White y Falkenberg. Revolution in The City. On The Recources of Urban Guerrillas.

This article was downloaded by: [Johns Hopkins University]
On: 08 January 2015, At: 03:37

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK
Terrorism and Political

Violence
Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20
Revolution in the city: On

the resources of urban
guerrillas
a b
Robert W. White & Terry Falkenberg White
a
Assistant Professor of Sociology , Indiana
University , Indianapolis
b
Project Director for the Center for Survey
Research , Indiana University , Bloomington
Published online: 21 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: Robert W. White & Terry Falkenberg White (1991) Revolution
in the city: On the resources of urban guerrillas, Terrorism and Political Violence,
3:4, 100-132, DOI: 10.1080/09546559108427129
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559108427129
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all
the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our
platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors
make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of
the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and
Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,
demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access
and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 03:37 08 January 2015
Revolution in the City:
On the Resources of Urban Guerrillas
ROBERT W. WHITE AND
TERRY FALKENBERG WHITE
Authors who address the topic of rural guerrilla warfare argue that the ability to
engage in political violence is predicated upon support from the local population
and the capabilities of guerrilla organizations. We examine the applicability of
these arguments for modern urban guerrilla warfare. We find that the Provisional
Irish Republican Army draws on individual, organizational and environmental
resources, and that the impact of these resources on the IRA has changed over
time. Of these resources, the most important appear to be a combination of
individual and organizational resources. Organizing into a cell structure in 1977
made the IRA dependent on only the passive support of the Northern Irish
Nationalist population, and a high level of political awareness among IRA
guerrillas guarantees that the IRA maintains this passive support.
Classic statements about guerrilla activity often begin with the guerrilla in
the countryside. Here, rebels start with a small, isolated group and strike
a blow for the oppressed. They gain notoriety, attract recruits, and then
begin to operate in inhabited areas, making contact with the peasantry.
With increasing numbers in an 'inaccessible place', a 'settled life' with
small industry and a court system is established. Government troops
eventually attack, are defeated, and the number of men and arms
increases. Then,
With the ups and downs characteristic of warfare the movement
continues to grow; by this time the extensive work among the
masses makes easy movement of the forces possible in unfavorable
territory and so opens the final stage, which is suburban guerrilla
warfare.1
Following continued partial victories, the 'enemy' is compelled to fight on
terms set forth by the guerrillas. Soon after this, comes victory and
liberation.
This general argument is rooted in the experiences of revolutionaries
who undertook wars of national liberation in the rural areas of countries
like Ireland, China, and Cuba, and attributes only a secondary role to
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 100-132
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
ON THE RESOURCES OF URBAN GUERRILLAS 101
urban guerrillas. But the urban scene has been a focus of extensive
guerrilla and/or terrorist attitudes ever since Narodnaya Volya was
formed in Russia during the 1870s,2 and various subsequent Russian
terrorist groups found the city a most congenial operating sphere. After
World War II, the Irgun continued this pattern of functioning exclusively
in urban areas. EOKA (Cyprus) and FLO (Algeria) mounted both urban
and rural campaigns. Since the late 1960s many guerrilla groups have
been predominantly active in urban settings.3
How well do the arguments of rural guerrilla strategists apply to
modern urban warfare? Traditional guerrilla statements offer advice to
the rural guerrilla, noting the importance of several factors for waging
political violence. We address these arguments with a case study of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, a modern guerrilla organization with
a large urban component to the violence it perpetrates." We consider the
different kinds of resources that are available to urban-based groups
engaging in political violence, and then we examine the impact of these
resources on the IRA's campaign.
The Individual, Organizational, and Environmental Resources of

Guerrilla Armies
Proponents of political violence typically struggle against powerful and
resourceful opponents. The experiences of rural-based guerrillas suggest
that waging political violence requires three different types of resources:
individual, organizational, and environmental.
Individual Resources of the Urban Guerrilla
Individual, or personal, resources are internal to guerrillas and cannot be
shared by others.5 The literature on guerrilla warfare identifies three key
personal resources that affect the individual-level abilities of guerrillas:
adaptability, political awareness, and interpersonal support networks.
Che Guevara emphasizes the importance of adaptability for guerrillas,
and Regis Debray notes that a key advantage for guerrilla armies is
mobility and flexibility; without these qualities there is no element of
surprise and no rapid execution of tactics. These are necessary for a
weaker army to be successful.6
Political awareness and interpersonal networks also benefit guerrillas.
Guerrilla warfare is dangerous, it is physically and emotionally demand-
ing, and it is often unrewarding at the personal level. It requires commit-
ment and political awareness from individual guerrillas.7 Committed
guerrillas absorb sacrifices, and politically-aware guerrillas recognize the
long-term social consequences of their actions. A committed and aware
102 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
guerrilla, for example, will sacrifice an immediate operation in order to

protect local supporters and thereby maintain long-term local support.8
Social links between guerrillas and their sympathizers provide emotional
and operational benefits. The broader a guerrilla's support base, the
more emotional support there is available. Broad support bases also
provide tangible resources, for example, in the form of safe houses or
locations to dump arms.
Organizational Resources of Guerrilla Movements

Organizational resources are beyond direct individual control, and affect
individual guerrillas equally. William Gamson identifies organizational

features that enhance the 'combat readiness' of social movement
organizations.' Bureaucratic organizational structures help challenging
groups maintain commitments from members and make it easier to
activate these commitments. Centralized power structures limit the
development of internal conflict in challenging groups, and make it less
likely that a challenging group will experience the severe problem of
factionalization.
Perhaps as important as any one organizational characteristic is the
knowledge that guerrilla movements face powerful and aggressive
opponents searching for effective counterinsurgency tactics. The
strategies, tactics, and organizational structures of both guerrilla armies
and governmental elites evolve and transform as they respond to threats.
This suggests that organizational flexibility, or 'tactical innovation', will
be an important resource for guerrilla organizations. Indeed, Che
Guevara comments: 'No rigid scheme can be offered for the organization
of a guerrilla band; there will be innumerable differences according to the
environment in which it is to operate'.10
Environmental Resources of Guerrilla Movements
Environmental resources are also beyond individual control and affect
social movement members equally. As we view them, environmental
resources are similar to the macromobilization resources of social move-
ments that Charles Tilly describes, for example, funds available from
external sources or the political opportunity structure that a social
movement faces." Retrospective accounts by guerrilla activists suggest
that the single most important resource for guerrillas is support from the
surrounding population.12
Case studies and research support this argument. Tom Barry's account
of the 1920s Irish Republican Army shows that this army greatly bene-
fited from local supporters. Patrick O'Sullivan's research on the geo-
graphy of guerrilla warfare suggests that modern guerrillas have moved
from rural to urban settings because they are at a comparative advantage
in areas with high population density.13 Support from a local population
benefits guerrillas in two ways. It makes it easier to organize, for
example, by bringing in new recruits, and it allows freedom of movement
within the geographic area.
We examine the ability of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to
wage political violence over the 20 year period from 1969 to 1988. Two
analyses are presented. These analyses assess the resources that enable
individual IRA guerrillas to carry out their roles.15 We first examine the
personal resources that aid individual guerrillas as they engage in military
operations. We then examine the organizational and environmental

