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RULE 130 SECTION 42 – PART OF THE RES GESTAE

1. People vs. Tiozon – 198 S 368 (Petrache)

2. People vs. Naranja – 108 P 781 (Gutierrez)
3. People vs. Palomones – 336 S 80 (Dionisio)
4. People vs. Raquel – 265 S 248 (Sanchez)
5. People v Sace 617 S 336 (Ramos)
6. People v Esoy 617 S 552 (Villegas)
7. Talidano v Falcon Maritime 558 S 279 (Corpuz)
8. Zarrate v RTC 591 S 510 (Alfafara)

RULE 130 SECTION 43 BUSINESS ENTRIES

1. Jose v Michaelmar Phils 606 S 116 (Barcelon)

2. Security Bank v Gan 493 S 239 (Agramon)

RULE 130 SECTION 44 – ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

1. People vs. Bernaldez – 294 S 317 (Petrache)

2. People vs. Divina – 221 S 209 (Gutierrez)
3. People vs. Leones – 117 S 382 (Dionisio)
4. People vs. Crisostomo – 160 S 47 (Sanchez)
5. Feria vs. CA – 325 S 525 (Ramos)

RULE 130 SECTION 47 – TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

1. De Leon vs. People – 210 S 151 (Villegas)

RULE 130 SECTION 48 – OPINION RULE

1. Lim vs. CA – 214 S 273 (supra) (Corpuz)

2. People vs. Galleno – 291 S 762 (Alfafara)

RULE 130 SECTION 49 – OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS

1. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc. – 306 S 762 (Barcelon)

RULE 131 SECTION 1 – BURDEN OF PROOF

1. Jimenez vs. NLRC – 256 S 84 (Agramon)

2. Mallari vs. CA – 265 S 456 (Petrache)

RULE 131 SECTION 3 – DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS

1. Lozano vs. De Los Santos – 274 S 45 (Gutierrez)

2. LRT vs. Natividad – 397 S 75 (Dionisio)
3. Del San Transport Lines vs. C&A Const. Inc. – 412 S 524 (Sanchez)
4. People vs. De Guzman – 229 S 795 (Ramos)
5. People vs. Navaja – 220 S 624 (Villegas)
6. People vs. Castañeda – 252 S 247 (Corpuz)
7. People vs. Simbulan – 214 S 537 (Alfafara)
8. People vs. Baludda – 318 S 503 (Barcelon)

RULE 130 SECTION 42 – PART OF THE RES GESTAE

1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID

 G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991

FACTS: Tiozon was charged for violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession firearms) and murder.

According to the testimony of the victim’s wife, at around 11pm, while she and her husband
were sleeping, they were awakened by the accused's knocks on their door. The accused
appeared drunk and her husband welcomed him into their house. The accused showed a gun to
her husband [victim] and the latter even toyed with it. The wife walked a few steps away from
the two but when she looked back, they were gone. 5 minutes later she heard 2 gun shots, the
accused knocked on their door and he told her that he shot her husband. When she went to her
husband, they sought help from their neighbor, even the accused helped them in carrying the
victim towards the main road. She pushed the accused and even without the latter’s help, they
were able to reach the main road; after which, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them
lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused.

ACCDNG TO THE DEFENSE: Accused was on his way home from work when the victim called
him to his house. When he was about to enter the victim’s house, the latter poked a gun at him,
which he grabbed, the victim’s wife then saw him holding said gun. He returned the gun to the
victim and they drank beer, thereafter they went out to buy more. After buying, the victim left
ahead of the accused because he had to pee. The accused then heard 2 gunshots, he followed
where the shots came from and saw the victim sprawled on the ground. When he asked the
victim who shot him, the victim was already gasping for breath and could no longer talk. He then
saw a gun near the victim and in wanting to bring the said gun to the victim’s wife, he picked the
same, but he suddenly realized that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw the gun
to the grassy area; he then informed the wife of the latter that her husband was shot to death;
when he returned, the body was no longer there because townspeople already carried the
victim towards the main road; when the policemen arrived he was ordered to go with them at the
Kalookan Police Headquarters; However, he admitted that it was him who accompanied the
policemen in retrieving the fatal gun at the grassy area at the back of his house.”

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder relying on circumstantial evidence. According
to the trial court, the testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive gunshots, accused
went back to her house and informed her that he accidentally shot her husband deserves merit,
Besides, the Court sees no reason for the wife to concoct such story that would point to the
accused as the culprit specially so that had not the accused became the prime suspect in this
case, he would be the best person to be used as a prosecution witness, with more reason that
from the evidence presented, it appears that the widow of the victim harbours no ill-feeling
towards the accused otherwise, she would have prevented accused accused's entry in her
house on that fatal evening.
Such testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place
admitted to her having accidentally shoot the victim is admissible evidence against the accused
declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the
hearsay rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife’s testimony is part of res gestae? NO

HELD: The court does not agree that the wife’s testimony was part of the res gestae, and held
that there was a misapplication of the rule. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be
deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal
significance may also be received as part of the res gestae, and therefor an exception to the
hearsay rule.
· In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is
not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other
party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement
was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were
not true, which he did in this case.
· Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged
statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its
admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given. The
transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Rosalina Magat vda. de
Bolima, wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an objection.

(2) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE NARANJA,

Defendant-Appellant
G.R. No. L-13288 June 30, 1960
PARAS, C. J.
(ELIZALDE-GUTIERREZ)

DOCTRINE:

There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from
hearsay by their connection with the principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist
of a complication of circumstances so intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each
other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific
parent of others, and each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred
facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known for a right understanding of its
nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of the res gestae, may always be
shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their admissibility is determined by the judge
according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion:
it being extremely difficult, if not impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more
particular description.

FACTS:
Accused was charged and convicted of the murder of Mamerto Signey. The accused has
appealed, contending that the alleged crime has not been established, particularly because
there is no evidence (1) as to the kind of blunt instrument that killed the deceased; (2) as to the
position of the assailant when he allegedly killed the deceased; (3) as to the possession of a
blunt instrument by the accused on the night of the crime, and (4) as to the cause of the death
of the victim. The accused considers the testimony of Maria Diaz, wife of the deceased, whom
she later admitted to have an illicit affair with the accused mainly relied upon by the trial court,
as weak, uncorroborated, self-serving, unnatural and not direct.

According to Maria Diaz, after the accused committed the crime, he confessed to her that he
had killed her husband and he cautioned her not to tell anyone. The accused also informed her
that her husband lay dead at the creek east of their house. Diaz testified against the accused in
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the confession of the accused falls under res gestae?

RULING: YES.

As regards the contention that the elements of the crime have not been shown, suffice it to say
that the confession of the accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence falling under the res gestae
rule.
SEC. 33, Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be
received as a part of the res gestae. (Rule 123, Rules of Court.)

Quoting Professor Greenleaf, Chief Justice Moran, in his Comments on the Rules of Court,
explains the res gestae rule as follows:
There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from
hearsay by their connection with the principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist
of a complication of circumstances so intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each
other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific
parent of others, and each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred
facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known for a right understanding of its
nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of the res gestae, may always be
shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their admissibility is determined by the judge
according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion:
it being extremely difficult, if not impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more
particular description.
Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased; and the
implementation of his evil design is borne out by the actual and physical facts of the case. The
testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect that, when Maria Diaz came to his house for help,
she told him that her husband was dead and could be found at a certain place, amply proves
the fact of the crime as confessed by the accused. The presence of the bluish black spot at the
nape of the deceased, Mamerto Signey, and the opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right
on the medulla oblongata could have caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of the
accused to Maria Diaz.

3.) PEOPLE v. PALOMINO

Facts:
Appellants Joshua and Alejandro Palomino are brothers. Both are members of the 18th Street
gang. On July 2, 2006, they committed a series of crimes with fellow gang member Ernesto
Ubaldo. The three men attacked two boys on a street corner in Panorama City, beating them
both, one into unconsciousness. Jose Duran stopped to assist the two boys and was kicked into
unconsciousness by appellants and Ubaldo. Joshua held a gun on Wendy Duran during the
assault, which was also witnessed by the Durans' children. None of the victims were gang
members.

As appellants left the scene, they made gang signs, challenged a motorist stopped at a stoplight
and hit him with a firearm. Alejandro discharged a firearm at two police officers who came to the
scene. He was caught on video discarding the gun as he fled. Joshua and Ubaldo were arrested
at the scene less than a minute after the attacks. Alejandro was arrested the next day. DNA
analyses showed that blood on Joshua's and Alejandro's jeans came from Jose Duran. Duran's
blood was also on Joshua's shoe.
As appellants and Ubaldo were attacking I.S. and Marvin, Jose Duran was driving his SUV
westbound on Nordhoff Street toward Van Nuys Boulevard. His wife, Wendy Duran, and the
couple's two children, Melissa and Angelina, were in the vehicle. Jose Duran stopped his
vehicle approximately 20 feet away from where appellants were attacking I.S. and Marvin. Mr.
and Mrs. Duran yelled at appellants to leave the boys alone. Jose Duran got out of his vehicle
and ran towards appellants, intending to help I.S. and Marvin. Wendy Duran heard someone
say: "Saca el cuete." This means get out the gun. Jose Duran kicked Joshua off one of the
boys, but Joshua grabbed Jose's leg, knocked him to the ground, and struck him. Alejandro and
Ubaldo kicked Jose Duran repeatedly in the chest, face, and head, even as he bled profusely.
Melissa and Angelina began screaming. Wendy Duran got out of her vehicle and yelled at
Alejandro and Ubaldo to leave Jose Duran alone. Joshua pointed a silver semiautomatic firearm
at her face, and said: "If you move, I'll kill you."2 Alejandro approached Wendy Duran and said:
"I'm sorry, hyna," then went back to kicking Mr. Duran. Alejandro then added: "You have to
understand this is gang-related."
Issue:
Whether or not Wendys statement may still be admissible as part of res gestae.

