Go vs CA
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from
his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of
the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San
Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers.
The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the
shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has
waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been
posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule
113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure
pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at
the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal
knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.
Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not
apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected
by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to
preliminary investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest”
or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six
(6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
“when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting”
officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting —
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That
information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not
believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held
that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed
bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that
they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when
the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation
was a legitimate one.
PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25,
1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one
their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner. An information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring

that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a
jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he
was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
Hisbag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he
was carrying the marijuana, theinvestigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the
blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his business
was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the
RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two
watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved
the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against

unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest

allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless
the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to
be committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and

seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC

witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his
arrival was certain. And from the information they have
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team had determine on his own authority that a search warrant
was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined

by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED