occupation unless repealed.
Annulled proceedings of other governments
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 phil 113 (1945)
Facts:
CO KIM CHAN (alias CO KIM CHAN), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ
TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
respondents
This involves a petition for mandamus praying that the respondent judge of the
lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in a civil case before said
court. The proceedings were initiated under the regime of the government
(called Republic of the Philippines) established during the Japanese military
occupation.
After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio
Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, sating that a proclamation
issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courst of the Philippines and, without an
enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines.
The respondent judge likewise contends that the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.
Issues:
-Whether or not the judicial proceedings and decisions made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American
occupation.
-Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which
he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts.
-Whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation,
those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Held:
All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments
of a de facto government are good and valid and continue even during
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would
violate the law of nations.
Since laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending
before it.
PNB v CA
FACTS:
1. Epifano de la Cruz owns two lots of land in Bulacan which he mortgaged to
PNB. For failure to make payments, his property was to be foreclosed by PNB.
2. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that: in extra-judicial foreclosure of real-
estate mortgage: if the property is worth more than four hundred pesos, the
notice shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
news paper of general circulation in the municipality or city. To comply with
the law, the notices of the sale of Epifano de la Cruz’s foreclosed properties
were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper Daily Record. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the
dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday respectively.
3. The CA declared void the foreclosure of the property of Epifano de la Cruz
because PNB failed to comply with the required publication of notices (in
compliance with Section 3 of Act No. 3135). PNB appeals to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: WON there was valid compliance in regard to the required
publication? NO.
DOCTRINE:
Article 13 of the Civil Code is silent on the definition of a week. An
interpretation of “week” was provided in the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs.
City of Modesto, et al. The term, “week” was interpreted to mean as a period
of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Where the word is used simply
as a measure of duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means
a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on
which it begins.
APPLICATION:
In the case at hand, the publication on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as
sufficient publication for the second week because the period for the first week
should be from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week
should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. Publication on
April 11, 1969 was both accomplished during the first day of the third week
and cannot be equated with compliance in law.
Petitioners excluded the date of the first publication (March 28, 1969) pursuant
to Article 13 that says in computing for a period, the first day is excluded while
the last day is included. It would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969
as reckoning point, in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New
Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to make
the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of
extending the first week by another day. This incongruous repercussion could
not have been the unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135
was enacted.
Case: Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC
Topic: Sources of Philippine Laws and When they Take Effect
FACTS
 The Seamen Private Respondents had breached their NBS-approved
contract with the Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. when they
demanded a salary increase of 50% and that, via cablegram, threatened
the company. The Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. denied,
as decided by their Principal, Messrs. Kyoei Tanker Company
Limited, the said demand of the seamen and asked permission from
the National Seamen Board (NSB) to terminate the manning contract
of the seamen.
 The National Seamen Board (NSB), through its Executive Director
Cresencio C. Dayao, authorized the Vir-Jen Shipping to terminate the
manning contracts of the seamen, and that they may disembark the
whole compliment/crewmembers of the vessel M/T ‘’Jannu’’. Upon
the disembarkation of the seamen in Japan and they were sent back to
Manila, the private respondents filed a complaint against Vir-Jen for
the illegal dismissal and non-payment of the wages. NSB ruled in
favor of the petitioners.
 The seamen, after receiving copy of said decision on July 9, 1980,
appealed the decision of the NSB to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on July 23, 1980 or fourteen (14) days later. The
NLRC reversed the decision of the NSB on the ground that the
termination of the contract was without valid cause. The NLRC, in its
decision, required the Vir-Jen Shipping Inc. to pay the wages and other
monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the
employment contract.
 The Vir-jen Shipping Inc. submitted a petition to the Supreme Court
for its resolution on the issue that NLRC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction and that it acted with the grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioner maintains that the Minister of Labor may not, under the
guise of issuing implementing rules of law, go beyond the clear and
unmistakable language of the law and expand it at his discretion.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the respondents filed within the 10 day reglementary period for
appeal
RULING
No,10 days contemplates calendar days and not working days. It is in the