Held:
Here, there was no conflict about the words used or whether they were repeated accurately.
Alejandro testified that he was involved in the fight with the boys and Jose Duran, only saw
Wendy Duran for a moment as he was fleeing the scene and did not speak to her. Thus, he
denied making the statements at all. The issue for the jury was simply to determine whether
Wendy Duran was credible. The jury was instructed on evaluating witness credibility. CALJIC
No. 2.71, as given, still told the jury, "You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant
made an admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or part." CALJIC No. 2.27
told the jury that when only one witness testified to a particular fact, "You should carefully review
all the evidence upon which the proof of that fact depends." The court further instructed the jury
with CALJIC No. 2.20 (believability of a witness), 2.21.1 (discrepancies in testimony), 2.21.2
(witness willfully false), and 2.22 (weighing conflicting testimony).
The jury was fully instructed on assessing the credibility of a witness. I.S. and Melissa
substantively corroborated Wendy Duran's account of being held at gun point. The evidence
that appellants were acting to benefit their gang was extremely strong. We see no reasonable
probability that appellants would have received a more favorable outcome if the court had
instructed the jury to view evidence of Alejandro's statements to Wendy Duran with caution.

(4) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO

RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL,
accused-appellants.
[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996]
REGALADO, J.:
(SANCHEZ)

DOCTRINE: The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be

utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.

FACTS: (PROSECUTION) At midnight of July 4, 1986, thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito

Gambalan attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. To his surprise,
heavily armed men emerged at the door and declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. His
wife Juliet, went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband lifeless; while a
man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a
man fall beside their water pump while two other men ran away. Police came and found one of
the perpetrators of the crime (identified as Amado Ponce) wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victims’ house. Appellants were apprehended on different occasions.

FACTS: (DEFENSE) Valeriano Raquel testified that he left Cotabato and went to Maguindanao
on 02 July 1986 to harvest palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while sleeping, he was arrested
and brought to municipal jail of Cotabato. He also testified that he already heard the name of
Amado Ponce to be an owner of a parcel of land in Cotabato, and that their house and that of
the victims’ were located in the same barangay.

Appellants’ father, Antonio Raquel testified that Sabas Raquel, a soldier, left Cotabato and
went to his place of assignment at Pagadian on the same date, 02 July 1986, that several
policemen came over to his house looking for his two sons, that he gave them pictures of his
sons and even accompanied them to Maguindanao where they arrested Valeriano.

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986,
he was assigned in Iligan City, and that Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on
duty on July 4, 1986.

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.

TC: found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE: Did the TC err in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime
charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the
crime?

HELD: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of
the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.

In her testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows:

Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see
any when you pip (sic) at the window?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2)
persons who were running away, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two
(2) persons running away?
xxx
Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?
 A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived. [10]
(Italics ours.)

On cross-examination she further testified:

Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?
A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.
Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the
gun of your husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?
FISCAL DIZON:
Already answered.
She was not able to identify, your Honor.
Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.[11]
xxx
Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and
you saw two (2) person(s) running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
A: I saw them running sir going around.
Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?
A: They were running towards the road.
ATTY. DIVINO:
Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir.[12] (Emphases supplied.)

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused
escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an
accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity
to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.[15]

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[16]

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions,[17] those

exceptions do not however apply to the present case. Firstly, except for that extrajudicial
statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to
the crime. Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence,
was made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce.

5) (RES GESTAE)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs TIRSO SACE y MONTOYA
G.R. No. 178063 April 5, 2010

FACTS:

On 1999, AAA was inside their house with her 10 year old brother BBB and a nephew, when
suddenly appellant showed up. Appellant admitted he came from a drinking spree, and then
AAA told him to leave. Appellant made sexual advances on AAA. When CCC, DDD and
Abelardo was on their way home, they heard scream from AAA. They rushed inside the house
to find AAA. Appellant suddenly showed up and joined in the search for AAA. . They saw AAA
lying on the ground, lifeless. They went to the Barangay to report and then the officers noticed
bloodstains on appellant’s clothes. Appellant admitted that he was the one who committed the
crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not statement made by appellant be considered as res gestae

HELD:

YES.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime to
the prosecutions witnesses. According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and
killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellants statements infront of
the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Revised
Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this case. Appellant
had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His admission was
made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of alcohol
at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His
confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellants spontaneous statements made to
private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by the constitutional
safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.

(6) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JONJIE ESOY y HUNGOY, ROLANDO CIANO y SOLEDAD and ROGER BOLALACAO y
DADIVAS, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 185849 April 7, 2010 J. Villarama
(VILLEGAS)

FACTS:
On January 18, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., the victim Lorenzo Coro and Andrea Pabalan (Pabalan),
rode a jeepney bound for Buendia Avenue at Taft Avenue corner T.M. Kalaw Street in Manila. Upon
reaching Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street, Ermita, Manila, appellants boarded the jeepney.
Pabalan noticed that Esoy and Ciano were staring at all the passengers. Feeling apprehensive, she
moved beside the victim and whispered to him that she did not like the way the two (2) were staring
at them. Esoy and Ciano also seemed to be high on drugs, so she told the victim not to look at them.
When she again looked at Esoy and Ciano, the two (2) suddenly drew out their balisongs and swung
the same at them. In the ensuing commotion, the other passengers including appellants alighted
from the jeepney. When Pabalan told the victim that they should go down, she saw the victim’s
bloodied chest. She then shouted for help and that they be taken to the hospital. The jeepney driver,
however, told them to alight from the vehicle. Fearing that the victim might run out of blood, she told
him that they should go down. The victim then told her that his cellular phone was snatched and
asked her where appellants fled. Pabalan just insisted that they alight from the vehicle and not to
worry about his cellular phone. Upon alighting from the jeepney, the victim fell down after a few
steps. But with the help of two (2) motorcyclists, they were able to hail an FX taxi and the victim was
immediately brought to the nearby Philippine General Hospital (PGH) where he was operated on.
Unfortunately, however, the victim died at 11:00 p.m. that same night.

Several days after, or on January 31, 2001, Pabalan informed SPO1 Olavario that she saw the three
(3) appellants inside the WPD jail and positively identified them as the assailants.

Appellants, for their part, denied any involvement in the robbery-homicide incident. They claimed
that they were at their workplace in Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila, when the incident happened.

RTC: found appellants guilty of robbery with homicide

CA: affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE: W/N the guilt of the appellants for the crime of robbery with homicide has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: YES!

Appellants argue that (1) no evidence was presented by the prosecution establishing that personal
property was taken from the victim except for the hearsay allegation of Pabalan; and (2) no witness
testified that the victim or Pabalan actually saw one of the appellants take something from the victim.
The contentions, however, are likewise without merit.

The witness testified to the following:

“After the commotion, when I was about to alight from the jeep, he told me that "my cellular
phone was snatched." I told him "let’s go." He asked me "where did they run?" I told him not
to bother about that and let’s go to the hospital.

Though Pabalan’s testimony as to the victim’s utterance that his cellular phone was taken is only
hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay rule, the victim’s spontaneous
utterance being part of res gestae.

Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victim
or spectator to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
22
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In the instant case, all the elements of res gestae are
sufficiently established insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned: (1) the
principal act (res gestae) – the robbery and stabbing of the victim – is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, that is, within minutes
after the victim was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched; and (3) the statement concerns
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances – his cellular phone was
stolen during the startling occurrence. The testimony being an exception to the hearsay rule, the trial
court did not err in admitting the same.

WHEREFORE, the April 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

7) JUANITO TALIDANO, Petitioner, vs. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC.,
SPECIAL EIGHTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER
ERMITA C. CUYUGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172031 July 14, 2008
TINGA, J.:
(CORPUZ)

DOCTRINES:
 a) In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in
verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act;

b) To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal
act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances;

c) For the second res gestea, requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be
characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3)
the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act

FACTS: Petitioner Talidano was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and
Allied Services, Inc. and was assigned to a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation
based in Korea. He claimed that this chief officer in Korea always discriminated and maltreated
the vessel’s Filipino crew. He sent a letter-complaint to the International Transport Federation in
London and this act was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed.
He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.

Falcon argued that petitioner Talidano voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been
warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination and
disrespect towards his superiors.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Talidano’s complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for
gross neglect of duties. On appeal,the NLRC reversed said ruling and held that the dismissal
was illegal as the fax messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by
petitioner have no probative value and are self-serving. Falcon thus elevated the case to the CA
which declared that petitioner’s dismissal was valid.

The CA relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly after Talidano committed
a serious neglect of his duties. The first fax message reported the misbehavior of Talidano. The
second fax message pertained to a report of a crew discharge essentially containing the same
information. CA treated these messages a part of the res gestea proving neglect of duty on the
part of Talidano. In defending the non-presentation of the logbook, it stated that three years had
already passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of Falcon Maritime.

MR by Talidano was denied hence this instant case.

ISSUE: WON the fax messages were part of res gestea?

RULING: NO
RATIO:

Talidano maintains that the first fax message containing the information that the vessel
encroached on a different route was a mere personal observation of the ship master and should
have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages cannot be considered
as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He
also contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to the vessel and that if he did
commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits
that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been
concocted to justify his unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his
dismissal from employment stemmed from his filing of the complaint with the ITF, which his
superiors resented.

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
accompanying the equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the
res gestae.

To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances.

Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its
course—is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax
messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as
part of the res gestae of the first kind.

Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the
principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the
issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act.

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be
one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not
accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were
made simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.

Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the Japanese
port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.

In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests
on the employer. Private respondent miserably failed to discharge this burden. Consequently,
the petitioner’s dismissal is illegal. SC also noted that private respondent failed to comply with
the procedural due process requirement for terminating an employee.

Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly
insufficient as these messages were addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to
petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing neglect of duty. Neither was he
informed of his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an opportunity to
present his side. The failure to comply with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent’s
liability on top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the NLRC is REINSTATED.

8) ARTHUR ZARATE vs REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL
G.R. No. 152263 July 3, 2009
PERALTA, J.:
(ALFAFARA)

Doctrine: A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of

the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

Facts: On or about 10:00 p.m. of April 1, 1994, Good Friday, Ernesto Guiritan, a homosexual
and beautician, was seated alone on a bench outside the Sta. Rita Church. The church was just
across the public plaza of Gingoog City separated by Cabilto Street. Arthur Zarate approached
Guiritan and asked him for a cigarette. When Guiritan could not produce one, Zarate
immediately stabbed Guiritan with a switchblade knife and ran away. Feeling pain and sensing
that he was profusely bleeding, Guiritan walked a short distance and called for help. Eduardo
Remigoso and Mario Binasbas came to his aid. Guiritan asked them to bring him to the hospital.

