PIL

JURISDISCTION
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO & SARAW, 43 PHIL. 19 (1922)

FACTS:
On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the midst of the
islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros. The said
Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on
the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there
and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

ISSUE: Did the CFI in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw?

HELD:
Yes. First of all, the facts can’t be disputed. All the elements of the crime of piracy were
there. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi,and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. The CFI has jurisdiction because
pirates are in law hostes humani generis (enemy of mankind).

Piracy is a crime against all mankind, therefore, it can be punished in any competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found.-The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits. The crime is
against all mankind, so it is also punished by all. It doesn’t matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state. Those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes.

GEORGE TUBB AND WESLEY TEDROW VS THOMAS GREISS

GR NO. L-1325, 7 APRIL 1947

Original action in SC; Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
 13 Jan 1947, Petitioners were apprehended by the US Army authorities and have been held in custody since
then.
 28 Jan 1947, petitioners were formally charged by said authorities with violations of Articles of War
regarding misappropriation of US government property destined for military used, and such acts were
committed within premises occupied by US Army.
 Tubb and Welsey, US Citizens residing in PH under employment with Army of US under the Army of US, filed
a petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE: WON Philippine courts have exclusive jurisdiction over their arrest, confinement and imprisonment

HELD:
No. Petition is dismissed.

In the contract of employment entered into by petitioners with the United States Army, they voluntarily
submitted themselves to United States military law while serving said contract, thereby submitting themselves
to the full extent of the authority of the United States Army in this area. This, coupled with the fact that
petitioners are American citizens, makes their position during the subsistence of said contract no different from
that of enlisted men, enlistment after all being nothing more than a contract of voluntary service in the armed
forces of one's country. Petitioners then, in relation to the United States Army in the Philippines and during the
subsistence of their employment contract, can be deemed to possess the status of military personnel.

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It is a settled principle of International Law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place.
There can be no question that the concession of jurisdiction over passing troops to the local authorities
would be extremely inconvenient; and it is believed that the commanders, not only of forces in transit through
a friendly country with which no convention exists, but also of forces stationed there, assert exclusive
jurisdiction in principle in respect of offenses committed by persons under their command, though they may be
willing as a matter of concession to hand over culprits to the civil power when they have confidence in the
courts, and when their stay is likely to be long enough to allow of the case being watched. The existence of a
double jurisdiction in a foreign country being scarcely compatible with the discipline of an army, it is evident
that there would be some difficulty in carrying out any other arrangement.
Considering that a part of the United States Army is stationed in the Philippines with permission of our
government, and that petitioners who belong to the military personnel of that army are charged with violations
of Articles of War for offenses committed in areas under the control of the United States Army thereby giving
said army jurisdiction over their person and the offenses charged.

HAW PIA V. CHINA BANKING, 80 PHIL. 604 (1948)

FACTS:
Haw Pia had previously contracted a loan from China Banking Corporation in the amount of P5,103.35,
which, according to Haw Pia, had been completely paid, on different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank
of Taiwan, Ltd., which was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp.
With this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp to compel the bank to execute a deed of
cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to deliver its title. However, upon
service of summons, China Banking Corp demanded from Haw Pia for the payment of the sum of its
indebtedness with interests, which also constituted its counter claim in its answer.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of China Banking Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to show
that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp to accept Haw Pia's payment and that Bank of
Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate
the business of China Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished his
indebtedness to China Banking Corp.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that under the Hague Convention, a belligerent occupier can order the
sequestration of private property. But this sequestration is different from confiscation. WAR TIME TEST:
Although the corporation may be organized under the laws of the Philippines, but if the controlling stockholders
are enemies, then the veil of corporate fiction will be pierced and the nationality of the corporation will be
based on the citizenship of the majority stockholders in times of war.

BROWNELL VS SUN LIFE ASSURANCE

95 PHIL 228, GR NO L-5731, JUNE 22, 1954

FACTS:
This is a petition instituted in the CFI under the provisions of Philippines Property Act of the US against
the Sun Life Assurance company of Canada to compel the latter to comply with the demand of the former to
pay him the money which ½ of the proceeds of an endowment policy payable to Aihara, Japanese national.
The defenses of Sun Life Assurance are that immunities in Trading with the Enemy Act of US is doubtful
application in the Philippines and defendant is a trustee of the fund and under legal obligation to see to it that
it is paid to the person entitled.
CFI granted the petition. Hence, appeal was filed with the SC contending that CFI erred in holding that
the law is binding upon the inhabitants of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON the Trading with the Enemy Act apply to Philippines Govt.

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HELD:
Yes, A foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin provided
the former in which it sought to be made operative gives its consent. The consent need not be expressed it is
enough to be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.

In this case, the said act was conformed by President Roxas in a joint statement signed by him and by
Commissioner McNutt. Ambassador Romulo also formally expressed the conformity of the Government of the
Philippines to the approval of said act to the American Senate. It is well settled in the US that its laws have no
extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on Philippines Property
Act of 1946 and on the tacit consent and conduct of the Government of the Philippines in receiving the benefits
of its provisions.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
MILITARY BASES

USA V. RUIZ, 136 SCRA 487

FACTS:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation
and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so
they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of
the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUES: WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state
immunity.

DISCUSSIONS:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without
its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have
multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (juregestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
western Europe.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.

PIL JMC COLLEGE OF LAW