interest of labor that labor cases be disposed immediately as longer period
means more advantage for management seeing as they have money to employ
well-paid talented lawyers that can give them ingenious defenses.
NOTES
Plaintiff’s Argument: The Private Respondents’ appeal was filed out of time
as they filed 14 days after the receipt. Whereas under Article 223 of the Labor
Code which governs appeals from the National Seamen's Board to the National
Labor Relations Commission per Article 20(b) of the Code provides that such
appeals must be made within ten (10) days.
Respondents’ argument: section 7, Rule XIII, Book V of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code, the ten-day period specified in Article 223 refers to
working days and that this Court has already upheld such construction and
manner of computation in Fabula vs. NLRC.
Case: Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)
Topic: The Constitution- Purpose, Objective
FACTS
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that '(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased,' even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE/S
Whether the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended that the members of the
Judiciary be exempt from income tax (NO)
RULING
NO. The Judiciary is not exempt
The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final
text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987. Although
the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General
Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since
then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax
from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of
record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia
vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt
from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution
of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby
reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to
a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within
the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935
Constitution provided:
"x x x (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts) shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office x x x".
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law,
which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office.
x x x".
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973
Constitution specifically stipulated:
"No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from
payment of income tax. "
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
"
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article
XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent
of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution" of
salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to
Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual
salary of ____________and each Associate Justice __________pesos.
This draft was objected to because the special privilege on income tax
exemption would violate uniformity of taxation and equal protection.
Also, during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed
to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so
as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government."
Case: Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1966)
Topic: Constitution, Purpose/Objective
(1) Presumption of Innocence; Criminal cases elevated by convicted
public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough
treatment by the Supreme Court as criminal cases involving ordinary
citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence
must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The specific
provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an
accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be
made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively
 or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of said Constitution
(3) Statutory Construction; The principle of prospectivity of statutes,
original or amendatory, applies to judicial decisions.
FACTS
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in
Metro Manila. Filoteo was accused of hijacking a postal delivery van based on
the following Inofrmation:
 May 3, 1982, two armed men stopped a Postal Delivery Truck while
travelling in McArthur Highway. They robbed and carried away the
following: a) Postal Delivery Truck, b) Social Security System
Medicare Checks and Vouchers, c) Social Security System Pension
Checks and Vouchers, d) Treasury Warrants and e) Several Mail
Matters from abroad, amounting to 253K. Filoteo was identified as
the mastermind of the hijacking incident (pointed out by Mateo and
Liwanag who were caught with the checks from the hijacked truck)
 May 30, 1982 – Filoteo gave a sworn statement with counsel’s
presence regarding his participation in the hijacking incident and a
certification on the surrendered “voluminous assorted US checks and
vouchers”
 Filoteo, together with the other four accused men, plead not guilty to
this incidence. The other 6 accused remained at large while the
captured four others failed to appear in trials.
 June 18, 1987, Sandiganbayan rendered the decision of guilty for
Filoteo beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2(e), in
relation to Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
 Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent rendered its
assailed Decision and Resolution.
 Following are Filoteo’s ground for petition for certiorari:
o Respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its
determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis
of mere preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
o Respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioners
having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the
other accused in the hijacking of the mail van indubitably
established his direct participation and/or indispensable
cooperation in the said hijacking, the same being in gross
disregard of basic Rules of Law.
o The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion
as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and
considering against petitioner his alleged extra judicial
confession, despite uncontradicted testimony and
documentary proof that he was made to give or sign the
same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion,
threats and intimidation and without the presence and
assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in
gross violation of Constitutional Provisions and the
prevailing jurisprudence.
o Respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that Filoteo’s
denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak
and implausible/ The truth of the matter being that they
should have been sustained since petitioner was not
identified by the direct victims-eyewitnesses as among
those who participated in or were present at the hijack and
none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in his
possession or retrieved from him.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving
at said Decision? Furthermore, the issues raised by Filoteo can be summarized
in the following:
(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extrajudicial
confession executed by Filoteo without the presence of his lawyer,
admissible in evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress,
maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
(3) Was Filoteo’s warrantless arrest valid and proper?
(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
1. NO. Following are the SC’s ground regarding petitioner’s claim:
 (1) YES. Article III of Section 12 will have no retroactive effect.
Retroactive effect is construed to contain Bill of Rights and is
misplaced in this case.
(2) NO. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical
report showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his person.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different
documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of
lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent
in his certification, extrajudicial
confession and waiver of detention.
(3) YES. Filoteo’s claim is belatedly made. He should have
questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in
the trial court.
(4) YES. Contrary to Filoteo’s claim, his culpability has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
Petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
assailed
Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipal in the crime of robbery as
defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the
costs of the action
Case: JM Tuason & Co, Inc. v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413 (1970); Fernando, J.
Topic: The Constitution (Language)
FACTS
 RA 2616 authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City
owned by the petitioners (subdividing the land into smaller lots and selling
these to their occupants). In response, the petitioners filed before the lower
court a special civil action for prohibition with preliminary injunction (to
restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation) against
respondents, praying that the act be declared unconstitutional (as well as
invoking his rights to due process & equal protection of laws.1)The next
day, the lower court granted the prayer for the injunction (upon filing of a
P20K bond). After trial, the lower court held that RA 2616 is
unconstitutional.
 The respondents then appealed.
A further inquiry into the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to
authorize the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals was then needed, if for no other purpose than
to attain a greater degree of clarity.
ISSUE/S
 Whether or not Congress has the constitutional power to authorize
expropriation of lands (in RA 2616). YES
 Whether or not RA 2616 is unconstitutional because it violates the
petitioner’s rights to due process and equal protection of law. NO
RULING
 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. In case of doubt of the validity
of a challenged statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.
 No need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate
lands is without limit. As in the case of the more general provision on
eminent domain, there is the explicit requirement of the payment of just
compensation. It is well-settled that just compensation means the
equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
 The petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants
believed that veterans subdivision was the real owner. Only when the place
vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner
claimed for the first time that they are the owners. In this case, there is no
clear and palpable showing that the petitioner was singled out as a party to
bear the brunt of governmental authority of expropriation.
 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision that RA 2616 is
unconstitutional, denying the writ of prohibition, and setting aside the
preliminary injunction filed by petitioner.
NOTES
1
It is precisely because the challenged statute applies only to petitioner that he
could assert a denial of equal protection. "Republic Act No. 2616 is directed
solely against appellee and for this reason violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Unlike other laws which confer authority to expropriate
landed estates in general, it singles out the Tatalon Estate. It cannot be said,
therefore, that it deals equally with other
lands in Quezon City or elsewhere." subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have
 Explanatory note of bill (RA 2616): "It is the earnest desire of this group become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions
of patriotic and loyal citizens to purchase the lots at a minimum cost. [...] complained of.
The population of Quezon City has considerably increased. This increase
in population is posing a serious housing problem to city residents. This Petitions are granted. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void
bill will not only solve the problem but will also implement the land-for- and is accordingly set aside.
the-Iandless program of the present Administration."
 The challenged statute can survive tests of validity, as seen through the
text of the constitutional provision, the historical background (the framers
of the constitution being aware of the inequality of wealth in society), and
the fundamental law being intended to govern the life of a nation through
time.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

Facts:
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondent.


(Former) President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries,
to hold, in addition to their primary position, not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.

Petitioners are challenging E.O. No. 284’s constitutionality as its provisions

are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, Article IX of
the Constitution.

Issue:
-Whether or not E.O No. 284 is constitutional

Held:
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court
hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos, Secretary
of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their