The Victim was bought to the Hospital and was saved by the doctors and they operated on him
in order to save his life. After the operation Police officers went to the Victim to conduct
investigation. The victim feeling weak could not speak loudly thus, the officer need to put his
ears near the Victim. The victim said that he feels like he is going to die because of his wound
and declared that it was Zarate who stabbed him.
The Victim testified that he recognize the accused because he used to see him during town
fiesta. The Accuse on the other hand set up the defense of alibi and said that he only came to
know of the victim in court. He also claim that he was near his house decorating the altar for the
station of the cross during the time of the incident.

Geronima Cuerdo corroborated Zarates testimony. She admitted that Zarates mother was her
second degree cousin. She testified that on April 1, 1994, she requested Zarate to help in
preparing the Station of the Cross. There were about 20 persons present when the altar was
being prepared. She declared that Zarate could not have stabbed Guiritan because from 10:00
p.m. to midnight, she had been keeping a watchful eye on Zarate and he was right there.
Nevertheless, she admitted that it was possible for people around the place where the altar was
being arranged to have gone somewhere without her observing them.

The Trial Court found the Accused guilty of Frustrated homicide and not frustrated murder. The
accused appealed however the appellate court affirmed the Trial Court.

Issue: Can the Ante-mortem statement of the complainant be treated as part of res gestae

Ruling: Yes!

Ratio: Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, which includes statements given as part of the res gestae. The pertinent provision reads:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res
gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. The hospital records showed that the
operation started at 5:00 a.m. and ended at 7:30 a.m. of April 2, 1994. SPO1 Alecha testified
that it was also in the morning of April 2, 1994 that he took the statement of Guiritan, who stated
that it was petitioner who stabbed him.

SPO1 Alecha testified that he had to put his ear near Guiritans mouth so that he could hear
Guiritans answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal that the
statement was taken a few hours after the operation when he regained consciousness. His
statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the
shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive
the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae. Contrary to petitioners
contention, the statement was signed by Guiritan and its date was established by SPO1 Alecha.

Petitioner erred in stating that Guiritans statement, which was admitted as part of the res
gestae, was the sole basis for his conviction. Apart from the written statement, Guiritan, who
survived the stabbing incident, positively identified appellant in open court and testified that
petitioner was the one who stabbed him and that he knew petitioner even before the stabbing
incident. Conviction of the accused may be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness.

The trial court correctly disregarded petitioners alibi and denial that he was the perpetrator of
the crime. For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed but must also show that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime.

RULE 130 Section 43 – Business Entries

1.) Jose v Michaelmar Phils – 606

Bernardo B. Jose, Jr., vs. Michaelmar Phils., Inc
and Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc.
G.R.No. 169606 – 27 Nov 2009
Carpio, J.
(Barcelon)

DOCTRINE:
Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of
admissibility. There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need
not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity
and under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence
of this sort are called entries in the course of business, which are transactions made by persons
in the regular course of their duty or business.
Requisites for Admission in Evidence of Entries in the Course of Business. – In Canque
v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 579 (1999) the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
evidence of entries in the course of business: 1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside
the country, or unable to testify; 2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer; 3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries; 4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty; and 5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

FACTS:
 Michaelmar Phils., Inc (MPI) is the local agent of Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc.
(MSSI) which is in the business of carrying toxic fuels, gasoline and other combustible materials
internationally. MSSI hire Jose through MPI to be an oiler on board Maritime Tanker Limar. The
contract of employment states that the employee will be instantly dismissed if traces of alcohol
or prohibited drugs are found in their system in any random testing, pursuant to the company’s
Drug and Alcohol Policy.
Nearly two months after Jose began to perform his duties, a random drug test was
conducted on all officers and crew of M/T Limar at the port of Curacao. Jose was found positive
for marijuana and was informed about the results. But Jose was nbot dismissed outright, he was
still allowed to continue working. He was only dismissed and repatriated when they reached the
next port or after two more months. It should be noted that Jose received a 96% rating for his
performance and was described as hardworking, trustworthy and reliable.
When he arrived in the Philippines, Jose asked MPI to conduct another drug test, but
MPI ignored such request. Jose then procured drug testing on his owned from three different
testing centers and was found negative for marijuana. Jose then filed an illegal dismissal case
against MPI an MSSI with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of MPI and MSSI; NLRC
reversed the LA Decision; and the Court of Appeals reversed NLRC Decision.
One of the grounds raised by Jose in his Petition before the SC (which is in relation to
our topic) is that there is no just cause for his dismissal because the drug test result is unsigned
by the doctor. The drug test result indicates, among others, the following: typewritten words
‘Hool: Drs R.R.L. Petronia Apotheker” and “THC-COOH POS.”; the handwritten word
“Marihuana”; and the stamped words “Dr. A.R.A. Heath, MD,” “SHIP’S DOCTOR” and “29 OKT,
2002.” None of the doctors mentioned signed such result and Jose claims that such omission is
fatal as it goes to the veracity of the said purported drug test result.
ISSUE:
W/N the unsigned drug test result is admissible in evidence to prove just cause in the
dismissal of Jose?
RULING: YES. The SC affirmed the CA’s decision, that:
RATIO:
“Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of
admissibility. There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need
not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity
and under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence
of this sort are called entries in the course of business, which are transactions made by persons
in the regular course of their duty or business. We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test
result constitutes entries made in the ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer
of the vessel. The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel
conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be
issued and released by the medical officer. The ship’s physician at Curacao under whom the
tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his handwritten
comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no basis to suspect that
these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his duty. As the labor arbiter
points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require additional supporting
evidence except if it appears that the drug test was conducted not in accordance with drug
testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been suggested in this particular
case.”
“In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is violative of any
law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for admission in evidence of
entries in the course of business:
(1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify;
(2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and
(5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the entries were
made near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to
know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his professional capacity
and in the performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.”
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. ERIC GAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
(AGRAMON)

Doctrine:
There is no question that the entries in the ledgers were made by one whose duty it was to record
transactions in the ordinary or regular course of the business. But for the entries to be prima facie
evidence of the facts recorded, the Rule interposes a very important condition, one which we think is
truly indispensable to the probative worth of the entries as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that
is that the entrant must be "in a position to know the facts therein stated”

Facts:
Petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company is a banking institution duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.

In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its Soler Branch in Manila.
Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial
amount in his current account and he could draw checks on said account provided there were
sufficient funds to cover them. Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioner’s branch
manager then, Mr. Qui, respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another
person’s account also within the same branch.

Respondent availed of such arrangement several times by depositing checks in his account and
even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred them to the other
account. These transactions were covered by what were known as "debit memos" since respondent
had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.

Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his account. As of
December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to petitioner,
respondent refused to heed petitioner’s repeated demands for payment. For the period December
14, 1982 to September 15, 1990, the total obligation of respondent reached P297,060.01, inclusive
of interest.

Thus, in 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover the
P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from September 16, 1990 until fully paid.

Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the alleged overdraft
resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent
owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger cards it presented were merely hearsay
evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has established substantial evidence that respondent is liable for the
overdraft on his account? No.

Ruling:

To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger.

The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that
respondent consented to the transfers of funds.

Neither can we accept petitioner’s argument that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred. Petitioner invokes
Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.

Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the
ledger entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.

Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries, particularly
those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of
these entries.

There is no question that the entries in the ledgers were made by one whose duty it was to record
transactions in the ordinary or regular course of the business. But for the entries to be prima facie
evidence of the facts recorded, the Rule interposes a very important condition, one which we think is
truly indispensable to the probative worth of the entries as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that
is that the entrant must be "in a position to know the facts therein stated”

Debit memos are credit accommodations granted by the bank’s branch manager Mr. Qui to the
defendant, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which competent testimonial or documentary
evidence must be presented. In the face of the denial by the defendant of the existence of any such
agreement, and the absence of any document reflecting it, the testimony of a party to the
transaction, i.e., Mr. Qui, or of any witness to the same, would be necessary. The plaintiff failed to
explain why it did not or could not present any party or witness to the transactions, but even if it had
a reason why it could not, it is clear that the existence of the agreements cannot be established
through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for he was not in a position to know those facts.

There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in business records
which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course
of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a badge of
trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they purport to record what were independent
agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a client. In this case, the entries become mere
casual or voluntary reports of the official concerned.

RULE 130 SECTION 44 - ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODOLFO BERNALDEZ @ Dolfo

[G.R. No. 109780. August 17, 1998]

DOCTRINE: A medical certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.

However, if the entry in such certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established
as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be
presented in court to show his qualifications.
FACTS: Rodolfo Bernaldez was accused of raping his 10 yo niece. The prosecution presented
as its witnesses the victim and her father Pedro Bernaldez. However, Dr. Nancy de la Paz, who
examined the victim and issued the medical certificate, failed to testify.

The victim narrated that she was carried by her uncle upstairs who then removed her clothes
and let her lie down on the floor. While she was lying down, her uncle opened the zipper of his
pants and laid on top of her, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull
movement while on top of her. After a while, a sticky and warm object came out from his penis.
After the rape, accused-appellant gave her P5.00 and threatened her not to tell anybody
otherwise, he would kill her parents, brothers and sisters. Complainant further claimed that
accused-appellant had been abusing her since five (5) years ago and these repeated acts were
done in the same place

The very next day after the last rape incident, complainant was sent by her father to go to
accused-appellants house in order to borrow P10.00 from him. However, complainant refused to
go prompting her father to beat her. It was only then that she revealed to her father the cause of
her reluctance and narrated to him the repeated rape and assaults of her uncle. Immediately
after learning of the rape, her parents brought complainant to the Polangui Police Station to
report the incident and file the complaint. Afterwards, she was brought for treatment to Pio
Duran Memorial District Hospital, a government hospital where she was examined by Dr. Maria
Nancy de la Paz who issued a Medical Certificate dated September 3, 1990 (Exh. B).

The trial court gave weight to the medical certificate issued on 3 September 1990 by Dr. De la
Paz, who was a government doctor at the time. In considering the medical certificate despite the
failure of Dr. De la Paz to testify thereon, the trial court reasoned that such document, being an
act done by a public officer, was presumed to be done regularly unless proved otherwise. It
concluded that the finding of [o]ld lacerations at 3:00 and 9 oclock and newly-healed lacerations
at 11 oclock on the hymen of MARIA TERESA proved that someone had carnal knowledge of
her. Nevertheless, a medical examination was not an indispensable requisite in the prosecution
for rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued? YES.

