THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA,
, petitioner,
and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE
CA, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
FACTS:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners'
second amended complaint against respondents.
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and
Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle
of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned
several neighboring houses, including the personal
properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among
them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the
station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as
the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
Petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to
the supervision of their employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITOR should
apply in this case.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa
liquitor and adjudged defendant Caltex liable for the
damage done to the proper of its neighbours. The principle
applies with equal force because the gasoline station, with
all its appliances, equipment, and employees, was under
the control of the defendant. The persons who knew or
could have known how fire started were the defendant and
their employees but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent
omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to
provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames
from leaping over it. Defendants' negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also
with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring
houses.
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted
by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children DOMING,
LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME,
ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed
MABLE, respondents.
GR. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988
FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop (petitioner) in Caloocan
City was situated adjacent to the residence of private
respondents.. On August 1971, private respondent first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to
request that a firewall be constructed between the shop
and private respondents' residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
On Sept 6, 1974 fire broke out in petitioner's shop. It
spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and
the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the
conflagration was never discovered.
Private respondents filed an action for damages against
petitioner which the Court of First Instance granted the
Court of appeals affirmed The CFI decision but reduced the
award of damages, thus this review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITOR
should be applied in this case
HELD: YES.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the
doctrine, considering that in the normal course of
operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible
material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and
fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on
the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely
presumed. Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a
finding of negligence.
Therefore, the Court had more than adequate basis to find
petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private
respondents.
TEAGUE V. FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-29745, JUNE 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the
Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice
located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler
Street, Quiapo, Manila was owned and operated by
petitioner Teague.
The said second floor was unpartitioned, had only one
stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, and having eight
windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape
ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was
indicated on the wall.
On October 24, 1955 - a fire broke out in a store for surplus
materials located about ten meters away from the institute
(across the street).
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic
Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic
ensued amongst 180 students. No part of the Gil-Armi
Building caught fire. However, after the panic was over,
four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of
plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others
injured on account of the stampede.
The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for
damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a violation of a statute constitutes
negligence
HELD:
YES. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety
regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
The negligence is based primarily on the fact that the
provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila had not been complied with in connection
with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The
Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez.
The violation of the ordinance consisted in the fact that the
second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2
meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of
the building had a second stairway under construction.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, Defendant-
Appellant.
G.R. No. L-21749. September 29, 1967.
FACTS:
Barge L-1892 owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. was being
towed down the Pasig river by two tugboats "Bangus" and
"Barbero” (also owned by Luzon). The barge rammed
against one of the wooden piles of Nagtahan bailey bridge,
smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. At the
time, the river’s current was swift and the water was high
due to heavy rains in Manila.
The Republic sued the company for the actual and
consequential damages caused (P200,000). However, Luzon
Stevedoring Corp disclaimed liability, on the grounds that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were
caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to
sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction
to navigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the collision of Luzon’s barge with the
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused
by fortuitous event or force majeure
HELD:
NO. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and provided with
adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the
barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the
bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on
Luzon’s part or its employees manning the barge or the
tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events,
such a thing does not happen if proper care is used. In
Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by
what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule.
Luzon strongly stresses the precautions taken by it: that it
assigned two of its most powerful tugboats; that it assigned
to the task the more competent and experienced among its
patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-
checked and inspected; that it instructed its patrons to take
extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was
called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be
held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
These very precautions, however, completely destroy the
appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure
(which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an
obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable"
(A1174, NCC). It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been fore seen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed but it must be one impossible to
foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
FACTS:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC) arrived at the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to conduct
docking manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel,
Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders
to the crew of the vessel. However the anchor did not hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken.
A commotion ensued between the crew members. The bow of
the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier.
Phil. Pilots Association filed a complaint for a sum of money
against FESC, Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding
them liable with MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino.
ISSUE:
WON FESC, Gavino and MPA should be held liable for negligence
HELD:
YES. The rule is that there is a presumption of fault against a
moving vessel that strikes a stationary object. In admiralty, this
presumption does more than merely require the ship to go
forward and produce some evidence on the presumption matter.
