DA – Roberts Centrism

1NC Roberts Centrism DA

Roberts is keeping court conservatives in check by crafting a compromise that
prevents full reinstatement of the travel ban
Wheeler 7/2 (2017, Lydia, The Hill regulations reporter, “Justice Roberts’s fingerprints seen on travel
ban decision”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/340298-justice-robertss-fingerprints-
seen-on-travel-ban-decision) MFE

The unusual compromise at the center of the Supreme Court’s big decision this week to reinstate part
of President Trump’s travel ban was a hallmark of how the court appears to operate under Chief
Justice John Roberts. The court said the government could ban entry of nationals from six countries – Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen –
but carved out an exemption for individuals who have a “bona fide relationship” to a person or entity in the U.S. It’s not the first time the court

under Roberts’ leadership has tried to find common ground that’s novel and unexpected, a telltale sign
to court-watchers that the chief justice played a significant role in the decision. “It had a split the baby
feel to it and when the court has wanted to project some amount of unity or consensus it’s done so by
ruling in these small ball ways,” said Sam Erman, an associate professor of law at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, who
clerked for Justice John Paul Stevens and then Justice Anthony Kennedy. “ Roberts has said he wants more consensus on the court.

We know he’s trying to move the court in that direction.” The decision was reminiscent of the court’s 5-4
ruling in 2012 that upheld President Obama’s healthcare law. Roberts cast the deciding vote. In that decision,
Roberts viewed the mandate that people buy health insurance or face a penalty not as an order, but as a tax. Though the federal government does not have the
power to order people to buy health insurance, Roberts said, “the federal government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance.”
The decision was hailed as a major victory for Democrats but Republicans didn’t walk away empty handed. The court significantly
limited the law’s Medicaid expansion. The government, Roberts said could not threaten to pull states’ existing Medicaid funding if they declined to comply with the
expansion. Roberts has been leading the court for more than a decade and court watchers say he has spent
much of his tenure trying to keep the court above the partisan fray. Herman Schwartz, a professor of law at American
University Washington College of Law, said the court’s most creative rulings come in cases that are centered on the most controversial issues. “ Roberts is

the chief justice and that means he has a special concern about the court not looking wildly partisan or
even partisan period that’s one consideration,” he said. “Secondly, a lot has to do with the public importance of the issue. He’s
no fool. He knows some things draw more attention than others.” Last year the court told the Obama administration and religious groups
in a unanimous ruling to work out a compromise over the birth control mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The justices said the parties “should be afforded an
opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered ‘receive
full and equal health coverage,'” that includes coverage for contraceptives. Ilya Shapiro, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, who lectures
on half of the Federalist Society, claims the court was forced to find a compromise in that case, given that it was shorthanded with only eight justices following the
death of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, He said a 4-4 ruling would have made the mandate constitutional in some parts of the country and unconstitutional in
others. Like all chief justices, Schwartz said Roberts
is already concerned about the legacy he will leave behind. While
the Roberts court is pushing the country well to the right, Schwartz said he has at times worked as a stop on
that momentum. If the court’s most conservative members – Justice Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch – had
their way, Trump’s full travel ban would have been reinstated.

[Insert Link: Plan = Liberal Decision]

The plans liberal ruling provides political cover for Roberts to embolden
conservativism on other issues – health care proves
Ware 13 (January 24, Charles Jerome, president of the national law firm Charles Jerome Ware, P.A.,
Attorneys and Counselors. He is a renowned trial attorney, with several celebrity clients and numerous
successful cases to his credit, “SCOTUS SYNOPSIS (GESTALT): U.S. SUPREME COURT 2012-2013 TERM”,
The Lawyers Mailbox, http://thelawyersmailbox.blogspot.com/2013/01/scotus-synopsis-gestalt-us-
supreme.html) MFE
The term will also provide signals about the repercussions of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s surprise
decision in June to join the court’s four more liberal members and supply the decisive fifth vote in the
landmark decision to uphold President Obama’s health care law. Every decision of the new term will be
scrutinized for signs of whether Chief Justice Roberts, who had been a reliable member of the court’s
conservative wing, has moved toward the ideological center of the court. The term could clarify whether
the health care ruling will come to be seen as the case that helped Chief Justice Roberts protect the
authority of his court against charges of partisanship while accruing a mountain of political capital in
the process. He and his fellow conservative justices might then run the table on the causes that
engage him more than the limits of federal power ever have: cutting back on racial preferences, on
campaign finance restrictions and on procedural protections for people accused of crimes. The texture
of the new term will be different, as the court’s attention shifts from federalism and the economy to
questions involving race and sexual orientation. The new issues before the court are concrete and
consequential: Who gets to go to college? To get married? To vote?

Status quo compromise has a limited impact but a conservative turn ensures full
reinstatement of the travel ban
Wolf & Gomez 6/26 (Richard, USA Today SC correspondent, & Alan, USA today immigrant reporter,
“Supreme Court reinstates Trump's travel ban, but only for some immigrants”, USA Today,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/26/supreme-court-reinstates-president-
trumps-travel-ban/103134132/) MFE

The court's action isn't expected to set off the kind of chaos seen around the world when Trump
signed the first travel ban into effect on Jan. 27. That executive order, which went into effect immediately,
barred all travelers from seven countries from entering the U.S. even if they had green cards, valid visas or refugee status. It led to at least 746
people temporarily detained at U.S. airports, some being deported back to their home countries, and untold numbers of others prevented from
boarding their flights at airports overseas. The revised travel ban, with the court's limitations, cannot go into effect before
Thursday at the earliest, based on a memorandum recently signed by the president. A chaotic history From the very beginning, the travel ban
has led to chaos at U.S. airports and courthouses across the country. Because visa and green card holders were included in the first ban, it
immediately produced confusion and protests at U.S. airports. Within days, federal judges in New York and Boston intervened, and a third
federal judge in Seattle issued a nationwide injunction in early February. Trump unveiled a revised order in March that smoothed out some of
the original ban's rougher edges and narrowed the list of countries to include Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It called for a 90-day
ban on travelers from six countries and 120 days for refugees, but excluded visa and green card holders, deleted a section that gave preference
to Christian minorities, and included a waiver process for those claiming undue hardship. That order was blocked by a federal judge in Hawaii
hours before it was to go into effect on March 16, as well as by another federal judge in Maryland. The Justice Department appealed both
rulings, leading to similar slap-downs by federal appeals courts in Richmond May 25 and San Francisco June 12. As it reached the Supreme
Court, the travel ban had been struck down on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit ruled 10-
3 that it discriminated against Muslims by targeting only countries with overwhelmingly large Muslim majorities. But a three-judge panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled unanimously that the ban violated federal immigration law by targeting people from certain
countries without improving national security. Through all the defeats, Trump was forced to play on what amounts to his opponents' home turf:
The 9th Circuit, based in San Francisco, is dominated by President Bill Clinton's nominees. The 4th Circuit, based in Richmond, is dominated by
President Barack Obama's nominees. All 13 judges on those two courts who voted to strike down the revised travel ban were appointed by
Democratic presidents. By contrast, the
Supreme Court includes five justices named by Republican presidents and
four by Democrats. Chief Justice John Roberts
is a strong proponent of executive authority, particularly in foreign
affairs. Alito has spent his entire career working for the government. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in a 2015
immigration case that a "legitimate and bona fide" reason for denying entry to the United States can pass
muster. Gorsuch is a stickler for the written text of statutes — and banning Muslims isn't mentioned in
Trump's executive order. Thomas is the most conservative of all. Despite those advantages, Trump at times has been his
own worst enemy. His presidential campaign speeches, official statements and tweets gave opponents of the ban fodder for their challenges --
from Trump's vow in 2015 to seek "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" to his lament this month that his
lawyers should have pushed for a "much tougher version" rather than the "politically correct" order he signed in March.
Fully reinstating the travel ban wrecks the economy
Mcauliffe 17 (February 3, Terry, Governor of Virginia, “US economy the next victim of Trump's travel
ban”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/317707-us-economy-the-next-
victim-of-trumps-travel-ban) MFE
Last week in Washington, I spoke on behalf of all of America’s governors to tell our newly elected president and congressional leadership that we are ready to work with them on an agenda
that grows our economy and makes people’s lives better. Four days later, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring and I stood amid a chaotic scene at Dulles International Airport. We were

the president’s appalling executive order to ban refugees and people from
searching for answers from airport authorities on

certain Muslim-majority countries from entering the country. This attack on American values has
divided our nation and made Americans less safe both at home and abroad. But just as important to
the future of our country, it has had a chilling effect on the ability of states like Virginia to bring new jobs and
economic activity here from around the world. In the past three years, Virginia has closed 878 economic development deals worth $14.44 billion in
capital investment. Of those deals, 133 were projects with companies headquartered overseas. These commitments garnered more than $3.9 billion in investments, creating 11,546 jobs and
saving 2,912 more. As governor, I’ve traveled the globe on 22 domestic and international trade missions to 19 different countries to attract companies to the Commonwealth. Before last week,
the United States of America was seen nearly universally as a beacon of democracy where people could travel and engage in commerce freely, without fear of being harassed, detained, and

two different companies have

deported because of their nationality or religion. That all changed when President Trump signed that order. In just the past few days,

informed Virginia that they are putting promising economic development projects on hold as a direct
result of this illegal order. Both companies are based in Middle Eastern countries that are not actually
subject to President Trump’s order; but they are too fearful that their countries could be next to
consider doing business within the U.S. at this time. One of the business people even has a valid U.S.
visa, but is unwilling to risk traveling just to be sent back home. These are companies that have an established
relationship with us and want to bring their business to America. Our world-class public university system in Virginia is also suffering
consequences. Professors and students that our schools attracted from around the globe are afraid to travel — despite having valid work or student visas — or risk being unable to return to
Virginia. I have already received reports of Virginia college students who have been barred from returning to the U.S. after traveling. Students, professors, job-creators, and asylum-seekers
from all over the world are a part of the rich cultural and economic tapestry that make America the greatest nation on Earth. If we are unable to welcome a diverse group of people from
around the world, we’re going to sit on the sidelines while competitors move quickly to attract that talent. They’ll waste no time courting businesses and jobs that should have come to
America. This disastrous order comes at a time when Virginia’s economy is finally growing again after devastating sequester cuts slowed our climb out of the Great Recession. In October, we’re

We know our growth is not guaranteed and we must work to maintain our
facing another round of more severe sequester cuts.

progress every single day. By hampering our ability to maintain and build upon these gains, the
president has put our economy at risk. In Virginia, we’ve been targeted further through an arbitrary freeze in federal hiring that will hurt our workers,
including veterans who are seeking new avenues to continue their public service. We do not have to sacrifice national security to continue welcoming people who will contribute to a more

this action only serves to empower our enemies and provides a ready-made
prosperous, diverse America. In fact,

recruitment tool for terrorist organizations who believe we are waging a war on Islam. On behalf of the people of Virginia, I joined with my Attorney
General Mark Herring this week to defend the rights of Virginians by bringing major legal action against the administration. I am deeply disappointed that

only days after coming to Washington to pledge partnership, I was compelled to join a federal suit against this unilateral and discriminatory executive order. This is not the

America we know. As a Commonwealth founded in the principles of religious liberty and freedom from
tyranny, Virginia will continue to stand against this ban and work to reverse the damage it is already
doing to our economy, our higher education system, and our reputation as the leader of the free world.

Economic decline causes global war.

Green & Schrage 09, IR Prof @ Georgetown (Michael Green, Senior Advisor & Japan Chair @ The
Center for Strategic and International Studies & Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign
Service, Steven Schrage, CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business, Former Senior official with the U.S.
Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, “It's not just the
economy,” March 26th 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/KC26Dk01.html)
Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just
beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has
been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can
even have jarring impacts on great powers. It
is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was
followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel
autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the
world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at
home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London
Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading
to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its
economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that
could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security
are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so
far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the
leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it
internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's
currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming
its own economy. Rather tha..n creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate
greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for
short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of
shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and
sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and
protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in
Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global
economy, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are
closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday
last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese
leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun
and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have
come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese
example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic
nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran
have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited
their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on
Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets,
leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a
nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow
members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences
between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more
pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow
nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of
falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian
leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to
suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical
advantages against the international system.
Uniqueness
 UQ – Squo Compromise Solves
The ban is limited now- Roberts is critical to uphold the decision in the fall
Liptak & Shear 6/26 (2017, Adam, Covers US Supreme Court for NY Times, & Michael D., New York
Times Author, “Supreme Court Takes Up Travel Ban Case, and Allows Parts to Go Ahead”, New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban-case.html)
MFE
WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court cleared the way on Monday for President Trump to prohibit the entry of some people into the United States from countries he
deems dangerous, but the
justices imposed strict limits on Mr. Trump’s travel ban while they examine the
scope of presidential power over the border. Mr. Trump quickly hailed the court’s decision to hear arguments on the travel ban in
October, saying — in a formal White House statement, not a tweet — that the justices’ temporary lifting of some of the legal roadblocks to his ban was a “clear
victory” for national security. “As president, I cannot allow people into our country who want to do us harm,” Mr. Trump wrote, calling his efforts to limit entry into
the country a “suspension” instead of a ban. “I want people who can love the United States and all of its citizens, and who will be hardworking and productive.” He
later tweeted: “Very grateful for the 9-O decision from the U. S. Supreme Court. We must keep America SAFE!” But those challenging the travel ban said the

court’s opinion would protect the vast majority of people seeking to enter the United States to visit a
relative, accept a job, attend a university or deliver a speech. The court said the ban could not be imposed on
anyone who had “a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United
States.” Karen Tumlin, legal director of the National Immigration Law Center, said advocates for refugees and other immigrants would urge the justices this fall
to lift the president’s travel ban for everyone seeking to come to the United States. “We think it’s repugnant to our values that they might be treated differently

because of where they are from or how they choose to pray,” Ms. Tumlin told reporters. The court’s opinion sets up a historic legal clash
in which the justices will weigh the president’s power to set national security priorities against the need
to protect individuals from discrimination based on their religious beliefs or national origin. In saying they would
take the case, the justices partly endorsed the administration’s view that the president has vast authority to control who crosses the border. They said the

president’s powers to limit immigration “are undoubtedly at their peak when there is no tie between
the foreign national and the United States.” But the opinion also signaled that some of the justices might believe that Mr. Trump exceeded
even that broad authority when he twice sought to impose a blanket ban on entry to the United States from certain predominantly Muslim countries. With the
limits imposed on Monday by the court, the
travel ban will be far narrower than the one he proposed in his first week
in office and a later, revised version. For Mr. Trump, the opinion was a rare legal victory after months in which the lower courts repeatedly
chastised him for imposing a de facto ban on Muslims’ entering the country. In May, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va., said
the president’s revised order “drips with religious intolerance, animus and discrimination.” In a statement, officials at the Department of Homeland Security said the
court opinion would allow the department “to largely implement the President’s executive order.” Mr. Trump used similar language in his statement, saying his
travel ban would now “become largely effective.” Critics of the ban disputed those assessments. Cecillia Wang, the deputy legal director for the American Civil
Liberties Union, said the opinion meant that the ban would not apply to many people while the court case proceeds. “Clearly, the White House press statement
today is based on alternative facts,” Ms. Wang said. The court’s decision could lead to months of administrative and legal wrangling as consular officials try to
determine which people are allowed to seek entry into the United States and which are barred by the opinion. “We are going to be monitoring all of that,” said
Becca Heller, the director of the International Refugee Assistance Project, one of the plaintiffs in the case. The justices said the distinction should be easy to
administer. “In practical terms, this means that” the executive order “may not be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide
relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” they wrote. But Justice Clarence Thomas, who issued a partial dissent on Monday that was joined by
Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch, warned that the court’s opinion would “prove unworkable” for officials at consulates around the world and would
invite “a flood of litigation” from people denied entry. “Today’s
compromise will burden executive officials with the task of
deciding — on peril of contempt — whether individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter
the United States have a sufficient connection to a person or entity in this country,” Justice Thomas wrote. Based on
the dissent, those three justices are likely to vote in favor of the Trump administration . The court’s four-

member liberal bloc — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan — are likely to vote against it. That leaves the ultimate fate of the ban in the hands of Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. Attorney General Jeff Sessions called the court’s decision an “important
step towards restoring the separation of powers between the branches of the federal government,” and he expressed confidence that the court would uphold the
president’s travel ban in its entirety after it heard the case this fall. Some opponents of the travel ban said they worried about the fate of people who might be
barred from entering the United States in the meantime. “The court’s ruling will leave refugees stranded in difficult and dangerous situations abroad,” said Hardy
Vieux, the legal director of Human Rights First. “Many of these individuals may not have ‘bona fide relationships,’ but have strong reasons to look to the United
States for protection.” Mr. Trump’s revised executive order, issued in March, limited travel from six mostly Muslim countries for 90 days and suspended the nation’s
refugee program for 120 days. The time was needed, the order said, to address gaps in the government’s screening and vetting procedures. Two federal appeals
courts had blocked critical parts of the order, and the administration had asked that the lower court rulings be stayed while the case moved forward. The Supreme
Court granted part of that request in its unsigned opinion. The Fourth Circuit ruled on constitutional grounds, saying the limits on travel from the six countries
violated the First Amendment’s ban on government establishment of religion. It blocked those limits, but not the suspension of the refugee program. This month,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, blocked both the limits on travel and the suspension of the refugee program. It ruled on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds, saying Mr. Trump had exceeded the authority granted him by Congress. The
Supreme Court agreed to
review both cases in October, noting that the government had not asked it to act faster. The court
suggested that the administration could complete its internal reviews over the summer, raising the
prospect that the case could be moot by the time it is argued.

The court is taking a compromise approach to the ban now which limits its impact
Williams 6/26 (2017, Joseph P., news Editor for U.S. News & World Report, “Supreme Court Allows
Travel Ban to Take Partial Effect”, US News, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2017-06-26/supreme-court-allows-trump-travel-ban-to-take-partial-effect) MFE

“President Trump’s Muslim ban violates the fundamental constitutional principle that government
cannot favor or disfavor any one religion,” Omar Jadwat, director of the American Civil Liberties Union Immigrants’ Rights Project, said in a
statement. Jadwat led a team of lawyers who argued the case in court. “Courts have repeatedly blocked this indefensible and

discriminatory ban,” Jadwat said. “The Supreme Court now has a chance to permanently strike it down.”
Dismissing it as a religious-based test in the guise of national security, Jadwat said the “Muslim ban” should be declared

unconstitutional because it “violates the fundamental constitutional principle that government cannot
favor or disfavor any one religion.” Marge Baker, executive vice president of People For the American Way, agreed. “The court’s
decision to stop parts of the ban from going into effect mitigates some of the damage being done to
millions of innocent people; but the fact that even part of the ban remains in place is still an insult to Muslims in this country and around the world,”
Baker said in a statement. “This kind of bigotry has no place in the law – which is precisely why it's prohibited by our Constitution.” Caroline Fredrickson, president
of the American Constitution Society, says she was surprised the high court wants to hear arguments on an issue that could be over by the time it renders its
decision. But the
justices could have an ulterior motive: using the case to more clearly define the limits of
presidential authority to set immigration policy. “It looks like some of the justices really want to get to the merits of this,” she says. “I
think we have some justices who believe the president has gone too far.” Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas and Neil
Gorsuch seemed to hint that the half-loaf the court delivered to Trump could open up a can of worms before the case gets argued. While they believe the White
House has a good chance of prevailing in the case, the justices said in a concurrent opinion written by Thomas, they are concerned that the ruling “will burden
executive officials with the task of deciding – on peril of contempt – whether individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the United States have a
sufficient connection to a person or entity in this country.” Moreover, by allowing some but not all of the ban to be enacted, Thomas wrote, the decision “also will
invite a flood of litigation until this case is finally resolved on the merits, as parties and courts struggle to determine what exactly constitutes a ‘bona fide
relationship,’ who precisely has a ‘credible claim’ to that relationship, and whether the claimed relationship was formed ‘simply to avoid’ ... the executive order. “I
think [the court overall was] trying to be as limited in their ruling as possible. They're sort of splitting the baby,”
Fredrickson says. “They're giving each side a little bit and neither side not very much.” Nevertheless, the issue “could all

be mooted by the fall” if the White House rewrites the order, Fredrickson says. The Supreme Court “is going to
start looking into whether animus [against Muslims] played a role [in Trump’s order] and there’s a lot of
evidence it did," she says. "I think they want to provide legal analysis of the limitations of the president's
authority.” On the final day for rulings at the Supreme Court, a group from the Concerned Women for America, a Christian women's activist group, shows their
support as the justices ruled 7-2 for Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Mo., that churches have the same right as other charitable groups to seek state money for
new playground surfaces and other non-religious needs, in Washington, Monday, June 26, 2017. School Choice Advocates Cheer Court Monday’s move by the court
is the latest step stemming from one of Trump’s first major acts as chief executive, when he issued an executive order that then barred travel by immigrants from
seven countries, among its other provisions. Though it triggered confusion and protests at airports nationwide, the order held for seven days until a
federal judge in Seattle blocked it. Instead of appealing that decision to a Supreme Court left shorthanded by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia – and Republicans’
decision to block then-President Barack Obama from filling the seat before leaving office – Trump revoked the order in favor of a revised version that removed Iraq
from the list of affected countries. But federal judges in Hawaii and Maryland blocked key aspects of the order before it went
into effect. The Justice Department appealed, but the 4th Circuit upheld a Maryland injunction against the travel ban, while the San Francisco-based 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals also largely upheld the ruling from Hawaii. The 4th Circuit ruling, in particular, pointed to public statements by Trump as undermining the
argument that the ban was based on national security and not targeting Muslims. In asking the Supreme Court to get involved, the White House pushed back on
that conclusion, declaring prior courts “openly second-guessed” the president’s judgment, delayed action on an urgent national security issue and put American
lives at risk.

John Roberts keeping Court moderate on travel ban right now

The Economist 6/26 (S.M., “The Supreme Court’s curious compromise on the travel ban,” The
Economist, https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/06/shrewd-justice) JZ

JOHN ROBERTS, the chief justice, frequently warns against the perceived politicisation of the courts. In
April he said there is a “real danger” that the public will misconstrue “partisan hostility” surrounding
Congress and the White House as influencing “nonpartisan activity of the judicial branch”. So when a
political hot potato arrives on the chief justice’s doorstep, we should expect him to do all he can to cool
it down. That is no mean task when it comes to Donald Trump’s executive order banning travel from six Muslim-majority countries. The legal
and political battle over the president’s travel restrictions—beginning with his ill-fated order on January 27th and continuing with the revised
policy on March 6th—has raged for five months. When
the nation’s highest court waded into the controversy on June
26th, it appeared to give the Trump administration a rather thorough win. In fact, the endorsement of the
president’s travel policy is partial and temporary, and the anodyne, unsigned 13-page order may be all the Supreme Court ever has to say about
it. The “per curiam” (by the court) missive did two things. First, it noted that the justices have agreed to hear Trump v State of Hawaii and
Trump v International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) in a consolidated oral argument “during the first session of October Term 2017”, which
begins on October 2nd. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not commit to a hearing timeframe when it grants a case; it was responding to Mr
Trump’s request for expedited review. Second, the order partially lifted injunctions lower federal courts had imposed on Mr Trump’s executive
order. Until the justices have a chance to fully vet it, the travel ban may go into effect “with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide
relationship with a person or entity in the United States”. But the justices “leave the injunctions entered by the lower courts in place” for
individuals who can claim a direct connection with people or organisations in America. The upshot? Foreign students admitted to the University
of Hawaii and a plaintiff’s mother-in-law living in Syria may not be blocked from entering the country. Nor may the Iranian wife of a plaintiff in
Trump v IRAP. And anyone else “similarly situated”—that is, who has relatives or business to do in America—may not be stopped at the border.
Latest updates Louisiana’s criminal justice reforms will reduce its prison population DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 6 HOURS AGO Brazil’s army is
becoming a de facto police force GRAPHIC DETAIL 7 HOURS AGO Why British Airways customers might enjoy a strike by flight attendants
GULLIVER 7 HOURS AGO Obituary: Joel Joffe died on June 18th OBITUARIES 10 HOURS AGO A new play explores the genesis of Britain's titanic
tabloid PROSPERO 12 HOURS AGO Retail sales, producer prices, wages and exchange rates 13 HOURS AGO See all updates For everybody else,
though, Mr Trump’s travel ban may take effect. People living in Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen who have no “bona fide” link
to America should not plan on traveling there for the next three months. Why? “[A]n unadmitted and nonresident alien...ha[s] no constitutional
right of entry to this country”, the justices wrote, and “whatever burdens may result from enforcement” of the entry ban ”against a foreign
national who lacks any connection to this country, they are, at a minimum, a good deal less concrete than the hardships identified by the courts
below”. People with a reprieve from the ban include “a worker who accepted an offer of employment from an American company or a lecturer
invited to address an American audience”, but not someone who “enters into a relationship simply to avoid” the restrictions—such as
foreigners who rush to get themselves added to a client list of an American nonprofit organisation like IRAP. JusticeClarence Thomas,
joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, wrote separately to say they would have revived Mr
Trump’s travel ban in full. The “compromise will burden executive officials with the task of deciding—on
peril of contempt— whether individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the United
States have a sufficient connection to a person or entity in this country”, they wrote, and will invite “a
flood of litigation”. And, Justice Thomas added, the very judges that blocked Mr Trump’s travel ban would probably be the ones
considering whether a potential traveler has a “bona fide” reason for being excused from it. There are two key takeaways here. First, the
court said, 6-3, that the freeze on Mr Trump’s travel ban should not be lifted entirely. This means that a
solid majority of the justices—the four liberals plus the chief justice and Anthony Kennedy—believe
there is at least a decent case to be made that the executive order is illegal when applied to foreign
nationals with some tie to people or organisations in America. We don’t know the legal grounds on which these six
justices find the travel ban potentially flawed—it could be the First Amendment’s ban on religious discrimination (as the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held), limits to a president’s power to control immigration under the Immigration and Naturalisation Act (as the Ninth Circuit held), or
something else. But if there was no plausible legal basis for lifting the ban on these individuals, the court would have given Mr Trump a freer
hand to stop them. Second, the timetable suggested by the Supreme Court means that the October hearing may never happen. Here’s why. If
the travel ban goes into (partial) effect in three days, as specified by Mr Trump’s clarification on June 14th, it will run its course in 90 days,
expiring on September 27th, 2017. That’s five days before the justices take their seats for their next term. There is no need to judge the legality
or constitutionality of a ban that has expired. Why did the justices fail to note this oddity? Perhaps because it is not their job to implement the
executive order, and they opted not to presume that Mr Trump will put it into effect when he said he would. But
there’s another
possibility: the administration gave them an opportunity to avoid addressing the ban more quickly, and
they took it. Look at this parenthetical from today’s order: “(The Government has not requested that we expedite consideration of the
merits to a greater extent.)” The implication is clear: we could have held a special hearing in July—an unusual but not unprecedented move—
but nobody asked us to. So,
despite granting Mr Trump’s plea to hear his case and largely lifting the lower-
court stays on the travel ban, Chief Justice John Roberts apparently worked out an ingenious
compromise with his liberal brethren and the swing justice, Anthony Kennedy, that injects the Supreme
Court only minimally into a big question on the scope of executive power in the Trump era. The chief
justice has avoided making politically volatile judicial pronouncements on presidential immigration
powers, anti-Muslim bias and the justiciability of tweets, and has positioned himself somewhere to the
left of the court’s new conservative triumvirate.