HELD: The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. De la Paz
despite the failure of the latter to testify. The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule. However, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be
presented in court to show his qualifications. Here, a distinction must be made between
admissibility of evidence and probative value thereof. Nevertheless, a medical examination is
not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone testimony of the victim is sufficient if
credible.
3.) PEOPLE vs LEONES
G.R. No. L-48727 | September 30, 1982

Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 Defendant-appellant: JOSEPH LEONES y

DUCUSIN alias JESSIE

Summary:

FACTS:
Appeal from the decision of CFI of La Union, Branch I, convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime of rape charged in the following information (sentenced to reclusion perpetua), to wit:
o That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1973, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
Province of La Union, Philippines, said accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin alias Jessie, by
means of violence and use of force compelled the offended party (Irene Dulay) to swallow
tablets and consequently thereafter while she fell into semi-consciousness the said accused
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Irene Dulay
against her will in the house of the accused, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence.
• Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito
Leones at San Fernando, La Union where she resided.
• On April 22, 1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that
day, the members of the Leones family, including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his
sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby beach resort for a picnic.
• At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the
appellant and Elizabeth entered the room where complainant was lying down and forced her to
take three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were aspirin. The complainant
refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when the appellant held her mouth while his
sister pushed the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth left the room and after a while the
complainant felt dizzy.
• Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took of her panty. Then the
appellant went on top of her. The complainant tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy,
the appellant succeeded in abusing her.
• At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant,
found the complainant unconscious near her room without any panty on. She was then taken to
the La Union Provincial Hospital by the driver of the Leones family.
• When admitted to the hospital at about 6:00 P.M. of the same date (April 22, 1973), the
complainant was semiconscious, incoherent and hysterical. She refused to talk and to be
examined by the doctors. She was irritated when approached by a male figure.
• The complainant was first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she
had vaginal bleeding. The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by
Dr. Estioco that she might have been a victim of rape.
• In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on April 26, 1973
after which she issued a medical certificate with the following findings
1. Presence of erythema of the vestibular portion of external genitalia;
2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock;
3. Easily admit one finger with pain;
4. Unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity;
5. Smear exam for sperm cell-negative;
6. D'plococci-negative
7. Florence test-reagent not available.
Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any examination
to determine whether drug was given to the complainant.
• The accused-appellant denied the charge imputed to him, claiming that at the time of the
alleged rape between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock p.m. on April 22, 1973, he was at the beach
resort with the other members of the family, namely his sister Elizabeth, his stepmother
Natividad Leones, his younger brothers and sisters named Marivic, Theresa, Carol, Pinky and
Bongbong together with other companions, for a picnic and had lunch thereat, swimming and
picture-taking.

ISSUE: W/N trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged since the evidence
presented against him did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. – YES, LEONOS
ACQUITTED

RATIO:

1. The clinical case record of Irene Dulay's admission and confinement at the Provincial Hospital
of La Union contains entries which totally and completely belie the claim of the complainant that
she was raped by the accused in the afternoon of April 22, 1973.
• The entry written in the clinical record when Irene Dulay was admitted under the item
"Complaints" reads: Vaginal Bleeding, and below this entry appears the Diagnosis-Healing
lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen.
• Assuming that the victim was raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the
same day she was admitted in the hospital), then the lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and
10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be Healing in the clinical case
record.
• It would be described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new
lacerations." There is no instant formula, technique or process known to medical science or by
human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen within three (3) hours or so after
defloration.
• Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B Medico Legal Officer,
NBI, Department (now Ministry) of Justice, We have the following comment on:
Healing time of laceration of the hymen:
Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.
 More extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.
o Complicated types and those with intervening infection may cause delay in the healing
depending upon the extent of the involvement of the surrounding tissue and the degree of
infection. Complicated laceration may even require surgical intervention."
• Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which
was then already healing on April 22, 1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration occurred
several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a week-long vacation to
her hometown in Pugo, La Union and there is evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand
Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house of her
employer in San Fernando, La Union, she had already chest and stomach pains and a
headache.
• The written entries in the clinical case record, showing the date of her admission in the
hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing
lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines
in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a
government hospital.
• In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately,
he was not presented as a witness for the government.
• In connection with the clinical record, there is one piece of damaging evidence which not
only derogates the theory of the prosecution but also cannot be explained by the government,
and that is the frank testimony of Dr. Fe Cayao herself, thus:
o Q — The question is: did you not discover through reading the clinical history of the
patient that the woman was not complaining of alleged rape?
A — It was not indicated in that she was complaining of an alleged rape.

2. From the same clinical case record, it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay,
was having her menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated
that she had vaginal bleeding.
• She herself admitted in her testimony that on April 22, 1973, she was having her
menstruation.
• It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior
that a man would have sexual intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as
was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was allegedly abused by the accused.
• We cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of
civil engineering studying in Baguio City, would break or violate such a taboo by drugging the
complainant girl with the help of her sister and afterwards have sex relations with her in her
menstrual condition.

HELD: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of conviction is

hereby REVERSED and the accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
 (2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG, accused-appellants.
G.R. Nos. 93808-09. April 7, 1993
CAMPOS, JR., J
(ELIZALDE-GUTIERREZ)

DOCTRINE:

A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the police. Entries in
official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. They are not conclusive. It is undisputed that the alleged time of the commission
of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the parish priest Fr.
Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor presented as a
witness during the trial. The information supplied is therefore hearsay and does not have any
probative value.

FACTS:

Accused Divina and Baga were charged with murder and frustrated murder in two informations
filed against them by the Baillos. As stated in the case, the Baillo family were heading home
from the flea market when shots were fired behind them. Concepcion Baillo, the mother was hit
and mortally wounded and eventually died while the son Jaime also fell down when he was hit
at the back and at the hip. Later on, the accused were identified by Jaime in the crime scene
after he was instructed by his father Ambrocio to hide behind some plants. Ambrocio on the
other hand, left to get a vehicle and soon reported the incident to the police of Dauin whom they
are residents and to their parish priest. Rogelio Baillo, the other son, however, reported the
incident to the police station where the crime was committed.

Accused Divina and Baga interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Both were convicted by the
trial court. Upon automatic review by the Supreme Court, trial court’s conviction of Divina was
sustained while Baga was acquitted because the evidence of the prosecution were not sufficient
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Neither conspiracy was established between the
two accused.

Thus, this appeal of accused Divina.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the entries in a police blotter is conclusive and can be admissible as evidence?

RULING: NO.
Accused Belarmino Divina argues that as stated in the police blotter, the shooting incident
happened at around 7:40 o'clock in the evening of June 17, 1988 and not 6:30 o'clock as
claimed by the prosecution witnesses. It was therefore, not possible for the victim Jaime Baillo
to have seen the accused without the aid of a lighted torch.

We do not agree. A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the
police. Entries in official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. It is undisputed that the alleged time of the
commission of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the
parish priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor
presented as a witness during the trial. The information supplied is therefore hearsay and does
not have any probative value.

RULE 130 SECTION 44 – ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

(4) G.R. No. L-32243 April 15, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO, accused-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
(SANCHEZ)

DOCTRINE: In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health
officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of
the victim

FACTS: xxx while Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of Romeo Geronimo, he
met the latter and invited him to have a drink in the place of a friend. Romeo declined the offer.
Suddenly Eugenio rushed towards Romeo who was then standing near a store facing the street
with his back towards Eugenio and shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one (1)
meter. The bullet entered about two (2) inches below the axilla (armpit) and came out on the
right side of the chest about one (1) inch to the sternum. Romeo fell to the ground mortally
wounded while Eugenio ran away. By-standers who were near the place came to the aid of the
fallen victim and brought him to the Hospital where the doctor pronounced the victim dead upon
arrival.

Crisostomo was charged for Murder. After the arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of
not guilty and again during the trial, the accused signified his intention to withdraw his plea of
not guilty to the charge of murder and to substitute it with a plea of guilty to a lesser charge of
homicide and prayed that he be allowed to prove the mitigating circumstances. The same plea
was made by the accused after the prosecution had rested its case but the fiscal did not agree.
Thus the court denied the petition.
The trial court convicted the accused with Murder.

ISSUE1: Did the trial court err in finding that he admitted having killed the victim.

HELD: Yes. Testifying in his defense the appellant claims that at the time of the incident when
he saw the victim he played a joke on him by drawing his gun from his waist and pointing the
same to the victim but the gun suddenly went off, its bullet hitting the victim. Taken by surprise
he fled.

No doubt from the said version of the appellant he effectively admitted having shot the victim
Romeo Geronimo.

Indeed, during the trial and as late as after the prosecution had rested its case, the appellant
offered to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty of the lessor
offense of homicide but the prosecution refused to agree with his proposal.

ISSUE2: Can the prosecution establish the actual cause of death of the victim sans autopsy?
He contends that the death certificate of the victim (Exhibit A) to which he offered no objection is
admissible only to establish the fact of death not the cause of the death of the victim. He further
avers that the testimony of Dr. Juan Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not
perform an autopsy shows that he did not qualify as an expert witness; and even if he were an
expert witness there was no basis for him to render an opinion as to the cause of death of the
victim.

HELD: These arguments are devoid of merit.

Dr. Santos, who was then the municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, categorically
testified that the cause of death of the deceased was a through and through gunshot wound
which was caused by a bullet. 1 Although he may not be an expert witness, as a physician and
health officer he is certainly qualified to give an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim.
He externally examined the body of the deceased on the same night of the incident, and found
no other sign of external violence except the shot wound. 2 Under such circumstances, one
need not be an expert to render an opinion that the said gunshot wound was the cause of death
of the victim.

The death certificate and the notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external examination of the
body of the victim establish the cause of death of the deceased contrary to the contention of the
appellant. 5 In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health
officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of
the victim. 6

ISSUE3: The appellant assails the findings of the court a quo that he acted with treachery in the
commission of the offense. He contends that while it may be true that he suddenly attacked the
victim, it does not appear that he had consciously adopted the mode of attack intended to
facilitate the perpetuation of the offense without risk to himself. In fact appellant claims that he
was drunk and as such he could not have reflected on the special means of the execution of the
act.
HELD: In the present case, the appellant admitted that he had a previous altercation with the
victim wherein he was hit by the deceased with a bottle because of certain differences they had
in a billiard hall although he claimed to have resumed friendly relations with the victim thereafter.
10
Nevertheless, at the time of the incident, the appellant went through the motion of inviting the
victim to join him in a drinking spree which the victim declined and then suddenly, without any
ceremony, he shot the victim while his (the victim's) back was turned. The appellant used a gun,
a lethal weapon to insure his design to kill the victim. He fired at him at a short distance aiming
at a vital spot of his body. The victim was unarmed. From the environmental circumstances of
the case, alevosia has been fully established. 11

ISSUE4: appellant alleges that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness.