resources that benefit guerrillas. In this second examination, we pay
special attention to interaction between the individual, organizational,
and environmental resources of guerrillas and the counterinsurgency
techniques of their opponents. A goal of counterinsurgencies is to negate
the resources of guerrillas, to turn resources into constraints. Over the
course of a guerrilla war a complex series of counter-responses by
governmental elites and guerrilla activists to changing conditions in-
fluence the kinds of resources employed by guerrillas and the efficacy of
these resources.
Historical Background
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) dates from the 1916 Easter Rising
against the British. It has historical antecedents that date directly to the
1840s, and an ideology that dates to the French and American Revolu-
tions.16 A guerrilla campaign waged by the IRA and its political wing,
Sinn Fein, forced the British from 26 of the 32 Irish Counties in the early
1920s. The six Northeastern counties (Northern Ireland), two-thirds
Protestant and Loyalist (or Unionist), remained part of the United
Kingdom. Benign neglect from the British and Loyalist machinations
effectively excluded Irish Nationalists from the Northern political process
at Stormont Castle.17 This, and other discriminatory practices, created
sympathy for IRA activities among a segment of the Nationalist popula-
tion. Thus, there were IRA guerrilla campaigns against the British
government and the Northern State from 1939 to 1945 and from 1956 to
1962. Both campaigns ended in failure.18
In the 1960s a non-violent civil rights campaign developed in the North.
Non-violent protest was met with sectarian violence from the Loyalist
community, often with the support of the local police, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC). Serious rioting in Deny in August 1969 forced the
British to send in troops to separate the Nationalist and Loyalist com-
munities. Shortly thereafter the British Army was deployed throughout
the North. In December 1969 and January 1970, the IRA and Sinn Fein
split into Provisional and Official factions. The Provisionals were
militants who felt the IRA should oppose the presence of British troops
militarily. Since 1969 they have done this. The IRA's leadership is not
composed of social movement 'professionals'. Instead, the leadership is
described as 'men of no property'; like most IRA recruits and sym-
pathizers, they come from the working class urban and rural districts in
Northern Ireland (and, to a lesser degree, the Irish Republic).19 External
elites provide little support for the IRA. The Irish Catholic hierarchy
regularly condemns IRA violence. The diaspora Irish did supply sig-
nificant amounts of money in the early 1970s, but external financing has
declined markedly over time. By 1978 British Intelligence estimated that
the IRA obtains 87 percent of its funds from indigenous sources (this
includes commercial activities and theft). Funds from the US increased in
1981 when republican prisoners fasted to death on hunger strike, but
funding fell as the emotions associated with the hunger strike faded.20
Data Sources and Operationalizations
Dependent Variables
The longer a guerrilla's career, the more damage that guerrilla brings to
his or her opponents, and the more effective that guerrilla is. Guerrilla
careers are typically shortened by two events, death and capture. Both
outcomes terminate guerrilla involvement, and both are costly for guer-
rilla organizations. We employ three indicators of the ability of guerrillas
to wage political violence: (1) the length of individual guerrilla careers,
(2) the yearly rate at which IRA guerrillas are killed, and (3) the yearly
rate at which IRA guerrillas are arrested.
Varied sources support our argument that career length taps a dimen-
sion of guerrilla abilities and efficacy. Guevara states: '... the essential
task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed'.21
IRA veterans agree with this. Sean MacStiofain, the Provisional IRA's
first Chief of Staff, echoes Guevara's comment: 'I'd say that every
guerrilla ... urban or rural, his duty is to survive. I mean a dead guerrilla
can't serve the cause, and a live guerrilla then continues to serve the
cause' (Personal interview, 1990).
Similarly, the 'Green Book', the IRA's manual for recruits, stresses
the importance of avoiding arrest. British Intelligence confirms that IRA
Volunteers practice this:
The principle that the terrorist must have a safe method of escape is
the dominant feature in PIRA [Provisional IRA] tactics. PIRA very
seldom plan operations that involve high risk and if in doubt they
abort the mission. Shooting attacks are mainly conducted on the
'shoot and scoot' principle.22
Simply put, a live guerrilla is more effective than a dead one, and a free
guerrilla is more effective than an arrested one. The longer a guerrilla can
stay alive, or remain free, the more able and effective that guerrilla is.
Data Sources
We first examine the resources that contribute to the careers of IRA
Volunteers. Like many modern guerrilla conflicts, there are both rural
and urban dimensions to the Provisional IRA's campaign. We focus on
the IRA in Belfast, Northern Ireland's largest city with a population of
314,000 in 1981.23 The urban conflict is essential to the Provisional IRA,
and some authors argue that the large Nationalist population in Belfast
provides the heart of the Provisional IRA.24 Most of the information on
guerrilla careers is taken from obituaries found in the book Belfast
Graves, published by the National Graves Association (NGA).25 The
NGA is dedicated to restoring and maintaining the graves of those who
have died for 'Irish freedom' and fostering 'veneration and respect for the
national dead'. The book is a tribute to IRA volunteers from Belfast who
died between 1969 and 1984. Post-1984 obituaries and additional infor-
mation was found in the pages of An PhoblachtlRepublican News, Sinn
Fein's weekly newspaper, and other relevant sources.26
Between 1969 and 1988, 87 IRA guerrillas died on 'active service' in
Belfast, i.e., they died in the course of IRA operations. Included in most
of the obituaries is information concerning the guerrilla's date of birth,
date of death, cause of death, area of Belfast within which he/she lived,
date of joining the Republican Movement, family political background
and marital status at the time of death. Complete data are available for 67
Belfast Volunteers.27
Because the careers of deceased guerrillas may be different from the
careers of guerrillas who survive, we expanded our data by interviewing
IRA veterans. The interviews, conducted in March 1990, serve two
purposes. They provide greater coverage of the kinds of people involved
in the IRA and they allow us to utilize triangulation processes that
increase the quality of the overall data.28 These interviews follow a series
of interviews with many republicans since 1984, including earlier inter-
views with some of these respondents. This long-term interaction
decreases possibilities of bias and is likely to constrain statements such
that they are more valid. The interview data allow us to assess the validity
of the variables we construct from the obituary data, and to check for
alternative interpretations of our findings.29
Three high-level IRA veterans were interviewed: Joe Cahill, Sean
MacStiofain, and Ruairi CBradaigh. Because they are prominent
republicans they were willing to have their interviews recorded and
quoted. Their unique knowledge of the Provisional IRA makes them
ideal respondents, e.g., all three were alleged to be members of the initial
seven-person Provisional IRA Army Council. The following briefly
documents the reported guerrilla and political career of each.30
Joe Cahill, born and reared in Belfast, joined the IRA in the 1930s. He
was imprisoned in the 1940s and the 1950s, and was the IRA's Belfast
Commander (OC) in 1971. By trade he is a carpenter and construction
foreman. Cahill became IRA Quartermaster in 1973, and he was repor-
tedly on the Army Council into at least the late 1970s. He is currently
Treasurer of Provisional Sinn Fein.
Sean MacStiofain was born and raised in England, and emigrated to
Ireland in 1959. He joined the IRA in 1949, and was imprisoned in
England in the 1950s. MacStiofain joined the IRA's Army Council in the
1960s as Director of Intelligence. From their formation in 1969 until his
arrest in 1972 MacStiofain was the Provisional's Chief of Staff (CoS).
Prior to becoming Chief of Staff he was a salesman for Conradh na
Gaelige, an Irish language organization. After his release from prison he
was active in Sinn Fein until his early 1980s retirement from the organiza-
tion. Ruairi 6Bradaigh, born and reared in County Longford, in
Southern Ireland, joined the IRA in 1951. He was Chief of Staff in the
late 1950s and the early 1960s. Throughout the 1960s he was on the Army
Council. At this time he was a school teacher. He became President of
Provisional Sinn Fein upon its formation in 1970, and held the position
until 1983. He is currently President of Republican Sinn Fein, a group
that split from Provisional Sinn Fein in 1986.
Six lower-level veterans from Belfast were interviewed. Three veterans
were interviewed individually, and three others were interviewed in a
focus group setting. To insure confidentiality and anonymity, only one of
the six active service veterans of the Belfast IRA was interviewed on tape.
This person, from West Belfast, was charged in 1974 with possession of
explosives and membership in the IRA. Conviction on the membership
charge allows him to acknowledge his IRA involvement. He joined Na
Fianna Eireann, the IRA's youth wing, in 1971 at the age of 15 and then
graduated into the IRA in 1973. None of the other five respondents has
been convicted of IRA membership and they are understandably reluc-
tant to be interviewed on tape and asked questions about their former
membership in an illegal organization. Field notes were taken. Few

details of their careers can be provided. Each person was on active service
in Belfast in the 1970s, and some of them were on active service in the
1980s.
In our second analysis we present historical information on the IRA's
campaign from 1969 through 1988. We focus on the impact that organiza-
tional and environmental resources have on the abilities of IRA Volun-
teers. We employ two indicators of these abilities, the number of IRA
deaths on active service per year for the entire North of Ireland and the
number of persons arrested for paramilitary offenses (i.e., murder,
attempted murder, firearms, explosives, and theft) per year in the North.
Dividing these by the level of violent incidents (shootings, explosions,
and bombs defused) provides rates of deaths on active service and arrests
that are standardized by the level of IRA activity.31 The interviews are
also utilized in our second investigation. They allow us to compare
historical accounts of 20 years of IRA violence with the perceptions of
both low-level and high-level IRA activists.
The Guerrilla Careers of the Belfast IRA

The literature on guerrilla warfare suggests four resources that sig-
nificantly influence the careers of individual guerrillas: support from the
local population, physical dexterity and adaptability, interpersonal sup-
port networks, and political awareness. For our analysis of guerrilla
careers we developed indicators of the first three of these resources. We
then approached our intensive interview respondents. Each person was
asked the open ended question: 'What makes someone a good (or,
effective) urban guerrilla?' The respondents usually noted either some
aspect of guerrilla political awareness, the link between guerrilla activity
and community support, or the relationship between these two concepts.
Sean MacStiofain's comments are typical:
INTERVIEWER: What makes someone a good urban guerrilla?
MacSTIOFAlN: A person has got to be from the locality, right? ...
he's got to be respected within his own community, right? So
therefore he has the protection of the community. Like he becomes
a fish who can swim (laughs). ... He has got to have an intimate
knowledge of his - the areas he's going to operate in. He has got to
be considerate about the needs of his own community. In other
words, that any operation he carries out should not cause casualties
to his own people ...
This first question was followed by direct questions asking respondents to
evaluate the importance of each of the other resources for guerrillas.
Responses to these questions were insightful and allowed us to better
understand the importance of the resources suggested by the literature on
guerrilla warfare. Indeed, comments like those offered by MacStiofain,
coupled with additional information found in responses to later ques-
tions, helped us to better understand the concept of political awareness
and enabled us to focus on this in our second analysis.
We consider three dimensions of the resource 'support from the local
population'. One dimension is the 'benign neutrality', or passive accep-
tance, of the guerrilla by the local population. A passively accepting
population might even disapprove of a guerrilla campaign, but it will not
oppose the campaign or assist counterinsurgents.32 A wealth of evidence,
including personal accounts and electoral results, demonstrates that

among the Northern Irish Nationalist community there has been at least
passive support for the IRA from the foundation of the state on through
to today.33 A second dimension is active support for the guerrilla from the
local population. Active support exists when the local population engages
in activities that openly confront the guerrilla's opponents. Activities like
anti-government marches and riots can tie down counterinsurgents and
provide cover for guerrilla operations. At various points during the
current IRA campaign a large portion of the Northern Nationalist
population has actively supported the IRA. We consider these two
dimensions of population support in our second analysis. The third
dimension is geographical, and we consider it in our analysis of guerrilla
careers.
Our geographic measure of support from the local population is based
on the size of the different Nationalist areas within which Belfast guer-
rillas are based. There are six significant Nationalist areas in Belfast (see
Belfast Map). By far the largest area is West Belfast, which stretches from
the Lower Falls to Andersonstown. The smallest areas are Unity Flats
and the Short Strand. We expect that the larger the area, the easier it is
for guerrillas to carry out operations. Guerrillas from larger areas should
have longer careers. For example, the Short Strand is surrounded by pro-
British, Loyalist, communities. It is, therefore, easier for the security
forces to enter, patrol, and exit the area, and more difficult for the IRA to
operate in the area.
The area of operation for each guerrilla was determined from the IRA
structure in Belfast, the characteristics of the guerrillas, and the know-
ledge that Volunteers are active in the areas where they live.34 The IRA's
Belfast Brigade is divided into three battalions. The First and Second
Battalions are based in West Belfast, and the Third Battalion consists of
active service units in all other areas of the city.35 Using the 'Roll of
Honour' of the Republican movement, which is published in An
Belfast
SOO 1000 M«tru
] Loyalist Areas
I Nationalist Areas 'I