Roberts opposes court politicization- wants to compromise now

The Economist 6/2 (2017, The Economist is a news source that offers authoritative insight & opinion
on international news, politics, business, finance, science, technology & the connections between them,
“Donald Trump asks the Supreme Court to reinstate his travel ban”, The Economist,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/06/final-appeal) MFE
Whether or not their stay application succeeds, Mr Trump's lawyers are asking the Supreme Court to decide by the end of June—when the justices scatter for the
summer—whether to hear the full case. If the court does, the next term, which begins on the first Monday in October, could feature a historic showdown on
executive power in the Trump era. Chief Justice John Roberts, no fan of the court’s perceived politicisation, would
like to find a way to reduce the drama. A stay might do that: Mr Trump's 90-day ban on travel and 120-
day pause on refugees would probably expire before the justices could sit down to hear the case—
perhaps rendering it moot. Or, as Harvard law professor Mark Tushnet points out, granting a stay in Hawaii but denying it in IRAP would permit a
review of vetting procedures from the six named countries without empowering the administration to halt travel. However it handles Mr Trump's

pleas, the court is now in the thick of the most heated inter-branch controversy it has addressed in
decades.

The courts are pushing back against the full travel ban until October
Johnstone 7/2 (Anthony Johnstone, 7-2-2017, "4 ways the Supreme Court could rule on Trump’s
travel ban," Salon, http://www.salon.com/2017/07/02/4-ways-the-supreme-court-could-rule-on-
trumps-travel-ban_partner/) JD

The Supreme Court has decided to hear two legal challenges to President Donald Trump’s revised “travel
ban.” Among other things, the executive order Trump signed in March temporarily bars entry of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In cases arising out of Maryland and Hawaii, lower courts had blocked applying the

ban to all nationals from the six countries. Now, under the Supreme Court’s June 26 order, family
members, students, employees and others with “a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the
United States” will be allowed entry. At the same time, the Supreme Court will allow part of the travel ban to
go back into effect for “foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.”
The Supreme Court will hear the combined cases in October after the justices return from summer
recess. Its decision will be its first major encounter with a president who criticizes the courts as political. As a professor of constitutional law who studies law and
politics, I see four ways forward for the Supreme Court in these cases.
 A2: Limited Travel Ban Fails
The limited ban avoids the downsides of the full ban
Epps 6/26 (2017, Garrett, Professor of constitutional law & legal creative writing at the University of
Baltimore, “Trump's Limited Travel Ban Victory”, The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-trump-administrations-limited-
victory/531708/) MFE

But partof the order is still blocked, and that part is quite important: The ban “may not be enforced
against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in
the United States. All other foreign nationals are subject to the provisions of EO–2.” To me, as to Lederman, that
seems like a remarkable win for the challengers. This means, as the Court made clear, that visas—and refugee
admissions—must still be issued for eligible family members of foreign-born residents of the U.S.;
foreign-born students accepted by American universities; and employees of U.S.-based businesses. The
reduction in refugee numbers, as well, cannot be enforced against refugees who have such a “bona fide”
relationship with persons or entities in the United States. This represents a significant part of the
potential visitors, immigrants, and refugees the order purported to bar. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justices Samuel
Alito and Neil Gorsuch, wrote a partial dissent suggesting that the entire stay, not just part of it, should be lifted at once, and the order allowed to take full effect.
The court’s decision to grant cert. and narrow the stay, Thomas wrote, represents an “implicit conclusion that the government has made a strong showing that it is
likely to succeed on the merits” when the case is heard. That is probably true as a matter of court doctrine, and it provides an unsubtle hint that the administration
has three votes in its pocket for whatever it wants to do; but, again, the case most likely won’t proceed to judgment on the merits. In the meantime,
the
challengers have won a different, potentially important “implicit” recognition by the court’s majority—
plaintiffs living in the U.S. may have standing to raise claims of discrimination by relatives, students, or
employees living abroad.

Current compromise is the best case scenario given SCOTUS’s reluctance to make a
partisan decision
Feldman 6/26 (Noah, prof of constitutional & int’l law at Harvard Univ, “Be Wary of a Compromise on
Trump’s Travel Ban,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-26/be-wary-of-a-
compromise-on-trump-s-travel-ban)KC
The court’s opinion was scrupulous about trying to avoid any comment on how the case would turn out, with regard to whether the parties
challenging the travel ban have cause to do so or on the merits of their arguments. Two appeals courts have ruled against the ban, one by
saying that anti-Muslim discrimination was the guiding force behind the executive order, the other by saying Trump did not provide a valid
national security reason for it. The
Supreme Court on Monday focused on the extent of the stay put in place by
the lower courts -- and that’s where the compromise came. The lower courts dealt with the executive order by freezing
its operation altogether. The justices took a different tack. They kept in place the ban as it relates to citizens of the six
countries “who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United
States.” In detail, the court explained that meant the travel ban can’t be applied to foreigners seeking
entry who have a “close familial relationship” with people inside the U.S. And it can’t be applied to
foreigners who have been admitted to U.S. universities, offered jobs with U.S. corporations or invited to
speak by U.S. groups. The court went out of its way to clarify that such relationships to entities must be
“formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading” the
executive order. The court said specifically that nonprofit immigration advocacy organizations “may not contact foreign nationals from
the designated countries, add them to client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion.” But the justices
lifted the freeze on the travel ban with respect to people from the six majority Muslim countries who
are outside the U.S. and have no U.S. connections. The government’s interest in exclusion and the
president’s power to do so, the court said, “are undoubtedly at their peak when there is no tie between
the foreign national and the United States.” In practice, the court’s ruling means Trump’s travel ban
won’t be able to affect the great majority of foreign nationals who were actually trying to get to the U.S.
from the six countries. It was already extremely difficult to get a visa from these countries unless you
had family ties or a specific invitation. The State Department under President Barack Obama wasn’t in
the habit of giving out tourist visas to applicants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria or
Yemen. And the vetting process that would accompany a visa request from these countries would in
any case have made the granting of such visas unlikely to the point of impossibility. Given the practical reality
that the court’s new distinction doesn’t give the Trump administration much in practical terms, it’s worth
asking why the justices bothered to create it. . The best answer is that the court, especially Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy, didn’t want the court’s decision to be read as a partisan
rejection of the Trump administration, the way the lower court opinions often did.

Limited travel ban solves economy- tourism

Isidore 7/6 (Chris Isidore, 7-6-2017, "Trump's travel ban not hitting international visits to U.S.,"
CNNMoney, http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/06/news/economy/international-travel-trump-
impact/index.html) JD

International travel to the U.S. grew 5.2% in May compared to last year, according to the U.S. Travel Association's latest
report released Wednesday. The group also revised its April reading higher, to year-over-year growth of 6.6%.
The index measures data from a number of sources, including advance search and booking data, hotel room demand and the number of
passengers who actually get on planes. "There is widespread talk of daunting challenges to the U.S. travel market.
Perception of the country abroad is mentioned most. Yet the resilience of our sector continues to
astound," said Roger Dow, CEO of the trade group, in the report. In part, overseas marketing campaigns -- launched due to concerns about
the administration's travel policies -- are helping to keep travel to the U.S. strong. Travel industry experts have been worried
since early this year that President Trump's travel restrictions and immigration policies could dent travel
to the U.S. Though the policies affect only a small fraction of visitors, the experts speculated the rules would make
even travelers from Europe and other countries not covered by the ban feel unwelcome.

The limited travel ban is going smoothly because of the courts limits
Martin 7/1 (Michel Martin, 7-1-2017, "Explaining The Confusion Behind The Limited Travel Ban
Guidelines ," NPR.org, http://www.npr.org/2017/07/01/535187227/explaining-the-confusion-behind-
the-limited-travel-ban-guidelines) JD

The State Department guidelines for the limited travel ban allow for some family members and not
others, including grandparents. Reuter's Yeganeh Torbati explains the confusion. On this busy travel weekend for Americans, we'll turn now
to President Trump's efforts to ban people from six predominantly Muslim countries from traveling to the U.S. Now, his initial effort had been
blocked by federal judges after it sparked confusion, protests and lawsuits. But five days ago, the Supreme Court said the ban can
be implemented in part. The justices said that foreign nationals without a, quote, "bona fide relationship to a person or entity,"
unquote, may be excluded. But just what is a bona fide relationship? The State Department quickly issued guidance saying
spouses, in-laws and children - including adult children - siblings and stepsiblings are in but grandparents are
not. Those engaged to be married were not included initially but were added later. Now, this new version has not incited
protests to this point, but it continues to spark complaints about how and why these distinctions were put into place. We wanted to
hear more about it so we called Yeganeh Torbati. She covers the State Department for Reuters, and she's been following the travel ban story
closely. I started by asking her what we know about the ban so far and how it was rolled out. YEGANEH
TORBATI: The State Department sent out pretty detailed instructions on Wednesday evening to consular officers saying that this will take effect
in 24 hours or so, which was Thursday night. So far, it seems to be going pretty smoothly in terms of the consular
officers know who they should be rejecting or not rejecting. It's a vastly narrower number of people from the original
travel ban, certainly the one in January and then even the one that was revised and issued again in March. And that's due to the
Supreme Court's limits.

The public agrees with the limited travel ban

Reuters 7/5 (Reuters Editorial, 7-5-2017, "Most American voters support limited travel ban: poll,"
Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-poll-idUSKBN19Q2FW)

Six in 10 American voters support the new ban on people from six predominantly Muslim countries from
entering the United States unless they can show they have a close relative here, according to opinion poll results
released on Wednesday. The Politico-Morning Consult poll found 37 percent of voters said they "strongly
supported" the new U.S. State Department guidelines that would deny visas to citizens of Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen who
do not have close relatives in the United States. Another 23 percent of voters said they "somewhat support" the
guidelines. The poll was conducted online on Thursday and Friday following a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that partly upheld the ban, with
1,989 registered voters taking part. The poll results' margin of error was 2 percentage points, meaning results could vary that much either way.
(Link to the poll: politi.co/2uJLfoO) The
survey asked respondents whether they support or oppose the State
Department's new guidelines, "which say visa applicants from six predominately Muslim countries must
prove a close family relationship with a U.S. resident in order to enter the country." It did not mention
U.S. President Donald Trump, nor the president's executive orders on immigration. The Supreme Court ruled on June
26 that the temporary travel ban could proceed so long as visa applicants with a "bona fide relationship"
with a person or entity in the United States were exempted. A year before his election, Trump promised voters he would
seek a temporary "total and complete shutdown" of Muslims entering the United States. Trump said it was necessary to prevent attacks by
Islamist militants, while critics said it was a needlessly discriminatory policy that could inflame prejudice against Muslims in the United States
and abroad. The
partial ban, which took effect on Thursday, was most strongly supported by Trump's
fellow Republicans, 83 percent of whom approved. Even among Democratic voters, only 46 percent
said they were opposed. Forty-one percent of Democrats said they support it, and the remaining 13
percent said they "don't know." The Supreme Court allowed the ban, which bars people from the designated six countries for 90
days and refugees from any country for 120 days, to take effect until it can take up the case during its next term starting in October.
 A2: No Hearing
The case will be heard
de Vogue 6/5 (2017, Ariene, CNN Supreme Court Reporter, “Has Trump finally found a court that will
endorse the travel ban once and for all?”, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/04/politics/trump-travel-
ban-supreme-court/index.html) MFE
End of the term The court is likely to act on the government's requests sometime in June during the final month of the current term. The travel
ban has turned a sleepy term into a potential blockbuster. As
the justices race to finish opinions from this term, they are
also considering hot button issues for the next term, including cases on the Second Amendment, religious liberty and even a
follow-up to the same-sex marriage opinion from 2015. Now, the travel ban is a part of that list.
 A2: Gerrymandering Thumper
Travel ban will be ruled on before gerrymandering- doesn’t thump
a) Travel ban ruled on in October or earlier
Howe 7/7 (2017, Amy, Reporter and Contractor for SCOTUS blog, “Dispute over travel ban could
return to Supreme Court”, SCOTUS Blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/dispute-travel-ban-
return-supreme-court/) MFE
Late last month, the Supreme Court granted the Trump administration’s request to review two lower-court rulings that had blocked the implementation of the
March 6 executive order – often referred to as the “travel ban” – that sought to impose a freeze on visas for travelers from six Muslim-majority countries. The

justices allowed part of the ban to go into effect until they can hear oral argument in October and
decide the case. But litigation over the travel ban could be back at the Supreme Court sooner than generally
expected, as the plaintiffs challenging the ban seek additional guidance from the justices about exactly should be allowed to enter the United States under the
Supreme Court’s June 26 order.

b) The gerrymandering case will be ruled on much later- beyond 2018

Levy 6/19 (2017, Pema, reporter at Mother Jones, “Supreme Court Will Decide the Fate of Partisan
Gerrymandering”, Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/06/supreme-court-will-
decide-the-fate-of-partisan-gerrymandering/) MFE

The lower court had ordered the state to draw new maps by November, to be used in the 2018 elections. But on Monday,
the Supreme Court put that on hold until it decides the case—meaning Wisconsin will likely go
through at least one more election cycle using its current gerrymandered districts. The hold could be an
indication that the court is leaning toward reinstating the gerrymandered maps for good, because
justices weigh the likelihood of success when deciding whether to grant stays.
Link
 Link: Affirmative Action
Affirmative action in education is unpopular based on ideological positions- Roberts
must sway left
Epstein et. al 6 (June 29, Lee, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of Political Science &
Professor of Law at the Department of Political Science, Washington University, USA, Andrew D. Martin,
Dean of the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, & the Arts, prominent political
scientist, Kevin M. Quinn, Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, &
Jeffrey A. Segal, SUNY Distinguished Professor Ph.D., Michigan State University, Guggenheim Award
Winner 2012, “Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, & How Important?∗”,
Berkeley Law, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/media/PrefChange.pdf pg. 43-44) MFE
To see why, first consider a scenario under which no new justices join the Court. Also assume (in contrast to our overall findings here) that the justices’ current ideal
point estimates remain relatively stable. Under these assumptions, and given the configuration of preferences displayed in Figure 19, Justice Kennedy will hold the
swing position for the foreseeable future—meaning that doctrinal development rests largely on his shoulders.168 More specifically, for areas of the law in which he
and O’Connor were below (or above) various cut points, we would predict minimal legal change. Along these lines is Lawrence. The odds in 2003 were far greater
than 50-50 that both would vote to strike down the law; and, now in 2006, as we show in Figure 20, Kennedy remains well south of the Lawrence cut point line.
Legal change here is thus highly unlikely but not so for affirmative action. As Figure 20 also displays, at no point in his career did
Kennedy’s revealed preferences fall below the Grutter line. Indeed, today the odds are only about 34 percent
that he would vote to uphold a Grutter -like program. Given his current role as the median justice, and
again assuming no preference change among the existing justices, this will come as disturbing news for
supporters of affirmative action in education and, of course, a promising development for opponents.
And yet, the evidence of widespread ideological drift we have offered here suggests that this status quo scenario, while not impossible, is unlikely. Far more
plausible is a scenario in which at least one justice exhibits ideological fluctuation. New Court members are always prime suspects. As we have seen, it is difficult to
make inferences about their long-term patterns based on their first-year preferences. But even setting aside Alito and Roberts, doctrinal change (or, in some
instances, surprising stability) is possible if Kennedy continues to drift to the left.
 Link: Bilingual Education
Republicans oppose any non- English first programs
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are
responsible for the education of their children. We do not believe in a one size fits all approach to education and support

providing broad education choices to parents and children at the State and local level. Maintaining American
preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all students can reach their potential. Today’s education

reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and
rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local control of our schools, and it wisely sees consumer rights in education –
choice – as the most important driving force for renewing our schools. Education is much more than schooling. It is the whole range of activities by which families
and communities transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge and skills, but ethical and behavioral norms and traditions. It is the handing over of a
personal and cultural identity. That is why education choice has expanded so vigorously. It is also why American education has, for the last several decades, been
the focus of constant controversy, as centralizing forces outside the family and community have sought to remake education in order to remake America. They have
not succeeded, but they have done immense damage Attaining Academic Excellence for All Since 1965 the
federal government has spent $2
trillion on elementary and secondary education with no substantial improvement in academic
achievement or high school graduation rates (which currently are 59 percent for African-American students and 63 percent for Hispanics).
The U.S. spends an average of more than $10,000 per pupil per year in public schools, for a total of more than $550 billion. That represents more than 4 percent of
GDP devoted to K-12 education in 2010. Of that amount, federal
spending was more than $47 billion. Clearly, if money were the
solution, our schools would be problem-free. More money alone does not necessarily equal better performance. After years of trial and
error, we know what does work, what has actually made a difference in student advancement, and what is powering education reform at the local level all across
America: accountability on the part of administrators, parents and teachers; higher academic standards; programs that support the development of character and
financial literacy; periodic rigorous assessments on the fundamentals, especially math, science, reading, history, and geography; renewed focus on the Constitution
and the writings of the Founding Fathers, and an accurate account of American history that celebrates the birth of this great nation; transparency, so parents and
the public can discover which schools best serve their pupils; flexibility and freedom to innovate, so schools can adapt to the special needs of their students and
hold teachers and administrators responsible for student performance. We support the innovations in education reform occurring at the State level based upon
proven results. Republican Governors have led in the effort to reform our country’s underperforming education system, and we applaud these advancements. We
advocate the policies and methods that have proven effective: building on the basics, especially STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and math) and
phonics; ending social promotions; merit pay for good teachers; classroom discipline; parental involvement; and strong leadership by principals, superintendents,
and locally elected school boards. Because technology has become an essential tool of learning, proper implementation of technology is a key factor in providing
every child equal access and opportunity. Consumer Choice in Education The Republican Party is the party of fresh and innovative ideas in education. We support
options for learning, including home schooling and local innovations like single-sex classes, full-day school hours, and year-round schools. School choice – whether
through charter schools, open enrollment requests, college lab schools, virtual schools, career and technical education programs, vouchers, or tax credits – is
important for all children, especially for families with children trapped in failing schools. Getting those youngsters into decent learning environments and helping
them to realize their full potential is the greatest civil rights challenge of our time. We support the promotion of local career and technical educational programs
and entrepreneurial programs that have been supported by leaders in industry and will retrain and retool the American workforce, which is the best in the world. A
young person’s ability to achieve in school must be based on his or her God-given talent and motivation, not an address, zip code, or economic status. In sum, on
the one hand enormous amounts of money are being spent for K-12 public education with overall results that do not justify that spending. On the other hand, the
common experience of families, teachers, and administrators forms the basis of what does work in education. We believe the gap between those two realities can
be successfully bridged, and Congressional Republicans are pointing a new way forward with major reform legislation. We support its concept of block grants and
the repeal of numerous federal regulations which interfere with State and local control of public schools. The bulk of the federal money through Title I for low-
income children and through IDEA for disabled youngsters should follow the students to whatever school they choose so that eligible pupils, through open
enrollment, can bring their share of the funding with them. The Republican-founded D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program should be expanded as a model for the
rest of the country. We deplore the efforts by Congressional Democrats and the current President to kill this successful program for disadvantaged students in order
to placate the leaders of the teachers’ unions. We support putting the needs of students before the special interests of unions when approaching elementary and
secondary education reform. Because parents are a child’s first teachers, we support family
literacy programs, which improve the
reading, language, and life skills of both parents and children from low-income families. To ensure that
all students have access to the mainstream of American life, we support the English First approach and
oppose divisive programs that limit students’ ability to advance in American society . We renew our call for
replacing “family planning” programs for teens with abstinence education which teaches abstinence until marriage as the responsible and respected standard of
behavior. Abstinence from sexual activity is the only protection that is 100 percent effective against out-of-wedlock pregnancies and sexually-transmitted diseases
including HIV/AIDS when transmitted sexually. It is effective, science-based, and empowers teens to achieve optimal health outcomes and avoid risks of sexual
activity. We oppose school-based clinics that provide referrals, counseling, and related services for abortion and contraception. We support keeping federal funds
from being used in mandatory or universal mental health, psychiatric, or socio- emotional screening programs.
 Link: Desegregation
Desegregation policy is liberal- gives Roberts support for conservative agenda
Eastman 17 (May 12, Nicolas J., Georgia State University Ph.D. Department of Educational Policy
Studies College of Education & Human Development, “Lost Ground: Neoliberalism, Charter Schools, and
the End of Desegregation in St. Louis, Missouri “, Scholar Works,
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1192&context=eps_diss, Abstract) MFE

During the final decades of the twentieth century, U.S. urban education
policy experienced a sea change in its orientation
toward equity. Mid-century social liberalism and its programs for expanding access to public education
resources through desegregation and more equitable funding gave way to neoliberal reforms focused on
improving outcomes through deregulation, accountability regimes, and market discipline. Charter schools are the
vanguard of neoliberal education reform. While much of the research on charters aims at either substantiating or critiquing their success claims relative to
traditional public schools, in this dissertation, I examine the role of charter schools within the larger processes of urbanization. Specifically, I focus on St. Louis,
Missouri, where, in 1998, a single piece of education reform legislation (Senate Bill 781) legalized charter schools and set an end for the largest and longest-running
school desegregation program in U.S. history. Rather than legalize charters statewide, SB 781 restricted them to St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri’s only two
metropolitan areas to have operated court-enforced desegregation programs. Combining
critical policy analysis and economic
geography, I link both desegregation and charter schools to urban neoliberalization, arguing that racialized processes
of accumulation structured (and continue to structure) uneven development in such a way to make educational equity-based reforms necessary and their failures
inevitable. Here too, St. Louis has an important story to tell. With deindustrialization and suburbanization resulting in a 63 percent decline in population in just over
60 years, St. Louis, like many other Rust Belt cities, has wholly embraced neoliberalism’s entrepreneurial ethos. Through public-private partnerships and a portfolio
of tax incentives, St. Louis has sacrificed public education in its efforts to attract capital back to the city. Rather than mitigating these issues, the neoliberal
restructuring of public education in St. Louis has embraced the same market logics that contributed to educational divestment and school segregation. I argue for a
more expansive approach to critical policy analysis in education, one that addresses the limitations of reform within the existing political economy and relocates
educational issues and their solutions within a larger struggle for racial and economic justice.
 Link: Education Reform
Federal role in education is opposed by the Republican party
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are
responsible for the education of their children. We do not believe in a one size fits all approach to education and support

providing broad education choices to parents and children at the State and local level. Maintaining American
preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all students can reach their potential. Today’s education

reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and
rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local control of our schools, and it

wisely sees consumer rights in education – choice – as the most important driving force for renewing
our schools.