HELD: The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he committed the offense is self-
serving and uncorroborated. Besides, appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy, 12
and that he was on the way to another drinking spree. Obviously he had not drunk enough. He
remembers the details of the shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he
imbibed and the persons who were with him. He realized the gravity of the offense he
committed so he fled and hid from the authorities. He sought sanctuary in the chapel of Sto.
Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca bus to Manila. All
these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been impaired.

ISSUE5: appellant argues that he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender stating that although he hid himself from the authorities for ten (10) days, he
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter upon the advice of his parents.

HELD: The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in hiding,
upon the advise of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was
detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. 14 The Court agrees that the appellant is entitled to
this mitigating circumstance.

ISSUE6: Can the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of
homicide be credited in his favor?

HELD: No. In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He
reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating. 16

ISSUE7: the appellant claims that he should be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
HELD: No. The offense committed is the crime of murder as the killing was qualified by
treachery.

(ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS)

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN
PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY
OF MANILA, respondents. [G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]
(RAMOS)

FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to
present by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, for the jeepney hold-
up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. Twelve years
later, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was
then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were
missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested
to the fact that the records of Criminal Case could not be found in their respective offices. Upon
further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. On October
3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme
Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not court’s monthly report may be admitted as evidence

HELD:
A court’s monthly report constitutes an entry in official records, which is prima facie evidence of
facts therein stated.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then
Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in
official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima
facie evidence of facts therein stated.
RULE 130 SECTION 47 – TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

(1) FLAVIO DE LEON, GREGORIO DE LEON and APOLONIO SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
G.R. No. L-66020 June 22, 1992 J. Gutierrez
(VILLEGAS)

FACTS:
The NBI initiated an investigation about the death of one Benjamin Aguinaldo. For this purpose,
they were able to secure the sworn testimony if three (3) witnesses, namely, Ricardo Reyes y
Ancheta; Marcelino Quinto, Jr. y Taylo; and Eduardo Flores y Garcia. From these sworn statements,
they extracted the following:

Ricardo Reyes pointed to Flavio de Leon, Gregorio de Leon and Apolonio Santos as three (3) of the
five (5) men who had forcibly taken Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of March 2, 1970 and that
was the last time Aguinaldo was seen alive. This was corroborated by witness Marcelino Quinto.

Eduardo Flores testified that in the evening of March 2, 1970, while inside his house, he heard some
commotion outside but was not able to go out to inquire about it as his wife prevented him. The
following morning, however, he learned from Isidro Ramos that Benjamin Aguinaldo was
manhandled by Flavio de Leon and Gregorio de Leon and others whom he could not identify.

In connection with the investigation of both Reyes and Quinto before then Assistant Fiscal Luis
Victor, the stenographic transcript of said preliminary investigation was obtained, and that both
Reyes and Quinto are now deceased.
From the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings at the preliminary investigation the
following facts were testified to by Ricardo Reyes, now deceased:

At about 6:30 in the afternoon of March 2, 1970, he was with Benjamin Aguinaldo, a PUJ jeep driver
plying the route at Baclaran. He had known Aguinaldo at that time for approximately seven (7)
months, On that date, they made several trips, the first was at Baclaran-Cubao route and back; the
second was in Quiapo (sic) and then back to Baclaran; the third was to Sta. Cruz; and the fourth was
to Divisoria. By the time they were back at Baclaran, it was about quarter to 10:00 P.M. At that time,
Aguinaldo decided to return the jeepney to its owner, Isidro Ramos at Sto. Niño. When they were
about thirty (30) meters from the house of Ramos, Aguinaldo gave him P0.60 to buy one-half (1/2)
pack of cigarettes. He got out of the jeep and went to two (2) stores, but they were already closed,
so he walked towards the garage. When he had about twenty (20) meters away, he saw five (5) men
in a jeep approach Aguinaldo who had parked his jeep. He moved closer and sought cover on the
fence of a house just across the house of Ramos about ten (10) meters away. Four (4) men
surrounded the jeepney where Aguinaldo was and Gregorio de Leon hit Aguinaldo with the butt of a
.45 caliber pistol. When Aguinaldo protested, Gregorio hit him again. Thereafter, Isidro Ramos and
his wife came out of the house and decided to interfere but were unable to do anything. Apolonio
Santos, a Barrio Policeman, boarded the jeepney and helped push Aguinaldo out of the vehicle.
Aguinaldo was dragged by Gregorio de Leon and two (2) other men towards the other jeep where
Flavio de Leon was waiting. Apolonio Santos at that time was holding a revolver. Aguinaldo was
placed in between the two (2) men at the back seat with Apolonio Santos seated beside him.
Gregorio sat beside Santos. Flavio then started the engine and passed the portion of the road he
was hidden (sic) proceeding towards the dumping area. He witnessed the incident because the
fence along the side of the house of Ramos is made of hollow blocks about two (2) and one-half
(1/2) feet high on top of it. After a few minutes he left his hiding place and walked along Daan Ilaya
going towards the main road when he heard five (5) shots in succession coming from the direction of
the dumping area. He got apprehensive, and hid himself at the compound of a school which was
about eighty (80) meters away from the dumping area. After several minutes, he walked towards the
national road where he boarded a jeepney and went home. He did not report what he saw because
of fear. The following morning, that is March 3, 1970, Teresita Aguinaldo, wife of Benjamin
Aguinaldo, went to his house accompanied by a certain Eddie to inquire about her husband. He
advised Teresita to inquire from Mang Abio (Flavio de Leon) and in the afternoon of the same day,
Teresita returned to him saying that Mang Abio denied knowing where her husband was. It was only
at that moment when Teresita was told of the incident he witnessed the night before. Flavio de Leon
is the father of Gregorio de Leon.

Likewise, on the basis of the transcript presented by the prosecution, the following facts appear to
have been testified to by Marcelino Quinto, Jr., at the preliminary investigation:

Sometime on March 2, 1970, he went to Wawa to look for Efren Zamora who just won in a race bet,
but was not able to see him. That evening, he saw Mang Abio, Apolonio, Goring and Benjamin
Aguinaldo on board a jeep. He was then at that time coming out of Wawa proceeding towards
Quirino Avenue. He recognized Benjamin Aguinaldo, so he shouted "Ben". "Ben ano ang
nangyayari?" Since the jeep was moving slowly, it stopped and Goring alighted from the jeep poking
towards him a .45 caliber pistol with a warning not to interfere or he might get involved. He was
unable to move until the jeep left towards the direction of the fields (bukid). Although the jeep had its
dim lights on, there was a fluorescent lamp in the street and he recognized Benjamin inside the jeep
with the accused. He did not report the incident to the police because he thought Benjamin
Aguinaldo had committed something wrong since two (2) barrio policemen were on board the jeep
with Aguinaldo. At first, he did not know the first names of Flavio, Goring and Apolonio and Saro. But
in the morning of March 3, 1970, he asked a tricycle driver who knew those persons and they were
identified respectively as Flavio de Leon, Gregorio de Leon, Apolonio Santos, while the first name of
Saro could not be given. He inquired about the first names of those people because he received
information that they will liquidate all witnesses. It was only on March 4, 1970 when he learned that
Benjamin Aguinaldo died. On that date when he saw the wife of Benjamin with Eddie Flores waiting
for a ride, he approached them and told them of what he saw in the evening of March 2, 1970. The
two (2) then invited him to go to the parents of Benjamin Aguinaldo at Araneta Avenue.
Subsequently, on March 16, 1970, he was informed that he, together with Toring, Fabian, Ricardo
Reyes and Boy Bungi and another one were being hunted by Goring and Mang Abio. He did not
know anyone of these people except Ricardo Reyes. According to his information, Goring planned to
liquidate them all. At first, he did not believe the information. But one day he saw Goring riding a blue
owner jeep with two (2) companions. A stout man alighted with a carbine, asking for Quinto. He
became frightened, so he went no Sta. Rita to hide. When he was told that the people looking for
him were gone, he proceeded to Cubao to the parents of Aguinaldo, telling them that he will testify
as a witness in this case against the accused. He did not report the incident that happened to him
because the accused were officers in the company of policemen. (Rollo, p. 20-28)
The lower court, relying primarily on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ricardo Reyes and
Marcelino Quinto, rejected the alibi interposed by the defense and rendered a decision finding all of
the accused guilty of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent court erred in sustaining the admission by the trial court of the NBI
sworn statements and preliminary investigation testimonies of Ricardo Reyes and Marcelino Quinto,
Jr.
HELD: No!

It is worthy of note that except for the question as to the admissibility of the sworn statements taken
during the NBI investigation which comprised the direct testimony of Reyes and Quinto during the
preliminary investigation, as well as the admissibility of the rest of the testimonies taken during the
said proceeding, the issues raised are factual.

The issue as to the admissibility of the sworn statements and testimonies of Reyes and Quinto
deserves scant consideration at this stage of the case because this Court had already put the issue
to rest when it denied the petition for certiorari earlier filed by herein petitioners questioning the
decision of the Court of First Instance to admit the transcripts in question. By the express provision
of section 1 (f) Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, the testimonies given by witnesses during the
preliminary investigation of the case on trial should be admitted into evidence when such testimony
was taken by question and answer in the presence of defendant or his attorney, and there was an
opportunity for the defendant to cross examine the witness "who is dead or incapacitated to testify or
cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines"
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing Premises considered, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is hearby AFFIRMED.

RULE 130 SECTION 48 – OPINION RULE

1) NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO,

as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 91114 September 25, 1992
J. Davide, Jr.
(CORPUZ)

DOCTRINE: A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment,

when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely
on facts related in the hypothetical question.

FACTS: Juan Sim filed for a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly Lim on the ground
of mental illness labelled as “schizophrenia”. For this petition, he presented three witnesses
during the trial.
Dr. Lydia Acampado, a doctor of medicine who specializes in Psychiatry and Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, was presented by the prosecution. The
defense opposed this on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the doctor had examined Nelly Lim in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

Dr. Acampado nevertheless took the witness stant where she testified as an expert witness,
without testifying on any information acquired while attending to Nelly Lim in a professional
capacity but only as to hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither
revealed the illness she examined and treated Nelly Lim for nor disclosed the results of her
examination and the medicines she prescribed. She was also asked to render an opinion as to
what kind of illness are stelanize tablets applied to and on hypothetical facts respecting
certain behaviours of a person.

