CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES

From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo

4-MANRESA 2017-2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL………………………………………………………………………………………………………...……2
DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER…………………………………………………………………………………………………...7
DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN………………………………………………………………………………………………17
EQUAL PROTECTION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30
REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS……………………………………………………………………………..….…..…..39
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A VALID ARREST…………………………………………………………………………………………..…53
WHEN THINGS SEIZED ARE WITHIN PLAIN VIEW OF A SEARCHING PARTY………………………………………………….59
STOP AND FRISK……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………61

EXPRESS WAIVER………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….64
AIRPORT SECURITY………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..65
REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST…………………………………………………………….……...71
STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RULE……………………………………………………………………………………………………..75
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF ILLEGAL ARREST…………………………………………………………………………………84
WHEN TO RAISE ILLEGALITY OF ARREST……………………………………………………………………………………………85
PRIVACY………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………87
PRIOR RESTRAINTS/SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT…………………………………………………………………………………93
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER……………………………………………………………………………………………………. …97
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (CONTEMPT OF COURT)…….………………….99
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. ..100
ACADEMIC FREEDOM……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..101
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE…………………………………………………………………………………………………104
LIBERTY ABODE AND OF TRAVEL………………………………………………………………………………………………106
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION……………………………………………………………..107
RIGHT TO BAIL…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….113
WHEN RIGHT TO BAIL MAY BE INVOKED……………………………………………………………………………………..120
WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT, WHEN IT IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION………………………………………….121
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES…………………………………………………………………………………………..122
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE………………………………………………………………………………………………..123
RIGHT TO BE HEARD PERSONALLY OR BY COUNSEL……………………………………………………………………..124
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION…………………………………………………….126
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL…………………………………………………………………………129
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES…………………………………………………………………………………………….131
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION………………………………………………………………………………….132
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES……………………………………………………………………………….. .135
ACTS WHICH WHEN DONE WERE INNOCENT (EX POST FACTO LAWS)…………………………………………………141
CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS………………………………………………………………………..142
THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY…………………………………………………………………………...142
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS………………………………………………………………………..151
WRIT OF AMPARO…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………153
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA………………………………………………………………………………………………………….162

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 1

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
CABALIT VS. COA
FACTS: Philippine Star news reported that the
employees of LTO Bohol are shortchanging the
government by tampering with their income reports.
Eventually a formal charge of dishonesty was filed
against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman directed the parties to submit their
position papers pursuant Administrative Order No. 17.
No cross-examination of State Auditor Cabalit was
therefore conduced. The Office of the Ombudsman
rendered judgment finding petitioners liable for
dishonesty. Petitioners sought reconsideration but their
motions were denied. CA dismissed their petitions.
Petitioners claim that they were denied due process of
law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve
the case based only on the affidavits and other
evidence on record without conducting a formal hearing.
They lament that the case was submitted for decision
without giving them opportunity to present witnesses
and cross-examine the witnesses against them.
Petitioner Cabalit also argues that the Office of the
Ombudsman erred in applying the amendments under
A.O. No. 17 to the trial of the case, which was already in
progress under the old procedures under A.O. No. 07.
She stressed that under A.O. No. 07, she had the right
to choose whether to avail of a formal investigation or to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
evidence on record. Here, she was not given such
option and was merely required to submit her position
paper.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the right to
due process when the hearing officer at the Office
of the Ombudsman adopted the procedure under
A.O No 17, notwithstanding the fact that the said
amendatory order took effect after the hearings had
started. No violation of due process.
HELD: Petitioners were not denied due process of law
when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the
case based on the affidavits and other evidence on
record. Section 5(b)(1)32 Rule 3, of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, plainly provides that the
hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties
to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their
respective verified position papers on the basis of which,
along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer
may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only
when the hearing officer determines that based on the
evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory
hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2)
and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will
be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for
further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the
hearing officer. As the petitioners have utterly failed to
show any cogent reason why the hearing officers
determination should be overturned, the determination
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 2
will not be disturbed by this Court. We likewise find
no merit in their contention that the new procedures
under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case
was already undergoing trial before the hearing
officer, should not have been applied.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have
a vested right in procedural rules.
Well to remember, due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always and in all situations require
a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person
is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
More often, this opportunity is conferred through
written pleadings that the parties submit to present
their charges and defenses.34 But as long as a party
is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests
in due course, said party is not denied due process.
Neither is there merit to Cabalits assertion that she
should have been investigated under the old rules of
procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, and not
under the new rules. In Marohomsalic v. Cole, we
clarified that the Office of the Ombudsman has only
one set of rules of procedure and that is A.O. No. 07,
series of 1990, as amended. There have been
various amendments made thereto but it has
remained, to date, the only set of rules of procedure
governing cases filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Hence, the phrase as amended is
correctly appended to A.O. No. 7 every time it is
invoked. A.O. No. 17 is just one example of these
amendments.
YLAYA VS. GACOTT
FACTS: Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint
against Atty. Gacott. According to her, Atty. Gacott
deceived her and her late husband, Laurentino, into
signing a preparatory deed of sale which they
thought would be used in the sale of the properties to
the City Government of Puerto Princesa which at that
time were subject to expropriation proceedings. But
to their dismay, according to her, it was converted
into a deed of absolute sale in favor of latter's
relatives.
Atty. Gacott denied these and claimed that
Laurentino and Reynold had originally purchased the
properties and were co-owners. Laurentino
subsequently sold his share to Reynold under the
deed of absolute sale.
Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion
to withdraw and executed an affidavit affirming and
confirming the existence, genuineness, and due
execution of the deed of absolute sale. But the IBP
governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2 years,
finding him guilty of the violation of Rule 1.01 and
canon 16 of the code of professional responsibility.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Atty. Gacott filed a Petition for Review assailing IBP's
ruling contending that the latter violated his right to due
process as he was not able to cross-examine Ylaya.
This is not to mention that the complainant failed to
offer corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations.
ISSUE: WON the IBP violated Atty. Gacott's right to
due process
HELD: NO, there is no violation of Atty. Gacott’s right to
due process.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be
heard. Denial of due process means the total lack of
opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As
a rule, no denial of the due process takes place where a
party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to
present his case; what is prohibited is the absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to
due process because he was not given the "amplest
opportunity to defend himself, to cross-examine the
witness complainant, to object to the admissibility of
documents or present controverting evidence" when
the IBP rendered its conclusion without requiring the
complainant to adduce evidence in a formal hearing
and despite the absence of corroborative proof. He
insists that these defects rendered the complainants
allegations as hearsay, and the IBPs report,
recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face
confrontation with the complainant when she failed to
appear at the required mandatory conference on
October 6, 2005, the records reveal that the respondent
fully participated during the entire proceedings and
submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence,
before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for
reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence,
which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010?
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v.
Laguesma, we held that due process, as applied to
administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain
one's side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals, due process
in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
the opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial
of the procedural due process takes place. The
requirements of due process are satisfied where the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.
In this case, the respondent's failure to cross-examine
the complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the
claim that he had not been afforded due process. The
respondent was heard through his pleadings, his
submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his
oral testimony during the October 6, 2005, mandatory
conference. These pleadings, evidence, and testimony
were received and considered by the IBP
Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 3
recommendation and were the bases for the IBP
Boards Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of
due process is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. A party who has had the opportunity
to be heard on his motion for reconsideration cannot
successfully invoke a denial of due process.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the requirement of the law
was afforded to the respondent."
OCAMPO VS. ABANDO
FACTS: Elements of Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) discovered a mass grave containing skeletal
remains in Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave was
believed to be used by the NPA/CPP/NDFP to bury
their members who are executed after accused and
adjudged of being military spies/informers.
In an undated letter with attached complaint-affidavits,
the Provincial prosecutor conducted preliminary
investigation and thereafter issued a subpoena to the
petitioners requiring them to submit counter-affidavit.
Petitioner Ocampo submitted a counter-affidavit but
argued that he was not furnished the supplemental
affidavit of a witness-complainant, while the other two
petitioners (Echanis and Baylosis) did not submit
because they allegedly did not receive the subpoena.
Petitioner Ladlad did not also submit counter-affidavit
but made a formal entry of appearance, thru his
counsel, during the preliminary investigation.
Despite this, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
information for multiple murder with the RTC of Leyte.
Petitioners assailed the filing of information via Rule
65 on the ground that they were denied due process
of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are denied due
process of law in the conduct of preliminary
investigation.
HELD: NO. A preliminary investigation is "not a
casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent
from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a
public trial. While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of
criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right
to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer
shall decide whether the allegations and defenses
lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is
bound to dismiss the complaint.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial
of due process.
In this case, petitioners were not denied due process of
law based on the following:
As to petitioner Ocampo, for him to claim that he was
denied due process by not being furnished a copy of
the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would
imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on
the Supplemental Affidavit
As to Echanis and Baylosis, as long as efforts to reach
a respondent were made, and he was given an
opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid. In this case, the
Resolution of the Prosecutor stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is
sufficient for due process.
As to petitioner Ladlad, despite supposedly never
received a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad, through his
counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of
appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to
participate.
GUTIERREZ VS. COA
FACTS: Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer, with the
designation of Cashier III at the NFA. The total
undeposited collection as of March 31, 2008 was
P10,896,459.50. Of that amount, P10,105,687.25 was
placed in the "pearless" boxes7 in a wooden cabinet
and P790,772.25 was placed in the safety vault.
Armed men entered the premises of the NFA and took
Gutierrez’s undeposited collections. The State Auditor
issued a demand letter to Gutierrez ordering her to
immediately produce the missing amounts and she was
also ordered to submit within 72 hours a written
explanation why such shortage occurred.
Gutierrez requested relief from money accountability for
the loss of the collections. The letter was addressed to
State Auditor Joaquin. Commission on Audit Director IV
Tito S. Nabua (Director Nabua) issued a decision
denying Gutierrez's appeal.
Gutierrez argues that she was assisted by counsel only
after a withholding order had already been issued. She
also argued that the Commission on Audit Director's
issuance of a decision on her appeal without requiring
her to file an appeal memorandum was a violation of
her due process rights.
ISSUE: W/N Guttierez’s right to due process was
violated
HELD: NO. The right to counsel under Section 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 4
proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings. It
is a right given to persons accused of an offense
during criminal investigation. Any proceeding
conducted by an administrative body is not part of the
criminal investigation or prosecution. Petitioner is
not being accused of or investigated for a crime.
Petitioner's due process rights were not violated
when the Commission on Audit Director had failed to
require her to submit an appeal memorandum before
he decided her appeal of the State Auditor's issuance
of a withholding order. There was also no violation of
due process rights when the Commission on Audit
issued its January 31, 2012 decision denying her
request for relief from accountability, without a
petition for review of the Commission on Audit
Director's decision. The right to appeal is not part
of due process. Neither is it a natural right.
In sum, due process in administrative
proceedings does not necessarily require a trial
type of hearing. Neither does it require an
exchange of pleadings between or among the
parties. Due process is satisfied if the party who
is properly notified of allegations against him or
her is given an opportunity to defend himself or
herself against those allegations, and such
defense was considered by the tribunal in
arriving at its own independent conclusions.
SEC VS. UNIVERSAL
FACTS: In an Order dated July 27, 2004, the SEC
suspended URPHI's Registration of Securities and
Permit to Sell Securities to the Public for failure to
submit its reportorial requirements despite the lapse
of the extension period, and due to lack of sufficient
justification for its inability to comply with the said
requirements.
In a letter dated September 28, 2004, URPHI
requested for a final extension, or until November 15,
2004, within which to submit its reportorial
requirements.
In an Order of Revocation7 dated December 8, 2004,
the SEC revoked URPHI's Registration for its failure
to submit its reportorial requirements within the final
extension period. It was not until December 9, 10,
and 14, 2004 however, when URPHI finally submitted
to the SEC its reportorial requirements.
URPHI also appealed the SEC Order of Revocation
by filing a Notice of Appeal and a Memorandum. But
both were denied in a subsequent SEC Resolution.
ISSUE: WON URPHI was accorded due process.
HELD: Yes. In the present case, due notice of
revocation was given to URPHI through the SEC
Order dated July 27, 2004. Despite the extension,
URPHI still failed to submit said reports. Though no
formal hearing was held, URPHI was still given an
opportunity to be heard through the letters dated
September 13 and 18, 2004 before the Order of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Revocation was issued, as well as through its Notice of
Appeal and Memorandum when it moved to reconsider
the said order.
The Court has consistently held that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.23 Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party
who has had the opportunity to be heard on such
motion.24 What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES VS. BF HOMES
FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) is the owner of
several parcels of land located in the northern portion of
BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision, particularly
identified as Italia II lots.
BF Homes, represented by Florencio B. Orendain
(Orendain), as rehabilitation receiver appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and
SMPI, represented by Federico C. Gonzales, President,
entered into three successive Deeds of Absolute Sale
whereby the former sold to the latter a total of 130 Italia
II lots.
SMPI completed the payments for the 130 Italia II lots.
BF Homes delivered the Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) to SMPI but only for 110 of the 130 Italia II lots
purchased by SMPI.
SMPI, thru counsel, sent BF Homes a letter demanding
the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs. BF Homes failed
or refused to heed the demand of SMPI. Consequently,
SMPI filed a Complaint for specific performance with
damages before the HLURB to compel BF Homes to
deliver the remaining 20 TCTs to SMPI.
BF Homes filed its Answer (With Counterclaim). SMPI
filed a Reply; BF Homes filed a Rejoinder (To
Complainant's Reply).
Housing and Land Use Arbiter Rowena C. Balasolla
(Arbiter Balasolla) issued an Order directing the parties
to submit their respective position papers and
supporting evidence, as well as their draft decisions.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
In her Decision, Arbiter Balasolla suspended the
proceedings until the SEC ruled on the issue of whether
or not Orendain, the receiver of BF Homes, had
authority to execute the Deeds of Absolute Sale over
the 130 Italia II lots in favor of SMPI. SMPI filed a
Petition for Review with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
After a further exchange of pleadings by the parties, the
HLURB Board of Commissioners HLURB Board of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 5
Commissioners affirmed the suspension of
proceedings.
SMPI appealed the foregoing Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners before the OP. The OP
adjudged that the HLURB should have resolved the
case. BF Homes filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied by the OP. Aggrieved, BF Homes
sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by way of
a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the OP that the
HLURB had the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the complaint for specific performance and
damages of SMPI and should not have suspended
the proceedings until the SEC had ruled with finality
on the issue of Orendain's authority to sell the 130
Italia II lots to SMPI. The Court of Appeals ordered
the case to be REMANDED to the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board for continuation of
proceedings with dispatch,
SMPI filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
insofar as the Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the HLURB for further proceedings. The appellate
court denied said Motion in a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not BF Homes can claim denial of
due process if case is no longer remanded to the
HLURB. – NO.
HELD: xxx It is clear from the plain language of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 and
aforecited jurisprudence that the HLURB had
exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for specific
performance filed by SMPI against BF Homes for the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs.
The OP and the Court of Appeals are correct that the
HLURB, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction,
did not have to suspend the proceedings and should
have went ahead to resolve the complaint for specific
performance filed by SMPI given its statutory
mandate under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1344 and its technical competence and expertise
over the subject matter. The HLURB was called upon
to determine the contractual obligations of BF Homes
and SMPI, as seller and buyer of subdivision lots,
respectively, under the terms and conditions of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale in relation to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957.
In contrast, the proceedings before the SEC involved
the receivership of BF Homes, an intra-corporate
matter, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals. While
the HLURB and SEC proceedings may be related
(i.e., Orendain executed the Deeds of Absolute Sale
of the 130 Italia II lots as receiver of BF Homes), the
two cases could proceed independently of one
another.
Nonetheless, the Court disagrees with the Court
of Appeals and finds no more need to remand the
case to the HLURB.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
To recall, the parties were able to file pleadings and
submit evidence before Arbiter Balasolla. The case was
already deemed submitted for resolution with Arbiter
Balasolla stopping short only of actually rendering a
decision. Taking into account that the necessary
pleadings and evidence of the parties are already on
record, returning the instant case to the HLURB for
further proceedings will simply be circuitous and
inconsistent with the summary nature of HLURB
proceedings. The Court keeps in mind the shared
objective of Rule 1, Section 2 of the 1996 Rules of
Procedure of the HLURB, as amended, and Rule 1,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court to promote a
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition/determination
of every action.
Pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, "the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered." However, said doctrine is not an
absolute or inflexible rule. The Court recognized
several exceptions in Republic v. Lacap, viz.:
[T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which
are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto
proceedings, x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The contractual relationship between BF Homes as
owner and SMPI as buyer of subdivision lots is
governed by Presidential Decree No. 957 and is
undeniably imbued with public interest. Hence, it is
crucial that the dispute between them be resolved as
swiftly as possible.
In Spouses Chua v. Ang, the Court declared that "public
interest and welfare are involved in subdivision and
condominium development, as the terms of Presidential
Decree Nos. 957 and 1344 expressly reflect, x x x
Shelter is a basic human need whose fulfillment cannot
afford any kind of delay."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 6
Even if the case is no longer remanded, BF
Homes cannot claim denial of due process. "The
essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings, this
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied." In the instant case, SMPI and BF Homes
were afforded the opportunity to present and address
each other's arguments through an exchange of
pleadings, as well as to submit their respective
evidence before Arbiter Balasolla. To recall, the case
was already submitted for decision before Arbiter
Balasolla, meaning, there is nothing more left for the
parties to submit or do. To remand the case and
repeat the entire process once again before the
HLURB Arbiter will not only be impractical, but also
unreasonable and oppressive for SMPI.
Relevant herein are the following pronouncements of
the Court in Ching v. Court of Appeals:
[T]he Supreme Court may, on certain exceptional
instances, resolve the merit of a case on the basis of
the records and other evidence before it, most
especially when the resolution of these issues would
best serve the ends of justice and promote the
speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, considering the peculiar circumstances
attendant in the instant case, this Court sees the
cogency to exercise its plenary power:
"It is a rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be
served if a case or the determination of an issue in a
case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and
from there to the Supreme Court (citing Board
of Commissioners vs. Judge Joselito de la Rosa and
Judge Capulong, G.R. Nos. 95122-23).
"We have laid down the rule that the remand of
the case or of an issue to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it and
particularly where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by the remand thereof (Escudem vs.
Dulay, 158 SCRA 69). Moreover, the Supreme Court
is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even those not raised on appeal if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
disposition of the case."
On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and for the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
instead of remanding them to the trial court for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of
the case.
CAWAD VS. ABAD
Interpretative regulations, which do not affect
substantial rights of a person, need not be published
because they do not modify, amend, or supply what the
law provides.
FACTS: On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No.
7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers, was signed into law in order to
promote the social and economic well-being of health
workers, their living and working conditions and terms
of employment. Accordingly, public health workers
(PHWs) were granted additional allowances and
benefits.
Pursuant to Section 35 of the Magna Carta, the
Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter,
in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration with
various government agencies and health workers'
organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR
consolidating all additional and clarificatory rules issued
by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from
the effectivity of the Magna Carta.
On September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC
issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC
Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, which was
opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the same
diminishes the benefits granted by the Magna Carta for
PHWs.
ISSUE: Whether respondents Enrique Ona and
Florencio Abad acted with grave abuse of discretion
and violated substantive due process when they issued
DBM-DOH Joint Circular no. 1, S. 2012 which was
made effective on January 1, 2013, barely three (3)
days after it was published in a newspaper of general
circulation on December 29, 2012, in violation of the
rules on publication.
HELD: No. Anent petitioners' contention that the
DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to
comply with Section 35 of RA No. 7305 providing that
its implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days
after publication in a newspaper of general circulation,
as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the
University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the
National Administrative Register (UP Law
Center-ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the
circumstances of this case dictate otherwise.
Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural
due process, is required by law in order for
administrative rules and regulations to be effective.
There are, however, several exceptions, one of which
are interpretative regulations which "need nothing
further than their bare issuance for they give no real
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 7
consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed." These regulations need not be
published for they add nothing to the law and do not
affect substantial rights of any person.
Thus, in Association of Southern Tagalog Electric
Cooperatives, et. al. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), wherein several orders issued
by the ERC were sought to be invalidated for lack of
publication and non-submission of copies thereof to
the UP Law Center - ONAR, it has been held that
since they merely interpret RA No. 7832 and its IRR,
particularly on the computation of the cost of
purchased power, without modifying, amending or
supplanting the same, they cannot be rendered
ineffective.
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question
gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself had already prescribed. There is really no new
obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for
it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305
and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify,
amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the validity of
which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was
duly published and filed with the UP Law Center -
ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity
because in view of the pronouncements above,
interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH
circular herein, need not be published nor filed with
the UP Law Center - ONAR in order to be effective.
Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.
Nevertheless, it bears stressing that in spite of the
immateriality of the publication requirement in this
case, and even assuming the necessity of the same,
its basic objective in informing the public of the
contents of the law was sufficiently accomplished
when the DBM-DOH Joint Circular was published in
the Philippine Star, a newspaper of general
circulation, on December 29, 2012.
DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER
FERNANDO VS. ST. SCHOLASTICA
FACTS: Respondents St. Scholastica’s College
(SSC) and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc.
(SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with
principal offices and business addresses at Leon
Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of
land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters,
located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the
property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the
sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house
of the novices, and the retirement house for the
elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive
are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
Marikina City enacted ordinance No. 192 which
provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a
five-meter allowance between the front monument line
and the building line of an establishment. Section 5 of
the ordinance provides:
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences
be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front
monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments
and educational and religious institutions.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and
move back the fence. As a response, the respondents
filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The
RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence,
this certiorari.
ISSUE: Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a
five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?
HELD: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people.”
Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must
pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public
and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This
would be tantamount to a taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. Anent the
objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful
acts and “un-neighborliness” due to the walls and
fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus,
finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable
and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is
not valid.
LEGASPI VS. CITY OF CEBU
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu
enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic
enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions
defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu
City).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 8
Jaban, Jr. and Jaban, Sr. brought suit in RTC
seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as
unconstitutional for being in violation of due process.
Jabans contend that the ordinance, by leaving the
confiscation and immobilization of the motor vehicles
to the traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to officials
exercising judicial authority, was violative of the
constitutional guaranty of due process; that such
confiscation and immobilization should only be after a
hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the
immobilization and the clamping of the cars and
motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could
be subject to abuse.
City of Cebu: the passage of Ordinance 1664 is in
accordance with the police powers exercised by the
City of Cebu through the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and granted by the Local Government Code. With
respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of
the Code states:
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative branch of the city, x x x shall x x x
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places
and approve the construction, improvement, repair
and maintenance of the same; xxx
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges;
prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and,
when necessary in the interest of public welfare, x
xx
The scope of the legislative authority of the local
government is set out in Section 16, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. –Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with
the requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and
the relevant statutes. NO.
HELD: No.
TEST FOR A VALID ORDINANCE
A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu
of delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village
Association,Inc.,23 the Court cogently observed:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily
in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however,
may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies
of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
Vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traffic rules and regulations was
expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and
also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. With the broad
latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities,
their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective
unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and
statutory safeguards.
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS
The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance
is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
The police power granted to local government units
must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
Any government act that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction
of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true
whether the denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very
validity of the law itself.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 9
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court expounded
on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law
as a limitation on the acts of government, viz:
1. Procedural due process- refers to the
procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with that kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide
when it takes a particular action.
2. Substantive due process - asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other
words, substantive due process looks to whether
there is sufficient justification for the government’s
action.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the
guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the
petitioners cannot be sustained.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used
in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough
to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else
obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which
were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in
avowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of
vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at
all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its
Whereas Clauses.
Considering that traffic congestions were already
retarding the growth and progress in the population
and economic centers of the country, the plain
objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the
public interest and advance the general welfare in the
City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to
fulfill the compelling government purpose of
immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic
congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles
obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
RE: CONTENTION THAT THE PETITIONERS
WERE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PROTEST
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664
are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive
and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose
vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest
such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel
enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No.
1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative
escape in the form of permitting the release of the
immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to
the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City
of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe
Belciña–officials named in the ordinance itself.
Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by
clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or
obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply
either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a
traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation.
And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle
was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but
designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and
thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of
the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
MANILA MEMORIAL VS. DSWD
FACTS:
 Congress enacted RA 7432 or the Senior’s Citizen
Act.
 The law grants senior citizens certain privileges. One
of which is 20% discount on all purchases made by
senior citizens from establishments.
 Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme,
petitioners (businessmen) questioned the
constitutionality of RA 7432, as amended by RA
9257, as well as its implementing rules and
regulations.
 According to them: “The laws and IRR allow
business establishments to claim the 20% discount
given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the
DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the
same.”
ISSUE: WON the law is unconstitutional?
HELD: No. It was a valid exercise of police power.
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power.
Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of the 20%
discount to determine if it constitutes an exercise of
police power or eminent domain. The 20% discount is
intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who,
at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed,
more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus,
in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It
may not be amiss to mention also that the discount
serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent
the productive years of their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation. This distinct
cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an
integral part of this law.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a
regulation affecting the ability of private establishments
to price their products and services relative to a special
class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern.
The 20% senior citizen discount has not been
shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory.
The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one
under consideration, must, thus, be determined on a
case-to-case basis. Whether that line between
permissible regulation under police power and "taking"
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 10
under eminent domain has been crossed must, under
the specific circumstances of this case, be subject to
proof and the one assailing the constitutionality of the
regulation carries the heavy burden of proving that
the measure is unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the
burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law
rests upon the one assailing it and "the burden
becomes heavier when police power is at issue."
Congress must be given sufficient leeway in
formulating welfare legislations.
In a way, this law pursues its social equity objective
in a non-traditional manner unlike past and existing
direct subsidy programs of the government for the
poor and marginalized sectors of our society.
Verily, Congress must be given sufficient leeway in
formulating welfare legislations given the enormous
challenges that the government faces relative to,
among others, resource adequacy and administrative
capability in implementing social reform measures
which aim to protect and uphold the interests of those
most vulnerable in our society. In the process, the
individual, who enjoys the rights, benefits and
privileges of living in a democratic polity, must bear
his share in supporting measures intended for the
common good. This is only fair. In fine, without the
requisite showing of a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, the validity of the assailed law
must be sustained.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES VS. PRBRES
FACTS: R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the
"Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real
estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate
service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers,
assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the
country.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the
PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series
of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted
Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare
as void and unconstitutional the following provisions
of R.A. No. 9646:
“SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real
Estate Service. – (a) No partnership or
corporation shall engage in the business
of real estate service UNLESS it is duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the persons
authorized to act for the partnership or
corporation are all DULY REGISTERED
AND LICENSED REAL ESTATE
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
BROKERS, APPRAISERS OR
CONSULTANTS, as the case may be. xxx ”
Petitioners argue that this law it violates the due
process clause as it impinges on the real estate
developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to
use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article
428 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether Section 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar
as they affect the rights of real estate developers, are
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process
HELD: No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the
constitutional rule against deprivation of property
without due process of law. They stress that real estate
developers are now burdened by law to employ
licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose
of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of
money, time and resources in their projects, petitioners
aver that real estate developers will still have less
control in managing their business and will be burdened
with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of
property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of
property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No.
9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by
the new requirement of engaging the services of only
licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable
consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always
been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise
of the police power of the State particularly when their
conduct affects the execution of legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation of the State,
public health and welfare and public morals.20 In any
case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that
licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due
process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under
the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions.21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of
professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners
by increasing their competence and raising ethical
standards as real property transactions are "susceptible
to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are in
the hands of unqualified persons working under an
ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory
regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real
estate sector for greater contribution to our gross
domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a
vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of capital,
in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting
overall national progress."22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the
State’s police power. As we said in another case
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 11
challenging the constitutionality of a law granting
discounts to senior citizens:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of
an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness
to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs." It
is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common
good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings
and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view
of the presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
FACTS:
• Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
• Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law.
ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA
10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.
HELD:
1. The RH Law does not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are
not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider”
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”.
The “private health care institution” cited under
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private
health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad
enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
AS TO POLICE POWER:
SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. - No marriage
license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
unless the applicants present a Certificate of
Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning
Office certifying that they had duly received adequate
instructions and information on responsible parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the
Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government. A cursory reading of
the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom
of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law
requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar,
whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted
by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are
completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.
HERMANO OIL VS. TOLL REGULA TORY BOARD
FACTS: Hermano Oil owned a parcel of land located at
the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX situated
at Barangay Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan. The parcel
of land was bounded by an access fence along the
NLEX. In its letter dated September 7, 2001,4 the
petitioner requested that respondent Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way,
contending that it had been totally deprived of the
enjoyment and possession of its property by the access
fence that had barred its entry into and exit from the
NLEX. On September 26, 2001, however, the TRB
denied the petitioner's request saying that Said request
is inconsistent with the provision of Section 7.0 of
Republic Act No. 2000, also known as the Limited
Access Highway Act. Moreover, allowing easement of
right-of-way may have detrimental/adverse effect on the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 12
scheduled rehabilitation and improvement of the
North Luzon Expressway Interchanges, as well as on
the operational problems, i.e. traffic conflicts that may
arise, if approved.
The petitioner sued the TRB and Engr. Jaime S.
Dumlao, the TRB's Executive Director, in the RTC.
The petitioner alleged in its amended complaint that
the access fence had totally deprived it of the use
and enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress
and egress to its property; that the only access
leading to its property was the road network situated
in front of its property; that it was thereby deprived of
its property without due process of law and just
compensation; and that it was also denied equal
protection of the law because adjacent property
owners had been given ingress and egress access to
their properties.
The lower courts dismissed the case filed by
Hermano and denied its prayer for the issuance of
writ of injunction to enjoin the respondents from
implementing an access fence on its property, and to
direct them to grant it a right of way to the NLEX.
ISSUE: WON Hermano Oil was deprived of its
property without due process of law and in
violation of the equal protection clause? NO
HELD: The establishment of the access fence did
not violate the petitioner's constitutional and legal
rights. It is relevant to mention that the access fence
was put up pursuant to Republic Act No. 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act), the enforcement of
which was under the authority of the DOTC.
The putting up of the access fence on the
petitioner's property was in the valid exercise of
police power, assailable only upon proof that
such putting up unduly violated constitutional
limitations like due process and equal protection
of the law. In Mirasol v. Department of Public Works
and Highways, the Court has further noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility
designed to promote the fastest access to certain
destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance
require close regulation. Public interest and safety
require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll
ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special
kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of
transport could use it.
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a
reasonable restriction on the petitioner's property
given the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita
Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent properties
were accorded unrestricted access to the
expressway, there was a valid and reasonable
classification for doing so because their owners
provided ancillary services to motorists using the
NLEX, like gasoline service stations and food stores.
A classification based on practical convenience and
common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply
because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific
uniformity.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Lastly, the limited access imposed on the
petitioner's property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. There is no question that
the property was not taken and devoted for public
use. Instead, the property was subjected to a
certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to
secure the general safety and welfare of the
motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and
valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was
certainly not entitled to any just compensation.
FERRER VS. BAUTISA
FACTS: Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No.
SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City.
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment
equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed
value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City
Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a
special account to be established for the purpose.
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax
( SHT ) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government
for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land
banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized
housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction
of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings
and other similar structures; and (e) financing of
public-private partners hip agreement of the Quezon
City Government and National Housing Authority (NHA)
with the private sector.
Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed
by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment.
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235,
S-2013 was enacted wherein the proceeds collected
from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be
deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked
special account under the general fund to be utilized for
garbage collections.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO was filed seeking to declare
unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095,
S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized
Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are
being imposed by the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned ordinances are
proper exercises of police power.
HELD: Petition partially granted. The constitutionality
and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the
"Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City" is·
SUSTAINED for being consistent ·with Section·43 of
RA 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235,
S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all
domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 13
Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected
relative to its enforcement.
Police power, which flows from the recognition that
salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law), is the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people. Property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government in the exercise of
police power. In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched
that taxation may be made the implement of the
state’s police power.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized
Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed
value of land in excess of Php100,000.00. This
special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A.
No. 7279 or the “Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992” (UDHA). The SHT is one of the sources
of funds for urban development and housing
program. Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax . – Consistent
with the constitutional principle that the
ownership and enjoyment of property bear a
social function and to raise funds for the Program,
all local government units are hereby authorized
to impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%)
tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban
areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00).
The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is
a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside from
the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the
UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities which include, among
others, programs and projects for low-cost housing
and other mass dwellings. The collections made
accrue to its socialized housing programs and
projects.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or
merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the
police power for the general welfare of the entire city.
It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing
slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to
the underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their
property investments, fully enjoying the same in view
of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will
enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them
law-abiding constituents and better consumers of
business products.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is
subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to
the requirement that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the words of City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio, Jr.:
The police power granted to local government units
must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as
the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to
free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police
measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the
police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due
process clause.
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power only if there is a
lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise and (2) the mean s
employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
On the Garbage Fee
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC
and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers
under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative
bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants. Section 16 of the
LGC provides:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 14
SECTION 16. General Welfare . – Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in
statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs. The provisions related thereto are liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in
accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people in the community.
Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority
to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is
in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents.
One of the operative principles of decentralization is
that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and
national policies, the LGUs shall share with the
national government the responsibility in the
management and maintenance of ecological balance
within their territorial jurisdiction. In this regard, cities
are allowed to exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities which include, among others, solid
waste disposal system or environmental
management system and services or facilities related
to general hygiene and sanitation. R.A. No. 9003, or
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,
affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of its provisions within their
respective jurisdictions while establishing a
cooperative effort among the national government,
other local government units, non-government
organizations, and the private sector.
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to
impose and collect such reasonable fees and
charges for services rendered. "Charges" refer to
pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or
property, while "Fee" means a charge fixed by law or
ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a
business or activity.
The fee imposed for garbage collections under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
regulation of an activity. As opposed to petitioner’s
opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax.
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon
City, the SC declared that "if the generating of revenue
is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is
also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias,
the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the
imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and
that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives
the presumption that the same is a tax.
SC accordingly said that the designation given by the
municipal authorities does not decide whether the
imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The
determining factors are the purpose and effect of the
imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of
the ordinance. Thus, "when no police inspection,
supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard
set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees to
attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in
the business designated, without qualification or
hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the
stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no
prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye,
but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of
the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong
that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is
being exercised."
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage
fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on
double taxation must necessarily fail.
SC did not sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235
as it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an
ordinance must be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not
unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory. (This will
be discussed under F – Equal Protection in syllabus.)
INTERNATIONAL VS. GREENPEACE
BACKGROUND
In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed Executive
Order (EO) No. 430 creating the National Committee on
Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) which was tasked
to identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in
initiating genetic engineering experiments and
introducing new species and genetically engineered
organisms and recommend measures to minimize
risks.
In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety
Guidelines which governs the regulation of the
importation or introduction, movement and field release
of potentially hazardous biological materials in the
Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines
on Planned Release of Genetically Manipulated
Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic
Species (PHES).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 15
On 29 December 1993, the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) came into force. This is a multilateral
treaty recognizing the great potential of modern
biotechnology for human well-being if developed and
used with adequate safety measures for the
environment and human health.
In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena
Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to
ensure an adequate level of safe transfer, handling
and use of living modified organisms resulting from
modern biotechnology. The Philippines signed the
same on May 24 of the same year.
In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA)
issued DA Administrative Order No. 08 which
provides rules and regulations for the importation and
release into the environment of plants and plant
products derived from the use of modern
biotechnology.
On 17 March 2006, EO No. 514 (EO 514) entitled,
“Establishing the National Biosafety Framework
(NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation,
and Strengthening the NCBP” was issued. It
expressly provides that DAO 2002-08, NCBP
Guidelines on the Contained Use of GMOs, except
for provisions on potentially harmful exotic species
which were repealed, and all issuances of the Bureau
of Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on products of
modern biotechnology, shall continue to be in force
and effect unless amended by the issuing
departments or agencies.
FACTS: On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of
Undertaking was executed between International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the
Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI)
and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in
pursuance of a collaborative research and
development project on eggplants that are resistant
to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies
involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant
Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company
(MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII)
of USAID.
The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the
pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The
crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant
genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic
to target insect pests. The latter is said to be highly
specific to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot
borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of
eggplant.
NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of
Contained Experiment which was conducted from
2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct
of experiment, all the biosafety measures have been
complied with and no untoward incident has
occurred.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of
Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety permits to UPLB.
Field testing commenced on various dates in the
following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato;
Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago
Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and
individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a
petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that
the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right
to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
The required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under PD 1151 was not secured prior to the
project implementation
There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the
safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the
environment
There was a study conducted showing adverse effects
on rats who were fed Bt corn, local scientists likewise
attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and
animal health Bt crops can be directly toxic to
non-target species
There is a failure to comply with the required public
consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code
The case calls for the application of the precautionary
principle, it being a classic environmental case where
scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and
socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and
preliminary scientific evaluation indicates reasonable
grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the
environment
The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace,
et.al., to wit:
Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing and
registering as herbicidal product Bt talong in the
Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus
commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit to an
environmental impact statement system under the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB);
(2) to submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid
risk assessment, field tests report, and regulatory
compliance reports; (3) to submit all issued
certifications on public information, public consultation,
public participation and consent from the LGUs affected
by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of
an amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5)
for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public
information on the nature of Bt talong and Bt talong field
trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 16
On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan
against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB, ordering
them to file a verified return.
The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
 All environmental laws were complied with,
including public consultations in the affected
communities
 The Bt talong project is not covered by the
Philippine Environmental Impact Statement Law
 There is a plethora of scientific works and literature,
peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt talong for
human consumption
 Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are
irrelevant in the field trial stage as none of the
eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals
 There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy
of courts
 Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they
do not stand to suffer any direct injury as a result
of the Bt talong field tests
 The precautionary principle does not apply since
the field testing is only a part of a continuing study
to ensure that the field trials have no significant
and negative impact on the environment
SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the
case to the Court of Appeals.
On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the
following procedural issues before the CA: (1)
whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file
the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether the
petition has been rendered moot and academic by
the alleged termination of the Bt talong field testing;
and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable
controversy
CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved
that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess legal
standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is
capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the
alleged non-compliance with environmental and local
government laws present justiciable controversies for
resolution by the court.
On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of
the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the precautionary
principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases (the Rules)
finds relevance in the case.
CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI rejecting
the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to
academic freedom. The writ stops the field trials of Bt
talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong
research. Thus, there is no assault on academic
freedom.
CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the
theory that introducing a genetically modified plant
into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing
act.”
Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI,
EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to reverse the CA
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field
trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.
ISSUES:
WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing
WON the case is moot and academic
WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies
WON the law on environmental impact
statement/assessment applies on projects involving the
introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed
by the public respondents in the processing and
evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing
WON the Precautionary Principle applies
HELD: Two constitutional provisions bear upon the
issues relied upon by private respondents in this case.
Both are found in Article II, viz.:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Traditionally, these provisions articulate the doctrine
that health and ecological concerns are proper
purposes of regulation and, therefore, can be the basis
of the state's exercise of police power. Having
constitutionally ordained goals and principles are, per
se, compelling state interests.
Thus, restricting the rights to property and liberties does
not deny their holders their "due process of law"
provided there is a discemable rational relationship
between the regulatory measure and these legitimate
purposes. We have, prior to the 1987 Constitution,
adopted a fairly consistent deferential standard of
judicial review considering that the Congress has more
leeway in examining various submissions of a wider
range of experts and has the power to create the
forums for democratic deliberation on various
approaches.
In recent times, we have included a higher degree of
review of regulatory measures by requiring that there
shall be a judicially discemable demonstration that the
measure is least restrictive of fundamental rights.
Thus, in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,19 this
court recognized "three levels of scrutiny":
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court
reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis
scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs
only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must
show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at
least substantially related to serving that interest; and c)
strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 17
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny
is triggered by suspect classifications based on race
or gender but not when the classification is dnfvvn
along income categories.20 (Citations omitted)
This exacting level of scrutiny has been considered in
several instances in recent jurisprudence. In Estrada
v. Escritor,21 this court required the state, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, to show that the
means adopted to pursue the state's interest of
preserving the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
a high standard of morality and decency among its
personnel was the least restrictive means vis-a-vis
respondent's religious freedom. More recently, our
Decisions in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections22 and Social Weather Stations v.
Commission on Elections23 considered the propriety
of measures adopted to regulate speech in the
context of political exercises.
The requirement of adopting the least restrictive
means requires that respondent agencies show that
there were alternatives considered within the
democratic and deliberative forums mandated by law
and that clear standards were considered within
transparent processes. It is not for this court to
consider the validity of the standards chosen. We
must, however, be convinced that there is such a
standard, that it was assiduously applied, and the
application was consistent.
DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
REPUBLIC VS. SAMSON-TATAD
FACTS: On 13 July 2001, petitioner, represented by
the Department of PublicWorks and Highways
(DPWH), filed a Complaint against several
defendants,including private respondents, for the
expropriation of several parcels of land affected by
the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue
Flyover. During thependency of the proceedings,
petitioner received a letter dated from thereporting
that the subject property was government land.
Petitioner was therefore prompted to file an Amended
Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the area
conforming to the findings, and thereafter filed
aManifestation and Motion to have the subject
property declared or considered of uncertain
ownership or subject to conflicting claims. RTC inter
alia admitted the Amended Complaint and declared
the property a subject of conflicting claims. Private
respondents interposed objections, saying tha
tpetitioner was barred from presenting the evidence,
as it constituted acollateral attack on the validity of
their TCT No. RT-11603. RTC rendered an order in
favour of the private respondents. A subsequent
petition for certiorari was denied in the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
ISSUE: CAN THE COURT IN THE SAME
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING BE
GIVENAUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF A PROPERTY?
HELD: YES. petitioner may be allowed to present
evidence to assert its ownership over the subject
property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is
entitled to just compensation. That the court is
empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be
condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner
thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from
Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provide inter
alia that “court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation X X X or the benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto.
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court
that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of
ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must
be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is
empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be
condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner
thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from
Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If
the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or
there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court
may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation
for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the
benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding
to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of
the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude the
commencement of the action nor prevent the court from
assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require,
in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of
eminent domain should state in the complaint that the
true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or
specified with accuracy.
SY VS. LG OF QUEZON CITY
FACTS: Novermber 7, 1996 the City through then
Mayor Ismael Mathay, filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000
sq. m. parcel of land owned and registered under the
name of Henry Sy, which was intended to be used as a
site for several government activities.
March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 19 of the LGC of
1991 the City deposited the amount of 241,090 with the
Office of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair
market value of the subject property based on its tax
declaration. Sy did not question the right to expropriate
the property but only the amount of just compensation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 18
The RTC tasked 3 commissioners to determine the
proper amount of just compensation. It was decided
by 2 of them that it should be P5,500 per sq. m. to be
computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation complaint (Nov. 7, 1996). On the other
hand, 1 said that the amount should be P13,500 per
sq. m.
The RTC ruled that just compensation should be
P5,500 per sq. m. It also didn’t award damages and
back rentals in favor of Sy. For equity considerations,
6% legal interest was awarded computed from the
date of the filing of the expropriation until full payment
of just compensation. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling with the modification that the City should pay
Sy the amount of P200,000 as exemplary damages
(because the City took the property without even
initiating expropriation proceedings) and attorney’s
fees equivalent to 1% of the total amount due. Sy
was denied payment for back rentals and damages
for shelved plans of utilization.
Both Sy and the City’s motion for reconsideration
were denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the amount
of just compensation, its grant of 6% legal interest,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees-PARTLY
HELD: The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the
nature of the City’s obligation as an effective
forbearance. It was held in Republic v. CA that “the
debt incurred by the government on account of the
taking of the property subject of an expropriation
constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore,
warrants the application of the 12% legal interest.”
Also, legal interest should accrue from the time of the
“taking” of the property in 1986 (when the property
was already used as a Barangay Day Care and
Office) and not from the filing of the complaint for
expropriation on November 7, 1996. The lack of
proper authorization, i.e. resolution to effect
expropriation, did not affect the character of the City’s
taking of the subject property in 1986. There is
“taking” when the owner is actually deprived of the
use of his property, thus, the legal character of the
City’s action as one of “taking” did not change.
Because of such irregularity in the actual “taking” and
filing of the expropriation proceedings, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded to
the landowner for equity purposes. MIAA v.
Rodriguez states that “these are wanton and
irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and
corrected. Hence the award of exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is in order.”
With regard to the amount of just compensation, the
P5,500 per sq. m. cannot be sustained. This was
derived from documents that were issued in 1996.
Valuation should be based as of the time of the
taking which was in 1986. Thus, the case should be
remanded to the RTC for proper assessment.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Wherefore, the Petition is partly granted. The CA
decision is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to
the RTC.
SEC. OF DPWH VS. TECSON
FACTS: Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona
Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of in
San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land was
among the properties taken by the government
sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and
without the necessary expropriation proceedings and
used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents
demanded the payment of the fair market value of the
subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras
(petitioner Contreras), then District Engineer of the First
Bulacan Engineering District of petitioner Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), offered to pay the
subject land at the rate of ₱0.70 per square meter per
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC)
of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents
demanded for the return of their property or the
payment of compensation at the current fair market
value.
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed
a Complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the
possession of the subject parcel of land and that they
be paid attorney’s fees.
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
that the suit is against the State which may not be sued
without its consent; (2) that the case has already
prescribed; (3) that respondents have no cause of
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation,
they should be paid only the value of the property in
1940 or 1941.
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order granting
respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
state immunity from suit.
When elevated to the CA, the appellate court did not
agree with the RTC and found instead that the doctrine
of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because
the recovery of compensation is the only relief available
to the landowner. To deny such relief would undeniably
cause injustice to the landowner.
It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by
petitioners without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the
property owners sought recovery of the possession of
their property.
ISSUES:
a. Is the action barred by prescription or laches? No
b. If not, are the property owners entitled to recover
possession or just compensation?Yes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 19
HELD: Even if we squarely deal with the issues of
laches and prescription, the same must still fail.
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is
applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an
injustice. This doctrine finds no application in this
case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due
course to respondents’ claim. Both equity and the law
direct that a property owner should be compensated
if his property is taken for public use. Neither shall
prescription bar respondents’ claim following the
long-standing rule "that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first
acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe."
When a property is taken by the government for
public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the
remedies available to a landowner. The owner
may recover his property if its return is feasible
or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken.
For failure of respondents to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long period of
time, they are deemed to have waived and are
estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for
which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property
as between one who receives, and one who desires
to sell, x xx fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government." This rule holds true when the
property is taken before the filing of an expropriation
suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings
the action for compensation.
The Court in the Forfom Development Corporation
[Forfom] v. Philippine National Railways, Eusebio
v. Luis, Manila International Airport Authority v.