Roberts can bridge the gap by going centrist on the aff, allowing him to press
conservative on other issues
Hill & Jochim 16 (May 6, Paul, Founder, CRPE & Research Professor, UWB, & Ashley, Research
Analyst, “Sustaining Centrist Education Reform in a Time of Polarization”, CPRE,
http://www.crpe.org/news/sustaining-centrist-education-reform-time-polarization) MFE

Education has not escaped the politics and polarization in the Presidential campaign. The strong center defined by GOP
moderates and Democrats for Education Reform still exist but its ranks are strained and likely to grow thinner. Ideologues on the
right and left won’t agree that the policy consensus that emerged with President George W. Bush and continued

through the Obama administration was moderate and centrist. But much of it was, embracing accountability,
choice, and innovation but also focused on productive uses of funds, improving teacher quality, and
closing the achievement gap. But, anti-reform rhetoric right and left has had its effect. Stand-pat
superintendents and local unions can hide behind the claim that charter schools and testing are a
billionaires’ assault on communities and that schools can improve only with vast increases in funding;
GOP legislators and right-of-center think tanks can retreat to claims that government should have no
role in K-12 other than to fund vouchers. From these positions, neither left nor right is likely to
accomplish much. As before, the left can only deliver a more expensive system, not a more effective one.
And the right stands to prove yet again that a K-12 system without government oversight can be
discredited by a few bad actors. But these results will become evident only in the long run. Will the centrist reform community survive to resume
its work when progress is once again possible? The growing polarization in American education makes the center an

important arbitrator of evidence and debate. But for the center to play these roles, it must take stock and act strategically. While it was
ascendant, the pro-reform center made some mistakes that strengthened its opponents. Over-confidence about the quality of the Common Core State Standards,
test-based evaluation of teachers, and replacement of traditional public schools with charters led to actions that were more aggressive than the results could always
justify. Natural allies, especially parents and community leaders who wanted better schools, were often put off by reformers’ disregard for local sensibilities and
demands for speed. Union-funded opposition groups have gained as a result. Centrist
reformers – state chiefs who favor innovation
and accountability, local portfolio district leaders, nonprofits and philanthropies – can stay around, keep
the ground gained to date, and be ready to move ahead again in two or four years. But that won’t just happen. During the coming hard times, reformers need to:
Highlight progress and bright spots: Cities like Denver, Cleveland, and Indianapolis have made a real difference for kids via choice, new schools, and performance
accountability. Philanthropies and think tanks can continue to document the continued progress in these cities. Keep the pressure on the existing system: Continue
to shine light on persistent inequities. Support rigorous studies and commentaries showing that millions of kids, particularly minorities are languishing in existing
schools. Broaden the reform coalition: Cultivate political support among parents and teachers who are better off
today as a result of centrist reform. Help blue-collar whites in suburbs, towns, and rural areas see that the existing system contribute to their
problems and can’t adapt to their needs. Keep pressing for innovation: Develop and evaluate new ideas in personalized and blended learning and demonstrate the
effectiveness of making good matches between school approaches and student needs. New approaches to education in suburbs, small towns, and rural areas will
pay off politically and for kids. Acknowledge reform liabilities: From Common Core implementation, civil rights abuses, and bad charter schools, reformers have their
own liabilities that need to be aired and addressed. Ignoring problems or defending bad policy does not make them go away but does arm your opponents who
have equally ambitious agendas. Document the inevitable state and local failures Develop new leadership pipelines: Invest
in pathways for
superintendents and state chiefs, who will be critical to continued progress in an era of federal
retrenchment. Build and sustain networks of reform superintendents and state officials who will
otherwise be isolated and beleaguered. This strategy will depend on philanthropies, think tanks, and advocacy groups. The latter groups also
pose risks for the center if they pander to ideologues, pick fights with opponents, or ignore evidence that doesn’t favor their agenda. Philanthropies may play the
most important role in ensuring that the center remains meaningful. Advocacy groups and think tanks are dependent on funds from philanthropy, making their
agendas in part a function of foundation leadership. Foundations are always under pressure to jump on some new bandwagon, and (given board composition and
incentives) some of that will happen. But the foundations that have underwritten the progress made to date need to sustain it financially. Centrists
have a
critical role to play in mediating the polarization that has come to dominate education and American
politics more broadly. Their advantage over ideologues on the left and the right comes from following
the evidence and building sustainable coalitions within states and localities. A failure on either of these
fronts risks making the center irrelevant at a time when their ideas and leadership are more important
than ever. During this period of polarization and reaction, centrists need to winter over at Valley Forge,
not give up and go home.
 Link: Expanding Public School Options
Democrats support expanding public school options
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

The Democratic Party understands the importance of turning around struggling public schools. We will
continue to strengthen all our schools and work to expand public school options for low-income
youth, including magnet schools, charter schools, teacher-led schools, and career academies. Because there
is no substitute for a great teacher at the head of a classroom, the President helped school districts save more than 400,000

educator jobs. We Democrats honor our nation's teachers. If we want high-quality education for all our kids, we must listen to the people who are on the
front lines. The President has laid out a plan to prevent more teacher layoffs while attracting and rewarding

great teachers. This includes raising standards for the programs that prepare our teachers, recognizing
and rewarding good teaching, and retaining good teachers. We also believe in carefully crafted
evaluation systems that give struggling teachers a chance to succeed and protect due process.
 Link: Funding
Education funding is opposed by Republicans
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are
responsible for the education of their children. We do not believe in a one size fits all approach to education and support

providing broad education choices to parents and children at the State and local level. Maintaining American
preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all students can reach their potential. Today’s education

reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and
rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local control of our schools, and it wisely sees consumer rights in
education – choice – as the most important driving force for renewing our schools. Education is much more than schooling. It is the whole range of activities by
which families and communities transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge and skills, but ethical and behavioral norms and traditions. It is the handing
over of a personal and cultural identity. That is why education choice has expanded so vigorously. It is also why American education has, for the last several
decades, been the focus of constant controversy, as centralizing forces outside the family and community have sought to remake education in order to remake
America. They have not succeeded, but they have done immense damage Attaining Academic Excellence for All Since 1965 the
federal government
has spent $2 trillion on elementary and secondary education with no substantial improvement in
academic achievement or high school graduation rates (which currently are 59 percent for African-American students and 63
percent for Hispanics). The U.S. spends an average of more than $10,000 per pupil per year in public schools, for a total of more than $550 billion. That represents
more than 4 percent of GDP devoted to K-12 education in 2010. Of that amount, federal
spending was more than $47 billion. Clearly, if
money were the solution, our schools would be problem-free. More money alone does not necessarily equal
better performance. After years of trial and error, we know what does work, what has actually made a difference in student advancement, and what is
powering education reform at the local level all across America: accountability on the part of administrators, parents and teachers; higher academic standards;
programs that support the development of character and financial literacy; periodic rigorous assessments on the fundamentals, especially math, science, reading,
history, and geography; renewed focus on the Constitution and the writings of the Founding Fathers, and an accurate account of American history that celebrates
the birth of this great nation; transparency, so parents and the public can discover which schools best serve their pupils; flexibility and freedom to innovate, so
schools can adapt to the special needs of their students and hold teachers and administrators responsible for student performance.We
support the
innovations in education reform occurring at the State level based upon proven results. Republican Governors have led in the effort to reform our
country’s underperforming education system, and we applaud these advancements. We advocate the policies and methods that have

proven effective: building on the basics, especially STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and math) and phonics;
ending social promotions; merit pay for good teachers; classroom discipline; parental involvement; and strong leadership by principals, superintendents, and locally
elected school boards. Because technology has become an essential tool of learning, proper implementation of technology is a key factor in providing every child
equal access and opportunity.
 Link: Hispanic Educational Opportunities
Democrats support Hispanic educational aspirations
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

Democrats typically pursue policies that are antithetical to the aspirations of Hispanics and other Americans,
favoring increased taxes and regulations on small businesses and opposing school choice. They are leaving
tremendous opportunities for Republicans to win the hearts and minds of Hispanic voters. And yet Republicans have proven themselves remarkably tone-deaf when
it comes to courting Hispanic voters--to the extent that they court them at all. Attracting Hispanic votes does not require abandoning conservative principles--quite
the contrary. Rather, it means seeing Hispanic voters as individuals, most of whom fervently cherish our nation's ideals. Much common ground exists, if there is a
will to find it and good faith in championing it. To
win Hispanic votes--and those of immigrants generally--Republicans
should play to their strengths while avoiding alienating rhetoric that makes them appear anti-immigrant.
 Link: Minimizing School Choice
Opposition to school choice is liberal
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

Democrats typically pursue policies that are antithetical to the aspirations of Hispanics and other Americans,
favoring increased taxes and regulations on small businesses and opposing school choice. They are leaving
tremendous opportunities for Republicans to win the hearts and minds of Hispanic voters. And yet Republicans have proven themselves remarkably tone-deaf when
it comes to courting Hispanic voters--to the extent that they court them at all. Attracting Hispanic votes does not require abandoning conservative principles--quite
the contrary. Rather, it means seeing Hispanic voters as individuals, most of whom fervently cherish our nation's ideals. Much common ground exists, if there is a
will to find it and good faith in championing it. To
win Hispanic votes--and those of immigrants generally--Republicans
should play to their strengths while avoiding alienating rhetoric that makes them appear anti-immigrant.
 Link: Privatizing Education
Privatizing schools is liberal education reform
Katz 17 (February 17, Daniel S., PhD in teaching, learning & educational policy from Michigan State
University, “Betsy DeVos Broke the Ed. Reform Coalition – For Now”, Daniel Skatz,
https://danielskatz.net/2017/02/17/betsy-devos-broke-the-ed-reform-coalition-for-now/) MFE

Democrats, after all, have been full members of the education reform club for some time now. As Valerie Strauss of The
Washington Post notes, Democrats who opposed DeVos’ confirmation have not been shy about joining the education reform coalition in the past two decades:
That’s why it was unusual when, in 2001, the late Sen. Edward Kennedy, the liberal Massachusetts Democrat, gave critical support to the new conservative
Republican president, George W. Bush, in passing a new education law called No Child Left Behind (NCLB). A bipartisan, they said, was to make sure public schools
attended to the needs of all students, but the
law actually became known for creating new “accountability” measures for
schools based on controversial standardized test scores. By embracing the NCLB system of high stakes testing
coupled with dramatic consequences, Democrats enabled the move to privatize more and more public school money

as charter schools proliferated in the wake of schools being labeled as failing. Today, a cadre of Democratic
politicians such as former Newark Mayor and now Senator Cory Booker, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy, New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo, and yes, former President Barack Obama are as dedicated to some or all of the central tenants of

education reform as any Republican. And as the debate over the Every Student Succeeds Act demonstrated, most Congressional Democrats are
still in favor of high stakes accountability testing that is the centerpiece of education reform – and which
provides the leverage necessary for Betsy DeVos to have wrought her special kind of chaos on her home state of Michigan and leaves her poised to try the same at a
national level.
 Link: Religious Education
Withholding federal funding for non- secular institutions is unpopular with the
Supreme Court
Barnes 6/26 (2017, Robert, Washington Post Reporter, “Supreme Court sides with religious
institutions in a major church-state decision”, Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-sides-with-religious-institutions-
in-a-major-church-state-decision/2017/06/26/f6187a2a-5a13-11e7-9fc6-
c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.1cb732f8a365) MFE

The Supreme Court ended its term Monday with a major First Amendment decision, ruling that efforts
at separating church and state go too far when they deny religious institutions access to government
grants meant for a secular purpose. In siding with a Missouri church that had been denied money to
resurface its playground, the court ruled 7-2 that excluding churches from state programs for which
other charitable groups are eligible is a violation of the Constitution’s protection of the free exercise of
religion. “The consequence is, in all likelihood, a few extra scraped knees,” wrote Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. “But the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a
public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot stand.” Trinity Lutheran Church
in Columbia, Mo., brought the case because it was excluded from a state program that reimburses the cost of rubberizing the surface of playgrounds. The

church scored high in the grant process, but Missouri’s state constitution, like those in about three
dozen states, forbade government from spending public money on “any church, sect, or denomination
of religion.” The decision came as the court completed work on the cases it had accepted for the term and scheduled a couple for fresh arguments in front of
a full court including Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, who joined the court in April.

Democrats oppose federal funding for religious education

On the Issues 16 (March 5, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information to
voters about candidates, “Democratic Views on Religion”, Republican Views,
http://www.republicanviews.org/democratic-views-on-religion/) MFE

This country was founded on the principle of separation of Church and State. However, the true extent to
which this separation is enforced and what religious freedoms are protected under the law have long
been items of controversy. Overall, the Democratic Party is less religious than the Republican Party.
Democrats are more likely to push for a more defined separation of Church and State than Republicans
are. Democratic views on religion stand strictly against the profiling of any individual for their religious beliefs. All religions should be safe from unfounded
accusations. They also stand strictly against imposing any religious beliefs or practices on those who don’t

necessarily support them. Over time, this belief has evolved into a phenomena referred to as the “God Gap,” where people who are not religious tend
to be Democrats whereas people who are religious tend to be Republican. Democrats believe that the only faith-based

organizations that should receive federal funding are those that are successful in serving federal
funding goals, such as treating addiction or helping the homeless. Many Democratic initiatives to limit federal involvement in
religious issues have been deemed a “war on religion” by Republican adversaries.
 Link: School Building
Building modern and safe schools is a democratic platform goal
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

We need to put one million new teachers in our classrooms. We must reduce class size by hiring 100,000 teachers. We need to
pay teachers like professionals. We should rebuild school buildings to assure students can attend
schools that are modern and safe. We need to construct new schools to meet the needs of the largest
generation of students in history. We must assure that schools have the resources to meet the
challenges of an increasingly diverse student population. Source: 2000 Democratic National Platform as
adopted by the DNC
 Link: Sexual Education
The Republican party supports abstinence education and opposes contraceptive
education
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are
responsible for the education of their children. We do not believe in a one size fits all approach to education and support
providing broad education choices to parents and children at the State and local level. Maintaining American
preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all students can reach their potential. Today’s education

reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and
rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local control of our schools, and it wisely sees consumer rights in education –
choice – as the most important driving force for renewing our schools. Education is much more than schooling. It is the whole range of activities by which families
and communities transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge and skills, but ethical and behavioral norms and traditions. It is the handing over of a
personal and cultural identity. That is why education choice has expanded so vigorously. It is also why American education has, for the last several decades, been
the focus of constant controversy, as centralizing forces outside the family and community have sought to remake education in order to remake America. They have
not succeeded, but they have done immense damage Attaining Academic Excellence for All Since 1965 the
federal government has spent $2
trillion on elementary and secondary education with no substantial improvement in academic
achievement or high school graduation rates (which currently are 59 percent for African-American students and 63 percent for Hispanics).
The U.S. spends an average of more than $10,000 per pupil per year in public schools, for a total of more than $550 billion. That represents more than 4 percent of
GDP devoted to K-12 education in 2010. Of that amount, federal
spending was more than $47 billion. Clearly, if money were the
solution, our schools would be problem-free. More money alone does not necessarily equal better performance. After years of trial and
error, we know what does work, what has actually made a difference in student advancement, and what is powering education reform at the local level all across
America: accountability on the part of administrators, parents and teachers; higher academic standards; programs that support the development of character and
financial literacy; periodic rigorous assessments on the fundamentals, especially math, science, reading, history, and geography; renewed focus on the Constitution
and the writings of the Founding Fathers, and an accurate account of American history that celebrates the birth of this great nation; transparency, so parents and
the public can discover which schools best serve their pupils; flexibility and freedom to innovate, so schools can adapt to the special needs of their students and
hold teachers and administrators responsible for student performance. We support the innovations in education reform occurring at the State level based upon
proven results. Republican Governors have led in the effort to reform our country’s underperforming education system, and we applaud these advancements. We
advocate the policies and methods that have proven effective: building on the basics, especially STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and math) and
phonics; ending social promotions; merit pay for good teachers; classroom discipline; parental involvement; and strong leadership by principals, superintendents,
and locally elected school boards. Because technology has become an essential tool of learning, proper implementation of technology is a key factor in providing
every child equal access and opportunity. Consumer Choice in Education The Republican Party is the party of fresh and innovative ideas in education. We support
options for learning, including home schooling and local innovations like single-sex classes, full-day school hours, and year-round schools. School choice – whether
through charter schools, open enrollment requests, college lab schools, virtual schools, career and technical education programs, vouchers, or tax credits – is
important for all children, especially for families with children trapped in failing schools. Getting those youngsters into decent learning environments and helping
them to realize their full potential is the greatest civil rights challenge of our time. We support the promotion of local career and technical educational programs
and entrepreneurial programs that have been supported by leaders in industry and will retrain and retool the American workforce, which is the best in the world. A
young person’s ability to achieve in school must be based on his or her God-given talent and motivation, not an address, zip code, or economic status. In sum, on
the one hand enormous amounts of money are being spent for K-12 public education with overall results that do not justify that spending. On the other hand, the
common experience of families, teachers, and administrators forms the basis of what does work in education. We believe the gap between those two realities can
be successfully bridged, and Congressional Republicans are pointing a new way forward with major reform legislation. We support its concept of block grants and
the repeal of numerous federal regulations which interfere with State and local control of public schools. The bulk of the federal money through Title I for low-
income children and through IDEA for disabled youngsters should follow the students to whatever school they choose so that eligible pupils, through open
enrollment, can bring their share of the funding with them. The Republican-founded D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program should be expanded as a model for the
rest of the country. We deplore the efforts by Congressional Democrats and the current President to kill this successful program for disadvantaged students in order
to placate the leaders of the teachers’ unions. We support putting the needs of students before the special interests of unions when approaching elementary and
secondary education reform. Because parents are a child’s first teachers, we support family literacy programs, which improve the reading, language, and life skills of
both parents and children from low-income families. To ensure that all students have access to the mainstream of American life, we support the English First
approach and oppose divisive programs that limit students’ ability to advance in American society. We renew our call for
replacing “family
planning” programs for teens with abstinence education which teaches abstinence until marriage as
the responsible and respected standard of behavior. Abstinence from sexual activity is the only
protection that is 100 percent effective against out-of-wedlock pregnancies and sexually-transmitted
diseases including HIV/AIDS when transmitted sexually. It is effective, science-based, and empowers
teens to achieve optimal health outcomes and avoid risks of sexual activity. We oppose school-based
clinics that provide referrals, counseling, and related services for abortion and contraception. We support
keeping federal funds from being used in mandatory or universal mental health, psychiatric, or socio- emotional screening programs.
 Link: Spending
Democrats favor spending on public schools
Henderson 15 (August 3, Michael B., Brookings Institution Author, “How far apart are Democrats and
Republicans on school reform?”, Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-
chalkboard/2015/08/03/how-far-apart-are-democrats-and-republicans-on-school-reform/) MFE

There are differences on other issues—increasing spending, raising teacher pay, government funded universal preschool,
government funded preschool for low income families, charter schools, vouchers for low-income families, merit pay, tenure, and Common Core—but these
differences hardly pit the parties in opposing corners of the ring. In only one case does the majority from one party oppose the majority from the other. Nearly
three-fourths of Democrats favor more spending on public schools, and 54 percent of Republicans oppose it.
 Link: Standardized Testing
Accountability testing is liberal education reform
Katz 17 (February 17, Daniel S., PhD in teaching, learning & educational policy from Michigan State
University, “Betsy DeVos Broke the Ed. Reform Coalition – For Now”, Daniel Skatz,
https://danielskatz.net/2017/02/17/betsy-devos-broke-the-ed-reform-coalition-for-now/) MFE

Democrats, after all, have been full members of the education reform club for some time now. As Valerie Strauss of The
Washington Post notes, Democrats who opposed DeVos’ confirmation have not been shy about joining the education reform coalition in the past two decades:
That’s why it was unusual when, in 2001, the late Sen. Edward Kennedy, the liberal Massachusetts Democrat, gave critical support to the new conservative
Republican president, George W. Bush, in passing a new education law called No Child Left Behind (NCLB). A bipartisan, they said, was to make sure public schools
attended to the needs of all students, but the
law actually became known for creating new “accountability” measures for
schools based on controversial standardized test scores. By embracing the NCLB system of high stakes testing
coupled with dramatic consequences, Democrats enabled the move to privatize more and more public school money

as charter schools proliferated in the wake of schools being labeled as failing. Today, a cadre of Democratic
politicians such as former Newark Mayor and now Senator Cory Booker, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy, New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo, and yes, former President Barack Obama are as dedicated to some or all of the central tenants of

education reform as any Republican. And as the debate over the Every Student Succeeds Act demonstrated, most Congressional Democrats are
still in favor of high stakes accountability testing that is the centerpiece of education reform – and which
provides the leverage necessary for Betsy DeVos to have wrought her special kind of chaos on her home state of Michigan and leaves her poised to try the same at a
national level.
 Link: Teachers
Expanding number & pay of teachers is a democratic platform goal
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

We need to put one million new teachers in our classrooms. We must reduce class size by hiring 100,000 teachers. We need to
pay teachers like professionals. We should rebuild school buildings to assure students can attend schools that are modern and safe.
We need to construct new schools to meet the needs of the largest generation of students in history.
We must assure that schools have the resources to meet the challenges of an increasingly diverse
student population. Source: 2000 Democratic National Platform as adopted by the DNC
 Link: Voucher Opposition
Democrats oppose vouchers & support school choice
On the Issues 17 (January 10, American non-partisan, non-profit organization providing information
to voters about candidates, primarily via their web site, “Democratic Party on Education”, On the Issues,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Education.htm) MFE

Instead of pushing private school vouchers that funnel scarce dollars away from the public schools, we
will support public school choice, including charter schools and magnet schools that meet the same high
standards as other schools. And at a time when so many schools charged with our future are relics of the past, we will build new
schools and offer the technology and equipment for a 21st century education. Source: The Democratic
Platform for America, p.31-32 , Jul 10, 2004
 Link Turns Case
Politically charged decisions mean failed enforcement & rollback
Kuhn 12 (June 29, David Paul, Chief Political Correspondent for RealClearPolitics, “The Incredible
Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court”, The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-
the-supreme-court/259155/) MFE

Scholars consider these narrow decisions the most political. Research indicates that 5-to-4 rulings are
the most likely to be overturned by later Courts. They carry the same legal authority as more
unanimous opinions -- but not the same moral authority. In this vein, the one branch of government
designed to be above partisanship echoes the rise in hyperpartisanship seen throughout Washington.
The Roberts Court has decided more cases by a 5-to-4 ruling (about 21.5 percent) than any Court before it,
though only by a narrow margin. The previous Court, led by William Rehnquist, decided 20.5 percent of its cases by this minimum coalition. That
rate, however, represents roughly twice the share of 5-to-4 rulings in the Stone Court, during World War II. And the Stone Court had more than three times the rate
of 5-to-4 decisions of any Court prior. Roberts noticed the trend early in his term. "I do think the rule of law is threatened by a steady term after term after term

focus on 5-4 decisions," Roberts told The New Republic's Jeffrey Rosen in 2006. "I think the
Court is ripe for a similar refocus on
functioning as an institution, because if it doesn't, it's going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an institution."
Internal Link
 I/L: Partisan Balancing
Roberts opposes court politicization- wants to reduce drama
The Economist 6/2 (2017, The Economist is a news source that offers authoritative insight & opinion
on international news, politics, business, finance, science, technology & the connections between them,
“Donald Trump asks the Supreme Court to reinstate his travel ban”, The Economist,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/06/final-appeal) MFE
Whether or not their stay application succeeds, Mr Trump's lawyers are asking the Supreme Court to decide by the end of June—when the justices scatter for the
summer—whether to hear the full case. If the court does, the next term, which begins on the first Monday in October, could feature a historic showdown on
executive power in the Trump era. Chief Justice John Roberts, no fan of the court’s perceived politicisation, would
like to find a way to reduce the drama. A stay might do that: Mr Trump's 90-day ban on travel and 120-
day pause on refugees would probably expire before the justices could sit down to hear the case—
perhaps rendering it moot. Or, as Harvard law professor Mark Tushnet points out, granting a stay in Hawaii but denying it in IRAP would permit a
review of vetting procedures from the six named countries without empowering the administration to halt travel. However it handles Mr Trump's

pleas, the court is now in the thick of the most heated inter-branch controversy it has addressed in
decades.

Roberts wants judicial legitimacy & precedent authority- public approval means no
partisan fray
Wheeler 7/2 (2017, Lydia, The Hill regulations reporter “Justice Roberts’s fingerprints seen on travel
ban decision”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/340298-justice-robertss-fingerprints-
seen-on-travel-ban-decision) MFE

The unusual compromise at the center of the Supreme Court’s big decision this week to reinstate part
of President Trump’s travel ban was a hallmark of how the court appears to operate under Chief
Justice John Roberts. The court said the government could ban entry of nationals from six countries – Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen –
but carved out an exemption for individuals who have a “bona fide relationship” to a person or entity in the U.S. It’s not the first time the court

under Roberts’ leadership has tried to find common ground that’s novel and unexpected, a telltale sign
to court-watchers that the chief justice played a significant role in the decision. “It had a split the baby
feel to it and when the court has wanted to project some amount of unity or consensus it’s done so by
ruling in these small ball ways,” said Sam Erman, an associate professor of law at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, who
clerked for Justice John Paul Stevens and then Justice Anthony Kennedy. “ Roberts has said he wants more consensus on the court.