The trial court and the CA allowed Dr. Acampado to testify hence the case was elevated to the
SC.

ISSUE: WON a physician may be an expert witness and testify only on her opinion requiring her
special knowledge, skill, experience or training despite having a physician-client relationship
with the petitioner.

RULING: YES.

RATIO: Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge of the Female Service of the
National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an
expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.

The information testified upon by Dr. Acampado were not obtained from the patient while
attending her in her professional capacity and neither were the information necessary to enable
the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. Neither did the information
obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her
or invite reproach.

After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration
that touched or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim,
during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that
she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient.

Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion
regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The
facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and had no bearing to
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the patient.
A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment,
when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer
solely on facts related in the hypothetical question.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOERAL GALLENO

G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998
PER CURIAM:
(ALFAFARA)

Doctrine: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon
the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases,
and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the
special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter
under observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.

Facts: Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who
had to leave the province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn,
together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody
of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.

At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to
have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found
the two children left to themselves.

Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering her
shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. As Evelyn was only five-years old while
appellant was fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her
cry in pain.

When the parents went home, they saw the victim bleeding in her genital area they went to the
hospital to stop the bleeding and told that them that the bleeding was caused by a blunt object
penetrating the vagina of the accused. Their daughter was subsequently recommended to be
admitted to the hospital however due to financial constraint they were unable to do so.
The accused was apprehended and denial is presented as the defenses. Accused-appellant
testified that when he arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he
found the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar. While seated at the balcony, accused-appellant was
approached by Evelyn, who knew him. He cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right
hand holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first
time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail was
long and the child was not wearing any underwear.

Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, resulting
in a judgment of conviction.

Issue: Are the opinions of the doctors in this should be admitted by the court?

Ruling: Yes.

Ratio: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions.
It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill
or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under
observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other
words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert
testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the
fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not
mean the trial court's interference is wrong.

The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was
his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not
the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is
entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries
of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.

As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused the
laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused. This is
best exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Lourdes Laada on cross-examination.

Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not the outright incredulity of the
version of accused-appellant which is not in accord with ordinary human experience. We thus
can not help expressing sentiments similar of those of the trial court when is said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his credibility. He failed to
explain how his ring finger accidentally came in contact with the genitalia of Evelyn, while it was
established by the prosecution that at that time Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex
gratia argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate
to the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch when she was in shorts. The Supreme Court, in
People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human
perception can be warped by the impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious
workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness'
testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.

RULE 130 Section 49 – Opinion of Expert Witness

1.) Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc.
and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Company, Inc. – 306 SCRA 762
G.R. No. 132607, 05 May 1999
Purisima, J.:
(Barcelon)
DOCTRINE:
Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have
probative value, reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court.
It is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert testimonies. If from the facts
and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to
resort to expert opinion evidence. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based
their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the
latter are of more probative value.

FACTS:
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of dry-docking and repairing marine vessels while William Lines, Inc. (WLI) is in
the shipping business and owner of M/V Manila City (the vessel), a luxury passenger-cargo
vessel. M/V Manila City was insured by Prudential.
WLI contracted the services of CSEW for M/V Manila City’s annual repairs. While the
vessel was undergoing dry-docking repairs within the premises of CSEW, the master, officers
and crew of the vessel stayed in the vessel, using their cabins as living quarters. Other
employees hired by WLI to do repairs and maintenance work were also present during the dry-
docking. After dry-docking, the vessel was transferred to the docking quay. A fire broke out in
the ship, and in spite the efforts of the CSEW fire brigade as well as the fire department of
Mandaue, the vessel sank, resulting to its total loss. WLI sued CSEW for the loss. Prudential
subrogated to the rights of WLI being the vessels insurer.
 There are two versions of the origin of the fire. CSEW claims that it originated from the
vessels cabins which were used by the WLI’s employees as living quarters. This claim was
corroborated by the fire experts, David Frey and Gregory Michael Southard, presented by
CSEW during trial. The said fire experts opined that the fire did not originated from Tank Top
No. 12, where the CSEW workers for working, but on the crew accommodation cabins where
WLI’s employees were staying.
Prudential, on the other hand, theorized that the fire broke out from Tank Top 12, where
the CSEW workers where cropping out steel plates using acetylene, oxygen and welding torch.
This was corroborated by the vessel’s crew. In fact, the Chief Mate of the vessel testified that he
observed that he rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit was already
burning, prompting him to scold the CSEW workers.
The RTC of Cebu, as well as the CA gave more weight to the testimonies of the WLI
crew and ruled in favor of WLI and Prudential.
(Note: Other topics in this case include Review by SC of CA findings of fact; Res Ipsa Loquitor
in negligence; Subrogation in Insurance; and Contracts of Adhesion)
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that the testimonies of CSEW’s expert witnesses have no
probative value in this case?
RULING: No.
RATIO:
Neither is there tenability in the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
erroneously ruled on the inadmissibility of the expert testimonies it (petitioner) introduced on the
probable cause and origin of the fire. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding the testimonies of the fire experts, Messrs. David Grey and Gregory Michael
Southeard, who testified on the probable origin of the fire in M/V Manila City. Petitioner avers
that since the said fire experts were one in their opinion that the fire did not originate in the area
of Tank Top No. 12 where the JNB workers were doing hotworks but on the crew
accommodation cabins on the portside No. 2 deck, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
should have given weight to such finding based on the testimonies of fire experts; petitioner
argues.
But courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may
have probative value, reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the
court.Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as evidence is a
prerogative of the courts. It is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert
testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable,
there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In the case under
consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence on the
probable cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the
vessel when the fire occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based
their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the
latter are of more probative value. Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in
giving more weight to said testimonies.
Petition denied. CA Decision affirmed.

ERNARDO JIMENEZ and JOSE JIMENEZ, as Operators of JJs TRUCKING, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PEDRO JUANATAS and FREDELITO
JUANATAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 116960. April 2, 1996
(AGRAMON)

Doctrine:
One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.

Facts:
Private respondents Pedro and Fredelito Juanatas, father and son, filed a claim for unpaid
wages/commissions, separation pay and damages against JJ s Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo
Jimenez. Said respondents alleged that in December, 1987, they were hired by herein petitioner
Bernardo Jimenez as driver mechanic and helper, in the trucking firm, JJ Trucking. They were
assigned to a ten-wheeler truck to haul soft drinks of Coca-Cola Bottling Company and paid on
commission basis, initially fixed at 17% but later increased to 20% in 1988.

Private respondents further alleged that for the years 1988 and 1989 they received only a partial
commission of P84,000.00 from petitioners total gross income of almost P1,000,000.00 for the said
two years. Consequently, with their commission for that period being computed at 20% of said
income, there was an unpaid balance to them of P106,211.86. In March, 1990 their services were
illegally terminated.

Petitioners contend that respondent Fredelito Juanatas was not an employee of the firm but was
merely a helper of his father Pedro; that all commissions for 1988 and 1989, as well as those up to
March, 1990, were duly paid; and that the truck driven by respondent Pedro Juanatas was sold to
one Winston Flores in 1991 and, therefore, private respondents were not illegally dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the payment of the balance of their commissions?
Yes

Ruling:
One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.

When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden
of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a
defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the
burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the
creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.

In the instant case, the right of respondent Pedro Juanatas to be paid a commission equivalent to
17%, later increased to 20%, of the gross income is not disputed by petitioners. Although private
respondents admit receipt of partial payment, petitioners still have to present proof of full payment.
Where the defendant sued for a debt admits that the debt was originally owed, and pleads payment
in whole or in part, it is incumbent upon him to prove such payment. That a plaintiff admits that some
payments have been made does not change the burden of proof. The defendant still has the burden
of establishing payments beyond those admitted by plaintiff.

The testimony of petitioners which merely denied the claim of private respondents, unsupported by
documentary evidence, is not sufficient to establish payment. Although petitioners submitted a
notebook showing the alleged vales of private respondents for the year 1990, the same is
inadmissible and cannot be given probative value considering that it is not properly accomplished, is
undated and unsigned, and is thus uncertain as to its origin and authenticity.

The positive testimony of a creditor may be sufficient of itself to show non-payment, even when met
by indefinite testimony of the debtor. Similarly, the testimony of the debtor may also be sufficient to
show payment, but, where his testimony is contradicted by the other party or by a disinterested
witness, the issue may be determined against the debtor since he has the burden of proof.

RULE 131 SECTION 1 – BURDEN OF PROOF

2) DIOSDADO MALLARI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

DOCTRINE: The fact that the firearm seized is a ‘paltik’ or homemade gun and that it is illegally
manufactured does not dispense with requirement of proof that it is unlicensed. In crimes
involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the
same, a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense which the
prosecution has the duty not only to allege but also to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS: On 27 Dec 1990, at around 2:30 p.m., Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra received
reliable information that Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest in connection
with Criminal Case for Homicide was seen at Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac.

lmmediately upon receipt of such information, Manipon with Esguerra and Pat. Simbulan, with
personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against Mallari in
connection with Criminal Case for Homicide, immediately proceeded to Sitio 14, Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, they arrested Mallari and told him to remain stationary.
Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one
M-16 live ammunition

After investigation, Mallari was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. RTC: convicted for the crime (IPFA) beyond reasonable doubt.

Mallari contended that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found
in his possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license therefor and
absent this essential element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, it was
manifest error for the Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.

Contention of the prosecution: Since a ‘paltik’ is a homemade gun and is illegally manufactured
as recognized in People vs, Fajardo, this kind of gun cannot be issued a license or permit, it is
no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed.

ISSUE: W/n the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari did not
have the requisite license for the firearm and ammunition found in his possession? YES

HELD: The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari did not have the
requisite license for the firearm and ammunition. In crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have
the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a negative fact which
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the
prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP (FEU)
that Mallari was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession. The
absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction
erroneous. (The allegation of the prosecution must be substantiated by other evidence such as
proving if Mallari is a licensee of the said ‘paltik’)

SC: Mallari is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

RULE 131 SECTION 3 – DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION

(1) REYNALDO M. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. HON. ELIEZER R. DE LOS SANTOS,

Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 58, Angeles City; and ANTONIO ANDA, respondents

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was
killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman)
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial
court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally
liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal
damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and
LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere
fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by
Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought
to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176
in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the
employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

G.R. No. 125221. June 19, 1997

PUNO, J.
(ELIZALDE-GUTIERREZ)

DOCTRINE:

The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner and private respondent belong are duly
registered with the SEC, but these associations are two separate entities. The dispute between
petitioner and private respondent is not within the KAMAJDA nor the SAMAJODA. It is between
members of separate and distinct associations. Petitioner and private respondent have no
intracorporate relation much less do they have an intracorporate dispute. The SEC therefore
has no jurisdiction over the complaint.