I Nixed Areas
ANDERSONSTOWN
mmamamammmm
Source: Irish Freedom Movement Handbook
PhoblachtlRepublican News every Easter, we determined the Battalion
for roughly half of the deceased guerrillas. The obituaries confirmed that
First and Second Battalion Volunteers were from West Belfast. For the
other guerrillas, namely, those in the Third Battalion, Na Fianna
Eireann, and Cumann na mBan (the women's wing of the movement) we
used obituary information to place each person in the correct area.
Our indicator of adaptability and physical dexterity is the age of the
guerrilla at the time of his or her recruitment into active service. We
expect that younger recruits are more agile, more flexible, and more open
to innovation, and that they are therefore better guerrillas than older
recruits. As a result, younger recruits mature into their guerrilla roles and
have longer guerrilla careers. This is consistent with the literature from
guerrilla activists. Guevara explicitly points to the virtues of adaptability
in guerrilla warfare, and links this with the age of guerrillas.36 Debray
argues that the main advantage of the guerrilla is his/her flexibility and
mobility, and suggests that younger guerrillas are better able to develop a
political awareness from their military experiences.37
Our indicator of interpersonal support networks is the marital status of
each Volunteer. We created a binary variable indexing whether or not the
Volunteer was married at the time of his or her death. Married Volun-
teers should have greater interpersonal resources relative to their non-
married counterparts. These support networks should provide resources
in the form of emotional support and safe hiding places. The Belfast
veteran interviewed on tape, a bachelor, commented on these support
networks:
INTERVIEWER: Would [married Volunteers] ... because they had
in-laws and other places to hide ... would they have had a bigger
network?
IRA VETERAN: Umn, I suppose, yeah. I mean (much more asser-
tively), yeah. I mean, that certainly is a factor. It helps only in that
it's easier to approach people who you have been in contact with or
know. And it's also, in human terms, more uh, if you're staying in a
house that belongs to people that you know it's more relaxing. So
it's nice. Whereas, if you were just going into somebody's house it's
a bit awkward ... it [in-law networks] wasn't something that if you
hadn't of had that you would be in trouble or anything. It was just
more convenient I suppose.
Important, the respondent acknowledges that it is not essential for an
IRA Volunteer to be married. He was not. Unmarried guerrillas are
accepted at safe houses, and whether or not a safe house is available is not
determined by a family connection. Being married, however, probably
does increase the number of safe houses available, and staying at a

relative's house is probably less stressful than staying at a stranger's
house. Below, we examine how important this is for an urban guerrilla.
Analysis of Individual Guerrilla Careers

Means and standard deviations for each variable are presented in Table
I.38 The average Belfast guerrilla was 19 years and a few months old when
recruited. The youngest recruit (into Na Fianna Eireann) was 13 years of
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF BELFAST IRA VOLUNTEERS: MEANS
(Standard Deviations) and Category Percentages (N = 67)
Age At Recruitment 19.33

Into the IRA (in years) (4.92)
Marital Status 28.0%
(1 = Married; (.454)
0 = Not Married)
Support Area Where Operated

(0) Loyalist/Mixed Area 3.0%
(n=2)
(1) Unity Rats 1.5%
(n=l)
(2) Short Strand 14.9%
(n=10)
(3) Markets 1.5%
(n=l)
(4) New Lodge 3.0%
(n=2)
(5) Ardoyne 19.4%
(n=13)
(6) West Belfast 56.7%
(n=38)
Mean 4.85
(1.73)
Length of IRA 28.78
Career (in Months) (27.80)
age. Four recruits were 14, and 11 were 15 years of age. The two oldest
recruits were 34 years of age. Twenty-eight percent of the guerrillas were
married at the time of their death. Most of the guerrillas (38; 57 per cent)
were from West Belfast, and the average career length was a little less
than 2V^ years (29 months). Virtually all of the guerrillas were from the
working class. None of them had a university education. Those who were
employed held jobs like bricklayer, labourer, pipe stressor, or 'appren-
tice'.39
Table 2 presents difference of means tests comparing levels of career
tenure across categories of the independent variables. All of the tests are
in the predicted direction, with longer mean career lengths for married
Volunteers, for people active in West Belfast, and for younger Volun-
teers. Although only the age at recruitment variable is significant at
conventional levels, the differences for the other two groups approach
significance despite the small number of cases.
TABLE 2
DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST COMPARING THE CAREER LENGTH
OF BELFAST VOLUNTEERS ACROSS VARIABLES
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)
Variable Mean Career Length t Significance
Marital Status
Married 40.32
(n=19) (44.04)
1.55 .068
Not Married 24.21
(n=48) (16.36)
Support Area Size

West Belfast 33.29
(n=38) (31.76)
1.62 .054
All Other Areas 22.86
(n=29) (20.63)
Age At IRA Recruitment

Less than 20 years 36.16
(n=43) (30.99)
3.78 .000
20 years and older 15.54
(n=24) (13.40)
Alternative Interpretations: Age at Recruitment and Marriage

The age range for active Irish Republican guerrillas is approximately 25
years, from roughly 15 to 40 or so years of age.40 If the IRA limits the
involvement of its youngest members to less dangerous activities they
may by default have longer careers. We discussed this issue with the IRA
veterans, and we learned from them that the nurturing process is brief
enough that its impact on the relationship between age at recruitment and
career tenure is minimal. For example:
INTERVIEWER: When you joined the IRA [in 1973 at age 17], I
assume you would have again been nurtured by older Volunteers.
... How long would it have been before ... somebody wasn't
looking after you and you were just a regular member of the unit?
IRA VETERAN: Uh, well it - there's progression, you know? When
you would go in you wouldn't be, you would be given less difficult
tasks initially. And then just as you became more experienced you
would move along and somebody would come in behind you. And,
you know, and then somebody - people was probably getting
arrested or interned or whatever, so there was that kind of
progression along with military training until you were actively

involved in operations.
INTERVIEWER: How long?
IRA VETERAN: I suppose it took maybe six or seven months.
To confirm that a nurturing process does not cause the observed

relationship between age at recruitment and career tenure, we divided
the Volunteers into five 'Age at Recruitment' groups: 15 years or less, 16-
20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, and 31 years or more. We then
calculated the mean career length for each group, and plotted the
relationship between age at recruitment and mean career length (see
Figure 1). If younger guerrillas are indeed better than older guerrillas,
perhaps because they develop into the role of a guerrilla more easily,
there should be a linear and negative relationship between the age groups
and their respective mean career lengths, that is to say, the older the
recruit, the shorter the career length. In contrast, if the relationship
between age at recruitment and career length results from younger
recruits being protected from the hazards of guerrilla warfare, there
should be a non-linear relationship between the age groups and their
respective mean career lengths. In this situation, the two younger groups
should have similar career lengths, and the three older groups should
have similar career lengths, but the career lengths for the younger groups
should be significantly greater than the career lengths for the older
groups. As shown in Figure 1, mean career tenure consistently decreases
as age at recruitment increases. As age at recruitment increases the
relationship does become weaker, suggesting there is some nurturing of
younger recruits, but the overall pattern suggests a true, and negative,
relationship between recruitment age and career tenure.
Marriage may increase the social support networks of Volunteers, but
it may also increase their family responsibilities. This will inflate the
career lengths of married guerrillas if it limits their involvement to less
risky activities. We asked each of the veterans if, in their experiences,
FIGURE 1
AGE AT IRA RECRUITMENT BY MEAN CAREER LENGTH
55
54
53
52
51
50 50.75 months
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26 26.38 months
25
24
23
22
21
20
19 18.79 months
18
17
16
15
14
13 12.80 months
12
11
10
9
8 8.0 months
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
15 or 16-20 21-25 26-30 31 +
L^s Age At IRA Recruitment Groups
they found married guerrillas to be more cautious. None of them had,
including those who were unmarried when on active service. Joe Cahill
has an interesting observation on the subject.
INTERVIEWER: Would being married help or hurt a guerrilla? Or no
effect?
CAHILL: Well (laughs), I'm a married man myself so, I've never
found wives a hindrance, you know? I found it a big help. That you
have the support of your wife and family, you know? I'd say that
being married could be a hindrance in some cases, depending upon
what type of support you'd get from your wife and family.
Cahill's comments suggest that marriage influences guerrillas dif-