Rodriguez, was confronted with common factual
circumstances where the government took control
and possession of the subject properties for public
use without initiating expropriation proceedings and
without payment of just compensation, while the
landowners failed for a long period of time to question
such government act and later instituted actions for
recovery of possession with damages. The Court
thus determined the landowners’ right to the payment
of just compensation and, more importantly, the
amount of just compensation. The Court has
uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling for
purposes of compensation. As in said cases, just
compensation due respondents in this case should,
therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but
at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in
Republic v. Lara, et al., and repeatedly held by the
Court in recent cases, thus:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
x xx "The value of the property should be fixed as of
the date when it was taken and not the date of the
filing of the proceedings." For where property is taken
ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings,
the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value
thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value
of his property at the time it is taken x xx.
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject
property for more than fifty years without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents’
property without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and without payment of just compensation,
petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard of
respondents’ proprietary rights which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking,
respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in
the form of actual or compensatory damages which in
this case should be the legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum on the value of the land at the time of taking
in 1940 until full payment. This is based on the principle
that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking.
NPC VS. CRUZ
FACTS: Napocor filed an expropriation proceeding
against Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz who are the
owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park
Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan. The complaint, filed on February 17, 1997,
primarily sought the determination of just compensation
due the respondents after the negotiations for the
purchase of the lots failed. RTC directed the Bulacan
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and
submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to
be acquired by Napocor in order ‘to judicially guide the
Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to
the defendants.’" Napocor appealed the RTC’s order
with the CA asserting that the appointment of the PAC
as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, specifically, Section 5 thereof which states:
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain
and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of appointment
shall designate the time and place of the first session of
the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report shall be
submitted to the court. Copies of the order shall be
served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of
any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 20
within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
resolved within thirty (30) days after all the
commissioners shall have received copies of the
objections.
It contends that Rule 67 requires the trial court to
appoint three persons, and not a committee like the
PAC. The members of the PAC also did not
subscribe to an oath which is required under Section
6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Napocor further
alleges that the CA erred in disregarding the
compromise agreement it entered into with the
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just
compensation by the PAC was proper? YES
HELD: The settled rule in expropriation proceedings
is that the determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. Although the appointment of
commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not
impose any qualifications or restrictions on the
appointment, other than that the commissioners
should not number more than three and that they
should be competent and disinterested parties. In this
case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC
as commissioners substantially complies with
Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is
immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee
instead of three persons to act as commissioners,
since the PAC is composed of three members – the
Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we
find each member of the PAC competent to perform
the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the
valuation of the affected lots. As correctly found by
the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with
the updating and time-to-time determination of
currently assessed, as well as, market value of
properties within their jurisdiction." The mere fact that
they are government officials does not disqualify
them as disinterested persons, as the provincial
government has no significant interest in the case.
If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be
objectionable, it should have filed its objections early
on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the
CA. The second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 67
states that objections to the appointment of any of
the commissioners shall be filed with the court
within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
resolved within thirty (30) days after all the
commissioners shall have received copies of the
objections. Likewise, we find untenable Napocor’s
claim that the amount of just compensation was
without factual and legal basis. That the properties
were valued at ₱427.76 per square meter in August
1996, then at ₱2,200.00 in October 1997 does not
necessarily indicate that the assessment by the PAC
was manipulated. Napocor itself acknowledge an
increase in the value of the properties when it
modified its offered settlement from ₱427.76 to
₱1,900.00. Also, the LBP Appraisal Report, which
Napocor itself commissioned, has pegged the fair
market value of the properties at ₱2,200.00 per
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
square meter. The report considered important
improvements in the vicinity, among them, the
construction of a school, a church and several public
buildings.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just
compensation fixed in the commissioners’ report, its
remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days
from receipt of the notice of the report. Section 7, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court states that report shall be
filed within sixty (60) days from the date the
commissioners were notified of their appointment,
which time may be extended in the discretion of the
court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the
court shall serve copies thereof on all interested
parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10)
days within which to file objections to the findings
of the report, if they so desire.
The execution of the compromise agreement, by itself,
did not enjoin the CA from resolving the appeal. By its
terms and as found out by the CA, the compromise
agreement required the approval of the CA for it to take
effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA’s
authority to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed
to furnish the CA a copy of the agreement.
DYCOCO VS. CA
FACTS: In November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed
a complaint tor ejectment, cancellation of certificates of
land transfer,damages and injunction against private
respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio
Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno, Rogelio Siapno,
Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde,
Sr. were also named respondents in the complaint.
In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they
are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No. 216,
a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon,
Albay, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According
to them, the respondents named in the complaint took
advantage of the liberality of petitioner-spouses,
entered the subject property, successfully registered
themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes,
and occupied and cultivated the property to the
prejudice of petitioner-spouses. Said respondents
deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and
possession of the property without paying
petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due
thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws,
said respondents subleased their respective
landholdings to other persons.
All seven respondents named in the complaint were
summoned but only Bonde and Rogelio submitted their
answer and position paper. Bonde and Rogelio showed
that they already own their portions of the property
through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential
Decree No. 27. Pursuant to the said law,
petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their
favor which resulted in the issuance to them of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 21
emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No.
E-2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively.
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a
decision dated June 27, 1995 finding private
respondents “not worthy to become beneficiaries”
under Presidential Decree No. 27.
On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial
Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated
November 22, 1995 ordering, among others, the
ejectment of private respondents from their
respective tillage, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion
for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and to Cite
Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private
respondents returned to the subject property
although they have already been ordered ejected.
Petitioner-spouses submitted their Comments
[on]/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of
Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16,
1996 and Supplemental Comments [on]/Opposition
to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of
Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by
Respondents dated October 3, 1996 where they
countered private respondents’ motion by arguing
that both the motion to quash and the notice of
appeal were filed beyond the prescribed period.
Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered
mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due
course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated June 2, 2000. In its entirety, the
said resolution reads:
The petition (for review), filed under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED DUE
COURSE and, as a consequence, DISMISSED, for
late filing, as the petition was filed beyond the
extended period of fifteen (15) days granted under
Resolution dated May 5, 2000, which resolution was
issued pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Dycoco are
entitled to just compensation in relation to due
process.
HELD: There is no question that petitioner-spouses
are entitled under the law to receive just
compensation for the property taken from them and
transferred to private respondents by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27. Due process guarantees
that taking of private property by the State for public
use should be with payment of just compensation.
Unfortunately, petitioner-spouses themselves did not
consider the issue of just compensation as
compelling enough because they did not raise it in
the complaint or in the position paper which they filed
in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. They only
claimed just compensation for the first time on appeal,
that is, when they filed their petition for review with
the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not
raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal bursts the bubble that is the
alleged compelling nature of petitioner-spouses’
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
claim. Petitioner- spouses ask for due process, but
fairness and due process dictate that evidence and
issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the
first time on appeal.
On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not
validly present for the first time the issue of nonpayment
of just compensation in the Court of Appeals. Under the
law, the DARAB has primary, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands
awarded under Presidential Decree No. 27.
In any event, the right of petitioner-spouses to payment
of just compensation does not include reacquisition of
ownership and possession of the property transferred
to private respondents pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27. Lands acquired under Presidential Decree No.
27 do not revert to the landowner.
The due process claim of petitioner-spouses has no leg
to stand on. They have had ample opportunity to
defend their interests in due course. Stripped to its
basic concept, due process is simply the opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Petitioner-spouses were given the
chance to sufficiently state their case concerning the
timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by private
respondents. In particular, they submitted to the Office
of the Provincial Adjudicator their Comments
[on]/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of
Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16,
1996 and Supplemental Comments [on]/Opposition to
the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of
Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents
dated October 3, 1996 where they argued that both the
motion to quash and the notice of appeal of private
respondents were filed beyond the prescribed period. In
the DARAB level, petitioner-spouses filed a Counter-
Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated
February 9, 1997 where they again pointed out that the
appeal of private respondents was filed out of time.
Thus, petitioner-spouses cannot correctly claim that
they were not heard on the matter.
More importantly, it has already been found that the
notice of appeal was filed on time, particularly with
respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez. To
question such finding is to raise a question of fact.
However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be
raised in an original action for certiorari. Only
established or admitted facts can be considered. In this
connection, it has been established that the copy of the
Provincial Adjudicator’s decision dated June 27, 1995
was sent by registered mail to and received by private
respondent Berma’s daughter who lived in
another barangay. Such receipt by Berma’s daughter
cannot be validly considered as service of the
Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Sections 4
and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure,
which became effective on June 22, 1994, provides:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 22
SECTION 4. Service of Pleadings, Notices and
Resolutions. – a) The party filing the pleading shall
serve the opposing party with a copy thereof in the
manner provided for in these Rules and proof of such
service shall be filed with the records of the case; and
b) Summons, notices and copies of resolutions,
orders or decisions shall be served personally as far
as practicable, or by registered mail upon the party
himself, his counsel, or his duly authorized
representative. However, notice to the counsel is
notice to the party himself whether he be a
complainant or petitioner, or a defendant or
respondent.
SECTION 9. Proof of Completeness of Service. –
The return is a prima facie proof of the facts indicated
therein. Service by registered mail is completed upon
receipt by the addressee, his counsel, or by the duly
authorized representative or agent.(Emphases
supplied.)
At that time, private respondent Berma had neither
counsel nor duly authorized representative.
Therefore, the copy of the Provincial Adjudicator’s
decision should have been served on Berma
personally or by registered mail. As it was sent by
registered mail to private respondent Berma as the
addressee, service thereof could only have been
completed upon receipt by Berma. As it was not
received by private respondent Berma but by his
daughter who resided in another barangay, there
was no proper and completed service of the
Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Thus,
with respect to him, the notice of appeal was also
filed on time.
Petitioner-spouses primarily anchor this petition on
an invocation of the rule on liberality in the
construction of procedural rules. However, the
“liberal construction rule” is not a license to disregard
procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural
rules should be followed except only when, for the
most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure.
Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament
when they decided to change horses in midstream
and engaged the services of their present counsel on
April 10, 2000 or just a week before the expiration of
the period to appeal in the Court of Appeals,
discharging the services of their former counsel who
handled the case from the level of the Provincial
Adjudicator to the DARAB. They cannot escape the
consequences of a belated appeal caused by the
need of their new counsel for more time to study
voluminous records and familiarize himself with the
case. Moreover, as shown above, petitioner-spouses
not only failed to show any persuasive reason why
they should be exempted from strictly abiding by the
rules when they filed their petition for review in the
Court of Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
again disregarded the rules in various ways absent any
compelling reason when they filed this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
REPUBLIC VS. BPI
FACTS: In this case, petitioner questions the appellate
court’s Decision affirming the trial court’s Order granting
additional just compensation for consequential
damages for BPI’s building. Petitioner contends that
BPI’s building was “never taken” by petitioner, and that
to award consequential damages for the building was
unfounded and without legal basis. In support of its
contention, petitioner relies on the letter dated 12
September 2000 of the DPWH to the Office of the
Solicitor General stating that the proposed sidewalk of
2.50 meters was reduced to 2.35 meters, thus leaving
BPI’s building intact.
ISSUE: whether the award of additional just
compensation for BPI’s building in the amount fixed
therefor is unfounded and without legal basis.
HELD: Petitioner’s argument is untenable.
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant
consequential damages. Consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value.51 The rules on
expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award
of consequential damages. Section 6 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
x x x The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and
deduct from such consequential damages the
consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from
the public use or public purpose of the property taken,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals,52 we
held that
To determine just compensation, the trial court should
first ascertain the market value of the property, to which
should be added the consequential damages after
deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which
may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential
benefits exceed the consequential damages, these
items should be disregarded altogether as the basic
value of the property should be paid in every case.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of
Appeals
Lastly, as to the argument of plaintiff-appellant that the
award of additional just compensation for the building of
defendant-appellee is erroneous and without legal
basis because the building was never taken by the
government in the expropriation proceeding conducted
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 23
by the trial court nor was it affected by the
construction of the Zapote-Alabang Flyover, We find
the ruling of Republic of the Philippines through the
DPWH vs. CA and Rosario R. Reyes appropriate to
apply in this case, to wit:
Petitioner contends that no consequential damages
may be awarded as the remaining lot was not
“actually taken” by the DPWH, and to award
consquential damages for the lot which was retained
by the owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment on
the part of the latter.
Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious.
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real
property is necessary to grant consequential
damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by
petitioner, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square
meter lot) of private respondent suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value, consquential
damages may be awarded to private respondent.
(Italicization in the original)
Petitioner would also have us review the bases of the
courts below in awarding just compensation for the
building for consequential damages. The uniform
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are
entitled to the greatest respect. They are binding on
the Court in the absence of a strong showing by
petitioner that the courts below erred in appreciating
the established facts and in drawing inferences from
such facts. We find no cogent reason to deviate from
this.
The Court would like to stress that there is a stark
absence in the records of any proof that DPWH
communicated its amended plan to BPI or to the trial
court. On the other hand, the trial court found that
BPI was not notified of the reduction and had relied
only on the DPWH letter dated 12 August 1997
saying that it was not possible to reduce the width of
the sidewalk. Petitioner had actively participated in
the expropriation proceedings of the portion of BPI’s
lot according to the original plan, the decision for
which was promulgated on 25 November 1998. The
trial court had also ruled that additional just
compensation for the building was in order in its
Decision dated 10 September 1999, from which
petitioner moved for reconsideration but only as to
the procedure in the determination of the amount.
Further, the records show that by 07 September
1999, when Officer-In-Charge Agbayani conducted
an occular inspection, a new building had already
been constructed replacing the old one; whereas the
amended plan was communicated by DPWH to the
OSG only in September 2000, when the trial court
was constituting anew the Board of Commissioners
to determine the amount of just compensation for the
building. The findings of the lower courts are borne
by the records. Hence, there was proper basis for the
determination of just compensation for the building
for consequential damages.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. VS. DSWD
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
FACTS: Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme
contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation."
ISSUE: Is Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution
applicable for the 20% Senio Citizen discount given
by the drugstores?
HELD: No. The 20% discount is not private property
actually owned and/or used by the business
establishment. It should be distinguished from
properties like lands or buildings actually used in the
operation of a business establishment which, if
appropriated for public use, would amount to a "taking"
under the power of eminent domain. Instead, the 20%
discount is a regulatory measure which impacts the
pricing and, hence, the profitability of business
establishments. At the time the discount is imposed, no
particular property of the business establishment can
be said to be "taken." That is, the State does not
acquire or take anything from the business
establishment in the way that it takes a piece of private
land to build a public road.
While the 20% discount may form part of the potential
profits or income/gross salesof the business
establishment, as similarly characterized by Justice
Bersamin in his Concurring Opinion, potential profits or
income/gross sales are not private property, specifically
cash or money, already belonging to the business
establishment. They are a mere expectancy because
they are potential fruits of the successful conduct of the
business. Prior to the sale of goods or services, a
business establishment may be subject to State
regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen discount,
which may impact the level or amount of profits or
income/gross sales that can be generated by such
establishment. For this reason, the validity of the
discount is to be determined based on its overall effects
on the operations of the business establishment.
REPUBLIC VS. ORTIGAS
FACTS: Respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of
its property and reserved one portion for road widening
of the DPWH project-C5 Road Extension. It designated
Lot 5-B-2-A-1 which was actually used for road
widening and it was not compensated for the use of its
property.
Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for
authority to sell to the government the said lot and
alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of
the property for road widening purposes.
Petitioner filed an opposition, alleging that respondent
Ortigas’ property can only be conveyed by way of
donation to the government, citing Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the
Property Registration Decree.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ortigas may not sell and
may only donate its property to the government. NO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 24
HELD: Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to
the government. It must be compensated because its
property was taken and utilized for public road
purposes.
Petitioner’s reliance on PD 1529, Section 50, which
provides that delineated boundaries, streets,
passageways, and waterways of a subdivided land
may not be closed or disposed of by the owner
except by donation to the government, is erroneous.
It contemplates only roads and streets in a
subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on
a private property that was taken from an owner for
public purpose.
As a rule, when there is taking of private property for
some public purpose, the owner of the property taken
is entitled to be compensated.
There is taking when the following elements are
present:
1. The government must enter the private property;
2. The entrance into the private property must be
indefinite or permanent;
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the
property;
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from
the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All of the above elements are present in this case.
Petitioner construction of a road — a permanent
structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the
use of the general public is an obvious permanent
entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part.
Given that the road was constructed for general
public use gives it public character, and coursing the
entry through the DPWH gives it a color of legal
authority. As a result, respondent may not anymore
use the property for whatever legal purpose it may
desire. In other words, respondent was effectively
deprived of all the bundle of rights attached to
ownership of property.
Hence, respondent Ortigas’ property should be
conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines with just
compensation.
HERMANO OIL vs TRB
FACTS: Petitioner requested that TRB grant an
easement of right of way. Contending that it had been
totally deprived of the enjoyment and possession of
its property by the access fence that had barred its
entry into and exit from the NLEX. TRB denied the
request. Petitioner filed a complaint against TRB for
specific performance and grant of the easement of
right of way and damages. OSG filed a Motion to
Dismiss and this was granted by the RTC. CA
affirmed the dismissal. Petitioners assert that no
expropriation proceeding was taken against the
subject property.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just
compensation. Not entitled.
HELD: The limited access imposed on the petitioner's
property did not partake of a compensable taking due to
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is
no question that the property was not taken and
devoted for public use. Instead, the property was
subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in
order to secure the general safety and welfare of the
motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and valid
exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly
not entitled to any just compensation.
REPUBLIC VS HERIS OF BORBON
FACTS: NAPOCOR entered a property located in
Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines.
Respondents, heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, are the
owners of the property.
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Batangas City, seeking
the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a
portion of the property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR
had not negotiated with them before entering the
property and that the entry was done without their
consent. Nonetheless, they tendered no objection to
NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be
expropriated but for the entire property whose potential
was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the
project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings. NAPOCOR prayed that the proceedings
be discontinued "under such terms as the court deems
just and equitable," and that the compensation to be
awarded the respondents be reduced by the equivalent
of the benefit they received from the land during the
time of its occupation, for which purpose the case could
be remanded to the trial court for the determination of
reasonable compensation to be paid to them
ISSUE: WON the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
HELD:YES, the expropriation proceedings can be
dismissed.
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at
the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably
with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be
upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the
nature of the power of eminent domain. The right of
eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate, not only the public but the private
property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty,
to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not
unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 25
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be
paid to the property owner. These requirements
partake the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep
the property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means, “use by
the public.” However, the concept has expanded to
include utility, advantage or productivity for the
benefit of the public. “Public use” has now been held
to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public
benefit,” and “public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the
property be maintained throughout the proceedings
for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the
public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of
public use, the expropriator should commit to using
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should
file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is
then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter desires
to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of
the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness
and equity.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of
the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite
cessation of the public purpose of the project would
result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor
of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and
the eventual return of the property to the respondents,
there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them
because their property would not be taken by
NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the
property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate
the respondents for the disturbance of their property
rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying to them
actual or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be
based on what they actually lost as a result and by
reason of their dispossession of the property and of
its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants,
and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of
the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal
of the expropriation proceedings is a development
occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing
the effect of converting the case into an action for
damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The
court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as
an action for damages.
MERCADO VS. LBP
FACTS: Petitioners owned a 9.8 hectares of
agricultural land situated in Kilate, Toril, Davao City
(adjacent to Eden). The provincial Agrarian Reform
Office informed petitioners that 5.2 hectares of their
land shall be placed under the CARP coverage and
were offered P287,227 as just compensation.
Petitioners rejected the offer thus summary
administrative hearing was conducted to determine just
compensation. The Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator sustained the valuation of Provincial Office.
Upon appeal to the DARAB, the latter ruled that the
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation shall be
appealable to RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.
When petitioners filed their case to the RTC, the latter
awarded them P25 per square meter. The RTC, in
arriving at its decision, did not use the guidelines set
forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR A.O. no.5.
ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just
compensation by the RTC is proper.
HELD: NO In eminent domain, the determination of just
compensation is principally a judicial function of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC). In the exercise of such judicial function,
however, the RTC must consider both Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or Comprehensive
Land Reform Law of 1988) and the valuation formula
under applicable Administrative Order (A.O.) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
However, the Court clarified that the RTC may relax the
application of the DAR formula, if warranted by the
circumstances of the case and provided the RTC
explains its deviation from the factors or formula
above-mentioned. the RTC is not strictly bound by the
formula created by the DAR, if the situations before it
do not warrant its application. The RTC cannot be
arbitrarily restricted by the formula outlined by the DAR.
While the DAR provides a formula, "it could not have
been its intention to shackle the courts into applying the
formula in every instance.
In this case, the RTC did not take into consideration the
guidelines in RA 6657 as well as the DAR A.O. no. 5. It
did not even explain the reason for deviating from the
general procedure. Thus, making its finding of just
compensation irregular and invalid.
The case was remanded to the RTC for determination.
REPUBLIC VS. MUPAS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 26
FACTS: The court ordered petitioners Republic of
the Philippines, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and Manila International Airport
Authority to pay the Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the amount of
$371,426,688.24 with interest at 6%per annum as
just compensation for the expropriation of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA-IPT III).
PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan challenge the
validity of the RTC's decision for alleged violation of
their right to due process. They point out that the
RTC promulgated its decision in Civil Case No.
04-0876 on May 23, 2011, immediately after the
release of the BOC's Final Report on March 31, 2011.
They complain that since the RTC's clerk of court did
not furnish the parties copies of the Final Report, the
trial court violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court as they failed to object to the Final
Report's contents.
They contend that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of
the commissioners' final report on all interested
parties upon the filing of the report. Each party shall
have ten days within which to file their objections to
the report's findings.
ISSUE: W/N the parties were afforded due
process despite their non-receipt of the BOC final
report.
HELD: Yes. The parties' failure to receive the
Final Report did not render the May 23, 2011
Decision null and void.
The essence of procedural due process is the right to
be heard. The procedural due process
requirements in an eminent domain case are
satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity
to present their evidence before the
commissioners whose findings (together with the
pleadings, evidence of the parties, and the entire
record of the case) are reviewed and considered
by the expropriation court. It is the parties' total
failure to present evidence on just compensation
that renders the trial court's ruling void. The
opportunity to present evidence during the trial
remains to be the vital requirement in the
observance of due process.
The record will show that the parties exhaustively
discussed their positions in this case before the BOC,
the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court.
They had ample opportunity to refute and respond to
each other's positions with the aid of their own
appraisers and experts. Each party, in fact, submitted
countervailing evidence on the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III. They also filed numerous and
voluminous pleadings and motions before the lower
courts and before this Court. The mere failure of the
RTC's clerk of court to send the parties copies of the
BOC Final Report is not substantial enough under
the attendant circumstances to affect and nullify the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
whole proceedings. Litigation is not a game of
technicalities. Strong public interests require that this
Court judiciously and decisively settle the amount of
just compensation in the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
III. We cannot further delay this more-than a-decade
case and let interests accrue on just compensation by
remanding the case once more to the trial court.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
HABABAG, SR. (2015)
FACTS: Alfredo Hababag, Sr. (Alfredo) was the owner
of several parcels of agricultural land in the Municipality
of Gubat, Sorsogon. The aforesaid landholdings were
voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the government
under the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.”
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) initially valued
the subject lands at 1.2m but Alfredo rejected the
valuation. Ultimately, the case reached the RTC where
RTC finally valued the lot at 5.65 million. Still
dissatisfied, Alfredo appealed to the CA and so CA
rendered its Decision, finding a mathematical error in
the computation of the reasonable income from the
coconut trees, and remanded the case for the
re-computation of the accurate amount of just
compensation.
Pursuant to the CA Decision, the RTC ordered the
Commissioner to re-compute the accurate amount of
just compensation applying the Income Productivity
Approach. The RTC’s computation was however set
aside for failure to give due consideration to the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula
under DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94.
ISSUE: What is the proper way of computing just
compensation
HELD: In the landmark case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,40 the Court defined the term "just
compensation" as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has been repeatedly -stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full [and] ample.
In this relation, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court, has been conferred with the original and
exclusive power to determine just compensation for
parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to the
agrarian reform program.42 To guide the RTC in this
function, Section 1743 of RA 6657 enumerates the
factors which must be taken into consideration to
accurately determine the amount of just compensation
to be awarded in a particular case. They are:
(a)
the acquisition cost of the land;
(b)
(b) the current value of like properties;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 27
(c)
(c) the nature and actual use of the property,
and the income therefrom;
(d)
(d) the owner's sworn valuation;
(e)
(e) the tax declarations;
(f)
(f) the assessment made by government
assessors;
(g)
(g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the
property; and
(h) (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.
In keeping with these considerations, the Court finds
the CA's valuation - which made use of the DAR
formula - as reflective of the factors set forth in
Section 17 of RA 6657. Records disclose that the
CA's computation, as adopted from the LBP's own
computation, is based on:
(a) actual production data;
(b) the appropriate industry selling prices of the
products from the Philippine Coconut Authority and
the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics of Sorsogon; and
(c) the actual uses of the property.
On the contrary, the Court finds the RTC's
valuation to be improper, as it contradicts the
definition of "market value" as crafted by
established jurisprudence on expropriation.
To elucidate, in determining the amount of just
compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied
the Income Productivity Approach which
approximated the income for the remaining
productive life of the crops therein, without
considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases,
and with the expectation that they would be
compensated by developments which could be made
by the property owner.49 The Court has repeatedly
ruled that the constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent
of the market value of the property, which is, in turn,
defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives and one who desires to
sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.50 In this accord, therefore, the Court
cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which
was "based on the principle of anticipation which
implies that the value of a property is dependent on
the potential net benefit that may be derived from its
ownership."51 Clearly, this approach, which is largely
characterized by the element of futurity, is
inconsistent with the idea of valuing the expropriated
property at the time of the taking.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
HABABAG, SR. (2016)
FACTS: In the Court's September 16, 2015
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Decision, it affirmed the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), fixing the just compensation for the
subject 69.3857 hectare lands at P2,398,487.24 and
imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance, but
modified the imposable interest rate.
The Court upheld the CA's valuation which made use of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) formula as
reflective of the factors set forth under Section 17 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, and rejected the
compensation fixed by the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
96-6217, which applied the Income Productivity
Approach as contrary to the jurisprudential definition of
just compensation in expropriation cases, i.e., "market
value" at the time of actual taking by the
government. Considering that the initial valuation in the
amount of P1,237,850.00 paid to the landowners is
lower than the just compensation finally adjudged, the
Court likewise sustained the award of legal interest on
the unpaid balance, but modified the imposable interest
rate, in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular
No. 799, series of 2013.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Land Bank of the Philippines'
(LBP) is to be discharged from the payment of legal
interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation. – NO.
2. The clarification of the date of taking from which to
reckon the computation of legal interest on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation.
HELD:
1. With respect to the LBP's Motion for Reconsideration
In its Motion for Reconsideration, the LBP contends that
it is not liable for the payment of interest, considering
the absence of: (a) delay since it promptly deposited
the initial valuation for the subject lands; and (b)
substantial difference between the amount of initial
valuation and the final just compensation, which were
purportedly the compelling circumstances in the case
of Apo Fruits Corporation vs. LBP (Apo Fruits), cited by
the Court in its September 16, 2015 Decision to justify
the imposition of interest.
The argument is specious.
In Apo Fruits, the Court had illuminated that the
substantiality of the payments made by the LBP is not
the determining factor in the imposition of interest as
nothing less than full payment of just compensation is
required. The value of the landholdings themselves
should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and that interest is due and should
be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this
principal sum after the taking has been completed, viz.:
[T]he interest involved in the present case "runs as
a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 28
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments
made by the LBP to the petitioners cannot be a
proper premise in denying the landowners the
interest due them under the law and established
jurisprudence. If the just compensation for the
landholdings is considerable, this compensation
is not undue because the landholdings the
owners gave up in exchange are also similarly
considerable x x x. When the petitioners
surrendered these sizeable landholdings to the
government, the incomes they gave up were likewise
sizeable and cannot in any way be considered
miniscule. The incomes due from these properties,
expressed as interest, are what the government
should return to the petitioners after the government
took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the
landholdings themselves should be equivalent to
the principal sum of the just compensation due;
interest is due and should be paid to compensate
for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after
taking has been completed. This is the
compensation arrangement that should prevail if
such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional
standard of being "just."
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just
compensation is legally significant at all under the
circumstances of this case, the significance is only in
putting a stop to the running of the interest due
because the principal of the just compensation due
has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is
to condone what is effectively a confiscatory action in
favor of the LBP.
x x x [T]he interest, however enormous it may
be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable
because it resulted directly from the application
of law and jurisprudence - standards that have
taken into account fairness and equity in setting the
interest rates due for the use or forebearance of
money.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this
Court should tread lightly in imposing liabilities on the
LBP because this bank represents the government
and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say
that public interest refers to what will benefit the
public, not necessarily the government and its
agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit of
the public. Greater public benefit will result if
government agencies like the LBP are conscientious
in undertaking its tasks in order to avoid the situation
facing it in this case. Greater public interest would
be served if it can contribute to the credibility of
the government's land reform program through
the conscientious handling of its part of this
program.(Emphases and italics in the original,
underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the just compensation for the
subject lands was finally fixed at P2,398,487.24,
while the payments made by the LBP only amounted
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
to P1,237,850.00. Hence, there remained an unpaid
balance of the "principal sum of the just compensation,"
warranting the imposition of interest.
In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, the Court
reemphasized that just compensation contemplates of
just and timely payment, and elucidated that "prompt
payment" of just compensation encompasses
the payment in full of the just compensation to the
landholders as finally determined by the
courts. Hence, the requirement of the law is not
satisfied by the mere deposit by the LBP with any
accessible bank of the provisional compensation
determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent
release to the landowner after compliance with the legal
requirements set forth bv RA 6657.
Accordingly, the LBP's Motion for Reconsideration
should be denied with finality.
2. With respect to the LBP's Motion for Clarification of
the Date of Taking
That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP's
alternative Motion for Clarification, illumines that the
interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance,
reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or emancipation
patents are issued by the government, until June 30,
2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment. However, while the LBP averred that the
landowner's title was cancelled in favor of the
Republic, copies of the Republic's title/s was/were not
attached to the records of these consolidated cases.
Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit
certified true copies of the Republic's title/s to the RTC
upon remand of these cases, and the latter to compute
the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of
Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the said title/s.
NPC vs. MANALASTAS
Just Compensation
The formula for determination of just compensation to
landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate,
as inflation is properly accounted for through payment
of interest on the amount due to the landowner, and
through the award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity in
the taking of property.
Estoppel inoperative against Government
Estoppel generally finds no application against the
State when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors,
irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents,
irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of
the affairs of the State without any hindrance on the
part of the government from implementing laws and
regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal acts
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 29
of its agents shackling government operations and
allowing others, some by malice, to profit from official
error or misbehavior.
FACTS: NAPOCOR, a government-owned and
controlled corporation involved in the development of
hydro-electric generation of power and production of
electricity, constructed transmission lines on
respondents' parcel of land affecting an area of
26,919 square meters. Petitioner entered said land
without the knowledge or consent of respondents,
without properly initiating expropriation proceedings,
and without any compensation to
respondents-landowners. Because of said
transmission lines, respondents alleged that they
could no longer use their land as part of a subdivision
project as originally intended, which ultimately
caused financial loss to their family. Thus,
respondents filed a complaint against petitioner and
its officers with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondents demanded the removal of the power
lines and its accessories and payment of damages,
or in the alternative, payment of the fair market value
of the affected areas totalling 26,000 square meters
of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter.
RTC issued a Decision ordering defendant
NAPOCOR to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P92,827,351.00, by way of just compensation and
Attorney's fees.
On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that
the RTC erred in factoring the devaluation of the
peso in the computation of the fair market value of
respondents' land. Petitioners maintain that the
inclusion of the inflation rate in arriving at the value of
just compensation has no legal basis, and it was a
palpable mistake on the part of its representatives
and counsel to make a recommendation factoring in
said inflation rate in the computation of just
compensation. None of the parties contest the finding
that the fair market value of the property at the time of
taking was Php 170.00 per square meter.
The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification.
The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer assail
the valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the
same being a judicial admission. Moreover, the CA
pointed out that taking an inconsistent position on
appeal cannot be allowed.
ISSUE (1): Did the Court commit an error when it
included the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso in
determining the just compensation due to
respondents?
RULING: Yes. The formula for determination of just
compensation to landowners does not include the
factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly
accounted for through payment of interest on the
amount due to the landowner, and through the award
of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases
where there was irregularity in the taking of property.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Just compensation is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation. The State is not obliged to pay premium
to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss
sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of
the circumstances availing at the time the property was
taken. More, the concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which
ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
The Court recognizes that the owner's loss is not only
his property but also its income-generating potential.
Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its
value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair
exchange for the property and the potential income lost.
The rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate
the petitioners for the income they would have made
had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking.
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the
fair value of the property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The just compensation due to the landowners amounts
to an effective forbearance on the part of the State—a
proper subject of interest computed from the time the
property was taken until the full amount of just
compensation is paid—in order to eradicate the issue of
the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time.
Thus, the valuation of the land for purposes of
determining just compensation should not include the
inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay
in payment of the price of expropriated land is
sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest
on the market value of the land as of the time of taking
from the landowner.
ISSUE (2): Is estoppel operative against the
Government rendering it unable to assail the valuation it
recommended, the same being a judicial admission?
RULING: No. Estoppel generally finds no application
against the State when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors,
irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 30
irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of
the affairs of the State without any hindrance on the
part of the government from implementing laws and
regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal
acts of its agents shackling government operations
and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from
official error or misbehavior. The rule holds true even
if the rectification prejudices parties who had
meanwhile received benefits. Even granting that the
persons representing the government were negligent,
the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the
Republic.
The fact that it was petitioner's own counsel that
recommended the inclusion of the inflation rate in the
determination of just compensation should not be
taken against petitioner. After all, it is ultimately the
courts' mandated duty to adjudge whether the
parties' submissions are correct. It is the courts, not
the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation
or application of the law and, thus, only the courts
may determine the rightful compensation in
accordance with the law and evidence presented by
the parties. It is incongruous for the court to uphold a
proposition merely because it was recommended by
a party, despite the same being erroneous.
EQUAL PROTECTION
GARCIA VS. DRILON
FACTS: On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia
(private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No.
06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats
of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that
left private respondent physically and emotionally
wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed
private respondent on both arms and shook her with
such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At
another time, petitioner hit private respondent
forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter,
Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on
him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her
many times. When private respondent decided to
leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay
for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat
her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father
because of his cruelty to private respondent.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to
despair causing her to attempt suicide on December
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the
hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her
when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even
told his mother-in-law that respondent should just
accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate
from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would
not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted
him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe
there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner,
among other things, to surrender all his firearms
including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262
for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus,
providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it
means violence by men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed
by women against children and other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to
deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it
because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish
spousal violence. The said remedies are
discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an
abused husband and an abused wife, the equal
protection guarantee is violated.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD: RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is
Substantially Related to the Achievement of
Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest
civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form
of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and
the Common Law Legal Code: all "assumed patriarchy
as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the
view of male superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone,
reflected the theological assumption that: husband and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 31
wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus "they were
‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was
the husband," a concept that evidently found its way
in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the
enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of
patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take on
the dominant roles both in the community and in the
family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining
more power over women – power, which must
necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence
against women is one of the ways men control
women to retain such power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave,
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men.
In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male
control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire
1600s, English common law began to limit the right
of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common
law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no
thicker than their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the
undeniable numerous cases involving violence
committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases
involving violence against women were filed under
RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked
first among the different categories of violence
committed against women. The number of reported
cases showed an increasing trend from 2004 to
2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support
based on statistics that women and children are
the most vulnerable victims of violence, and
therefore need legal intervention. On the other
hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to
anchor a conclusion that men need legal
protection from violence perpetuated by women.
Different treatment of women and men based on
biological, social, and cultural differences
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The persistent and existing biological, social, and
cultural differences between women and men prescribe
that they be treated differently under particular
conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for
women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman
as compared to a man requires the special protection of
the law, as gleaned from the following
recommendations of the CEDAWCommittee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal
start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical
to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and
culturally constructed differences between women and
men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and
men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality
also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming
under representation of women and a redistribution of
resources and power between men and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or
substantive equality. These results may be quantitative
and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying
their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with
men, enjoying the same income levels, equality in
decision-making and political influence, and women
enjoying freedom from violence.
The government’s commitment to ensure that the
status of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel
to that of a man, requires the adoption and
implementation of ameliorative measures, such as RA
9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the
violence that she endures in her private affairs will not
be ignored by the government, which is committed to
uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then
she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be
empowered.
RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the
government to actively undertake ameliorative action
that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by
years of discrimination. The equal protection clause
when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger
mandate for the government to combat such
discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is “THE” ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken
an ameliorative action that would address the evil
effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is
deeply embedded in the society’s subconscious, on
Filipino women and children and elevate their status as
human beings on the same level as the father or the
husband.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 32
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male
abuses borne of discrimination against women. It is
an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse
discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not
an exception to equality, but an expression and
attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and
substantive equality which the Filipino people
themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987
Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary
as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society
to achieve substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive
equality
In the context of women’s rights, substantive
equality has been defined by the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that
women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve
equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee
women treatment that is identical to that of men.
Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men
must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women
and men will be required in order to address such
differences.
Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved
under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be
regarded and treated as the same. But this model
does not take into account biological and socially
constructed differences between women and men.
By failing to take into account these differences, a
formal equality approach may in fact perpetuate
discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model – this recognizes differences
between women and men but considerswomen’s
weakness as the rationale for different
treatment. This approach reinforces the inferior
status of women and does not address the issue of
discrimination of women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model – this assumes that
women are "not vulnerable by nature, but suffer
from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these
imposed disadvantages were eliminated, there was
no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive
equality model gives prime importance to women’s
contexts, realities, and experiences, and the
outcomes or results of acts and measures directed,
at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the
disadvantages they experience as women.
The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does
not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality
model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does
not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
classification. The non-identical treatment of women
and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and
aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and
women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection
to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important
governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children
are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary,
to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives
the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the
constitutional provision of equal protection simply
requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the
same way. It does not connote identity of rights among
individuals, nor does it require that every person is
treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a
safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions
among persons are based on reasonable classifications
and made pursuant to a proper governmental purpose.
In short, statutory classifications are not
unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and
made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen
the family. Congress found that domestic and other
forms of violence against women and children
contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family
ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively
promote the family’s total development. Congress also
found, as a reality, that women and children are
more susceptible to domestic and other forms of
violence due to, among others, the pervasive bias and
prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles
within the family environment that traditionally exist in
Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it
necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within
the family between men, on the one hand, and women
and children, on the other hand. This recognition,
incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our
law on persons and family under the Civil Code also
recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between
men and women in the context of the family.
AQUINO VS. PPA
FACTS: The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21
August 19895 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 otherwise
known as The Salary Standardization Law.
Before the law, pursuant to LOI 90, PPA issued
Memorandum Circular No. 57-87 dated 1 October 1987
which granted to its officials holding managerial and
supervisory positions representation and transportation
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 33
allowance (RATA) equivalent to 40% of their basic
salary. Thereafter, PPA issued a Memorandum
Circular which extended the RATA entitlement to its
Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal
Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20%
of their basic pay. 2 months after, PPA made another
issuance which adjusted effective 1 January 1990,
the RATA authorized under Memorandum Circular
No. 36-89, from 20% to 40% based on the
standardized salary rate.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor,
however disallowed in audit the grant of RATA to
PPA Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units,
Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel
occupying positions with salary grades of 17 and
above who were appointed after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6758. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
COA and declared that an official to be entitled to the
continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must be an
incumbent as of 1 July 1989 (effectivity of RA 6758).
As a result of a ruling of the SC, there are at present
two categories of managers and supervisors at the
PPA. The first category is composed of PPA officials
who were occupying their positions and actually
receiving the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97 as of 1
July 1989 and who continue to receive such benefit.
The second category consists of officials who were
not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 or were appointed
or promoted to their positions only after 1 July 1989.
The second category officials therefore receive a
lesser RATA under the General Appropriations Act
although they hold the same rank, title and may have
the same responsibilities as their counterparts in the
first category.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PPA IN DENYING THE
CLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR 40% RATA HAS
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION. NO
HELD: The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not prohibit discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification
should:
1. be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences,
2. that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
4. that it must apply equally to each member
of the class.
The different treatment accorded the second
sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of RA 6758
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
to the incumbents as of 1 July 1989, on one hand, and
those employees hired on or after the said date, on the
other, with respect to the grant of non-integrated
benefits lies in the fact that the legislature intended to
gradually phase out the said benefits without, however,
upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay and
benefits.
The consequential outcome under Sections 12 and 17
is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a
higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his
predecessor’s RATA privilege or to the transition
allowance. After 1 July 1989, the additional financial
incentives such as RATA may no longer be given by the
GOCCs with the exemption of those which were
authorized to be continued under Section 12 of RA
6758.
Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not infringe the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as it is based
on reasonable classification intended to protect the
rights of the incumbents against diminution of their pay
and benefits.
We conclude this case with the words borrowed from
former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban:
During these tough economic times, this Court
understands, and in fact sympathizes with, the plight of
ordinary government employees. Whenever legally
possible, it has bent over backwards to protect labor
and favor it with additional economic advantages. In the
present case, however, the Salary Standardization Law
clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue
to be granted only to employees who were
"incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. Hence, much to its
regret, the Court has no authority to reinvent or modify
the law to extend those benefits even to employees
hired after that date.
NATIONAL ARTIST VS. EX. SEC.
FACTS:
 The National Artists Awards Committee (NAAC) and
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA) decided to team up and jointly administer
the National Artists Award.
 After four deliberations of NAAC and NCCA, they
came up with the final four nominations. (Conde,
Santos, Francisco and Aguilar-Alcuaz)
 They submitted this recommendation to the
President.
 However, some names who were not included in the
“nominations” were declared as “national artists” of
the Philippines.
 The petitioners in this case questioned such
declaration and alleged that foremer President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening
and selection process for the Order of National
Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of
the Deliberation Panels.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 34
ISSUE: WON the act of President GMA amounted to
grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation
of the right to equal protection.
HELD: Yes. There was a special treatment for
some individuals who were declared as national
artists.
It should be recalled that respondent Guidote-Alvarez
was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to
the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was
not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of
them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails
to pass rational scrutiny.60 No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad
has been shown that would justify deviating from the
laws, guidelines and established procedures, and
placing respondents in an exceptional position.
The undue classification was not germane to the
purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law
and well-established guidelines, rules and
regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While
petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order
of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal
opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the
foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s
right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES VS. PRBofRES
FACTS: R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the
"Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real
estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate
service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers,
assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the
country.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the
PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series
of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted
Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare
as void and unconstitutional the following provisions
of R.A. No. 9646:
“SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts
Constituting the Practice of Real Estate
Service. – The provisions of this Act and its
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
rules and regulations SHALL NOT APPLY to
the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall
directly perform by himself/herself the acts
mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference
to his/her or its own property, EXCEPT REAL
ESTATE DEVELOPERS;”
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage
natural and juridical persons dealing with their own
property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees
or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings.
However, real estate developers are specifically
mentioned as an exception from those enumerated
therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the
equal protection clause because it unjustifiably treats
real estate developers differently from those exempted
persons who also own properties and desire to sell
them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist
between ordinary property owners and real estate
developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of
entering into real estate transactions and do not need
the services of licensed real estate brokers.1âwphi1
ISSUE: Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate
developers differently from other natural or juridical
persons who directly perform acts of real estate service
with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause?
HELD: No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the particular legislation.26 If classification is germane
to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the
class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal
protection guarantee.27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized
government support for the development of "a corps of
highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined
real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of
internationally accepted standards and practice of the
profession."28 Real estate developers at present
constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest
number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and
consultants due to the sheer number of products (lots,
houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell
nationwide. As early as in the ‘70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers
who have reneged on their representation and
obligations to comply with government regulations such
as the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads,
drainage, sewerage, water system and other basic
requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot
buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations
perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was
issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate
development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No.
9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity
of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real
estate service practitioners, including and more
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 35
importantly, those real estate service practitioners
working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals
or entities having isolated transactions over their own
property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business,
a business which is highly regulated by the State to
ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do
exist between ordinary property owners exempted
under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like
petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A.
No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is
valid and constitutional.
DISINI VS. SOJ
FACTS:
 Petitioners assail the validity of several provision
of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012.
 Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
ISSUE: (on equal protection clause) Is Section
4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, valid and constitutional?
HELD:(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of
domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others
from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to
an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time
of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the
name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual
property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or
cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will
cause a user using his real name to suffer the same
fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
For example, supposing there exists a well-known
billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the
law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person
who registers such name because he claims it to be
his pseudo-name and another who registers the
name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial
distinction between the two, the law should recognize
the difference.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio
Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it
as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he
uses the name that the law condemns. The law is
reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to
the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of
denial of equal protection is baseless.
SAMEER OVERSEAS VS..CABILES
FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C.
Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control
job in Taiwan.
Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to
sign a one year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee
of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment
contract.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on
July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport." She was
asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover
her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement
fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment
of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and
exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with
the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer].
ISSUE: WON the respondent was dismissed from
employment without due process of law? YES
HELD: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to
show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord
her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose
productivity and quality standards at work. They may
also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 36
employees comply with these standards. Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient
in her work and negligent in her duties may, therefore,
constitute a just cause for termination under Article
282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it. The
burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that
the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." Failure to
show that there was valid or just cause for
termination would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in
work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer
has set standards of conduct and workmanship
against which the employee will be judged; 2) the
standards of conduct and workmanship must have
been communicated to the employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior
to the employee’s performance assessment.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that
respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in
her work. No evidence was shown to support such
allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify
what requirements were not met, what efficiency
standards were violated, or what particular acts of
respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was
sufficiently informed of the standards against which
her work efficiency and performance were judged.
The parties’ conflict as to the position held by
respondent showed that even the matter as basic as
the job title was not clear. The bare allegations of
petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that
there is just cause for termination. There is no proof
that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with the due process
requirements.
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from
hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not
only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the
requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employers
did not comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The
employer is required to give the charged employee at
least two written notices before termination. One of
the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.
The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the
employer’s decision." Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given "an
opportunity to be heard."
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and
hearing requirements. Respondent started working
on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was
terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same
day and barely a month from her first workday. She
was also repatriated on the same day that she was
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018

informed of her termination. The abruptness of the HELD: YES.To insist that the ECC validly interpreted
termination negated any finding that she was properly the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under
constitutional right to due process of law was violated. the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents
of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under
BARTOLOME VS. SSS Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD
626. SC held that such postulation cannot be
FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by
countenanced.
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel
Maersk Danville. As such, he was enrolled under the As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply
government's Employees' Compensation Program requires that all persons or things similarly situated
(ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred on board should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
to his untimely death the following day. bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the
John was, at the time of his death, childless and
concept of equal justice under the law requires the
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
state to govern impartially, and it may not
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
drawdistinctions between individuals solely on
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San
governmental objective.
Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union
office denied the claim. The concept of equal protection, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to all
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch
persons or things without distinction. What it simply
and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to
requires is equality among equals as determined
the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
protection clause permits classification. Such
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather,
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio).
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio
It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were
differences do not make for a valid classification."
proven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the
ECC ratiocinated: In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable
basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents.
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626 [Labor Code], as
Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the
amended, provides that beneficiaries are the
ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate
"dependent spouse until he remarries and
parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness
dependent children, who are the primary
since the classification is not germane to the law
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
being implemented. The Court sees no pressing
parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
government concern or interest that requires
dependent children, the illegitimate children and
protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of
legitimate descendants who are the secondary
unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as
can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD
a primary beneficiary when there are no other
626 – that employees and their dependents may
dependent children who are qualified and eligible
promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of
for monthly income benefit."
work-connected disability or death - will be better
The dependent parent referred to by the above served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so
provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered narrowly interpreted.
member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of
There being no justification for limiting secondary
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can
ECC believes that the appellant is not considered a
be no other course of action to take other than to
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the
strike down as unconstitutional the phrase
latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in
"illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1)
effect, the adoption divested her of the status as the
of the Amended Rules on Employees’
legitimate parent of the deceased.
Compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the
The Decision of the ECC is bereft of legal basis.
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
contravention of the equal protection clause.
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 37

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the
death benefits under the Employees' Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's
sole remaining beneficiary.
FERRER, JR. VS. BAUTISTA
FACTS: The City of Quezon passed two ordinances
namely.
The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC
allowing the imposition of special assessment (1/2 of
the assessed valued of land in excess of P100k)
The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013
on Garbage Collection Fees imposing fees depending
on the amount of the land or floor area).
Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned
the validity of the city ordinances.
According to Ferrer:
The city has no power to impose the tax.
The SHT violates the rule on equality because it
burdens real property owners with expenses to provide
funds for the housing of informal settlers.
The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
Also, he assails the validity of the garbage fees
imposition because:
 It violates the rule on double taxation.
 It violates the rule on equality because the fees
are collected from only domestic households and
not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains,
and other commercial dining places that spew
garbage much more than residential property
owners.
ISSUE: WON the ordinances were valid.
HELD:
1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon
City is valid.
Cities have the power to tax
It must be noted that local government units such as
cities has the power to tax. The collection for the
socialized housing tax is valid. It must be noted that the
collections were made to accrue to the socialized
housing programs and projects of the city.
The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of
power of taxation + police power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to
tax (primary) and police power (incidental). Removing
slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an
orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance
the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 38
constituents and better consumers of business
products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality
Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real
property owner and an informal settler. In fact, the
Supreme Court said that the disparity is so obvious. It
is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to
select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation
or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance
based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of
the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory
The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax
rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA
(Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on
properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers
properties with an assessed value exceeding
P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a
tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special
assessment paid by the property owner beginning in
the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is
invalid.
Note: There was no violation of double taxation
but there was a violation of the rule on equity.
There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage
fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon
City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental,
the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the
imposition a tax."
Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage
fee is tantamount to double taxation because
garbage collection is a basic and essential public
service that should be paid out from property tax,
business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of
the Quezon City Government. All these are valid
taxes. The garbage fees are license fees
Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the
objectionable or prohibited sense the same property
must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once;
both taxes must be imposed on the same property or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
subject-matter, for the same purpose, by the same
State, Government, or taxing authority, within the same
jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same taxing
period, and they must be the same kind or character of
tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no
substantial distinction
There is no substantial distinction between an occupant
of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment,
on the other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of
occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large
degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.
The garbage fees or rates are unjust and
inequitable
A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or
socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount
than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit
occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq.
m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and
the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless
of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a
socialized housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose
of the ordinance
The declared purpose is: "promoting shared
responsibility with the residents to attack their common
mindless attitude in over-consuming the present
resources and in generating waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land
or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium,
socialized housing project or apartment, respondent
City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the
appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include,
among others, household age and size, accessibility to
waste collection, population density of the barangay or
district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the
property.
SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is
upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an
annual garbage fee on all domestic households in
Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS
WORLDWIDE WEB VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of
the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed
applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of
petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located
at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 39
City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office
premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation
(Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient
Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or
Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water
or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage
and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT).
The warrants were implemented on the same day by
RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region
Police Office. Over a hundred items were seized,19
including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10
monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files,
and a laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes that
even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and
broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet
Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without probable
cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute
theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a
crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants;
and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were
"fruits of the poisonous tree."
HELD:
Is an application for a search warrant a criminal
action?
The Supreme Court held that an application for a
search warrant is not a criminal action.
As held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
104879, 6 May 1994, 232 SCRA 249), an application
for a search warrant is a “special criminal process,”
rather than a criminal action.
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search
warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a
writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of
a public necessity.
Is the conformity of the public prosecutor necessary
to question an order quashing search warrants?
NO. The Court has consistently recognized the right
of parties to question orders quashing those warrants.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Accordingly, the Court sustained the CA’s ruling that
the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary
before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of
an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
May an order quashing a search warrant be the proper
subject of an appeal?
It depends. Where the search warrant is issued as an
incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a
search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still
“something more to be done in the said criminal case,
i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein.”
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and
issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed,
the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial
process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
In this case, the applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents
to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants
issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there
was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the
quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken
therefrom.
What is a general warrant?
It is defined as “a search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property
to be seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which
items to take.
State the rule in describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized in a search warrant.
The search warrant must satisfy the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be seized
A search warrant need not describe the items to be
seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid
when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity
in the description of the things to be seized when the
things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.
In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection
between the items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services
and business. Prior to the application for the search
warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm
that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or
switching equipment, and support equipment such as
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 40
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations.”
OCAMPO VS. ABANDO
FACTS: Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that,
had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the
records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge
would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that
Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in
the record that were used as bases for his finding of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
The determination of probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed
to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial
judge.
ISSUE:Whether or not there is probable cause for
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused
is a question of fact based on the allegations in the
Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.
HELD: Here, the allegations of petitioners point to
factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the
contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the
issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above,
the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and
conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered
with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Again, "he sufficiently complies with the requirement
of personal determination if he reviews the
[I]nformation and the documents attached thereto,
and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he
is being charged."
PEOPLE VS. ROM
FACTS: Two weeks prior to 31 August 2000, the
VCS-CCPO received confidential information from
their informant that alias Dodong, who turned out
later to be the appellant, whose real name is Vicente
Rom, was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu and
also maintained a drug den at his residence in
Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City. Thus, the
VCS-CCPO, particularly PO2 Martinez, conducted
surveillance and monitoring operation.
On 31 August 2000, at around 10:15 p.m., P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez, Chief of VCS-CCPO, formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant.
The buy-bust team was composed of PO2 Martinez
(poseur-buyer), Senior Police Officer 1 Jesus Elmer
Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez), PO3 Yanson, PO3
BenicerTamboboy (PO3 Tamboboy), PO3 Jaime
Otadoy (PO3 Otadoy) and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez (team
leader). Being the designated poseur-buyer, PO2
Martinez was provided with a ₱100.00 peso bill and a
₱10.00 peso bill buy-bust money bearing Serial Nos.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
AD336230 and AM740786, respectively, and both were
marked with the initials of PO2 Martinez, i.e. "MM." The
former amount would be used to buy shabu while the
latter amount would serve as payment for the use of the
drug den.
After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
target area and upon arrival there at around 10:20 p.m.,
PO2 Martinez proceeded directly to the appellant’s
house, which was earlier pointed to by their informant,
who was also with them during the buy-bust operation.
The rest of the buy-bust team strategically positioned
themselves nearby. Once PO2 Martinez reached the
appellant’s house, he knocked on the door, which the
appellant opened. PO2 Martinez subsequently told the
appellant that he wanted to buy shabu worth ₱100.00.
The appellant looked around to check if PO2 Martinez
had a companion. Seeing none, the appellant took out
his wallet from his pocket and got one heat-sealed
plastic packet containing white crystalline substance,
later confirmed to be shabu, and gave it to PO2
Martinez. The latter, in turn, gave the ₱100.00 peso bill
marked money to the appellant. While this sale
transaction was going on, PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez were only five to eight meters away from PO2
Martinez and the appellant. P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez clearly
witnessed the sale transaction as it happened right
outside the door of the appellant’s house.
Afterwards, PO2 Martinez told the appellant that he
wanted to sniff the shabu, so the latter required the
former to pay an additional amount of ₱10.00 as rental
fee for the use of his place. After paying the said
amount, the appellant allowed PO2 Martinez to enter
his house. Once inside the house, PO2 Martinez was
directed by the appellant to proceed to the room located
at the right side of the sala. Upon entering the said
room, PO2 Martinez saw three persons, later identified
to be Jose Delloso (Delloso), Danilo Empuerto
(Empuerto) and Arnie Ogong (Ogong), already sniffing
shabu.
Thereupon, PO2 Martinez made a missed call to P/Sr.
Insp. Sanchez, which was their pre-arranged signal, to
signify that the whole transaction was consummated.
After the lapsed of about 10 to 15 seconds, the rest of
the team, who were just few meters away from the
appellant’s house, barged in and identified themselves
as police officers. PO2 Martinez then told PO3 Yanson
to hold the appellant. PO3 Yanson grabbed the
appellant and made a body search on the latter that
led to the recovery of four heat-sealed transparent
plastic packets containing white crystalline
substance, which were inside the appellant’s brown
wallet that was tucked in his pocket; the buy-bust
money consisting of ₱100.00 peso bill and ₱10.00
peso bill; and ₱280.00 consisting of two ₱100.00
peso bills, one ₱50.00 peso bill and three ₱10.00
peso bills believed to be the proceeds of the
appellant’s illegal activities. The one heat-sealed
plastic packet of shabu bought by PO2 Martinez from
the appellant remained in the possession of the former.
The appellant, Delloso, Empuerto and Ogong were
informed of their constitutional rights and were later
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 41
brought by the buy-bust team to their office, together
with the confiscated items, for documentation. At the
office of the buy-bust team, the confiscated items
were given to their investigator, SPO1 Fernandez,
who marked the one heat-sealed plastic packet
containing white crystalline substance, which was the
subject of the sale transaction, with
VRR-8-31-2000-01 (buy-bust) while the other four
heat-sealed plastic packets containing white
crystalline substance, which were recovered from the
appellant, were similarly marked with
VRR-8-31-2000-02 to VRR-8-31-2000-05. The
"VRR" in the markings are the initials of the appellant,
i.e., Vicente Ramonida Rom.
Thereafter, all the five heat-sealed plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance, together with
the Request for Laboratory Examination, were
brought by PO3 Yanson to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis,
which examination yielded positive results for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," as evidenced by Chemistry Report No.
D-1782-2000.
ISSUE: Are the pieces of evidence admissible in
evidence?
HELD: No.There is also no truth on the appellant’s
claim that the entry in the house was illegal making
the search and the seizure in connection thereto
invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence obtained by
the police officers inadmissible for being the "fruit of a
poisonous tree."
This Court in Dimacuha v. People clearly states:
The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose. To give full protection to it, the Bill of
Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that
any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In People v. Chua Ho Sanwe pointed out that the
interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute and that warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in the following
instances: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure
in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of
Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to
wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in
hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto
while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual
possession of another 10.78 grams of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of
an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the
basis of information received from Benito Marcelo
regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's
arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent
seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of
her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the
prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any property found upon his
person in order to find and seize things connected with
the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore,
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
To repeat, the appellant, in this case, was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was
lawfully arrested. Following Dimacuha, the
subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic
packets of shabu in the appellant’s wallet that was
tucked in his pocket was justified and admissible in
evidence for being the fruit of the crime.
With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the
prosecution had likewise proved beyond a shadow of
reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the
offense of illegal possession of shabu in violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended
PLDT VS. ALVAREZ
FACTS:PLDT's network is principally composed of the
Public Switch Telephone Network, telephone handsets
and/or telecommunications equipment used by its
subscribers, the wires and cables linking these
handsets and/or equipment, antennae, transmission
facilities, the international gateway facility (IGF) and
other telecommunications equipment providing
interconnections. To safeguard the integrity of its
network, PLDT regularly conducts investigations on
various prepaid cards marketed and sold abroad to
determine alternative calling patterns (ACP) and
network fraud that are being perpetrated against it.
During a test call placed at the PLDT-ACPDD office, the
receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone number
(2-8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call
was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila.
Upon verification with the PLDT's Integrated Customer
Management (billing) System, the ACPDD learned that
the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is
Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic
Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco,
Parañaque City. It further learned that several lines are
installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R.
Razo, among others, as subscribers.
Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDT's Quality Control
Division conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic
Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision - both in Barangay Don Bosco,
Paranaque City - and discovered that PLDT telephone
lines were connected to several pieces of equipment.
Police Superintendent Gilbert C. Cruz filed a
consolidated application for a search warrant before
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 42
Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of the RTC, for the
crimes of theft and violation of PD No. 401. According
to PLDT, the respondents are engaged in a form of
network fraud known as International Simple Resale
(ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC.
Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants applied for.
Accordingly, four search warrants were issued:
1.) for violations of Article 308, in relation to Article
309, of the RPC (SW A-1 and SW A-2) of PD No.
401, as amended
2.) (SW B-1 and SW B-2) for the ISR activities being
conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound
and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision,
both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City.
The four search warrants enumerated the objects to
be searched and seized as follows:
1. MERIDIAN SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL
LINES and/or CABLES AND ANTENNAS and/or
similar equipment or device capable of transmitting
air waves or frequency, such as a Meridian
Subscriber's Unit, Broadband DSL and telephone
lines;
2. PERSONAL COMPUTERS or any similar
equipment or device capable of accepting
information applying the prescribed process of the
information and supplying the result of this process;
3. NOKIA MODEM or any similar equipment or
device that enables data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with other data terminal
equipment via a telephone line;
4. QUINTUM Equipment or any similar equipment
capable of receiving digital signals from the internet
and converting those signals to voice;
5. QUINTUM, 3COM AND CISCO Routers or any
similar equipment capable of switching packets of
data to their assigned destination or addresses;
6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment
capable of switching data;
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any
similar equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing
and using telephone lines and/or equipment[.]
PNP searched the premises indicated in the warrants.
On December 10, 2003, a return was made with a
complete inventory of the items seized. On January
14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP filed with the
Department of Justice a joint complaint-affidavit for
theft and for violation of PD No. 401 against the
respondents. Respondents filed with the RTC a
motion to quash the search warrants essentially on
the grounds that there was no probable cause for the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
crime of theft and that the enumeration of the items to
be searched and seized lacked particularity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search warrants should be
quashed on the ground of lack of probable cause? NO
2. Whether SW B-l and SWB-2 should be quashed on
the ground of lack of particularity? YES
HELD: We partially grant the petition. MODIFIED in
that SW A-l and SW A-2 are hereby declared valid and
constitutional.
1. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 2. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of
a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in
connection with one specific offense. In search warrant
proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. The court must necessarily determine
whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or
quashal of the search warrant because the personal
properties that may be subject of the search warrant
are very much intertwined with the "one specific
offense" requirement of probable cause.
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA (involving copyright
infringement), the CA voided the search warrant issued
by the trial court by applying a doctrine that added a
new requirement (i.e., the production of the master tape
for comparison with the allegedly pirate copies) in
determining the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of search warrant in copyright infringement
cases. The doctrine referred to was laid down
in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of
Appeals. 20th Century Fox, however, was promulgated
more than eight months after the search warrants were
issued by the RTC. In reversing the CA, the Court ruled
that the 20thCentury Fox ruling cannot be retroactively
applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 87-053. There was satisfactory
compliance with the then prevailing standards under
the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed
well taken. The lower court could not possibly have
expected more evidence from petitioners in their
application for a search warrant other than what the law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 43
and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially
accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
Columbia could easily be cited in favor of PLDT to
sustain the RTC's refusal to quash the search
warrant. The issue of whether telephone services or
the business of providing these services could be the
subject of theft under the RPC had not yet reached
the Court when the search warrants were applied for
and issued. Supervening facts may transpire after the
issuance and implementation of the search warrant
that may provide justification for the quashal of the
search warrant via a petition for certiorari. If the
offense for which the warrant is issued is
subsequently decriminalized during the pendency of
the petition for certiorari, then the warrant may be
quashed. For another, a subsequent ruling from the
Court that a similar set of facts and circumstances
does not constitute an offense, as alleged in the
search warrant application, may be used as a ground
to quash a warrant.
The Court granted PLDT's motion for reconsideration
of the Court First Division's ruling in Laurel and ruled
that "the act of engaging in ISR is xxx penalized
under xxx article [308 of the RPC]." As the RTC itself
found, PLDT successfully established in its
application for a search warrant a probable cause for
theft by evidence that Laurel's ISR activities deprived
PLDT of its telephone services and of its business of
providing these services without its consent. With the
Court En Banc's reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling,
then the CA's quashal of these warrants would have
no leg to stand on.
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire
the status of a "decided" case that is
"deemed settled and closed to further argument" if
the Court's decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party.
In applying Laurel despite PLDT's statement that the
case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration, the CA legally erred in refusing to
reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a
non-formal ruling of the Court. While the CA's dutiful
desire to apply the latest pronouncement of the Court
in Laurel is expected, it should have acted with
caution, instead of excitement, on being informed
by PLDT of its pending motion for
reconsideration.
In the present case, the issue is whether the
commission of an ISR activity, in the manner that
PLDT's evidence shows, sufficiently establishes
probable cause for the issuance of search
warrants for the crime of theft. Since the Court,
in Laurel, ultimately ruled then an ISR activity justifies
the elements of theft that must necessarily be alleged
in the information a fortiori, the RTC's determination
should be sustained on certiorari.
2. The requirement of particularity in SWB-1 and
SWB-2
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Aside from the requirement of probable cause, the
Constitution also requires that the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. This requirement of particularity in
the description, especially of the things to be seized, is
meant to enable the law enforcers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and, thus, prevent the seizure of
the wrong items. It seeks to leave the law enforcers with
no discretion at all regarding these articles and
preventing the law enforcer from exercising unlimited
discretion as to what things are to be taken under the
warrant and ensure that only those connected with the
offense for which the warrant was issued shall be
seized.
The requirement of specificity, however, does not
require technical accuracy in the description of the
property to be seized. One of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized
under a search warrant is when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Additionally, the Rules require that a search warrant
should be issued "in connection with one specific
offense" to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot
warrant. The one-specific-offense requirement
reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable
cause. Under the Rules, the following personal property
may be subject of search warrant: (i) the subject of the
offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
In the present case, we sustain the CA's ruling nullifying
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW B-l and SW B-2 for failing
the test of particularity. More specifically, these
provisions do not show how the enumerated items
could have possibly been connected with the crime for
which the warrant was issued, i.e., P.D. No. 401. For
clarity, PD No. 401 punishes any person
who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority
fromxxx the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, xxx,
Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW B-l and SW B-2 read as
follows:
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any
similar equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using
telephone lines and/or equipment.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 44
According to PLDT, the items in paragraph 7 have a
direct relation to violation of PD No. 401 because
these items are "fruits of the offense" and that the
information it contains "constitutes the business
profit" of PLDT. We disagree with PLDT. The fact that
the printers and scanners are or may be connected to
the other illegal connections to the PLDT telephone
lines does not make them the subject of the offense
or fruits of the offense, much less could they become
a means of committing an offense. It is clear from
PLDT's submission that it confuses the crime for
which SW B-l and SW B-2 were issued with the
crime for which SW A-l and SWA-2 were issued: SW
B-l and SW B-2 were issued for violation of PD No.
401, to be enforced in two different places as
identified in the warrants. The crime for which these
search warrants were issued does not pertain to the
crime of theft - where matters of personal property
and the taking thereof with intent to gain become
significant - but to PD No. 401.
These items could not be the subject of a violation of
PD No. 401 since PLDT itself does not claim that
these items themselves comprise the unauthorized
installations. For emphasis, what PD No. 401
punishes is the unauthorized installation of telephone
connection without the previous consent of PLDT. In
the present case, PLDT has not shown that
connecting printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to a
computer, even if connected to a PLDT telephone
line, would or should require its prior authorization.
Neither could these items be a means of committing
a violation of PD No. 401 since these copying,
printing and storage devices in no way aided the
respondents in making the unauthorized
connections.
LAUD VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National
Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent
Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the
Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao
City, where the alleged remains of the victims
summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death
Squad" may be found. In support of the application, a
certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to
the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December
2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried
the victims.
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta),
acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC,
found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 which was later enforced by the
elements ofthe PNP-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, in coordination withthe members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15,
2009.The search of the Laud Compound caves
yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4
Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence
premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta
had no authority to act on the application for a search
warrant since he had been automatically divested of his
position as Vice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by
the Court; (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to
issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407which was to be
enforced in Davao City; (c) the human remains sought
to be seized are not a proper subject of a search
warrant; (d) the police officers are mandated to follow
the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human
remains; (e) the search warrant was issued despite lack
of probable cause; (f) the rule against forum shopping
was violated; and (g) there was a violation of the rule
requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the
articles to be seized.
ISSUES: The issues for the Court’s resolution are as
follows: (b) whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the
compelling reasons requirement under Section 2,
Rule126 of the Rules of Court; (c) whether the
requirements of probable cause and particular
description were complied with and the
one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court was violated.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search
Warrant No. 09- 14407; Exception to the Compelling
Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states
the requirements for the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manilaand
Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to
those "involving heinous crimes, illegalgambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein
by the Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for
such cases may befiled by "the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP)
and the AntiCrime Task Force (ACTAF)," and
"personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies."
As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these
RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the
Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such
applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 45
The Court observes that all the above-stated
requirements were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the
PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus
Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous
crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor,
Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive
Judge, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which,
as the rules state, may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application
involves a "special criminal case" excludes it from the
compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant
shall be filed. — An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application,
any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime isknown, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed,
the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant
applications before the Manila and Quezon City
RTCs for the above-mentioned special criminal
cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a
search warrant is being applied for in connection with
a special criminal case as above-classified already
presumes the existence of a compelling reason;
hence, any statement to this effect would be
superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with.
By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
to issue warrants to be servedin places outside their
territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters
under the said section have been complied with, as in
this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds
nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the
RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements
for the Issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 and the One-SpecificOffense Rule
Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
In order to protect the people’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) provides that no search warrant shall
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
issue except upon probable causeto be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued
except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offenseto be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident
from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims.
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from
the testimony of Avasola, who was personally
examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more
likely than not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons
had been perpetrated and that the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be
searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., the Court
explained the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish probable cause for a search warrant, as
follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only
torest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by
the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. However, the findings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor
run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 46
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the
quantum of proof to establish the existence of
probable cause had been met. That a "considerable
length of time" attended the search warrant’s
application from the crime’s commission does not, by
and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s
claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
the CA correctly observed, the delay may be
accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and
natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case.
The Court similarly concludes that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement that
there be a particular description of "the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement."
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies
with the foregoing standard since it particularly
describes the place to be searched, namely, the
three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in
Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City:
You are hereby commanded to makean immediate
search at any time [of] the day of the premises above
describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves (as
sketched) inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3,
Brgy. Ma-a, Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take
possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were
killed and buried in the just said premises.
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search
warrant even made explicit reference to the sketch
contained in the application. These, in the Court’s
view, are sufficient enough for the officers to, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to
be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly
described, namely, the remains of six (6) victims who
were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises.
Laud’s posturing that human remains are not
"personal property" and, hence, could not be the
subject of a search warrant deserves scant
consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. – A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits
of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. "Personal property" in the
foregoing context actually refers to the thing’s
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or
alienated by a particular person. Article416 of the Civil
Code, which Laud himself cites, states that in general,
all things which can be transported from place to place
are deemed to be personal property. Considering that
human remains can generally be transported from
place to place, and considering further that they qualify
under the phrase "subject of the offense" given that
they prove the crime’s corpus delicti, it follows that they
may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the
above-cited criminal procedure provision. Neither does
the Court agree with Laud’s contention that the term
"human remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert
the particular description requirement. Asthe Court
sees it, the description points to no other than the things
that bear a direct relation to the offense committed, i.e.,
of Murder. It is also perceived that the description is
already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily
allow given that the buried bodies would have naturally
decomposed over time.
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular
description requirement – both as to the place to be
searched and the things to be seized – had been
complied with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the
one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was
intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot
warrants, or those which are issued for more than one
specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot
warrants was discussed in the case of People v. CA as
follows: There is no question that the search warrant
did not relate to a specific offense, in violation of the
doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of
Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as
follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.— A
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in
the search warrant and has merely said that there was
probable cause, omitting to continue that it was in
connection withone specific offense. He could not, of
course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that
could refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, "to robbery,
theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the
search warrantwas totally null and void and was
correctly declared to be so by the very judge who had
issued it.
Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court
affirms the CA Ruling which upheld the validity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
PEOPLE VS. BREIS
FACTS: An informant went to the PDEA-CAR field
office at Melvin Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 47
offered the information that the accused were bound
to transport a box of marijuana from Baguio City to
Pampanga. Mangili referred the informant to Senior
PDEJA Officer Tacio for further interview and then
the matter was referred to the PDEA
Officer-in-Charge Edgar Apalla, who after careful
evaluation, ordered Agent Tacio to form a team for
the entrapment of the accused. Due to time
constraints, the PDEA team chose not to secure any
warrant nor coordinate with the nearest police
station.
Thus, pretending to be passengers, Mangili and
Peralta boarded the bus and they observed two male
individuals whose physical appearances fitted the
descriptions given by the informant. Both agents
likewise saw a box placed in between the legs of
accused Breis.
After introducing themselves as PDEA agents,
Mangili asked the accused Breis to open the box but
Breis ignored the request which made Mangili lift and
open the box. He took one brick and discovered it
was marijuana. The "Ginebra San Miguel" box
yielded three more bricks of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid Search and
seizure and arrest
HELD:YES. It is imperative that we rule on the
validity of the warrantless search and seizure and the
subsequent warrantless arrest of appellants.
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure
can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. No less than the
Constitution guarantees this right -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.40
Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.41 However, the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as
the search of moving vehicles. In People v. Libnao,
the Court held:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to
visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
and subjected to an extensive search, such
would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e.,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains a[n]
item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.44 The determination of probable cause must
be resolved according to the facts of each
case.45redarclawThe Court has ruled in several
dangerous drug cases4 that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search.
In People v. Mariacos the police received at dawn
information that a baggage of marijuna was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion.
There, the informant described the bag containing the
prohibited drugs. The Court held that the police had
probable cause to search the packages allegedly
containing illegal drugs.
In the present case, the vehicle that carried the
prohibited drugs was about to leave. The PDEA agents
made a judgment call to act fast, as time was of the
essence. The team arrived at the terminal around 15
minutes49 before the bus was scheduled to depart.
Upon boarding the bus, IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta
identified two men fitting the description given by the
informant in possession of a box described50 by the
informant to contain marijuana.
Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion
based on appellants' behavior that the latter were
probably committing a crime. IO1 Mangili casually
asked appellant Yumol who owned the box at their
(appellants') feet. After answering that it belonged to
them (appellants), Yumol suddenly stood up and tried
to leave. IO1 Peralta prevented him from getting off the
bus. Then IO1 Mangili asked appellant Breis what was
contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis
shoved IO1 Mangili and tried to flee. It must be noted
that IO1 Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent
before either appellant tried to leave the bus.
appellants were attempting to get out of a bus that was
about to leave the terminal, and not one that had just
arrived, where the other passengers were, as can be
expected, seated in preparation for departure. It is
unnatural for passengers to abruptly disembark from a
departing bus, leaving their belongings behind. Any
reasonable observer would be put on suspicion that
such persons are probably up to no good. To a trained
law enforcement agent, it signaled the probability that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 48
appellants were committing an offense and that the
objects left behind might be contraband or even
dangerous articles.
Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants
were not simply passengers carrying a box in a bus.
They engaged in suspicious behavior when they tried
to flee after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box
and identified himself as a PDEA agent. Worse, in his
attempt at flight, Breis pushed IO1 Mangili, already
knowing that the latter was a PDEA agent. This
brazen act on the part of Breis only cemented the
belief that appellants were likely hiding a wrongdoing
and avoiding capture by law enforcers.
A further point. Appellants each attempted to alight
from a departing bus, leaving behind their belongings.
They may be deemed to have abandoned the box in
their flight. A thing is considered abandoned and
possession thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the
hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi
(the intention of returning) is finally given up.65 That
appellants got up to leave a departing bus without
bringing their box points to the absence of both spes
recuperandi and animus revertendi. Indeed, although
their flight was thwarted by the PDEA agents, both
appellants intended to leave the box behind without
returning for it. Abandonment has the effect of
converting a thing into res nullius.66redarclaw
In the United States, abandoned articles, such as
those thrown away, are considered bona vacantia,
and may be lawfully searched and seized by law
enforcement authorities.
Applied analogously, there is no objectionable
warrantless search and seizure of the box of
marijuana abandoned in the bus by appellants.
Given the above discussion, it is readily apparent that
the search in this case is valid.
Having been found with prohibited drugs in their
possession, appellants were clearly committing a
criminal offense in the presence of IO1 Mangili and
IO1 Peralta. The subsequent warrantless arrest falls
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
Hence, the warrantless arrest of appellants is lawful.
OGAYON VS.PEOPLE
FACTS: Based on a search warrant, several
policemen went to Ogayon’s residence. The
policemen saw five people inside a nipa hut and
restrained them as well as serving the search warrant.
Ogayon, being the owner of the residence, was also
arrested. Ogayon’s contention were as follows: (a)
search warrant was defective because "there was no
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in
which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the
required searching questions and answers in order to
determine the existence of probable cause". (b) even if
he questioned the validity upon search warrant only
upon appeal, such should not be interpreted as a
waiver of his rights because appeals opens the case
anew and
ISSUE1: Is the failure to attach stenographic notes
to the search warrant fatal? Held: No. Warrant may
still be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the
requisite examination was made and probable cause
was based thereon. We find that the failure to attach to
the records the depositions of the complainant and his
witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s
examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by
itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the
right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements,
however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.
ISSUE 2: Was the requirement of examination and
probable cause present in this case? Held: No.
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself,
we find nothing in the records of this case indicating
that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses. The
absence of depositions and transcripts of the
examination was already admitted; the application for
the search warrant and the affidavits, although
acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found
in the records. The records, therefore, bear no evidence
from which we can infer that the requisite examination
was made, and from which the factual basis for
probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the
constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise,
it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that
the search warrant was issued after the requisite
examination of the complainant and his witnesses was
made, the Court declares the Search Warrant a nullity.
ISSUE 3: Since the validity of the search warrant
was questioned only on appeal, should that be
construed as a waiver? Held: No. We reiterate that
the requirement to raise objections against search
warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by
jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this
requirement cannot in any way diminish the
constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should
be issued upon a finding of probable cause. Ogayon’s
failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure
the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity
of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. POSADA
FACTS: In its judgment, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu.
The RTC held, among others, that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of illegal possession of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 49
dangerous drugs. It found the search warrant, which
led to the immediate arrest of accused-appellants,
valid and the chain of custody of the seized items
preserved. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced
accused-appellants to suffer imprisonment and pay
fines.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with
the modification as to penalty. The CA added that
any question on the validity of the search warrant
was closed in a September 21, 2006 Resolution, in
which the RTC denied accused-appellants’ Motion to
Quash Search Warrant. The CA further ruled that the
certification signed by accused-appellant Jocelyn
was not a confession but an acknowledgment of the
fact that the police had conducted a search of their
premises by virtue of the search warrant; that the
search was conducted in an orderly manner; and that
the search was conducted in her presence and in the
presence of Kagawad Arcilla.
On October 27, 2010, the accused-appellants filed
their notice of appeal following the September 30,
2010 Decision on the ground that it was contrary to
facts, law, and applicable jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
YES
HELD: The Office of the Solicitor General correctly
argued that any question as to the validity of the
search warrant was closed by the September 21,
2006 Resolution of the RTC, which the
accused-appellants opted not to question further. As
mentioned by the CA, the judicial finding of probable
cause in issuing a search warrant should not be
doubted when the judge personally examines the
applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to
doubt his reliability and competence in evaluating the
evidence before him.
With regard to the designation of the place to be
searched, the RTC sufficiently justified that the
search warrant particularly described the place to be
searched: a sketch showing the location of the house
to be searched was attached to the application and
the search warrant pointed to only one house in the
area.
A long-standing rule is that a description of the place
to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the
place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.
Taking from American Jurisprudence, “[t]he
determining factor as to whether a search warrant
describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity is not whether the description is sufficient
to enable the officer to locate and identify the
premises with reasonable effort.”
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged for violation
of Sec 11 of RA 9165. Liwanag Sandaan and her team
implemented a search warrant of the
accused-appellant’s house. Since there are three
houses or structures inside the compound believed to
be occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch of the
compound describing the house to be searched was
prepared and attached to the search warrant.
When they were already outside the house of Punzalan,
the knocked on the door and a woman, later identified
as Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When they
introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed
that they have a search warrant. Punzalan immediately
closed the door but was not successful since the PDEA
agents pushed the door open. The team was able to
enter and showed and read the search warrant infront
of the accused-appellants. Drugs were confiscated.
They assailed the validity of the search warrant.
According to petitioners, PDEA agents who applied for
a search warrant failed to comply with the requirements
for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the
approval of the PDEA Director General. The court that
issued the warrant had no authority to issue the search
warrant since the search is supposed to be conducted
is outside its territorial jurisdiction. They insist that that
they were not inside their house and were inside the
closed van when their house was searched and forcibly
breaking into their house with the use of an acetylene
torch. Thus they argue that the shabu seized were
inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was valid. Yes.
HELD: In the instant case, aside from their bare
allegation, accused-appellants failed to show that the
application for search warrant of the subject premises
was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or his
authorized representative. On the contrary, the search
warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17
satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the
issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly
authorizes the Executive Judges and the
Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and
Quezon City to issue search warrants to be served in
places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special
criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in
this case, for as long as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with.
The testimonies of the police officers who caught
accused-appellants in flagrante delicto in possession of
illegal drugs during the conduct of a valid search are
usually credited with more weight and credence, in the
absence of evidence that they have been inspired by an
improper or ill motive. Here, there is no proof of any ill
motive or odious intent on the part of the police officers
to impute such a serious crime to accused-appellants.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 50
LESCANO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Howard Lescano was charged with illegal
sale of dangerous drugs was filed. According to the
Information filed, Lescano, while being under the
influence of the illegal drug, particularly
THC-metabolites, did then and there willfully, and
unlawfully and knowingly deliver and sell during a
buy-bust operation, to PO3 Hortencio Javier Php100
worth of marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous drug in
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
weighing one gram and four-tenths (1.4) of a gram.
During the trial, Lescano denied that he was selling
marijuana. He claimed that on July 8, 2008, at around
5:00 p.m., he was at Tulio Street just sitting and
passing time when P/Insp. Julius Javier arrived and
introduced himself as a police officer. P/Insp. Javier
then frisked Lescano but the search turned out futile
as nothing was recovered from him. Other police
officers arrived. PO1 Mataverde and PO3 Javier then
told him that something was confiscated during the
frisking. Lescano insisted that there was nothing
confiscated from him.
In support of Lescano's testimony, the defense also
presented the testimony of Rogelio Jacobo (Jacobo),
Lescano's neighbor. According to Jacobo, he was
waiting for his niece at a nearby store along Tulio
Street, about six (6) to seven (7) meters away from
where Lescano was standing when he saw the latter
being accosted by a police officer. Jacobo then
approached them and asked what the problem was.
The officer replied by saying: "Baka pati ikaw isama
namin." Jacobo then informed the relatives of
Lescano that he had been arrested.
ISSUE: WON there is compliance with the requisites
of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
HELD: NO, there is no compliance.
As regards the items seized and subjected to
marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the
performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory
and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to
when and where these actions must be done. As to
when it must be "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." As to where it depends on whether the
seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a
search warrant was served, the physical inventory
and photographing must be done at the exact same
place that the search warrant is served. In case of
warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3)
persons to be present during the physical inventory
and photographing. These persons are: first, the
accused or the person/s from whom the items were
seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a
representative of the National Prosecution Service.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
There are, however, alternatives to the first and the
third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s
from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second,
his or her counsel. As to the representative of the
National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place.
Section 21 spells out matters that are imperative. "Even
the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate
compliance but do not actually comply with the
requirements of Section 21 does not suffice." This is
especially so when the prosecution claims that the
seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of
carefully planned operations, as is the case here.
It is glaring that despite the prosecution's allegations
that a buy-bust operation was carefully planned and
carried out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully
complied with. While an inventory was supposed to
have been conducted, this was done neither in the
presence of petitioner, the person from whom the drugs
were supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his
counsel or representative. Likewise, not one of the
persons required to be present (an elected public
official, and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have
been around during the inventory and photographing.
We are, in effect, left with no other assurance of the
integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving
claims of the prosecution and of its witnesses. These
claims cannot sustain a conviction. As in Garcia, the
mere marking of seized items, done in violation of the
safeguards of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt.
The Court of Appeals made much of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. It
intimated that this presumption trumped the
presumption of innocence of an accused in light of how
"all the evidence [supposedly] points to the conclusion
that [petitioner] sold the marijuana." This is a serious
error.
Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, leaves room for deviating from its
own requirements. It includes a proviso stating that
"noncompliance of [sic] these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items." However, the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of any such justifiable grounds.
If at all, its own claims that the buy-bust operation was
carefully conceived of and carried out make its position
even more dubious. These claims are all the more
reason to expect that Section 21(1) shall be complied
with meticulously.
PETRON LPG VS ALUG
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 51
FACTS: Petitioners sought the assistance of NBI thru
a complaint alleging that the respondents are
engaged in illegal selling/refilling and distribution of
LPG products.
For this reason, NBI elements conducted
surveillance and test-buy operations against the
respondents. Thereafter, NBI authorities applied for
search warrants with the RTC of La Union and
submitted, among others, certification from PETRON,
SHELL, etc. that respondents are not authorized
dealer of LPG products, photographs of the premises
of respondents, the refilled LPG cylinders, to support
the allegation of illegal refilling.
Respondent argued that search warrant should not
be issued on the ground that the
applicant for a search warrant and his witnesses
should have personal knowledge of facts in order to
establish probable cause, that the applicants have no
personal knowledge that the subject test-buy LPG
cylinder was refilled by respondents that there is no
truth to the applicants’ claim that they actually
examined and weighed the test-buy LPG cylinder, as
they admitted during the proceedings that it was the
LPG dealers’ association that inspected and weighed
the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not a search warrant should
be issued.
HELD: YES
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he
or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
In this case, a complaint was filed with the NBI, which
conducted surveillance and test-buy operations;
written certifications were submitted to the effect that
the respondent was not an authorized refiller of the
LPG companies’ branded cylinders; finally, an
inspection of the test-buy cylinder was conducted,
and the results thereof embodied in a written
document which was submitted as evidence in the
proceedings. The Court finds that there exists
probable cause for the issuance of search warrants
as applied for by petitioners.
On the claim of lack of personal knowledge, the Court
subscribes to petitioners’ argument that facts
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
discovered during surveillance conducted by De Jemil
and Antonio – on the basis of information and evidence
provided by
petitioners – constitute personal knowledge which could
form the basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Indeed, as was declared in Cupcupin v. People,
the surveillance and investigation conducted by an
agent of the NBI obtained from confidential information
supplied to him enabled him to
gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities
complained of
OEBANDA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: United States Office of Inspector General,
through Special Agent Daniel Altman, sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate alleged financial fraud committed by
Visayan Forum Foundation, Inc. (Visayan Forum), a
nonstock, non-profit corporation, against the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Visayan Forum was then receiving funding from USAID
which suspected that Visayan Forum was fabricating
documents and official receipts for purchase of goods
and services to justify expenses and advances covered
by USAID funding.
The NBI Agents, under the authorization of the NBI
Deputy Director for Special Investigation Service, jointly
applied for a search warrant with the RTC of Quezon
City.
After Judge Cabochan personally examined the
applicants, the two NBI Agents, and their witnesses,
and was satisfied of the existence of facts upon which
the application was based, Judge Cabochan issued
Search Warrant No. 4811(12) against Visayan Forum.
Petitioners submit that the judge who issued the search
warrant did not sufficiently ask probing, exhaustive, and
extensive questions. Petitioners insist that the judge
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but
must make her own extensive inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. Petitioners also argue
that no probable cause existed for the issuance of the
search warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the search warrant was
proper
HELD: On whether the judge asked probing and
exhaustive questions- Yes.
In an application for search warrant, the mandate of
the judge is for him to conduct a full and searching
examination of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. The searching questions
propounded to the applicant and the witnesses
must depend on a large extent upon the discretion
of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule
as to how a judge may conduct his examination, it
is axiomatic that the said examination must be
probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary,
general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 52
his own inquiry on the intent and factual and
legal justifications for a search warrant. The
questions should not merely be repetitious of the
averments stated in the affidavits/deposition of
the applicant and the witnesses.11
In the present case, the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes, comprised of 72 pages which was taken
during the hearing, shows that Judge Cabochan
extensively interrogated the two NBI Agents who
applied for the search warrant. By representing
themselves to be part of the audit team of B.F.
Medina and Company, the two NBI Agents were able
to freely enter and move around Visayan Forum's
premises. There, the NBI Agents were able to
sufficiently observe the layout of the office buildings,
the location of relevant documents and equipment,
and the movement of the employees. Most
importantly, the NBI Agents were able to distinctly
describe the alleged wrongful acts that Visayan
Forum committed and was committing at that time.
As to Probable Cause – Yes.
A search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with a specific
offense alleged in an application based on the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his
witnesses. This is the substantive requirement
for the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probable
cause is a personal task of the judge before
whom the application for search warrant is filed,
as he has to examine the applicant and his or her
witnesses in the form of "searching questions
and answers" in writing and under oath. The
warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be
seized.19
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable
cause requires such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discrete and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.20 In People v. Punzalan,21
we held that there is no exact test for the
determination of probable cause in the issuance
of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the
process of exercising their judicial function.
Here, the records show that the applicants for the
search warrant and their witnesses were able to
sufficiently convince the judge of the existence of
probable cause based on their own personal
knowledge, or what they have actually seen and
observed, in Visayan Forum's premises. The NBI
Agents related to the RTC how they entered Visayan
Forum, in the guise of representing themselves as
part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and Company.
The NBI Agents personally saw that Visayan Forum's
employees and occupants altered and fabricated
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
documents and official receipts covered by USAID
funding. They even photocopied some documents and
receipts proving such fabrication. Also, the NBI Agents
were able to particularly describe Visayan Forum's
premises, exactly locating the place to be searched with
sketches of the buildings and various floors and rooms.
Further, they described in great detail the things that
were seized documents, receipts, books of account and
records, and computers used by Visayan Forum's
employees.
DYNAMICS OF SEARCH WARRANT
719 SCRA 723 (N/A)
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO A VALID ARREST
MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29,
2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2
Alejandro Cepe (PO2 Cepe) and PO3 Edilberto Zeta
(PO3 Zeta), who were all assigned to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police
Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot
patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the
process, they heard a man shouting "Putang ina mo!
Limang daan na ba ito?" For purportedly violating
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of
Manila (Manila City Ordinance) which punishes
breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as
Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were
able to recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. PO2 Soque confiscated the
sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where
the former marked the item with the latter's initials,
"RMG." There, Police Superintendent Ferdinand
Ricafrente Quirante (PSupt Quirante) prepared a
request for laboratory examination which, together with
the specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist
Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PS Insp
Calabocal) examined the specimen which contained
0.173 gram of white crystalline substance and found the
same positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA
9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his
version of the incident. He narrated that on December
29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, while walking
along Balingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from
one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing approached
and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man
who eventually introduced himself as a police officer.
Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) where the
said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to
be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque propositioned
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 53
Ramon and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his
release. When Ramon's wife, Amalia Goco, was
unable to produce the P20,000.00 which PO2 Soque
had asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila
City Hall for inquest proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ramon was validly arrested. – NO.
2. Whether or not the warrantless search that
resulted from it was valid/legal? – NO.
HELD: Enshrined in the fundamental law is a
person's right against unwarranted intrusions by the
government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same
sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by
government authorities in contravention of the
foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard,
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides
that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section [referring to Section 2]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the
above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute
and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, the
traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of
evidence in plain view, consented searches, "stop
and frisk" measures and searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of
particular significance to this case and thus,
necessitates further disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a
subsequent search is one that is carried out under
the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court which requires that the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest
a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the
term probable cause has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In
this light, the determination of the existence or absence
of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the
factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for
allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance. xxx Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus,
to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it
must be established that the apprehension was
effected after a reasonable assessment by the police
officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony
negates the presence of probable cause when the
police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of
Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in
a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing
with each other on the street, would constitute any of
the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila
City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not
making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder,
disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not
assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon
another; and, the words he allegedly shouted "Putang
ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous,
threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended
to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at
the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still
teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the
place of arrest ever complained that Ramon's shouting
disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested
member of the community (a certain Rosemarie
Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely
standing in front of the store of a certain Mang Romy
when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2
Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed
and took him away.
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and
circumstances could not have engendereda
well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had
been committed by Ramon at the time that his
warrantless arrest was effected. All told, no probable
cause existed to justify Ramon's warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends
upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of
the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty, this should not be exercised in a whimsical
manner, else a person's liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it is largely
expected of them to conduct a more circumspect
assessment of the situation at hand. The determination
of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 54
liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing
expeditions. It demarcates the line between
legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and
ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this
respect, it must be performed wisely and cautiously,
applying the exacting standards of a reasonably
discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally
guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine
probable cause should be clothed with utmost
conscientiousness, as well as impelled by a higher
sense of public accountability.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was
validly arrested, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was also illegal. As such, the
subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is in
admissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree as mandated by the
above-discussed constitutional provisions. In this
regard, considering that the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Ramon's
acquittal should therefore come as a matter of
course.
PEOPLE VS. ROM
The prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute. One exception is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest wherein an officer making
an arrest may take from the person arrested any
property found upon his person in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime.
FACTS: On the occasion of Vicente Rom’s arrest for
having been caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu,
PO3 Yanson conducted a body search on the former
resulting to the recovery of four more heat-sealed
plastic packets containing white crystalline substance
inside his wallet that was tucked in his pocket with an
aggregate weight of 0.15 gram, which were later
confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
ISSUE: Is there a valid search incidental to a valid
arrest?
HELD: Yes. The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of
Rights the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. To give full protection to
it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the exclusionary
principle that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
In People v. Chua Ho, we pointed out that the
interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute and that warrantless
searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the
following instances: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognizes permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3)
arrest of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams
and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a
result of an entrapment operation conducted by
the police on the basis of information received
from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal
drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was
lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of
shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook
was justified and legal in light of the prevailing
rule that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any property found
upon his person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The seized regulated
drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being
the fruit of the crime.
