Malversation of public funds or property (Art.

217)
Ilogon v. Sandiganbayan
Afadf

Facts: Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro
City from July 1978 to January 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting payments, making
collections and effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed.

On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors conducted an examination of the cash and
accounts of Ilogon covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination
showed that Ilogon incurred a shortage in his accounts amounting to P118,871.29. Hence, he was charged
with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the RPC.

Before the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that the amounts represent vales (cash advances) granted to
postal employees. The accused did not have these amounts on hand when his cash and account were
audited on September 13, 1983, because the reimbursements for the said cash advances were not yet in
his possession.

As regards the cash shortage of P4,747.86, it is his claim that all the while, this amount had in fact been in
the possession of his teller. While he forgot to tell the auditors that the cash was actually with the teller,
he later remitted this amount to the Land Bank.

The Sandiganbayan found Ilogon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Ilogon argues that he never misappropriated the amount of P118,003.10 for his own personal use as the
bulk of it was given as cash advances to his co-employees.

Issue: W/N Ilogon is liable for malversation

Held: Yes. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable
officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor
was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a
shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same.

In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage
of P118,003.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation
for the same.

The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not
exculpate him from his criminal liability.

The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount later is of no moment. THE RETURN OF FUNDS
MALVERSED IS NOT A DEFENSE. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing
the accused's criminal liability. At best, it is a MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

In the light of the above finding and under the plain language of the applicable laws, We hold that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The
judgment of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and
ore." His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP).
Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
former's premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the BIR addressed to the
Regional Director of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other
personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of
Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt” assumed the undertakings specified therein. Subsequently,
he wrote a letter to the BIR's Regional Director for Revenue stating that since Jaime Ancla intends to cease
operation with him, he desired to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities he had over the
property by virtue of the receipt he had signed. Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the
truck to the security manager of PICOP and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of
the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the truck's exit was given, however, it was too late.

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of Revenue
Region 10 B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the surreptitious
taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the name of
Oscar Cueva at PICOP.

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the following Information filed by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual,
stating that Azarcon, a private individual, in his capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or
deposited by the BIR, conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the Isuzu Dump truck or its value of
P80,831.59, by then and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow
away the said vehicle with the authority, consent and knowledge of the BIR, Butuan City, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

Respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision finding the accused guilty. Petitioner filed a motion for
new trial or reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property – NO.

HELD:
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be
proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of
the RPC determines who are public officers:

Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of
the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.

Thus, (to) be a public officer, one must be — (1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the
government, or Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and (2) That his authority to take part in
the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be — a. by direct provision of the
law, or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the
BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
authorized by popular election. The next logical query is whether petitioner's designation by the BIR as a
custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent
authority. We answer in the negative.

The prosecution argues that "Article 222 of the RPC . . .defines the individuals covered by the term
'officers' under Article 217 . . ." of the same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon became "a depository
of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted under Article 217."

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private
individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds,
revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or
deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual
when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information
charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged
as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and
therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Conniving with or consenting to evasion (Art. 223)
Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Alfredo Rodillas is a policeman specially charged with the duty of keeping under his custody one
Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner being tried for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After the hearing, Rodillas allowed Zenaida to have lunch with her husband. While eating, Zenaida’s
husband asked Rodillas if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling well
and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the ladies’ comfort
room while he stood guard along the alley facing the door, without first ascertaining for himself whether
said comfort room is safe and without any egress by which the said detention prisoner could escape.

Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out and told him that she was going to buy sanitary
napkins for Zenaida. After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the
accused entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room.
He noticed that the window of said comfort room was not provided with window grills.

Rodillas formally reported the matter to his superior officer at the City Jail. The Sandiganbayan found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence under
Article 224 of the RPC.

Issue: W/N Rodillas is liable for Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner

Held: Yes. The elements of the crime under Article 224 are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that
he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final
judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence.

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the fact that
he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner’s negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner Zenaida
Andres. The negligence referred to is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-
performance of duty on the part of the guard.

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his authority
when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. As a police officer who was
charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a
violation of the regulations.

In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when
he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to
each other at the request of a co-officer.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure
the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of
definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty.
The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the petitioner’s suspicion because the only
pretext given by the prisoner was that she was going to answer the call of nature. It was, therefore,
unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone. Despite this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter
the comfort room without first establishing for himself that there was no window or door allowing the
possibility of escape. He even allowed the prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse
that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently waited for more than ten minutes for the
companion to return. This was patent negligence on the part of the police officer.

The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was no connivance between
him and the prisoner. However, the petitioner is not being charged with conniving under Article 223 but
for evasion through negligence under Article 224. It is, therefore, not necessary that connivance be
proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED.

Note: Article 224 of the RPC provides,

“ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the
negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer
shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and temporary special disqualification.”