ferently depending upon its timing. People who are settled into their
marriages prior to becoming active guerrillas may be risk averse or have
non-supportive spouses. In contrast, active guerrillas who marry may
increase their social networks and personal resources, since these people
probably marry sympathetic and supportive spouses. We created two
binary variables reflecting the timing of marriage. One variable indexes
whether or not an individual was married prior to joining the IRA (1 =
TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING CAREER LENGTH, INCLUDING
TWO BINARY VARIABLES INDEXING TIMING OF MARRIAGE
(Unstandardized Coefficients; Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Married After Joining 41.10**
The IRA (1 = yes; 0 = No) (8.62)
Married Before Joining 4.17
The IRA (1 = yes; 0 = No) (9.59)
Support Area Size 1.78
(0-6 Ordinal Scale) (1.67)
Age at IRA Recruitment -1.81"
(In years) (.619)
Constant 49.06**
(15.70)
R2 .43
R2 .39
N 64a
** = p < . 0 1
"The timing of marriage cannot be determined for three people.
yes), and the other indexes if the person married after joining the IRA (1
= yes; our reference category is people who were never married). We
regressed the individual IRA career length on these two variables, and
the age at recruitment (measured in years) and size of support area
(measured on a 7 point ordinal scale) variables. The results, presented in
Table 3, support the argument that marriage leads to increased longevity
for IRA Volunteers because it increases their social networks and
resources. The 'Married After Joining the IRA' variable is positively and
significantly related to the longevity of the IRA Volunteers. Active
guerrillas who became married had their careers lengthened by almost
three and one half years (41.10 months).41
The results also confirm our findings above. Younger guerrilla recruits
have significantly longer careers (1.8 months longer for each year
younger when recruited) and the coefficient for Support Area Size is in
the predicted direction, although it is insignificant.
Individual-level resources help guerrillas carry out their duties.
Guerrillas do not operate in a vacuum, however. They are members of
organizations and they and their organizations exist in changing and
hostile environments. These changing conditions and the organizational
and environmental resources available to guerrillas are now examined.
The IRA: From Reorganization to a Long War Strategy

We divide the Provisional IRA's campaign into four time periods: (1)
From Reorganization to Open Warfare, 1969-74; (2) The Truce and its
Immediate Impact, 1975-76; (3) IRA Reorganization for a Long War,
1975-81; and, (4) Response to the Long War Strategy, 1982-88. Each
time period is associated with major changes in the IRA's organizational
structure and the environment within which the IRA operates.
From Reorganization to Open Warfare, 1969-1974
The Provisional IRA began with few resources for military activity, and
the local population would not sanction direct attacks on British troops -
who were welcomed in 1969 as defenders and peacekeepers. Throughout
1970 the IRA organized behind barricades in 'no-go' areas. These areas
were created in response to the violence of 1969, and they worked to
exclude the security forces from Nationalist working class areas.42
Concurrent with IRA organizing, Nationalists were becoming alienated
from the British Army. Rioting was met with CS (tear) gas that affected
the uninvolved, and Nationalists also perceived that their community was
disproportionately subject to curfews and large-scale searches for arms
by the security forces.43
The IRA was reorganized by the end of 1970. By January 1971 there
was public support for attacks against British soldiers.44 The violence
escalated. In August 1971 the British responded with internment; IRA
suspects were arrested and held without trial. Anti-internment riots and
marches followed. At one march (Bloody Sunday in Deny) 13 unarmed
Nationalists were shot dead by British troops (a 14th died later). IRA
recruiting soared, there was a widespread disobedience campaign, and
there was general support for an armed campaign.45 This helped the IRA
move to the offensive. In their interviews, 6Bradaigh, Cahill, and
MacStiofain all stated that this widespread support was essential. The
Belfast veteran was on active.service during this time. He describes how

local supporters helped the IRA:
IRA VETERAN: ... you could have straightly, even if you were in
trouble, gone into any house and expected that people would give
you some sort of assistance.
Support was so widespread that the IRA was able to move about in
relative freedom. In the 'no-go' areas, behind barricades, they openly set
up local headquarters in 'call-houses'.
INTERVIEWER: How many people in the local population would
have known you were in the IRA?
IRA VETERAN: Probably, well, all the active republicans. The
republican support that's in the area would all have known. And
then, I suppose just anybody that was in any way perceptive. You
know, because if you were seen, for example, with someone who
was just out of internment or ... if you went in and out of a call
house in a street, anybody on the street who seen you going into that
house would know you were in the IRA.
Table 4 indexes the development of the Provisionals from 1969 through

1974. There were 8 'incidents' (shootings, explosions and bombs defused)
in 1969 and 383 incidents in 1970. In the 1971-74 period there was an
average of 6,652 incidents per year. With the active support of the
population, operations became safer for Volunteers. In the 1969-70
period one Volunteer died for every 98 incidents. In the 1971-74 period
one Volunteer died for every 235 incidents.
The British responded to the violence in several ways. The Labour
government at Westminster met with the Provisional leadership and a
short-lived ceasefire was negotiated with the IRA in June-July 1972.
When it collapsed, 6,000 more troops were sent to the North (for a total
of 21,000), and the 'no-go' areas were cleared. The IRA continued to use
TABLE 4
FROM DEFENSIVE REORGANIZATION TO OPEN WARFARE, 1969-1974
Year Incident IRA Active Ratio Persons Ratio

Level Service Deaths Deaths : Incidents Arrested Arrests : Incidents
1969 8 0 — na1 na1
1970 383 4 1 :96 na na
1971 3,271 12 1 :273 na na
1972 12,481 56 1 :223 na na
1973 6,538 31 1 : 211 1,209 1 : 5.41
1974 4,319 14 1 :308 1,087 1 : 3.97
Total 27,000 117 1 : 231 — —
Sub-Total
1969-70 391 4 1:98 — —
Sub-Total
1971-74 26,609 113 1 :235 2,2962 1 : 4.732
Notes 1. Annual arrest figures are unavailable for 1969-1972.
2. Calculated for 1973-74 only.
'call houses' (through 1974), but was forced to become more security-
conscious. The Belfast IRA veteran commented on this:
IRA VETERAN: I suppose it [the practice] probably just slowly
disintegrated as the British intelligence improved, you know? How
they've changed. You were more careful about the call houses you
were using, and there would have been a slow input until you got to
this position where you weren't using that procedure at all... You'd
have seen the OC in the morning for an hour and then the call house
as such wouldn't have been used the whole day. So you wouldn't
have people running in and out all day. You'd have done the
meeting, decided, and then maybe done a meeting at three o'clock
in the afternoon, or the following morning. So it was - 1 mean, that
the security problems would have been cut down in that way. So it
was just a, probably a progression. I mean, things just didn't - you
didn't drop one way of doing things and switch to another. Things
change slowly.
High arrest levels, better British intelligence, and a negative public
reaction to explosions at two pubs in Birmingham in November 1974 (late
telephone warnings resulted in 21 deaths and 182 injured) made the IRA
leadership responsive to the possibility of another ceasefire. The con-
tinued violence, still at high levels, and the return of Harold Wilson and a
Labour government at Westminster suggested that the British might be
interested in negotiations. Church leaders initiated contact with the
Republicans that led to a 1974 Christmas truce.46
The Truce and Its Immediate Impact

The ceasefire, despite intermittent breakdowns, held until late in the year
when the bombing campaign resumed (there was no formal end to the
truce). By implementing several counterinsurgency strategies the British
benefited more from the truce than the IRA/ 7 The security forces were
'Ulsterised'. British troops were moved to support roles and the RUC
and the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR, part of the
British Army) became the primary security agents. Internees were
released and political status ('special category status') for prisoners was
terminated. In its place, the policy of 'Criminalisation' formally defined

IRA 'soldiers' as 'criminals' and 'terrorists'. These policies comple-
mented one another. Criminalisation cost the IRA a propaganda
weapon, and Ulsterisation seemed to confirm the image that the
'troubles' required only a more effective police force. Together, the two
policies limited the impact the war had on the British public, making it
seem the product of belligerent Irish people.
The ceasefire, and the British counterinsurgency policies, made res-
tarting the campaign difficult for the IRA.48 Disillusion set in in some
quarters, and the return to a normal life tapped the commitment of some
IRA members. Further, better security force intelligence identified some
activists who were subsequently arrested when they returned to the IRA.
Finally, many people in the local population had hoped for continued
peace, not a return to war. The mass mobilization and active protest of
Nationalists in the early 1970s had subsided. The relatively low incident
levels for 1975 and 1976 shown in Table 5 reflect IRA difficulties.
TABLE 5
THE 1975 TRUCE AND ITS IMMEDIATE IMPACT