We know he’s trying to move the court in that direction.” The decision was reminiscent of the court’s 5-4
ruling in 2012 that upheld President Obama’s healthcare law. Roberts cast the deciding vote. In that decision,
Roberts viewed the mandate that people buy health insurance or face a penalty not as an order, but as a tax. Though the federal government does not have the
power to order people to buy health insurance, Roberts said, “the federal government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance.”
The decision was hailed as a major victory for Democrats but Republicans didn’t walk away empty handed. The court significantly
limited the law’s Medicaid expansion. The government, Roberts said could not threaten to pull states’ existing Medicaid funding if they declined to comply with the
expansion. Roberts has been leading the court for more than a decade and court watchers say he has spent
much of his tenure trying to keep the court above the partisan fray. Herman Schwartz, a professor of law at American
University Washington College of Law, said the court’s most creative rulings come in cases that are centered on the most controversial issues. “Roberts is

the chief justice and that means he has a special concern about the court not looking wildly partisan or
even partisan period that’s one consideration,” he said. “Secondly, a lot has to do with the public importance of the issue. He’s
no fool. He knows some things draw more attention than others.” Last year the court told the Obama administration and religious groups
in a unanimous ruling to work out a compromise over the birth control mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The justices said the parties “should be afforded an
opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered ‘receive
full and equal health coverage,'” that includes coverage for contraceptives. Ilya Shapiro, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, who lectures
on half of the Federalist Society, claims the court was forced to find a compromise in that case, given that it was shorthanded with only eight justices following the
death of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, He said a 4-4 ruling would have made the mandate constitutional in some parts of the country and unconstitutional in
others. Like all chief justices, Schwartz said Roberts
is already concerned about the legacy he will leave behind. While
the Roberts court is pushing the country well to the right, Schwartz said he has at times worked as a stop on
that momentum. If the court’s most conservative members – Justice Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch – had
their way, Trump’s full travel ban would have been reinstated.

Roberts looking to balance partisanship—travel ban decision used to balance victories

& losses of Trump administration
Feldman 6/26 (Noah, prof of constitutional & int’l law at Harvard Univ, “Be Wary of a Compromise on
Trump’s Travel Ban,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-26/be-wary-of-a-
compromise-on-trump-s-travel-ban)KC
The U.S. Supreme Court has left in place most of the judicial freeze on President Donald Trump’s controversial travel ban from six majority
Muslim countries. The justices announced Monday that they will hear arguments in the fall and decide the issue after that. That’s a win for the
ban’s opponents. But there’s also reason to be wary of what’s coming. Three conservative justices wrote separately to say
that they would have reinstated the travel ban altogether, signaling that they will vote to uphold the
ban when the time comes. And the per curiam opinion (Latin for a decision issued without signatures) joined in full by
the other six justices reflects a clear desire for compromise -- which in turn could mean that there might not be five votes
to strike down the ban altogether when and if the court must ultimately rule on whether the ban is lawful. The court’s opinion was
scrupulous about trying to avoid any comment on how the case would turn out, with regard to whether the
parties challenging the travel ban have cause to do so or on the merits of their arguments. Two appeals courts have ruled against the ban, one
by saying that anti-Muslim discrimination was the guiding force behind the executive order, the other by saying Trump did not provide a valid
national security reason for it. The Supreme Court on Monday focused on the extent of the stay put in place by the lower courts -- and that’s
where the compromise came. The lower courts dealt with the executive order by freezing its operation altogether. The justices took a different
tack. They kept in place the ban as it relates to citizens of the six countries “who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person
or entity in the United States.” In detail, the court explained that meant the travel ban can’t be applied to foreigners seeking entry who have a
“close familial relationship” with people inside the U.S. And it can’t be applied to foreigners who have been admitted to U.S. universities,
offered jobs with U.S. corporations or invited to speak by U.S. groups. The court went out of its way to clarify that such relationships to entities
must be “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading” the executive order. The court said
specifically that nonprofit immigration advocacy organizations “may not contact foreign nationals from the designated countries, add them to
client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion.” But the justices lifted the freeze on the travel ban with respect
to people from the six majority Muslim countries who are outside the U.S. and have no U.S. connections. The government’s interest in
exclusion and the president’s power to do so, the court said, “are undoubtedly at their peak when there is no tie between the foreign national
and the United States.” In
practice, the court’s ruling means Trump’s travel ban won’t be able to affect the
great majority of foreign nationals who were actually trying to get to the U.S. from the six countries. It was
already extremely difficult to get a visa from these countries unless you had family ties or a specific invitation. The State Department under
President Barack Obama wasn’t in the habit of giving out tourist visas to applicants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria or Yemen. And
the vetting process that would accompany a visa request from these countries would in any case have made the granting of such visas unlikely
to the point of impossibility. Given
the practical reality that the court’s new distinction doesn’t give the Trump
administration much in practical terms, it’s worth asking why the justices bothered to create it. The best
answer is that the court, especially Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy, didn’t
want the court’s decision to be read as a partisan rejection of the Trump administration, the way the
lower court opinions often did. Put another way, the point of the modest compromise is to give Trump the
chance to say that the court gave him a partial victory. This might insulate the court from the kind of
attacks that Trump has made on the lower courts. Justice Clarence Thomas’s partial dissent, joined by Justices Samuel Alito
and Neil Gorsuch, tried to spin the per curiam opinion as a win for Trump. Thomas wrote that the court’s decision included an “implicit
conclusion that the Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits -- that is, that the judgments below will be
reversed.” That’s overstating the case quite a bit. Thomas’s logic was that, when a party asks the court to hear a case and to stay a lower court
decision in the meantime, it ordinarily must convince the justices that there is a “significant possibility” of a reversal. But the circumstances
here are different, because the Trump administration is asking for a stay of another stay already issued by the lower court. And in reaching
its ruling, the Supreme Court went out of its way not to say what was likely to happen. Instead the opinion said
that “crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment.” And it said its goal was “not to conclusively
determine the rights of the parties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.”
 I/L: Political Capital
Supreme Court needs political capital for decisions – Roberts especially concerned
Gibson and Nelson 14 (James L. Gibson, Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government, Michael J.
Nelson, Ph.D. Candidate for Department of Political Science, “The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court:
Conventional Wisdoms, & Recent Challenges Thereto,” Washington University in St. Louis,
http://mjnelson.wustl.edu/papers/AnnualReview.pdf) JZ

The particular problem of the U.S. Supreme Court3 is that it is heavily dependent upon legitimacy for its
efficacy and survival. As all undergraduates learn, the federal courts have neither the power of the purse
(carrots) nor the sword (sticks) and are therefore uncommonly dependent upon voluntary compliance
from their constituents.4 Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the U.S. Supreme Court is particularly
vulnerable to backlashes against its decisions because it often rules against the preferences of the
majority, 5 and because, as an institution, it is unusually dependent upon the actions of other actors and
institutions. The Supreme Court has little meaningful inherent or constitutional jurisdiction; instead, it gets its power to decide issues from
ordinary legislation. What Congress giveth, Congress can taketh away. Even the fundamental structure of the institution –
e.g., the number of justices on the Court – can change (and has throughout American history). Without legitimacy, the Supreme
Court can be punished for the disagreeable decisions it makes, and/or those decisions can be ignored (for
an important analysis of the Court/Congressional relations, see Clark 2011). The justices of Court are keenly aware of the importance of
legitimacy to their institution, often discussing the concept in their rulings. For example, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, in their well-
known opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) write: The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means, and to declare what it
demands. . . The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them,
as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that
the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation (865-866) The Casey example is not unique; Farganis (2012, 207)
reports that “since the Court’s 1954 decision in Brown, in fact, the justices have made seventy-one such
references to the Court’s institutional legitimacy, compared with just nine in the 164 years up to that
point.” Beyond the justices’ opinions, journalistic accounts of the Court often describe actions taken by the justices to preserve institutional
legitimacy. In a particularly stark case, Crawford (2012) reports that Chief Justice Roberts acted strategically
out of concern for institutional legitimacy during the opinionwriting process for National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, changing his vote from one to strike down the Affordable Care Act to
one that preserved the constitutionality of the legislation. Crawford writes, “As Chief Justice, [Roberts] is
keenly aware of his leadership role on the Court, and he is also sensitive to how the Court is perceived
by the public. There were countless news articles in May warning of damage to the Court – and to Robert’s reputation – if the Court were
to strike down the mandate.” In short, legitimacy is a concept with both practical and scholarly importance.
 A2: Court PC Not Real
Supreme Court justice political capital theory is true
Johnson 16 (November, Timothy R., Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. He is the coauthor (with Christopher P. Gilbert,
David A. M. Peterson, & Paul A. Djupe) of Religious Institutions & Minor Parties in the United States,
“The Supreme Court Decision Making Process”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-98) MFE
The attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision-making suggests that justices are unconstrained in their ability to vote for their most preferred policy outcomes
because they enjoy life tenure (Segal & Spaeth, 2002). In other words, because justices do not face election or retention, and because they usually do not have
higher political ambitions, they can vote for their most preferred outcomes without consequence. In contrast, the
strategic model suggests that,
although they pursue policy goals, justices cannot always make decisions that conform perfectly to their
preferences. Rather, because five justices must usually agree on a decision to set precedent justices must
pay particular attention to the preferences, and likely actions, of their immediate colleagues. In short,
Supreme Court justices alter their behavior in order to achieve their goals within the context of making
decisions by majority rule. A recent, yet rich, literature explores the extent and impact of internal bargaining
between justices (see, e.g., Ringsmuth, Bryan, & Johnson, 2013; Johnson, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2000; Caldeira,
Wright, & Zorn, 1999; Epstein & Knight, 1998). These works are progeny of Murphy (1964), who argued that justices are rational actors and act

as such when deciding cases. The reason for this is obvious, as Murphy notes: “Since he shares decision making authority with eight other judges,
the first problem that a policy oriented justice would confront is that of obtaining at least four, and hopefully eight, additional votes for the results he wants and the
kinds of opinions he thinks should be written in cases important to his objectives” (1964, p. 37). While Murphy did not systematically test his theory, others have
done so. For example, in
an analysis of Justice Brennan’s and Justice Marshall’s private papers, Epstein and
Knight (1995) demonstrate that over 50% of cases in one sample contained one or more bargaining
statements between the justices.5 In a later monograph, Epstein and Knight conclude that, “law, as it is generated by the
Supreme Court, is the result of short-term strategic interactions among the justices and between the
Court and other branches of government” (1998, p. 18).
 I/L: Roberts Key
Chief justice Roberts has heavy influence over court decisions- overcomes status quo
opposition
Johnson 16 (November, Timothy R., Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. He is the coauthor (with Christopher P. Gilbert,
David A. M. Peterson, & Paul A. Djupe) of Religious Institutions & Minor Parties in the United States,
“The Supreme Court Decision Making Process”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-98) MFE

While the justices sit for oral arguments on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays during the term, private conference discussions
take place on Wednesdays and Fridays. These discussions serve two purposes—to choose cases from the discuss list to set for
future arguments and to vote on the cases that have already been argued. Because the justices meet in conference twice a week,
they use Wednesday conferences to discuss the merits (outcomes) of cases heard Mondays and
Tuesdays. Friday conference is therefore reserved for cases argued on Wednesdays.21 These meetings, held in the
conference room that adjoins the chief’s chambers, are completely private. That is, nobody is allowed in the room except the justices. If something is

needed from outside the room the most junior justice calls to make the request.22 When conference begins the chief justice presents the facts of the first

case. From there he offers his personal view of the case and then casts his vote.23 When the chief is done the
associate justices offer their views and votes in order of seniority. That is, the most senior associate justice
presents and votes next with each justice doing so until the Court’s newest member finishes the
discussion.24 Usually the justices have a fairly good idea of how they will vote in the case, but there are times when they are less certain. 25 The
justices repeat this process for each case argued during the current week. The Importance of Conference Discussion and Votes
Scholars have emphasized for decades that conference votes are only the tip of the iceberg for the
business the justices conduct (see, e.g., Epstein & Knight, 1998). However, the only data normally available to scholars are the conference votes.26 Little information
exists about the legal and policy issues the justices discuss during conference, which means scholars have largely ignored this part of the Court’s decision-making process. Despite the paucity

there is evidence to suggest the justices discuss the key aspects of cases they decide. Johnson
of research in this area

the justices clearly pick up on issues briefed by the parties and on issues
(2004) demonstrates that, during conference,

discussed during oral arguments. More specifically, justices discuss policy options and key precedents during
their private conference discussions. Similarly, Knight and Epstein (1996) find that the justices clearly discuss precedent at conference. For them, this suggests the
justices believe they are bound by the norm of respecting past decisions. In short, while scholars do not yet have a full picture of what transpires during conference, these studies provide

Beyond the discussions about the specific issues the

insights that have, until the past decades, eluded scholars and Court watchers alike.

justices must decide, conference is important because how the justices vote determines who will
ultimately write the majority opinion in a case. If the chief justice votes with the majority at the end of
a case discussion he has the authority to choose who write the majority opinion.27 This prerogative helps
him influence the Court’s agenda because he can select either an author whose opinion is close to his
own preferences or one who will minimize the prospective policy loss if the chief’s preferred outcome
does not prevail (Epstein & Knight, 1998; Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2000). More specifically, Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000) demonstrate that the
justice who assigns the opinion has some power to set the agenda for the majority coalition because the writer
gets the first move in the bargaining process. The chief exercises this discretion and guides the opinion toward his preferred

position by assigning it to ideologically proximate justices (or to himself), especially in important cases. In other words,
although the chief justice is constrained by norms, like equitable distribution of assignments, he has the power to choose who will articulate

the Court’s opinion and the lens through which a case will be decided.28
 I/L: Conservativism  Ban
Increased court conservativism ensures full reinstatement of the ban
Lee 6/6 (2017, Kurtis, political reporter for the Los Angeles Times, “President Trump wants a travel
ban, and conservative media agree”, LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-
essential-washington-updates-president-trump-wants-a-travel-ban-1496772681-htmlstory.html) MFE

It’s possible Trump’s proposed travel ban, which bars temporary travel to the United States from six majority-Muslim countries, is headed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court is expected to decide in a few weeks whether to hear the government’s appeal of a 4th Circuit ruling
against the travel ban. This piece, displayed prominently on the Washington Times website much of the morning, notes that Republican
officials from more than a dozen states – all conservative-leaning -- have called on the Supreme Court to allow
Trump’s travel ban to be implemented. “The states said Mr. Trump has broad powers under the law to decide
whom to admit, and said U.S. law is replete with examples of the government singling out groups for
different treatment in immigration contexts,” the conservative newspaper reports. The states include Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Mississippi.

The full travel ban is a core conservative platform goal

Christi & Pierce 16 (July 28, Muzaffar, lawyer, is Director of MPI's office at New York University
School of Law, & Sarah, Associate Policy Analyst for U.S. Programs at the Migration Policy Institute,
“Republican and Democratic Party Platforms Reflect Parallel Universes on Immigration Policy”,
Migration Policy Institute, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/republican-and-democratic-party-
platforms-reflect-parallel-universes-immigration-policy) MFE

The Republican platform, not surprisingly, contains two central themes embraced by presidential nominee Donald
Trump since he made immigration a centerpiece of his campaign: building a wall on the southern border and screening immigrants from
certain countries or with certain religious affiliations. This year’s platform calls for walling off the entire 2,000-mile border, in
contrast with the 2012 version, which advocated finishing the double-layered fencing mandated along certain sections of the border under the Secure Fence Act of
2006. While the platform mirrors the Trump vow to build a wall along the entire U.S.-Mexico border, the document attempts to take a more nuanced and practical
stance than the candidate’s recommended ban on admission of all Muslims or all individuals from regions with proven histories of terrorism. Instead, the

platform advocates “special scrutiny” for foreign nationals seeking admission from terror-sponsoring
countries or “regions associated with Islamic terrorism.” The platform also calls for renewal of the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a post-9/11 program under which males from
25 predominantly Muslim countries were required to register and be fingerprinted and photographed
upon entry to the United States or while within the country. NSEERS was suspended in April 2011. In a
major departure from one of Trump’s primary themes, and in a concession to the standard party position, the platform is silent on enforcement measures against
the estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants—refraining from taking a stance on the candidate’s call for mass deportations. The Republican
platform, for the first time in recent history, asks for a reduction in legal immigration by arguing that “it is
indefensible to continue offering lawful permanent residence to more than one million foreign nationals
every year.” And it seeks major revisions of the criteria for granting refugee or asylum status—by limiting protection to “cases of political, ethnic, or religious
persecution.” The United States is one of 145 signatory countries to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defines a refugee as someone fleeing
persecution based on “reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” Elsewhere, the platform reprises the
traditional fare of prior blueprints, but with a sprinkling of the more hard-edged rhetoric common today. These include preventing states from issuing licenses to
unauthorized immigrants, mandatory five-year prison sentences for illegal re-entry, penalizing states and localities that are commonly known as “sanctuary cities,”
and recognizing the role of states in immigration enforcement.
Impact
 Impact – Ban (Economy)
Trump’s travel ban hurts the economy – immigrants key
State of Politics 17 (a running statewide conversation about NY politics, 3/9/17, “DiNapoli: Travel
Ban Hurts Economy”, http://www.nystateofpolitics.com/2017/03/dinapoli-travel-ban-hurts-economy/)
ACT

President Donald Trump’s ban on travel and refugees is hurting the state’s economy, Comptroller Tom DiNapoli
said in a radio interview on Thursday, pointing to the broader impact the moratorium could place on tourism.
“You’ve already seen some of those numbers go down,” he said on WCNY’s The Capitol Pressroom. “People are getting concerned,
if I go there, will I be able to come back? So, I think there are so many negative connotations about what
the president is proposing.” Trump announced this week he had signed a revised executive order
blocking travel from six predominately Muslim countries, while also banning refugee travel. Upstate New
York, in particular, has seen an influx of refugees over the last decade. State lawmakers are pushing for the budget to include funding for
refugee centers that could be lost once the refugee ban is in effect. DiNapoli, in the interview, decried what he said was rhetoric that is
disparaging of immigrants. “So
much of the hyped up rhetoric that we’re disparages immigrants, it’s not new,
but it’s certainly at a hyped up level since the campaign,” he said. “In New York, where would be without our
immigrant communities? It’s a strength. It’s an economic strength.”

Travel ban hurts the economy – four warrants

Bowsher 17 (Karla, freelance journalist, 2/1/17, “4 Ways Trump’s Travel Ban Could Hurt the U.S.
Economy”, https://www.moneytalksnews.com/4-ways-trumps-travel-ban-could-hurt-the-economy/)
ACT

During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump floated the idea of banning travel from
some predominantly Muslim countries to the U.S. At the time, a nonprofit organization — the Council
on Foreign Relations, or CFR– quietly shared a report on how such a ban would affect the U.S. economy.
Now that President Trump has acted on his idea, the CFR is calling attention back to its report. In a blog post
this week, Robert Kahn, an international economics fellow at the CFR, notes that “the effects of extreme vetting on U.S. economic

activity are immediate and far-reaching.” Before we look at those effects, though, let’s take a look at the president’s action. The executive
order On Friday, Trump signed an executive order titled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” As a New York Times report
summarized it, the order: Indefinitely barred Syrian refugees from entering the United States Suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days Blocked
citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries, refugees or otherwise, from entering the United States for 90 days: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Since then,
protests have broken out and CEOs of major corporations have spoken out
against the ban. On Sunday, Trump issued a follow-up statement: “… The seven countries named in the Executive Order are the same
countries previously identified by the Obama administration as sources of terror. … This is not about religion — this is about terror and keeping
our country safe. …” The possible effects According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the possible economic
effects of a travel ban, “particularly if the president’s order is expanded to include more countries over
time,” include a: Broader “chilling effect” on travel to the U.S., which could depress tourism and disrupt
supply chains, among other impacts. Direct loss of spending as high as $14 billion to $30 billion per year.
Loss of as many as 50,600 to 132,000 jobs. Loss of $4.6 billion in education spending by foreign students.
Kahn concludes by stating that “an efficient vetting system for foreign travelers” can benefit security. But if Trump’s vetting “… is
seen by the world as creating a hostile environment for foreign travelers or more fundamentally
signaling a less open attitude towards the world, it will have broad based and far reaching economic
consequences.”
 Impact - Economy
Economic decline in an interconnected world collapses the global economy, results in
multiple scenarios for war.
Pamlin & Armstrong 15 – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation,
Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School &
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human
Civilization,” Global Challenges Foundation, February 2015,
http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf)

Often economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a breakdown of law and
order. Societal collapse usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human societies, often along with their life
support systems. It broadly includes both quite abrupt societal failures typified by collapses, and more
extended gradual declines of superpowers. Here only the former is included. The world economic and political
system is made up of many actors with many objectives and many links between them. Such intricate,
interconnected systems are subject to unexpected system-wide failures due to the structure of the network311 –
even if each component of the network is reliable. This gives rise to systemic risk: systemic risk occurs when parts that
individually may function well become vulnerable when connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint
risk that can spread from part to part (contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related
outside systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical infrastructure315 (such as
power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that a
small internal or external disruption could cause a highly
non-linear effect,316 including a cascading failure that infects the whole system,317 as in the 2008-2009
financial crisis. The possibility of collapse becomes more acute when several independent networks
depend on each other, as is increasingly the case (water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for
instance).318 This dependence links social and technological systems as well.319 This trend is likely to be
intensified by continuing globalisation,320 while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem
inadequate to address the issue.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even exacerbate
the problem.323 Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought by a coronal mass ejection,324 an
ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems
collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But a
simple global systems
collapse still poses risks on its own. The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the
careful matching of different types of capital325 (social, technological, natural...) with each other. If this matching
is disrupted, this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption.326 States
and institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons.327 And institutional
collapses can create knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more
impoverished and destabilising entities.328 Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale if they
weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects (such as conflict
or starvation) could cause great death and suffering.

Economic decline leads to nuclear war

Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace
program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International
Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current
understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and
economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions
can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and
drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or
unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars
among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14,
437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an
inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and
the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries
could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three
main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated
economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014;
Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act
on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by
foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic
development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic
begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external
dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or
credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or
prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the
instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are
unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count
on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a
territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy
alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail
to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result,
interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist
emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence
remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could
lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or
conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view
to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

Economic decline guarantees multiple scenarios for nuclear war & turns every other
impact
Harris & Burrows 9 - PhD in European History @ Cambridge & Counselor of the US National
Intelligence Council & Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew
J. & Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington
Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be
the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of
outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a
growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to
believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period
include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in
1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the
same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in
the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow
would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if
change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth
unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion
of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities
within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long
established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training
procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and
disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would
become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced
drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in
the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons,
and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent
relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in
the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a
nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between
those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined
with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will
produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear
attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times,
and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense,
potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such
as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-
mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to
assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if
government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for
maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will
have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval
buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval
capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious
funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,
rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation
in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East,
cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and
between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Diversionary theory means nations will go to war
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in
Economics of War & Peace: Economic, Legal & Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith & Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict.
Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic
decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the
systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent
power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981)
that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995).
Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment
for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins
(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and
connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a
dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of
trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He
argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an
optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,
particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external
armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal
conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages
between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic
conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each
other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across
borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting
government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic
decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a
'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006)
find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly
correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency
towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic
support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in
the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use
of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an
increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between
integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic
interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the
first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global
interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic
crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Goes nuclear
Kemp 10 – Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House
under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs & senior director for
Near East & South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East
Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Geoffrey Kemp, 2010, The
East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can
go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India,
China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy.
As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the
energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social
welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not
limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more
“failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover
by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of
war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist
Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under
these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear
terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further
devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this
scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s
population.