To repeat, the appellant, in this case, was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully
arrested. Following Chua Ho, the subsequent seizure of
four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu in the
appellant’s wallet that was tucked in his pocket was
justified and admissible in evidence for being the fruit of
the crime.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
FACTS: According to the prosecution, at about 6:00
a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police
Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text
message from an unidentified civilian informer that one
Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept
the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San
Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting
area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City. A passenger jeepney from Barangay
Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached
the two male passengers who were later identified as
Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 55
PO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the
contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin. After this exchange,
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana. Thereafter, they were
arrested.
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest
illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just
done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney
and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. Since the arrest was illegal, the
warrantless search should also be considered
illegal. However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
waived his right to object to such irregularity when he
did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and
seizure and whether the marijuana confiscated is
admissible as evidence?
HELD:NO.As a general rule, searches conducted
with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. The existence of probable
cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers. Probable cause at
this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged
to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the
searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a
particular description of the place and the things to be
searched.
However, there are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of
Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant. This court
has taken into account the "uniqueness of
circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured." The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search
warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to
a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals
was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object
is either to determine the identity of a suspicious
individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information." This court stated that the "stop and frisk"
search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly
unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . .
a search warrant."
The search involved in this case was initially a
"stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terrysearches) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal
to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this
should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness"
present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an individual is acting
in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
In the case at bar, Cogaed was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11
of Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 56
SPO1 Elmer Amposta together with other CSUs,
acted on the information that Jacinta Marciano was
selling drugs to tricycle drivers. They were
dispatched to Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite, to
conduct an operation. While at the place, they waited
for a tricycle going to, and coming from the house of
Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle
carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house.
The group chased the tricycle. After catching up
with it, they requested Sanchez to alight. It was
then they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Sanchez if he could see the
contents of the match box which the latter agreed to.
While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small
transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that it was a
regulated drug, the group accosted Sanchez and the
tricycle driver. They were brought to the police
station.The forensic chemist from NBI found that the
said susbtance was shabu.
Sanchez denied all the allegations of the prosecution.
He said that he and Darwin Reyes were on their way
hope where they transported a passenger, when their
way was blocked by four armed men riding an
owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men
frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked
what offense did they commit. The officers told him
that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He
reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger
there but the policemen still accosted him and he was
brought to Imus Police Station.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in
flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no
longer necessary. NO
HELD:It is observed that the Court of Appeals
confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with
stop-and-frisk principle.
STOP-AND-FRISK VS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO
A LAWFUL ARREST
A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and
should not be confused with the search incidental to
a lawful arrest envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. The
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made, the process cannot be reversed.
The arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime.
As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk
search is a limited protective search of outer clothing
for weapons. Where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, he is entitled for the protection of
himself.
The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are:
1. The general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause
2. The more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police office to
take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
NO VALID SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A VALID
ARREST
IN THE CASE AT BENCH, neither the in flagrante
delict arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle was
applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure
made by the police operatives. The search preceded
the arrest of Sanchez . There was no arrest prior to the
conduct of the search. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 113, arrest
is the taking of a person into custody that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Sec.
2 of the same rules provides that an arrest is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
It appears that SPO1 Amposta after they caught up with
the tricycle just noticed Sanchez holding a match box
and requested if he could see the contents. The arrest
was made only after the discovery by SPO1
Amposta of the shabu inside the box. What
happened in this case was a search first before arrest
was effected. This does not qualify under a valid
warrantless arrest under Sec. 5 Rule 113*.
The evidence on record reveals that no physical act
could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he
had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. He was merely seen by the police
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug
peddler. It has not been established either that the
rigorous conditions set in par. B of Sec 5 of Rule 113
have been complied with. The police officers had no
personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought
shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually
possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle.
The police officers had no inkling whatsoever as to
what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug
dealer. Nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it
show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious
drug activities inside the house. There was no over
manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was
attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegally
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 57
possessing shabu.
RULE 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
NO VALID STOP-AND FRISK
There is no valid stop-and-frisk. This is an act of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapon/s or
contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s
outer clothing for possible concealed weapons. The
apprehending officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officer’s experience and
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons or contraband
concealed.
The Court does not find the totality of the
circumstance sufficient to incite a reasonable
suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on
Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug
pusher and boarding a tricylce without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone
could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and
prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu
in his possession.
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
The following are the requisites:
1. the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area
2. the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
It is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject
shabu does not fall within the plain view exception.
There was no valid intrusion. Sanchez was illegally
arrested. The subject shabu was not inadvertently
discovered and it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here,
the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box
being then held by Sanchez and was not readily
apparent or transparent to the police officers.
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with
violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act).
 He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
 As a defense, he claimed that at the time of the
incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3
Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go
with them to the police station.
 At the police station, he was also informed that he
had been identified as responsible for shooting
Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at
the police station.
 The RTC convicted Villanueva.
 Villanueva appealed the case to the CA. He alleged
that the RTC erred in not declaring his search and
arrest as illegal for it was made without a warrant.
 CA upheld RTC’s ruling. Villanueva raised the case
to the SC.
 Villanueva claimed that his arrest does not fall within
the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took
place on the day of the alleged shooting incident.
Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any
warrant of arrest was illegal.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and arrest was
valid?
HELD: No.
Note: Both warrantless search and warrantless arrest
was illegal. The SC in this case said that the accused
Villanueva is already estopped to question the validity
of the warrantless arrest because he did not raise the
issue during his arraignment for the offense charged.
HOWEVER, there is no showing that he waived his
right to question the warrantless search.
Nevertheless, records reveal that
accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity
of his arrest before his arraignment.
The circumstances that transpired between
accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none
of the above that would make the warrantless arrest
lawful. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He
actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.
The warrantless search conducted is not among
those allowed by law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 58
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest.Accused-appellant was arrested
without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace
officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The accused did not waive his right to question
the validity of the warrantless arrest
Records have established that both the arrest and
the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the
legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest the legality of the
search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on
when a warrantless search can be conducted.
These searches include:
(1) search of a moving vehicle;
(2) seizure in plain view;
(3) customs search;
(4) waiver or consented search;
(5) stop-and-frisk situation;
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
The search made was not among the enumerated
instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a
customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain
view as the seized item was allegedly found inside
the left pocket of accused-appellant’s pants. Neither
was it a stop-and-frisk situation.
Re: Consent search
While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that
"[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence."
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case,
petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents
of his pocket.
Hence, the evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the
seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the seized item,
therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot
be sustained. This being the case, we see no more
reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in
the handling of the confiscated drug.
PEOPLE VS. CASACOP
FACTS: Acting on a tip from an informant that a. certain
Edong was selling shabu in Quezon Street, Barangay
San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, the Chief of Police of
San Pedro Police Station, Police Superintendent Sergio
Dimandal formed a team to conduct surveillance on
appellant. Upon receiving a positive result, Senior
Police Officer 4 Melchor Dela Pena (SPO4 Dela Pena)
prepared a pre-operation report which was sent to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
SPO4 Dela Pena then formed a buy-bust team
composed of Police Officer 1 Jifford Signap (POl
Signap) as the poseur-buyer, SPO2 Diosdado
Fernandez, SPO1 Jorge Jacob and POl Rommel
Bautista, as police backup." Thereafter, the buy-bust
team proceeded to the target area. POl Signap and the
informant approached appellant's house. PO1 Signap
was introduced to appellant by the informant as the
buyer of shabu. He handed the marked money,
consisting of three (3) P100.00 bills, to appellant, who
took a plastic sachet from his left pocket and gave it to
him. POl Signap made the pre¬arranged signal of
calling SPO4 Dela Pena. The backup team rushed
towards appellant's house and arrested him. PO1
Signap frisked appellant and recovered an improvised
glass tooter, aluminum foil strip, cigarette lighter, two (2)
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, and the
marked money. PO1 Signap conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items and correspondingly
marked them in appellant's house.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of
possession of shabu and its paraphernalia and sale of
shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the
back of his house on 21 July 2005 at around 12:00 pm
when five (5) police officers barged into his house. After
confirming that he is Edong, appellant was handcuffed
and brought to the police station. Appellant claimed that
the police only planted evidence against him because
they were not able to pin him down in a robbery case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 59
Found in appellant's pocket AFTER HE WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE were two (2) more plastic
sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tooter
containing shabu residue and the rolled aluminum foil
with shabu residue
ISSUE:WON the sachets of shabu confiscated from
the pocket of the accused were legally seized?
HELD: YES. THE SACHETS OF SHABU WERE
LEGALLY SEIZED FROM THE THE ACCUSED.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of
shabu were established. POl Signap, the
poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the
person who sold him the white crystalline substance
in one plastic sachet which was later proven to be
positive for shabu. In exchange for this plastic sachet;
PO1 Signap handed the marked money a.s payment.
The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia
were likewise established. Found in appellant's
pocket after he was caught in flagrante were two (2)
more plastic sachets containing shabu, an
improvised glass tooter containing shabu residue and
the rolled aluminum foil with shabu residue. Under
Rule 126, Section 13, a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a warrant. There was no
showing that appellant had legal authority to possess
the shabu and its paraphernalia. Moreover, the fact
that these contraband were found in his physical
possession shows that he freely and consciously
possessed them.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case,
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved.
WHEN THINGS SEIZED ARE WITHIN
PLAIN VIEW OF SEARCHING PARTY
PEOPLE VS. CALANTIAO
FACTS:
 Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta was convicted
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously having in his
possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of
dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of
997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug.
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
 While two police officers, PO1 NELSON
MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ, were
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their
office and asked for police assistance regarding a
shooting incident.
 PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to where
they found the white taxi. While approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired
their guns towards them (police officers) and ran
away. They chased them but they were subdued.
 PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag
containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from
Calantiao’s companion [a] .38 revolver.
 The suspects and the confiscated items were then
turned over to the Police Station for investigation.
Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of
marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials,
"NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The
result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP.
JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
 The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was
corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he
personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated
from the accused. He confirmed that he was with
PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused
and his companion and testified that while PO1
Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag
containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated
from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
 The accused offered a different version of the story.
According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and
his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost
collided with another car. Reyes then opened the
window and made a "fuck you" sign against the
persons on board of that car. That prompted the
latter to chase them and when they were caught in a
traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons
on board of that other car alighted and kicked their
taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano
slapped the latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit
mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police
officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and when
Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and
Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the
police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body
frisking and their wallets and money were taken.
PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and
informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A
newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them
and said police officer told them that it would be
sufficient evidence against them. They were
detained and subjected to medical examination
before they were submitted for inquest at the
prosecutor’s office.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 60
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegedly seized items are
inadmissible as evidence in accordance to the plain
view doctrine.
HELD: This Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s
arguments. Search and Seizure of Marijuana valid.
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s
contention that the marijuana in his possession
cannot be admitted as evidence against him because
it was illegally discovered and seized, not having
been within the apprehending officers’ "plain view."
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are
governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.–
A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable
exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on
them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2)
evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It
seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers
and the integrity of the evidence under the control
and within the reach of the arrestee.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black
bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the
marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending
officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be
used as evidence against him because its discovery
was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is
misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to
the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside
the suspect’s person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in
the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x
x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification –
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
Calantiao’s situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag,
which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately
opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s
lawful arrest
CRESCENCIO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Acting on an information that there was a
stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of
the house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel),
the Chief of the Forest Protection Unit of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino
Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos
(Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house at Balico,
Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon
arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under
the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about
two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the
DENR personnel tried to investigate from the
neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber,
the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the
DENR personnel entered the premises of the
petitioner’s house without a search warrant.
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber,
which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered.
When the DENR personnel asked for documents to
support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter
showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by
Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the
said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel
scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions
and the species of the lumber did not tally with the
items mentioned in the receipt.
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt,
Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked
for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they
were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the
DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No.
004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces
and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated, which
showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were
issued to the petitioner.
Upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he
and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the
petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later
loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the
transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San
Roque, Talibon, Bohol.
The petitioner was charged by the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner of the offense charged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 61
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner
contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents
to show that she bought the questioned lumber from
legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search
and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was
illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have
been admitted in evidence against her.
ISSUE: WON there was illegal search of
petitioner’s premises and seizure of the lumber,
hence, inadmissible as evidence? NO
HELD: The Constitution recognizes the right of the
people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional
prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions, one of which is
seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain
view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view"
of an officer, who has a right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence.
There is no question that the DENR personnel were
not armed with a search warrant when they went to
the house of the petitioner. When the DENR
personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the
lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at
the shoreline about two meters away from the house
of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said
lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure
of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to
arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant.
Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the
forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any
personnel of the Philippine National Police to
arrest, even without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code
and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense or the
forest products gathered or taken by the offender.
Clearly, in the course of such lawful intrusion, the
DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the
lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24
pieces of magsihagon lumber, as well as her
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations
constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry
Code.
STOP AND FRISK
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
FACTS: Refer to previous digest
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and
seizure of marijuana as against the appellant.
HELD: NO.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
(I.) One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search
warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to
a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information." This court stated that the "stop and
frisk" search should be used "when dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the
city streets where unarguably there is no time to
secure . . . a search warrant."
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop
and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal
to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this
should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness"
present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience of the police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an individual is acting
in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
In several cases, the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner,
based on their experience, is indicative of a person who
uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in
guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
(Manilili vs. CA & People vs. Solayao),
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who
signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 62
(II.) Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give
the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in
this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.
The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the
bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without
a valid search warrant.
(III.) Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches
and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement
and that the search serves the purpose of protecting
the public. As stated in Malacat:
A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.
The "stop and frisk" search was originally limited to
outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence
also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to
People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in
drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the police officers prepared themselves. The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified
her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look
inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal. There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure. It was only the
informant that prompted the police to apprehend
her. The evidence obtained was not admissible
because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was
acquitted.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was
the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant, who
informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches
exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of
Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means
that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Respondent in this case was acquitted by the Court
COMERCIANTE S. PEOPLE
FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed
before the RTC charging Comerciante ofviolation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in
the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan
(Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3
Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle,
patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at
Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along
Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10
meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante
and a certain Erick Dasilla7 (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with
one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and
Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed
that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
 The RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
 The CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid stop and frisk.
HELD: The stop and frisk made was not valid.
The Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a
valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
untenable. In People v. Cogaed, the Court had an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 63
opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk"
searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to
as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given
the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of
"suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern - based on facts that they themselves
observe - whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the
law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement
further. It does not have to be probable cause, but
it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a
genuine reason to serve the purposes of the
"stop and frisk" exception:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Other notable points of Terry are that while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a
single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's
acts of standing around with a companion and handing
over something to the latter do not constitute criminal
acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct
a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the
"stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be
deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor
a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante.
As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted
and exonerated from all criminal liability.
EXPRESS WAIVER
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag
from Barangay Lun-Oy and during acheckpoint, the
driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the
police telling that Cogaed wascarrying marijuana inside
Cogaed’s bag! the police officer then approached
Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of
his bags" Cogaed replied that he did not know what
was inside and tha the was just transporting the bag in
favor of marvin, a barriomate" Cogaed subsequently
opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana
inside" and was then arrested by the police officers"
ISSUE: Whether OR NOT there was a valid search
and seisure! and, whether the marijuana confiscated is
admissible as evidence"
HELD: The right to privacy is a fundamental right
enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has
many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its
protection through the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
However, there are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of
Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant.60 This court has
taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 64
the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured."
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.(Citations
omitted)
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search
warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the
person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information."66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen
dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop
and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would
not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018

than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic
right to security of one’s person and effects.
The Constitution provides: Any evidence obtained in
violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
and likewise sustained the validity of the body search
made on Ramon as an incident of a lawful
warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he
committed in the presence of the police officers,
notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)
subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision
originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures
that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses,
papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and
are upheld.
AIRPORT SECURITY
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was
valid
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW: exclusionary rule
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution enshrines a persons right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same
sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by
government authorities in contravention of the said
provision rendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding in relation to Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution.

MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE Commonly known as the exclusionary rule, the

above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute
FACTS:On December 29, 2007, while PO2 Roberto
and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, one of the
Soque, et. al, conducting a routine foot patrol along
traditional exceptions, among others, is searches
Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila, they heard a man
incidental to a lawful arrest which is of particular
shouting Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?. For
significance to this case and thus, necessitates
purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised
further disquisition.
Ordinance of the City of Manila which punishes
breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as
REMEDIAL LAW: valid warrantless arrest
Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a
able to recover from him a small transparent plastic
subsequent search is one that is carried out under
sachet containing white crystalline substance
the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon was
of Court14which requires that the apprehending
charged with possession of dangerous drugs under
officer must have been spurred by probable cause to
Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165.
arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. The term
probable cause, specifically with respect to arrests
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and contented
has been understood to mean such facts and
that while walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
welding machine, a man in civilian clothing approached
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
has been committed by the person sought to be
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man
arrested.
who eventually introduced himself as a police officer.
Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) where the
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2 Soque
said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs.
arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844
Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to
(breaches of peace) of the Manila City Ordinance.
be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque for P20, 000.00 in
Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the
exchange for his release, unable to give the money
disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a
asked for, Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall
warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be
for inquest proceedings.
established that the apprehension was effected after
a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a
The RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of possession
public disturbance is being committed. However,
of dangerous drugs; finding all its elements to have
PO2 Soques testimony surrounding circumstances
been established through the testimonies of the
leading to Ramons warrantless warrant clearly
prosecutions disinterested witnesses. It also upheld the
negates the presence of probable cause when the
legality of Ramons warrantless arrest, observing that
police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of
Ramon was disturbing the peace in violation of the
Ramon.
Manila City Ordinance during the time of his
apprehension.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting
in a thickly populated place, with many people
On appeal, the CA affirmed the factual findings of RTC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 65
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
conversing with each other on the street, would
constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844
of the said ordinance. The words he allegedly shouted
"Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not
have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot
considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit
Street was still teeming with people and alive with
activity. Further, no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the
public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of the
community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even
testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the
store of a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian
clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached
Ramon, immediately handcuffed and took him away.
In its totality, the facts and circumstances could not
have engendered a well-founded belief that any breach
of the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time
that his warrantless arrest was effected. Thus, no
probable cause existed to justify Ramons warrantless
arrest.
POLITICAL LAW: inadmissible evidence
Consequently, since it cannot be said that Ramon was
validly arrested, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu
purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible
evidence.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
is reversed and set aside.
SALES VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: On May 24, 2003, petitioner was scheduled to
board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan at
its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the old Manila
Domestic Airport (now Terminal 1), Domestic Road,
Pasay City at around 8:30 in the morning. As part of the
routine security check at the predeparture area,
petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal Detector
Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a
body search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M.
Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security
Group (ASG).
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly
bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants. When
Soriano asked petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner
obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano
struggled with petitioner as the latter was nervous and
reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket.
Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor, PO1
Cherry Trota-Bartolome who was nearby.
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked
him to open his hands. Petitioner finally opened his
right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried
marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing petitioner
of his constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-Bartolome
brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 66
Police Center for Aviation Security (2nd PCAS),
PNP-ASG Intelligence and Investigation Branch and
immediately turned over petitioner to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport Team at
the Ramp Area, Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex, Pasay City. The investigating
officer, POII Samuel B. Hojilla, placed the markings
on the two marijuana sticks: "SBH-A" and "SBH-B."
The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when
subjected to chemical analysis at the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City yielded
positive results for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
ISSUE: Was the search made upon Sales valid?
HELD: Yes. In this case, the prosecution has
satisfactorily established that airport security officers
found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting
tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final
security check at the airport’s pre-departure area.
Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his
short pants pocket to Soriano who became
suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly bulging"
item while frisking petitioner.
In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure
of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a
routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such
evidence obtained in a warrantless search was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers
are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply
to routine airport procedures.
Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the
airport is a standard procedure but assails the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
conduct of Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in
singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and
empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous
search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself
testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner
walked past through the metal detector and hence
nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security
check. He likewise mentioned the fact that he was
carrying a bundle of money at that time, which he said
was not accounted for.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on
petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his
pockets upon the frisker’s reasonable belief that what
he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner’s short pants
was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9
of R.A. No. 6235. Said provision reads:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the
airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed
thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure
of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to
board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in
People v. Canton where the accused, a female
passenger was frisked at the NAIA after passing
through the metal detector booth that emitted a beeping
sound. Since the frisker noticed something bulging at
accused’s abdomen, thighs and genital area, which felt
like packages containing rice granules, accused was
subjected to a thorough physical examination inside the
ladies’ room. Three sealed packages were taken from
accused’s body which when submitted for laboratory
examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused
was forthwith arrested and prosecuted for illegal
possession of a regulated drug.Affirming accused
Canton’s conviction for the crime of illegal possession
of shabu, we ruled that accused-appellant was lawfully
arrested without a warrant after being caught in
flagrante delicto. We further held that the scope of a
search pursuant to airport security procedure is not
confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry
search" doctrine. The more extensive search
conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the
discovery of packages on her body, her
apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused
the suspicion of the frisker that she was hiding
something illegal. Thus:
It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit
the action of the airport security personnel to simply
refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her
home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby
depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 67
accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the
strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under
the circumstances.
The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants
pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, the illegal substance
(marijuana) seized from him was therefore
admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to
show the contents of his short pants pocket after the
frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers containing
marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the
suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed
carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by
the said authorities.
PEOPLE VS. CADIDIA
FACTS:Marilyn Trayvilla testified that on 31 July
2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while performing
her duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila
Domestic Airport Terminal I, she frisked the accused
Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area and she
noticed something unusual and thick in the area of
Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered
that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the
unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s
explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee
Leilani M. Bagsican brought the accused to the
comfort room inside the domestic airport to check.
When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove
her underwear, they discovered that inside were two
sachets of shabu.
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as
charged. On appeal, the accused-appellant,
contended that the trial court gravely erred when it
failed to consider the conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses’ and that the identity of the
illegal drugs allegedly seized was not proven with
moral certainty due to the broken chain of custody of
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was
valid? YES
HELD: Airport frisking is an authorized form of
search and seizure. As held in similar cases of
People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this
Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila
Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of
drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in
their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The
Court in both cases explained the rationale for the
validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure or their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches arc
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity or the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed. travellers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and. if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.
DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:Routine baggage inspections conducted by
port authorities, although done without search warrants,
are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to
ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island
vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and forth
taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007,
Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to
go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left
his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15
minutes to purchase a ticket.
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the
terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine for inspection.The operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine
operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007. She saw the
impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms
inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Upon seeing the suspected
firearms, she called the attention of port personnel
Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then.
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the
bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and
consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.
"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer
Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called
by . . . Igot." Igot told Officer Abregana that there were
firearms in a bag owned by a certain person. Igot then
pointed to the person. That person was later identified
as Dela Cruz.
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The
bag was then inspected and the following items were
found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance;
seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4) live
ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 68
whether he had the proper documents for the
firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his
violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also
informed of his constitutional rights.
ISSUES:Whether petitioner waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and assuming
that there was no waiver and whether there was a
valid search and seizure in this case.
HELD: We deny the Petition.
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner
presented his bag for inspection to port
personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage
inspector manning the x-ray machine station. With
regard to searches and seizures, the standard
imposed on private persons is different from that
imposed on state agents or authorized government
authorities.
This court held that there was no unreasonable
search or seizure. The evidence obtained against the
accused was not procured by the state acting
through its police officers or authorized government
agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern
relationships between individuals; it cannot be
invoked against the acts of private individuals:
If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a
reasonable search conducted by private persons are
not covered by the exclusionary rule.
To determine whether the intrusion by the port
personnel in this case was committed by private or
public persons, we revisit the history and
organizational structure of the Philippine Ports
Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the
country’s aim to develop transportation and trade in
conjunction with national and economic growth. In
1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created for
the reorganization of port administration and
operation functions. The Philippine Ports Authority’s
Charter was later revised through Presidential
Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter provided that
the Authority may:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
after consultation with relevant Government agencies,
make rules or regulations for the planning, development,
construction, maintenance, control, supervision and
management of any Port or Port District and the
services to be provided therein, and for the
maintenance of good order therein, and generally for
carrying out the process of this Decree.
The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given
police authority through Executive Order No. 513.
In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to
specifically administer all ports located in the Province
of Cebu. The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit
corporation . . . under the supervision of the
Department of Transportation and Communications for
purposes of policy coordination." Control of the ports
was transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1,
1996, when its operations officially began.
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the
state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles
within its ports. While there is a distinction between port
personnel and port police officers in this case,
considering that port personnel are not necessarily law
enforcers, both should be considered agents of
government under Article III of the Constitution. The
actions of port personnel during routine security checks
at ports have the color of a state-related function.
Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having
the color of state-related functions and deemed agents
of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case.
Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security
measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic
ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable
reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted
to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems,
signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 69
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the
second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the
attention of the port police officer?
We rule in the negative.
The port personnel’s actions proceed from the
authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers
and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner
already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning
machine.
The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray
scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option
not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a
crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the
passengers passing through ports or terminals.
Probable cause is:
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
induce a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that
can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law are in the place to be searched.135
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an
affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if
weighed against the safety of all passengers and the
security in the port facility.
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the
presentation of person and effects for port security
measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when
measured against the possible harm to society
caused by lawless persons.
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy
occurred during petitioner’s submission to port
security measures. This court should determine
whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.
After detection of the firearms through the x-ray
scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect
petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable. However,
this court lays down the exceptions where
warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle;
(4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:
In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not
validly consent to the search conducted by the port
authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual
intention to relinquish his right against a warrantless
search.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be
weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show
that petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the
x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray
machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily
submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:
Prosecutor Narido:
Q. What did he tell you?I
A. asked him if I can check his bag?
Q. What was his response?
A.He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.
It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer
Abregana’s attention was called and the bag was
inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the
assessment of witnesses’ credibility by the trial court,
because the latter was in a better position to observe
their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand."
We do not find anything erroneous as to the findings of
fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was
committing a crime leading to the search of his personal
effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds
the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable
and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag
of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in
the course of such valid search are thus admissible as
evidence against [the] accused.
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui
Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted
authorities to search their persons and premises
without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 70
claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In
addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at the
domestic port was not given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances.
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument
that there was no valid consent to the search
because his consent was premised on his belief that
there were no prohibited items in his bag. The
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found does not automatically negate valid
consent to the search when incriminating items are
found. His or her belief must be measured against
the totality of the circumstances. Again, petitioner
voluntarily submitted himself to port security
measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was
familiar with the security measures since he had
been traveling back and forth through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that
the present petition falls under a valid consented
search and during routine port security procedures
meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is valid.
The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag
is different from a customs search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement
of a valid search warrant, are allowed when "persons
exercising police authority under the customs law . . .
effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of
customs laws." The Tariff and Customs Code
provides the authority for such warrantless search, as
this court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.:
The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases.
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People,
in that the state’s policy to combat smuggling must
not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on
whether the state has the duty to accord
constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which
duty has not been paid, as with a person’s papers
and/or effects.
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the
requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the
search was/were exercising police authority under
customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement
of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a
dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that
the search was part of routine port security measures.
The search was not conducted by persons
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
authorized under customs law. It was also not
motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code or other customs laws. Although customs
searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is
important that the search must be for the enforcement
of customs laws.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
BURGOS VS. ESPERON
FACTS: These incidents stemmed from our June 22,
2010 Resolution referring the present case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s
directly commissioned agency, tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos.
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the CA concluded that the present case
falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo.
The petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order the persons
named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2)
issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the
motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further
hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
HELD: After reviewing the newly discovered evidence
submitted by the petitioner and considering all the
developments of the case, including the March 18,
2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we
resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion
Ex Abundanti Cautela.
We note and conclude, based on the developments
highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the
Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As
we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely
embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the
enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of
Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It
is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial
action that it directs.24The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a
specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings
has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what
the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr., v.
Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms "responsibility" and
"accountability" signify in an Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 71
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance.26
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing,
the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the
CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in
the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt.
Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with
Jonas’ disappearance.27
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision already ruled with finality on the entities
responsible and accountable (as these terms are
defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013
decision, the CA found, by substantial evidence, that
Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis
of Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one
of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to
interfere because the latter had been under
surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA
also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for
having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the
following directives to address the enforced
disappearance of Jonas:
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative
arm, the PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the
abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large
and to establish the link between the abductors
of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the
ERAP 5 incident;
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Director General of the Philippines National
Police, and their successors, to ensure the
continuance of their investigation and
coordination on the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos until the persons found
responsible are brought before the bar of
justice;
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights
to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence
required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police to extend full
assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in
the conduct of the latter’s investigation; and
(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Chairman, Commission on
Human Rights to submit a quarterly report to the
Court on the results of their respective
investigation.28
We note that the respondents did not appeal the March
18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013 CA
resolution denying their motion for partial
reconsideration.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the
final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of
the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance
of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to
issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to
the CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We so
conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance
of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA
would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the
ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ
through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by
the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing
investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it
cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and
prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with
finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do
not thereby rule on the admissibility or the merits of the
newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner.
We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the
proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the
other entities whose identities and participation in the
enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in
future investigations and proceedings. Considering that
the present case has already reached the prosecution
stage, the petitioner’s motion should have been filed
with the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies
of the government.
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of
Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine
who is responsible or accountable; and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.1âwphi1
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served in the present case with the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 72
CA’s final determination of the persons responsible
and accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas and the commencement of criminal action
against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal,
investigation and prosecution proceedings are
already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo
proceeding now before us.
Based on the above developments, we now hold that
the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo has been served and
exhausted.
CARAM VS. SEGUI
(Note: Warrant of Arrest was not mentioned in this
case once. It is about writ of amparo. There are no
other cases of the same name)
FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous
relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of
her pregnancy. When Julian was born, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed
of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
Subsequently, Baby Julian was “matched” with
Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was
then commenced.
Christina who had changed her mind about the
adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings.
She also said she wanted her family back together.
The DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera
informing her that the certificate declaring Baby
Julian legally available for adoption had attained
finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment
which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. On
July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking
to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of
amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child.
HELD No. The Court held that the availment of the
remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was
no enforced disappearance in this case. As to what
constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in
Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to
wit:
a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction
or any form of deprivation of liberty;
b) That it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
c) That it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and,
d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced
disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers
never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum
explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before
the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby
Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the
context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing. She is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child
and contesting custody over him. What is involved is
the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
HAO VS. PEOPLE
=FACTS: Private complainant Dy alleged that he was a
long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch
where Ngo was the manager. Because of their good
business relationship, Dy took Ngo's advice to deposit
his money in an investment house that will give a higher
rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia
Hao, who presented herself as an officer of State
Resources, the recommended company that can give
Dy his higher investment return.
Relying on Ngo and Gracia's assurances, Dy initially
invested 10 million. He then received the promised
interest in the investment urging to increase his
investment to 100 million. In return, Gracia also issued
several checks totaled 114 million to Dy representing
his earnings for his investment. All these checks were
subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
For failure to reach Ngo and Hao, Dy filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioners, Ngo and others for
syndicated estafa. The public prosecutor filed an
information for syndicated estafa against the petitioners
and their six co-accused. Judge Marquez issued
warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to
defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
They invoked the absence of probable cause against
them and the pendency of their petition for review with
the DOJ.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to lift warrant of
arrest is proper. NO
HELD: Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a judge is mandated to personally
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 73
determine the existence of probable cause after his
personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution
and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.
These provisions command the judge to refrain from
making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s
findings and to conduct his own examination of the
facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three
options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or
information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue
warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their
co-accused. To be valid, these warrants must have
been issued after compliance with the requirement
that probable cause be personally determined by the
judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to
merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct
a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally
review the prosecutor's initial determination and see
if it is supported by substantial evidence.
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a
personal determination of the existence of probable
cause to support the issuance of the warrants based
on its February 26, 2004 order stating that the
issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge
was done after his personal examination of the facts
and circumstances strong enough in themselves to
support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that
in fact happened. The fact was not denied by
petitioners.
Under this situation, Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily
issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after
his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances
that led him to believe that there was probable cause
to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a
criminal offense.
ANNOTATION – THE RIGHT TO BAIL BY
ALICIA GONZALEZ-DECANO
Bail – is the guaranty that a person arrested on a
criminal charge will appear for trial or examination
when duly required, If he is temporarily released.
FORMS OF BAIL
1. Cash bond – a sum of money, in the amount
designated in an order fixing bail, posted by a
defendant or another person in his behalf, with a
court or other authorized public officer upon
condition that the money be forfeited if the
defendant does not comply with the order of the
court requiring his attendance.
2. Recognizance – a contract between the sureties
and the state for the production of the principal at
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the required time. It is an obligation of record,
entered into before some courts or magistrates duly
authorized to take it, with the condition in criminal
cases being the appearance of the accused for trial.
3. Corporate surety bond – one issued by a
professional bondsman, that is one who is habitually
engaged in the business of furnishing bonds in civil
actions or for persons arrested or detained for
prosecution.
4. Property bond – is an undertaking constituted as a
lien on the real property given as a security for the
amount of the bail.
PURPOSES OF BAIL
 Bail is never required by way of punishment or
denied for the purpose of punishing a person
accused of crimes; nor is it the functions of bail
to prevent or license the commission of crime.
 Admission to bail gives full fealty to the basic
principles of freedom, interest in our system,
that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is established by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION ON BAIL
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution states
that, “All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law.
Limitations on the Right to Bail – subject to the
limitations that the person applying be in custody of the
law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
RIGHT TO BAIL BEFORE THE FILING OF CHARGES
 A person is entitled even before the complaint of
information is filed against him.
 Indeed if, the right to bail protects those already
charged under a formal complaint or information,
there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying
its benefits to one as against whom the proper
authorities may even yet conclude that there exists
no sufficient evidence of guilt
CONDITIONS OF THE BAIL: REQUIREMENTS
1985 CRIMPRO Rule 114
Sec. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.
All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval
and remain in force at all stages of the case until its final
determination, unless the proper court directs
otherwise;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial
without justification despite due notice shall be deemed
an express waiver of his right to be present on the date
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 74
specified in the notice. In such case, the trial may
proceed in absentia; and
(d) The accused shall surrender himself for execution
of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and
address of the accused, the amount of the
undertaking and the conditions herein required.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last 6
months showing the face, left and right profiles of the
accused must be attached thereto.
Conditions set out in the Rules, Exclusive –
 The conditions provided in Section 2, Rule 114
apply ex proprio vigore in all kinds of bail whether
or not the same were expressly stipulated in the
undertaking.
 Additional obligations other than those set out in
the law cannot be imposed, otherwise it might
result in the imposition of conditions which would
absolutely prevent and render it impossible for the
defendant to secure his liberty during the trial,
notwithstanding the fact that he is entitled to his
liberty as a matter of right.
Bail as a matter of right; exception –
 Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged
is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
 Bail is a matter of discretion:
o Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprison ment; and
o If the decision of the RTC convicting the
accused change the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable.
When bail may be denied or cancelled (Sec 4,
Rule 114, 1995 CrimPro)
a. If the penalty imposed by the trial court exceeds 6
years of imprisonment
b. When upon showing by the prosecution with notice
to the accused of the following and other similar
reasons:
(1) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist or
habitual delinquent or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstances of
reiterations;
(2) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail with valid
justification;
(3) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon;
(4) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(5) There is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
(Sec 5, Rule 114, 1995 Criminal Procedure as
amended)
Amount of Bail: guidelines –
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Criminal Procedure
enumerates the guidelines in the granting of Bail in this
manner “ the judge who issued the warrant or granted
the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to, the following
facts:
a. Financial ability of the accused to give bail
b. Nature and circumstance of the offense
c. Penalty for the offense charged
d. Character and reputation of the accused
e. Age and health of the accused
f. Weight of the evidence against the accused
g. Forfeiture of other bail
h. The fact that the accused was fugitive from
justice when arrested
i. Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. “
WHEN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A
WARRANT
(STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RULE)
ANTIQUERA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Police officers were conducting a police
visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two
unidentified men rush out of a house and boarded a
jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police
officers approached the house. When they peeked
through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera
and Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers
entered the house, introduced themselves and arrested
Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1
Cabutihan saw a jewelry box which contained shabu
and unused paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty
of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs. The court affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: WON the arrest is lawful being one made in
flagrante delicto.
HELD: NO, the arrest was unlawful.
The circumstances here do not make out a case of an
arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when
they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107
David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a
crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to
do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car
and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects were
the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 75
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice
anything amiss going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked
through its partially opened door, they saw no activity
that warranted their entering it.
Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything
amiss going on in the house from the street where
they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that
warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was
plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers
that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
PEOPLE VS EDAÑO
FACTS: Police officers, together with an informant,
conducted an entrapment operation against the
accused.
At 7:00 PM, the accused together with one
companion arrived at the location on board a vehicle.
The informant went inside the vehicle and they talked
about some things. Thereafter, the informant waved
at the police officers and when the latter approached
the vehicle, the accused alighted and ran away. The
police officers were able to apprehend the accused
and with him, they found a bag containing suspected
shabu and a firearm.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is
valid.
HELD: NO Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is known an
arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to the accused to rouse suspicion in the
mind of the police officer that he (accused) had just
committed, was actually committing, or was
attempting to commit a crime. In fact, the police
officer testified that the appellant and the informant
were just talking with each other when he
approached them.
That the accused attempted to run away when the
police officer approached him is irrelevant and cannot
by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
police officer with personal knowledge that the accused
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It
is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are
many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of
retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to
appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully
apprehended as a guilty party
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has
been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be
evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was
unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances seized from him
is inadmissible in evidence, having comefrom an invalid
search and seizure.
PEOPLE VS. ENDAYA
FACTS: Appellant was charged under two separate
informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lipa City, Branch 12, with violation of Section 5 and
Section 11, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165.
Accused contends that assuming without conceding
that he had in fact sold and possessed the plastic
sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence
for being fruits of a poisonous tree, having been
obtained after an unlawful arrest and search.
ISSUEl: W/N a valid warrantless arrest was
conducted.
HELD: Yes.
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected
under paragraph (a) or what is termed "in flagrante
delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 76
caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must
concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2
Chavez personally witnessed the exchange between
appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money
and the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance which subsequently tested positive for
shabu. At the time he was arrested, therefore,
appellant was clearly committing a crime in full view
of the buy-bust team.
As held by the CA: Because [appellant] had been
caught in flagrante delicto by the apprehending police
officers, they, as the arresting officers were duty-
bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to
search him for anything that may be used as proof of
the commission of the crime. The search, being an
incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its
validity.
PESTILOS VS. GENEROSO
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme
Court (SC) holds that the following must be present
for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from
the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge.—The clincher in the element of “personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances” is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required
time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the
police officers have gathered the facts or perceived
the circumstances within a very limited time frame.
This guarantees that the police officers would have
no time to base their probable cause finding on facts
or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation. The reason for the element of the
immediacy is this — as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the
pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with
the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the police officer’s determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited
to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of
time. The same provision adds another safeguard
with the requirement of probable cause as the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances
before the police officer could effect a valid
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
warrantless arrest. In light of the discussion above on
the developments of Sec- tion 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our
jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following
must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the
facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.
The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; With these facts
and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one
hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners,
we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless
arrests.—To summarize, the arresting officers went to
the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime
transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by
the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what
transpired. With these facts and circumstances that
the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time
that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the
time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying
the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within then police officers’
observation, perception and evaluation at the time of
the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers’ personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to
be arrested has recently committed the crime.—To
reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed
under the terms of the above cited provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this
case) and the police officer has probable cause to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 77
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime. Considering the
circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality
where it took place, its occasion, the personal
circumstances of the parties, and the immediate
on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
FACTS: On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the
morning, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso). Atty. Generoso called the Central Police
District, Station 6 to report the incident.4 Acting on
this report, several police officers were dispatched to
to go to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance. The police officers arrived at the scene of
the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as
those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan
Hills Police Station for investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to
Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a
bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived
the attack.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They
alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crimeThe
records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005,
at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued
between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the
petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS
WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.c
HELD:
Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the
scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hourafter the alleged mauling; the alleged crime
transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty.
Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted
by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of
the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the
police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso
in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively
identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled
him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened
in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police
officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v.
Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless
arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the
police officers have complied with the requirements set
under Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought
to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the
incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police
officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed — the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 78
committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the
scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of
the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that
the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,
particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties,
and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took
place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Refer to previous digest
ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva’s arrest falls within
the purview of valid warrantless arrests – NO, but
estopped.
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within
the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took
place on the day of the alleged shooting incident.
Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any
warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained
is, consequently, inadmissible.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment
stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner was
admissible in evidence against him; that the search
conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise
the issue regarding the apprehending officers’
non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
9165 for the first time on appeal.
HELD: Accused-appellant is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between
accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none
of the above that would make the warrantless arrest
lawful.
Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant
never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the
case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly
and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court and waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest.
PEOPLE VS. MIRANDA
It has been ruled time and again that non-compliance
with Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 does not make
the items seized inadmissible. Substantial compliance
thereof is sufficient. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS: Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a
buy-bust operation was conducted to apprehend
Miranda. After the consummation of the sale of shabu,
the poseur-buyer introduced himself as a police officer
to appellant. Appellant tried to flee, but a police officer
was able to grab him by his left hand and recover
another plastic sachet of suspected shabu.
Appellant through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
challenged the earlier decision of the RTC finding
Miranda liable for violating RA 9165. The PAO averred
that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken
chain of custody over the evidence. The PAO stressed
that, other than the marking made by P/CI Chica on the
specimens, there was no testimony that the specimens
were photographed in the presence of the appellant, a
member of the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative, and an elective government official.
Likewise, the marking was not done immediately upon
seizure as the specimens were marked only upon
arrival at the PDEA office.
ISSUE: Is the strict enforcement of RA 9165 proper to
warrant Miranda’s conviction?
HELD: Yes. It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal
drugs in this case was brought about by a buy-bust
operation – a form of entrapment that is resorted to for
trapping and capturing criminals. It is legal and has
been proved to be an effective method of apprehending
drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards is undertaken. Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a buy-bust operation is
employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 79
The Court gives full faith and credence to the
testimonies of the police officers and upholds the
presumption of regularity in the apprehending
officers’ performance of official duty. It is a settled
rule that in cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for
they are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary.
Lastly, on the argument of appellant that there was
no immediate marking of the seized item and thus
created a broken chain of custody, the same cannot
prosper.
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 pertinently
provides: The apprehending officer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.
Evidently, the law itself lays down exceptions to its
requirements. Thus, non-compliance with the above
mentioned requirements is not fatal. In fact it has
been ruled time and again that non-compliance with
Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items
seized inadmissible. Substantial compliance thereof
is sufficient. "What is essential is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused." Here, the records reveal that the police
officers substantially complied with the process of
preserving the integrity of the seized shabu.
COMERCIANTE VS. PP
FACTS: According to the prosecution, at around 10
o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS
group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were
aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on
their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay
Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2)
men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain
Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking
that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a
distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed
that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC,
thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's
failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to
present his evidence. RTC found Comerciante guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. The RTC found that PO3 Calag
conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante,
which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu.
In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable
cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that
PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was
carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach
and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that
absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled
by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have
properly performed his duty when he arrested
Comerciante.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless
arrest?
HELD: Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure
becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect
people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides an
exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 80
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to
operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of
the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows
for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In the instant case, there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag
himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour
when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing
around and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing,
he decided to effect an arrest.
It highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming
that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify
with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance
of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance
inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other
overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante
as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that
the former had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of
standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante
and his companion were showing "improper and
unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his
reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he
had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in
possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars
on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that
what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed
shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the
rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it. As already discussed, the factual
backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3
Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not
enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had just committed a crime;
a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which
does not obtain in this case.
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's
acts of standing around with a companion and handing
over something to the latter do not constitute criminal
acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct
a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the
"stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be
deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor
a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante.
As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Comerciante must necessarily be
HOMAR VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile
hunter, PO1 Tan saw the petitioner crossing a "No
Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. Tan and
Civilian Agent Tangcoy immediately accosted him and
told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground,
prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery
of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough
search on the petitioner’s body and found and
confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he
suspected as shabu.
The petitioner was then charged for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165.
ISSUE: Whether there was a lawful arrest? No.
HELD: To determine the admissibility of the seized
drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 81
contraband was lawful. There must be a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede
the search. For this purpose, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides the only occasions when a
person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In
the present case, the respondent alleged that the
petitioner’s warrantless arrest was due to his
commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in
the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence of or
within the view of the arresting officer.
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality
of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti
of the crime - shabu- was obtained. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be
inadmissible as evidence against him.
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on
the petitioner’s body. Particularly, the prosecution
failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a
crime, to wit:
1. Tan merely stated that the petitioner
"crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a
place not designated for crossing."
2. Respondent failed to prove that the portion
of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner
crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area.
The petitioner was also not charged of
jaywalking.
FILING OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE NOT A
CONDITION PRECEDENT
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal
charge is not a condition precedent to prove a
valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal
charge against an accused, the prosecution is not
relieved from its burden to prove that there was
indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of
the crime.
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
This presumption cannot overcome the presumption
of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights
enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
elementary principle accords every accused the right to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.
INDISPENSABILITY OF THE INTENT TO ARREST
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching
of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of
the petitioner, to wit:
1. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the
petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him
but accosted him and pointed to him the right
place for crossing.
2. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered
by the fact that there was no criminal charge
that was filed against the petitioner for crossing
a "no jaywalking" area.
3. From Tan’s testimony, the intent to arrest the
petitioner only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for
which they informed him of his constitutional
rights and brought him to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in
a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was
emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines. The
Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused
in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the
police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no
intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the
lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was
unlawful.
In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is
further highlighted when it was not recovered
immediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was
any, but only after the initial search resulted in the
recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan,
Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of
the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the
shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his
person was callously brushed aside twice by the
arresting police officers.31
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not
timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment as required by the Rules.1âwphi1However,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 82
this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects
the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is
well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest,
its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction
and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.
SARAUM VS. PEOPLE
Summary of facts: PDEA conducted a buy-bust
operation for one “Pata”. Saraum was not the subject
for the buy-bust operation but during the pursuit of
“Pata”, the PDEA team found him in the act of doing
a shabu pot session. “Pata” run towards his house
where Saraum and one other person were using
prohibited drugs.
FACTS:
 Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12
or RA No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
 In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of
a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.
 According to the prosecution:
o PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation at
Brgy. Lorega, Cebu City.
o During the operation, the subject of the
buy-bust operation “Pata” eluded arrest as
he tried to run to his shanty.
o Inside the house, which was divided with a
curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also
saw Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who
were holding drug paraphernalia
apparently in preparation to have a
"shabu" pot session.
 Saraum claimed as a defense that he was merely
passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the
house of his parents-in-law when men with
firearms (PDEA team) held him. They were
already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were
his neighbors.
 Believing that he had not committed anything
illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the
criminal charge only when he was brought to the
court.
 RTC convicted him. The CA upheld RTC’s
decision.
 Accused Saraum questioned the lower court’s
ruling alleging that the arrest was invalid because
there was no warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
HELD: Yes.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a
crime, which instance does not require a warrant
in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense
in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a
valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pate," who,
in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum
and Esperanza were incidentally caught in
possession of the illegal items.
Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with
regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust
operation and his possession of the seized items that
he claims to have "countless, lawful uses."
On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have
adequately explained the respective uses of the items
to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia.
There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory
examination and finding as to the presence or absence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal
substances on said items since possession itself is the
punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the
right to search the shanty for objects relating to the
crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found.
In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently
saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items
were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in
seizing them. Considering that Saraum's arrest was
legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were
likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded
from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated
drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain
the judgment of conviction.
NOTE: Even if SC considers the arrest as invalid,
Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection
thereto when he did not raise the issue before
entering his plea.
"The established rule is that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the
objection is deemed waived."
In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its
objection to the admission of the seized drug
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 83
paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only
during the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution.
WARRANTLESS ARREST
FACTS: According to the prosecution, at around 10
o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS
group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were
aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on
their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay
Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2)
men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain
Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one
of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters,
PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated
two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for
a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher
in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were
just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road,
were arrested and taken to a police station. There,
the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal
drugs from them and were asked money in exchange
for their release. When they failed to accede to the
demand, they were brought to another police station
to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs
ISSUE: WON there was a lawful warrantless arrest
made against Comerciante and Dasilla?
HELD: NO. The warrantless arrest made was not
lawful.
25Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides three (3) instances
when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed;
(c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate,
two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.27 On
the other hand,
Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time
of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge
of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant
case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3
Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30
kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and
Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. ON THE BASIS OF THE
FOREGOING, HE DECIDED TO EFFECT AN
ARREST.
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly
implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he
has perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside
two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act could be
properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former
had just committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around
with a companion and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were
showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put
by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient
in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. That his reasonable suspicion
bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow
officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b)
his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was
still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the
rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 84
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it. As already discussed,
the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to
show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by
Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the
arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime
must, in fact, have been committed first, which
does not obtain in this case.
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF ILLEGAL
ARREST
PEOPLEVS. EDAÑO
FACTS:
 The prosecution charged the appellant and
Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate
Informations.
 The evidence for the prosecution established that
on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the
Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, together
with a female informant, went to the parking area
of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an
entrapment operation against a certain alias
"Nato."
 At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on
board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The
informant approached the appellant and talked to
him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant
waved at PO3 Corbe
 When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant,
the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away.
PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia
chased the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab
the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the
ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied"
transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right
hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in
the appellant’s waist. The other members of the
police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police
brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items
to the police station for investigation.
 The seized items were examined and found them
positive for the presence of shabu.
The appellant, for his part, testified that at around
4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi on the
phone, and informed him that the motorbike starter
the latter needed was already available.9 On the
same day, Vanessa Paduada called the appellant,
and asked for the directions to McDonalds, West
Avenue.10 At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and Ruben
arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on board a
space wagon. The appellant met them at the
subdivision gate, and showed the starter to Siochi.
Thereafter, Vanessa called on the appellant’s cellular
phone. The appellant then boarded the vehicle, and
told Siochi that he would just talk to a person at
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
McDonalds.11 When the space wagon arrived at
McDonalds, the appellant alighted from the vehicle and
proceeded towards the restaurant’s entrance.
Afterwards, Vanessa called him from inside a parked
car. The appellant approached Vanessa who, for her
part, alighted from the car. Vanessa told the appellant
to get inside the car’s rear. The appellant did as
instructed; Vanessa went to the front passenger seat,
beside a male driver.12 Immediately after, the male
driver alighted from the vehicle and entered the car’s
rear. The appellant went out of the car, but the male
driver followed him and grabbed his hand. The
appellant resisted, and wrestled with the driver along
West Avenue. During this commotion, the appellant
heard a gunfire; four (4) persons approached him, and
then tied his hands with a masking tape.13 The police
placed him on board a pick-up truck, and then brought
him to Bicutan. In Bicutan, the police brought him to the
interrogation room, where they punched him and
placed a plastic on his head.14
The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however,
acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbe’s
testimony was "vague and equivocal;" it lacked details
on how the appellant was lured to sell shabu to the
informant, and how the entrapment operation had been
planned. The appellant also argued that his warrantless
arrest was illegal since he was not committing any
crime when the police arrested him. He also claimed
that the police did not mark and photograph the seized
items, and that there was a broken chain of custody
over the confiscated drugs.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with
the argument that the testimony of PO3 Corbe was
clear and convincing; the inconsistencies in his court
testimony pertained only to minor details. It also
claimed that the appellant’s arrest was valid, and the
seized shabu was admissible in evidence. Finally, the
OSG maintained that there was no break in the chain of
custody over the seized plastic bag containing shabu.19
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.
HELD: Warrantless arrest invalid; seized items
inadmissible.
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of
a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed
to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3
Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was
actually committing, or was attempting to commit a
crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant
and the informant were just talking with each other
when he approached them.
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and
the informant were just talking to each other; there was
no exchange of money and drugs when he approached
the car. Notably,while it is true that the informant waved
at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the
pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 85
been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on
cross-examination that he had no personal
knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug
and gun inside the space wagon when he
approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3
Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the police
officer with personal knowledge that the appellant
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity.
As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when
PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per seis not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,
for even in high crime areas there are many innocent
reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses,and fear of being wrongfully apprehended
as a guilty party.Thus, appellant’s attempt to run
away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various
explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it
could likewise signify innocence.24
In other words, trying to run away when no crime
has been overtly committed, and without more,
cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest
was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic
bag containing white crystalline substances seized
from him is inadmissible in evidence, having
comefrom an invalid search and seizure
WHEN TO RAISE ILLEGALITY OF ARREST
ROALLOS VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Roallos was charged in an Information for
the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 before the RTC.
Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed
that, on the date of the incident, he merely stayed
with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited
for her mother; that he went out of the office twice to
meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed
that his arrest was illegal since the same was
effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise
averred that he was not informed of his rights
when he was arrested nor was he made to
undergo any preliminary investigation.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Roallos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
Roallos appealed the case until it reached the
Supreme Court. In support of the instant petition He
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
argues, among other things, that he was denied due
process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary
investigation. Roallos also asserts that his arrest was
illegal considering that the same was effected sans any
warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge
against him should have been dismissed considering
the unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.
ISSUE: WON Roallos was denied due process since
he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and
that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation?
NO
HELD: In Miclat, Jr. v. People, the Court emphasized
that the accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to
move for the quashal of the information against him
on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no
objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise
this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Similarly, in Villarin v. People, the Court stressed that
the absence of a proper preliminary investigation
must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to
have waived his right to a preliminary investigation
by entering his plea and actively participating in the
trial without raising the lack of a preliminary
investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised and must not have
been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the
case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or
require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which,
necessarily "involves a re-examination and
re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial
finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the
Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation."
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment,
Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed
illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper
preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus,
he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity
in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE VS. VASQUEZ
FACTS: A confidential informant reported to P/Insp.
Fajardo about the illegal drug activities of alias Don.
P/Insp. Fajardo then formed a buy-bust team. P/Insp.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 86
Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don
at Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon
City and was able to convince alias Don that she was
a good buyer of shabu. The latter demanded a
second meeting to see the money.
After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo was
furnished with five genuine ₱500.00 bills together
with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed
her initials in the genuine bills below the name
"Benigno Aquino, Jr." After meeting with P/Insp.
Fajardo, alias Don decided that the drug deal would
take place in front of alias Don’s rented apartment on
Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila.
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around
2AM. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked
towards the direction of alias Don’s apartment. Alias
Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope,
which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed
to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the
buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal
which was to scratch her hair to indicate the
consummation of the deal.
The rest of the team rushed to the suspects. Upon
frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces
of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. PO2 Trambulo
marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT"
and the date. The police officers then informed the
suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the
police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don
handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, it contained six pieces of
plastic bags of white crystalline substance.
Examination revealed that the white crystalline
substances were positive for methamphetamine
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI,
working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics
Chemistry Division. He alleged that policemen
entered his rented apartment and kicked down the
door to his room while he was sleeping. He woke up
to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw
that there were six policemen searching his room,
picking up what they could get. One of them opened
a cabinet and got drug specimens in Donald’s
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory
aide.
RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged.
CA affirmed the conviction of the appellant.
The appellant appealed his case to the SC to once
again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the
purported illegality of the search and the ensuing
arrest done by the police officers and (2) his
supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs
seized from him. He argues that the police officers
did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest
at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite
the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample
time to secure a warrant of arrest against him.
Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant
avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the
crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that
he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his
custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with
the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused can still raise the
illegality of his arrest before the Supreme Court?
HELD: NO. The SC held in People v. Tampis that "any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of
the information against them before their arraignment,
appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon
their voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is
that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a
buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the
ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without
warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the
validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court
holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs
from the appellant is likewise valid.
SC held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1)
search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by
invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the
subsequent search upon his person.
PRIVACY
FERNANDO VS. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE
FACTS: Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC)
and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc.
(SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with
principal offices and business addresses at Leon
Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 87
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the
fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities,
and other improvements.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina
sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same
time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide
parking space for vehicles to park.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for
prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC),
docketed as SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK.11
The respondents argued that the petitioners were
acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance
No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by
virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for
the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the
promotion of public convenience and general
prosperity.
RTC: It further found that the 80% see-thru fence
requirement could run counter to the respondents’
right to privacy, considering that the property also
served as a residence of the Benedictine sisters, who
were entitled to some sense of privacy in their affairs.
It also found that the respondents were able to prove
that the danger to security had no basis in their case.
Moreover, it held that the purpose of beautification
could not be used to justify the exercise of police
power.
ISSUE: W/N the exposure of respondents’ property
via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to
privacy. YES
HELD: 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1
limiting the height of fences to one meter and
requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least
80% see-thru, should remain valid and enforceable
against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test,
the petitioners must show the reasonable relation
between the purpose of the police power measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.36
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage,
suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or
unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is
clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
and security. The means employed by the petitioners,
however, is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly
oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not
adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to
this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide
better protection and a higher level of security, or serve
as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall
solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such
exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be
criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence
would be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears
that the respondents’ concrete wall has served as more
than sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed
ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may not,
under the guise of police power, infringe on private
rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic appearance of
the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive
how a see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness"
between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in
accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their
property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to
privacy, considering that the residence of the
Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
The right to privacy has long been considered a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right
to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone,37 as
governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.38 It is
inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.39
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result
in an undue interference with the respondents’ rights to
property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192
is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents.
IN RE: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ (2013 MFR)
FACTS: On 15 November 2011, the Court
promulgated its Decision in the present case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for
Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos,
Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin
Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 88
take the appropriate action with respect to any
possible liability or liabilities, within their respective
legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The
Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to
this Court the results of their action within a period of
six months from receipt of this Decision.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their Motion
for Reconsideration,1 arguing that the soldiers
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military cannot be held
accountable for authoring the abduction and
torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve
solely on the claim that respondents were never
specifically mentioned by name as having
performed, permitted, condoned, authorized, or
allowed the commission of any act or incurrence
omission which would violate or threaten with
violation the rights to life, liberty, and security of
petitioner-respondent and his family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman submitted the
Investigation Report, as compliance with the Court’s
directive to take appropriate action with respect to
possible liabilities respondents may have incurred.
The exhaustive report detailed the steps taken by the
Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil, or
administrative liabilities may be imputed to the
respondents. It was reflected therein that the lawyers
for the Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that
the latter are hesitant to appear before them for
security reasons.
HELD: Recent information, however, revealed that
Noriel and his family are no longer interested in
participating in the present case.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
available to the petitioner. As explained in the
Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability
for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
even administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a
standard for the grant of the writ was correctly
applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon v.
Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all
the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In
other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the
privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present motion
for reconsideration raises no new issues that would
convince us otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not competently
identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained
the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their
names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The
CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay7 as a meticulous and straightforward account
of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the
manner in which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the NPA.
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the
violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be
caused not only by a public official’s act, but also by his
omission. Accountability may attach to respondents
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.15 The
duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective.
HING VS. CHOACHUY
FACTS: On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill
and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners
of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development &
Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C,
adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents
constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo
Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case,
Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction
would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent
to petitioners property; that the court, in that case,
denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for
failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to
get evidence to support the said case, respondents on
June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners property; that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 89
respondents, through their employees and without
the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners on-going construction; and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners right to privacy. Thus,
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to
remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined
from conducting illegal surveillance.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents
claimed that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras ,nor did they order their employees to take
pictures of petitioners construction. They also
clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are
mere stockholders.
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order
granting the application for a TRO.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the
RTC denied the same in its Order dated February 6,
2006.
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting
the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave
abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive
writ. The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was
not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence. The CA also
said that since respondents are not the owners of the
building, they could not have installed video
surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus,
they are not the proper parties.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there is a violation of
petitioners right to privacy?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution
and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as
to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
sensibilities. "It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned.
"Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let
alone."
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to
privacy and protects them against the States abuse
of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one,
not even the State, except "in case of overriding social
need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their
homes.
CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his
castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter.
"The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil
law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy
of anothers residence." This does not mean, however,
that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because
the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is
entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to
enter may come in.
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as
his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.
POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test to determine whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 90
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy must be determined on a
case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are
installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers
residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for
Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the
application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by respondents of a revolving camera,
even if it were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of
the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on
respondents property or the roof of the factory at the
back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it
actually spans through a good portion of the land of
petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court
understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up
deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in
his property. The monitor showed only a portion of
the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to
secure the building and factory premises, then the
camera should revolve only towards their properties
at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the
petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as
property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of
a third person."
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners
property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right
to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not
belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
is discretionary on the part of the court taking
cognizance of the case and should not be interfered
with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of
any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in
finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.
DISINI VS. SOJ
FACTS:These consolidated petitions seek to declare
several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional
and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use
of the cyberspace.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks
to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the
following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard
certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their
commission as well as provisions that would enable the
government to track down and penalize violators.
These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in
the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of
Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination
of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 91
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access
to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and
Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of
related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on
the crime of libel.
ISSUES: Are the following provisions of the
Cybercrime Law unconstitutional for violating the
right to privacy?
A. Section 4(b)(3) – No
B. Section 12 - Yes
RULING: Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:x xxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:x xxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The
intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if
no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy
and correspondence.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of
the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court
acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in
Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy
exists independently of its identification with liberty; it
is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is
the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The
Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon" the relevance of these zones to the
right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in
our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law
and in accordance with customary legal process.
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones
arises not only from our conviction that the right
to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the
right most valued by civilized men," but also from
our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones
of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is the basis of the
right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence. In assessing
the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
The usual identifying information regarding a person
includes his name, his citizenship, his residence
address, his contact number, his place and date of birth,
the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and
similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly
to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how
government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well
as the right to due process of law.
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic
Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record
by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a
computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s
origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service, but not
content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or
disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate
and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated
information.
The court warrant required under this section
shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce and the showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that
any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed, or is being committed, or is
about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence
that will be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution
of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 92
and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement
agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data
in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or
provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim
that data showing where digital messages come from,
what kind they are, and where they are destined
need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners
invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to
be protected from government snooping into the
messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a
proper governmental purpose since a law may
require the disclosure of matters normally considered
private but then only upon showing that such
requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of
the law, that there is a compelling State interest
behind the law, and that the provision itself is
narrowly drawn. In assessing regulations affecting
privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate
concerns of the State against constitutional
guarantees.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in
enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put
order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for
public good. To do this, it is within the realm of
reason that the government should be able to
monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all
sorts of cybercrimes.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of
Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample
safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and
invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is
understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in
Morfe v. Mutuc that certain constitutional
guarantees work together to create zones of
privacy wherein governmental powers may not
intrude, and that there exists an independent
constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be
left alone has been regarded as the beginning of
all freedoms.
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,
the United States Supreme Court classified privacy
into two categories: decisional privacy and
informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves
the right to independence in making certain
important decisions, while informational privacy
refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to
informational privacy—that those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data
in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right
not to have private information disclosed, and the
right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter
is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective
test, where one claiming the right must have an
actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a
certain matter. The second is an objective test,
where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being
challenged, not in relation to its application to a
particular person or group, petitioners’ challenge to
Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of
electronic devices to communicate with one another.
Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general public’s point of view.
Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it
would have no basis in fact.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it
says that traffic data collection should not disclose
identities or content data, such restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law
enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands
from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver
and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data
to those "associated with specified communications."
But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would
specify the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities
to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever
specified communication they want. This evidently
threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs
to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time"
because it is not possible to get a court warrant that
would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving
vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a
police officer’s determination of probable cause that a
crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity
for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is
immediately carried out, the thing to be searched
stands to be removed. These preconditions are not
provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that
Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users
and that the procedure envisioned by the law could be
better served by providing for more robust safeguards.
His bare assurance that law enforcement authorities
will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course
not enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace
communications in real time and determine their
sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow
the government and kindred institutions to monitor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 93
individuals and place them under surveillance in
ways that have previously been impractical or even
impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x xx
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society." The Court must ensure that laws
seeking to take advantage of these technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time; and
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or
the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
PRIOR RESTRAINTS/SUBSEQUENT
PUNISHMENT
GARCIA VS. MANRIQUE
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from an article in
Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation
wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor,
which allegedly contained disparaging statements
against the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged
that the subject article undermines the people’s faith
in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they
employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the
Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 185132.
The pertinent portions of the article which was
entitled, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱
20-M?" Prior to the publication of the foregoing article,
two (2) interrelated petitions were filed before this
Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 185132 and 181311,
entitled Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. and Province of Bataan v. Hon.
Remigio M. Escalada, respectively.
Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or
defamatory in his article since he only stated the facts
or circumstances which attended the issuance of the
TRO. He likewise denied that he made any
degrading remarks against the Supreme Court and
claimed that the article simply posed academic
questions. If the article ever had a critical undertone,
it was directed against the actions of the petitioners,
who are public officers, and never against the
Supreme Court. At any rate, he asseverated that
whatever was stated in his article is protected by the
constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
ISSUE:Is the article protected by constitutional
freedom of speech and press? NO
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
HELD: Contempt, by reason of publications relating to
court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A
publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass
or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This
is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the
majority. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand
of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or
to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is
no contempt where there is no action pending, as there
is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt
exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
x x x Courts would lose their utility if public confidence
in them is destroyed.
We find the subject article illustrative of the second kind
of contemptuous publication for insinuating that this
Court’s issuance of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was
founded on an illegal cause. The glaring innuendos of
illegality in the article is denigrating to the dignity of this
Court and the ideals of fairness and justice that it
represents. It is demonstrative of disrespect not only for
this Court, but also for the judicial system as a whole,
tends to promote distrust and undermines public
confidence in the judiciary by creating the impression
that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially. The article does not aim for an academic
discussion of the propriety of the issuance of the TRO
but seeks to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this
Court. To suggest that the processes of this Court can
be obtained through underhand means or that their
issuance is subject to negotiation and that members of
this Court are easily swayed by money is a serious
affront to the integrity of the highest court of the land.
Such imputation smacks of utter disrespect to this Court
and such temerity is deserving of contempt. While he
claims good faith, the contents of his article bespeak
otherwise. A person’s intent, however good it maybe,
cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or
writing. It is gathered from what is apparent, not on
supposed or veiled objectives.
Constitutional protection to free speech and press is not
a shield against scurrilous publications, which are
heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but
to trigger doubt on their integrity based on some
imagined possibilities. In Alarcon, we emphasized that
it is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of
speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that
freedom should not be confused with freedom in its true
sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing
vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 94
Constitution than the fullest protection of their
legitimate exercise. As important as is the
maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its
administration of justice and secure in its continuous
enjoyment of public confidence. x x x.
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of
equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,
within the context, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. Manrique's article, lacking in
social value and aimed solely at besmirching the
reputation of the Court, is undeserving of the
protection of the guaranties of free speech and press.
DISINI VS. SOJ
FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to
declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer,
a person can connect to the internet, a system that
links him to other computers.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
The government asserts that the law merely seeks to
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system.
HELD: Overbreadth Doctrine (Data Interference)
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic
data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from
overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms
at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course
an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or the
fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of
citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries
of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind
of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing
and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the
chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since
Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to
punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free
exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on
petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no
set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.
Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
Overbreadth Doctrine (Aiding and Abetting)
Section 5 (Aiding and Abetting) in relation to Section
4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography is unconstitutional.
Section 5 renders criminally liable any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes.
It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines
for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The
terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and
other messages.
In effect, actions such as “Liking”, or Commenting” on
or “Sharing” an online post that is found to be
defamatory is not punishable as “aiding or abetting” a
cybercrime offense. However, if the “Comment” does
not merely react to the original posting but creates an
altogether new defamatory story, then that should be
considered an original posting published on the internet.
Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly
punish authors of defamatory publications.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of
cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to
apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section
4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6)
on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 95
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1)
on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the
exercise of the freedom of expression. The crime of
willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is
for the same reason not objectionable.
Generally, the void for vagueness doctrine does not
apply to penal statutes. By way of exception, when a
penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, a facial challenge grounded on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who
claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise
any constitutional ground – absence of due process,
lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based
solely on the violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may
for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own rights under the assailed statute
where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the
"chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does
not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being
charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
chills him into silence.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an
incomparable, pervasive medium of communication.
It is inevitable that any government threat of
punishment regarding certain uses of the medium
creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of
the great masses that use it. In this case, the
particularly complex web of interaction on social
media websites would give law enforcers such
latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively
enforce the law.
GMA VS COMELEC
FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in
issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution)
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during
the forth coming elections.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of monitoring
requirement ( The airtime minutes spent by the
numerous candidates for various elective positions, in
real time. Requirement of submission of certain
documents to aid the Comelec in ensuring that
candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed
limits). contending, among others, that it constitutes
prior restraint
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 on airtimelimits violates freedom
of expression, of speech and of the press.
b. Whether or not the monitoring requirement
constitutes prior restraint
HELD:
1. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on
airtime limits also goes against the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of
the press
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without
the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said.
And where there is a need to reach a large audience,
the need to access the means and media for such
dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press
and broadcast media come along. At the same time,
the right to speak and to reach out would not be
meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a
few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable
means by which the communicator and the audience
could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits unreasonably restricts
the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important
expressions protected by the Fundamental Law.
"[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press
are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected
at all costs for the sake of democracy."51 Accordingly,
the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise
justified by a compelling state interest.
The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here,
the adverted reason for imposing the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing
field - does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the
COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly
after one has clipped its wings.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 96
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to
adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast
time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be nece
essary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to.
To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself - a form of suppression of his political
speech.
Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is arguably
the most costeffective medium of dissemination.
Even a slight increase in television exposure can
significantly boost a candidate's popularity, name
recall and electability."54 If that be so, then drastically
curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively reach
out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his
freedom to speak as a means of connecting with the
people.
Finally on this matter, it is pertinent to quote what
Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion in the
landmark Pentagon Papers case: "In the First
Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential
role in our democracy. The press was to serve the
governed, not the governors. The Government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the
Government. The press was protected so that it
could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government."55
In the ultimate analysis, when the press is silenced,
or otherwise muffled in its undertaking of acting as a
sounding board, the people ultimately would be the
victims.
2. Held: the Reporting Requirement for the
COMELEC's monitoring is reasonable.
Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted
by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and
candidates are afforded equal opportunities to
promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the
restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, the
directive to give prior notice is not unduly
burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it
be characterized as prior restraint since there is no
restriction on dissemination of information before
broadcast.
Comparing the original with the revised paragraph,
one could readily appreciate what the COMELEC
had done - to modify the requirement from "prior
approval" to "prior notice." While the former may be
suggestive of a censorial tone, thus inviting a charge
of prior restraint, the latter is more in the nature of a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
content-neutral regulation designed to assist the poll
body to undertake its job of ensuring fair
RAPPLER VS. BAUTISTA
FACTS: Media corporations, such as ABS-CBN and
GMA, (called the “Lead Networks”) as well as other
outlets, such as petitioner Rappler, Inc. entered into a
Memorandum Agreement with COMELEC, chaired by
Andres D. Bautista, to enter into a broadcast pool for
the coverage of the 2016 presidential and
vice-presidential debates. This means that the several
parties involved share the same video and audio for the
debates. The parties involved also agreed to share on
the expenses and the sponsorship. The assailed
provision in the Agreement under the topic of “Online
Streaming” is as follows:
19. Subject to copyright conditions or separate
negotiations with the Lead Networks, allow the debates
they have produced to be shown or streamed on other
websites;
Rappler had many questions about this provision
directed to Andres D. Bautista, but the latter never
answered the same. Given the importance and time
constraint, the Supreme Court immediately addressed
Rappler’s concerns.
ISSUE 1: Can the online streaming be subjected to
copyright conditions? Held: Yes. Thus, the copyright
conditions for the debates are: (1) the reproduction or
communication to the public by mass media of the
debates is for information purposes; (2) the debates
have not been expressly reserved by the Lead
Networks (copyright holders); and (3) the source is
clearly indicated. (In other words, if Rappler wanted to
play the video of ABS-CBN, then it should stream the
video as it is, unaltered.)
ISSUE 2: What if Rappler wanted an unedited video
because it did not want the advertisements? Answer:
If petitioner opts for a clean feed without the proprietary
graphics used by the Lead Networks, in order for
petitioner to layer its own proprietary graphics and text
on the same, then petitioner will have to negotiate
separately with the Lead Networks. Similarly, if
petitioner wants to alter the debate audio by deleting
the advertisements, petitioner will also have to
negotiate with the Lead Networks.
ISSUE 3: Can Rappler also stream the audio? Held:
Yes. Audio of presidential debates belongs to public
domain. Even those not part of the Agreeement, such
as radios stations, have the right to the audio. Once the
conditions imposed under Section 184.1(c) of the IPC
are complied with, the information - in this case the live
audio of the debates -now forms part of the public
domain. There is now freedom of the press to report or
publicly disseminate the live audio of the debates. In
fact, the MOA recognizes the right of other mass media
entities, not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the
debates subject only to the same copyright conditions.
The freedom of the press to report and disseminate the
live audio of the debates, subject to compliance with
Section 184.1(c) of the IPC, can no longer be infringed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 97
or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the
press to report and disseminate the live audio of the
debates is now protected and guaranteed under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that "[N]o law shall be passed abridging the
freedom x x x of the press."
The presidential and vice-presidential debates are
held primarily for the benefit of the electorate to assist
the electorate in making informed choices on election
day. Through the conduct of the national debates
among presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
the electorate will have the "opportunity to be
informed of the candidates' qualifications and track
record, platforms and programs, and their answers to
significant issues of national concern. The political
nature of the national debates and the public's
interest in the wide availability of the information for
the voters' education certainly justify allowing the
debates to be shown or streamed in other websites
for wider dissemination, in accordance with the MOA.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 786 SCRA 931 (N/A)
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
MARANTAN VS. DIOKNO
FACTS: The criminal cases involve an incident which
transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton
Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis Xavier
Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and
killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower
at Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a
television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting
incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan
was the ground commander in a police-military team,
which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men
(Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to
Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of
the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty.
Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and
conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press
conference. During the press conference, they
maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable
comments on the conduct of the Court in handling
G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious
comments on the merits of the criminal cases before
the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused
guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in
"TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan
quotes a portion of the interview, as follows:
Atty. Diokno: So ang lumabas din sa video that the
actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang
nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay
sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang
nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano: Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper
dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming sa
buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo
na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o: Sinasabi nila na may
kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong
kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so
arrogant because they protected him all these years.
They let him get away with it. So even now, so
confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering
so many innocent individuals.
Atty. Diokno: Despite the overwhelming evidence,
however, Supt. Marantan and company have never
been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their
participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were
commended by their superiors and some like Marantan
were even promoted to our consternation and disgust.
Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition
in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po
kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. –
hangang ngayon wala pa pong action ang Supreme
Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng
homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they
were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno: Eight years have passed since our love
ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed
them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who
is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and
remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just
humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out
will not stop until you personally intervene.
Ernesto Manzano: Up to this date, we are still praying
for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o: Ilalaban namin ito no matter
what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean
everything shows that they were murdered.
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub
judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt
under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for
their contemptuous statements and improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice. He argues that
their pronouncements and malicious comments delved
not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in
resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely
concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of
murder. It is Maranta’s position that the press
conference was organized by the respondents for the
sole purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in
the petition filed before it and the outcome of the
criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible
parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the
Atimonan incident.
The respondents, in their Comment, argue that there
was no violation of the sub judice rule as their
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 98
statements were legitimate expressions of their
desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of
context and did not actually impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in a concrete
way; that no criminal intent was shown as the
utterances were not on their face actionable being a
fair comment of a matter of public interest and
concern; and that this petition is intended to stifle
legitimate speech.
ISSUE:: Whether or not the sub judice rule has been
violated.
HELD: The petition must fail.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect
contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt
are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is
conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is
an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt,
and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended
to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court
"it must really appear" that such does impede,
interfere with and embarrass the administration of
justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale
for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in
order to allow them to conduct their business
unhampered by publications and comments which
tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As
important as the maintenance of freedom of speech,
is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may
serve as an aid in determining the proper
constitutional boundary between these two rights.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment must be "extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high"
before an utterance can be punished. There must exist
a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm
the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should
not be impaired through the exercise of the power of
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the
utterances in question make a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.
The contemptuous statements made by the
respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case,
particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the
Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the
respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion
that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This
is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No.
199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the
charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no
malice on the face of the said statements. The mere
restatement of their argument in their petition cannot
actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the
respondents' comments reveals that they were simply
stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There
was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed
without any action from the Court. There appears no
attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding
still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such
a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly
and fair administration of justice." By no stretch of the
imagination could the respondents' comments pose a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred
from the comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline
instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases. The power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is
wanting.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
CONTEMPT OF COURT
RE: LETTER OF THE UP FACULTY
FACTS: On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya
Lolas (in the case of Vinuya vs Executive Sec), Attys. H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 99
for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as
one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010,
entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22
and on Atty. Roque’s blog.
The Court in a resolution (Show Cause Resolution)
directed the law professors to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the bar.
ISSUE: 1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny
respondents their freedom of expression? No
HELD: The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression. A reading
of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a
decision of the Court nor that they had charged one
of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who
are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have
expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in
the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the
Court considered excessive and uncalled for under
the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the
UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that
respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their
expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth "when it was "[o]f public
knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.
The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers
must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the
limits of fair comment and common decency.
In a democracy, members of the legal community are
hardly expected to have monolithic views on any
subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of
conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from
criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they
are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable
qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There
is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or
the law school to which they belong.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 SALN
FACTS: Rowena Paraan, a Research Director of the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)
and Karol Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ
sought for copies of Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Net worth (SALN) and the Personal DateSheet (PDS)
or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of its Justices for the year
2008 for the purpose of updating their database of
information on governmental officials to the Court. The
special committee created by the Supreme Court
chaired by then Associate Justice Minita
V.Chico-Nazario to review the request issued a
Memorandum recommending the creation of a
Committee on Public Disclosure to take over the
functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
with respect to requests for copies of SALN and other
personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the
documents that were asked were filed.
ISSUE: Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the
right to information?
HELD: Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand
with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service.
But the right to information is not absolute. It is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to
that right:(1) national security matters and intelligence
information;(2) trade secrets and banking
transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other
confidential information such as confidential or
classified information officially known to public officers
and employees by reason of their office and not made
available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and
the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
SERENO VS CTRM OF NEDA
FACTS: Respondent Committee on Trade and Related
Matters (CTRM), an office under the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA), is an advisory body of
the President and the NEDA relating to tariffs and
related matters.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 100
Respondent held a meeting in which it resolved to
recommend to President GMA the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products.
Petitioner, the president of Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the PH (APMP),
wrote to respondent to request a copy of the minutes
of their meeting.
The respondent refused on the ground that such
documents or records fall under the concept of
privileged matters under RA 6713 and its IRR.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a mandamus case with the
RTC to compel respondent to furnish them with the
minutes. The petitioner invoked their right to
information under the Constitution and argued,
among others, that the minutes sought is not
privileged and that the committee members of
respondent are not part of the President’s Cabinet
who enjoy executive privilege.
ISSUE: Whether respondents may be compelled
to furnish petitioner with the minutes of their
meeting.
HELD: NO. The constitutional guarantee of the right
to information on matters of public concern
enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution complements the State’s policy of full
public disclosure in all transactions involving public
interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the
1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at
ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in
the operations of the Government, and at
safeguarding the exercise by the people of the
freedom of expression.
Two requisites must concur before the right to
information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to
matters of public concern or public interest. And,
secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in
determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern or public interest. However, the
Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the
manufacture of
plastic and other related materials, and provides
essential input requirements for the agricultural and
industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the position of
the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor
to the overall growth of the country’s economy easily
makes the information sought a matter of public
concern or interest.
The second requisite is that the information
requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In this case, the meeting
was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by
virtue of the committee’s composition and the nature
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs,
trade and policy-making. The information withheld was
within the scope of the exemption from disclosure
because the CTRM meetings were directly related to
the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the
President as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign
affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in
Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A.
No. 6713.
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right
constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally
construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the
claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege
as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose
information must be clearly asserted by specifying the
grounds for the exemption. In case of denial of access
to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the
information sought to be obtained is not a matter of
public concern, or that the same is exempted from the
coverage of the constitutional guarantee. The burden
has been well discharged herein.
Also, the fact that some members of the committee
were not part of the President’s Cabinet was of no
moment. What should determine whether or not
information was within the ambit of the exception from
the people’s right to access to information was not the
composition of the body, but the nature of the
information sought to be accessed. A different holding
would only result to the unwanted
situation wherein any concerned citizen, like the
petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter
of public concern and the State's policy of full public
disclosure, could demand information from any
government agency under all conditions whenever he
felt aggrieved by the decision or recommendation of the
latter.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
MERCADO VS. AMA
FACTS: The petitioners were faculty members teaching
at AMACC. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing
rating based on the performance standards; hence
AMACC did not give them any salary increase.
Because of AMACC’s action on the salary increases,
the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and
overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for
discriminatory practices.9
The petitioners individually received a memorandum
from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor
Mary Grace Beronia, informing them that with the
expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would
no longer be renewed.
The petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal
because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for
monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 101
AMACC. The petitioners also contended that
AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence,
their dismissal was ineffectual.
AMACC contended in response that the petitioners
worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured
appointment and were still within the three-year
probationary period for teachers. Their contracts
were not renewed for the following term because
they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal
System for Teachers (PAST) while others failed to
comply with the other requirements for regularization,
promotion, or increase in salary. This move,
according to AMACC, was justified since the school
has to maintain its high academic standards.
ISSUE: W/N AMACC may place such standards
for its teachers to comply as a requisite for
continued employment.
HELD: Yes. In the academic world, /a school
enjoys academic freedom – a guarantee that
enjoys protection from the Constitution no less.
Section 5(2) Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom.
The institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide and adopt
its aims and objectives, and to determine how
these objections can best be attained, free from
outside coercion or interference, save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in
the term "academic freedom" encompass the
freedom of the school or college to determine for
itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be taught;
(3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may
be admitted to study.
AMACC’s right to academic freedom is particularly
important in the present case, because of the new
screening guidelines for AMACC faculty put in place
for the school year 2000-2001. We agree with the CA
that AMACC has the inherent right to establish high
standards of competency and efficiency for its faculty
members in order to achieve and maintain academic
excellence. The school’s prerogative to provide
standards for its teachers and to determine whether
or not these standards have been met is in
accordance with academic freedom that gives the
educational institution the right to choose who should
teach.
In Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission,
we emphasized:
It is the prerogative of the school to set high
standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality
education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long
as the standards fixed are reasonable and not
arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside.
Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which
barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The same academic freedom grants the school the
autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions
for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the
overarching limitations under the Labor Code.
Academic freedom, too, is not the only legal basis for
AMACC’s issuance of screening guidelines. The
authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its
management prerogative – the right of an employer to
regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the
freedom to prescribe work assignments, working
methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding
transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off
and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.
Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself
that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its
medium for hiring its teachers. It also acted within the
terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on
probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters.
CALAWAG VS. UP VISAYAS
Schools; University of the Philippines; Under the
University of the Philippines (UP) System’s faculty
manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving
or disapproving the composition of a thesis
committee.—By necessary implication, the dean’s
power to approve includes the power to disapprove the
composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP
System’s faculty manual, the dean has complete
discretion in approving or disapproving the composition
of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with
the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the
Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries
Program, we agree with the CA’s interpretation that the
thesis committee’s composition needs the approval of
the dean after the students have complied with the
requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate
Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines for
the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.
FACTSl The petitioners enrolled in the Master of
Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas. They
finished their first year of study with good grades, and
thus were eligible to start their thesis in the first
semester of their second year. The petitioners then
enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative
thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex
Baleña to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other
faculty members’ consent to constitute their respective
thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the
letters the petitioners sent to Dean Baylon, asking him
to approve the composition of their thesis committees.
Upon receipt of the petitioners’ letters, Dean Baylon
wrote a series of memos addressed to Professor
Sanares, questioning the propriety of the thesis topics
with the college’s graduate degree program. He
subsequently disapproved the composition of the
petitioners’ thesis committees and their tentative thesis
topics. According to Dean Baylon, the petitioners’ thesis
titles connote a historical and social dimension study
which is not appropriate for the petitioners’ chosen
master’s degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered the
petitioners to submit a two-page proposal containing an
outline of their tentative thesis titles, and informed them
that he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 102
over the role of the adviser and of the thesis
committees.
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the RTC, asking it to order Dean
Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners’
thesis committees and approve their thesis titles.
They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean
Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while the
suit was pending.
ISSUE: WON the DEAN has the right to disapprove
the Petitioner’s thesis. Yes.
HELD: Verily, the academic freedom accorded to
institutions of higher learning gives them the right to
decide for themselves their aims and objectives and
how best to attain them.10 They are given the
exclusive discretion to determine who can and
cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can
confer the honor and distinction of being their
graduates.
This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish
requirements for graduation, such as the completion
of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be
accomplished by their students. The courts may not
interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there
is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and
capriciously exercised their judgment.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA VS. ISAE
FACTS: Complainant Evangeline Santos filed a labor
complaint for illegal dismissal against her employer
defendant International School Manila and Brian
McCauley. Previously, complainant was “first hired
by the School in 1978 as a full-time Spanish
language teacher.” After filing for a leave of one
academic year, she agreed to teach the only
available Spanish class and four other classes of
Filipino.
Since it was her first time to teach Filipino, “the
School’s high school administrators observed the
way she conducted her classes. The results of the
observations on her classes were summarized in
Classroom Standards Evaluation Forms
accomplished by the designated observers. In
accordance with said forms, Santos was evaluated in
the areas of Planning, the Teaching Act, Climate,
Management and Communication.”
Subsequently, after making observations, the
Assistant Principal completed his Classroom
Standards Evaluation Form. He remarked that “the
lesson plan that Santos provided ‘was written with
little detail given.’ Santos was also noted as needing
improvement. xxx Hill also stated that Santos’s
management of the class left much to be desired. Hill
added that ‘[t]he beginning and the end of the class
were poorly structured with students both coming late
and leaving early with no apparent expectations to
the contrary.’” Almost similar remarks were made on
the Spanish class of Santos.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
After another observation on the Filipino classes, the
new Assistant Principal noted that Santos needed
improvement on certain areas. Thereafter, Santos was
made to undergo a remediation phase of the evaluation
process through a Professional Growth Plan. After the
implementation of the plan, there were noticeable
improvements on Santos. However, the positive
reviews “were gradually replaced by renewed concerns
on her planning.” Thus, a written notice to explain was
sent to complainant “directing her to explain in writing
why her employment from the School should not be
terminated because of her failure to meet the criteria for
improvement set out in her Professional Growth Plan
and her substandard performance as a teacher.”
In response, “Santos blamed the School for her
predicament. She said that, in the last few years, she
had been forced to teach Filipino, a subject which she
had no preparation for. The School allegedly made this
happen against her objections and despite the fact that
she had no training in Filipino linguistics and literature.
Santos also asked for clarification on why she was
being asked to explain and the reasons therefor.
Thereafter, a series of conferences were held to clarify
matters. Afterwards, the management rendered a
decision terminating her employment.’
ISSUE: Whether or not Defendants are liable to
Santos – NO.
HELD: Defendants were not liable. Termination was
valid and legal.
In this case, the actuations of Santos cannot constitute
gross and habitual neglect of her duties. “From the very
beginning of her tenure as a teacher of the Filipino
language, the recurring problem observed of Santos
was that her lesson plans lacked details and coherent
correlation to each other, to the course, and to the
curriculum, which in turn affected how lessons and
instructions were conveyed to the students. After
Santos was placed in a Professional Growth Plan on
March 29, 1996, petitioners observed a noticeable
improvement on her part. In his memo dated May 24,
1996, then Assistant Principal Loy even stated that
Santos’s improvement was a result of her positive
attitude in approaching her growth plan. Unfortunately,
though, Santos could not sustain this progress. Not
long after, the School administrators were again
admonishing Santos for her vague lesson plans that
lacked specifics.”
However, based on records, “the inadequacies of
Santos as a teacher did not stem from a reckless
disregard of the welfare of her students or of the issues
raised by the School regarding her teaching. Far from
being tainted with bad faith, Santos’s failings appeared
to have resulted from her lack of necessary skills,
in-depth knowledge, and expertise to teach the Filipino
language at the standards required of her by the
School.” Consequently, defendants “sufficiently proved
the charge of gross inefficiency, which warranted the
dismissal of Santos from the School.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 103
As previously held, “it is the prerogative of the
school to set high standards of efficiency for its
teachers since quality education is a mandate of
the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed
are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at
liberty to set them aside.” Further, this is also in
in line with the academic freedom accorded to
schools.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the
validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One
can only speculate on the content, manner and
medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature
nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to
rule on its constitutionality or validity.
FACTS: It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law,
in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom. According to the petitioners,
these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education
even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be
taught to their students. Citing various studies
conducted in the United States and statistical data
gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase
of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of
families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia;
the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society;
and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.
ISSUE: Does Section 14 of the RH Law violate the
principle of academic freedom?
HELD: No. At this point, suffice it to state that any
attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
One can only speculate on the content, manner and
medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature
nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to
rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the
State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members
of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that
the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to
that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens
patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the
youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important
role in nation building. Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive
health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence
against women and children and other forms of gender
based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social
and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights
and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood,
and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the
teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate
provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall
be developed in conjunction with
parent-teacher-community associations, school officials
and other interest groups, it could very well be said that
it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes
apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.
While the Court notes the possibility that educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
IMBONG VS. OCHOA
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation
of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 104
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law
violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for
the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
religious freedom.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive
Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
HELD:
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe
that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could
express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in
statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn
child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of
the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for
protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec
3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that
only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the
RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions
of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH
Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the
use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the
RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 105
PERFECTO VS. ESIDERA
FACTS: Perfecto filed an administrative Complaint
against Judge Desales-Esidera for falsification of
public document and dishonesty.
Judge Desales-Esidera was first married to Richard
Tang Tepace on May 7, 1987 at the MTCC of Manila.
On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave
birth to a daughter with Renato Verano Esidera at
Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City. Her marriage
to Richard Tang Tepace was later declared void on
January 27, 1992.
Perfecto alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified
her daughter’s birth certificate to make it appear that
she and Renato Verano Esidera were married on
March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a
legitimate child.
Based on her certification of marriage records, Judge
Desales-Esidera married Renato Verano Esidera on
June 3, 1992.
Respondent judge: Everything she did was legal and
in accordance with her religious beliefs. She was,
indeed, married to her second husband on March 18,
1990, but only under recognized Catholic rites. The
priest who officiated their marriage had no authority
to solemnize marriages under the civil law. This
marriage was merely a sacramental marriage
entered into only to comply with the requirements of
their religious beliefs. It was valid only under the
Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect.
“. The basis of morality is generally the do’s and
don’ts set by the Church of whatever religion. As
Catholics, we have the Ten Commandments. I have
sinned against one but I took advantage of the
Sacrament of Reconciliation and the Sacrament of
Matrimony. I did not, and do not live with anybody
not my husband as defined by my Catholic faith.
Chastity is a virtue. Even if one is civilly married but
if there is no religious ratification, in the eyes of my
God, the spouses are living in sin and cannot take
the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist.”- Judge
Esidera =(
ISSUE Whether benevolent neutrality and claims of
religious freedom can shield respondent judge from
liability for misconduct. NO.
HELD:
TEST OF BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
In Estrada, this court ruled that in religious freedom
cases, the test of benevolent neutrality should be
applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality,
religious freedom is weighed against a compelling
state interest:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests.
We find that there is no compelling state interest that
may limit respondent judge’s right to participate in
religious and merely ceremonial acts that are
non-violative of other people’s rights and with no legally
binding effect. The institution of marriage is not
threatened when we accommodate respondent judge’s
freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they
have secular counterparts under our laws.
In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and
her husband be given the same rights as civilly married
partners before their civil wedding in 1992. She does
not ask that our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as
valid. Respondent judge also does not seem to be
against civil marriages. She and her husband were
even civilly wed after her marriage with her first spouse
was declared void.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM NOT A SHIELD FROM
LIABILITY FOR MISCONDUCT
However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious
freedom cannot shield respondent judge from liability
for misconduct under our laws.
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual
relations with another person during the subsistence of
a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression.
Legal implications and obligations attach to any person
who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless
of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s
religion.
Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even
more so as a judge, is expected to abide by the law.
Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in
dispensing justice. Thus, in finding respondent judge
administratively liable for a violation of her marriage
obligations under our laws, this court protects the
credibility of the judiciary in administering justice.
Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be
saints. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They
are expected to care about and sustain the law. This
court’s jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their
acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of
Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This
court cannot be expected to condone misconduct done
knowingly on account of religious freedom or
expression.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is
SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1) month
with a warning that repetition of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES VS.
MACARINE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 106
Summary of facts: A Judge travelled to HK with his
family without a travel authority from OCA. This was
a violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
FACTS:
 OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign
travels of judges and court personnel, regardless
of the number of days, must be with prior
permission from the Court. Otherwise, they shall
be subjected to a disciplinary action.
 On August 13, 2009, Judge Macarine wrote the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with
his family for the period of September 10 - 14,
2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday.