FACTS:

Lozano was the president of KAMAJDA (Kapatirang Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney Drivers’

Association, Inc.) while Anda was the president of SAMAJODA (Samahang Angeles-Mabalacat
Jeepney Operators’ and Drivers’ Association, Inc.). In 1995, the two agreed to consolidate the
two corporations, thus, UMAJODA (Unified Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney Operators’ and Drivers
Association, Inc.) was created. In the same year, elections for the officers of UMAJODA were
held. Lozano and Anda both ran for president. Lozano won but Anda alleged fraud in the
elections and thereafter he refused to participate with UMAJODA. Anda continued to collect
fees from members of SAMAJODA and refused to recognize Lozano as president of
UMAJODA. Lozano then filed a complaint for damages against Anda with the MCTC of
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Anda moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
MCTC judge denied Anda’s motion. On certiorari, Judge De Los Santos of RTC Angeles City
reversed and ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that what is involved is an intra-
corporate dispute which should be under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case involves an intra-corporate dispute which should be under the
jurisdiction of the SEC and not by the MCTC?

RULING: NO

The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the light of its nature and function under
the law. This jurisdiction is determined by a concurrence of two elements: (1) the status or
relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them
and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the
State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises. The second element requires that the
dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation,
partnership or association or deal with the internal affairs of the corporation, partnership or
association. After all, the principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control of
corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that investments in these
entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of
economic development.

There is no intra-corporate nor partnership relation between petitioner and private respondent.
The controversy between them arose out of their plan to consolidate their respective jeepney
drivers' and operators' associations into a single common association. This unified association
was, however, still a proposal. It had not been approved by the SEC, neither had its officers and
members submitted their articles of consolidation in accordance with Sections 78 and 79 of the
Corporation Code. Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members
but only upon issuance of the certificate of consolidation by the SEC. When the SEC, upon
processing and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the consolidation of the
corporations is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code and existing laws, it
issues a certificate of consolidation which makes the reorganization official. The new
consolidated corporation comes into existence and the constituent corporations dissolve and
cease to exist.

The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner and private respondent belong are duly
registered with the SEC, but these associations are two separate entities. The dispute between
petitioner and private respondent is not within the KAMAJDA nor the SAMAJODA. It is between
members of separate and distinct associations. Petitioner and private respondent have no intra-
corporate relation much less do they have an intra-corporate dispute. The SEC therefore has no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
 3) DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION,
[G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003]
INC., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
(SANCHEZ)

DOCTRINE: Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there

instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

FACTS: Respondent constructed a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo,
Manila.

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner, anchored
at the Navotas Fish Port. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T.
Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about
eight (8) hours. At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to
seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested.
At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away
from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high.
He succeeded in avoiding collision with the Napocor power barge, but the ship hit the deflector
wall constructed by respondent.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage
was caused by a fortuitous event.

TC: dismissed the complaint and ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because (i) it
had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident, (ii) applied the emergency rule,
(iii) the cause of the damage (typhoon Katring) was an act of God.

CA: reversed the decision of the trial court and found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in
deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and
thus held petitioner liable for damages.

Petitioner’s arguments: xxx It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that
petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. Granting that Capt.
Jusep was indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due diligence
in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent;

HELD: Yes. Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a
report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8
hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994,
when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already
congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative
success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case,
but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep,
despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the
lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim
that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after
receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way
past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to
him, it was not very cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet.

ISSUE: (2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?

HELD: Yes. Petitioner is vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee.

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also
the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty.
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt.
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen
be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence
in supervising its employees.

In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the
rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that once negligence on the
part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he observed the diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines
for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and
monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.

So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents failure to allege in its
complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, it was held that it is not necessary
to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, inasmuch
as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a
case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

4) (DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS)
G.R. No. 106025 February 9, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.CARLOS DE GUZMAN y PANALIGAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant has been in the watch list of the police authorities as a prohibited drug
peddler. PO3 Arnaldo Manzon and Patrolman Eduardo Chiapoco of the Western Police District
decided to conduct the buy-bust operation against the accused-appellant along Coral and R. A.
Reyes Streets, Tondo, Manila. Manzon acted as the poseur-buyer, with Chiapoco as the
apprehending officer. The buy-bust operation was conducted at 7:30 in the evening. Pat.
Manzon posed as a Metro Manila aide. Together with a confidential informant, he casually
approached accused de Guzman and asked if he could "score" (buy) a deck of "shabu."
Accused de Guzman informed him that a deck would cost fifty pesos. Manzon then handed the
accused a previously marked P50.00 bill. In exchange, the accused gave him an aluminum foil
containing crystalline granules. Manzon scrutinized the contents of the foil and then executed
the pre-arranged signal to his companion, Patrolman Chiapoco. The accused was forthwith
arrested by Pat. Chiapoco. The accused was frisked and the search yielded four aluminum, foils
containing white crystalline granules.They escorted the accused to the WPD Narcotics Office
and was turned over to Investigator Pat. Vicente Rodriguez. The latter, in turn, marked the
seized articles and requested for its chemical analysis by the WPD Criminal Investigation
Laboratory Division.Accordingly, Patrolmen Manzon and Chiapoco executed a Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension relating in detail the events leading to the arrest of de Guzman. The chemical
analysis report confirmed that the five aluminum foils contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Consequently, an Information was filed against Carlos de Guzman y Panaligan
for violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial court erred in upholding the credibility of the Policemen witnesses for
the prosecution and in convicting the accused

HELD:
A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted
on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which
may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an
official act or duty has been regularly performed. Presumption of this nature is indulged by the
law for the following fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be
presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of
government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust
and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such
department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. Thus, this presumption
evidences a rule of convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress
would spring in the affairs of men.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness.

(5) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEXANDER NAVAJA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 104044 March 30, 1993 J. Davide
(VILLEGAS)

FACTS:

Accused was the object of a buy-bust operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs Section (ANDDRUS) of the Cebu City Police. Unlike in other buy-bust operations where
the supposed seller of prohibited drugs is arrested immediately after the transaction, Navaja
successfully evaded arrest after the consummation of the sale and just as the members of the
buy-bust team were about to pounce on him.

The ANDDRUS filed a complaint against the accused for the violation of Section 4, Article II of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and an Information against the accused was filed.

On 10 May 1990, the accused was finally apprehended. Consequently, Criminal Case No. CBU-
16994 was revived and arraignment of the accused was set for 2 July 1990. Arraigned on said
date, the accused pleaded not guilty.

During trial, only one out of the five policemen who were part of the buy bust operation testified
against him. The trial court convicted him based on this evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the non-presentation of other witnesses gave rise to the presumption of
suppression of evidence
HELD: NO!

There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific or minimum number of
witnesses to sustain a conviction for any of the offenses described in the Dangerous Drugs Act.
It is the prosecuting fiscal's prerogative to determine who or how many witnesses are to be
presented17 in order to establish the quantum of proof necessary for conviction.

In this case, the prosecution deemed it sufficient to present Pfc. Espina alone since any other
testimony which would have been given by the other members of the buy-bust team would be
merely corroborative in nature. The non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not
constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case.

Besides, there is no showing that the other peace officers were not available to the accused for
the latter to present as his own witnesses. The rule is settled that the adverse presumption from
a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful, (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative, (3) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

The court, for its part, is not precluded from rendering a judgment of conviction based solely on
the testimony of a single witness as long as such testimony is found to be credible and satisfies
the court that the accused is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The accused was seen — not caught as he had escaped — in flagrante as a result of the buy-
bust operation. In such an operation, what is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received
the marijuana from the accused and that the same was presented as evidence in court.21 This
Court has consistently held in drug cases that absent any proof to the contrary, law enforcers
are presumed to have regularly performed their duty. In the instant case, there exists no such
contrary proof. Accused has not presented evidence of any ulterior motive that could have
moved Ranulfo Espina to testify against him. The rule is also settled that in the absence of
evidence that would show why the prosecution witness would testify falsely, the logical
conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that such testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.

WHEREFORE, the Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

6) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. FERNANDO CASTAÑEDA Y

SALES, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 114972 January 24, 1996
J. Puno
(CORPUZ)
DOCTRINE: The rule on suppression of evidence cannot be invoked by accused-appellant
where the same evidence is available to him.

Section 5(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced" does not apply when the testimony of the witness not produced
would only be corroborative.

FACTS: One night, when private complainant Eugenia Sese was at home with her children, she
noticed at a distance of 5 meters, a person walking towards her house. Although it was night
time, the moon was bright and her house was lighted with 3 kerosene lamps. She sensed
danger. Her husband was away, her children were asleep and her neighbors were 20 meters
away. She shouted but the intruder was able to grab her and poke at knife at her neck. He then
demanded money and she was dragged forcibly inside her house.

Inside the house, she clearly saw the face of the man through the aparador’s mirror. She
handed P200.00 to him. With a knife still pointed at her, he ordered her to pull down her pants.
He then raped her then disappeared into the darkness.

Eugenia then woke up her children, sought help from the neighbors. The barangay officials were
able to capture the Accused with the help of the identification made by Eugenia.

Rodolfo David, a barangay tanod, was one of those who responded to Eugenia. He claimed that
private complainant told him that she could not identify the person who robbed and molested
her. She described the criminal to be tall, thin, with a tie around his head, and that the suspect
belonged to the Llarves family.

In his defense, Accused Castaneda claimed that he was on a birthday party when the crime was
committed. His brother-in-law Eduardo Garcia, corroborated his alibi.

The trial court convicted Castaneda. Hence this appeal.

In the instant case, Accused Castaneda argues that the he was misidentified as the barangay
tanod David testified that the culprit described by private complainant was tall, slim and a
Llarves. Allegedly, this description was given in the presence of barangay officials who were not
called as witnesses by the prosecution. He charges the prosecution with suppression of
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether evidence was suppressed which was sufficient to prove the accused’s
innocence.