The moving vessel must show that it was without fault, that they
did all the reasonable care required or that the collision was
occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was a result of
inevitable accident. In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal,
the presumption of fault attaches to the moving vessel and makes
a prima facie case of fault against the vessel.
Such incidents simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things
unless the vessel has been mismanaged. It is not sufficient for the
respondents to produce witnesses to testify that as soon as the
danger became apparent everything possible was done to avoid
the incident. What was done was too little or too late. Still the
vessel was at fault for being in a position in which as unavoidable
collision would occur.
The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC are
declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to reimbursement
from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability
in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed
reserved fund.
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO
and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Facts:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the
latter's private patient. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr.
Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a
caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered
the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin who
prescribed for her certain medicines. Despite this, the pain still
kept recurring. She then decided to consult Dr.Ma. Salud Kho.
After examining her, Dr. Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit
to another surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs.
Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst
on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and
pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right
side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece
of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove which was the
cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all
the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber
allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified
that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination.
However, the trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's
testimony that when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece
of rubber, "Dr. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but
that she threw it away." This statement, the trial court noted, was
never denied nor disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude that
there are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that
offending "rubber"There was also doubts as to the whereabouts
of the piece of rubber, The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable
Held:
Yes. What is established is that the rubber left by appellee caused
infection, placed the life of appellant Flotilde in jeopardy and
caused appellant fear, worry and anxiety. Dr. Batiquin's statement
cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber near
private respondent Villegas's uterus. And even if we were to
doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber, we are
not justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of a piece of
rubber from private respondent Villegas's abdomen.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine
are present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section
were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the
private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its
way into private respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to
say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her
uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-
product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The
petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a
piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for
all the adverse effects thereof.
(Cases when the doctrine was held inapplicable)
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ
vs. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK
G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910
Facts:
On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, together with
her child, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a
delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached),
came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went
close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by.
However, the driver of the wagon tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside of the wagon to unload the forage. While doing so, another
vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made
some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the
delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the
ground and was unable to stop the horses. The horses then ran up
and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in
which the plaintiff was ridding.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle
Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon
for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However,
a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened
the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the
horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was
guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of
Article 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.
Issue:
whether or not the employer is liable for the negligence of such
driver in handling the team under the last paragraph of the above
provisions.
Held:
No. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses
which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the
cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of
the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he
had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the
condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that
they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the
horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner
described on the day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that
which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the
day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers.
“Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most
ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary
results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes
successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate
against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates
a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the
circumstances under which the act complained of was performed.
It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant’s
case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the
injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears.” - Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. v. Tolson
(139 U.S., 551)
Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.
(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949
Facts:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946 while the plaintiff-appellee and
other companions were loading grass, an electric transmission
wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power
and Development Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly parted,
and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was
about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full
shock of 4,400 volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed
through his body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns
from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and
causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed
when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the
incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence in
evidence
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the negligence in
maintaining the electric transmission wire.
Held:
The appellate court held: “in case of non-contractual negligence,
or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of
the defendant, it is also a recognized principle that ‘where the
thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not occur as if he having
such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is shifted
to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care.
This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or
transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the
case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every
right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the
sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of
events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather, injure
people, unless they are subject to unusual strain and stress or
there are defects in their installation, maintenance and
supervision, just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the
warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is
negligent (which is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire
snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence
in its installation, care and maintenance.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
Facts:
Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio
Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the
telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as
follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-
66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-
KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram
sent to him wounded his feelings, caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other
people have come to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges
that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between
the sending and receiving operators, that they were
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not
form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any
person reading the same would logically think that they refer to
Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision ruling that the company was negligent and failed to take
precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating
incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed among
other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication;
however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
Issue:
Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily
for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.
Ruling:
Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on
Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on
respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own
employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person
transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the
petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There
is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were
included in the message transmitted, without the consent or
knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of
contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous
matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a
corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting
messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the
petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the
pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in
order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may
be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine
of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering
the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.