He stated that his travel abroad shall be charged
to his annual forced leave. However, he did not
submit the corresponding application for leave.
 For his failure to submit the complete requirements,
his request for authority to travel remained
unacted upon.
 Judge Macarine proceeded with his travel abroad
without the required travel authority from the OCA.
 The OCA filed an administrative case against
Judge Macarine for violation of OCA Circular No.
49-2003.
 Judge Macarine now questions the validity of the
OCA Circular contending that it restricts freedom
of movement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OCA Circular is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No.
The right to travel under the 1987 Constitution is
not absolute.
True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is
not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel
provided that such restriction is in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health as
may be provided by law. This, however, should by no
means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent
power of administrative supervision over lower
courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but
merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court personnel, before
they can go on leave to travel abroad.
To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct
according to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice, OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to
travel abroad to submit, together with his application
for leave of absence duly recommended for approval
by his Executive Judge, a certification from the
Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his
Certificate of Service for the month immediately
preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three
(3) months from date of submission, pursuant to
Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
For traveling abroad without having been officially
allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
BONUS: The act of Judge Macarine in securing a travel
authority from the Court was a mitigating circumstance.
In the present case, the respondent, after learning that
his daughter had already booked him and his family in a
hotel in Hongkong, immediately went to Manila to
secure his travel authority from the Court. However,
with the short period of time from their arrival in Manila
on September 9, 2009 up to the time of their booking in
Hongkong from September 13 to 15, 2009, he was
pressed for time and opted not to complete the required
travel authority, with the intention of securing one after
his travel. The respondent regretted his failure to
comply with the requirements of OCA Circular No.
49-2003. He acknowledged his mistake and promised
not to commit the same infraction in the future.
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
PEOPLE VS. SORIANO
FACTS: Soriano was accused of raping and killing an 8
year-old girl.
The prosecution contended that on 2 January 1999, the
Chief Investigator of Wao, Senior Police Officer 4 Edwin
B. Bacerra, Sr. (SPO4 Bacerra), questioned Soriano.
Because there were no lawyers available and
Soriano claimed to be a minor, a representative
from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Mercedes Oyangoren
(Oyangoren), assisted him during the investigation.
He ADMITTED therein that he saw AAA near the canal.
She tried to run away, but he caught up with her. She
then started shouting for help, prompting him to panic
and choke her. Thereafter, he removed her clothes, bit
her left breast and threw her into the water. These
statements were reduced into writing and signed by
both Soriano and Oyangoren
Soriano, on the other hand claimed that, without
informing him of the contents of the document (warrant
of arrest), SPO4 Bacerra made him sign it in front of
Oyangoren. Mayor Balicao purportedly questioned
Soriano inside the former’s vehicle, threatened him that
he would be fed to the crocodiles if he would not
confess, and promised to help him if he would admit to
having perpetrated the crime. Allegedly for these
reasons, Soriano confessed to killing AAA.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 107
There was circumstantial evidence pointing to him as
the only possible culprit: he was seen drinking on the
day the crime happened; according to the witnesses
he was the only person who was seen using the road
nearest the crime scene at the time of commission of
the crime; and that the dirty clothes confiscated from
him were the same ones he wore on the day the
crime was committed
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial executed by accused
is admissible in evidence?
HELD: No. It is not admissible.
At the outset, it should be underscored that following
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the CA
was correct in ruling that the EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION elicited by Mayor Balicao and
SPO4 Bacerra from Soriano without the presence
of counsel is INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
The law enforcers' missteps in the performance of
the investigation and the prosecuting attorney's
careless presentation of the evidence cannot lead to
any other conclusion other than that there are doubts
as to the guilt of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. IBANEZ
FACTS:
 In this case the appellants Cachuela and Ibanez
assail the decision of the CA, affirming with
modification the decision of RTC, finding them
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
 The evidence revealed that Ibanez went to
Weapons System Corporation (WSC) and told
Henessy Auron, WCS Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought a
gun barrel at the company’s gun show.
 Ibanez inquired about the firing range, the days
when there are many people in the firing range,
and whether Henessy was the only female
employee.
 Two days after, Henessy arrived at WSC but no
one opened the door. She called Zaldy Gabao,
another employee who answered from inside the
store saying that he could not open the door
because his hands were tied. Eventually the police
arrived and when they entered the premises, they
saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault
and the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was
seen in the firing range dead, suffering from
several gunshot wounds.
 Upon investigation, NBI received information that
the group of Cachuela was involved in the crime
and that they have been looking for buyers of
firearms. The NBI conducted an entrapment
operation upon the execution of which, Melvin
Nabilgas approached them and told them that he
had been sent by Cachuela and Ibanez to look for
buyers of firearms.
 The police told Nabilgas that they were conducting
an entrapment operation, so Nabilgas surrendered
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
to the police, and gave the names of the other
persons involved. Using Nabilgas, the police
eventually was able to catch Catchuela and Ibanez
separately, selling the firearms.
 At the NBI Main Office, during a police line-up, Zaldy
pointed out the persons responsible for the crime.
Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and even Zaldy in the
crime.
 An information was filed for robbery with homicide
but during the trial Zaldy eventually died.
 RTC acquitted Nabilgas, but found the other
appellants guilty of the crime, ordering them to pay
the heirs of Rex and to pay the amount for restitution
of the value of the stolen. The CA latter affirmed the
decision of the RTC but decreasing the amount for
restitution and the indemnity for the heirs of Rex.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the out of court
identification by Zaldy of the perpetrators
of the crime is admissible as evidence.
2. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of Nabilgas is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
1. NO. Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons
involved in the crime in a police line-up held at the Main
office of the NBI. Zaldy did not testify in court for he died
during the trial. All of these were testified in court by
Special Investigator Lino who did not state when the
line-up took place, how it was conducted, if there were
the persons in the line-up with the appellants and
whether the line-up was confined to persons of the
same height and built as the appellants. Lino’s failure to
state these relevant details renders unreliable the
out-of-Court identification.
2. NO. Nabilgas executed an extra6udicial
confession at the NBI Main Office, implicating the
appellants and even Zaldy in the crime. During trial, he
repudiated this confession, claiming that he had been
tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to
copy a prepared statement. The Court ruled that
Nabilgas’ extra6udicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence.
When Nabilgas confessed, he was already under
custodial investigation or when the police investigator
already starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect. The Court emphasized that the
lawyer called to be present should be as much as
possible the choice of the confessant but if the lawyer is
furnished for the accused, the lawyer should be
competent, independent and can fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused.
In the case at bar, Atty. Go was provided by the NBI
itself despite Nabilgas’ declaration that he already had
a lawyer, Atty. Paglinawan. Nabilgas also testified that
Atty. Go merely represented herself to be a mere
witness to the confession and not a lawyer. There was
nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 108
whether Nabilgas’ confession was voluntary, and if
he fully understood the consequence of his
confession and its impact on his rights.
The Court also added that the confession was not
corroborated by a witness who was present at the
time the written confession was made, for the
prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness
stand. Also, the confession is inadmissible in
evidence against the appellants in view of the RES
INTER ALIOS ACTA Rule which provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.
An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is not admissible against his
co-accused because it is considered as hearsay
against them. The only exception is when conspiracy
is proved but Nabilgas’ participation in the conspiracy
was not proved for he was even acquitted.
Despite that, the circumstantial evidence against
Ibanez and Cachuela was sufficient for their
conviction. The court rules that no doubt exists,
based on the appellants’ actions, that their primary
objective was to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex
was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery.
The Court considered the act of Ibanez inquiring from
Henessy two days earlier before the crime, and the
fact that Cachuela and Ibanez were caught in an
entrapment operation selling the firearms and
ammunition. Also, the same bullets found in Rex’s
body came from the subject firearms. However, the
Court stated that cannot second-guess on what could
have been the reason behind the perpetrators’ act
of sparing Zaldy’s life, but the only evidence against
Zaldy, which is Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession, is
inadmissible so it can only be a mere speculation,
thus not proving Zaldy’s liability.
TANENGGEE VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: On March 27, 1998, five separate
Informations7 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against petitioner.
Tanenggee was the branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December
1997. After the discovery of the irregular loans,
an internal audit was conducted and an
administrative investigation was held in the Head
Office of Metrobank, during which petitioner
signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit
"N") in the form of questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs
Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted
and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in
said interview, petitioner admitted having committed
the allegations in the Informations, specifically
forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the
loan were secured or personally received by the
petitioner although it should be the client of the bank
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
who should receive the same; and that all the answers
of the petitioner were contained in a typewritten
document voluntarily executed, thumb marked, and
signed by him (Exhibit "N").
For his defense, accused Carlos Lo Tanenggee
testified that in the middle of January 1998, two (2)
Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or
on 26 January 1998, petitioner was asked by Elvira
Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to
report to the Head Office on the following day. When
petitioner arrived at the said office, he was surprised
that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2)
senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2)
policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain
clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit
of the bank, Valentino Elevado.
Petitioner claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a
paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to
sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was
intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police
that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign;
that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was
not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that
"just to get it over with" he signed the paper which
turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting,
petitioner went to see Tan at his office but was unable
to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no
avail.
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated
Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty
of the crimes charged. Petitioner appealed the case
until it reached the Supreme Court.
While he admits signing a written statement,
petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof
and alleges that he was only forced to sign the
same without reading its contents. He asserts that
said written statement was taken in violation of his
rights under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain
silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of
the first two rights. Hence, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON said written statement was taken in
violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain
silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of
the first two rights, hence, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence against him? NO
HELD: The constitutional proscription against the
admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 109
to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
informed of the two other rights above.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that
petitioner gave an uncounseled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning
was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but
merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained
of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be
under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, we declared that the right to counsel
"applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on
the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of
Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:
However, it must be remembered that the right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during
an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer
in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he
allegedly committed in the course of his employment.
No error can therefore be attributed to the courts
below in admitting in evidence and in giving due
consideration to petitioner’s written statement as
there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
Petitioner’s written statement was given
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed,
under duress and intimidation, an already prepared
typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks
sustainable basis and his supposition is just an
afterthought for there is nothing in the records that
would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or
admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the
burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed to
overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his
written statement was found to have been executed
freely and consciously. The pertinent details he
narrated in his statement were of such nature and
quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could
furnish. The details contained therein attest to its
voluntariness.
In People v. Muit, it was held that "one of the indicia
of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s
extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
and facts which the investigating officers could not have
known and could not have supplied without the
knowledge and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of
protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative,
against the investigator and the two policemen present
who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign
negate his bare assertions of compulsion and
intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed
intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement
shall be considered as having been voluntarily
executed.
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read
the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the
instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral
degree from a reputable educational institution and
had been a bank manager for quite a number of
years. He is thus expected to fully understand and
comprehend the significance of signing an instrument.
It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can
therefore expect no consideration for it.
PEOPLE VS. CHAVEZ
FACTS: In the information, it was alleged that Chavez
killed Elmer Duque/Barbie and took the latter’s mobile
phones and jewelries. There were 22 injuries on
Barbie’s body. He was charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily
surrendered to SPO3 Casimiro at the police station nine
days after the crime was allegedly commited.
SPO3 Casimiro informed them of the consequences in
executing a written statement without the assistance of
a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her
statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex
Francisco. She also surrendered two cellular phones
owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.
Chavez explained that he was a friend of the victim and
treated each other like brothers. Prior to Barbie’s death,
they had a misunderstanding as Barbie suspected
that he was having a relationship with Barbie’s
boyfriend, Maki. When Barbie did not reply to his text
message, Chavez decided to go to Barbie’s house to
settle their misunderstanding and was allowed to enter.
He went home thereafter.
RTC convicted Chavez of the crime of robbery with
homicide. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON accused was properly apprised of his
Miranda rights?
HELD: NO.It is contrary to human nature for a mother
to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that
her son committed a heinous crime.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 110
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when
he voluntarily went to the police station for
investigation, and his mother accompanied him.
SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she
surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to
help her son" and "perhaps the accused felt that the
investigating police are getting nearer to him.
Chavez’s mother "turned-over 2 units of
cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason
told her that said cellphones belonged to victim
Barbie. . . that Chavez was wounded in the incident
and that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole
infront of their residence." The records are silent on
whether Chavez objected to his mother’s statements.
The records also do not show why the police
proceeded to get his mother’s testimony as opposed
to getting Chavez’s testimony on his voluntary
surrender.
At most, the lower court found that Chavez’s mother
was informed by the investigating officer at the police
station of the consequences in executing a written
statement without the assistance of a lawyer. She
proceeded to give her statement on her son’s
confession of the crime despite the warning. SPO3
Casimiro testified during his cross-examination that
there was no lawyer who informed her of the
consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit.
The booking sheet and arrest report states that
"when the accused was appraised of his
constitutional rights and nature of charges imputed
against him, accused opted to remain silent." This
booking sheet and arrest report was dated two days
after Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had
voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the
commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights,
which require that:
(a) any person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and
will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has
the right totalk to an attorney before being questioned
and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be provided before any questioning if he so
desires.
The Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must
be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."
The invocation of these rights applies during
custodial investigation, which begins "when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions
to the person to elicit incriminating statements."
It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply
when one is "taken into custody by the police," such
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect
ordinary citizens from the pressures of a custodial
setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
"inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the
custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases
to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of
persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial
investigation to "include the practice of issuing an
‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for
any violation of law."
This means that even those who voluntarily
surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a
custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also
being questioned by an investigating officer in a police
station. As an additional pressure, he may have been
compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station.
SC found Chavez to be guilty of the crime of homicide,
and not the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The prosecution palpably failed to
substantiate its allegations of the presence of criminal
design to commit robbery, independent of the intent to
commit homicide. There is no evidence showing that
the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.
PEOPLE VS. PENAFLOR
FACTS: On 7 September 1993, an Information[3] was
filed against accused Rodolfo Omilig y Mancia (Omilig)
for the killing of Eduardo Betonio (Betonio). On 16
November 1993, the Information[4] was amended,
impleading accused Anacleto C. Matas, Jr. (Matas) and
accused-appellant Peñaflor. Finally, the
Information[5] was again amended, which impleaded
accused Oscar Ondo (Ondo).
During arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC acquitted accused Matas, Omilig,
and Ondo, while it convicted accused-appellant
Peñaflor for the crime of murder for killing Betonio. The
RTC admitted accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions because they were not taken
under duress or intimidation as the extrajudicial
confessions were conducted at the Prosecutor’s Office
and not in a police station, and in the presence of his
relatives.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 111
The Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellant
Peñaflor’s conviction.
The Court of Appeals ruled that accused-appellant
Peñaflor’s two extrajudicial confessions were
admissible in evidence as he was not under custodial
investigation when the said extrajudicial confessions
were executed; they were conducted before an
Assistant City Prosecutor and a City Prosecutor.
ISSUE: Rights of persons under custodial
investigation
HELD: As correctly found by the lower courts,
accused-appellant Peñaflor executed his extrajudicial
confession not during custodial investigation, but
during the preliminary investigation. In Ladiana v.
People, the Court defined the difference between
custodial investigation and preliminary
investigation: Custodial Interrogation/Investigation “is
the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way”;[27] on the other hand, Preliminary
Investigation “is an inquiry or a proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.”[28] In Ladiana,
this Court has unequivocally declared that a person
undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation.
The import of the distinction between custodial
interrogation and preliminary investigation relates to
the inherently coercive nature of a custodial
interrogation which is conducted by the police
authorities.[29] Due to the interrogatory procedures
employed by police authorities, which are conducive
to physical and psychological coercion, the law
affords arrested persons constitutional rights to
guarantee the voluntariness of their confessions and
admissions, and to act as deterrent from coercion by
police authorities.[30] These safeguards are found in
Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Sans proper safeguards,
custodial investigation is a fertile means to obtain
confessions and admissions in duress.
Resultingly, as pronounced in Ladiana, the claim by
the accused of inadmissibility of his extrajudicial
confession is unavailing because his confessions
were obtained during a preliminary investigation.
And even if accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions were obtained under
custodial investigation, these are admissible. To be
admissible, a confession must comply with the
following requirements: it “must be (a) voluntary; b)
made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in
writing.”[31] In the case at bar, the prosecution did not
present proof of the absence of any of these
requirements.
Assistance of competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice
The defense claimed that accused-appellant
Peñaflor’s two extrajudicial confessions were
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
inadmissible because he was assisted by an
incompetent and not an independent counsel. We do
not agree.
To be a competent and independent counsel in a
custodial investigation, “[the] lawyer so engaged should
be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or
advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a
while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the
interview.”[32] It has been made clear that counsel
should be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first
question until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession.[33] “Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain
that the confession is made voluntarily and that the
person under investigation fully understands the nature
and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights
to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent.”[34]
In the case at bar, there was no evidence, not even an
allegation, that the counsel who assisted
accused-appellant Peñaflor when his extrajudicial
confessions were obtained were absent at any stage of
the duration of the proceedings. Based on his
admission, Atty. Cavales was the last person to arrive
for the conduct of preliminary investigation. However,
the preliminary investigation commenced only after he
arrived. Only then were questions propounded to
accused-appellant Peñaflor.[35]
With regard to the submission that accused-appellant
Peñaflor’s appointed counsel is not of
accused-appellant Peñaflor’s own choice as warranted
by Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, our
discussion in People v. Tomaquin[36] on the meaning of
“preferably” is relevant:
Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigations should be as far as reasonably possible,
the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but
the word "preferably" does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. What is imperative is that the counsel should
be competent and independent.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring ours, citation omitted.)
As borne by the records, the appointments of Atty.
Cavales and Atty. Cristobal as counsel de officio were
with the conformity of accused-appellant Peñaflor. They
succeeded Atty. Padilla upon his discharge as counsel
for accused-appellant Peñaflor. The prosecutors
allowed accused-appellant Peñaflor to engage the
services of the new counsel
Presumption of regularity
There was also neither evidence nor allegation that
accused-appellant Peñaflor was coerced to confess
and that the nature and consequence of his
extrajudicial confessions in relation to his constitutional
rights were not thoroughly discussed to him. As
correctly observed by the RTC, the preliminary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 112
investigations were conducted in a neutral place;[39] it
was conducted at the Prosecutor’s office and in the
presence of accused-appellant Peñaflor’s relatives,
which facts were never refuted by the defense.
What needs to be noted here is that “a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that
it was given as a result of violence, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency.”[40] The
prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence to
prove the presence of any circumstance that would
negate the admissibility of his confession. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
prevails over mere allegations.
The presumption of regularity operates when the
prosecution proffers that government officials tasked
with responsibilities regarding the enforcement of our
laws and procedures submit that the crime has been
duly proven,[41] which, however, may be refuted by
the defense. It is upon the defense to disprove such
presumption by adducing no less than clear and
convincing evidence, showing that the performance
of functions was tainted with irregularity and that the
official had motive to falsify,[42] such that, any taint of
irregularity renders the presumption unavailable. In
the case at bar, the defense failed to refute such
presumption.
In the end, “[w]hat is sought to be protected by the
Constitution is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false not to provide him
with the best defense."
PEOPLE VS PEPINO
FACTS: The prosecution evidence showed that at
1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a woman
entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors
Corporation in Sucat, Paranaque City, and pretended
to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino,
pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup,
Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the
cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the
cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to
go with them. After five months, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that
they had apprehended some suspects, and invited
him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven
persons: five males and two females. Edward
positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario
Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
The rtc and CA ruled in favour of Edward and the two
were convicted. Gomez appealed the decision
contending that Edward's identification of her during
trial "may have been preconditioned x x x by
suggestive identification"[20] made at the police
lineup.
HELD: Admissibility of Identification
We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's
identification of her during trial might have been
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
preconditioned by the "suggestive identification" made
during the police lineup.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[30] the Court explained
the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test
to determine the admissibility of such identifications in
this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up
for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
In People v. Pineda,[42] the Court acquitted Rolando
Pineda because the police suggested the identity of the
accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda
and his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo
Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According to the Court,
"there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing
attention on the two accused."[43]
Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo[44] acquitted
appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a lone photograph
was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus
held that the appellant's in-court identification
proceeded from, and was influenced by, impermissible
suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find
Edward's out-of-court identification to be reliable and
thus admissible.
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION 649 SCRA 649
(N/A)
RIGHT TO BAIL
PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA
FACTS:De Gracia was charged with the crime of
Murder, with a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On February 22, 2012, while detained in the Manila City
Jail, accused filed a petition for bail.
During the hearing on the petition for bail, the
prosecution presented Robert Bryan Villanueva
(Robert), Joshua Mendoza (Joshua) and MerwinIrison
(Merwin), as their witnesses, to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused for the crime of murder was
strong.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 113
Their testimonies tended to show that on December
28, 2011, at about past 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
victim David Paul (David) together with Robert,
Joshua, Merwin, Bless Roquero (Bless) and their
other friends celebrated their post-Christmas party in
the house of Rio Polintan (Rio), at Ana Sarmiento
Street, Malate, Manila.
At about past 12:00 midnight of December 29, 2011,
De Gracia came and uttered, "Gate-crasher ako,
okay langba.?" A policeman by profession, he was
then in civilian clothes. Sarah, the sister of Rio, then
asked De Gracia if he had any pasalubong, to which
he replied, "Ito bala." De Gracia then talked with Rio,
whom he personally knew. He joined the group and
drank coffee cocktail. He then saw Bless at the dining
area and recognized her as the ex-girlfriend of his
friend. The two talked with each other.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, De Gracia and
Bless were still conversing while seated beside each
other in the sala. After cooking, Merwin went to the
sala and placed some food on the table. He noticed
that the gun of De Gracia was also on top of the table.
Merwin then saw him insert a magazine with bullets
in his gun, place it in his holster and tuck it in his
waistline. Merwin sat beside David, who was seated
opposite De Gracia and Bless.
After a while, Merwin stood up and went to the
kitchen to eat some lumpia. Robert then heard Bless
say to De Gracia, "Kayang kaya
kongangbugbuginang ex ko, ikaw pa kaya." After
uttering these words, Bless pulled De Gracia's hair.
Joshua, who was then at the stairway, heard De
Gracia, in a somewhat high pitch tone, threaten Bless
by saying, "Sigekapagsinabunutanmoakoulit,
babarilinkoyungkaibigan mo." Joshua saw De Gracia
hold his gun and point it at David. All of a sudden, De
Gracia fired his gun, hitting David on the chest. Out of
fear, Robert ran to the kitchen while Merwin, who was
then in the kitchen, overheard the gunshot. When the
latter turned his head, he saw David slowly slipping
down from his seat. Merwin shouted, "Si Dave!" and
carried him towards the door.
Robert testified that De Gracia was about 1 to 1 1/4
meters away from David when he fired the gun.
Joshua related that there was no heated discussion
within the group before the shooting; that when De
Gracia uttered the threatening words to Bless, there
was no anger in his tone; that De Gracia had a drink
but was not intoxicated; and that after De Gracia
threatened Bless, the gun fired.
Merwin added that he saw De Gracia holding the gun
after shooting David; that De Gracia approached
David and lifted his t-shirt and there was blood on his
chest; that De Gracia told them to bring David inside
his vehicle; and that David was brought to the Ospital
ng Maynila where he was pronounced dead.
In its August 31, 2012 Order, the RTC granted the
petition for bail.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Not in conformity, the public prosecutor filed a petition
for certiorari against the assailed order of the RTC
before the CA. The OSG asserts that the evidence
proving guilt of the accused was strong. It cites the RTC
order which stated that "it is evident that the accused
decided to shoot any of the friends of Bless in an
instant." The OSG points out that the word "decided"
indicates the conscious and deliberate adoption of a
mode of attack by the accused to facilitate the killing
without risk to himself.
While the OSG may concede that the suddenness of
the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding
of treachery, it qualifies that "[w]here, however, proof
obtains that the victim was completely deprived of a
real chance to defend himself against the attack, as in
the instant case, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery ought to and should be
appreciated."
On February 10, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed
decision, dismissing the petition of the OSG.
ISSUE:Is the ruling of the CA agreeing with the RTC’s
order admitting respondent to bail erroneous?
HELD: No.An accused charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua may still be
granted bail.
The accused was charged with the crime of murder,
which carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
hence, a non-bailable offense. From the standpoint of a
layman, an accused indicted for a "non-bailable
offense" cannot be granted bail prior to his conviction.
Such interpretation, however, is technically inaccurate.
Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are not
entitled to bail before conviction. A reading of the
provision reveals that bail shall only be denied when
the evidence of guilt for the offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua is strong. Necessarily, in all other
instances, bail must be granted before the conviction of
the accused. The right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Evidently,
despite being charged with a non-bailable offense, an
accused can still possibly acquire bail.
Conversely, if the evidence of guilt is strong, then the
accused cannot enjoy provisional liberty before his
conviction. There is nothing unreasonable in denying
the right to bail to one charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, as it is likely that the accused, rather than
await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a
penalty demanding a lifetime of incarceration, would be
tempted to flee the jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 114
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the
determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or
"Evident proof in this connection has been held to
make clear, strong evidence which leads a
well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he
will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered. "Presumption great" exists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the inference
of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong,
clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion.
Guided by these judicial pronouncements, the
prosecution must establish before the trial court, after
proper notice and hearing, that the evidence against
an accused for the crime charged is strong so as to
deny him of his provisional liberty.
Treachery was not proven by strong evidence.
Insofar as the evidence presented during the hearing
on the petition for bail is concerned, the Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution failed
to prove that the accused deliberately or consciously
adopted the means of execution. Without the crucial
element of treachery being established, the evidence
of guilt for the crime of murder against the accused is
deemed not strong. Accordingly, the accused is
entitled to bail.
ENRILE VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Before the Court is the petition for certiorari
filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and
his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the PDAF. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the
same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued,
Enrile voluntarily surrendered and was later on
confined at the PNP General Hospital following his
medical examination. Thereafter, Enrile filed his
Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital
and his Motion to Fix Bail.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an
accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is
the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show
clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the
right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and
his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and
his social standing.
Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively
denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:Was there grave abuse of discretion in the
denial of Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail? YES
HELD: YES The presumption of innocence is rooted in
the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail, and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused. Bail may be granted
as a matter of right or of discretion. The right to bail is
expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution. The general rule is any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or
(2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
The Court ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that
a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 115
accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this
wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail
in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution
for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later,
over its strong objections. The court granted bail on
the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of
three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed
at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or
not there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless
the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight
of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6,
Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an
ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither
present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or
otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
For this purpose, a summary hearing means x x x
such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not
sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence
for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply
with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct
a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. We
first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail
the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered. In now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to: x x x uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility
of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1)
that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 116
In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk
of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that
at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.
With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and
history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should
be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s
health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan
did not recognize. There is no question at all that
Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP
General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, was not
even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC)
and the internist doctor of that medical facility
because of the limitations in the medical support at
that hospital.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ
FACTS: The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit
executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T.
Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on
Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a
post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the
Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects
thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of
private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a
former mayor of Bacolod City.
Based on the verification conducted in the
establishments that issued the official receipts, it was
alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to
enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from
the Government the total amount of P279,150.00
instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
overclaim of P274,306.75.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases
four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324)
were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were
raffled before public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in
SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still
at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No
Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.
She argued that the three cases are bailable as a
matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium
period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day
to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the
imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the maximum of
the medium period.
ISSUE:: Whether or not Valdez is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
HELD: YES The controversy is, in fact, not one of first
impression. Mañalac, Jr. v. People already resolved
that an accused charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
where the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not
entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an
actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should
be allowed to post bail since reclusion perpetua is not
the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of
the fraud involved. It was also posited that Article 48 of
the RPC applies "only after the accused has been
convicted in a full-blown trial such that the court is
mandated to impose the penalty of the most serious
crime," and that the reason for the imposition of the
penalty of the most serious offense is "only for the
purpose of determining the correct penalty upon the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law." This
Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the
petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue of
whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is
restricted in cases whose imposable penalty ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua. Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al., in
relation to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that
Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled to bail as a matter of right
since he is charged with a crime whose penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were
manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We opined that the
Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable
since it is an indivisible penalty. The Court's
pronouncement is consistent with the earlier cases
of People v. Conwi, Jr., People v. Enfermo, and People
v. Pajaro, et al. as well as with the fairly recent case
of Zafra v. People.
The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are
in keeping with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically,
Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, "the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period." Thus, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 117
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties
for malversation and falsification should be taken into
account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation
of public funds or property if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside from
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the
total value of the property embezzled. On the other
hand, the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification
committed by a public officer. Considering that
malversation is the more serious offense,
the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00
is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling
in Mañalac, Jr. should be revisited on the ground that
Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro,
et al., and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a
judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court
and affirmed on appeal by this Court. As will be
shown below, the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a
matter of right to an accused who is charged with a
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (7a)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the
term "punishable" under the provisions above-quoted?
In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer
to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. People v.
Temporada, which was even cited by petitioner,
perceptibly distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which
consists of a range of period of time. This is what is
referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance,
under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges from 12
years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further,
the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be
imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of
homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC
shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.
From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single
fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
"penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison
term he has to serve.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the
one provided by the RPC before conviction to
determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while
the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison
sentence upon conviction. Hence, it is maintained that
the penalty imposable for the offense charged against
private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324
non-bailable.
The argument is erroneous.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty"
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such
crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in
view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty
of reclusion temporalmaximum to reclusion
perpetua shall be applied in its maximum. The
falsification, which is the means used to commit the
crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic
aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall
impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of
the RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be
imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64
refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering the
aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the
"penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua,
considering that the ISL finds no application as the
penalty is indivisible.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 118
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public
respondent is spot on had it not
confused imposable penalty with prescribed penalty.
Nonetheless, reading through the text of the assailed
Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually
meant prescribed penalty whenever it referred
to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence, the
ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification
be imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt
that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at
their inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue.
This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for the
application of the penalty contemplated under Article
48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can
be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is
the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime
charged which should be considered and, not the
penalty to be actually imposed. Illustrative cases
such as Catiis v. Court of Appeals, et al. and People
v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.
In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty
imposable for the offense charged that was
considered for purposes of bail.
A circumspect reading of substantive law validates
this view. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
provides that: x x x x
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which
practically bears the same meaning as "imposable."
It is only logical that the reference has a direct
correlation with the time frame "before conviction"
since trial is yet to begin; hence, it can only be the
penalty imposable of the offense charged that can be
considered for purposes of bail.
In these cases, the offenses charged are the
complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In
determining the penalty imposable, it is the penalty
for the most serious crime which is considered.
Between Malversation and Falsification, it is
Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As
thus provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua."
The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied
in its maximum period, or reclusion perpetua, since
this will already consider the application of the
penalty in the event of a conviction.
A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code states:
The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus,
the reference can only point to the time when a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
judgment of conviction is impending. If and when "the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period," is thus
applied in the proper application of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused. Certainly, this cannot be
considered for purposes of bail.
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution
must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should
allege each element of the complex offense with the
same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses
were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a
complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
support the charge as to one of the component
offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense
proven.
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be
found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved
during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it
would be premature to rule that the supposed crime
committed is a complex crime since it is only when the
trial has terminated that falsification could be
appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of
the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or
falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven
after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the
right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it
turns out that there is no complex crime committed.
Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval
in depriving the accused person's constitutional right to
bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not
even considered as inherently grievous, odious and
hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex
crimes does not change the nature of the constituent
offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law. When
committed through falsification of official/public
documents, the RPC does not intend to classify
malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been
expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a
non-bailable offense, the law should have already
considered it as a special complex crime like robbery
with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide,
and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of
right to an accused charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
palpable when compared with an accused indicted for
plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 119
9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in
plunder committed through malversation of public
funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of
ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have
committed malversation of public funds thru
falsification of official/public documents, which is not
a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a
matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or
as low as P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly
unfair and could not have been contemplated by the
law.
The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to
Valdez as an accused following the rule of lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is
the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to
the accused.
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. When there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in
favor of the accused.Since penal laws should not be
applied mechanically, the Court must determine
whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law.
For having ruled that an accused charged with the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents that
involves an amount in excess of P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary
hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary.
Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao, an affirmative
relief may be obtained from the court despite the
accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication
of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion
to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the
amount of bail in this case) where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. Private respondent
Luzviminda S. Valdez is entitled to bail, as a matter of
right.
PEOPLE VS. PIAD
FACTS: Davis with other men were charged in two (2)
informations with the crimes of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs during a party weighing 0.03 gram
and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a
party.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned and they
pleaded "Not Guilty." Davis, however, was not
arraigned because he had jumped bail.
RTC found them guilty. Piad, Villarosa and Davis
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Davis has the right to appeal
considering he jumped bail.
HELD: Davis lost his standing to appeal
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If the
offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.23 In case bail is granted, the accused must
appear whenever the court requires his presence;
otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited.24
When a person is finally convicted by the trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. – Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may
be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman. xxx
Here, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs during a party and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a
party.1avvphi1 Both offenses did not have a prescribed
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, thus, bail was a matter of right.
Accordingly, Davis secured a surety bond with Summit
Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. on May 6, 2005.
On August 8, 2005, Davis failed to appear before the
RTC which considered him to have jumped bail. At that
point, the RTC should have cancelled the bailbond of
Davis with Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc.
Although he was subsequently arrested and arraigned
on May 15, 2008, it is alarming that no record of Davis’
confinement in any detention facility was ever found.25
When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction,
Davis and his counsel were present in the courtroom.
Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal
before the RTC or the CAI° Nonetheless, any motion for
bail pending appeal should have been denied because
Davis violated the conditions of his previous
bail.26 Necessarily, as he previously jumped bail and no
bail pending appeal was secured, the R TC should
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 120
have immediately issued a warrant of arrest against
him.
In the same manner, the CA should not have
entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in
this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.27 As no
such surrender was made in this case, in the eyes of
the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore,
not entitled to seek relief from the courts.
WHEN RIGHT TO BAIL MAY BE INVOKED
QUI VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Cyril Calpito Qui (babae ni ha) was charged
with two counts of violation of Republic Act No. 7610
for two incidents of threatheing to bash the head of
John Ignacio, 8 years of age, causing emotional and
psychological damage. RTC convicted her. In her
appeal to CA, her urgent petition for bail was denied
as she was a flight risk.
Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
following assignment of errors, to wit: (1) there is a
manifest absence of all the conditions justifying a
denial of bail under Sec. 5 of Rule 114; (2) the
conviction of petitioner is for a bailable offense and
the evidence of guilt against her is not strong; and (3)
since petitioner’s conviction by the RTC is under
appeal, hence not yet final, she should be accorded
the constitutional guaranty of innocence until proved
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, which guaranty
entitles her to bail. In gist, the core issue boils down
to whether petitioner is entitled to bail pending
appeal.
ISSUE 1: Does a person already convicted enjoy
the constitutionality guaranty of innocence? Held:
No. Petitioner’s argument that she has the
constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of
guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly,
after one is convicted by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence, and with it, the
constitutional right to bail, ends. As to the strength
of evidence of guilt against her, suffice it to say that
what is before the Court is not the appeal of her
conviction, let alone the matter of evaluating the
weight of the evidence adduced against her.
ISSUE 2: Was the denial of right to bail proper?
Held: Yes. Under the present rule, the grant of bail is
a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. Indeed, the
undisputed fact that petitioner did not attend the
hearings before the RTC, which compelled the trial
court to issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably
indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with court
processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily
against a grant of bail pending appeal.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT WHEN
IT IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION
GACAL VS. JUDGE INFANTE
FACTS: Atty. Gacal, the private prosecutor in
Criminal Case for murder charges Judge Infante with
gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and
evident partiality, for the latters failure to set a hearing
before granting bail to the accused and for releasing
him immediately after allowing bail.
The preliminary investigation of the case was
conducted by MCTC Judge Balanag. Finding the
existence of probable cause that an offense of Murder
was committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, together with the records of the
case, with No Bail Recommended. Upon review of the
resolution of the investigating judge, he filed the
information for Murder against accused Ancheta but a
bail of P400, 000.00 for the provisional liberty of the
latter was recommended. Relying on the
recommendation of the Fiscal, respondent judge
granted the Application for Bail of the accused.
After the respondent judge has approved the property
bond posted by the accused, the complainant, as
private prosecutor filed a MR and/or Cancel Bailbond or
in the alternative, Very Urgent Motion to Moto Proprio
correct an Apparent Error. After several deferments and
postponements, respondent judge resolved to deny the
Motion on the ground that the private prosecutor was
not authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecutions Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to
prosecute the case.
Atty Gacal filed an administrative complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman which was indorsed to the
Office of the Court Administrator.
ISSUE: Can respondent judge in granting bail to the
accused dispense with the hearing of Application for
Bail? NO.
HELD: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law (Sec. 13, Art. III).
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
no person charged with a capital offense or offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec.
7, Rule 114).
The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. By reason of
the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a
capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by respondent judge after
the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 121
application for bail is absolutely indispensable before
a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecutions evidence is weak or strong (People vs.
Dacudao). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of
a judge to conduct hearing the moment an
application for bail is filed if the accused is charged
with capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can
be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt is
weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other
hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall
be granted.
Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an
order granting the application for bail filed by the
accused based merely on the order issued by the
Fiscal recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the accused without even
bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for
the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate
his right and authority to determine whether the
evidence against the accused who is charged with
capital offense is strong or not.
In this case, the following were observed by the
Court:
Bail hearing was mandatory. Although, in theory, the
only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of
the accused at the time set for the arraignment and
trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose
of preventing the release of an accused who may be
dangerous to society or whom the judge may not
want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory
before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion. With more reason is this true in
criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, states that: No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of criminal action.
In Cortes v. Catral, the Court has outlined the
following duties of the judge once an application for
bail is filed, to wit:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless or whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, id);
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond otherwise, the petition should
be denied.
In case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing was
not dispensable. Even where there is no petition for bail
in a case, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is
separate and distinct from the initial hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, in which the
trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a
chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise,
a violation of due process occurs. The fact that the
public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did
not warrant dispensing with the hearing.
Public prosecutors failure to oppose application for bail
or to adduce evidence did not dispense with hearing.
The gravity of the charge in Criminal Case No. 1138-03
made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a
bail hearing in which he could have made on his own
searching and clarificatory questions from which to infer
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. He
should not have readily and easily gone along with the
public prosecutors opinion that the evidence of guilt,
being circumstantial, was not strong enough to deny
bail; else, he might be regarded as having abdicated
from a responsibility that was his alone as the trial
judge.
Judge Infantes granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
The failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior
to the grant of bail in capital offenses was inexcusable
and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules
as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He
well knew that the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial
discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail
despite the absence of a petition for bail from the
accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the
absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
RIGHT TO BAIL 647 SCRA 613 (N/A)
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
LAI VS. PEOPLE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 122
FACTS: According to the prosecution, the victim
Enrico Villanueva, Jr. together with his friends were
seated inside the passenger jeepney owned by the
accused, Nelson Lai y Bilbao. While they were
waiting for their friend to arrive, the Lai suddenly
approached the vehicle and ordered all the persons
who were seated inside to alight therefrom. After all
of them have alighted from the jeepney, the accused
instantaneously grabbed the victim by the latter's left
arm and accused him (the deceased) of having
stolen the antenna of his (Lai's) vehicle. Denying that
he was responsible for the theft of the antenna, the
victim was able to free himself from the hold of the
accused and ran away.
At around 11:00 o'clock of the same evening, the
accused allegedly shot the victim during a brownout.
The victim was rushed to the hospital where bleeding
from a gunshot wound in the neck and awaiting
medical attention, he was able to tell four persons,
including his father and a police officer, that it was Lai
who shot him.
But according to the petitioner, when the accused
and his wife were about to have their late dinner at
around 11:00 o'clock, a brownout occurred. About
two seconds after the lights went out; he heard a
gunshot, which he initially thought, was merely a
firecracker. Later, when he overheard that someone
was shot at the dance hall, which was only 40 meters
away from his house, he went out to look for his two
sons. At the dancehall, someone told appellant that
his son was the one who carried the victim to the
hospital. So appellant went home and proceeded to
eat his dinner. At around 11:45 o'clock of the same
evening, while appellant was already resting, three
policemen came to his house and told him that the
victim mentioned his name as the one who shot him.
Believing that he has done nothing wrong, appellant
volunteered to go with the policemen. Appellant
claims that when they arrived at the police station, he
even asked that a paraffin test is to be conducted on
him, the result of which was negative.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide. The Court of Appeals
affirmed such decision.
The Petitioner contended that he was deprived of
due process when the honorable presiding judge
acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he
was appointed to the bench decided this case.
ISSUE: WON accused Lai was deprived of his right
to due process.
HELD: Yes, the right of due process of Lai was
violated.
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due
process of law cannot be denied to any accused. The
Constitution has expressly ordained, "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." An essential part of the right is to be
afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for
any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on
and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable
requisite of procedural due process. The Court has
said:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded
'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that.
They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge; otherwise, they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise, they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial
(and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established
facts and the pertinent law.
The adoption of rules governing the disqualification of
the judges from hearing and deciding cases should
there be any cause that diminishes or negates their
impartiality is a firm means of ensuring their impartiality
as judges. In particular, Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court embodies the rule on
self-disqualification by a sitting judge, viz.:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as
the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered
his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the
Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 123
did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented
by the rules on disqualification had no relation
whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in
the case before becoming the judge. He must be
reminded that the same compulsory disqualification
that applied to him could similarly be demanded of
the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer if either
of them should be appointed as the trial judge
hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is to
ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect
the life, liberty, and property of the petitioner as the
accused should be conducted and determined by a
judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent.
The CA's reliance on Lao v. Court of Appeals was
inappropriate. In Lao, the Court opined and declared
that the petition to disqualify the trial judge must be
filed prior to the rendition of judgment. But the
supposed disqualification of the judge in Lao was
premised on the bias as perceived by a party. We
should point out that perceived bias was a ground
covered by the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 3 7, supra, and would justify only the voluntary
inhibition of the judge. In contrast, Judge Elumba's
situation rested on a ground for mandatory
disqualification because it emanated from the
conclusive presumption of his bias. Such a ground
should have been forthwith acknowledged upon
Judge Elumba's assumption of the judgeship in
Branch 42, or, at the latest, upon the ground being
raised to his attention, regardless of the stage of the
case.
Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his
protestations to the contrary, could not be expected
to render impartial, independent and objective
judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His
non-disqualification resulted in the denial of the
petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To
restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings
held against him before Judge Elumba and his
ensuing conviction have to be nullified and set-aside,
and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to
the R TC for a partial new trial to remove any of the
prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right
to due process. The case shall be raffled to a Judge
who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba
under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
DUNGO VS PEOPLE
FACTS: Appellants Dungo and Sibal were convicted
by the RTC for violation of RA 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing law for the death of Villanueva.
In their defense, they attacked the constitutionality of
Section 4 of RA 8049 inasmuch as it allegedly
violates their constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Section 4 of RA 8049 provides that the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the
commission of the punishable acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of RA 8049
violates the constitutional right of the accused of
presumption of innocence
HELD: NO
Finding of prima facie evidence does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because,
before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have
still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on
such evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima
facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the
petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their
presence in the venue.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence
against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal
design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim to
attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually
participated in it based on the prima facie evidence.
These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of
the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven
by the prima facie evidence due to their presence
during the hazing, unless they prevented the
commission of the acts therein.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD PERSONALLY OR BY
COUNSEL
MILLA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer
of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). Milla
represented himself as a real estate developer from
Ines Anderson Development Corporation, which was
engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and
offered to sell MPI a property therein located.
Criminal charges for falsification were filed against
Milla.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel,
Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza, deprived him of due process.
Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had
rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the
latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 124
surprised to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already
rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it had
issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an
Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New
Trial, which Milla claims to have been denied by the
trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus,
demonstrating his counsel’s negligence.
ISSUE: W/N the negligence of counsel deprived
Milla of due process of law.
HELD: No. The general rule is that the mistake of
a counsel binds the client, and it is only in
instances wherein the negligence is so gross or
palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to
the aggrieved client.
In this case, Milla was able to file a Demurrer to
Evidence, and upon the trial court’s denial
thereof, was allowed to present evidence.
Because of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was
justified in considering that he had waived his
right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court still
allowed him to submit a memorandum in the
interest of justice.
Further, contrary to his assertion that RTC Br. 146
denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest
thereafter filed by his former counsel, a reading of the
2 August 2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it
partially denied the Omnibus Motion for New Trial
and Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but granted the
Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies under
the Rules of Court, allowing him to file an appeal and
lifting his warrant of arrest.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances
that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case
and was granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot
be said that the mistake and negligence of his former
counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived
him of due process.
PEOPLE VS. LARA
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The
right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.—Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was
not provided with counsel when he was placed in a
police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police
line-up without the assistance of counsel did not
render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
FACTS: RTC convicted Lara of robbery with
homicide. On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors
that supposedly attended his conviction, and alleged
among others that he was not assisted by counsel
when the police placed him in a line-up to be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON his constitutional right to a lawyer was
violated when he was made to stand in a police line-up
without counsel.
HELD: No. Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not
provided with counsel when he was placed in a police
line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without
the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel
is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment
custodial investigation begins and being made to stand
in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled
in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of
Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the
so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part
of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of
People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police
line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who
gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
IBAÑEZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing
Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners together
with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David
Ibañez (David), who have remained at large, were
charged with the crime of frustrated homicide.
During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and
Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who was
selected as their counsel de oficio only for that
occasion. At his arraignment on December 10, 2002,
Emilio appeared with the assistance of Atty. Antonio
Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then appointed by
the trial court as counsel de oficio for all the accused. In
the pre-trial conference that followed, Atty. Manzano
appeared for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was
informed that the trial for the presentation of
prosecution evidence was set on June 18, 2003.
Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective
testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing. However,
Atty. Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 125
despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one of the
petitioners, absented himself from the same hearing.
Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners’
counsel de oficio. In its Order dated September 3,
2003, the trial court appointed Atty. Gregorio Cañeda,
Jr. (Atty. Cañeda) as the new counsel de oficio of the
petitioners. On the same date, Atty. Cañeda
conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and even
expressed his desire to continue with the
cross-examination of said witness on the next
scheduled hearing. In the hearing of September 17,
2003, Atty. Cañeda appeared for the petitioners but
Bobot and Emilio did not show up. This prompted the
trial court to issue the corresponding warrants for
their arrest and the bonds posted by them for their
provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor
of the government. Despite the continued absence of
his clients, Atty. Cañeda religiously attended the
succeeding hearings. On November 5, 2003, upon
his request, the trial court relieved Atty. Cañeda of his
designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners.
Per the trial court’s Order dated February 10, 2004,
Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the
Public Attorney’s Office, was designated as the
petitioners’ counsel de oficio. However, Atty.
Pantua’s designation was recalled upon her
manifestation that she had previously assisted
Rodolfo in initiating the present case. In her stead,
the trial court appointed the petitioners’ current
counsel de oficio, Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty.
Sindingan).
Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing
the petitioners. With his help, all three petitioners
finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005.
Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of
another prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as
the presentation of evidence for the defense.
After both parties had rested their case, they were
required to submit their respective memoranda in
thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the
Memorandum for the petitioners while no
memorandum was ever filed by the prosecution.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were deprived of
their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. –
NO.
HELD: No Deprivation of Right to Counsel
The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon
Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which states
that:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable
component of due process in criminal prosecution. As
such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct
rights available to the accused. A deprivation of the
right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in
arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field.
Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially
deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a
grave denial of due process.
On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch
effort to be exculpated, the petitioners insisted that they
were denied of their right to counsel when their
counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18, 2003
trial court hearing during which Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit
gave their testimonies. As a consequence, the
petitioners argued that they were divested of the
opportunity to cross-examine the said two prosecution
witnesses.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part,
disputed the petitioners’ claim that they were deprived
of their constitutional right to counsel. xxx The OSG
pointed out that since the beginning of the proceedings
in the trial court until the filing of the present petition
before this Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were
appointed and represented the petitioners and to which
designation the latter did not raise any protest. The
OSG opined that the trial court judge made sure that
the petitioners were adequately assisted by a
counsel de oficio when they failed to engage the
services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG
recommended the dismissal of the petition.
The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.
There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced
by the fact that the petitioners were not only
assisted by a counsel de oficio during arraignment
and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de
oficio actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court including the direct and
cross-examination of the witnesses. As aptly found
by the CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a
counsel de oficio all throughout the proceedings except
for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was
absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their
testimonies. As previously stated, it was during said
hearing when the trial court declared that the
cross-examination of the said two prosecution
witnesses was deemed waived.
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination
is the essence of the right to cross-examine. The
case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the
meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an
integral component of due process with a colatilla that
the same right may be expressly or impliedly waived, to
quote:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal
or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a
fundamental right which is part of due process.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 126
However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting
to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of
it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine
and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.
Such is the scenario in the present case where the
reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not
subjected to cross-examination was not because the
petitioners were not given opportunity to do so.
Noticeably, the petitioners’ counsel de oficio omitted
to mention that in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald,
one of the accused, did not show up despite prior
notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional
liberty was ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court
asserting the very right he seemingly waived and
abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing
without justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the
petitioners interpose any objection to the
presentation of testimony of the prosecution
witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did
their counsel de oficio subsequently seek a
reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.
Going by the records, there is no indication that any
of the counsel de oficio had been negligent in
protecting the petitioners’ interests. As a matter of
fact, the counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial
court hearings in representation of the petitioners
despite the latter’s unjustified absences.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the
absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the
hearings of this case amounts to a denial of right
to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the
nullification of the entire trial court proceedings
and the eventual invalidation of its ruling.
In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that
a particular counsel de oficio did not or could not
consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is
effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially
so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing
that the several appointed counsel de oficio in any
way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant
and to the trial court and that the defense had
suffered in any substantial sense therefrom.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
PATULA VS. PEOPLE
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is
not clearly charged in the complaint or information.
To convict him of an offense other than that charged
in the complaint or information would be violative of
the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
FACTS: The RTC rendered a decision finding Patula
guilty of Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC. Patula
appealed because while the charge against her is
Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the evidence presented against her and upon
which her conviction was based, was Falsification, an
offense not alleged or included in the Information under
which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Thus,
the RTCs judgment grossly violated her Constitutional
and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.
ISSUE: Whether the constitutional and statutory right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against her was violated when she was
convicted upon or by evidence of Falsification
considering that the charge against her is Estafa
through misappropriation under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: Yes. The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights
to every person accused of a crime, among them the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the
nature and cause of the accusation in the information
should never be taken for granted by the State. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.
CANCERAN VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: The records disclose that Caneeran, together
with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was
charged with "Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00
noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 127
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Jovito Caneeran, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one
another with his co-accused Frederick Vequizo, URC
Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever
Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama Mega
Center, with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream
valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega
Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio,
thus, performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of theft as a consequence but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of accused's will, that is, they
were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega
Center who prevented them from further carrying
away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream,
to the damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega
Center.
Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against
him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser
of La Tondena, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he
was in Ororama to buy medicine for his wife. On his
way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a
male person of around 20 years of age requested
him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that
he did not know the name of this man who gave him
P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic
Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the
unnamed person because he was struck by his
conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of
the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier,
he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a
jeepney; that three persons ran after him, and he was
caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of
Ororama, where he was mauled and kicked by one of
those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110
cellular phone and cash amounting to P2,500.00; and
that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while a
certain Amion took his necklace.
Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information
for theft was already filed on October 9, 2002 which
was eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second
Information was filed for the same offense over the
same incident and became the subject of the present
case. RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable
doubt which was thereafter affirmed by the CA.
Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his
conviction. He insists that there was already double
jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was
already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the
second case. Canceran also contends that there
was no taking of the Ponds cream considering
that "the information in Criminal Case No.
2003-141 admits the act of the petitioner did not
produce the crime of theft." Thus, absent the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
element of taking, the felony of theft was never proved.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of
Canceran’s right to be informed of the charges against
him?
HELD: YES
Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of
the Nature and Cause of Accusation against Him.
No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of
every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him. It is fundamental that every element of which
the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out
in the information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of
theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was
done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
away is accomplished without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things. "Unlawful taking,
which is the deprivation of one's personal property, is
the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without
unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense
could only be attempted theft, if at all."
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to
freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the
concept of 'taking' itself, in that there could be no true
taking until the actor obtains such degree of control
over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the
effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted,
and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all
the acts of execution have not been completed, the
"taking not having been accomplished.
A careful reading of the allegations in the Information
would show that Canceran was charged with
"Frustrated Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the
Information read:
x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of
Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627,20,
belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by
William Michael N. Arcenio, thus performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of
theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some cause independent of
accused's will.
Since there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The
Information can never be read to charge Canceran
of consummated Theft because the indictment
itself stated that the crime was never produced.
Instead, the Information should be construed to mean
that Canceran was being charged with theft in its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 128
attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may
only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted
Theft. The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not
from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the law alleged to have been
violated - these being conclusions of law - but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.=
ESTRELLADO-MAINAR VS.. PEOPLE
FACTS: The prosecution charged the petitioner with
the crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which punishes "[a]ny person who,
pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall
convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner
under Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes the
act of any person who, knowing that real property is
encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although
such encumbrance is not recorded.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner's conviction under
Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC was proper? NO.
HELD: Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that an accused has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the
Information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined
by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the
title or designation of the offense contained in the
caption of the Information. It is fundamental that
every element of which the offense is comprised
must be alleged in the Information.
The elements of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real
property; (2) that the offender knew that the real
property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must
be express representation by the offender that the
real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that
the act of disposing of the real property be made to
the damage of another.
The Information in the present case did not allege
that the petitioner made an express representation
that the property sold is free from any encumbrance.
This Information was crafted in such a way that only
one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316,
paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through which
such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to
be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be
committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between
the petitioner and Naval also did not contain any
representation by the petitioner that the property being
sold was free from any encumbrance.
The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a
conviction for the crime for which the petitioner had
been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution failed to prove the
allegation in the Information that the petitioner
pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.
On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who
determines the charges to be filed and how the legal
and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as
components of the information. Fairness demands that
the petitioner should not be convicted of a crime which
she has not been charged with or which is not
necessarily included therein.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT RTC CDO
Summary of facts: A judge failed to act on the cases
filed before his sala. He was ordered by the OCA to act
on the cases but he did not do so. Eventually, he filed a
COC for elective position, which resulted to his
resignation. The OCA still recommended that he be
found guilty for failure to decide on cases and related
matters.
FACTS:
 From February 21 to 24, 2005, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) dispatched an Audit Team.
 The Audit Teamc onducted a judicial audit of Branch
20 of the RTC of CDO presided by respondent Judge
Pantanosas, Jr.
 The report of the Audit Team revealed that as of the
audit dates, Branch 20 had a total caseload of 599
cases consisting of 256 criminal cases and 343 civil
cases. Majority of these cases were not acted upon
by Judge Pantanosas, Jr..
 The OCA Deputy Administrator issued a
memorandum directing Judge Pantanosas, Jr. to:
o Take appropriate action on the pending
cases;
o Resolve within the reglementary period the
pending incidents in the criminal and civil
cases,
o Explain within ten days from notice his failure
to resolve the pending incidents in 14
criminal and civil cases within the
reglementary period.
 In his compliance, Judge Pantanosas, Jr. send an
explanation for his omissions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 129
 However, he still did not take appropriate actions
as mandated by OCA.
 On March 29, 2007, Judge Pantanosas, Jr. filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice
Governor of the Province of Misamis Oriental, and
was thereby deemed automatically resigned from
the Judiciary.
 Clearly, prior to his resignation, Judge Pantanosas,
Jr. did not:
(a) decide 115 cases;
(b) resolve pending matters or incidents in
100 cases;
(c) appropriately act on 100 cases with no
further action or setting after the lapse of a
considerable length of time;
(d) appropriately act on 45 criminal cases
with warrants of arrest but without return of
service; and
(e) appropriately act on five criminal cases
that had proceeded to pre–trial or trial
proper without conducting an arraignment
of the accused.
 The OCA recommended that the Judge be found
guilty of gross inefficiency and gross misconduct
and that he be FINED an amount equivalent to his
salary and benefits (including SAJJ, RATA, JDF
and Extraordinary Allowance) for 6 months to be
deducted from the retirement benefits due him to
serve as a strong deterrent to judges who may
wish to thwart the coercive powers of this Court by
filing a certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: WON Judge Pantasonas is guilty for gross
inefficiency and gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes.
MAIN RULING: A Judge who fails to decide cases
and related matters within the periods prescribed by
law is guilty of gross inefficiency, and may be
punished with dismissal from the service even for the
first offense, unless he has been meanwhile
separated from the service, in which instance he may
be imposed the stiffest of fines. For falsely rendering
certificates of service to the effect that he did not
have any unresolved cases and matters pending in
his court’s docket, he is also guilty of dishonesty,
another act of gross misconduct, for which he should
be sanctioned with dismissal from the service even
for the first offense. But his intervening separation
from the service leaves the only proper penalty to be
the forfeiture of his entire retirement benefits, except
his earned leaves.
Details:
The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a
primary aim of the Judiciary
Reason: so that the ends of justice may not be
compromised and the Judiciary will be true to its
commitment to provide litigants their constitutional
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their
cases.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
administers justice impartially and without delay. Under
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, a judge is obliged to perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.
To comply with his obligation, he must display such
interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of
the day’s labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at
the expiration of official seasons, but which proceeds
diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into
vacation periods. Only thereby can he do his part in the
great work of speeding up the administration of justice
and rehabilitating the Judiciary in the estimation of the
people.
Any unjustified failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency that
deserves the imposition of the proper administrative
sanctions. Hence, decision–making is his primordial
and most important duty as a member of the Bench.
Based on the audit reports of the OCA’s Audit
Teams, Judge Pantanosas, Jr. did not live up to
these tenets. Accordingly, he was administratively
liable for gross inefficiency.
Yet, Judge Pantanosas, Jr. seeks to avoid liability by
attributing part of the delay in deciding the pending
cases to the absence of the transcripts of stenographic
notes.The excuse interposed by Judge Pantanosas, Jr.
is unacceptable. The Court has ruled in Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Aquino:
That the incompleteness of the transcripts of
stenographic notes was not a valid reason for not
deciding cases within the extended period
granted by the Court, for, precisely, judges have
been instructed to take notes of the salient
portions of their hearings, and to proceed in the
preparation of their decisions without waiting for
the transcripts.
To let judges await the transcription of the
stenographic notes before they could render their
decisions would cause undue delays because
judges could then easily find justifications for
failing to comply with the mandatory period to
decide cases. Verily, the proper and efficient
management of his court is the responsibility of
every presiding judge – he alone is directly
responsible for the proper discharge of official
functions.
Given all the circumstances, Judge Pantanosas, Jr.
was guilty of two grave offenses of compounded gross
inefficiency and dishonesty. With the aggravating
circumstance of his having been already severely
sanctioned for the similar offense of failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period, the highest
penalty is warranted. That penalty would be dismissal
from the service had he still been in the active service.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 130
But the filing on March 29, 2007 of his certificate of
candidacy to run for public office automatically
deemed him resigned from the service. Accordingly,
the Court sanctions him properly by forfeiting all his
retirement benefits, except earned leave credits
BARCELONA VS. LIM
FACTS: On 14 August 2000, respondent
businessman Dan Joel Lim (Lim), the owner of Top
Gun Billiards, filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn
statement) with the Criminal Intelligence Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Lim
claimed as follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E.Ditan
and Pilipino Ubante, were influenced by petitioner to
file a labor complaint against Lim; and (2) petitioner,
then an NLRC officer, demanded 20,000 for the
settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. On
the strength of this sworn statement, the NBI
organized an entrapment operation against
petitioner.
On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that
petitioner would drop by Top Gun Billiards around
seven o’clock in the evening, expecting to receive the
20,000 petitioner was demanding from him;
otherwise, petitioner would order that Top Gun
Billiards be closed. After Lim handed him the marked
bills, petitioner began counting them. The latter was
arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put
the money in his bag.
After being duly informed of his constitutional rights,
petitioner was brought to the NBI office where he was
booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. Thereafter,
he underwent ultraviolet light examination. The
Certification of the NBI-Forensic Chemistry Division
stated that his hands "showed the presence of Yellow
Fluorescent Specks and Smudges," and that "similar
examinations made on the money bills showed the
presence of yellow fluorescent specks and smudges.
NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr. recommended
the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The NBI
filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the
City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila an Information against petitioner for
the crime of robbery.
Finding a prima facie case against petitioner,
Chairperson Seres issued Administrative Order No.
9-02, formally charging him with dishonesty and
grave misconduct.
The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte.
It found that petitioner had been caught red-handed
in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been
substantially established, the Board found him
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon
approval of this recommendation by NLRC
Chairperson Seres, petitioner was dismissed from
service.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and Appeal
Memorandum with the CSC on 27 December
2000, but it only issued its Resolution on 18 December
2006.
According to petitioner, he sees no justifiable reason
for the six–year delay in the resolution of his appeal
before the CSC. He is now asking this Court to “rectify”
the wrong committed against him and his family by
absolving him of the administrative charges.
ISSUE: Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy
disposition of his case has been violated by the CSC;
HELD: NO. Right of the petitioner to speedy disposition
of his case has not been violated by the CSC.
Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
reads:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is
guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy
disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six
years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not,
by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his
right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all,
a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances
peculiar to the case must also be considered. (Binay v.
Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413)
Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.,85 laid down the guidelines for
determining the applicability of Section 16, Rule III, to
wit:
In the determination of whether or not the right
to a “speedy trial” has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of delay,
reason for the delay, assertion of the right or
failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the
delay. x x x.
The CSC maintains that “[p]etitioner failed to assert
such right before the proceedings in the CSC and,
even assuming that there was delay in resolution of his
appeal before the CSC, no prejudice was caused to
him.”86
Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the fact that
he made several telephone calls to inquire about the
status of his appeal87 and sent to the Commissioner of
the CSC a letter dated 2 March 2001, informing the
latter that the case had been “forwarded to CSC–Main
without action of CSC–NCR,” sufficiently proves that
he did not fail to assert his right.
On this particular point, we have to agree with the
CSC that “the alleged telephone calls made by
petitioner are self–serving and lack corroborative
evidence.” Since there is no way of ascertaining
whether or not he actually made these phone calls,
this allegation cannot be given any probative value.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 131
As to the letter petitioner allegedly sent to CSC
Commissioner Jose Erestain, Jr., it is apparent from
the face of the letter that there is no indication at
all that the intended recipient actually received it.
The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights
conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by
law. Ones right to the speedy disposition of his case
must therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of
petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to
have waived it.
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
HO WAI PANG VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 13 Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines as
tourists. At the arrival area, the group presented a
Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning
Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the
baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their
turn came up.
 From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal
belongings. When the second bag was examined,
she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of
the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of
chocolates, what she saw inside was white
crystalline substance contained in a white
transparent plastic.
 Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four
chocolate boxes earlier discovered. All in all, 18
chocolate boxes were recovered from the
baggages of the six accused.
 NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated
the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the
presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him,
he conducted a test on the white crystalline
substance contained in said chocolate boxes at
the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. The
result of his examination of the white crystalline
substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
 The following day, the 13 tourists were
brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further questioning.
The confiscated stuff were turned over to the
Forensic Chemist who weighed and
examined them. Findings show that its total
weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the
representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Out of the
13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for
violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against
petitioner and his five co-accused.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
 Accordingly, six separate Informations all
dated September 19, 1991 were filed against
petitioner and his co-accused. They were
convicted.
 In this petition for certiorari, .Petitioner asserts
that he was deprived of his right to know and
understand what the witnesses testified to.
According to him, only a full understanding of
what the witnesses would testify to would
enable an accused to comprehend the
evidence being offered against him and to
refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.
 In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner
was given the opportunity to confront his
accusers and/or the witnesses of the
prosecution when his counsel cross-examined
them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter
to understand the proceedings before him and
if he could not do so, he should have
manifested it before the court. At any rate, the
OSG contends that petitioner was
nevertheless able to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses and that such
examination suffices as compliance with
petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses
against him.
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner was deprived of
his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him.
HELD: Petitioner was not denied of his right to
confrontation.
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register
any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite
the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been
shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced
him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner,
through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco
and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The
right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,36 the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 132
facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The
chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure
the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the
opportunity for cross-examination has been secured,
the function and test of confrontation has also been
accomplished, the confrontation being merely the
dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner’s
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him was not impaired
PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:
FACTS: The principal respondent in this case,
Homero A. Mercado, was the President of JAM Liner,
Inc. The other respondents, Antonio A. Belicena,
Uldarico P. Andutan Jr., Raul C. De Vera, and
Rosanna P. Diala, were Department of Finance (DOF)
officials formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center (DOF
One-Stop Shop).
Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify
against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the
tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop, Mercado
applied with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
immunity as state witness under its witness
protection program. On June 5, 2000 the DOJ
favorably acted on the application and granted
immunity to Mercado. Still, since the investigation of
the case fell within the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), the latter charged him
and the other respondents before the
Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division with violations of
Section 3(j) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and two
counts of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 4,
of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Cases
27511-14.
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation before the Ombudsman, citing the
DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably on
the motion, on September 4, 2003 the Ombudsman
executed an Immunity Agreement with Mercado. The
agreement provided that, in consideration for
granting him immunity from suit, Mercado would
produce all relevant documents in his possession
and testify against the accused in all the cases,
criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them.
Accordingly, on the same date, the Ombudsman filed
a motion to discharge Mercado from the information
involving him.
But on April 30, 2008 the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution, denying the Ombudsman’s motion. That
court held that the pieces of evidence adduced
during the hearing of the Ombudsman’s motion failed
to establish the conditions required under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to recognize the immunity
from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman
granted respondent Mercado and, as a result, in
declining to discharge him from the information as
a state witness? YES
HELD:The filing of the criminal action against an
accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman
from exercising the power that the Congress has
granted him. Section 17 of R.A. 6770 provides:
Section 17. Immunities. – x x x Under such terms and
conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other
evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in
any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by
the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity
granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he
be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
His above authority enables the Ombudsman to
carry out his constitutional mandate to ensure
accountability in the public service. It gives the
Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused
discharged from the information to increase the
chances of conviction of the other accused and
attain a higher prosecutorial goal. Immunity
statutes seek to provide a balance between the
state’s interests and the individual’s right against
self-incrimination. To secure his testimony without
exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law
recognizes that the witness can be given immunity
from prosecution. In such a case, both interests
and rights are satisfied.
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent
judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such
power in the Ombudsman as well as in the
Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ
an accused as a state witness must necessarily
originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is
to obtain a successful prosecution of the several
accused before the courts. The latter do not as a rule
have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s
evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently,
courts should generally defer to the judgment of the
prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an
accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear
cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17,
Rule 119.
The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado
was part of prosecutorial discretion in the
determination of who should be used as a state
witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation of
the Rules, this determination should be given great
weight by our courts. As this Court held in People v.
Court of Appeals:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 133
The Rules do not require absolute certainty in
determining those conditions. Perforce, the
Judge has to rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and the considerations presented by
the prosecuting officer.
"A trial judge cannot be expected or required to
inform himself with absolute certainty at the very
outset of the trial as to everything which may be
developed in the course of the trial in regard to the
guilty participation of the accused in the commission
of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for
the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as
to the necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested, as to the availability or
non-availability of other direct or corroborative
evidence; as to which of the accused is the ‘most
guilty’ one; and the like, the judge must rely in a large
part upon the suggestions and the information
furnished by the prosecuting officer. x x x."
DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: The complainants, Corazon and Charito,
claimed that Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner of
Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by
several unknown male persons believed to be police
officers for allegedly selling drugs. It was alleged that
petitioner, a police officer, demanded from them
₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for
the release of Ariel.
The complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to
file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the
meeting to the authorities. A team was immediately
formed to implement an entrapment operation which
took place inside a Jollibee branch in Cebu City. The
officers were able to nab Dela Cruz.
Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory
of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was
done. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result.
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness.
He denied the charges and testified that while eating
at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly
for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
done by the PNP Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also
requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the
taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation. CA affirmed trial court’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon
the petitioner is covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
HELD: NO.SC declared that the drug test conducted
upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law
or jurisprudence.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the
admissibility of the evidence, the lower court reasoned
that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when
he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a
statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine
from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only
for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
SC held that petitioner never raised the alleged
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he
is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest."
The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand ofcounsel is not required.
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. Hence,it has
been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers), and
an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his
body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; (U.S. vs. Tan Teng) to expel morphine from his
mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong) to have the outline of
his foot traced todetermine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas) U.S. and to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done. (People vs. Otadora)
In the instant case, SC failed to see how a urine sample
could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC
and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that
the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
In Gutang vs. People, a urine sample was considered
as admissible. Petitioner therein and his companions
were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a
search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team
found and confiscated shabu materials and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 134
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in
that case were also asked to give urine samples,
which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner
therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang
claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in
effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that
"what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from
the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in
Gutang was categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined
came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made
to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation. In
fact, the record shows that petitioner and his
co-accused were not compelled to give samples of
their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the
same when they were requested to undergo a drug
test.
The circumstances in Gutang are clearly different
from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug
case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third,
there were other pieces of evidence that point to his
culpability for the crimes charged.
In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested
for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample
taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only
available evidencethat was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his
urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked
for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile,
because he was still compelled to submit his urine for
drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the
Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, SC
cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is
being made. SC ordered the acquittal of petitioner in
this case.
PEOPLE VS. FIELDAD
FACTS: Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan
Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were
charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two
jail guards and for camapping.
ISSUE: W/N the right against self incrimination is
violated by the taking of the paraffin test of the accused.
NO
HELD: Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by
Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A
careful examination of the record reveals that the
following evidence establish Fieldad’s active
participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid
testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldad’s
hands was positive for the presence of gun
powder nitrates,33 as contained in her report.34 In
addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin
evidence. We note that Fieldad’s counsel
manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was
performed without the assistance of counsel,
contrary to the right of the accused.35 However, all
the exhibits offered by the prosecution, including
the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in
the Order dated 3 March 2000.36 To be sure, the
taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of
the accused against self incrimination. In People v.
Gamboa,37 we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was
subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the
presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense whose confession or admission may not be
taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent
and to havec ompetent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self incrimination is not
violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands.
This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the
paraffin test proved positively thathe just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
COSCUELLA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Coscolluela served as governor of the
Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 135
full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his
tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects
Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate,
and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman
for the Visayas (Office of the Ombudsman) received
a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from
People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to
investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and
agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount
of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around
a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation
Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a
Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding
probable cause against petitioners for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,” and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. However, the final
approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro
(Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June
19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to
Quash,12 arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated as the criminal charges against him
were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since
the complaint was instituted.
ISSUE: whether the SB gravely abused its discretion
in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition
of cases was not violated.
HELD: YES. A person’s right to the speedy
disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section
16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy
disposition of cases should be understood to be a
relative or flexible concept such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would
not be sufficient.22 Jurisprudence dictates that the
right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Hence, in the determination
of whether the defendant has been denied his right to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors
may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Records show that they could not have urged the
speedy resolution of their case because they were
unaware that the investigation against them was still
on-going. They were only informed of the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information against them only
after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB
on June 19, 2009.26 In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them
have already been terminated. This serves as a
plausible reason as to why petitioners never
followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this
point is the Court’s observation in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged
the speedy resolution of their case because they were
completely unaware that the investigation against them
was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is
the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment,
and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper
procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After
giving their explanation and after four long years of
being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to
assume that the charges against them had already
been dismissed.
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings, it was not the petitioners’ duty to follow up
on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite
the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in
view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints
lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v.
Wingo: A defendant has no duty to bring himself to
trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of
insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Respondent Mercado was the President of
JAM Liner, Inc. Other respondents, Belicena, Andutan
Jr., De Vera, and Diala, were Department of Finance
officials formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center (DOF
One-Stop Shop).
Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify
against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the tax
credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop, Mercado
applied with the DOJ for immunity as state witness
under its witness protection program. The DOJ
favorably acted on the application and granted
immunity to Mercado. Still, since the investigation of the
case fell within the authority of the Ombudsman, the
latter charged him and the other respondents before the
Sandiganbayan with violations of Section 3 of R.A.
3019 and two counts of falsification under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 136
The first information alleged that respondent DOF
officials approved and issued in 1996 Tax Credit
Certificate 7711 for P7,350,444.00 in favor of JAM
Liner, Inc. for domestic capital equipment although it
did not qualify for such tax credit. The second
Information alleged that they further illegally issued in
1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7708 for P4,410,265.50 in
favor of the same company covering its purchase of
six Mitsubishi buses.
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation before the Ombudsman, citing the
DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably on
the motion, the Ombudsman executed an Immunity
Agreement with Mercado. The agreement provided
that, in consideration for granting him immunity from
suit, Mercado would produce all relevant documents
in his possession and testify against the accused in
all the cases, criminal or otherwise, that may be filed
against them. Accordingly, on the same date, the
Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado
from the information involving him. But subsequently,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the
Ombudsman’s motion. That court held that the
pieces of evidence adduced during the hearing of the
Ombudsman’s motion failed to establish the
conditions required under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court for the discharge of an accused as a
state witness. The Ombudsman filed a motion for
reconsideration but the court denied it, hence, this
petition of the People of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution complied with
the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of
accused Mercado as a state witness
HELD: Yes.
Section 17. Immunities. – x xx Under such terms and
conditions as it may determine, taking into account
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other
evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in
any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted
by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity
granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he
be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
His above authority enables the Ombudsman to carry
out his constitutional mandate to ensure
accountability in the public service. It gives the
Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused
discharged from the information to increase the
chances of conviction of the other accused and attain
a higher prosecutorial goal. Immunity statutes seek to
provide a balance between the state’s interests and
the individual’s right against self-incrimination. To
secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can
be given immunity from prosecution. In such a case,
both interests and rights are satisfied.
The Ombudsman premised its grant of immunity to
Mercado on his undertaking to produce all the
documents in his possession relative to the DOF tax
credit scam and to testify in all pending criminal, civil,
and administrative cases against those involved.
Indeed, he had consistently cooperated even prior to
immunity agreement in the investigation and
prosecution of the case. His testimony gave the
prosecution a clearer picture of the transactions that led
to the issuance of the subject certificates.
In any event, the question before the Sandiganbayan
was whether or not Mercado met, from its point of view,
the following requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 for
the discharge of an accused to be a state witness: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no
other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be
the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any
time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
What is more, the criminal informations in these cases
charge respondents with having conspired in approving
and issuing the fraudulent tax credit certificates. One
rule of wisdom is that where a crime is contrived in
secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is
essential so he can testify against the others. Who else
outside the conspiracy can testify about the goings-on
that took place among the accused involved in the
conspiracy to defraud the government in this case? No
one can underestimate Mercado’s testimony since he
alone can provide a detailed picture of the fraudulent
scheme that went into the approval and issuance of the
tax credit certificates.1âwphi1 The documents can
show the irregularities but not the detailed events that
led to their issuance. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Mercado’s testimony can fill in the gaps in
the evidence.
Respondents further contend that Mercado should not
be granted immunity because he also benefited from
the unlawful transactions. But the immunity granted to
Mercado does not blot out the fact that he committed
the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher
social value in eliciting information from him rather than
in engaging in his prosecution.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS.
BUSTAMANTE
FACTS:The present administrative matter arose from
the judicial audit of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then presided
by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante (Bustamante).
Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 137
Considering the impending retirement of Judge
Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC was
conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In a
Memorandum dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista Villanueva
(Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial
audit findings that, as of audit date, there were 35
cases for decision (21 of which were already beyond
the reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending
incidents for resolution (19 of which were already
beyond the reglementary period) in Judge
Bustamante’s court.
At the end of his Memorandum, DCA Villanueva
asked Judge Bustamante to explain his failure to
decide the said cases within the reglementary period.
Judge Bustamante submitted a letter dated
November 8, 2010, addressed to DCA Villanueva, in
which he explained:
“xxxAs to why I failed to decide the said cases within
the reglementary period, it was because of the
volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the
Auditors when they came over to audit, I have
already started deciding with drafts attached to the
records but I was overtaken by more pressing
matters that I have to take immediate attention, like
urgent motions, motions to dismiss, motions to quash,
approval of bails. All of these are in addition to my
trial duties.
I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning,
and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock, with the desire to
finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night
just [to] comply with my duties within the time frame
but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on
time because as I said[,] of the volume of work in this
court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases
submitted for decision before I retired except, as
above stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056
because of the reasons already stated.xxx”
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s
explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases
and resolving pending incidents, the OCA
recommended that retired Judge Borromeo R.
Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be FINED in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.
ISSUE:Is the OCA correct?
HELD: Yes The Court agrees with the findings and
recommendation of the OCA.
Decision-making, among other duties, is the
primordial and most important duty of a member of
the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the
courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of
justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will
be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of their cases.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and
jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge
must decide cases within 90 days from submission.
As the Court summed up in Re: Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern
Samar:
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
judges must decide all cases within three months from
the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more
than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for
decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the
period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3
months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient
justification for his non-compliance therewith.
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that judges should administer justice without
delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases
pending before him. Without an extension granted by
this Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency
that merits administrative sanction.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly to the
business of the court and decide cases within the
periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the
1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also
mandated to decide cases within 90 days from
submission.
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial
Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence
and independence of the judiciary and make the
administration of justice more efficient. Time and again,
we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty
so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally
eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide
cases within the reglementary period constitutes a
ground for administrative liability except when there are
valid reasons for the delay.
This Court has always emphasized the need for
judges to decide cases within the constitutionally
prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the
administration of justice, no matter how brief,
deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 138
disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify
the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute.
A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service
to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead
persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and
demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall
behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases.
The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of
time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of
the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the
90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an
extension and such request is generally granted. But
Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in
any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case
within the required period, without any order of
extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is
liable for undue delay that merits administrative
sanction.
BARCELONA VS. LIM
FACTS: The CA affirmed the Civil Service
Commission Resolutions dated 18 December 2006
and 28 August 2007, which in turn affirmed the Order
dated 27September 2000 issued by the Chairperson
of the NLRC, Roy V. Señeres. The Order barred
petitioner, who was then the officer-in-charge of the
Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, from entering
its premises a month before the Efficiency and
Integrity Board could investigate the administrative
case for dishonesty and grave misconduct filed
against him.
Dan Joel Lim, the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay with the Criminal Intelligence
Division of the NBI. Lim claimed as follows: (1) his
employees, Arnel E.Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were
influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint
against Lim; and (2) petitioner, then an NLRC officer,
demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor
case filed against Lim. On the strength of this sworn
statement, the NBI organized an entrapment
operation against petitioner. The latter was arrested
by the NBI right when he was about to put the money
in his bag. After being duly informed of his
constitutional rights, petitioner was brought to the NBI
office. NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr.
recommended the prosecution of petitioner for
robbery under Article 293 of the RPC and violation of
RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Finding probable cause, the City Prosecutor filed with
the RTC of Manila on 18 August 2000 an Information
against petitioner for the crime of robbery.
Finding a prima facie case against petitioner,
Chairperson Señeres issued Administrative Order No.
9-02 Series of 2000 on 1 September 2000, formally
charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The Order created a panel (the Board) to look into
the present case; require petitioner to file an answer
to the charges; conduct an investigation; and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
thereafter submit its report/recommendation. The Order
also placed petitioner under a 90-day preventive
suspension upon receipt thereof.
The Board issued a Summons dated 19 September
2000 directing petitioner to answer the charges against
him. Both the Order and the Summons were served on
him, but he refused to receive them. He never filed an
Answer. On 23 October 2000, the Board conducted a
hearing attended by petitioner with three of his lawyers.
He manifested therein that he was not subjecting
himself to its jurisdiction. Thus, he left without receiving
copies of the Order and other documents pertinent to
the case.
The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It
found that petitioner had been caught red-handed in the
entrapment operation. His guilt having been
substantially established, the Board in its 31 October
2000 Report/Recommendation found him guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of
this recommendation by NLRC Chairperson Señeres
on 14 November 2000, petitioner was dismissed from
service. A copy of the Board’s Decision was received
by petitioner on 22 November 2000. On 1 December
2000, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time Within
Which to File the Proper Responsive Pleading, but it
was denied.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In his Appeal
Memorandum, he presented his side of the story.
Petitioner asked the CSC to nullify the 27 September
2000 Order of Chairperson Señeres. The Order barred
petitioner from entering the NLRC premises a month
before the hearing conducted by the Board. He then
questioned its impartiality. As proof of his allegation, he
made much of the fact that the Board denied his Motion
for Extension of Time Within Which to File a Proper
Responsive Pleading. Six years after petitioner had filed
his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 15
January 2007 which was denied. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA in
the assailed Decision dated 26 September 2008. The
CA issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition praying
for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court and the dismissal of the administrative
Complaint filed against petitioner. Petitioner comes
before this Court raising the following argument that the
CA, like the CSC, failed to address all the issues
presented by petitioner when it chose to keep silent on
the issue on the denial of the right of petitioner to the
speedy disposition of his case.
ISSUE: Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy
disposition of his case has been violated by the CSC?
NO
HELD: Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and Appeal
Memorandum with the CSC on 27 December 2000 but
it only issued its Resolution on 18 December 2006.
According to petitioner, he sees no justifiable reason for
the six-year delay in the resolution of his appeal before
the CSC. He is now asking this Court to "rectify" the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 139
wrong committed against him and his family by
absolving him of the administrative charges.
Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, reads:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is
guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of
speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the
CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner
does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was
denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case.
After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, as the facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case must also be
considered.
Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., laid down the guidelines for
determining the applicability of Section 16, Rule III, to
wit:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a
"speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors may
be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length of delay, reason for the delay,
assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. x x x.
While Petitioner insists that he made several
telephone calls to inquire about the status of his
appeal and sent to the Commissioner of the CSC a
letter dated 2 March 2001, informing the latter that
the case had been "forwarded to CSC-Main without
action of CSC-NCR,"the alleged telephone calls
made by petitioner are self-serving and lack
corroborative evidence." Since there is no way of
ascertaining whether or not he actually made these
phone calls, this allegation cannot be given any
probative value. As to the letter petitioner allegedly
sent to CSC Commissioner Jose Erestain, Jr., it is
apparent from the face of the letter that there is no
indication at all that the intended recipient actually
received it.
The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights
conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by
law. One’s right to the speedy disposition of his case
must therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of
petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have
waived it.
SUSTENTO VS. LILAGA
FACTS: A judge is mandated to resolve with
dispatch the cases and matters in his court, mindful
that any delay in their disposition erodes the faith of
the people in the judicial system.
In the Administrative Complaint dated 05 July 2010
filed by Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento, it was
averred that the said complainants concurrently
appear as the "Defendants" in an Unlawful Detainer
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
case ("Wilfreda Pontillan vs. Spouses Cesar Sustento)
and in a Specific Performance and Damages case
("Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento vs.
Wilfreda Pontillan, et al.," before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, Leyte).
In the Unlawful Detainer case, complainants Spouses
Sustento raised as one of their three affirmative
defenses the alleged violation of non-forum-shopping
rule by the plaintiff for their failure to disclose the
pending case for Specific Performance in the RTC,
Branch 6, Tacloban City, Leyte, involving the same
property subject matter of the ejectment case. Judge
Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste issued an Order
decreeing inter alia that "it is not plaintiffs duty to
disclose the pendency of the case for Specific
Performance since it was not she who filed the case
and [that] the issues and cause of action of the cases
are different x x x." On 29 September 2008, herein
complainants Spouses Sustento filed an Omnibus
Motion for a reconsideration which was later denied by
same Judge.
On 26 January 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City, Leyte,
praying for the annulment of the aforecited Orders
issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste. In an Order dated
03 March 2009, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan
directed private respondents to file their comment to the
petition. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed
their Comment/Answer. Complainants Spouses
Sustento followed suit, filing a rejoinder to Private
Respondent's Comments/Answer.
Almost six (6) months had already elapsed [and only
after complainants filed a motion for Early Resolution,
dated 08 September 2009] before respondent Judge
Lilagan issued an Order dated 15 September 2009
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Complainants
Spouses Sustento filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On 01 December 2009, private respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
was filed. On 08 December 2009, complainants
Spouses Sustento filed their Reply.
On 10 December 2009, respondent Judge Lilagan
issued an Order deeming the Motion for
Reconsideration submitted for resolution. However, up
to the date of the instant administrative matter was filed,
respondent Judge Lilagan has still yet to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration.
On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have
charged the respondent with undue delay in the
resolution of the petition for certiorari they had filed to
assail the adverse order issued by Judge Sylvia Z.
Pocpoc-Lamoste, an undue delay in the resolution of
their motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed
90-day period in violation of the Administrative Circular
No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Was the respondent guilty of the less serious
offense of undue delay in rendering an order by not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 140
resolving the complainants' motion for
reconsideration within the prescribed period?
HELD: We adopt the findings of the OCA.
The complainants' allegation against the respondent
judge of being biased in favor of MTCC Judge
Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition
for certiorari, was untenable because it was based on
suspicion. We emphasize that every allegation of
bias against a judge should be established with proof
of clear and actual bias. Otherwise, the allegation
should be rejected as speculative.
Anent the delay in the resolution of the complainants'
motion for reconsideration, we find that the
respondent judge was guilty thereof. We remind that
decision-making is primordial among the many duties
of judges. The speedy disposition of cases thus
becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only
thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised
and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of
ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial
and public trial.[19] To pursue this aim, the Court,
through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has
fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases and
matters. Tn respect of decisions, judges are given 90
days from the time the cases are submitted for
determination within which to render their judgments.
Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conductadmonishes all judges to promptly dispose
of the court's business and to decide cases within the
required periods. Failure to render a decision within
the 90-day period from the submission of a case for
decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of
the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the
speedy administration of justice.[20] Accordingly, any
judge who delays the disposition of any case or
matter beyond the prescribed period without the
Court's express clearance is liable for gross
inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.
On January 26, 2009, the complainants brought in
the RTC in Tacloban City their petition for certiorari to
annul the order issued by MTCC Judge
Pocpoc-Lamoste in Civil Case No. 2008-05-CV-08,
and the case was assigned to the respondent judge.
It was only on March 3, 2009 when he directed the
private respondent to file the comment on the petition.
The comment was filed on March 31, 2009, and the
complainants submitted their rejoinder to the
comment. Subsequently, after they requested the
resolution of the petition for certiorari by motion dated
September 8, 2009, he issued his order of
September 15, 2009 dismissing the petition
forcertiorari. In due time, they filed their motion for
reconsideration. The parties exchanged their written
submissions on the issue until the respondent judge
issued the order of December 10, 2009 deeming the
motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution.
But he did not resolve the motion for reconsideration
even by the time they filed their administrative
complaint against him on July 26, 2010 in the Office
of the Court Administrator.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
What is obvious is that the respondent judge took too
much time in disposing of the petition for certiorari and
the ensuing motion for reconsideration. The delays
were plainly violative of the injunction to him to act
expeditiously on the matters 90 days from their
submission.
The respondent judge sought to justify his delay by
citing the voluminous caseload he had as the presiding
judge. The justification does not persuade. Although we
are not insensitive to the heavy caseloads of the trial
judges, we have allowed reasonable extensions of the
periods for the trial judges to resolve their cases. If the
heavy caseload of any judge should preclude his
disposition of cases within the reglementary period, he
should notify the Court, through the Court Administrator,
of the reasons or causes for the delay, and request in
writing a reasonable extension of the time to dispose of
the affected cases. No judge should arrogate unto
himself the prerogative to extend the period for deciding
cases beyond the mandatory 90-day period.
The respondent judge insists that that he did not need
to act on the resulting motion for reconsideration
because the petition for certiorari, being a prohibited
pleading, was a contravention of the rules of
procedure.[22] Such insistence did not justify his
inability to act promptly. The fact that the petition
for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished him a
better reason to act promptly on the petition
for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration.
We are also not swayed by his other excuses of not
having then a legal researcher assigned to him; and of
his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The
court's business did not stop because of such events;
hence, he could not use such excuses to delay his
actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily,
the responsibility for the prompt and expeditious action
on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him
as the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others
like the legal researcher or the recently appointed
branch clerk of court.
The respondent judge gave other justifications, like the
time when the motion for reconsideration was
submitted for resolution on December 10, 2009 being
already in "the period of euphoria for the Christmas
holidays;" and that he was serving his three-month
suspension from office relative to another
administrative case of undue delay in rendering an
order when the case was filed, but resolved the
complainants' motion for reconsideration as soon as he
reported back to work. We reject these justifications as
unworthy explanations of the failure to resolve the
motion for reconsideration in an expeditious and
seasonal manner simply because they did not place the
timely resolution beyond the control of the respondent
judge.
The respondent cannot be spared from the
consequences of his undue delays in the case of the
complainants. He did not show that he ever requested
the Court for the additional time within which to dispose
of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 141
him to face the consequences of his inexplicable
inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and
neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the
90-day period from the submission of a case for
decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of
the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the
speedy administration of justice.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order falls
within the category of a less serious charge, and is
penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge,
any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three
(3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
This case is not the first time that the respondent is
found guilty of an administrative offense. Aside from
the charge dealt with in Daaco v. Judge
Lilagan, where he was suspended for three months
without pay for undue delay in rendering an order, he
had been penalized five times.
Although the OCA has recommended the penalty of
suspension from office for six months without salary
and other benefits, the Court opts to impose on the
respondent the penalty of fine of P45,000.00, with a
warning that a similar infraction in the future will be
more severely sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent Judge
Frisco T. Lilagan, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 34, in Tacloban City GUILTY of
gross inefficiency for his undue delay in resolving the
pending motion for reconsideration.
ACTS WHICH WHEN DONE WERE
INNOCENT (EX POST FACTO LAW)
LIBCAP VS. BAQUIAL
FACTS: Lanny Jean B. Baquial was employed by
Libcap as accounting clerk for Libcap’s Super
Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City. An audit of
Libcap’s Super was conducted, and the resulting
audit report5 showed that respondent made a double
reporting of a single deposit made on April 2,2001.
After serving several notice of investigations and
preventive suspension, Baquial was terminated. Prior
to her termination the amount of ₱1,437.00 was
deducted from respondent’s salary each payday on a
staggered basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due
process
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
HELD: The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are
correct in concluding that respondent was denied due
process, but their reasons for arriving at such
conclusion are erroneous. What they seem to have
overlooked is that respondent’s case has been
pre-judged even prior to the start of the investigation on
July 28, 2003. This is evident from the fact that the
amount of ₱1,437.00 – or the amount which petitioners
claim was embezzled – was peremptorily deducted
each payday from respondent’s salary on a staggered
basis, culminating on June 30, 2003, or nearly one
month prior to the scheduled investigation on July 28,
2003. In doing so, petitioners have made it clear that
they considered respondent as the individual
responsible for the embezzlement; thus, in petitioners’
eyes, respondent was adjudged guilty even before she
could be tried – the payroll deductions being her
penalty and recompense.
By pre-judging respondent’s case, petitioners clearly
violated her right to due process from the very
beginning, and from then on it could not be expected
that she would obtain a fair resolution of her case. In a
democratic system, the infliction of punishment before
trial is fundamentally abhorred. What petitioners did
was clearly illegal and improper.
While it is correct to conclude that there was valid
cause for dismissal considering that respondent did not
contest the NLRC or CA findings to such effect through
an appropriate appeal or petition, the only issue that
remains to be tackled is the correctness of the award of
nominal damages.
CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENTS
CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: In the trial for the case of estafa against Lito
Corpuz, one of the issues that came up in the Third
Division of the Supreme Court was the court’s concern
as to the fact that the penalties in the Revised Penal
Code (Note: In this case the bulk of the discussion was
not the criminal liability of Corpuz himself because it
really was clear that he committed estafa but whether
or not the the un-updated fines of the RPC constituted
inhuman and degrading punishment. The highest
penalty for estafa is 6 years and one day to 10 years is
the property involved exceeds P22,000.00)
ISSUE 1: Can the court modify the RPC penalties?
Held: No. There seems to be a perceived injustice
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in
1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range
of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as
that would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 142
render the whole situation without any remedy as
under Article 5 of the RPC, the court’s duty is to
recommend to the Secretary of Justice the need for
amendment.
Even if in the opinion of Dean Diokno who was
invited as amicus curaie in this case that the
incremental penalty provided for in estafa is
unconstitutional, it seemed to raise more questions
than answers. The Court deemed it best to leave the
resolution to the Congress.
ISSUE 2: Does the severity of the RPC provision
on estafa constitute inhuman and degrading
punishment? Held: No. Even if the imposable
penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court
cannot declare the provision of the law from which
the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties
were not given the opportunity to comment on the
subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of
a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and
not collaterally,more so in the present controversy
wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than
its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning
at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling,
and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus
be within the prohibition.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out
of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."
THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
YSIDORO VS. LEONARDO DE CASTRO
FACTS: Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte was
charged before the Sandiganbayan for withholding
and failure to give to Doller, Municipal Welfare Officer,
her RATA for August to December 2011 and
Productivity Pay in the course of the performance of
former’s official functions to the damage and injury
against the latter and detriment of public service.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The Sandiganbayan acquits him. The People filed a
petition for certiorari on the validity of the judgment
acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion, and exceeded its, or acted
without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith
when he withheld Dollers RATA and deprived her of her
productivity bonus. In the same manner, the People
asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that Doller was not eligible to
receive the productivity bonus for her failure to submit
her Performance Evaluation Report. The
Sandiganbayan disregarded the evidence showing the
strained relationship and the maneuverings made by
Ysidoro so that he could deny her this incentive.
Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for
procedural and substantive infirmities. First, he claims
that the petition was filed out of time considering the
belated filing of the Peoples motion for reconsideration
before the Sandiganbayan. Second, Ysidoro claims that
the Sandiganbayans ruling was in accord with the
evidence and the prosecution was not denied due
process to properly avail of the remedy of a writ of
certiorari. And third, Ysidoro insists that he can no
longer be prosecuted for the same criminal charge
without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by the
People on the validity of the judgment acquitting
Ysidoro of the criminal charge is proper. YES
HELD: In a review of a judgment of acquittal, the Rules
provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a
party to appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal
case before this Court. The first is by ordinary appeal
under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the
third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and
provides for a different mode of review. In addition,
each procedural remedy may only be availed of
depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be
reviewed.
A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal
issues. Issues which have not been properly raised by
the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the
resolution of the case are also resolved in this mode of
review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule
45 petition is generally limited to the review of legal
issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which
have been properly raised by the parties during the
appeal and in the petition. Under this mode, the Court
determines whether a proper application of the law was
made in a given set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the
other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of
the propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has
jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the
exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 143
As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases,
unlike a review via a Rule 65 petition, only judgments
of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal
or a Rule 45 petition. As we explained in People v.
Nazareno, the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of
judgments of acquittal through the remedies of
ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double
jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials,
thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial
would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has
been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further
prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal is likewise barred because the government
has already been afforded a complete opportunity to
prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing
to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and
becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendants already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction,
but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers
and resources of the State. Unfairness and
prejudice would necessarily result, as the
government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses
that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
the governments power and resources are once
again employed against the defendants individual
means. That the second opportunity comes via an
appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial
by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on
two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment
of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion
by the court; and where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process. The rule against double
jeopardy does not apply in these instances because
a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts
and law on the merits in the manner done in an
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does
not examine and assess the evidence of the parties
nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does
not include an inquiry on the correctness of the
evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65
only asks the question of whether there has been a
validly rendered decision, not the question of whether
the decision is legally correct. In other words, the
focus of the review is to determine whether the
judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.
Applying these legal concepts to this case, while the
People was procedurally correct in filing its petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not
raise any jurisdictional error committed by the
Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear is the
obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
in the case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a
Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by
examining the petition itself which does not allege any
bias, partiality or bad faith committed by the
Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition does
not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
Also, the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual
errors of judgment which are more appropriate in an
ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The
grounds cited in the petition call for the Courts own
appreciation of the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples
evidence in proving the element of bad faith, and the
sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus
to Doller
BAUTISTA VS. CUNETA-PANGILINAN
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for the crime of libel
by publishing defamatory articles against Sharon
Cuneta in the tabloid Bandera. They were the Editor
and Associate Editor of Bandera. RTC granted the
petitioners’ Demurrer and dismissed the case ruling
that the prosecution did not submit its
comment/opposition, thus the averments therein
became unrebutted. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Admit attaching the Comment alleging that
they filed such Comment but there was failure of the
trial court due to oversight to file such Comment. They
further alleged that they were deprived of due process.
RTC granted the Motion. Petitioners allege that the
grant of Demurrer was tantamount to an acquittal
therefore no longer appealable. Respondents counter
that the acquittal does not preclude further prosecution
since principle of double jeopardy does not attach in
cases where the court’s judgment of acquittal is void for
violating right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy.
Yes
HELD: To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting
on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the
offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned.
It should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’
Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal
of the case on the merits and a review of the order
granting the demurrer to evidence will place the
accused in double jeopardy.
When the accused files a Demurrer to evidence, the
trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction. If the trial court finds that the
evidence is not sufficient ant grants the Demurrer to
Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of
the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may
no longer be appealed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 144
Anent the prosecution’s claim of denial of due
process. As correctly found by the CA, the
prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to
state that the prosecution had actively participated in
the trial and already rested its case, and upon
petitioners' filing of their Demurrer to Evidence, was
given the opportunity to file its Comment or
Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its Comment
thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that the
word “may” was used in Section 23 of Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states
that if leave of court is granted, and the accused has
filed the Demurrer to Evidence within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice,
the prosecution “may” oppose the Demurrer to
Evidence within a similar period from its receipt. In
this regard, the CA added that the filing of a
Comment or Opposition by respondent is merely
directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional
requirement, and that in fact the trial court may even
proceed with the resolution of the petitioners'
Demurrer to Evidence even without the prosecution's
Comment.
BRAZA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Philippines was assigned the hosting
rights for the 12th Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in
December 2006. In preparation for this international
diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the
designated venue, the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) identified projects relative to
the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and
installation of traffic safety devices and lighting
facilities.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be
undertaken was the installation of street lighting
systems along the perimeters of the Cebu
International Convention Center in Mandaue City and
the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the
appearance of the convention areas and to improve
night-time visibility for security purposes. Four (4) out
of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded
to FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply
Company, Inc. (FABMIK).
Since three other projects were bidded out less than
two (2) weeks before the scheduled start of the
Summit, the DPWH and FABMIK executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby
FABMIK obliged itself to implement the projects at its
own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the
payment of the work accomplished. FABMIK was
able to complete the projects within the deadline of
ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit
facilities.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before
the Ombudsman –Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN
Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A
panel composing of three investigators conducted a
fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK,
was impleaded as one of the respondents.
The OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution, dated May 4,
2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the
finding of probable cause but modified the charge from
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 to violation of
Sec. 3(e) of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution
filed its Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information on May 8, 2009.
Braza filed his Comment (to the motion to admit
amended information) with Plea for Discharge and/or
Dismissal of the Case. He claimed that the first
information had been rendered ineffective or had been
deemed vacated by the issuance of the Supplemental
Resolution and, hence, his discharge from the first
information was in order. Braza averred that he could
not be arraigned under the second information without
violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
admitting the Amended Information, dated May 4, 2009,
(second Information) and denying Braza's plea for
dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan
ruled that Braza would not be placed in double jeopardy
should he be arraigned anew under the second
information because his previous arraignment was
conditional.
ISSUE: WON there is grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD: NO, there is no grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of
conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignment of
the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the
Revised Internal Rules of the Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedure,
this Court had tangentially recognized such practice in
People v. Espinosa, provided that the alleged
conditions attached to the arraignment should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened."
The Court further required that the conditions must be
expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment,
otherwise, it should be deemed simple and
unconditional.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench
would reveal that the arraignment of Braza under the
first information was conditional in nature as it was a
mere accommodation in his favor to enable him to
travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its
ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he would
abscond. The Sandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order
clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is,
that if the Information would be amended, he shall
waive his constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned
on the amended information without losing his right to
question the same. It appeared that these conditions
were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer by the
anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 145
consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily
submitted himself to such conditional arraignment
and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense of
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double
jeopardy had been convincingly laid out. Such waiver
was clear, categorical and intelligent. It may not be
amiss to state that on the day of said arraignment,
one of the incidents pending for the consideration of
the Sandiganbayan was an omnibus motion for
determination of probable cause and for quashal of
information or for reinvestigation filed by accused
Radaza. Accordingly, there was a real possibility that
the first information would be amended if said motion
was granted. Although the omnibus motion was
initially denied, it was subsequently granted upon
motion for reconsideration, and a reinvestigation was
ordered to be conducted in the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the
conditional arraignment and its legal consequences,
Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional
nature just to conveniently avoid being arraigned and
prosecuted for the new charge under the second
information.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in
Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which
reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy
would still attach even if the first information charged
an offense different from that charged in the second
information since both charges arose from the same
transaction or set of facts. Relying on the antiquated
ruling of People v. Del Carmen, Braza claims that an
accused should be shielded against being
prosecuted for several offenses made out from a
single act.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is
not altogether aware, of the ruling in Suero v. People
where it was held that the same criminal act may give
rise to two or more separate and distinct offenses;
and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as
there is variance between the elements of the two
offenses charged. The doctrine of double jeopardy is
a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing
the accused from the risk of being prosecuted twice
for the same offense and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the
subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act
or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for
the same offense.
DISINI VS SOJ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare
several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional
and void.
Among the assailed provisions of RA 10175 is Section
7 which provides that “A prosecution under this Act
shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of
any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
or special laws”.
HELD: Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine
that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and
penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law
and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws
define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar
prosecution of the other although both offenses arise
from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the
other. With the exception of the crimes of online libel
and online child pornography, the Court would rather
leave the determination of the correct application of
Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question
that if the published material on print, said to be libelous,
is again posted online or vice versa, that identical
material cannot be the subject of two separate libels.
The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one
already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under both
laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed
online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the Anti-child
Pornography law’s scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already
covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging
the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA
would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
JAMACA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave
Threats against petitioner with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military. He likewise filed a similar
complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
dismissed the complaint. The complaint before the
Office of the City Prosecutor prospered and led to the
filing of an Information against petitioner.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 146
Petitioner contends that the court committed a
reversible error in not applying the doctrine of res
judicata as the conviction of the accused petitioner
for the crime of grave threats by the trial court had
long been dismissed by the ombudsman for the
military in its resolution of january 26, 1998 for
exactly the same crime, which was upheld by this
honorable court in g.r. no. 134664 when it dismissed
a petition for certiorari of such dismissal and that
entry of judgment had been made on december 1,
1998, hence, if this erroneous conviction is not
reversed in this petition for review the same would
[be] tantamount to violating the constitutional rlghts of
the accused against double jeopardy.
Petitioner also argues that the court should have
dismissed the petition outright because private
complainant committed forum shopping by filing
similar complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman
for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
ISSUE:: W/N petitioner was placed in double
jeopardy and w/n the case should be dismissed on
the ground of forum shopping.
HELD: No as to both. It should be borne in mind that
for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper,
petitioner has to prove that a first jeopardy has
attached prior to the second.
As stated in Braza v. Sandiganbayan, the first
jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c ) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent."9 In this
case, the complaint before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military was
dismissed as early as the preliminary
investigation stage, thus, there was as yet, no
indictment to speak of. No complaint or
Information has been brought before a competent
court. Hence, none of the aforementioned events
has transpired for the first jeopardy to have
attached.
In Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court has categorically ruled that since the
preliminary investigation stage is not part of the
trial, the dismissal of a case during preliminary
investigation would not put the accused in
danger of double jeopardy in the event of a
re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. An
investigating body is not bound by the findings
or resolution of another such office, tribunal or
agency which may have had before it a different
or incomplete set of evidence than what had been
presented during the previous investigation.
Therefore, petitioner's indictment pursuant to the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor, and his
eventual conviction for the crime of grave threats, has
not placed him in double jeopardy.
As to the issue on forum shopping, the Court stated
in: De Guzman v. Ochoa, that failure to comply with
the requirements on the rule against forum shopping is
not a ground for the motu proprio dismissal of the
complaint because the rules are clear that said issue
shall cause the dismissal of the case only upon motion
and after hearing.
More importantly, as the Court held in S.C.
Megaworld Construction and Development
Corporation v. Parada, to wit:
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not
be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is
barred by estoppel.
In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the
question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA
and in the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be
raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss
or a similar pleading.
CHIOK VS. PEOPLE
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; For double jeopardy to
attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.—The 1987 Constitution,
as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the
accused against double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117
of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order
for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to
attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.
Same; Same; Same; Finality-of-Acquittal Rule; In order
to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on
criminal proceedings require that a judgment of
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate
court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory
upon its promulgation.—In order to give life to the rule
on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings
require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 147
the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable,
and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
This is referred to as the “finality-of-acquittal” rule.
Same; Same; In several cases, the Supreme Court
(SC) still proceeded to acquit an accused who
remained at large during the pendency of the
appeal.—After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal,
the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of
arrest. Exercising jurisdiction over Chiok’s appeal,
the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999
dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section 8,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute.—The appellate court may, upon
motion of the appellee or on its own motion and
notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant
is represented by a counsel de oficio. The
court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on
its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) The aforecited section gives the CA the
authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the
accused escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. This authority to dismiss an
appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary. When an
accused jumps bail during the pendency of his
appeal, the appellate court may exercise its
discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or
dismiss it outright. In several cases, we still
proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at
large during the pendency of the appeal.
FACTS: The RTC convicted Chiok of the crime
of estafa. On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of
Appeal on the RTC conviction and omnibus order.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest
pursuant to the omnibus order. The order of arrest
was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police
Station on July 25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok
could not be located at his last given address.26
On September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of Chiok.
The CA ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of
liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because
the offense for which he was convicted is a
non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight
during the pendency of his appeal is merely
conjectural.
The CA then rendered a Decision reversing and
setting aside the RTC and acquitted Chiok for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA found that the RTC
conviction did not contain findings of fact on the
prosecution's evidence but merely recited the
evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was
already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa.
Instead of relying on the strength of the prosecution's
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the
defense.
he CA likewise denied Chua's motion for
reconsideration and its supplement on the ground that
acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of
the record of the case would violate the guarantee
against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor
reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the
case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA
acquittal.
ISSUE: Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on the
grounds that the circumstances of this case is an
exception to the rule on double jeopardy.
HELD: The appeal from the judgment of acquittal
will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors,
guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and
provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to
attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following
elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the
crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case
was dismissed without his express consent.54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our
rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate
court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory
upon its promulgation.55 This is referred to as the
"finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was
explained in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of
an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed
the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its
resources and power should not be allowed to
make repealed attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness
and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 148
the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is
a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact
extent of one's liability. With this right of repose,
the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo
insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's
interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his
right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a
single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try
him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal
strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness
to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of
criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of
government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the
finality of the initial proceeding. As observed
in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the
State should not be able to oppress individuals
through the abuse of the criminal process."
Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would
be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized
certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy
and its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a
judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of
mistrial. In declaring the trial before
the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator
Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted
in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we
found that "the prosecution and the sovereign people
were denied due process of law with a partial court
and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of
his instructions."58 We considered the acquittal as
void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
II. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal
and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on
double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly,
she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is
a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the
OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and
its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void
judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks
cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they
have resulted in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her claim
on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C.
Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in
the evidence in the bouncing checks cases67 (BP 22
case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the
same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an
implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed
from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double
jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is
starkly different from this case. In Galman, we
concluded that there was a mock or sham trial because
of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue
pressures made by former President Marcos on the
prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the
case, which prevented the prosecution from fully
ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We
recognized the intensity and gravity of the pressure
exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted to
a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by
Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in
the BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a
TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok
equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We,
however, do not see the same evils presented
in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by
Chua were in a different case and when the main basis
of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical
evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself.
Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the
appellate court considered Chiok's offer of settlement in
arriving at the decision, having included it in its
statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to
nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the
appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it
would have convicted Chiok. These are purported
errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of
evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived
of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact,
actively participated in prosecuting the case before the
CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief69dated
December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder
Brief70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in
her petition, the OSG was able to present its case
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 149
before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's
position in this case on the merits is clear in the
submissions it has filed, as most eloquently
expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..."71 Certainly, no
grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where
both parties had the opportunity to present their case
and even required them to submit memoranda from
which its decision is based, as in this case.72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment
of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly
demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.73 Chua failed to do so.
MORILLO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing
Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing
business in Pampanga City under the name and style
of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction
materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport
Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of
Amasea General Merchandize and Construction
Supplies.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered
construction materials at the construction site where
respondent and his partners were undertaking their
project. After the last delivery, respondent paid in
cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn
from Metrobank. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted
to deposit the checks in her savings account at
Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They
were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the
dishonor to respondent and his partners and
demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued
two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity.
Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again
dishonored for the reason that the account from
which they were drawn was already a closed account.
Consequently, petitioner made several demands
from respondent and his partners, but to no avail,
prompting her to file a complaint.
The MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that
the prosecution had proven all the elements of
violation of BP 22 as against respondent.
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to
the RTC. The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling. On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the instant
case can be considered as an acquittal of respondent
herein, and thus, he can claim that his constitutional
right to protection against double jeopardy will be
violated. – NO.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
HELD: xxx It may be argued, however, that the instant
petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain
procedural infirmities.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or
a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is
not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from
appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is
one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the
OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the
same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and
special circumstances attendant in the instant petition,
however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the
merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's
dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent.
Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different
from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a
dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the
accused will not result in his acquittal. In the
oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a
confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and
acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits,
that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant
is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding,
either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of
the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution
has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves
for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on
the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in
such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. If the
prosecution fails to prove that the offense was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 150
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before
the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case, the defendant may
again be prosecuted for the same offense before
a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the
instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide
the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of
respondent's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate
court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous
reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was
committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and
not because of any finding that the evidence failed to
show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as
an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be
repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of
discretion.
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal
of the instant case cannot be considered as an
acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot
likewise claim that his constitutional right to
protection against double jeopardy will be
violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez, the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the
exceptions thereto which finds application to the case
at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from
the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by
the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion,
or with the express consent of the defendant; (2)
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of
the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon
by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal he found incorrect, the case
would have to be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal
the presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as
early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the
MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already
been moving for the dismissal of the case alleging
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be
considered to have been with respondent's express
consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal
herein is not an acquittal or based upon a
consideration of the merits. Third, the question raised
in this case is based purely on a question of law. In
view therefore of the presence of all three requisites,
the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by
double jeopardy.
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
ADONIS VS.. TESORO
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of
personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose
of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued
when the person is in custody because of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.
FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the Davao City RTC
for Libel, filed against him by then Representative
Prospero Nograles. While he was serving his sentence
at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20,
2007, a second libel case was likewise filed against
Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio.
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and
Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on
Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the
country, which included Adonis.
On January 25, 2008, Court issued Administrative
Circular No. 08-2008, the subject of which is the
"Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference
in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, filed with the
RTC a Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),
praying for his immediate release from detention and
for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine
pursuant to the said Circular.
Adonis moved for his provisional release from detention.
The motion was granted by Presiding Judge George
Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail in
the amount of P5,000. Subsequently on even date and
after Adonis filed a cash bond and an undertaking, the
trial court issued an Order directing Tesoro, the Chief of
Davao Penal Colony, "to release the accused Alexis
Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or
offenses." On the same date, the said order was served
to the respondent, but the release of Adonis was not
effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his
liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid
reason.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of
writ of habeas corpus filed by Adonis is proper.
HELD: No. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 151
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an
effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued
only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in
custody because of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel.
Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment,
he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He
was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him
parole, along with six (6) others. While it is true that a
convict may be released from prison on parole when
he had served the minimum period of his sentence,
the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a
ground for the disqualification of such convict from
being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was
granted the parole, the second libel case was
pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even
when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No.
48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ
under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed.
There was basis for the respondent to deny his
immediate release at that time.
MANGILA VS. PANGILINAN
FACTS: On June 16, 2003, seven criminal
complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were
filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto
Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from
the recruiting and promising of employment by
Mangila and the others to the private complainants
as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada,
and from the collection of visa processing fees,
membership fees and on-line application the private
complainants without lawful authority from the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a
preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for
the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail.
Thereafter, Mangila was arrested.
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that
the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet
completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without
sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals
(CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her
release from detention. Her petition averred that the
remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because
she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion
to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge
Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of
the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to
lift or recall the warrant.
The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its
lack of merit, explaining:
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not
be granted where relief may be had or could have
been procured by resort to another general
remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if
petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the remedy
available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus
but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a
petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that the Municipal
Judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation shall transmit his resolution, together
with the record of the case, including the warrant
of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall
review the same and order the release of an
accused who is detained if no probable cause is
found against him. Thus, the proper remedy
available to petitioner is for her to file with the
Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released
from detention on the grounds alleged in the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA err in ruling that habeas
corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release
of Mangila from detention?
HELD: NO. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a
writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might
be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 152
the question of whether the proceedings and the
assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The
writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides
for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances.
There is no question that when the criminal
complaints were lodged against Mangila and her
cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations involving "all
crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was
expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations.
– The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations
shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by
virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint
on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be
inquired into through habeas corpus.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of
arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he,
as the investigating judge, considered Palayon’s
evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against
her and her cohorts, which finding the Court
justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case
and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on
the day immediately following the preliminary
investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she
could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding.
Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to
the law or rule, such failure would not be the
equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights.15
Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to
impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
hinting that the investigating judge did not at all
consider the necessity of determining the existence
of probable cause for its issuance due to time
constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, for that consideration was presumed.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
resolution of the investigating judge was not final but
was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor
who had the power to order the release of the detainee
if no probable cause should beultimately found against
her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to
seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to
secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse
was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of
the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the
most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor
for appropriate action.
WRIT OF AMPARO
DELIMA VS. GATDULA
FACTS: February 2012 - Atty. Gatdula filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC Manila
against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Respondent wanted petitioners to cease
and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush
incident.
RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether
to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also
set the case for hearing to determine whether a
temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases
RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer.
The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus
required an Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the
main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he
ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
within five (5) working days
RTC: granted the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders
in relation to the evidence and reports involving an
on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of
Deputy Director Esmeralda.
Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 153
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ
of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the present
case? No
HELD: The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting
the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order
contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper
remedy at this time.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the
petitioners could not be the judgment or final order
that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the
dispositive portion of the "Decision" which merely
directs the issuance and service of the Writ of
Amparo.
The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together
with the decision. The temporary protection,
production and inspection orders are interim reliefs
that may be granted by the court upon filing of the
petition but before final judgment is rendered.
 The confusion of the parties arose due to the
procedural irregularities in the RTC”
1. First, the insistence on filing of an Answer
was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves
as the responsive pleading for petitions for
the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to
the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the
Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall
apply suppletorily insofar as it is not
inconsistent with the said rule. It is clear from
this rule that this type of summary procedure
only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is
mind-boggling how this rule could possibly
apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from
that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and
criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding.
2. second was the holding of a hearing on the
main case prior to the issuance of the writ
and the filing of a Return. Without a Return,
the issues could not have been properly
joined.
3. third irregularity: it required a memorandum
in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of
De Lima, et al.
4. The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision"
dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this
court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
DISCUSSION ON WRIT OF AMPARO
It is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and
security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such
as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Due to the delicate and urgent nature
of these controversies, the procedure was devised to
afford swift but decisive relief.
PROCEDURE:
1. It is initiated through a PETITION to be filed in a
Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.
2. The judge or justice then makes an "IMMEDIATE"
EVALUATION OF THE FACTS as alleged in the
petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed".
3. After evaluation, the judge has the option TO
ISSUE THE WRIT OF AMPARO OR
IMMEDIATELY DISMISS THE CASE. Dismissal
is proper if the petition and the supporting
affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to
life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand,
the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner.
4. The court compels the respondents to appear
before a court of law to show whether the grounds
for more permanent protection and interim reliefs
are necessary.
5. The respondents are required to file a RETURN
after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive
pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the
Return has other purposes aside from identifying
the issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.
6. There will be a SUMMARY HEARING only after
the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted.
If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done
ex parte.
7. After the hearing, the court will render the
JUDGMENT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations are proven with substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.
The judgment should contain detailed measures
which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the
Amparo case.
 These measures must be detailed enough so
that the judge may be able to verify and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 154
monitor the actions taken by the
respondents.
 It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule
45.
 After the measures have served their
purpose, the judgment will be satisfied.
 In Amparo cases, judgment is satisfied
when: (1) the threats to the petitioner’s life,
liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the
judgment; and (2) through consolidation
should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil.
 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment,
the extraordinary remedy of Amparo
allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure
the protection of constitutional rights.
IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS
OF EMPLOYEES
They are also required to state the actions they had
taken to:
1) verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2) recover and preserve evidence related to the
death or disappearance of the person identified
in the petition;
3) identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance;
4) determine the cause, manner, location, and
time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about
the death or disappearance; and
5) bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.
Clearly these matters are important to the judge so
that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that
will be required to further the protections, if any, that
will be due to the petitioner.
PADOR VS. ARCAYAN
FACTS:
 Rumors circulated that Pador was a marijuana
planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.
 On 17 March 2008, respondents Brgy. Captains
and tanod raided Pador’s ampalaya farm to search
for marijuana plants, but found none.
 Pador received invitation letters for a conference
from Brgy. Capt. Arcayan.
 Pador refered the invitation letters to his lawyer.
 The laweyer advised them not to attend and,
instead, send a letter-reply to Arcayan.
 Pador then alleged that the conduct of the raid, the
sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of
respondent barangay captain to receive their
letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more
harassment cases, false accusations, and
possible violence from respondents – gravely
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
threatened their right to life, liberty and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.
 The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo
was denied by the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the issuance of the writ of amparo.
HELD: No.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in
a petition therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ,
petitioners must prove by substantial evidencethat their
rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
The allegations in the petition were insufficient
bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is
anchored on the following allegations: first, that
respondents conducted a raid on the property of
petitioner based on information that the latter were
cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent
barangay captain sent them invitation letters without
stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that
respondent barangay captain refused to receive
petitioners’ letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners
anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases,
false accusations, and potential violence from
respondents.
The alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya
farm is an insufficient ground to grant the privilege
of the writ of amparo.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a
roving patrol was conducted, not on the ampalaya farm
of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining,
which was beside the lot possessed by David Quintana.
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact
entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador
himself admitted that they had done so with his
permission, as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan
barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted
him good morning. He told me that there are
reports that marijuana plants were grown at
our ampalaya farm and that there is already a
raid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 155
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I
allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya
farm for marijuana plants.
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done
without petitioners’ permission, we cannot grant the
privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass
on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion
occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners’
property rights.
On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find
that the barangay captain’s act of sending invitation
letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving
copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten
their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The
records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan
sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that
petitioners were coerced to attend the conference
through the use of force or intimidation. On the
contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the
conference, as they have in fact done in this case.
The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following
these events, they can anticipate more harassment
cases, false accusations and possible violence from
respondents – is baseless, unfounded, and grounded
merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As
such, this allegation does not warrant the
consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of
the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
adopted to address the special concerns of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
"
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
IN RE: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner (Noriel
Rodriguez) to appear or participate at this stage of
the proceedings due to security reasons does not
affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as
affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the
existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability
which may be imputed to the respondents is not the
province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ
serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action.5 In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that
investigations are conducted and the rights to life,
liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to
the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The
totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the
writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid
down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all
other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even
hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies
this basic minimum test.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the
privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present motion
for reconsideration raises no new issues that would
convince us otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not competently
identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained
the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their
names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The
CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay7 as a meticulous and straightforward account
of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the
manner in which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009,
he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers
addressed him as "sir."9 He saw Matutina again at
11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, when his abductors
took him to a military operation in the mountains. His
narration of his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings, personal
circumstances, and perceived observations. He
likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt.
Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
abduction, detention and torture.10 These facts were
further corroborated by Hermie Antonio Carlos in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September
2009,11 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return of the
Writ was correctly deemed illogical and contradictory by
the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had complained of
physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet
nevertheless signified his desire to become a
double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members
alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler,
Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 156
hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that
he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again
because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA.
However, in the same Return, respondents state that
petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the
military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that
he could get information regarding the movement
directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life
in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary
citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to
become an undercover agent and work alongside
soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he
dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA
comrades.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the
findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from
the abduction of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically
1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the
former’s right to security when they made a visual
recording of his house, as well as the photos of his
relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went
as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s
relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the
innermost portions of the house.13 There is no
reasonable justification for this violation of the right to
privacy and security of petitioner’s abode, which
strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, respondents
also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly
amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguez’s
rights to life, liberty, and security.14
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that
the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security
may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but
also by his omission. Accountability may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.15 The duty to investigate must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective.16
BURGOS VS. ESPERON
FACTS:
 These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010
Resolution referring the present case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the
Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with
the continuation of the investigation of Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the obligation to
report its factual findings and recommendations to
this Court. This referral was necessary as the
investigation by the Philippine National
Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the
initial CHR investigation had been less than
complete. In all of them, there were significant
lapses in the handling of the investigation. In
particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s failure
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one
male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas,
based on their interview with the eyewitnesses to the
abduction.
 On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court
its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in
compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
 On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and
leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a Resolution:
(1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2)
holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of the
Amparo aspect of the case; referring back the same
to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr.
and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt.
Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the Amparo
petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the
petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without prejudice
to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be
warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR
investigation.
 On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution
requiring submission of certain documents.
 On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted
a Manifestation and Motion in compliance with the
Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this
Manifestation and Motion are the following
documents:
a) The Summary of Information (SOI) of the
officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB,
7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
b) The Summary of Information (SOI) of the
intelligence operatives who were involved in the
ERAP 5 incident; and
c) The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt.
Fernando, who was a member of the 56th IB,
7th ID.
 On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a
Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory Order
praying among others that she be allowed to
examine the documents submitted to the Court
pursuant to paragraph III (i) of the Court’s July 5,
2011 Resolution. In our September 6, 2011
Resolution, we resolved, among others, to deny the
petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the
documents submitted to this Court per paragraph (i)
of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without
prejudice to our later determination of the relevance
and of the advisability of public disclosure of those
documents/materials
 On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution
requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio Eustaquio’s
affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing
investigation of Jonas’ abduction.
 On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated
October 28, 2011 from Commissioner Jose Manuel S.
Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation
Team, requesting photocopies of the following
documents:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 157
a) SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of
the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007;
b) SOI of the intelligence operatives who were
involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
c) SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of
the 56th IB, 7th ID
 In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied
the CHR's request considering the confidential
nature of the requested documents and because
the relevance of these documents to the present
case had not been established.
 On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its
Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure the
affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation with his
allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas,
appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among
the raiders who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament,
Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise
known as the "ERAP FIVE"). Attached to this
Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March
16, 2012.
 On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision
pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution
referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects
of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and
ruling on the merits of the petitions.
 The CA held that the issue in the petition for
habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or
detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a
victim of enforced disappearance, the present
case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas
corpus.
 Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that
the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of
Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the
evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that
the military was involved in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of
Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt.
Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached
him and told him not to interfere because the man
being arrested had been under surveillance for
drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt.
Baliaga – the face he identified in the pictures
because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA
also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative
evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive
identification, considering especially the absence
of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or
any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga.
Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible
and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for
the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
 The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public
respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP
Director General), filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA
decision.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
 On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution
denying the respondents’ motion for partial
reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP
was concerned, its failure to elicit leads and
information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas’
abduction is eloquent proof of its failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its
investigation. As far as the AFP was concerned, the
CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of the Philippine
Army was positively identified as one of the
abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of
serious effort to conduct further investigation, spoke
loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.
 To date, the respondents have not appealed to this
Court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.
 On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to: (1)
order the persons named in the sealed documents to
be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R.
No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis
of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed
attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to
the CA for further hearing on the newly discovered
evidence.
 The petitioner alleged that she received from a
source (who requested to remain anonymous)
documentary evidence proving that an intelligence
unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army
and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together,
captured Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco
Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This
documentary evidence consists of: (1) After
Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007; (2)
Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28,
2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The petitioner
also claimed that these are copies of confidential
official reports on file with the Philippine Army.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of amparo should be
issued anew in light of newly discovered evidence.
HELD: We note and conclude, based on the
developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the
writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police
agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the enforced disappearance of an individual.
The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs.24The
focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on
the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of
administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo
proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts
specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve.
In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms
"responsibility" and "accountability" signify in an
Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to have
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 158
participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing,
the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the
CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in
the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt.
Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with
Jonas’ disappearance.
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision already ruled with finality on the entities
responsible and accountable (as these terms are
defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013
decision, the CA found, by substantial evidence, that
Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis
of Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one
of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to
interfere because the latter had been under
surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA
also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for
having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the
following directives to address the enforced
disappearance of Jonas.
We note that the respondents did not appeal the
March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013
CA resolution denying their motion for partial
reconsideration.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the
final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination
of the entities responsible for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the
petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew
and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the
petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and
for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be
redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing
investigation being conducted by the DOJ through
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court
in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation
directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it
cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and
prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with
finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance.
To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s
motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to the
DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the
appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts
against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the
gathered evidence. For this purpose, we direct the
petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her
Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together
with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5)
days from receipt of this Resolution.
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of
Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine
who is responsible or accountable; and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.1âwphi1
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served in the present case with the
CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas
and the commencement of criminal action against Lt.
Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach
of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
MISON VS. GALLEGOS
FACTS: The records show that on 23 December 2013,
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)
of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol
Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for
arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of
Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of
the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to
petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest
and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable
alien.
Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.
On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria
Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being
a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No.
2711.This finding was approved by the BI Board of
Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a
Summary Deportation Order.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 159
On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with
the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant
and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at
the BI detention center, Ku was detained.
Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with Interim Remedies, docketed as SP
PROC. No. 14- 131282. On 22 January 2014, he also
filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo.
Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order
dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE: WON the privilege of the writ of amparo
was properly granted in the case at bar? NO
HELD: Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule) provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings
committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."
On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where
about s of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of
law."
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was
further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly
declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is
confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court
in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting "enforced disappearances" as the
term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to
remove the subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No.
9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an ‘enforced or
involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances
should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing
enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can
readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come
under the statutory definition of an enforced or
involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by
agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of
the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any
refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku.
Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to
remove Ku from the protection of the law for a
prolonged time.
The documents and pleading show that there was
never any intention on the part of the BI to re move Ku
from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16
January 2014, and received at the BI Detention Center
at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014, the following
day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s counsel was
immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Reconsideration before the BI, thereby
showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply guarded and
that he was never removed from the protection of the
law.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious
danger of being detained for a long period of time
without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will
fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under
detention.
According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an
amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person
against the actions of some government officials who
will likely take advantage of their positions and use the
power of the government at their command. Ku adds
that the longer he stays in confinement the more he is
exposed to life-threatening situations and the further
the violation of his guaranteed rights.
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be
noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to
establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other
than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not
able to present evidence that he was exposed to
"life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI
Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 160
that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has
access to his counsel.
Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to
file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump
up charges against him so as to justify his detention.
The fact remains, however, that even before his
arrest, deportation charges against him were already
duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was
improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts
were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to
his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause
the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial
killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved
party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden,
there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of
the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
SANTIAGO VS. TULFO
FACTS: Petitioners arrived at NAIA 3 aboard a Cebu
Pacific Airline flight from a vacation with their family
and friends. They waited for the arrival of their
baggage but were eventually informed that it was
offloaded and transferred to a different flight.
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before the
Cebu Pacific complaint desk.
As they were complaining, they noticed a man taking
photos of Claudine with his cellular phone. Raymart
approached the man and asked what he was doing.
Suddenly, the man, later identified as Ramon "Mon"
Tulfo, allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing
the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the
commotion, she approached Mon and the latter
likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back
against the counter. At that instance, Raymart rushed
to defend his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin
Atilano (Atilano) joined in the brawl. Immediately
thereafter, several airport security personnel came to
stop the altercation and brought them to the Airport
Police Department for investigation.
Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and
Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV
program comments and expletives against
petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate.
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled,
petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo against respondents before the RTC.
Judge Vargas granted a TPO in favor of petitioners
and directed respondents to file their return/answer.
In his return/answer, Ben Tulfo claimed that the
statements he uttered did not involve any actual
threat and that he merely expressed his strong
sentiments to defend his brother.
Judge Vargas submitted the case for resolution but
eventually retired. Judge Singh assumed office and
handled the present case. Thereafer, RTC dismissed
the petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of
petitioners' amparo petition was correct.
HELD: YES. In the landmark case of Secretary of
National Defense vs. Manalo, the Court has already
explained that the writ of amparo, under its present
procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, otherwise known as "The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo," was intended to address and, thus, is
presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings
and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof, x x x.
Indeed, while amparo (which literally means
"protection" in Spanish) has been regarded as a special
remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional
rights, the parameters of protection are not the same in
every jurisdiction. In Manalo, the origins
of amparo were discussed as follows:
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo"
literally means "protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available
in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of
the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to
many Mexican jurists. One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejon, drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847.
Since then, the protection has been an important part of
Mexican constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is
being violated, he orders the official, or the official's
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the
necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full
enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from
the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power
characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for
the entire nation.
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western
Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country.
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for
the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a
response to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof.
"Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are
generally characterized as "killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings,” while "enforced
disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of R.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 161
9851, otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity,"
"means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time."
In Navia vs. Pardico, the Court held that it must be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation.
Notably, the same requirement of government
participation should also apply to extralegal killings,
considering that the writ of amparo was, according to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that
drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to
"hold public authorities, those who took their oath to
defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a
high standard of official conduct and hold them
accountable to our people. In this light the sovereign
Filipino people should be assured that if their rights to
life and liberty are threatened or violated, they will
find vindication in our courts of justice."
Stated differently, the writ of amparo is an
extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the
government's incredible power in order to curtail
human rights abuses on its end.
Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current
writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from
Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which reads:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that the writ
is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same
section's second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that
involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and
security.
The two paragraphs should indeed be read together in
order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly
applicable is the statutory construction rule that
"clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.
Every part of the statute or, in this case, procedural rule
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered
together with other parts of the statute and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment."
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners’
amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any
case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described.
Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation
of respondents' purported violation of their right to life
and security, carried out by private individuals without
any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that
their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh, properly
exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the
same under this principal determination, regardless of
the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed,
has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the
authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it
is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the
purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the
petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through
prolonged but futile litigation.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
GAMBOA VS. CHAN
FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National
Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded
the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and
her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for the issuance of
writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 162
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
HELD: NO. The writ of habeas data is an
independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs
made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that
the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege
of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
SAEZ VS. ARROYO
FACTS:On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with
the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for
temporary protection order, inspection of place and
production of documents. In the petition, he
expressed his fear of being abducted and killed. He
likewise prayed for the military to cease from further
conducting surveillance and monitoring of his
activities and for his name to be excluded from
theorder of battle and other government record
sconnecting him to the Communist Party of
thePhilippines (CPP).During the hearings, the
petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he
noticed that he was always being followed by a
certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna.
"Joel" pretended peddling in the vicinity of the
petitioner’s store.
Three days before the petitioner was apprehended,
"Joel" approached and informed him of his marital
status and current job as a baker in Calapan,Mindoro
Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still
involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA
justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone
home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he
answered in the negative explaining that he was
afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. The
CA ruled that the petitioner failed to present sufficient
evidence to substantiate his petition for habeas data
and writ of amparo. The CA likewise dropped as
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
respondent, for Pres. GMA on the ground of her
immunity from suit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to
substantiate the petition for habeas data and writ of
amparo?
HELD:( as to the writ of habeas data)
From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations
stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules.
However, they are mere allegations, which the Court
cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so to speak, and
whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the
granting of the petition is a different matter altogether.
No substantial evidence exists to prove the petitioner’s
claims.
The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of
the evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing of a
petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data, not only direct evidence, but
circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may
be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.
Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law
can be raised before the Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is
not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate
court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be
that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with
the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden
of proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his
claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of
both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
expressly include in their coverage even threatened
violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or
security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the
free will – although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right
to security in the sense of "freedom from threat".
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must
find rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of
the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored
on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and
security by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order
of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities
made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to
compel him to be a military asset. While as stated
earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection
of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the
petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly
made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported
by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand
on nebulous grounds.
IN RE: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of
Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 163
military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under
the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Noriel was abducted by military men and was
tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his
membership in the NPA.
After his released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place,
and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres.
Arroyo, et al.
The CA granted the writs but dropped Pres. Arroyo
as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any
case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
After a careful examination of the records, the SC
was convinced that the Court of Appeals
correctly found sufficient evidence proving that
the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military abducted
petitioner Rodriguez, and detained and tortured
him. Hence, the SC affirmed with modification the
CA’s decision. The case was dismissed with respect
to respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino,
and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and
Vincent Callagan for lack of merit.
The SC directed the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to take the appropriate action with respect to any
possible liability or liabilities, within their respective
legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The
Ombudsman and the DOJ were ordered to submit to
the Court the results of their action within a period of
six months from receipt of this Decision.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the
Ombudsman to take further action, Ombudsman
Conchita Carpio Morales sent this Court a letter
requesting an additional two-month period within
which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated
that Noriel Rodriguez and his family refused to
cooperate with the investigation for security
reasons.
Respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the soldiers
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military cannot be held
accountable for authoring the abduction and
torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve
solely on the claim that respondents were never
specifically mentioned by name as having
performed, permitted, condoned, authorized, or
allowed the commission of any act or incurrence
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
omission which would violate or threaten with
violation the rights to life, liberty, and security of
petitioner-respondent and his family.
The Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report,
which detailed the steps taken by the Field Investigation
Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman,
concluding that no criminal, civil, or administrative
liabilities may be imputed to the respondents. It was
reflected therein that the lawyers for the Rodriguezes
had manifested to the FIO that the latter are hesitant to
appear before them for security reasons.
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that
provides legal assistance to victims of human rights
violations and their families) could not locate Noriel and
Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused to
participate in the present fact-finding investigation ‘for
security reasons.’ Recent information revealed that
Noriel and his family are no longer interested in
participating in the present case.
Instead of appearing before the FIO for a conference
under oath, SPO1 Robert B. Molina submitted an
Affidavit stating that Wilma H. Rodriguez appeared
before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to
enter into the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly
missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan.
Thereupon, he gathered information relative to Wilma’s
report "but the community residence failed to reveal
anything".
The other accounts – specifically that of respondent
Antonino C. Cruz, Special Investigator II of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as well as the
claims of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had
disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become an agent
("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion – have been
thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in our Decision.
The OMB further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be
asked to verify the circumstances under which he
executed these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent
claims will finally be settled," and that "(I)f there is one
person who can attest on whether detention and torture
were indeed committed by any of the Subjects herein, it
is Noriel Rodriguez himself, the supposed victim."
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it granted
the writ of amparo in favor of petitioner Noriel.
HELD: NO. SC denied the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration.
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear
or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to
security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ
granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any
case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or
administrative liability which may be imputed to the
respondents is not the province of amparo
proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both
preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 164
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation
and action. In this case then, the thrust of
ensuring that investigations are conducted and
the rights to life, liberty, and security of the
petitioner, remains.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
available to the petitioner. It is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The
totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the
writ was correctly applied by the Court.
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of
the privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present
motion for reconsideration raises no new issues that
would convince us otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not competently
identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained
the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their
names in the documentary evidence, is baseless.
The CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay as a meticulous and straightforward
account of his horrific ordeal with the military,
detailing the manner in which he was captured and
maltreated on account of his suspected membership
in the NPA.
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September
2009, he noticed a soldier with the name tag
"Matutina," who appeared to be an official because
the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." He saw
Matutina again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009,
when his abductors took him to a military operation in
the mountains. His narration of his suffering included
an exhaustive description of his physical
surroundings, personal circumstances, and
perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col.
Mina to be present during his abduction, detention
and torture. These facts were further corroborated by
Hermie Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances
surrounding the victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return of the
Writ was correctly deemed illogical and contradictory
by the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had
complained of physical ailments due to activities in
the CPP-NPA yet nevertheless signified his desire to
become a double-agent for the military. If petitioner
was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to
become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that
he would agree to become an undercover agent and
work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the
wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his
alleged NPA comrades.
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the
findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
the abduction of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically
1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the
former’s right to security when they made a visual
recording of his house, as well as the photos of his
relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as
far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s
relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the
innermost portions of the house. There is no
reasonable justification for this violation of the right to
privacy and security of petitioner’s abode, which strikes
at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, respondents also neglect to
address our ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and
effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation
of, or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty, and
security.
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that
the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security
may be caused not only by a public official’s act,
but also by his omission. Accountability may attach
to respondents who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate
must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as
a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG
Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De
Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a perfunctory
investigation which relied solely on the accounts of
the military. Thus, the CA correctly held that the
investigation was superficial, one-sided, and
depended entirely on the report prepared by 1st Lt.
Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit
petitioner’s version of the incident, and no
witnesses were questioned regarding it. The CA
also took into account the palpable lack of effort
from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the
Philippine National Police.
VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida
Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures
of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
(Angela) on her Facebook profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero
(Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 165
readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged
in to their respective personal Facebook accounts
and showed her photos of the identified students,
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing
articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s
students claimed that there were times when access
to or the availability of the identified students’ photos
was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and,
through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed
the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the
other students in the pictures in question, reported,
as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima
Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM Directress. They claimed that during the meeting,
they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda
Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima
informed their parents the following day that, as part
of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30,
2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012,
Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC
of Cebu City against STC. In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing
the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares
(Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an
intervenor. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless,
barred the sanctioned students from participating in
the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data on the
basis of the following considerations:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments
(e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed
into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach
party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook
accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education,
knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the
right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought
to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been
invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the
offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving
digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as
the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted
were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5,
2012, issued the writ of habeas data.
ISSUE:Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be
issued given the factual milieu
HELD: No. We find no merit in the petition.
Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the
pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case.
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 166
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court
aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar
has, in fact, defined habeas data as "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age." The writ, however, will not
issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person. Availment of
the writ requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege
of the writ may be extended.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly
evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he
explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.
Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacy––usually
defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
With the availability of numerous avenues for
information gathering and data sharing nowadays,
not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individual’s right to control said flow of
information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what
may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of
habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational
privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging
in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in
OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the
right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information.
At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information, some of
which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the
clamor for privacy in OSN activities
To address concerns about privacy, but without
defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this
caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it
makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof."
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility
and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on
his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the
user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user
can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook
friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view
the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular
friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by
the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook
users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the
visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses,
and photos, among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an
avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what
extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put
others in the position of receiving such confidences."
Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to
regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view
that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in
his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners
manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of
a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her
post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a reckless exercise, such that if,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 167
for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its
privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only
the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo
would still be deemed public by the courts as if the
user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only
strip these privacy tools of their function but it would
also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or
her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in
question were visible to other Facebook users and
whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In
other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the
photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out
a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to
Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to
affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence,
other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos
visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof
that they placed the photographs subject of this case
within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have an expectation
of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader, through
the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a
select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the
user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.
STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty
of teaching its students to beresponsible in their
dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in
OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing
that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not
violate the minors' privacy rights, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of
the court a quo.
LEE VS. ILAGAN
FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr.
Joy Margate Lee were former common law partners.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES
From the syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
4-MANRESA 2017-2018
Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,
proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that
his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011,
Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a
purported sex video she discovered from the aforesaid
camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan
denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall inside his
office and walked away.
Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence
in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No.
9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before
the National Police Commission. Ilagan claimed that
Lee's acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons
of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet
violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and
privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
warranted.
Lee contended that Ilagan's petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because:
(a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence
against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan?
NO
HELD: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as
a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals, which is defined as "the right to
control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself."
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the
writ of habeas data now stands as "a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEW CASES 168
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily,
the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it
bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not
issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able
to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through
the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video which he fears would somehow find its way
to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption he failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one's privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial
in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
The petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented. All that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by
the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing
therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to
commit any overt act towards the end of violating
Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor
would anything on record even lead a reasonable
mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends say
for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it
clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately
utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.