Decline leads to major diversionary conflict

Foster 12/19 [Dennis Foster, professor of international studies & political science at the Virginia
Military Institute, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?”,
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-
might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm_term=.43745ac4c66c]

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the
age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect
popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might
escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. ∂ One often-cited
example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which
several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention
from a disastrous economy. ∂ In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents
engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the
world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more
belligerent behavior. ∂ Do words translate into foreign policy action? ∂ One way to identify these traits is
content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more
likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. ∂ For one, conceptually simplistic
leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems
and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on
aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in
their ability to wield it effectively. ∂ Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard
to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely
to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that
divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and
confident (military force). ∂ Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found
that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight
Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and
unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more
complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. ∂ What about Donald Trump? ∂ Since Donald Trump’s
election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and
whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot
has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the
economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his
side via military action. ∂ I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events
from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I
estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The
graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. ∂ These results are
startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself,
his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous
high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any
indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those
unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. ∂ As a candidate, Trump also
scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he
used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in
the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and
“without a doubt.” ∂ A possible implication for military action ∂ I took these data on Trump and plugged
them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States
from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic
downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. ∂ But the model would predict that a
president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase
in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal
to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s
psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.
Economic decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, & regional
instability
Mann ’14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic &
international counterintelligence & counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a
U.S. Senator & served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for
an internal security & vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina,
Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND
FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014,
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can
figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues
with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and
change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows
that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within
global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states
new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the
proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the
case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline
and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security
guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of
strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states
and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar
international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor
security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North
Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and
how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a
trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global
financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the
current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and
perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing
diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade,
or engaging financial warfare against the United States.
 Impact – Ban (Democracy)
Travel ban undermines global democracy
CAIR 4/24 (CAIR = Council on American-Islamic Relations, “The Evolving Muslim Ban,” Council on
American-Islamic Relations, http://www.islamophobia.org/15-reports/186-the-evolving-muslim-
ban.html)KC

It is evident that thelooming designation is a witch hunt, with the underlying goal of eviscerating American
Muslim civil society and leadership through the fabrication of contrived guilt by association. It has the
potential to criminalize any Muslim engaged in, or even marginally associated with, the exercise of
Muslim civil and political rights. This could extend to community centers, relief providers, mosques, and any number of Muslim civil
activities. It plays perfectly into the hands of far-right Neo-Nazi populists who seek to, as Rafia Zakaria says, “make
all Muslims terrorists – not through insinuation but actually label them as such.” Through the overbroad use of
the material support statue, section 2339 of the Patriot Act, the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist designation could result in unfounded
government targeting of American Muslim entities alleged as either designated or related to designated entities. In other words, it
would
allow the government to attack any American Muslim organization it wants, without evidence or
support, based on religious prejudice. Unfortunately, this is not an unrealistic possibility, however terrifying it may
be, in light of Trump’s promise to shut down mosques, and supporting statements by members of his administration. The Human Rights Watch
states that the United States has a history of using material support charges in an overbroad manner, “punishing behavior that did not
demonstrate an intent to support terrorism.” Among other effects, such prosecutions “violate individuals’ rights to free expression and
association.” Thus, the terrorist designation could freeze American Muslim organizations in lawful action and
speech, including the freedom of worship and association, for fear of incrimination. It has the potential
to destroy the reputations of American Muslims through broad brushed accusations from government
officials. A coalition statement drafted by the Brennan Center states that “a designation could also result in
unconstitutional asset seizures and effective shut-downs of civil society and rights groups.” It is important to
remember that American Muslim organizations have already been thoroughly scrutinized under both the Bush and Obama administrations.
Were there anything suspect, they would not be flourishing in American soil today. American Muslim organizations are a vibrant and essential
part of the American fabric.
Choking the religious and political freedom of the American Muslim community is
a threat to the democratic ideals of this country. Trump is well on his way to fulfilling promises he made on his campaign
trail. His evolving Muslim Ban, which includes barring Muslim entry and preparing to cripple undermine
Muslim civic infrastructure, has been foremost on his list. Trump enthusiastically promised in his inaugural address, that
“the forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.” Will he make true on this promise too and remember the
demonized and scapegoated Muslim women and men?
 Impact - Democracy
Democracy prevents war—stops initiation, escalation, & protracted conflict
Placek 12 (Kevin, correspondent for The Diplomat, “The Democratic Peace Theory,” E-International
Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/the-democratic-peace-theory/)KC

The institutional and normative aspects of the democratic peace proposition, thus, provide a very clear,
logical reason why the global spread of democracy will result in greater international peace: democratic
political institutions make it difficult for governments to initiate war without the consent of the
electorate, and the accompanying cultural norms mean democracies will favour a peaceful means of
conflict resolution with one another. Of course, this would not necessarily reduce the overall incidence of war as the monadic
proposition that democracies are less likely to use conflict regardless of regime type does not hold. But this would still produce a
positive qualitative change: democracies are less likely to initiate wars, escalate nonviolent disputes
into full-scale war, or engage in long and protracted military conflicts. More importantly, an increase in the
number of democracies would extend the liberal peace to a greater number of countries, and increase the
probability of winning war – arguably providing a strong normative and practical rationale for liberal states to
conduct a more Wilsonian foreign policy. Recognising the inherent difficulties implicit with the democratisation process,
however, greater effort should be made to encourage the consolidation of political institutions prior to mass political/electoral participation in
transitional states. Strengthening international organisations that embody liberal norms and values, and encouraging economic
interdependence with nondemocracies would also help mediate the strategic uncertainty and misperceptions that exist where the Kantian
peace meets the Hobbesian state of anarchy.

Democracy ensures peace—3 warrants: 1) economic stability & long-term growth

prevents war, 2) pluralism stunts extremism, 3) empirics prove no war
Lagon 11 (Mark P., PhD, prof of Government at Georgetown Univ, “The Whys and Hows of Promoting
Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/whys-and-hows-
promoting-democracy)KC

Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to
build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the
world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial
means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded
appreciation of this truth. Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is
not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established
democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other
governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best
preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on
consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international
conduct for governments. There has long been controversy about whether democracy enhances
economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history will
likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence
of the past three years, democracy’s elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These elements
include, above all, freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster
predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in
Monterrey, Mexico, embraced good governance as the enabler of development. These elements have
unleashed new emerging powers such as India and Brazil, and raised the quality of life for impoverished
peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be
reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship between political
and economic liberalization. Finally, democracy affords all groups equal access to justice—and equal
opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy. Democracy’s support for pluralism prevents
human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being
squandered. Indeed, a shortage of economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed
significantly to the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism is also precisely what is needed to
stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world. Evolving U.S. Policy To say there are major
interests in democracy’s “enlargement”—that central concept in both national security strategy
blueprints of the Clinton presidency—does not settle what role the United States should play and what
policy tools are appropriate. These are the questions not of why but of how. A look at waves of U.S.
policy since World War II offers apt lessons. After World War II, the United States played a significant
role in deepening and widening democracy in Western Europe. The United States encouraged European
integration to stabilize the West European democracies, and NATO was a bulwark within which Italy,
West Germany, Portugal, and Spain democratized. Later, after the Cold War, the twin institutions of
NATO and an integrated Europe together created powerful incentives for emerging East European
democracies to join Western multilateral institutions. Cold War competition with the Soviet Union,
however, frequently led the United States to support illiberal governments. (President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s revealing quip about Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza—“He may be a bastard, but he’s
our bastard”—too often became U.S. policy during the Cold War years.)

Strong American moral standards foster democratic ideals abroad, spurs global
peace—strong democratic stance now is key
Abrams et. Al 16 (Elliott, full list of authors & qualifications available on web page, “U.S. Must Put
Democracy at the Center of its Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/the-u-s-must-put-democracy-at-the-center-of-its-foreign-
policy/)KC

The United States is founded on the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and for decades, support for
democracy and human rights around the world has been a central tenet of American foreign policy. While the United States must
maintain relations with many autocratic governments abroad, there are excellent reasons why most of our closest allies are democracies. Free
nations are more economically successful, more stable, and more reliable partners for the United States. Democratic societies are
less likely to launch aggression and war against their neighbors or their own people. They are also less
likely to experience state failure and become breeding grounds for instability and terrorism, as we have seen,
for example, in Syria. This means that the advance of democracy serves U.S. interests and contributes to order and
peace around the globe. During the past four decades, the number of countries that are free and
democratic has more than doubled. From Latin America and Central Europe to East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, people have
opted for accountable government. This remarkable progress is rooted in the universal longing for liberty and dignity — but it is
also due to America’s strong support for human rights and democracy, under administrations of both
parties. This support has been not only a means of expressing the values upon which our nation was founded, but also a pragmatic choice to
promote the governing system that advances security, provides stable markets, and protects human
rights. We write to urge you to embrace this cause and to make it a central part of your foreign policy platform. In recent years,
authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have become more repressive; they see the advance of
democracy not only within their borders but in neighboring states as a threat to their monopoly on
political power. A regime’s treatment of its own people often indicates how it will behave toward its neighbors and beyond. Thus, we
should not be surprised that so many of the political, economic and security challenges we face emanate from places like Moscow, Beijing,
Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. Repressive regimes are inherently unstable and must rely on suppressing
democratic movements and civil society to stay in power. They also are the source and exporter of
massive corruption, a pervasive transnational danger to stable democratic governance throughout the
world. The result is that democracy is under attack. According to Freedom House, freedom around the world has declined
every year for the past decade. That heightens the imperative for the United States to work with
fellow democracies to reinvigorate support for democratic reformers everywhere. Supporting freedom around
the world does not mean imposing American values or staging military interventions. In non-democratic countries, it means
peacefully and creatively aiding local activists who seek democratic reform and look to the United
States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling
for a more democratic society, and their resilience and courage amid such threats demand our support. Helping them upholds the principles
upon which our country was founded. Supporting democracy involves partnerships between the U.S. government and non-governmental
organizations that are struggling to bring freedom to their countries. Often, it means partnering as well with emerging democracies to
strengthen their representative and judicial institutions. This requires resources that Congress must continue to provide, and foreign assistance
must be linked to positive performance with regard to human rights and the advancement of fundamental freedoms. It also requires diplomatic
backing at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, throughout the different agencies of government, and from the Congress as well. It means
meeting with democratic activists from various parts of the world and speaking out on their behalf. Demonstrating solidarity with and support
for these brave individuals’ efforts to build a better future for their country is the right thing to do. In aiding their struggles for freedom and
justice, we build a more secure world for the United States.
There is no cookie-cutter approach to supporting
democracy and human rights, but there are fundamental, universal features we should emphasize:
representative institutions, rule of law, accountability, free elections, anti-corruption, free media
(including the Internet), vibrant civil society, independent trade unions, property rights, open
markets, women’s and minority rights, and freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and
religion. Many Americans question why the United States should have to shoulder the burdens of supporting freedom and democracy
throughout the world. But a growing number of democracies in Europe and Asia, as well as international organizations, are expending
significant resources to lend this kind of assistance.

Status quo political climate is tumultuous—US democratic backsliding now would

erode democracy abroad
Gallagher 16 (Adam, senior writer & editor in DC, “Global Democracy in the Trump Era: Will the U.S.
Abandon Its Leadership Role?”, the American Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/global-democracy-
trump-era-will-us-abandon-its-leadership-role)KC
Even before Donald Trump’s surprise win on Election Day, global democracy was in retreat. As the watchdog organization Freedom House
reported this year, rising
xenophobia and authoritarian regimes in 2015 helped push democracy into decline
for the 11th year in a row. Against this backdrop, Trump’s election sends an ominous portent about
the state of freedom in the world. In the United States, many women, blacks, Latinos, Muslims, and
members of the LGBT community now fear for their basic human rights. Internationally, Trump will
join a United Nations Security Council whose four other permanent member states could by next year
be led by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, far-right French politician
Marine Le Pen, and the United Kingdom’s inexperienced premier, Theresa May. It’s a cadre that
should not inspire confidence in those concerned with promoting liberal values around the world.
Ultimately, Trump’s election bodes poorly for democracy, both in the United States and globally. This starkly
reverses a trend that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union 25 years ago, when it seemed inevitable that democracy would triumph. As
Francis Fukuyama declared in his seminal essay, we had reached “the end of history.” But if the expansion of global democracy has occurred
largely within “Three Waves,” as Harvard political Scientist Samuel Huntington suggests, the most recent wave that surged following the fall of
the Berlin Wall began losing momentum by 2005. In such fragile, emerging democracies as Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and
Venezuela, democratic freedoms have actually regressed in recent years. Indeed, Larry Diamond, a leading contemporary scholar in the field of
democracy studies, has said that the world is in a “democratic recession.”
Troubling as democratic backsliding may be in
these parts of the world, the erosion of basic freedoms in Europe and the United States is arguably
even more dangerous. Trump’s election and the emergence of the nationalist far-right in Europe should disabuse us of the notion that
once a liberal democracy has been “consolidated,” as political scientists put it, it is here to stay. It no longer holds that once democratic
institutions, a vibrant civil society, and certain level of wealth are established, democracy is secure. If anything, liberal
democracies
around the world are in a more precarious position than is often believed, argue Harvard University Lecturer
Yascha Mounk and University of Melbourne political scientist Roberto Stefan Foa in a forthcoming paper in the Journal of Democracy. Their
research demonstrates that the U.S. and Europe are exhibiting the same declines in public support for
democracy, public openness to nondemocratic forms of government, and the same growing support for
“antisystem” parties and movements, as newer emerging democracies. Democratic backsliding in the
U.S., aggravated by the president-elect’s own inflammatory and unsubstantiated claims about what actually occurred on Election Day,
presents a special hazard to democratic norms internationally. The U.S. has historically played a vital
role in advancing global democracy. To be sure, American democracy faces its own serious problems—for example, economic
inequality is worse in the United States than in Turkmenistan, host to one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Nevertheless, in the
1980s and ‘90s, as the Soviet Union crumbled, many
in the world looked to the American system as a model of
prosperity and liberty. In the 1980s, the U.S. founded organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy to promote
democracy internationally. The political and financial support of the United States and its European allies played a decisive role in the “Third
Wave” described by Huntington.
 Impact – Ban (Terrorism)
The travel ban will be a propaganda tool for ISIS & hinders global allied
counterterrorism attacks
Mackintosh 1/31 (Eliza, CNN news producer, “Trump ban is boon for ISIS recruitment, former
jihadists and experts say,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/trump-ban-boosts-isis-
recruitment/index.html)KC

President Donald Trump's travel ban on seven Muslim-majority nations will be used by ISIS as a
recruitment tool, giving the militant group a major propaganda boost, former jihadists have told CNN. The
executive order, which blocks all immigrants and visa holders who are citizens of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Yemen and Somalia, reinforces
ISIS' narrative, according to former jihadi Abu Abdullah. "It canplay into their propaganda, to make it clear for anyone
who could be in doubt, that it's a war on Islam and all Muslims," Abdullah told CNN over a messaging service. The
names of the now-defected foreign fighters in this story have been changed to protect their identities. Another former jihadi said the
wedge being driven between Muslims living in the West and their governments is exactly what ISIS
wants. "[Trump's] helped ISIS a lot, he's basically being a tool for them in a way," Abu Obaida, a British
former Jabhat al-Nusra fighter in Syria, told CNN via direct message. "On social media right now there's a lot of people
quoting Anwar al-Awlaki (the late spokesperson for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and his last speech when he
said that America will turn on the Muslims." As Obaida indicated, sympathizers of Islamist militant groups
are already hailing Trump's ban online. In conversation on social media, various jihadists have said the executive
action unveiled America's "hatred towards Muslims," according to US-based SITE monitoring service. A pro-ISIS
account on Telegram -- an encrypted app favored by the militant group -- praised Trump as "the best caller to Islam,"
signaling the President's ban would attract new believers. "When US President Donald Trump says 'We don't want them
here' and bans the Muslim immigrants from Muslim countries, there is one thing that comes to our mind," stated one account on Facebook,
sharing an image of Awlaki, who was killed in a 2011 US drone strike in Yemen, with his quote. He's a caricature of the evil crusader that they
want to convince everyone exists. Charlie Winter, senior fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
at King's College London, who has studied ISIS propaganda for years, told CNN he has not yet seen the ban appear in official releases from the
militant group. But Winter said thepolicy is "far more potent than any video or other piece of propaganda" the
group could put out. "He's a caricature of the evil crusader that they want to convince everyone
exists," Winter said. Trump has already featured briefly in at least two propaganda videos released by ISIS, as well as one clip published by
the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. President Obama was also shown in similar videos. Members of the Iraqi forces in Mosul watch Donald
Trump giving a speech after he won the US president elections. It's not just ISIS that might capitalize on the ban, al Qaeda is likely to use it, too.
"Bybanning Muslims, lumping them with radical Islamism, Donald Trump provides ammunition and
motivation for al Qaeda and ISIS," said Fawaz Gerges, chairman of contemporary Middle East studies at the London School of
Economics and author of "ISIS: A History." Gerges said that to group more than 1 billion Muslims with Islamic extremists is "foolishly
counterproductive" to the battle against ISIS. Trump has said this is not a Muslim ban. Responding to the outcry over the executive order, the
President wrote: "This is not about religion -- this is about terror and keeping our country safe." But Gerges said Trump has provided ideological
inspiration to ISIS, and also contributed to deepening anti-American sentiments throughout the Muslim world. "The policy can easily be
interpreted, and is being interpreted, as a ban against Muslims," Gerges said. "If you are serious about defeating ISIS, the last thing you want to
do is portray the fight as Islam vs. the West." If you
are serious about defeating ISIS, the last thing you want to do is
portray the fight as Islam vs. the West. In the years since 9/11, the Bush and Obama administrations
were careful not to mix up a "war on terror" with a war with Islam. But the Trump team put the fight
against "radical Islamic terrorism" at the heart of its campaign. This, paired with Trump's previous calls for a "Muslim
registry," set the stage for the President's travel ban. Clint Watts, a former FBI counterterrorism special agent and US Army infantry officer,
said, asa result of Trump's rhetoric, the US administration will have a harder time partnering with
Muslim-majority countries in the region to fight ISIS and other terror groups. "This isn't an isolated policy.
Moving the embassy to Jerusalem. Calls for bringing back torture. All of these in combination amplify the rhetoric," Watts said. "Not only
are we increasing recruitment, but we're making it harder for our partners around the world to fight
with us against terrorism." By most accounts, Trump entered office to a diminished ISIS threat. A survey by IHS Conflict Monitor
released earlier this month suggested the group has lost nearly a quarter of its territory in Iraq and Syria last year alone, and more than a third
since its peak. Its finances have also taken a hit and 180 "senior" leaders have been taken out by airstrikes, according to the US-led coalition.
Iraqi-led forces trying to retake Mosul from ISIS have made significant gains since launching the offensive late last year. GOP Sen. John
McCain blasted Trump's executive order in an interview with CBS on Sunday, saying he was worried about how the ban
would be received in Iraq, where American forces are fighting alongside Iraqi troops to retake Mosul
from ISIS. McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, added that the ban would only "give ISIS some more propaganda."
"The Islamic State is on the back foot militarily, it's losing territory. This kind of action more than makes up for that," Winter said. "Even if ISIS
loses Mosul and Raqqa, the ideology will live on because of statements like these, policies like these."

The travel ban causes terrorism in three ways —1. Provides propaganda for extremist
group recruiting efforts 2. Wrecks Middle Eastern alliances 3. Causes domestic
islamophobia
NYT 1/28 (New York Times Editorial Board, “Donald Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Cowardly and Dangerous,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/opinion/donald-trumps-muslim-ban-is-cowardly-and-
dangerous.html)KC

The document does not explicitly mention any religion, yet it sets a blatantly unconstitutional standard
by excluding Muslims while giving government officials the discretion to admit people of other faiths.
The order’s language makes clear that the xenophobia and Islamophobia that permeated Mr. Trump’s
campaign are to stain his presidency as well. Un-American as they are, they are now American policy.
“The United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward
it and its founding principles,” the order says, conveying the spurious notion that all Muslims should be
considered a threat. (It further claims to spare America from people who would commit acts of violence
against women and those who persecute people on the basis of race, gender or sexual orientation. A
president who bragged about sexually assaulting women and a vice president who has supported
policies that discriminate against gay people might well fear that standard themselves.) The
unrighteousness of this new policy should be enough to prompt the courts, Congress and responsible
members of Mr. Trump’s cabinet to reverse it immediately. But there is an even more compelling
reason: It is extremely dangerous. Extremist groups will trumpet this order to spread the notion, today
more credible than ever, that the United States is at war with Islam rather than targeting terrorists.
They want nothing more than a fearful, recklessly belligerent America; so, if anything, this ban will
heighten their efforts to strike at Americans, to provoke yet further overreaction from a volatile and
inexperienced president. American allies in the Middle East will reasonably question why they should
cooperate with, and defer to, the United States while its top officials vilify their faith. Afghans and
Iraqis supporting American military operations would be justified in reassessing the merits of taking
enormous risks for a government that is bold enough to drop bombs on their homelands but too
frightened to provide a haven to their most vulnerable compatriots, and perhaps to them as well.
Republicans in Congress who remain quiet or tacitly supportive of the ban should recognize that history
will remember them as cowards. There may be no one better positioned to force a suspension of this
policy than Mr. Trump’s secretary of defense, Jim Mattis. Mr. Mattis was clear-eyed about the dangers
of a proposed Muslim ban during the election, saying that American allies were reasonably wondering if
“we have lost faith in reason.” He added: “This kind of thing is causing us great damage right now, and
it’s sending shock waves through this international system.” His silence now is alarming to all who
admire his commitment to American security. Mr. Mattis and other senior government officials who
know better cannot lend their names to this travesty. Doing so would do more than tarnish their
professional reputations. It would make them complicit in abdicating American values and endangering
their fellow citizens.

Trump’s travel ban will fuel independent terrorist actors

Carle 1/30 (Glenn L, retired CIA officer, part of National Intelligence Council, “Trump’s Immigration
Ban and the Loss of Our Democracy,” Newsweekhttp://www.newsweek.com/trump-immigration-ban-
loss-democracy-549858)KC

The problem is not so much one of Islamic terrorists coming to the United States on missions, which the
Muslim ban is supposed to stop but will not. There are terrorists of this sort, but overall the
counterterrorism services do a good job of identifying and stopping them. Instead, the phenomenon of
Islamic terrorism has been progressively becoming one of inspired Islamic terrorists: individuals who do
not belong to any formal terrorist group, but who have been affected by the narrative radical Islamists
disseminate, that of religious war between Muslim and Christian, of unrelenting hostility by the West to
Muslims, who usually feel alienated from the societies in which they live. These “little losers,” in the
expression I frequently used when serving in counterterrorism work in the CIA, may have some tenuous
contact with a terrorist group, but mostly are simply “inspired” to act. This is the kind of terrorist who
struck in almost every terrorist attack in the United States since the al-Qaeda attack of September 11,
2001: These are “inspired” Islamic terrorists, most of the time U.S. citizens; not Muslim terrorists
sneaking in to the country disguised as immigrants, or refugees, or students. The Muslim ban will not
keep terrorists out—none of the over 12,000 Syrian refugees, for example, has any connection to
extremism or terrorism, a conclusion reached after the extensive “vetting” now in place that can take
two years for a refugee or immigrant to get through. But the ban will feed the narrative of grievance
and anger that “inspires” these marginal souls to become Islamic terrorist killers.

The travel ban leads to a loss of US global leadership & make terrorist more likely
Loffredo 17 (Nicholas Loffredo, 3-11-2017, "More than 130 foreign policy experts argue Trump's travel
ban weakens national security," Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-travel-ban-weaken-
national-security-foreign-policy-experts-566722) JD

More than 130 former defense and foreign policy officials have criticized President Donald Trump's revised
travel ban as contrary to national security and a useful recruiting tool for the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). "We are deeply concerned that
the March 6, 2017, executive
order halting refugee resettlement and suspending visa issuance and travel
from six Muslim-majority countries will, like the prior version, weaken U.S. national security and
undermine U.S. global leadership," reads the letter, dated Friday and delivered to Trump, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly and Michael Dempsey, acting
director of national intelligence. Signatories include veterans of multiple presidential administrations, including Bill Clinton's secretary of state,
Madeleine Albright; Barack Obama's secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano; Obama's secretary of state, John Kerry; George W. Bush
and Clinton veteran Richard Clarke; Obama National Security Adviser Susan Rice; and many others. The foreign policy experts argue
that the new executive order, scheduled to go into effect March 16, plays into the hands of ISIS and other extremists by boosting
their message to disaffected Muslims worldwide. "It will send a message that reinforces the propaganda of ISIS and
other extremist groups, that falsely claim the United States is at war with Islam. Welcoming Muslim
refugees and travelers, by contrast, exposes the lies of terrorists and counters their warped vision ." In
January, Trump issued an executive order without warning that temporarily barred travel from seven Muslim-majority nations, suspended the
Syrian refugee program and temporarily halted refugee admissions from other nations. Chaos
ensued, with confusion over the
dictates of Trump's order playing out at the nation's airports, which saw repeated protests. It took only
days for a federal judge to temporarily suspend the order, a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Trump administration could have fought the decision in court but essentially let it stand while officials worked on a new travel ban that was
designed to avoid the legal pitfalls of the initial order. The March 16 directive suspends travel from six Muslim-majority nations—Syria, Iran,
Somalia, Yemen, Sudan and Libya, with Iraq left off the list—for 90 days and suspends the refugee resettlement program for 120 days. It
doesn't single out Syrian refugees, and green-card holders will not be affected by the order. Six states—Washington, New York, Oregon,
Minnesota, Massachusetts, Hawaii—already have filed legal challenges against the travel ban, calling it a "Muslim ban by another name," that
will negatively impact their residents. Legal experts say the states will have a tougher time challenging the more narrowly drawn order in court.
One strategy seeks to apply the pre-existing restraining order to the latest Trump directive, but the federal judge in Washington state who
initially ruled against the first executive order declined Friday to extend his order to the new ban, citing procedural hurdles. Trump
has
repeatedly cited national security concerns as his impetus for the executive order, and has insisted
that refugees need to be kept out while the U.S. develops more robust vetting procedures. The
foreign policy experts reject both arguments, writing that the travel ban actually harms national
security while potential refugees are already subjected to rigorous vetting. "Refugees are vetted more
intensively than any other category of traveler," they write. "They are screened by national intelligence
agencies and INTERPOL, their fingerprints and other biometric data are checked against terrorist and
criminal databases, and they are interviewed several times. "Bans like those included in this order are
harmful to U.S. national security and beneath the dignity of our great nation. Further, the order’s drastic
reduction in the number of refugees to be resettled in this fiscal year after the 120-day moratorium
weakens this country’s ability to provide global leadership and jeopardizes our national security interests by failing to
support the stability of our allies that are struggling to host large numbers of refugees," the letter reads. "America’s much-admired compassion
and openness are sources not of weakness but strength. These qualities accord with the ideals on which our nation was founded, and on which
our greatness rests."