Level Service Deaths Deaths: Incidents Arrested Arrests: Incidents
1975 2,438 8 1:305 1,100 1:2.22
1976 3,100 11 1:282 1,087 1:2.85
Total 5,538 19 1:291 2,187 1:2.53
Increased intelligence activity by the security forces is reflected in the

high arrest levels and higher arrest-to-incident ratios for 1975 and 1976.
In 1973-74 one person was arrested for every 4.73 incidents (see Table
4). In 1975-76, one person was arrested for every 2.53 incidents.
The 1975-76 period, however, was less dangerous for active guerrillas.
There was one death for every 235 incidents in the 1971-74 period,
compared to one death for every 291 incidents in the 1975-76 period. We
attribute this to the development of an individual-level resource, namely
political commitment and awareness, among post-ceasefire Volunteers.
These people returned to the IRA knowing that a quick victory was
unlikely. If they were to be arrested they would serve out a full, and
lengthy, sentence; yet they were willing to take this personal risk. They
also recognized that their support base had changed. The security forces
were actively trying to build up their own support in the working-class
Nationalist communities. Long-term support for the IRA, both passive
and active, was not guaranteed, but was dependent upon future IRA
activities. Thus, greater care had to be exercised to ensure civilian safety.
Increased political commitment and awareness on the part of Volunteers

helped the IRA restart the campaign, and helped individual guerrillas.
Our understanding of the impact of political awareness developed out
of the intensive interviews. Prior to the interviews we decided to ask
questions concerning changes in IRA Volunteers over the course of the
campaign. Several of the IRA veterans were asked to compare pre- and
post-truce Volunteers. Their comments consistently point to an increased
political commitment and awareness that benefits post-truce Volunteers.
Consider the comments of Joe Cahill, who compares pre- and post-truce
Volunteers, and then discusses the political awareness of contemporary
IRA guerrillas:
INTERVIEWER:... if there's such a thing, the typical guerrilla in the

early 1970s, say '71, '72, in Belfast, and the typical guerrilla in say,
1978, '79, how are they different?
CAHILL: Well, I'd say that the Volunteers in '78 and '79 was more
politically aware. In 1970, people were thrown into the thick of
things, without a terrible lot of thought. Or, if you like, political
awareness. This [political awareness] is something which has
developed over the years. In the early '70s it was purely a defense
mechanism. Then it developed into a freedom struggle. Now, in
order to understand the whole thing, a person would have to
become very politically aware of what he is doing. He'd have to see
the necessity of doing it I would say that most Volunteers today
going out on an operation would think of how this is going to
advance the cause. Because he's more politically aware today. He
has educated himself ... from that point of view, I'd say that the
Volunteer today is more committed, more dedicated and a better
thinker.
INTERVIEWER: And that would directly affect a person's ability to
operate?
CAHILL: Oh it would, yes. There'd be no recklessness, you know? I
think that's it. That's very important. Less recklessness in a person.
Greater political awareness among its Volunteers helped the IRA
continue its campaign despite counterinsurgency maneuvers and a
decline in active resistance among the general Nationalist population.
This political awareness also prompted the IRA's Northern leadership to
propose changes in the IRA's structure that also benefited the guerrillas.
IRA Reorganization for a Long War, 1977-81

In the short term, the ceasefire's primary effect was to discredit the
movement's Dublin-based leadership. The Northern IRA, the people
doing the fighting, proposed the creation of a semi-autonomous Northern
command. This produced a more efficient administrative structure that
allowed Northerners greater control over operations. This also defused
dissent in the IRA's Northern ranks. The change marks the beginning of a
peaceful process in which the Northern leadership gradually took control
of the Republican Movement. The new IRA leadership, which
developed out of the Northern Command, kept the IRA (which is
numerically dominated by Northerners) from splitting, even though Sinn
Fein split in 1986.4' In the long term, the failure of the ceasefire and the
implementation of British counterinsurgency policies demonstrated to
the Northern leadership that they were in for a long, difficult, 'protracted'
war. The new leadership determined that the IRA had to be reorganized
if they were to meet the demands of an increasingly hostile environment.
The most significant change they made involved the scrapping of the
brigade, battalion, and company structure. This structure, dating from
the 1920s, had lent legitimacy to the claim that the IRA was a guerrilla
army. It was suited to a mass uprising of the kind that took place in the
early 1970s. By the late 1970s it was a liability. In its place the Northern
leadership instituted a cell structure. By design, the cells, or Active
Service Units (ASUs), contain four persons (including the cell leader)
who have minimal knowledge concerning the identities of their superiors.
They are directed by a brigade officer, and control of weapons and
explosives is kept at the brigade level.50
Several direct benefits are derived from this new structure. First, and
perhaps most important, it is more secure. The IRA recognized that with
the early 1970s mass recruiting there was infiltration by the security
forces. The ASU system minimizes the amount of information available
to Volunteers. Second, it requires fewer soldiers. In the early 1970s there
were over 1,000 Volunteers in Belfast alone. Supporting, arming, and
hiding this many soldiers was expensive and burdened supporters in the
local population. The IRA was streamlined to 250 or so guerrillas. This
reduced the costs of financing the army to a more manageable level
(salaries for Volunteers are approximately £20 sterling per week; about
$32), and it reduced the burden on the local population, who continued to
provide safe houses and succor.51 It also reduced the number of new
recruits needed to replace those arrested, or retired, or killed in action.52
There are also indirect benefits to adopting the cell structure. First, it
promotes 'pattern maintenance' - a feeling of group membership that
exists even though a person is not actively participating in collective
action. Pattern maintenance makes it easier for social movements to
activate the commitment of their membership. The active service units
are akin to affinity groups in non-violent organizations. Such groups act

as a unit and group members share sacrifices, identities, and high levels
of commitment. Changing to the cell structure produced an even more
committed and dedicated IRA Volunteer.53 Second, the system is less
dependent upon large-scale, active support from the local population.
The massive unrest in the early 1970s created 'no go' areas and stretched
out the security forces. By the mid-1970s, the 'no go' areas were gone
and massive Nationalist resistance to the British presence had faded. The
IRA still had (and continues to have) high levels of passive support from
the local population.54 With the cell structure, this is enough. British
Intelligence commented on this in 1978:
Republican terrorists can no longer bring crowds of active sym-
pathizers onto the streets at will as a screen for gunmen. Indeed
there is seldom much support even for traditional protest marches.
But by reorganizing on cellular lines PIRA has become less
dependent on public support than in the past and is less vulnerable
to penetration by informers.55
Recognizing that the IRA was in for a long war, and awareness of
better intelligence gathering on the part of the security forces, also
prompted general changes in strategy. Well-known activists were en-
couraged to move into political work with Sinn Fein, and new people
replaced them in the IRA.56 Persons arrested were instructed to forego
alibis, which were often challenged, and to refuse to talk during inter-
rogation.57 For those charged with offenses, the traditional tactic of
refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Northern courts was aban-
doned. This earlier practice allowed Volunteers to make a political
statement to the Irish and international audience, but it was also tan-
tamount to admitting membership in the IRA. Now, persons arrested
were instructed to recognize the court and fight the charges they faced.
This made convictions more difficult, and using the system led to lesser
sentences. Finally, the IRA quit bombing economic targets and focused
on the security forces. The economic war placed large numbers of
civilians at risk, and it was destroying jobs. Focusing on the security
forces limited Nationalist alienation from the IRA, especially alienation
caused by bombings that went awry. It also led to a more efficient IRA
(see Table 6).
TABLE 6
INCIDENTS AND SECURITY FORCE DEATHS, 1969-1988
Year Incident Security Force

Level Deaths Deaths: Incidents

1969 8 1 1:8
1970 383 2 1:191
1971 3,271 59 1:55
1972 12,481 146 1:85
1973 6,538 79 1:83
1974 4,319 50 1:86
Sub-Total 27,000 337 1:80
1969-70 391 3 1:130
1971-74 26,609 334 1:80
1975 2,438 31 1:79
1976 3,100 52 1:60
Sub-total 5,538 83 1:67
1977 1,616 43 1:38
1978 1,388 31 1:45
1979 1,292 62 1:21
1980 1,042 25 1:42
1981 1,671 44 1:38
Sub-total 7,009 205 1:34
1982 879 40 1:22
1983 791 33 1:24
1984 582 28 1:21
1985 452 29 1:16
1986 646 24 1:27
1987 1,058 27 1:39
1988 995 39 1:26
Sub-total 5,403 220 1:25
Total
1969-1988 44,950 845 1:53
In the early years of the war (1969-74), one member of the security forces
(the RUC, UDR and British Army) was killed for every 80 incidents.
This ratio has consistently increased, such that in the 1982-88 period one
member of the security forces was killed for every 25 incidents.
The impact of these organizational changes is found in Table 7. 1977
was the safest year yet for the IRA, with only one guerrilla killed on active
service for every 404 incidents. In the 1971-74 period there was one death
for every 235 incidents; in the 1975-76 period one death for every 291
incidents. Compare this with the 1977-81 period, when one Volunteer
died for every 389 incidents. Arrests were also affected. In 1978, for
example, only 594 people were arrested, one per 2.34 incidents.
TABLE 7
IRA REORGANISATION FOR A LONG WAR 1977-1981

1977 1,616 4 1:404 916 1:1.76

1978 1,388 5 1:278 594 1:2.34
1979 1,292 3 1:431 453 1:2.85
1980 1,042 3 1:347 401 1:2.60
1981 1,671 3 1:557 472 1:3.54
Total 7,009 18 1:389 2,836 1:2.47
Response to the Long War Strategy, 1982-88

Faced with a more secure guerrilla army that was less likely to suffer
arrests and deaths on active service, the security forces responded in two
ways: with informers and (allegedly) with a 'shoot to kill' policy. The cell
structure made it more difficult for the security forces to obtain inside
information. In response, the RUC actively recruited informers. When
offered immunity and a new life, many of them became 'supergrasses' -
informants who testify against large numbers of their former comrades.
Between 1981 and 1986 statements from supergrasses led to the arrest of
over 600 people.58 The supergrasses seriously hurt the IRA. The ratio of
arrests to incidents was one arrest for every 2.13 incidents in the 1982-88
period (Table 8). Compare this with one arrest for every 2.47 incidents in
the 1977-81 period.
The 'shoot to kill policy' is controversial, and its existence is strongly
denied by the security forces. Events suggest there is such a policy.
Between 1982 and 1988 at least 22 IRA Volunteers were killed in the
North, and three more in Gibraltar, under questionable circumstances.
On several occasions the security forces, with inside information, were
able to ambush IRA active service units. Several of the Volunteers killed
were unarmed, and in some instances eyewitnesses stated that the
Volunteers were attempting to surrender when they were shot.59 For the
period 1982-88, one IRA Volunteer was killed on active service for every
135 incidents. Compare this with one death for every 389 incidents in the
1977-81 period.
The primary response by the IRA to both the supergrasses and the
'shoot to kill' policy was to continue their pattern of tightening security. A
public amnesty was offered to informers who revealed their activity and
stopped informing. Then, the families of supergrasses were threatened,
and several people retracted their statements. Finally, informers were
executed.60 This approach was complemented by a Sinn Fein publicity
campaign. The campaign attacked the character of the supergrasses, the
TABLE 8
THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE LONG WAR, 1982-1988

1982 879 4 1:220 491 1:1.79
1983 791 2 1:396 452 1:1.75
1984 582 9 1:65 379 1:1.54
1985 452 4 1:113 283 1:1.60
1986 646 3 1:215 269 1:2.40
1987 1,058 11 1:96 312 1:3.39
1988 995 7 1:142 3481 1:2.86
Total 5,403 40 1:135 2,534 1:2.13
1. Arrest figures for 1988 are estimated based on the Chief Constable's Annual Report.
reliability of their testimony, and the Northern Ireland judiciary, who

were willing to convict persons solely on the word of an informant while
the British judiciary refused to do this. Sinn Fein also appealed to
independent organizations for support. Several groups, including
Amnesty International, Canadian and American legal observers, and
some Catholic and Protestant clergy, supported the contention that
convictions via supergrass statements were unsafe.61
The republican counter to informers was effective. By July 1986 several
convictions had been overturned and the Northern judiciary was much
less inclined to convict without corroborating testimony. The efficacy of
the republican response is shown in Table 8. In 1986-88, the ratio of
arrests to incidents, which was one arrest for every 1.68 incidents from
1982 through 1985, decreased to one arrest for every 2.91 incidents.
Finally, although IRA deaths on active service were high through 1988,
there were only two deaths on active service in 1989 and none until
October 1990.
Summary of the Findings

The urban guerrillas of the Provisional Irish Republican Army draw on
three kinds of resources: individual, organizational, and environmental.
Individual-level resources help IRA members carry out operations.
Young guerrilla recruits who develop and mature into their guerrilla
roles, and guerrillas with extended social networks (which provide emo-
tional and physical support) are more effective guerrillas. Organizational
and environmental resources also help the IRA. Prior to the mass
mobilization of Northern Nationalists in 1971, IRA activities were
limited. With the resources derived from an actively supportive popula-
tion, the IRA was able to develop as a guerrilla army. The 1975 ceasefire
seriously affected IRA capabilities. Adding the Northern Command to
the IRA's bureaucracy, and the subsequent tactical innovation of reor-
ganizing into a cell structure in 1977, enabled the IRA to avoid defeat in
the mid-1970s. Thus, the IRA was able to continue on from the late 1970s
through the 1980s.
Individual-level resources also work in combination with organiza-

tional and environmental resources to produce a more potent Irish
Republican Army. The individual-level resource of political awareness
helped IRA members carry out operations in the 1975-76 (immediate
post-ceasefire) period, and it works to guarantee continued passive
support from the Nationalist population. With this support, the IRA can
threaten and even execute informers. Political awareness also helped the
Northern leadership recognize the ceasefire's full ramifications. This
prompted reorganization into the cell system, requiring only passive
public support.
Perhaps the most important resource for the IRA today is the cell
structure. It provides greater security for IRA Volunteers, requires
relatively few Volunteers, and is less dependent on the active support of
the local population. There is a cost associated with the structure,
however. It apparently limits the ability of urban guerrillas to quickly and
significantly increase the level of violence they can generate. Events in
1981 support this assertion. In that year 10 Republican prisoners fasted to
death in a protest against the criminalisation measures adopted in 1976.62
The H-Block/Armagh Campaign mobilized Northern Nationalists to a
degree not seen since the early 1970s. There were over 1,200 marches,
massive rioting following the hunger strikers' deaths, large turnouts at the
funerals (over 100,000 at the funeral of Bobby Sands), and open confron-
tations with the security forces (over 29,000 plastic bullets were fired in
1981). Yet, the level of IRA operations was relatively unaffected by this
active resistance from the Nationalist population.63 Incident levels rose in
1981, but they remained far below the early and mid-1970s levels.
However, 1981 was a much safer year for Volunteers in terms of deaths
on active service and arrests (see Table 8).
The limiting effect of the cell structure should not be overemphasized.
The cell structure requires only passive support from the Nationalist
population, and IRA guerrilla political awareness guarantees the main-
tenance of this support. In combination with additional individual-level
resources (e.g., support networks), the Provisional IRA should be able to
continue their campaign indefinitely.
Conclusions
The guidelines laid out for rural guerrilla warfare do apply in the modern
urban setting. The urban guerrilla, like his or her rural counterpart,
employs individual, organizational, and environmental resources. The
urban situation, however, seems to be more complex than the rural one.
As a result, the relationship between guerrilla resources and guerrilla

capabilities appears to be more complex in the urban setting than it is in
the rural setting. This is especially so concerning the interaction between
the organizational and environmental resources of urban guerrillas.
Classic statements on guerrilla warfare are based on the experiences of
rural guerrilla leaders like Mao Tse Tung in China and Tom Barry in
Ireland. These people directed relatively large armies over relatively
large parcels of territory. When harried, they could withdraw from the
scene and regroup.64 This makes counterintelligence gathering by
governmental elites difficult, and it places less of a burden on any one
group of supporters. It is also a luxury not afforded urban guerrillas. And
this makes the organizational structure of urban guerrilla armies
especially important. A large urban army has inherent problems when
compared to a large rural army. Surveillance in the urban setting is easier,
and a large urban army places a relatively constant and heavy burden on
its support base. A smaller, more secure urban army organized into a cell
structure alleviates these burdens. Urban guerrillas, and urban terrorist
groups, recognize this, and currently utilize cell structures in a number of
settings. Additional research is needed on these issues. Our results are
based on only one guerrilla organization. Much could be learned by
comparing the individual, organizational, and environmental resources
of several urban guerrilla organizations.
NOTES
A version of this paper was presented at The Determinants of Social Movement Activism
session at the 86th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 1991,
Cincinnati. We thank all of the people in Ireland who helped us. Special thanks go to Val
and Dolores Lynch and Rita O'Hare for their help and friendship. The comments of J.
Bowyer Bell, Larry Griffin, Randy Hodson, Albert McQueen, William Norris, Robert
Robinson and two anonymous reviewers were a great help. We also thank our research
assistants, Michael Fraser and Geoffrey Duncan. A final note of thanks goes to Charles
Feeney, James Walsh and William Walsh for their insights on guerrilla warfare. This
research was funded in part by an H. H. Powers Travel Grant from Oberlin College. Please
direct all correspondence to: Robert White, Department of Sociology, Indiana University,
425 University Boulevard, Indianapolis, IN 46202-5140, USA.
1. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 119.
2. The urban character of the Russian and subsequent movements is discussed in David C.
Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism (Toronto: CBC, 1971), Chs. 4-6.
3. Guevara, pp.47-49; Robert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward,
McCann and Geoghegan, 1972); George Grivas, General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare,
trans. by A. A. Pallis, (New York: Praeger, 1965); Richard Rubenstein, Alchemists of
Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 65-85.
4. For a discussion of the considerable social support IRA tactics command in Northern
Ireland, see Edward Moxon-Browne, 'The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the
Provisional IRA', in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), British Perspectives on Terrorism (London:

George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 41-72; Christopher Hewitt, The Effectivenesss of
Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), p. 29; idem,
'Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison', Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol.2, No.2 (Summer 1990), pp. 145-70.
5. Internal resources are similar to individual-level 'assets' that aid the micromobilization
of protest. William Gamson, Bruce Fireman and Steve Rytina, Encounters With Unjust
Authority (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1982), pp.82-93.
6. Guevara, pp. 81-83; Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York: Grove
Press, 1967), p.44.
7. Guevara, pp.50, 78-81; Mao Tse Tung, 'Strategic Problems in the anti-Japanese
Guerrilla War', Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Vol.11 (New York: International
Publishers, 1954), pp. 119-56; idem, 'The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the
National War', ibid., pp. 244-61; J. Bowyer Bell, On Revolt: Strategies of National
Liberation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 169-83.
8. Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom (Dingle, Eire: Brandon Books, 1986),
pp.63-64.
9. William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
1990), pp. 89-109.
10. Guevara, p.94. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ
during the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist
Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.59-89; Douglas
McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', American Sociological
Review 48 (1983), pp.735-54.
11. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1978).
12. Guevara, pp. 49-50; Mao Tse Tung, 'Take care of the living conditions of the masses
and attend to the methods of work', Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Vol.1 (New
York: International Publishers, 1954)., pp. 147-52; idem, 'On the Protracted War',
ibid, Vol.11, pp. 157-243.
13. Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: Anvil Books [1949], 1981); Patrick
O'Sullivan, 'A Geographical Analysis of Guerrilla Warfare', Political Geography
Quarterly, Vol.2, (1983), pp. 139-50.
14. Mao Tse Tung, 'Take care of the living conditions of the masses and attend to the
methods of work', Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Vol. I (New York: International
Publishers, 1954)., pp. 147-52; idem, 'On the Protracted War', ibid, Vol.11,
pp. 157-243; Guevara, p. 199; Grivas, General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare.
15. IRA violence provides the 'cutting edge' of the Irish Republican Movement. IRA
Volunteers carry out this violence. However, IRA intelligence officers, engineers and
other members may never be directly involved in a violent event. Also, on the fringe of
the movement are people who play important roles, e.g., people who offer safe houses.
These support roles are important, as is the political work of Sinn Fein activists, but we
argue that those who carry out IRA violence are the most essential activists in the Irish
Republican Movement. Active-service Volunteers take the greatest risks, and ul-
timately, their behavior determines if an operation is successful. These are the people
that we focus on in our analyses.
16. See Seán Cronin, Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology (Dublin:
Academy Press, 1980).
17. We refer to Northern Irish people as 'Nationalist' or 'Loyalist/Unionist' instead of the
often-used labels of'Catholic' and 'Protestant'. We do so for a number of reasons. First,
the vast majority of Catholics (82.9 percent) desire a united Ireland, provided it can be
achieved by peaceful means, i.e., they have Nationalist aspirations. See Edward
Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower
Publishing Co., 1983), p.35. Second, our own interviews and research indicates that
there is a small number of Protestants who carry on the tradition of Wolfe Tone
supporting Irish unification and who therefore participate in Sinn Fein and the IRA.
Third, using the labels 'Protesant' and 'Catholic' implies that the war in Ireland results
from religious differences, and that the IRA is a sectarian organization. Independent
research questions both of these implications. See Hewitt, Effectiveness of Anti-
Terrorist Policies, p. 29; and Ian McAllister, 'The Devil, Miracles and the Afterlife: the
Political Sociology of Religion in Northern Ireland', British Journal of Sociology, Vol.
33 (1982), pp.330-47.
18. Cronin, pp. 175-215; Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State, 2nd ed.,
(London: Pluto Press, 1980); J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-, rev. &
updated ed., (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1979).
19. J. Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-1986
(New Brunswick: Transaction, 1987), pp. 171-87.
20. See David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster, Vol. II (Belfast: Century Books, 1975),
p. 125; idem, The British Army in Ulster, Vol. III (Belfast: Century Books, 1976), p. 98;
Cronin, pp. 344-45; Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (Ayles-
bury: Corgi Books, 1989), pp.293-309.
21. Guevara, pp.55, 82. See also Mao Tse Tung, 'On the Protracted War', op. cit.,
pp. 205-207, 226-27.
22. Cronin, p. 350. See also David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster, Vol. IV (Belfast,
Century Books, 1981), p. 16. For a discussion of the Green Book see Bishop and Mallie,
pp.247-48, or Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA, 3rd ed. (London: Fontana Books, 1987),
pp.679-712.
23. Central Statistical Office: Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 124 (London: HMSO,
1981).
24. See Cronin, pp.204-205, 225-26; Farrell, p.viii; Coogan, pp.461-62, 579.
25. National Graves Association (NGA), Belfast Graves (Dublin: National Graves
Association, 1985). Career length was measured by taking the month and year in which
the individual was killed and subtracting from this the month and year in which the
individual became an active guerrilla. Date of death is available for all of the
Volunteers, but date of recruitment is not. In many instances we were able to estimate
the date of recruitment. When only the year of joining was available we assigned the
month of June as the starting month. Whenever additional information was available
we employed it. Thus, if a Volunteer joined the IRA in 'late 1972', we assumed this
meant Sept. 1972. The following is an example of our estimation procedures. The
obituary of IRA Volunteer Michael Clarke states that he joined the IRA 'after the
bombing of Kelly's bar by loyalists'; NGA, p. 101. We found the bombing in Richard
Deutsche and Vivien Magowan, Northern Ireland 1968-1973: A Chronology of Events,
Vol.2, 1972-73 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1974), pp. 177-79. It occurred on 13 May
1972. A car bomb destroyed the bar causing at least one fatality and injuries to 60 or
more people; see also Ciaran De Baroid, Ballymurphy and the Irish War (Baile Atha
Cliath; Aisling Publishers, 1989), pp. 154-57. We assume that Clarke formally joined
the IRA in June 1972. Clarke and Cumann na mBan Volunteer Anne Parker were
killed on 11 August 1972. This gave Clarke an active service total tenure of two months
(after they aborted a bombing mission, the bomb exploded as they were driving back to
their base). We subtracted from the measure of total tenure time in which Volunteers
were not on active service; i.e., time spent in prison, time spent in the IRA prior to the
current campaign (prior to July 1969), and time for ceasefires.
26. These include Nell McCafferty, The Armagh Women (Dublin: Co-op Books, 1981) and
De Baroid, Ballymurphy.
27. Dying on 'active service' indicates that the guerrilla was engaged in a military operation
when he or she died (32 people died in premature explosions, 35 were shot). Two
Volunteers killed preparing bombs are included. Volunteers killed in automobile
accidents, by accidental shooting (e.g., during training exercises), by Loyalist assas-
sination , and those who died while in prison are excluded: 58 guerrillas were in the IRA
when they died; 5 were members of Na Fianna Eireann, the IRA's youth group, and 4
were members of Cumann na mBan, the women's wing of the Irish Republican
Movement. For the vast majority of the guerrillas who were excluded because of
missing information, it was the date at which they joined the Republican Movement
that was missing. This prevented us from constructing a dependent variable for these
people. There is no evidence of a systematic process that caused this information to be
uncollected. For those variables for which information is available, the two groups, i.e.,
those with complete information (N=67) and those with missing information (N=20),
are similar. Each group was dominated by people from West Belfast (38 of 67, 56.7 per
cent; versus 89 of 20, 45 per cent), and the mean age at death for the two groups is
similar (22.79 for the group with complete data, 21.90 for the group with missing data).
28. See William A. Corsaro, 'Entering the Child's World - Research Strategies for Field
Entry and Data Collection in a Preschool Setting', in J. Green and C. Wallat (eds.),
Ethnography and Language in Educational Settings (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981),
pp. 117-46; and Aaron Cicourel, Theory and Method in a Study of Argentine Fertility
(New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 195-204.
29. See Howard S. Becker, Sociological Work: Method and Substance (New Brunswick:
Transaction, 1970), pp. 39-62. The validity of personal accounts has been questioned,
such as David Snow and Richard Machalek, 'The Sociology of Conversion', Annual
Review of Sociology, Vol.10 (1984), pp. 167-80. When asked to interpret personal
behavior, e.g., the motivation for joining a religious group, individuals may reconstruct
politically correct accounts. Instead of rejecting all account data as invalid, we agree
with the argument that personal accounts should be viewed as hypothetical statements
which may be verified or rejected; see Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, 'Accounting for
Action: Defending the Common Sense Heresy', Sociology, Vol. 17 (1983), pp.97-111.
Thus, our understanding of guerrilla careers and organizations is not exclusively based
on our respondents' subjective interpretations. In fact, we did not ask the respondents
to interpret their own guerrilla careers. Instead, we asked questions concerning their
experiences. We then evaluated this information with the historical record and the
obituary data.
30. Additional information on these people can be found in J. Bowyer Bell, The Gun in
Politics; idem, Secret Army; W.D. Flackes, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory
(London: Ariel Books, 1988); Bishop and Mallie, Provisional IRA.
31. We determined the number of IRA deaths on active service by comparing the IRA's
1990 'Roll of Honour' with the list of fatalities in the North provided by the Irish
Information Partnership (IIP), Agenda (London, IIP, 1988). The 'Roll of Honour' lists
all Republicans who have died during the current campaign. The IIP details the
circumstances surrounding each death associated with the war in the North since 1969.
Details on post-1986 deaths were found in the pages of An Phoblacht/Republican News.
Arrest data are taken from W.D. Flackes, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory;
incident levels are taken from the Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics
(London: HMSO, 1988). Several different groups perpetrate violence in Ireland, and
their members are arrested. Unfortunately, published information on arrests is not
broken down by paramilitary affiliation. In N. Ireland, most paramilitary violence is
carried out by the IRA, and most people arrested are associated with the IRA's
campaign. Also, the number of persons arrested better reveals the loss of personnel to
the IRA than does the number of persons convicted by crimes. For example, during the
supergrass period (1981-86, see below), some Republicans were denied bail and held in
prison for over two years, only to have the charges against them dismissed; see Andrew
Boyd, The Informers (Dublin: Merrier Press, 1984), pp.71-72.
32. Bell, On Revolt, pp. 171-72.
33. See Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1980);
Irish Freedom Movement, The Irish Freedom Movement Handbook: The Irish War,
3rd ed. (London: Junius, 1987), pp.276-86; Cronin, pp. 175-215.
34. Bell, Gun in Politics, pp. 182-83. IRA members are active outside of their home areas,
but most of their activities are confined to their home areas. For 63 cases we determined
where the person died; 43 (68 per cent) of these deaths were in the guerrilla's home
area. The shift in 1977 to a cell structure (see below) has not changed this tendency; see
Coogan, pp. 576-98. Of the six Belfast Volunteers to die on active service in the 1980s,
five died in their home areas.