RULING: NO.

RATIO:
Section 3, Rule 131: Disputable Presumptions – The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by evidence.

(e) “Evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

The rule on suppression of evidence cannot be invoked by accused-appellant where the same
evidence is available to him. In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have subpoenaed the
barangay officials who allegedly heard the description of the culprit given by the private
complainant. These barangay officials were not under the control of private complainant, a lowly
housewife in barangay Sta. Maria, Concepcion, Tarlac. It is far fetched to accuse her and the
prosecution of suppressing their testimonies.

Moreover, their testimonies could only be corroborative. In People v. Lorenzo, the SC held that
the presumption laid down in Section 5(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply when the testimony of the
witness not produced would only be corroborative.
Further, records show that immediately upon seeing a man coming to their direction, private
complainant recognized him as the criminal and pointed him to Apolinar, and then to the
barangay officials.

Accused Castaneda also cannot argue that he was not the criminal because he did not flee the
situs of the crime. Although flight from the scene is an indication of guilt, the act of returning to
the situs of the crime does not a converso indicate innocence. It is no longer strange for smart
criminals to return to the scene of the crime to stunt suspicion. The failure to present the knife
and the stolen P200.00 were also not indicative of his innocence.

Finally, the defense of alibi is rejected.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the judgment of the trial court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape, is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against accused-
appellant. SO ORDERED.

7) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs IRENE SIMBULAN y DOLOR and ELVIRA SUGUI y

SUNGA
G.R. No. 100754 October 13, 1992
REGALADO, J.:
Doctrine: They are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, there being no evidence to the contrary, and more so since there is nothing in the
record which would indicate that they were actuated by improper motives.

Facts: In the morning of September 14, 1988, at around 9:00 a.m., a male informant came to
the office of the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit of the NARCOM and relayed to Lt. Reuben Sindac
the information that @ NENE and @ ELVIE were engaged in the selling of shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride at Masangkay St., Makati, Metro Manila. Finding this
information to be viable (to use his own word), Lt. Sindac submitted to Lt. Col. Raval of the
NARCOM a pre-operation report. Lt. Col. Raval approved the said pre-operation report and
directed Lt. Sindac to constitute a team and conduct a buy-bust operation. For the purpose he
gave Lt. Sindac money for gasoline and P500.00 in five P100 bills as buy-money.

The five P100 bills bear the serial numbers WF 210212 (Exh. D), UM 242970 (Exh. G), WP
787691 (Exh. E). SZ 832140 (Exh. C), and UXZ 65475 (Exh. F) Lt. Sindac marked each of them
by shading the letter O in Bangko Sentral, and had them xeroxed.

A special team was formed and conducted a buy-bust operation and when the deal was done
the back-ups swoop in and arrested the vendors of drugs and recover the marked money.

From the target area, Lt. Sindac and his team members brought @ NENE, who was later
identified to be accused Irene Simbulan, and ELVIE, who turned out to be accused Elvira Sugui,
to their headquarters in Camp Crame. They also brought there Erlinda Sugui, the sister of Elvira
Sugui; whom they found in possession of shabu.

Upon reaching their Headquarters, Sgt. Directo marked the transparent plastic bag earlier given
to her by @ NENE, that contained what appeared to be shabu (Exh. K), with the letter "A",
prepared her "Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer" (Exh. A), and thereafter turned over the same to Lt.
Sindac. She also prepared the "Receipt for Property Seized" (Exh. L). On the other hand, Lt.
Sindac and his other team members executed their "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" (Exh. B).

By cover of a letter dated September 15, 1988 (Exh. J), the NARCOM sent the suspected shabu
(Exh. K) that was given by @ NENE to Sgt. Directo to the PC Crime Laboratory Service for
appropriate laboratory examinations. As requested in the said letter (Exh. J), Capt. Lina C.
Sarmiento, a forensic chemist, examined the said specimen and found it positive for
"methamphetamine hydrochloride", a regulated drug. (Exhs. H and M).

The defense argued that the police officers where driven by malice and the said buy-bust was a
sham in order to put them in jail. The accused also argued that the marked money was not
properly marked as prescribed by standard procedure and that the informant should have been
presented to the court.

The trial court found the accused guilty hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the action of the policemen is irregular and failed to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling: No!

Ratio: The narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses are worthy of credit. They are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, there
being no evidence to the contrary, and more so since there is nothing in the record which would
indicate that they were actuated by improper motives.

Furthermore, the testimonies of the apprehending officers were straightforward and consistent.
As expressly observed by the trial court in its decision –

. . ., in the course of their testimonies, the Court was intently observing the prosecution
witnesses, particularly Sgt. Directo and Lt. Sindac, and the Court was impressed by their
candidness and straightforward manner of testifying, which in the mind of the Court indicated
that they had testified truthfully. As a matter of fact, Lt. Sindac, who is only 27 years (old) had
impressed the Court that he is a professional whose only concern is to do his job and to do it
well…

It is argued by appellants that the failure of the prosecution to present the civilian informer was a
fatal omission. We do not agree. The poseur-buyer, S/Sgt. Directo, who dealt directly with
appellants in the purchase of the regulated drug was presented in the trial. Hence, the testimony
of the informer, if it were given, would at best be corroborative or cumulative. The rule is well
settled that each party has the prerogative to determine which witnesses to present and to
dispense with the testimony of persons who will only give corroboration. The non-presentation
of a mere corroborative witness does not amount to suppression of evidence.

Moreover, if the defense believed that the testimony of the informer was important to their case,
there was nothing to prevent them from compelling the latter's presence and availing of his
testimony in court by Compulsory process. The informer was known to the defense. It would
have been simple enough to have him produced by a subpoena for examination as a defense
witness. This, appellants inexplicably failed or declined to do.

The allegation of appellants that the marked money used were not properly marked in
accordance with accepted standard procedures, that is, by application of fluorescent powder,
does not deserve even a passing consideration. How the buy-bust money should have been
marked was of no significance in establishing the guilt of appellants. What is material is the
proof that the drug transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti. In fact, even the absence of the marked money or its non- presentation in court would
not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.

Secondly, the version of the defense that the poseur-buyer left after the sale, and then later
returned together with other NARCOM agents to make an arrest, is illogical and absurd. In a
buy-bust operation, drug dealers are apprehended in flagrante delicto, not in a disjointed
manner or sequence as appellants would portray.

Thirdly, appellants did not impute, much less prove, any ill motive on the part of the NARCOM
agents that would impel them to involve appellants in a serious criminal charge. There is nothing
in the records of the case suggesting that the testimonies of the NARCOM agents were
motivated by any reason other than their mission to curb drug abuse. Hence, the prosecution's
narration, of facts and identification of the accused-appellants should be given weight.

8.) People of the Philippines vs. Mateo Baludda y Suoy

G.R. No. 114198, 19 Nov 1999
Purisima, J.:
(Barcelon)
DOCTRINE:
It is disputably presumed that things which a person possesses, or over which he
exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him. The constitutional presumption of innocence will
not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable
as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. To warrant his acquittal, a person apprehended while
carrying a sack containing marijuana must show that his act was innocent and done without
intent to possess, i.e., without knowledge that what he possessed was a prohibited drug.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC of Bauang, La Union convicting Mateo
Balluda for violation of Sec 4, Art II of RA 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act) and sentencing him to
life imprisonment plus a Php20,000 fine.
The prosecution’s version of the facts:
On 24 Sept 1990, CIC Mauro Camat with other members of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) received a tip that people passing by their area are carrying huge
quantities of marijuana. They were ordered by their commanding officer to patrol the area. The
next day, Camat and companions encountered Mateo Baludda, Maximo Baludda (Mateo’s
uncle), Domingo Atibew and Ben Baristo carrying sacks on their backs. When Camat and
company introduced themselves as CAFGU and asked what’s in the sacks, Mateo, Domingo
and Ben ran away. Camat fired two warning shots, while one of his companions fired directly at
Mateo, wounding the latter in the shoulder and leg. Upon inspection of the sacks, they found
marijuana, so, they brought Mateo and Maximo to the PC Provincial Headquarters. Ben
surrendered to the police later on.
Defense’ version:
Mateo did not know what they were carrying. While he and his companions were walking
on the mountainous path, two shots suddenly rang out of the opposite direction and hit him. Ben
and Maximo stayed to look after him while Domingo ran away. When the CAFGU surfaced, they
allowed Ben to go home to get help. The next day, Mateo’s neighbors arrived as well as CIC
Camat and other CAFGU members. Then they were brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation.
The RTC upheld the prosecution’s version.
On appeal, Mateo avers that he did not take part in the alleged sale or transport of the
marijuana because he did not know what was in the sacks they were carrying.
ISSUE:
W/N Mateo’s contention is correct?
RULING:
No.
RATIO:
Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him. In U.S. vs. Bandoc,
the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the
house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough
to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The constitutional presumption of
innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be
so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on
the possessor of the dangerous drug to explain absence of animus possidendi.
In the case under consideration, it is not disputed that appellant was apprehended while
carrying a sack containing marijuana. Consequently, to warrant his acquittal, he must show that
his act was innocent and done without intent to possess, i.e. without knowledge that what he
possessed was a prohibited drug.
Appellant theorized that he merely acceded to the request of Maximo Baludda, his uncle,
to carry the sack without knowing that it contained marijuana. As ratiocinated below, it is
contrary to human experience that a man, 32 years of age, would readily agree to carry the load
of his uncle, without even knowing the place where to deliver such load, and without asking,
while negotiating a forested area, how far is their destination and how long it would take them to
reach the place, especially so because when they were apprehended at around 5:00 in the
afternoon, they had already been walking for around three (3) hours. Indeed, the tale of
appellant, too trite and hackneyed to be believed, does not suffice to overcome the prima facie
evidence of appellant’s awareness of his possession of prohibited drugs. Worse still for
appellant is the undeniable fact that he and his companions, except Maximo Baludda, fled
towards different directions after the police authorities announced their presence. If appellant
had nothing to do with the transporting of subject prohibited drugs, or if he really had no
knowledge that the sack he carried contained marijuana, there would have been no cause for
him to flee. If he had to run at all, it would have been more consistent with his protestation of
innocence if he ran towards, and not away from, the police officers. Obviously, what appellant
did removed any shred of doubt over his guilt; exemplifying the biblical adage: The wicked flee
when no man pursueth: but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
Decision of RTC was affirmed by the SC.