Travel ban becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—Islamophobic narrative of the ban fuels

ISIS recruitment propaganda
Williams 6/20 (Lauren C, tech reporter at ThinkProgress, “Half of Americans think Trump’s travel ban
was Islamophobic, agree with court challenges,” ThinkProgress, https://thinkprogress.org/6-in-10-
americans-say-muslim-ban-makes-us-safer-3ba7f38fa55e)KC
The majority of Americans believe that national security was the prime motivation behind President Donald Trump’s travel ban that temporarily
restricts travelers from Muslim-majority countries from coming to the U.S., according to a poll conducted by the Associated Press and the
University of Chicago’s NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. Of the 1,068 adults polled, six out 10 agreed the intent or motivation behind
the travel ban was to protect the country. Half of those polled also agreed that preventing Muslims from coming to the United States was a
major goal of the executive order Trump signed during his first days in office. Additionally, a majority of Americans support several courts’
challenges to the travel ban’s constitutionality. The poll also showed that people’s views strongly aligned with their political affiliation: 87
percent of Republicans believed the executive order is about national security compared to just 41 percent of Democrats. Democrats, 64
percent, were also more likely to believe the travel ban was Islamophobic, in that it aimed to bar Muslims from entering the country. Only 34
percent of Republicans agreed. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats were at odds regarding the legal challenges to the travel ban, with 73
percent of Republicans against and 82 percent of Democrats in favor. Terrorism experts have previously said Trump’s
travel and immigration bans won’t make the country safer, and could make threats worse. Since
September 11, no one has been killed in a terrorist attack by immigrants from the countries included in
the ban — Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, the New York Times reported. (Iraq was
removed from the list of targeted countries in the second iteration of Trump’s ban.) Additionally, fewer than one in four
Muslim Americans charged with terrorism related activities had family in those countries. There’s also concern
the ban, which has been criticized as un-American, could make Americans less safe and increase the Islamic State’s
reach by playing into their recruitment propaganda. Former jihadi Abu Abdullah told CNN that such
policies can “play into their propaganda, to make it clear for anyone who could be in doubt, that it’s a
war on Islam and all Muslims.” National security as it pertains to terrorism has increasingly become an issue worldwide. According
to a report from the Unisys Security Index, war and terrorism are the top concerns for consumers. The IT group surveyed 13,000 individuals
across 13 countries and found that 68 percent were “extremely” or “very concerned” about terrorism — a 44 percent jump from 2014. Concern
over hacking also jumped with 56 percent of Americans ranking it as a serious concern. Barely a third of respondents felt that way in 2014. The
survey and poll results follow a major global hack that affected more than 100 countries and has now been linked to North Korea, and several
attacks in the U.K. Anti-Muslim hate crimes have increased as a result.

Recruitment propaganda builds ISIS fighting force & motivates lone-wolf terrorist
attacks that can’t be preemptively stopped
Engel 15 (Pamela, politics editor for Business Insider, “ISIS has mastered a crucial recruiting tactic no
terrorist group has ever conquered,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-
revolutionizing-international-terrorism-2015-5)KC
"Jihadist propaganda had had a history measured in decades, but it had long been obscure and limited to an audience of mostly true believers,"
Stern and Berger wrote. "Suddenly, the stuff was everywhere, intruding on the phones, tablets, and computers of ordinary people who were
just trying to go about their daily business online." Through this online propaganda, ISIS not only touts its violent acts
against "non-believers," but also the lifestyle the group claims to offer its members, referred to by some
within the group as "five-star jihad." Most recently, ISIS media channels announced the reopening of a luxury hotel in Mosul,
complete with a photo spread of the facilities. And ISIS isn't just targeting Arabic-speaking Muslims who are already in the Middle East. The
New York Times reported last month that foreigners make up half of ISIS' fighting force, and an
estimated 4,000 come from Western countries. To further capitalize on this influx of foreigners, ISIS has
released propaganda videos featuring foreign fighters who speak Western languages and can encourage
others to come to Syria to wage violent jihad or help the caliphate in some other way. And these Western
recruits, many of whom are recent Muslim converts who are searching for adventure or a purpose for their lives, are becoming "some of the
most dangerous and fanatical adherents to radical Islam," according to The Washington Post. The newspaper also pointed out that "the number
of converts streaming to aid the Islamic State ... is far greater than in any other modern conflict in the Islamic world." To lure these new recruits
into a new life in the caliphate, ISIS recruiters — many of whom are young women — are on Twitter and Tumblr, updating their followers about
their lives and portraying ISIS territory in an overwhelmingly positive light. Recruiters also use messaging apps like Kik to communicate with
those who want advice on how to cross into Syria. ISIS' propaganda arm has created brochures on how to get there and what to pack, and
recruiters can arrange for an ISIS member to meet new recruits in Turkey and help them across the Syrian border. The
idea is to remove
potential barriers of entry into ISIS rather than create them, helping huge numbers of foreign fighters to
swell their forces in the Middle East. While Al Qaeda does have foreign fighters in its ranks, the central organization and its
offshoots are much more restrictive than ISIS, and their media campaigns aren't as wide reaching or sophisticated. They also missed a big
recruitment opportunity after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the US. "It was as if bin Laden believed al Qaeda could somehow
continue to act as the hidden hand after killing thousands of Americans in a single unforgettable spectacle," Stern and Berger wrote. "It took
years for al Qaeda to begin fully exploiting the media-ready elements of September 11." . The New York Times told the story of Ifthekar Jaman,
who lived in England and was born to parents who emigrated from Bangladesh. He traveled to Syria to join a jihadist group, but had trouble
getting accepted into the Nusra Front, the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Ifthekar met a man on a bus in Turkey who took him to a Nusra
recruitment office, but the group turned him down because he didn't have the recommendation letters he needed to get in. Shiraz Maher, a
research fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization in London, explained to the Times: "Al Nusra has a vigorous vetting
process, especially for foreigners. It’s called tazkiyah, and it means that you must be vouched for by someone already in the organization. The
system has worked well for Arabs with links to the group, but it has made it much more difficult for Europeans to join." When Al Qaeda was first
created, the group noted in a memo that there were four requirements for membership — swearing allegiance to the emir and being obedient,
obtaining a personal referral from a member of Al Qaeda's inner circle, and displaying "good manners," according to Stern and Berger. Al Qaeda
also funded foreign fighters around the world who could plan attacks, but these fighters couldn't necessarily call themselves members of the
central group itself. ISIS, on the other hand, says: "'If you’re a Muslim, you’re already part of the Caliphate,'" Maher said. "'So even if you’re too
fat, or too old to be a fighter, we’ll find something else for you to do. You have a right to emigrate. We’ll find a place for you.'" And while ISIS
does vet aspiring militants, social media has made it much easier for radicalized Westerners to find and connect with a recruiter who can vouch
for them and help them travel to the caliphate. Al Qaeda has also established a presence on social media, but its exclusionary policies still make
it more difficult for outsiders to penetrate the organization. Another important point of distinction that sets ISIS apart from rival terror groups
like Al Qaeda is that it is trying to establish itself as a legitimate authority that controls territory and provides civil services to its residents. While
some Al Qaeda affiliates have considered doing the same in the past, they saw it more as a PR opportunity rather than a necessary function
that was core to its mission, Stern and Berger argue. ISIS "seemed to relish" providing these services and the group's members "radiated
enthusiasm for these projects," according to the book. ISIS established consumer protection bureaus, displayed its flag prominently in public,
and set up police forces. Part of this has to do with its message that any "true" believers should emigrate to the caliphate. In his first public
speech after declaring himself the "caliph" or leader, of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said that "hijrah (or emigration) to the land of Islam is
obligatory" for Muslims. And ISIS wasn't just calling for fighters to join its caliphate, but also for doctors, administrators, engineers, scholars,
and women who could marry future martyrs and bear their children. Al Qaeda, however, sees the caliphate as a "distant goal" that would not
be reached in the immediate future, Stern and Berger note. And while
ISIS compels Muslims to travel to its territory, the
group also encourages "lone wolf" attacks in Western nations. This threat is becoming of increasing
concern for countries that already have a hard time monitoring potential extremists, some of whom
carry out attacks on their own terms without being directed by any leaders within the terror group itself.
Through these means, aspiring jihadists can create a Twitter account and say they're members of ISIS even if they have only minimal ties to the
organization. Social
media has also made it easy for foreigners to connect with fighters and recruiters in the
Middle East without ever having to set foot in Syria. We saw this happen recently with two gunmen who
shot a security officer in Texas at a contest that invited participants to draw the Prophet Mohammed. One
of the gunmen maintained a Twitter account with which he discussed ISIS and pledged allegiance to the group. ISIS later claimed responsibility
for the attack, although it's unclear if the gunmen were merely inspired by ISIS or if the group actually ordered the attack. The US government is
now scrambling to contain this threat. Just this week, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hosted a panel
called "Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment." Berger was a member of the panel. "What ISIS has accomplished
so far will have long-term ramifications for jihadist and other extremist movements that may learn from its tactics," Stern and Berger wrote in
their book. "A
hybrid of terrorism and insurgency, the former al Qaeda affiliate, booted out of that group in
part due to its excessive brutality, is rewriting the playbook for extremism."

Travel ban hinders counterterrorism efforts & boosts terrorist recruiting efforts
Maass 15 (Richard, PhD, prof of PoliSci @ University of Evansville, “Want to help the Islamic State
recruit? Treat all Muslims as potential terrorists,” The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/30/want-to-help-the-islamic-state-
recruit-treat-all-muslims-as-potential-terrorists/?utm_term=.6fbbcb860b98)KC

Here’s what we know. To be most effective, counterterrorism policies need to make an explicit distinction
between the individuals who genuinely threaten others with terrorism, on the one hand, and on the other, the
broader populations those terrorists claim to represent. Counterterrorism efforts — especially using force —
should narrowly target only the former, as much as possible. Groups that commit terrorism often hope to
provoke a violent overreaction against the community they claim to be defending. Even though most people in
that community are nonviolent, such a reaction might force them to turn to the terrorist group for their own
defense, swelling its ranks and realizing its ambition for greater political power. In other words,
counterterrorism policies that discriminate against Syrians or Muslims in general are precisely what the Islamic
State wants. Such an approach will, quite literally, help the terrorists win. How do we decide what makes someone a terrorist? When
we see people acting badly, our first instinct is to blame their bad behavior on something that has nothing to do with us, so that we don’t look
bad by association. Due to what psychological studies term the “ultimate attribution error,” we blame the bad behavior of people we see as
“others” on personal characteristics that make them intrinsically different from ourselves. In contrast, we blame the bad behavior of people
who are like “us” on external pressures and constraints (rather than on traits that we share). This explains why many non-Muslim Americans
instinctively decide Islam is the reason the Islamic State attacked Paris, but would never attribute the Oklahoma City bombing to the fact that
Timothy McVeigh was American. Moreover, this attribution error is especially likely after intense conflicts and when emotions run high — such
as after a terrorist attack. Blaming terrorism on people unlike ourselves is psychologically easy. But it’s also dangerous. Here’s how. First, since
most people in every major demographic category are not terrorists, attributing terrorism to such a broadly shared
characteristic gets the causes of terrorism wrong. Policies based on that way of thinking won’t work
effectively, because they’re not aiming at the actual problem. Second, we waste time and energy when we assume that
far more people are dangerous than actually are. Drawing a crass link between terrorism and all Syrians
or all Muslims, for example, implies that we’re in danger from every single one of some 17 million
Syrians or 1.6 billion Muslims (including more than 150,000 Americans of Syrian descent and more than 2.7 million Muslim
Americans). That’s absurd. Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of both Syrians and Muslims are not terrorists, just like the
overwhelming majority of any other nationality or religion. Third, we falsely conclude that others like us can’t commit
terrorism because they don’t share the trait that “causes” it. This can lead us to ignore individuals or
groups who may actually be quite dangerous, just because they look or speak in a familiar way . How to
help terrorists: Assume that everyone in their ethnic or religious group is a terrorist, too Here’s the larger problem. When we fall for the
universal attribution error and target the whole group that the terrorists (falsely) claim to represent, we hurt our own society and help the
terrorists. Many terrorist groups have claimed to represent a religious or ethnic population when most of those people actually rejected their
violence. But
in cases where the terrorists succeeded in provoking a discriminatory backlash against the
population at large, those nonviolent people were forced to turn to the terrorists for protection. In
other words, a xenophobic reaction to terrorism can actually help the terrorists’ recruiting and
fundraising, allowing them to grow far more powerful than they could have without it. For example,
the Tamil Tigers were only a small group when they attacked a Sri Lankan army patrol on July 23, 1983.
But that attack sparked “Black July,” a wave of anti-Tamil riots that quickly spread across the country
and left 400 Tamils dead and more than 100,000 homeless. The Sinhalese majority blamed all Tamils for
the Tamil Tigers’ violence. So where did Tamils turn for protection? To the Tigers, whose recruitment
boomed, starting a Sri Lankan civil war that would last for the next 26 years. Government
counterterrorism policies that aim too broadly can bring on the same result. The British combated the
Provisional Irish Republican Army during the 1970s and 1980s with policies that targeted far more
Catholics in Northern Ireland than those actually in the terrorist group. For instance, the British government armed
Protestant-dominated local police and paramilitaries, held without trial and aggressively interrogated numerous Catholics whom their local
communities knew full well had no connection to the PIRA, and used trials in which judges could convict someone with only a confession or the
testimony of a former accomplice. As happened with the Tamils and the Tamil Tigers, this
heavy-handed reaction drove many
Catholics in Northern Ireland — including many who would otherwise have rejected terrorist violence — toward the PIRA as
their only possible defense. The right kind of discrimination: Discriminating between terrorists and non-terrorists Counterterrorism
policies need to be discriminating to be effective, but in exactly the opposite way from what’s been suggested by the rhetoric coming from
some of our leaders. Rather than discriminating against the broader population a terrorist group wants to represent,
counterterrorism
policies need to effectively discriminate between those actually responsible for the terrorist threat and
the vast majority who prefer nonviolence and pose no real threat. Terrorism is not the product of a particular ethnicity
or religion. Instead, research has shown that a group’s use of terrorism has more to do with institutional and social psychological factors or a
misplaced belief it will effectively promote its goals. But terrorist groups only thrive over the long term if they can command enough
community support. As a result, the most effective counterterrorism policies apply force in a highly
discriminating way, specifically targeting individuals known to pose a threat, and leaving the broader
population free and peacefully integrated into society. Doing so drives the terrorists apart from their
desired constituency instead of driving them together. As Audrey Cronin’s study of counterterrorism strategies concludes,
“Marginalization from their constituency is the death-knell for modern groups.” In contrast, broad-brush counterterrorism
policies are both ineffective and dangerous. The United States tried such policies after 9/11, using a range of ethnic profiling
strategies that, as David Cole and Jules Lobel observe, failed to convict any terrorists. Worse than simply wasting resources, though,
xenophobic overreactions generate support for the terrorists. Robert Art and Louise Richardson conclude their edited
volume on democracy and counterterrorism by noting that “terrorist strategists have long been aware of the value of
provoking governmental overreactions that play back into the terrorists’ hands” and that the
“indiscriminate use of force” almost always backfires.

Trump’s travel ban will fuel independent terrorist actors

Carle 1/30 (Glenn L, retired CIA officer, part of National Intelligence Council, “Trump’s Immigration
Ban and the Loss of Our Democracy,” Newsweekhttp://www.newsweek.com/trump-immigration-ban-
loss-democracy-549858)KC

The problem is not so much one of Islamic terrorists coming to the United States on missions, which the
Muslim ban is supposed to stop but will not. There are terrorists of this sort, but overall the
counterterrorism services do a good job of identifying and stopping them. Instead, the phenomenon of
Islamic terrorism has been progressively becoming one of inspired Islamic terrorists: individuals who do
not belong to any formal terrorist group, but who have been affected by the narrative radical Islamists
disseminate, that of religious war between Muslim and Christian, of unrelenting hostility by the West to
Muslims, who usually feel alienated from the societies in which they live. These “little losers,” in the
expression I frequently used when serving in counterterrorism work in the CIA, may have some tenuous
contact with a terrorist group, but mostly are simply “inspired” to act. This is the kind of terrorist who
struck in almost every terrorist attack in the United States since the al-Qaeda attack of September 11,
2001: These are “inspired” Islamic terrorists, most of the time U.S. citizens; not Muslim terrorists
sneaking in to the country disguised as immigrants, or refugees, or students. The Muslim ban will not
keep terrorists out—none of the over 12,000 Syrian refugees, for example, has any connection to
extremism or terrorism, a conclusion reached after the extensive “vetting” now in place that can take
two years for a refugee or immigrant to get through. But the ban will feed the narrative of grievance
and anger that “inspires” these marginal souls to become Islamic terrorist killers.
 Impact - Terrrorism
Terrorism causes retaliation that escalates to full blown war
Byman 5/3 (Daniel L., senior fellow at center for ME policy, “Trump and the Next Terrorist Attack,”
Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/03/trump-and-the-next-terrorist-
attack/)KC

The best response in the hours after an attack involves a mix of rhetoric, leadership, and caution. The
president should publicly honor the dead and reassure Americans that the government is working to hunt down the guilty and care for those
injured. At the same time, he should point out that American Muslims have proven vital allies against terrorism. As FBI Director James Comey
put it, “They
do not want people committing violence, either in their community or in the name of their
faith, and so some of our most productive relationships are with people who see things and tell us things
who happen to be Muslim.” Almost half of all tips on extremism come from the community. An
immediate retaliatory strike—one that on its surface would signal toughness and thus be attractive to
a president who talks about toughness a lot—might be a mistake. Initial information on responsibility or the extent
of overseas links is often flawed or incomplete, and it is useful for the administration to assess a full range of options before plunging in. Since
the Trump administration is already hitting the Islamic State hard, it’s difficult to imagine an easy way to ratchet up the pressure that does not
involve significant costs or downsides. Instead, various agencies should be scrutinizing intelligence and security procedures to determine
culpability and identify real and potential holes while the military and intelligence agencies assess options overseas.
Based on his initial
record in office and rhetoric on the campaign trail, however, Trump might opt for a disastrous approach.
The president acts out of impulse, whether this involves sarcastic tweets to Arnold Schwartzenegger or the sudden decision to
bomb Syria after the regime’s use of chemical weapons. It’s safe to say that restraint and deliberation are not characteristics
of this administration—or the man himself. Perhaps even worse, this administration has a track record of
mismanaging policy processes. This includes signature items like the “Muslim Ban” executive order or less prominent but important
announcements, like the supposed deployment of an aircraft carrier to Korea. This bungling and the president’s many about-faces on issues
have damaged his credibility as a messenger and are likely to make people more skeptical of the content of his statements and actions in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack. The
president is likely to want to overreact abroad. He seems to want to appear
tough more than he wants to be effective. So he boasted, for example, about dropping a massive bomb on
Islamic State targets in Afghanistan without waiting to learn whether it achieved its objectives. On the
campaign trail, the president wanted to “bomb the shit out of them” even though it was not clear an increase in the scale
of bombing would achieve much. Trump might also expand the war, bringing it to new zones that have only a
tenuous Islamic State or al-Qaida presence. He has already authorized the intensification of US
operations targeting Shabaab and increased the pace of strikes targeting terrorist groups more
generally. Even more worrisome is what the President might do at home. On the campaign trail, the President repeatedly conflated
Muslims and terrorists, and with tensions and emotions running high after an attack this demonization might be especially likely. In the name of
border security, he might further limit immigration and travel from Muslim-majority countries or try to single out Muslims over other faith
communities.

Lone wolf attacks & terrorist access to WMDs means the impact is catastrophic
Schleifer 15 (Theodore, “Former CIA official: ISIS terrorist attack in U.S. is possible,” CNN Politics,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/politics/michael-morell-isis-attack-osama-bin-laden/index.html)KC

Islamic militants have the ability to direct individuals to conduct small-scale attacks in the United States
and could pose an even greater threat in the future, according to the former deputy director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Michael Morell, a longtime intelligence analyst who served as acting director of the agency after the
resignation of David Petraeus in 2012, warned that if ISIS was allowed to take refuge in Iraq and Syria, they could orchestrate an attack in the
United States. The group has claimed responsibility for a recent attack in Garland, Texas, where police killed two gunmen. Morell told CNN's
Jake Tapper on "The Lead" that it
is "not far-fetched" that ISIS or other terrorist groups could gain access to
weapons of mass destruction. "That would be the nightmare scenario: a terrorist attack, here in the United
States, here in New York, another major city, that involved either chemical, biological or other nuclear weapons ," he
said. Morell also disputed a report this week by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh that a walk-in informant tipped the United
States off to the location of Osama bin Laden before the American military killed him. "I can't tell you that somebody didn't walk into a station
somewhere and say 'I know where Osama bin Laden is.'" Morell said. "But I can guarantee you that no one walk in ever provided information
that actually led us to Osama bin Laden."

Nuclear terrorism is a growing threat—nuclear theft, uranium/plutonium theft, &

“dirty bombs” elevate risk of catastrophe
Cirincione 16 (Joe, President of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making foundation focused on
nuclear weapons policy & conflict resolution. “Nuclear terrorist threat bigger than you think,” CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/nuclear-terrorism-threat-cirincione/index.html)KC

Nuclear policy experts can seem like Cassandra, constantly prophesizing apocalyptic futures. In case you
haven't noticed, we don't live in a Mad Max world devastated by nuclear war. Terrorists have not blown up New York with a makeshift nuclear
bomb. We haven't bankrupted ourselves, despite the trillions of dollars spent on Cold War weapons. Cassandra's
curse, however,
was not that she was wrong, but that no one believed her. I don't know a single nuclear expert who
thinks that the threat of nuclear terrorism is shrinking. I don't know a single one who thinks that the
actions taken by world leaders at this week's Nuclear Security Summit are enough. We are fearful. And you
should be, too. Joe Cirincione Joe Cirincione Chills went down a lot of experts' spines last month when we saw the news that the Brussels
bombers, the ISIS terrorists who blew up the airport and attacked the metro, were secretly videotaping a Belgian
nuclear official. This official worked at a facility that had radiological material that terrorists could use
for a "dirty bomb." We do not know if they were filming him or his family, if there was a kidnap plot in motion, or what their exact plans
were. But this is not some Hollywood fantasy. This is real. A nuclear terrorist event may be closer than you think.
What are the risks? First, that terrorists could steal a complete nuclear weapon, like SPECTRE in the James Bond
thriller, "Thunderball." This is hard, but not impossible. The key risk is that the outside terrorists get insider help: For example, a
radical jihadist working at a Pakistan weapon storage site. Or the Belgian base just outside Brussels where we still stash a half-dozen nuclear
weapons left over from Cold War deployments. Or the Incirlik air base in Turkey where we keep an estimated 50 weapons just 200 miles from
the Syrian border. Second, terrorists could steal the "stuff" of a bomb, highly enriched uranium or
plutonium. They cannot make this themselves -- that requires huge, high-tech facilities that only nations can construct. But if they
could get 50 or 100 pounds of uranium -- about the size of a bag of sugar -- they could construct a
crude Hiroshima-style bomb. ISIS, with its money, territory and global networks, poses the greatest
threat to do this that we have ever seen. Such a bomb brought by truck or ship or FedEx to an urban
target could kill hundreds of thousands, destroy a city and put the world's economy and politics into
shock. Third, there is the possibility of a dirty bomb. Frankly, many of us are surprised this has not
happened already. I spoke to Jon Stewart on his show 15 years ago about the danger. This is not a nuclear explosion
unleashed by splitting atoms, but simply a conventional explosive, like dynamite, laced with
radioactive material, like cesium or strontium. A 10-pound satchel of dynamite mixed with less than 2
ounces of cesium (about the size of a pencil eraser) could spew a radioactive cloud over tens of square
blocks. No one would die, unless they were right next to the explosion. But the material would stick to the buildings. Inhaling just a speck
would greatly increase your risk of getting cancer. You could go into the buildings, but no one would. There would be mass panic
and evacuations, and the bomb would render a port, financial district, or government complex unusable
and uninhabitable for years until scrubbed clean. Economic losses could be in the trillions. North Korea
doesn't have an H-bomb North Korea doesn't have an H-bomb Fourth, terrorists could just attack a nuclear power
reactor, fuel storage or other site to trigger a massive radioactive release that could contaminate
hundreds or thousands of square miles, like Chernobyl or Fukushima. While nuclear reactors are hardened against
outside attack, including by the intentional crash of a medium-sized jet plane, larger planes could destroy them. Or a series of suicide truck
bombers. But it might not even take a physical explosion. This week, it was reported the United States and the United Kingdom are to simulate
a cyberattack on a nuclear power plant. Can we prevent these attacks? Yes, by eliminating, reducing and securing all supplies of nuclear
materials so that terrorists would find it too difficult to get them. And by reducing and better protecting nuclear reactors and spent nuclear
fuel. Are we doing enough? No. "The
capabilities of some terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State, have
grown dramatically," says Harvard scholar and former Bush Administration official William Tobey, "In a net calculation, the risk of
nuclear terrorism is higher than it was two years ago." The United States spends about $35 billion on nuclear weapons every year. This year, we
will spend $1.8 billion on all our efforts to stop the spread these weapons and stop nuclear terrorism. You don't have to be a nuclear expert to
know something is out of whack here. It is time we put our money where our threats are.