35. Bell, Secret Army, p. 374.
36. Guevara, pp.83-85.
37. Debray, pp.44, 89-90; see also Grivas, pp. 14-16, 26-28.
38. Technically, we have data on a population rather than data from a random sample of
that population. We still employ tests of statistical significance below in order to make
inferences about the causal processes we examine; see Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics,
rev. ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp.241-243.
39. These characteristics are similar to the characteristics of Republicans arrested in
Northern Ireland. Data on Irish Republicans arrested in 1975 and 1979 show that they
tend to be young (70 per cent under the age of 21 in 1975; 53 per cent under 21 in 1979),
without criminal records, and from the working class; Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and
Paddy Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland (Nottingham: The Cobden Trust,
1980), pp.199, 22-23.
40. See Coogan, pp. 665-671. This age range may be similar for many guerrilla organiza-
tions. The age range for Italian terrorists arrested between 1970 and 1984 extends from
15 years of age to around 45 years of age (97 per cent of 2,308 arrested Italian terrorists
were under 45 years old when arrested); Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank,
The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 80.
41. We compared the R2 from this equation with the R2 from an equation using a simple
binary measure of whether or not the person was married. Including the timing of
marriage variables in place of this simple measure increases the R2 significantly from
.34 to .43 (F1,59 = 9.315, p < .01).
42. Seán MacStiofáin, Revolutionary in Ireland (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975);
Bishop and Mallie, pp. 171-73; Flackes, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory.
43. Bell, Secret Army, pp.373-92.
44. Bishop and Mallie, p. 174.
45. John McGuffin, Internment! (Tralee, Eire: Anvil Books, 1973); Bishop and Mallie,
pp. 174-80; Bell, Secret Army, pp.373-92; Robert White, 'From Peaceful Protest to
Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Relpublican Army', Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology Vol. 94 (1989), pp. 1277-1302.
46. Bell, Secret Army, pp.414-18.
47. Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984
(London: Methuen, 1985), pp.200-202.
48. Bishop and Mallie, p.277.
49. Bishop and Mallie, pp.284-86, 310-37, 440-49; Cronin, pp.211, 295. The centraliza-
tion of power in the hands of those most active in the war limits internal conflict, as
Gamson suggests it will; William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, pp. 89-109,
168-172.
50. Bishop and Mallie, pp.320-22; Barzilay, British Army in Ulster, Vol. III, p. 18;
Coogan, pp. 579-80. In practice, the cell system worked better and was implemented
more fully in some areas than in others; Bishop and Mallie, pp.322-33.
51. Streamlining the IRA dramatically reduced the costs of financing it. The Belfast
Brigade was reportedly financed on £2,500 sterling per week in 1983 (about $4,000).
The IRA covers this, and other expenses, without difficulty. Taxi-firms associated with
the IRA in West Belfast alone bring in more than £3,000 per week. This is supple-
mented with income from other sources, including legitimate businesses (e.g., social
clubs) and 'fund-raising operations', e.g., post office robberies). Bishop and Mallie,
pp.391-93; John W. Soule, 'Problems in applying counterterrorism to prevent ter-
rorism: Two decades of violence in Northern Ireland', Terrorism, Vol. 12 (1989),
pp. 31-46.
52. Bell, Secret Army, pp.374-75. Bishop and Mallie, pp.344, 387-88; Cronin, p.342.
53. Gamson, Strategy of Social Protest, pp. 90-91, 172-75, 258-261; Barzilay, British Army
in Ulster, Vol. IV, p. 18.
54. Public opinion surveys and elections consistently show that the IRA and Sinn Fein have
a large support base in the working class districts of Northern Ireland. For example, in
1978, 46.3 per cent of Northern Irish Catholics agreed with the statement 'The IRA are
basically patriots and idealists'; Moxon-Browne, 'The Water and the Fish: Public
Opinion and the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland', in Wilkinson (ed.), British
Perspectives on Terrorism, p. 58. See also Hewitt, 'Terrorism and Public Opinion: A
Five Country Comparison'.
55. Cronin, p.342.
56. Cronin, pp.211, 295; Coogan, p.578.
57. Low-level intelligence on people was of such high quality that often an alibi could be
disproven so silence was deemed the best chance of avoiding charges. There are stories
of persons charged with crimes who avoided prosecution because the primary witness
against them was later killed. See Bishop and Mallie, p. 323; Nell McCafferty, Peggy
Deery (San Francisco: Cleis Press, 1988), pp.90-91.
58. Irish Freedom Movement, p. 152. Loyalist paramilitaries were also affected by the
supergrass tactic. However, the majority of those arrested on supergrass information
were republicans. Of 28 supergrasses listed in Boyd, pp.99-103, only 6 were former
members of Loyalist paramilitary organizations.
59. Irish Freedom Movement, pp. 66-71; John Stalker, The Stalker Affair (New York:
Viking, 1988); John Waters, 'The Vilification of Carmen Proetta', Magill, Vol. 11
(June 1987), pp. 18-23.
60. Bishop and Mallie, pp.401-404, 409; Boyd, p.77-78.
61. Several supergrasses had questionable backgrounds. The supergrass John Patrick
Grimley, for example, had a record of petty criminal behavior. He was expelled from
Sinn Fein in 1980 for 'irrational behavior'. At a republican social club he insulted the
crowd by speakig obscenities over a microphone. See Boyd, pp. 58-59; Bishop and
Mallie, pp. 393-400, 406-410.
62. Tom Collins, The Irish Hunger Strike (Dublin: White Island, 1986); Robert White,
'Commitment, Efficacy, and Personal Sacrifice among Irish Republicans', Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 16 (1988), pp.77-90.
63. Even if it did not directly influence the IRA's operational ability, the hunger strike
benefited the Republican Movement in many ways. Indeed, sympathy with the hunger-
strikers brought new recruits into the IRA. The primary benefit of the hunger strike for
Republicans is that it spurred the political development of Sinn Fein. Until 1981 Sinn
Fein was primarily a support organization. In 1981, on an Anti-H-Block/Armagh
ticket, IRA prisoner Bobby Sands was elected to Westminster. In the by-election after
Sands's death on hunger strike, the seat was won by Sinn Fein's Owen Carron, Sands's
former election agent. Sinn Fein built on these successes in the 1983 Westminster
elections by polling over 102,000 first preference votes (13.4 per cent of the first
preference vote, 43 per cent of the Northern nationalist vote); Irish Freedom Move-
ment 1987, p. 282. Since 1983 their vote in Northern elections has declined (to about 11
per cent of the overall vote), but it is still at a significant level (about 35 per cent of the
Nationalist vote).
64. For example, after a major confrontation with the British at Crossbarry, in March 1921,
Tom Barry's column was able to march 12 miles to safety; see Tom Barry, pp. 122-33.
65. The list of politically violent organizations that operate in urban areas (at least in part if
not entirely) and employ cell structures includes ETA, the Basque guerrilla organiza-
tion, and terrorist organizations like Action Directe and the Red Brigades; see Terrorist
Group Profiles (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988).

White y Falkenberg. Revolution in The City. On The Recources of Urban Guerrillas.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

White y Falkenberg. Revolution in The City. On The Recources of Urban Guerrillas.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [Johns Hopkins University]

On: 08 January 2015, At: 03:37

Terrorism and Political

Revolution in the city: On

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559108427129

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

The Individual, Organizational, and Environmental Resources of

guerrilla, for example, will sacrifice an immediate operation in order to

Organizational Resources of Guerrilla Movements

individual guerrillas equally. William Gamson identifies organizational

operations. We then examine the organizational and environmental

Data Sources and Operationalizations

membership in an illegal organization. Field notes were taken. Few

The Guerrilla Careers of the Belfast IRA

including personal accounts and electoral results, demonstrates that

I Nationalist Areas 'I

does increase the number of safe houses available, and staying at a

Analysis of Individual Guerrilla Careers

(Standard Deviations) and Category Percentages (N = 67)

Age At Recruitment 19.33

Support Area Where Operated

Variable Mean Career Length t Significance

Support Area Size

Age At IRA Recruitment

Alternative Interpretations: Age at Recruitment and Marriage

progression along with military training until you were actively

To confirm that a nurturing process does not cause the observed

Cahill's comments suggest that marriage influences guerrillas dif-

The IRA: From Reorganization to a Long War Strategy

Belfast veteran was on active.service during this time. He describes how

Table 4 indexes the development of the Provisionals from 1969 through

Year Incident IRA Active Ratio Persons Ratio

The Truce and Its Immediate Impact

terminated. In its place, the policy of 'Criminalisation' formally defined

Year Incident IRA Active Ratio Persons Ratio

Increased intelligence activity by the security forces is reflected in the

Increased political commitment and awareness on the part of Volunteers

INTERVIEWER:... if there's such a thing, the typical guerrilla in the

IRA Reorganization for a Long War, 1977-81

are akin to affinity groups in non-violent organizations. Such groups act

Year Incident Security Force

Level Deaths Deaths: Incidents

Year Incident IRA Active Ratio Persons Ratio

1977 1,616 4 1:404 916 1:1.76

Response to the Long War Strategy, 1982-88

Year Incident IRA Active Ratio Persons Ratio

reliability of their testimony, and the Northern Ireland judiciary, who

Summary of the Findings

Individual-level resources also work in combination with organiza-

As a result, the relationship between guerrilla resources and guerrilla

Provisional IRA', in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), British Perspectives on Terrorism (London:

five died in their home areas.

You might also like