Abuses against chastity (Art. 245)

Graft and Corruption
Almeda v. Perez

FACTS:
 Almeda acquired cash and properties from unknown source amounting to P121,407.98 during his
incumbency as Assistant Director of NBI. This violated RA 1379, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
Law
 Preliminary investigation was conducted and found out that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the petitioner acquired manifestly out of proportion to his salary.
 OSG amended the petition and added other counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and
disbursements thus increasing the cash from unexplained sources to P208,682.45 from Almeda’s
salary and other lawful income of only 59,860.97.
 Almeda contends that the new charges have already been investigated and dismissed, also the
respondents were not given a new preliminary investigation with respect to additional charges.
Under RA 1379, the offense being criminal in nature, the petition may not be amended as
substance without respondent’s consent. He asserts that the amendments were presented only
to delay the proceedings to prejudice the Almedas.

ISSUE:
Parricide (Art. 246)
People v. Tomotorgo
FACTS:

FACTS: Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had been persistently asking her husband
to sell the conjugal home and that their family transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws. Tomotorgo
would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife
were then living. Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and
improvements on the land which he was then farming.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his
farm Upon his return, he found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone. He finally saw his wife
carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of clothes some 200m away from their home. He asked and
pleaded with his wife that she should return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so.
When appellant sought to take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of
the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused.
Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood nearby and started
hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what
he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then returned to
the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena
de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay
Captain of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered. He also
brought with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife.
He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his
offense, he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him guilty of parricide but with three mitigating
circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court handed him the
wrong punishment. Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper
applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended. If the penalty
prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense which the accused wanted to commit, the
penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum period. Appellant avers that the
penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than that which he intended to commit
– physical injuries.

ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not parricide.

HELD: NO. Accused is guilty of parricide. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different
from that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by
the offender result from his felonious act because under Art. 4 (1) of the same code, he is liable for all the
direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit a grave wrong is at
best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes
graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant
considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. The court held that the fact
that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him
from liability for the resulting and more serious crime committed.
Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247)
People v. Abarca

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the
accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of
the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to
continue with the case by way of an appeal.

On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco Abarca went home and found his wife,
Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused,
the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-
in cabinet in their room jumped and ranaway. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At
around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16 rifle and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and
Koh there. He proceeded to the hangout of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong and
fired at him three times with his rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina
Amparado were rushed to the hospital and were rendered timely medical assistance that prevented their
deaths.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances can be applied in the instant case dissolving the criminal liability of the accused for
the murder of the deceased.
2. Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.

HELD:

1. Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant case.

2. No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

Article 247 qualifies death to be under exceptional circumstance when the following elements are
present: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.

There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse. That he went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is however vague. The length of
time that passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the
victim and the time the latter was actually shot took almost an hour. It must be understood however that
the shooting was the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. The killing has been
motivated by the same blind impulse and was the direct by-product of the accused’s rage. Satisfying both
provisions, Article 247 can therefore be applicable in this case. As a result, accused is not criminally liable
for the death of the deceased as he was under exceptional circumstance upon employing the act of killing.

As a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act. However, that
rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. Ruling that Article247 can be applied in this case,
accused was therefore not committing a felony when he killed the deceased. Having not committing a
felony, it therefore follows that the accused is not liable for the unintended acts which followed, in this
case, for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. It cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to
being the graver penalty (than destierro).

The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four
months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement
shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina
Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and
for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Homicide (Art. 249)

People v. Buensuceso 132 scra 143

FACTS:
 The said defendants together with two other policemen, Eduardo Mallari and Fidel Dela Cruz, were
charged with Murder of Pariseo Tayag. In the CFI of Bataan, only the four defendants were found to
be guilty of the said crime. They were to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and indemnify
the heirs of Tayag in the amount of P12,000.
 According to witness Apolonio Salvador, Patrolmen Aguilar and Tayag were found to be walking side-
by-side going towards the municipal building. Aguilar was trying to take the fan knife of Tayag, but
Tayag prevented him from taking it because he was not making any trouble. At the suggestion of
Aguilar, they went to the chief of police where they had a heated argument. Aguilar said that Tayag
cursed the Patrolman Mallari and Canlas who were present in the office. Tayag denied this and said
that Aguilar was trying to force him to give up his knife.
 As Tayag left the Office, Aguilar, Mallari and dela Ruz followed him. Aguilar fire his gun upward. Tayag
retreated backwards until he reached the fence of the plaza then Aguilar hit him above the right
knew. Tayag continued to run towards his house. Aguilar and Mallari went to the shed and they took
opposite sides of the road to intercept Tayag. Then there were several successive gunshots and Tayag
was seen dead.
 Dela Cruz took the knife from Tayag and gave it to Buensuceso, who had a revolver. Izon and Jose,
who also had guns, were also seen in the crime scene by the witness.
 PC Sgt. Romualdo Espiritu arrived at the crime seen and seen the commotion in the plaza. He
proceeded to the municipal building and investigated. He inspected the service pistol of Aguilar and
Buensuceso and found that they had been fired. Dela Cruz was not found with a pistol. He also asked
for Mallari’s service pistol.
 A diphenylamine test (paraffin test) was also made on the hands of the accused, which showed that
Izon and Joson were positive, while Dela Cruz and Mallari’s results were negative.
 The defendants in this appeal allege that the lower court erred in giving credence to the necropsy
report and ballistic report.
 Dispositive: The judgment appealed is affirmed. The indemnity is increased to P30,000.