Nuclear terrorism would be catastrophe & is a likely trigger for full-scale nuclear war—
the likelihood of a nuclear terror attack is significant
Helman 8 (Martin E., PhD, cryptologist, prof of engineering @ Stanford Univ, “The Odds for Nuclear
Armageddon,” http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf) KC

A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-
kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a
million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life
would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also
significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist
incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a
former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would
never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be
anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world
where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security
experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack
involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of
the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar
2005, pp. 14-15]. Classified studies may exist, but could not be used in this effort. Unclassified studies
that were missed by my search may also exist and, if adequate, could be substituted for some of the
proposed studies. However, experts on national defense, nuclear weapons, and risk analysis whom I
consulted as part of that search were unaware of any such studies. I support increased efforts to reduce
the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because
terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses
proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall
risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies
would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention.
 A2: Ban Solves Terrorism
The travel ban leads to more ISIS recruits in the US
Chapman 2/10 (Steve Chapman, 2-10-2017, "How Trump's travel ban helps terrorists,"
chicagotribune, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chapman/ct-trump-help-recruiting-
islamic-state-terrorists-perspec-xxx-20170210-column.html) JD

Middle Eastern terrorists figured out long ago it was too hard to get their people into this country. What
is easy is transmitting propaganda. As Pape points out, "ISIS terrorists in America are walk-in volunteers"
— people living in the U.S. who have been radicalized by its online videos. What the travel ban does, by singling out Muslims
in these seven countries, is to buttress the Islamic State claim that the West is at war with Islam . If the
policy induces a small percentage of American Muslims — who number 3.3 million — to embrace the group, the
risk of terrorism will multiply. Trump thinks he can protect the nation by blocking the arrival of
foreigners with murderous plans. The bigger danger is that the Islamic State will enlist more Americans
in its bloody cause. And Trump may be the best recruiter it has ever had.

The ban isn’t about national security

Alan Greene, 2-2-2017, "Trump’s travel ban is nothing to do with national security," Conversation,
http://theconversation.com/trumps-travel-ban-is-nothing-to-do-with-national-security-72170

In the two month interregnum between the 2016 presidential election and Donald Trump’s inauguration, many hoped that the new
president’s bark would be worse than his bite – that the office would make the man, rather than the man remaking the office.
It took Trump a week to dispel this hope, and to signal to the world that he means business. The last straw
was his executive order Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which
bans nearly all passport-holders from Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen from entry into the
US for 90 days. It also puts an indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. The order is supposedly meant to protect the nation from
foreign terrorists – but it has nothing to do with keeping Americans safe. It is an act of manipulative security
politics, and its motives lie elsewhere. The order’s supposed policy motives fail on simple logic. Since 1975, no terrorist
from any of the seven countries listed has been responsible for a fatal attack on US soil. Meanwhile, the
radical Islamists who carried out the San Bernardino attack and the Orlando massacre were not from
Trump’s seven listed countries – two were in fact US citizens. And that’s ignoring attacks from a white supremacist on an African-
American church in Charleston, South Carolina, or the shooting at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs by an anti-abortionist. Then
there are the US’s all-too-common mass shootings, which don’t get the “terrorism” label. (If Trump were serious about sacrificing liberties to
increase security, perhaps severe gun control would be a better place to start.) Similarly, if
Trump were genuinely concerned
about threats to the US, he would not have given his radical political advisor Stephen Bannon a full seat
on the National Security Council and downgraded the roles of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the director of national intelligence, who will now attend only when the council is considering issues in their direct areas of
responsibilities. All this points to the same stark fact: Trump’s executive order on refugees and foreign arrivals has
everything to do with the optics of the situation.
 Impact – Ban (Trade)
Restricting immigration leads to trade wars
Wasik 17 (John, writes about innovation, investor protection, money management, economics, college
financing, retirement and social issues, 2/1/17, “Here's How Trump Muslim Ban Will Slam U.S. Economy,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2017/02/01/heres-how-trump-muslim-ban-will-slam-u-s-
economy/#69fa712b4930) ACT

The travel curbs on people coming in from selected Muslim countries is going to hurt the U.S. economy.
President Trump and his advisers are bamboozling Americans into thinking that it's all about national
security. The ill-conceived, cruel restriction of just a handful of Muslim-dominated countries is a sideshow to some harmful moves that
Trump has promised. A potential trade war will cripple the U.S. economy in a number of ways. It starts with
restricting people from emigrating to the U.S. Financial markets on Monday initially reacted negatively
to the Trump ban. The value of the dollar relative to other world currencies also declined. Demonstrators
protest President Trump's executive immigration ban. Trump signed the controversial executive order that halted refugees and residents from
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States. ( JOSHUA LOTT/AFP/Getty Images) How will cherry-picking a handful of
immigrants and making their lives difficult impact the U.S. economy as a whole?
Large U.S. corporations, which are engaged in
the global marketplace, are increasingly deriving their profits overseas. If they are curbed from moving
people where they need them, that will hurt their productivity. And then there's the retaliation factor.
Any country subject to an emigration or trade curbs can make it difficult for U.S. businesses. They can slap
import fees on U.S. goods and refuse to admit U.S. citizens into their countries. And residents of foreign countries can boycott goods and
services made by U.S.-based companies. When any financial market gets a sniff of trade conflicts, it goes into a tailspin. Remember the sell-off
over the U.K. Brexit vote last year? The U.S. economy is nearly six times larger than Britain's, and will not react well to any trade restrictions.
“Sweeping bans on admission to the country from a number of nations risks undermining the globalization agenda that has helped pump
valuations in a range of U.S.-listed stocks over the last few years, whilst the prospect of similar restrictions being applied to U.S. citizens could
also hamper overseas trade initiatives," Remo Fritschi of ADS Securities told Marketwatch.com. The Brain Drain Another economic
deal-killer is that immigration curbs prevent top technologists and other professionals from entering and
staying in the U.S. A number of Silicon Valley leaders blasted the Trump order this weekend, saying that it was hurting their ability to
move and retain top talent. Amazon's Jeff Bezos said he would back Washington State's legal challenge to the ban. Ford CEO Mark Fields and
Chairman Bill Ford also said they oppose the ban, joining a wide range of Democratic senators and Republicans John McCain and Lindsey
Graham. Most of all, any punitive immigration ban discourages people who want to start businesses and
prosper in the U.S. from emigrating. I know a young Syrian lawyer who's trying to move here from Saudi Arabia to start a business
in America and is stymied in his diligent efforts to start a new life. The whole prospect of immigration discrimination is un-
American. Promising researchers, engineers, academics and other professionals will stay away from the U.S. if the know they're not
welcome or will be routinely detained and interrogated at U.S. airports. I know one Iranian scholar who's been arrested and detained in his own
country and came to the U.S. for academic and religious freedom. Of course, leading minds in any field have their choice of countries in which
to settle and work. They can go to Canada or Europe, or perhaps China, which is always trying to recruit top intellects. Restricting
the
flow of intellectual capital is another form of a trade war. Innovation happens in an unrestricted environment that
respects ideas over borders. A trade war that curbs talent from entering this country will follow a slippery slope into other areas. Although
many pundits have been "heralding" the rally in U.S. stocks since the national election, the market will head south in a big way if there's a hint
of trade retaliations. Even more troubling is the Trump Administration's proposal to tax Mexican imports to pay for a wall along the U.S. border.
That would not only raise the price of Mexican goods -- and hurt consumers -- it would raise the costs of doing business for U.S.-based
companies with manufacturing in Mexico. As Trump follows through on campaign promises to scrap major trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which could've secured a competitive advantage for U.S. companies against China, it's not clear what will actually stay in place. The
Administration has already walked back parts of its Muslim-country ban and is being sued in several federal courts. In any case, watch for the
market's reaction to ongoing changes in trade policy. While
corporations and wealthy investors are relishing the idea
of lower tax rates -- part of Trump's platform -- if they are accompanied by trade and talent roadblocks,
that optimism could evaporate quickly.
 Impact – Ban (Structural Violence)
Muslim ban results in violence against people of color & other marginalized
communities—the impact is not solely limited to Muslim communities
Beydoun 3/7 (Khaled A., prof of law at Univ of Detroit, “Muslim Ban Incites Vigilante Islamophobic
Violence,” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/muslim-ban-incites-
vigilante-islamophobic-violence-170307065614706.html)KC

On Monday, March 6, in Washington, DC, Donald Trump issued another executive order restricting the
entry of Muslims. The second rendition of the Muslim Ban dropped Iraq from the list of Muslim-majority states, exempted current visa
and green card holders from the restricted states, and featured other tweaks made to deflect any constitutional challenge. On Sunday,
March 5, in Washington State, a Sikh man was shot and wounded in front of his Seattle home. A hatemonger told
Deep Rai to "go back to your own country", then proceeded to shoot him. This shooting follows the murder of another man
of Indian origin in Kansas City, who was similarly told to "get out of my country" before being fatally shot
on February 24. The murder of Srinivas Kuchibhotla came roughly a month after Trump's enactment of the first Muslim Ban, which spurred the
mass protests and legal challenges that ultimately brought about its demise, and the re-drafted executive order issued on Monday. Upon first
glance, it may seem as if the vigilante violence that targets Muslims, and in the case of Rai and the late Kuchibohotla, individuals stereotypically
perceived as Muslims, is entirely disconnected or tenuously linked to the banning of Muslims. The latter involves formal state policy, while the
former concerns the irrational or deviant actions of private individuals. However,
in the way that the xenophobic or
Islamophobic rhetoric of politicians emboldens animus on the part of citizens, government law and
policy also endorses bigoted views and authorises the violence unleashed on Muslims and individuals
perceived as Muslims. This dialectic, whereby the state criminalises Muslim identity or brands it
suspicious by law, effectively instructs its citizens to partake in the national project of identifying and
punishing "the terrorist outsider". Endorsing damaging stereotypes Islamophobia is the presumption of
guilt assigned on to Muslims by state and private actors. But it must also be understood as a dialectic, namely, a process by
which state policies such as the Muslim Ban or counter-radicalisation policing endorse ingrained and popular
stereotypes of Muslims as alien, inassimilable, and prone to terrorism; and second, emboldens the private animus
and violent targeting of Muslim subjects. Therefore, Islamophobic policies, like the Muslim Ban, impact far more than
immigration or national security policy. Their legal impact is merely one dimension of their aggregate
damage. By endorsing the Islamophobic premise that Muslim identity is presumptive of radical threat or terrorism, Islamophobic
policies and programmes enacted by the state propagate the damaging stereotypes associated with this
premise, and promote the private vigilantism that threatens Muslims, and communities mistakenly
caricatured as Muslims. The Muslim Ban rubber stamps the embedded idea that terrorism is exclusive to
Islam, and regardless of one's legal status, exposes bona fide and imagined Muslims to the attacks of
hate-mongers that take the law into their own hands. This is especially the case during the Trump era, whereby his powder
keg of political rhetoric and ominous policy has spurred a frightening rise in hate crimes and incidents targeting Muslims and perceived
Muslims. Private Islamophobia, or the animus and violence unleashed by individuals, affects far more
than just Muslims, but also Sikhs, Latinx communities, Arab and Middle Eastern Christians, South
Asian Hindus, East African non-Muslims, and other groups that fit the caricature of the Muslim
outsider. Therefore, state policies built upon Islamophobic baselines expose more than merely Muslims
to the xenophobic violence and vigilantism. 'State-sponsored Islamophobia' Law is far more than merely law. And the
Muslim Ban is a policy that affects far more people than merely immigrants travelling to the United
States from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. While its direct legal effect is to exclude
nationals from these states, its cumulative influence is far more expansive and injurious. The Muslim
Ban rubber stamps the embedded idea that terrorism is exclusive to Islam, and regardless of one's legal
status, exposes bona fide and imagined Muslims to the attacks of hatemongers that take the law into
their own hands. State-sponsored Islamophobia incites the increased arson and vandalism of mosques,
the attacks on Muslim women wearing the headscarf, the rise of anti-Muslim slurs emanating from the
right and the left, and indeed, the shooting of Rai and murder of Kuchibohotla. This Muslim Ban,
unfortunately, will not only spur more Islamophobia at airports, but also spells more malice, menace,
and murder beyond them.
 Turns Case: Civil Liberties
Turns case; civil liberties are jettisoned if travel ban is implemented in full
Jamshidi 7/6 (Maryam Jamshidi, Acting Assistant Professor of Lawyering at NYU School of Law, “The
Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear Travel Ban Cases Does Not Bode Well for Civil Liberties,” Just Security,
https://www.justsecurity.org/42864/supreme-courts-decision-hear-travel-ban-cases-bode-civil-
liberties/) JZ

Should it go down this route, the Supreme Court will empower this president and those who follow him
to discriminate against a class of individuals based on religion and national-origin, under the guise of
vague national security concerns with virtually no basis in credible fact. Though many individuals may still be allowed
into the country under the Court’s ruling, a foundational element of U.S. immigration law and constitutional
principle will be eroded. The consequences of this are not minor. It will mean that religious and national-origin
based discrimination in modern day immigration policy will be permissible, at least in some
circumstances. This would effectively return us to a pre-1965 U.S. immigration system, in which black
and brown immigrants are disfavored. It would undermine one, if not the most, foundational principle of the U.S. Constitution –
that the government shall not favor or disfavor any one religion. It would make American Muslims, as well as those
Americans with roots in the six affected countries, even more marginalized than they are now –based on a
law that treats members of their faith and national groups as presumptively suspect and dangerous. The social meaning of such a Supreme
Court ruling would essentially be inescapable. Perhaps even more troubling, a
Supreme Court decision that does not confront
the bias reflected in the Muslim Ban will give further credence to the notion that national security is
normatively more important than civil liberties – and that a choice must be made between the two. The
Muslim Ban is a rare instance in which the invidious purpose of a law is crystal clear – if “national security” wins out in this case, it does not
bode well for instances where terrorism concerns more subtly (but no less substantially) discriminate against groups. In the very first paragraph
of the 4th Circuit’s opinion, Chief Judge Gregory wrote: The question for this Court, distilled to its essential form, is whether the Constitution . . .
remains ‘a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace.’ And if so, whether it protects Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive Order
that in text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination. Surely the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished founding
principles—that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one religion over another. Congress granted the
President broad power to deny entry to aliens, but that power is not absolute. It cannot go unchecked when, as here, the President wields it
through an executive edict that stands to cause irreparable harm to individuals across this nation. The Supreme Court will hopefully recognize
the social, political, and legal significance of the issues involved in the Muslim Ban cases and address them in a way that is both legally sound
and morally responsible. If it does not, rest assured the damage to the U.S. legal system and our society will not be
limited to this one issue.
 Turns Case: Democracy
Travel ban erodes democracy
Carle 1/30 (Glenn L, retired CIA officer, part of National Intelligence Council, “Trump’s Immigration
Ban and the Loss of Our Democracy,” Newsweekhttp://www.newsweek.com/trump-immigration-ban-
loss-democracy-549858)KC

What have we become? America rides as the fifth horseman of the Apocalypse when angered and
afraid. As I stood shivering at the black site 15 years ago, I asked myself in horror, “What have we become?” I became acutely uneasy that
the CIA and all of us were being subjected to a de facto usurpation of constitutional and executive
powers, rationalized with de jure, self-authorizing flimflammery…It was shocking to learn that the
president’s advisers informed him that his orders superseded our laws. We were becoming—in secret
and out of sight …no longer the government of checks, balances, and law that has defined us as a
nation….I feared that I had become part of what constituted elements of a de facto American junta….the
measures taken and laws traduced justified by our leaders and their followers, as juntas do, as necessary
responses to grave national danger. Now the loss of our democracy is happening in the open, however Trump
and Republican leaders rationalize it, through a gross ban on 212 million Muslims. There are countless foreign Muslims who
devote their lives, and who lose their lives, serving the United States, because of the inspiring inclusiveness of what being “American” has
always meant. Thousands of American Muslims offer their lives for these ideals, whereas our “Commander in Chief” has devoted himself
without exception to…self-adulation, and yet in arrogant ignorance dares pass judgment. We
have passed as a nation from
wrongly treating a few terrorists and suspects, some of whom deserved punishment but never torture,
and almost all of whom our intelligence services stop before they commit their terrorist acts, to banning,
alienating, and de facto declaring war on an entire religion. To no useful purpose. But even worse: We are losing
our democracy. And we are losing our soul.
 Turns Case: Economy
Travel ban collapses the economy
Wasik 2/1 (John Wasik, contributor to Forbes & New York Times, “Here’s How Trump Muslim Ban Will
Slam U.S. Economy,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2017/02/01/heres-how-trump-
muslim-ban-will-slam-u-s-economy/#3d45a8884930) JZ

The travel curbs on people coming in from selected Muslim countries is going to hurt the U.S. economy.
President Trump and his advisers are bamboozling Americans into thinking that it's all about national
security. The ill-conceived, cruel restriction of just a handful of Muslim-dominated countries is a
sideshow to some harmful moves that Trump has promised. A potential trade war will cripple the U.S.
economy in a number of ways. It starts with restricting people from emigrating to the U.S. Financial
markets on Monday initially reacted negatively to the Trump ban. The value of the dollar relative to
other world currencies also declined. Demonstrators protest President Trump's executive immigration
ban. Trump signed the controversial executive order that halted refugees and residents from
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States. ( JOSHUA LOTT/AFP/Getty Images)
How will cherry-picking a handful of immigrants and making their lives difficult impact the U.S. economy
as a whole? Large U.S. corporations, which are engaged in the global marketplace, are increasingly
deriving their profits overseas. If they are curbed from moving people where they need them, that will
hurt their productivity. And then there's the retaliation factor. Any country subject to an emigration or
trade curbs can make it difficult for U.S. businesses. They can slap import fees on U.S. goods and refuse
to admit U.S. citizens into their countries. And residents of foreign countries can boycott goods and
services made by U.S.-based companies. When any financial market gets a sniff of trade conflicts, it goes
into a tailspin. Remember the sell-off over the U.K. Brexit vote last year? The U.S. economy is nearly six
times larger than Britain's, and will not react well to any trade restrictions. “Sweeping bans on admission
to the country from a number of nations risks undermining the globalization agenda that has helped
pump valuations in a range of U.S.-listed stocks over the last few years, whilst the prospect of similar
restrictions being applied to U.S. citizens could also hamper overseas trade initiatives," Remo Fritschi of
ADS Securities told Marketwatch.com.

Travel ban results in brain drain – that tanks the economy

Wasik 2/1 (John Wasik, contributor to Forbes & New York Times, “Here’s How Trump Muslim Ban Will
Slam U.S. Economy,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2017/02/01/heres-how-trump-
muslim-ban-will-slam-u-s-economy/#3d45a8884930) JZ

Another economic deal-killer is that immigration curbs prevent top technologists and other
professionals from entering and staying in the U.S. A number of Silicon Valley leaders blasted the Trump
order this weekend, saying that it was hurting their ability to move and retain top talent. Amazon's Jeff
Bezos said he would back Washington State's legal challenge to the ban. Ford CEO Mark Fields and
Chairman Bill Ford also said they oppose the ban, joining a wide range of Democratic senators and
Republicans John McCain and Lindsey Graham. Most of all, any punitive immigration ban discourages
people who want to start businesses and prosper in the U.S. from emigrating. I know a young Syrian
lawyer who's trying to move here from Saudi Arabia to start a business in America and is stymied in his
diligent efforts to start a new life. The whole prospect of immigration discrimination is un-American.
Promising researchers, engineers, academics and other professionals will stay away from the U.S. if they
know they're not welcome or will be routinely detained and interrogated at U.S. airports. I know one
Iranian scholar who's been arrested and detained in his own country and came to the U.S. for academic
and religious freedom. Of course, leading minds in any field have their choice of countries in which to
settle and work. They can go to Canada or Europe, or perhaps China, which is always trying to recruit top
intellects. Restricting the flow of intellectual capital is another form of a trade war. Innovation happens
in an unrestricted environment that respects ideas over borders. A trade war that curbs talent from
entering this country will follow a slippery slope into other areas. Although many pundits have been
"heralding" the rally in U.S. stocks since the national election, the market will head south in a big way if
there's a hint of trade retaliations. Even more troubling is the Trump Administration's proposal to tax
Mexican imports to pay for a wall along the U.S. border. That would not only raise the price of Mexican
goods -- and hurt consumers -- it would raise the costs of doing business for U.S.-based companies with
manufacturing in Mexico. As Trump follows through on campaign promises to scrap major trade deals
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which could've secured a competitive advantage for U.S.
companies against China, it's not clear what will actually stay in place. The Administration has already
walked back parts of its Muslim-country ban and is being sued in several federal courts. In any case,
watch for the market's reaction to ongoing changes in trade policy. While corporations and wealthy
investors are relishing the idea of lower tax rates -- part of Trump's platform -- if they are accompanied
by trade and talent roadblocks, that optimism could evaporate quickly.

Travel ban would deck the tourism industry

Becker 2/7 (Gary S. Becker, Chief Economist for Catalyst Partners, LLC, “Trump Travel Ban Could Have
an Economic Impact,” Security Debrief, http://securitydebrief.com/2017/02/07/trump-travel-ban-could-
have-an-economic-impact/) JZ

The travel and tourism industry may be impacted as well. According to US Travel, direct spending by
resident and international travelers in the United States averaged $2.6 billion a day in 2015. If the
Executive Order hypothetically had a 1% impact on travel and tourism, direct spending might decrease
by $2.6 million every day. What is more, the industry supports 15.1 million jobs, and a 1% impact might
mean 151,000 fewer jobs. There is anecdotal evidence that restrictive immigration policies have
previously impacted travel and tourism. Laura Mandala, who runs an Alexandria, Virginia, market
research company for clients in the travel industry, including the Marriott hotel chain and state travel
bureaus, has said many of her clients spent less on her services in the years that immediately followed
9/11 and that she fears a repeat. Longer term, immigration policies of the sort put forward in Trump’s
travel ban can yield lasting damage to a desire to visit the United States. Given experiences at one land
border, some travelers have already indicated troubling sentiments. In the comments of an article in
Ontario’s Windsor-Star, one person wrote: “I’m not crossing for a while. Trump is so against everything I
stand for. I feel like supporting his USA and economy is not right. I was a frequent USA shopper for
groceries and events but not any longer. I’m Staying Canadian side.” Another person wrote, “I think the
US will see a lot of us Canadians staying on this side of the border. The dollar isn’t doing very well and
even if it was and you wanted to go shopping in Southgate, you might have to be screened and prove
your (sic) Canadian even with a passport and birth certificate. I don’t trust them.” Even as not all
travelers may hold these sentiments, they are nevertheless emblematic of a potential shift in perception
of traveling to the United States. To the extent that one or more of these individuals chooses to no
longer purchase goods or services in the United States, there is going to be some economic impact.
Coupled with statements from the private and non-profit sectors, the travel ban gives significant reason
for economic concern.

