however be used to launch unbridled searched
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person
searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the Narcom agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen
which was not withing their “plain view” when they arrested the appellant. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, the “plain view” doctrine does not apply and the marijuana
contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence
does not however diminish, in any way the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It is held that by virtue of the testimony of Sgt. Ani and Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant
to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Wherefore, the appeal is DIMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED [Note- where search was made without a warrant, the marihuana
cigarette or cigarettes seized in the raid were inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Zapanta, 195 SCRA 200)]

- People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999); (Berna)

FACTS: Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a
buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ”
[Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit
looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside
it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box.
He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks
were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO
Held: Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in
the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is
no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.
“ Plain view ” issue: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence.
Requisites
 The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
 The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
 It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten
bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.
It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was
in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation
of the drug as evidence in court.
 Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
 Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug
- People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999); (Ces)

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
One evening, an anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon that appellants were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. Together with SPO1
Fernando Arenas, they proceeded immediately to the house of the suspects. When they reached the house, they “peeped through a small window and saw one man and a woman
repacking suspected marijuana.” They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers and thereupon confiscated the tea bags containing marijuana and some drugs
paraphernalia. As such, Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Appellant delos Reyes claimed that he and his wife were merely tenants in Bolasa’s house and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. He added that when he
learned that Bolasa was repacking marijuana inside their room, he immediately ordered her to leave. As for Bolasa, she claimed that she was about to leave the house when she met
a certain “Rico” and conversed with him for some time. On appeal, Bolasa asserted that the marijuana seized from her cannot be used as evidence against her because the search
in her residence was illegal as her arrest preceding the search was likewise illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid or Whether or not the objects were seized in plain view
Held: No. The arrest is illegal. It does fall under any of the instances allowed by law in the absence of a warrant. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime
was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a
penal establishment.

It cannot be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence later
on found to contain marijuana was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of
accused-appellants inside the room.

It indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the entities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused, they (the police) should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid
arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused;
hence, they were acquitted.

f. “Private searches”
- People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991); (Christine Nartea)
Facts:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying
with them four gift wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and
expect the packages however appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted.
Before delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita, following standard procedure opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, Job and three NBI agents and a photographer went to
the Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the box in which appellants’ packages were places and in the presence of the NBI agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and
took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.
Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
No. Marijuana leaves found herein are admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizure applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution’s records further show, appellant did
not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment. On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which
a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

- Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735 (1997); (Jerald)

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling
price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope
addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination
of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked
by complainants.Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Issue: WoN the check is admissible as evidence despite the alleged unreasonable search and seizure perpetrated by private individual.

Held: Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill
of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to
Catolico.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one months salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay
at one-half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter’s decision, viz., that the evidence against
private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures
which is hereby set aside.

g. “Extraordinary circumstances”
- People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994); (Jued)