ISSUE:
1. Was the conviction of Izon & Joson as co-principals in the crime of Murder correct?
2. Was the court correct in holding that although there was no conspiracy between the 4 police
officers, they are guilty of Murder under Art. 248 of RPC?
3. Though he claimed to have acted independently, Was there treachery on the part of Aguilar
when he killed Tayag?

SUPREME COURT:
YES TO ALL. THE COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BACKED UP BY THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS.

1. All 4 of the police officers were seen by the witness Salvador to have been present at the crime
scene at armed with .38 calibre service revolvers.
2. The autopsy showed that Tayag died as a result of 4 gunshot wounds inflicted by .38 cal.
Revolvers. Specifically that the slug found from the knee of Tayag was from the Revolver of
Buensuceco.
3. The on-the-spot inspection by Sgt. Espiritu right after the incident, he found that the service pistol
of Aguilar had been fired & had 3 empty shells & 3 live ammunitions left, and that of Buensuceso’s
had been fired as well & had 4 empty shells & 2 live ammunitions left.
4. The Ballistic examination proved that the empty shells of ammunition were from the guns of
BUENSUCESO & AGUILAR.
5. The Chemistry Reports on the paraffin tests of IZON and JOSON showed positive results.
Therefore confirming Salvador’s declaration that they were in the vicinity of the crime at the time
it happened.
6. AGUILAR's plea of self-defense is evidently unmeritorious. AGUILAR followed the victim right after
the latter hurriedly left the office of the Chief of Police. If, as contended, the victim had thrust his
knife at AGUILAR inside the Municipal Building malting the former the unlawful aggressor, to be
sure, the incident would have happened there and then and not some 60 meters away from the
building.
7. There is ample evidence establishing that AGUILAR, BUENSUCESO, IZON, and JOSON had fired
their guns at the victim hitting him on different parts of his body.
8. Although it has not been established as to which wound was inflicted by each accused the Court
held that where the victim died as a result of wounds received from several persons acting
independently of each other, but it has not been shown which wound was inflicted by each
assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim.
9. The crime was qualified by TREACHERY hence it’s MURDER. Because:
a. The victim was already retreating backwards until he reached the fence of the town plaza
when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the former hitting him above the right knee.
 b. Despite the fact that he was already hit & wounded, & possibly immobilized, he was still
subjected to successive shots as shown by the wounds that he had received, even at his
back.
c. Evidently the means employed by the police tended directly & specially to insure the
execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim
might have made.
10. Also, Tayag’s killing was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the number of
assailants, which was however, absorbed by treachery. No other circumstances modify the
commission of the crime.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

People v. Pugay 167 scra 439

FACTS:
1. Miranda (deceased) was a retardate and is a friend of the accused Pugay (accused).
2. During a town fiesta in a public plaza, Samson (another accused) and Pugay saw Gabion (a friend) in
the ferris wheel. The two with their companions were drunk. When they saw Miranda walking nearby,
they made fun of him by making him dance.
3. Not contented of what they were doing, Pugay grabbed a can of gasoline and poured such to Miranda.
Gabion tried to stop Pugay but the latter was already pouring the gasoline. Later, Samson lit Miranda
making a human torch out of him.
4. Miranda died although he was rushed to the hospital. Pugay in his statement admitted that he poured
the gasoline believing it was water and then Samson set him on fire. Samson on the other hand argued
that Pugay did pour the gasoline but he did not see who set Miranda on fire.
5. The trial court rendered that Pugay and Samson were guilty of the crime of murder and availing Pugay
a mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

ISSUE:
Did the trial Court err in their decision?

HELD:
Yes. The proper offense are Homicide through reckless imprudence for Pugay and Homicide for Samson.
- Elements of Murder is that any person not falling in Art. 246 who kills another person through the
enumerated circumstances in Art. 248 (just see Art.248 for the 6 circumstances). On the other
hand, homicide is committed by a person who is not falling under the provision of Art.246, kills
another without the attendance of the circumstances enumerated in Art.249
- For Pugay
o He just committed homicide through reckless imprudence. First there was no attendant
qualifying circumstance found.
o Pugay’s argument is untenable. The stench of gasoline could have not skipped his notice
which shows his negligence on his actions.
- For Samson:
o He just committed homicide since no qualifying circumstance was proven. The act was
mearly for purpose of making fun and thus treachery cannot be deduced from such.
Giving him benefit of the doubt, Samson merely intended to burn the clothes. However,
although it was not what was intended, Article 4 applies where criminal liability is still
incurred although the wrongful act is different from what was intended for. Also, note
that burning clothes may cause physical injuries, a felony defined in the RPC.
 o Mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong may be given in his
favour. Gabion testified that the two (Pugay and Samson) were stunned when they saw
the deceased burning. Likewise, there was an absence of proof that accused has reason
to kill the deceased before the incident.

Decision: Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence sentenced a range of 4 mo. of arresto
mayor as minimum to 4 y. and 2 mo. of prision correccional as maximum. Samson is guilty of Homicide
sentenced of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.