Travel ban would limit influx of innovators

Saraiva & Jamrisko 2/21 (Catarina Saraiva, Bloomberg reporter, Michelle Jamrisko, Bloomberg
economy reporter, “Trump’s Travel Ban Won’t Hit the US Economy, at Least This Year,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-21/trump-s-travel-ban-won-t-hit-the-u-s-
economy-at-least-this-year) JZ

Measuring the economic impact of the Trump administration's immigration policy promises to be a
complicated and ongoing affair, particularly with the courts' suspension. In the meantime, many
economists have tried to gauge potential impacts, including Brian Schaitkin of the Conference Board,
who outlined the current role that immigrants targeted in Trump's order play in the U.S. economy.
Schaitkin finds that the citizens from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen who are banned
for at least 90 days under the original order are a "small but disproportionately skilled and well-
educated cohort," according to his Feb. 14 blog post. Immigrants in the labor force from those countries
are almost four times as likely as the average American to hold a Ph.D., and almost half have bachelor's
degrees — compared with less than a third of the U.S. workforce, he wrote. While labor-market
participants from those seven countries have a similar industry makeup as the overall workforce, they
also play an outsize role in filling much-needed health-care jobs as the U.S. population ages, Schaitkin
writes. What might more significantly impact the health of the U.S. economy is further restrictions of
this kind on immigration.

The travel ban will hurt the tourism trade which leads to an economic decline & a loss
of jobs
Dorgan 5/26 (Former U.S. Sen. Byron Dorgan, 5-26-2017, "Op-Ed: Just the threat of Trump's travel
ban is having this chilling effect on the economy," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/26/threat-of-
trumps-travel-ban-has-chilling-effect-commentary.html) JD

President Trump's relentless message about creating new jobs in the U.S. is at odds with the message that
is coming from his proposed travel ban and related comments about Mexico, China and other countries. The message foreign
travelers are hearing is that the U.S. isn't anxious to welcome visitors to our country. The seven-nation travel ban announced in
January has been blocked by the Federal Courts, most recently on Thursday by the Fourth Circuit, but it has already had an
impact on destination tourism travel to the U.S. These actions have set in motion consequences that could affect our country for years to come.
International travel to the U.S. creates and supports a large number of jobs in the travel industry. Since the
January White House travel ban announcement, international tourism to the United States has seen a
substantial decline. The result of that is jeopardizing the jobs and economic growth that comes from the U.S.
travel industry. Clearly, in this new age of terrorist threats, we need to carefully vet international arrivals to the U.S. That makes sense. Our
safety and security depend on it. But at the same time there
are powerful reasons we should be encouraging travel to
the United States by citizens of other countries who want to see America. The opportunity for others to
learn about our people and our country is another important way to make us more secure. In addition to
the proposed travel ban, the actions taken against some international travelers in recent months have sent the same
negative message about travel to the U.S. For example, on February 26th, French historian Henry Rousso, who had travelled to
our country more than thirty times, was landing in Houston to speak at a Texas A&M Conference. As he was going through the immigration
screening process at the airport that afternoon, he was pulled aside, put in a small adjoining room and spent the next ten hours being
questioned by U.S. immigration officials and was threatened with deportation. At 1:00 a.m., ten hours after his plane landed in Houston, he was
released. Henry Rousso said he is unsure whether he will ever again return to the United States. This is just one story about one international
traveler to the United States. There are many, many other similar stories. Does it really matter? It matters more than we know.
International travel and tourism to the United States is a powerful job generator for our economy.
Estimated spending by international travelers to the United States is $246 billion a year. Travel and
tourism supports 8.1 million American jobs with a significant portion of that coming from
international travelers who spend an estimated $4,400 per person during their U.S. trips. We have
some unfortunate experience with periods where the U.S. stopped welcoming international tourism. The
decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks is commonly referred to as the "lost decade" for the U.S.
travel industry. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the message from the U.S. to the rest of the world was that
we weren't anxious to have visitors from abroad. As a result, international travel to the U.S. collapsed
along with the jobs and economic opportunities. It took well over a decade for the U. S. to return to pre
9/11 numbers in international visitors. The U.S. tourism and travel industry and the Americans who worked in those jobs paid a
high price for that.
 Turns Case: Soft Power
The travel ban devastates the nation’s reputation
Mcauliffe 17 (February 3, Terry, Governor of Virginia, “US economy the next victim of Trump's travel
ban”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/317707-us-economy-the-next-
victim-of-trumps-travel-ban) MFE
Last week in Washington, I spoke on behalf of all of America’s governors to tell our newly elected president and congressional leadership that we are ready to work with them on an agenda
that grows our economy and makes people’s lives better. Four days later, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring and I stood amid a chaotic scene at Dulles International Airport. We were

the president’s appalling executive order to ban refugees and people from
searching for answers from airport authorities on

certain Muslim-majority countries from entering the country. This attack on American values has
divided our nation and made Americans less safe both at home and abroad. But just as important to
the future of our country, it has had a chilling effect on the ability of states like Virginia to bring new jobs and
economic activity here from around the world. In the past three years, Virginia has closed 878 economic development deals worth $14.44 billion in
capital investment. Of those deals, 133 were projects with companies headquartered overseas. These commitments garnered more than $3.9 billion in investments, creating 11,546 jobs and
saving 2,912 more. As governor, I’ve traveled the globe on 22 domestic and international trade missions to 19 different countries to attract companies to the Commonwealth. Before last week,
the United States of America was seen nearly universally as a beacon of democracy where people could travel and engage in commerce freely, without fear of being harassed, detained, and

two different companies have

deported because of their nationality or religion. That all changed when President Trump signed that order. In just the past few days,

informed Virginia that they are putting promising economic development projects on hold as a direct
result of this illegal order. Both companies are based in Middle Eastern countries that are not actually
subject to President Trump’s order; but they are too fearful that their countries could be next to
consider doing business within the U.S. at this time. One of the business people even has a valid U.S.
visa, but is unwilling to risk traveling just to be sent back home. These are companies that have an established
relationship with us and want to bring their business to America. Our world-class public university system in Virginia is also suffering
consequences. Professors and students that our schools attracted from around the globe are afraid to travel — despite having valid work or student visas — or risk being unable to return to
Virginia. I have already received reports of Virginia college students who have been barred from returning to the U.S. after traveling. Students, professors, job-creators, and asylum-seekers
from all over the world are a part of the rich cultural and economic tapestry that make America the greatest nation on Earth. If we are unable to welcome a diverse group of people from
around the world, we’re going to sit on the sidelines while competitors move quickly to attract that talent. They’ll waste no time courting businesses and jobs that should have come to
America. This disastrous order comes at a time when Virginia’s economy is finally growing again after devastating sequester cuts slowed our climb out of the Great Recession. In October, we’re

We know our growth is not guaranteed and we must work to maintain our
facing another round of more severe sequester cuts.

progress every single day. By hampering our ability to maintain and build upon these gains, the
president has put our economy at risk. In Virginia, we’ve been targeted further through an arbitrary freeze in federal hiring that will hurt our workers,
including veterans who are seeking new avenues to continue their public service. We do not have to sacrifice national security to continue welcoming people who will contribute to a more

this action only serves to empower our enemies and provides a ready-made
prosperous, diverse America. In fact,

recruitment tool for terrorist organizations who believe we are waging a war on Islam. On behalf of the people of Virginia, I joined with my Attorney
General Mark Herring this week to defend the rights of Virginians by bringing major legal action against the administration. I am deeply disappointed that

only days after coming to Washington to pledge partnership, I was compelled to join a federal suit against this unilateral and discriminatory executive order. This is not the

America we know. As a Commonwealth founded in the principles of religious liberty and freedom from
tyranny, Virginia will continue to stand against this ban and work to reverse the damage it is already
doing to our economy, our higher education system, and our reputation as the leader of the free world.
 Democracy k2 Heg
Democracy is key to upholding hegemony
Falton 4 (Robert, Professor of economic & social history, “The Future of Liberal Democracy: Thomas
Jefferson and the Contemporary World”, p.10) ALH

John Owen offers a contrasting perspective in the final essay of this vol-ume, "Hum-an Rights, Peace, and Power." He
sees the exercise
of America's power coinciding with the expansion of human rights and freedoms. In his view, there is no
contradiction between the global spread of liberal democracies and the American empire. Owen contends:
"The growth in the number of states that uphold human rights has entailed an expanding zone of
international peace and a rise in the influence and power of the United States." This is so, according to Owen,
because liberal democracies share a form of politics and philosophical principles that are virtually incompatible with the waging of war against
each other. The triumph of liberalism and human rights thus overlaps strongly with American hegemony
and a peaceful world order. In Owen's words, "the liberal-democratic club tends to be a zone of American
influence . . . [Liberals] do not worry about the purposes to which America is likely to put its power; or at least, they do not worry enough
to favor devoting their own countries' precious resources to counterbalancing U.S. power." America, however, tends to use its
diplomatic, economic, and military arsenal to oppose regimes it defines as "evil" or "illiberal." Not
surprisingly these are the regimes bent on undermining the United States' primacy. Owen argues that such
regimes fear human rights because they are the emblem of America's global reach and imperial predispositions. He thus concludes: “liberal
is an instrument not only of peace but of U.S. hegemony."

Middle East proves – democracy promotion is used as a tool of hegemony

Markakis 12 (Dionysius, “US Democracy Promotion in the Middle east: The Pursuit of hegemony?”,
London School of Economics) ALH

The promotion of democracy in the Middle East represents an important strategy of contemporary US
foreign policy. Like other great powers before it, the US has sought to propagate its political system and ideology,
comprised in this case of liberal democratic political values and free market economic principles, far
beyond its borders. In the Middle East though, democracy promotion emerged to the lore of US policy
later than in other parts of the world. Since the US assumed primacy in the region in the mid-twentieth century, its interests have
been ensured predominantly through authoritarian proxies. While this was also true of US policy elsewhere, for example Latin America, it
remained the standard of engagement far longer in the Middle East. This began to change in main under the Clinton administration, which
sought to encourage incremental economic and civil society reforms in the region, in the belief that these would serve as a prelude for political
reform and a new era of regional stability. Under the G. W. Bush administration, in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the
promotion of democracy emerged as an exigent aim of US policy in the Middle East, this primarily
because of the Administration's perception of the region's 'democratic deficit' as the underlying cause of
the attacks. Therefore, in contrast to popular belief, the strategy of democracy promotion was not introduced in the Middle East by the G.
W. Bush administration. Despite its more explicit rhetorical stance, it rather built on and augmented existing initiatives established by the
Clinton administration. Both
administrations were continuing in an established tradition of US foreign policy,
which has aspired to export a synthesis of democracy and capitalism as the necessary ingredients for the
'good life' in each and every country. This has been evidenced across the world, in an array of countries from the Philippines to
Panama to Poland. Where G. W. Bush and to a lesser extent Clinton did diverge from previous administrations was in their application of the
strategy of democracy promotion to the Middle East. At its essence the strategy of democracy promotion in the Middle East
relates to the paramount importance attached to the region by the US. This is manifested in a complex, multifaceted
and wide-ranging involvement, which derives from its primary regional interests: the security of energy supplies and its relationship with Israel.
The objectives of democracy promotion have been twofold. First, the
aim has been to ensure the stability of state and
society in the countries concerned, as well as the broader region, by gradually encouraging the
emergence of elite-based democracies to replace existing authoritarian arrangements, and institute a
more enduring form of stability. Second, the aim has been the achievement of hegemony in the
Gramscian sense, whereby the promoted liberal democratic ideology is accepted by Middle Eastern
societies as the natural order. While authoritarian governments were long seen as guarantors of 'stability' in the region, the
policy of democracy promotion has emerged as a result of the US's need to shape political transitions as
they inevitably occur across this last major bastion of authoritarian rule. The fact remains that authoritarian
governments, reliant on coercion, are more likely to face popular challenges to their rule and therefore instability, than governments that
utilise more consensual means, such as elite-based democracies.5 The Philippines under Marcos, Chile under Pinochet, and Panama under
Noriega are all examples, with the US eventually ceasing support and facilitating transitions to 'democracy'. This generally results in more
subtle, nuanced forms of social control, with the underlying aim consistently remaining the maintenance of stability. The
strategy of
democracy promotion is therefore not about the US exercising direct control in these countries, but
rather attempting to manage political outcomes so as to maintain its influence and interests. In the Middle
East as elsewhere, the US has sought to achieve this by cultivating the necessary actors, located mainly within civil society, to gradually facilitate
an eventual transfer of support away from authoritarian political systems to elite-based democracies. The present study has constituted an
attempt to trace the contours of this ongoing transition in US policy in the Middle East, a gradual strategic shift in emphasis from coercive to
consensual forms of governance.
Theory
 A2: Courts Ptx Bad
Courts politics are key to understand history & politics
Johnson 16 (November, Timothy R., Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. He is the coauthor (with Christopher P. Gilbert,
David A. M. Peterson, & Paul A. Djupe) of Religious Institutions & Minor Parties in the United States,
“The Supreme Court Decision Making Process”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-98) MFE

The U.S. Supreme Court is but one of three political institutions within the structure of the U.S. federal
government. Within this system of separated powers it rules on the constitutionality of some of the
nation’s most important legal and political issues. In making such decisions, the nation’s highest court
may be considered the most powerful of the three branches of the U.S. federal government.
Understanding this process will allow scholars, students of the Court, and Court watchers alike to gain
a better understanding of the way in which the justices conduct their business and to come to terms
with some of the most important legal and political decisions in our nation’s history. Combining a
theoretical account of Supreme Court decision-making with an examination of its internal decision-
making process illuminates this opaque institution.
DA - Court Stripping
1NC
 1NC Court Stripping DA
Federal courts are upholding the rule of law
Rodricks 17 (Dan Rodricks is an award-winning columnist for The Baltimore Sun, writing commentary
on local, regional and national news three days a week since January 1979, “Courts check Trump, at
least so far,” 4/4/17, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/bs-md-rodricks-
0405-20170404-story.htm, Baltimore Sun)

Besides his own incompetence, the

only check on President Donald J. Trump appears to be the federal
judiciary, at least for the time being. So Trump and his attorney general, Jeff Sessions, might want to slow down or even halt
Baltimore's pending consent decree on police reforms, but that does not mean it will happen. In fact, chances are pretty good that a judge in
Baltimore is going to say he sees no reason to hold the process up. And besides, Baltimore's mayor and police commissioner made it clear
Tuesday that the reforms are going to happen, no matter what — as they should. I realize that all but the 36 percent of Americans who think
Trump is doing a swell job are supposed to be in panic mode 24/7. But I have confidence in the federal judiciary and the
rule of law, at least for the time being. If you have been keeping score, you know that Trump and the people who work for him
have not exactly been killin' it in the courts. Since Trump took office in January, here's what the record shows: In February, a judge in Seattle
ordered a halt to the implementation and enforcement of Trump's travel ban on people from seven predominantly Muslim nations.
Responding with one of his tweet fits, Trump declared the ruling "ridiculous" and called U.S. District
Judge James Robart, a Republican appointee, a "so-called judge." The White House vowed to appeal
Robart's decision. A week later, a federal appeals court, made up of two Democratic appointees and one
appointed by a Republican president, upheld Robart's ruling and refused to reinstate Trump's executive
order. In March, after the Trump administration revised the president's executive order, two federal judges — one in Hawaii and one in
Maryland — ruled against it, saying that it constituted a Muslim ban, an act of religious discrimination. The judges used Trump's own words
against him, citing his campaign promises to at least temporarily keep Muslims from entering the country. Also citing Trump's own words —
"Get 'em outta here" — a federal judge in Kentucky ruled last week in favor of three people who contended that the tough-talking candidate
incited violence against them during a Louisville campaign rally last March. U.S. District Judge David Hale ruled that a lawsuit brought by three
protesters against the Trump campaign and two supporters could move forward. According to the Louisville Courier-Journal, Hale found
Trump's ordering the removal of an African-American woman "particularly reckless" because violence had broken out at an earlier Trump rally
and because hate group members were known to be in the Louisville crowd. The judge rejected Trump's free-speech defense. And also last
month, we had the denouement of the Trump University case, with U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel — "who happens to be, we believe,
Mexican," in Trump's words last year — overseeing a settlement in two class-action lawsuits and a civil lawsuit brought by the New York
attorney general. As
a result, Trump is to pay $25 million to end years of legal battles with hundreds of
customers who said they were sold empty promises to make them successful in real estate. Trump, who
had vowed that he would never settle the case, admitted no wrongdoing. So the president's record in
court is not good. Now Trump's attorney general, Jeff Sessions, orders the Justice Department to review consent decrees with troubled
police departments, like Baltimore's, because Sessions is a critic of consent decrees and because the Trump administration's priorities are
officer safety and morale and reducing violent crime — not protecting the public from rogue cops who violate civil rights. This move by Sessions
could hold up final approval of Baltimore's consent decree to bring reforms under court supervision to the Police Department. It doesn't seem
to matter to Sessions that this agreement between the city and DOJ took months to work out, and that it was supported by a report showing
that Baltimore police had routinely violated the constitutional rights of citizens, particularly those who lived in predominantly black
neighborhoods. Sessions and Trump are far removed from the scene and have no sense of the importance of having this matter resolved and
the reforms implemented. Baltimore needs to get on with it. This has all the markings of Trump's determination to erase the Obama legacy. In
fact, it seems to have more to do with that than anything else. There is no justification for further delaying the matter. I would be surprised if
U.S. District Judge James K. Bredar grants the DOJ delay at this point. But here's the thing: Ultimately, any of the matters I mentioned above
could end up in federal appellate courts made up of judges appointed by Trump. Beyond
that, there's only the Supreme
Court. As I said, the courts are the one check on Trump that Americans who cherish civil liberties and
the rule of law can count on — at least for the time being.

[Insert Link: Plan = Controversial Court Decision]

Controversial court decisions will set off congressional backlash and embolden court
stripping.
Crabb 12 (Barbara B. Crabb is a United States District Judge, Western District of Wisconsin. “Robert W.
Kastenmeier Lecture Bridging the Divide Between Congress and the Courts,”
http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/1-Crabb.pdf, Wisconsin Law Review)

These majorchanges in court administration put the judicial branch on a firmer footing than it had been in
the nineteenth century and gave it a larger measure of autonomy, but they did not change the basic
relationship between the two branches. The judiciary remained dependent on Congress for the
confirmation of new judges, the creation of new judgeships, funding for courthouses, their basic
budgets, and procedural rules, just as it is today. The courts still have no independent source of funding.
They have no right to be heard on congressional decisions to expand or restrict the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction or to enact laws that will
increase the courts’ workload. In other words, when it comes to matters affecting institutional independence, the judiciary has no
constitutional protection and its power is limited to persuasion. If Congress wanted to, it could retaliate
against the courts by cutting the courts’ funding; disestablishing individual courts; adding or taking
away Justices from the Supreme Court; imposing crippling [devastating] restrictions on the operations of
the courts; narrowing their jurisdiction; impeaching individual judges and Justices; and refusing to
confirm nominees to fill judicial vacancies. The framers set up what could well be a recipe for disaster: giving the judiciary the
last word on the law, with the inevitable controversies that authority will provoke, and then giving it no
institutional protection. It is a little like giving a person a very old and very unpredictable gun for personal security. If used properly, the
gun may perform its intended function, but it’s just as possible that it will inflict great damage on its owner. Making the judiciary the
final arbiter on the meaning of the law, with the authority to declare a law or practice unconstitutional
gives it power, but a power that can be explosive and set off backlashes of varying proportions. By no
means is it a power that can ward off encroachment by the other branches. When an entity has little power in a relationship, it behooves it to
assess the sticking points between it and its protagonist, husband carefully what little power it possesses, employ diplomacy, look for areas in
which the interests of both parties are in alignment, and seek ways to enhance what little power of persuasion it has.

Court stripping decks the rule of law – it’s arbitrary and allows Congressional
overreach
Samahon 10 (Tuan, teaches @ Villanova University and writes in the areas of federal courts and
constitutional law. His articles have been published in the Stanford Law Review, Ohio State Law Journal,
Hastings Law Journal, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, the University of Chicago Legal Forum,
among others, “Impeachment as Judicial Selection?”, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 595,
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol18/iss3/3)

An ideological selection process also has costs for the rule of law. The rule of law, defined here as the impartial
adjudication of disputes by reference to rules and standards articulated in advance, requires that similarly situated parties be
treated similarly without regard to their identities.389 The rules and standards should remain predictably
in force and change only in accordance with the rules for changing rules. The identity of the adjudicator
should matter little. To the extent it matters, it should principally influence construction, and not interpretation.390 The rule of
law may be undermined if political actors are able to use impeachment to obtain constitutional
amendment by judicial fiat rather than by resort to Article V’s amendment procedure. Ideological
impeachment, like ideological appointment, raises the concern that political actors will attempt to revise the
Constitution under the guise of interpretation. Such changes will reflect the concerns and
preoccupations of legal elites and not the considered democratic input of supermajorities.
The rule of law is vital to solving disease and terrorism globally – the US is modeled.
Greco 05 (Michael S. Greco, President of the American Bar Association, 12/5/'5 [Miami Daily Business
Review 52.42])

What makes the rule of law so important that it attracted such a distinguished community† First, because the
rule of law is so central to everything the legal community stands for, both in the United States and
around the world. And second, because we increasingly find that our nation's top international priorities-defeating
terrorism, corruption and even the spread of deadly diseases-are being undone at the ground level by
poor governance and lawlessness. As Rice eloquently told the gathering, "In a world where threats pass even through the most fortified boundaries, weak and
poorly governed states enable disease to spread undetected, and corruption to multiply unchecked, and hateful ideologies

to grow more violent and more vengeful." The only real antidote to these global threats is governments, in all corners of the world, that
operate with just, transparent and consistent legal systems that are enforced by fair and independent
judiciaries. These issues are not just the province of distant foreign governments. Building the rule of law must begin at home. Recent revelations in our own country-that the CIA has
maintained secret prisons for foreign detainees-underscore the urgent need for an independent, nonpartisan commission to investigate our treatment of such prisoners.

Rampant disease spread causes extinction

Casadevall 12 (Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and
Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of
biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats.
At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a
planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three
existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of
asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent
decades have provided
unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species.
Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed
by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian
species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of
extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some
proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to
microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority
of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last

member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host.
Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much

greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et
al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

Terrorist attacks escalate – killing billions

Myhrvold 14 (Nathan P, chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of

our present situation is that modern technology can

stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of

provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that
private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held
by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is
possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so
extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the
subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a
catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear

weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility
this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger
arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most
likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in

comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless
groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result,
they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective
destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke
reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in
point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go
so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived

the world will

and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually,

recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield
weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited
themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities.
Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.
 1NC Link Milliken
Overturning Milliken is controversial and would cause public backlash
Caldeira and McGuire 5 (Gregory A., Distinguished University Professor and University chair Professor of Poli-Sci at Ohio State, Kevin T.,
Associate Prof of Poli-Sci at UNC Chapel Hill, “The Judicial Branch,” edited by Kermit L. Hall, google books, p. 270) EYC

One very visible illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in how federal trial judges in the South
responded to the U.S. Supreme Court's command for racial desegregation of the public schools.
Resistance to the Court in the South was especially pronounced, and the federal judges responsible for
supervising desegregation there displayed various levels of enthusiasm for carrying the High Court's
policies to full effect. Leaving aside the practical obstacles to desegregation—more populous school
districts made the process difficult as a technical matter, as did having to reassign the very large
numbers of African Americans within some school districts—judges whose courts were physically
located within the school districts they were monitoring showed much greater reluctance to
desegregate than judges who were not members of the communities under their supervision.i6 In terms
of democratic responsiveness, the lesson here is obvious; fearful of popular backlash, federal judges
who each day had to face—literally face—a skeptical public reluctant to abandon its traditional
education policies felt pressure to stall the process of integrating their schools.

Public approval is key – congress will respond by stripping the court

Brandenburg 4 (Bert Brandenburg has a J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law, and is currently the president of Appleseed - a nonprofit
network of 17 public interest justice centers in the United States and Mexico that works to uncover and correct injustices and barriers to opportunity through legal,
legislative and market-based structural reformm “Keep the courts free and fair,” Association of Trial Lawyers of America) EYC

Since court-stripping efforts and other attacks on our courts come primarily from legislators, the remedy
is both easy and hard. Lawmakers know that courts and judges are useful political punching bags, but
they are also sensitive to public disapproval. As officers of the court, attorneys have a special role in
teaching the public about these threats. Lawyers can be a powerful force for public education, speaking
before associations, writing op-ed articles and letters to the editor, and urging legislators to respect the
unique role of our courts. In this election year, all who value fair, impartial courts should help educate
the public on the importance and fragility of what Chief Justice Rehnquist calls the "crown jewel" of our
democracy--an independent judiciary.

Court stripping decks the rule of law – it’s arbitrary and allows Congressional
overreach
Samahon 10 (Tuan, teaches @ Villanova University and writes in the areas of federal courts and constitutional law. His articles have been
published in the Stanford Law Review, Ohio State Law Journal, Hastings Law Journal, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, the University of
Chicago Legal Forum, among others, “Impeachment as Judicial Selection?”, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 595,
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol18/iss3/3) KEN

An ideological selection process also has costs for the rule of law. The rule of law, defined here as the impartial
adjudication of disputes by reference to rules and standards articulated in advance, requires that similarly situated parties be
treated similarly without regard to their identities.389 The rules and standards should remain predictably
in force and change only in accordance with the rules for changing rules. The identity of the adjudicator
should matter little. To the extent it matters, it should principally influence construction, and not interpretation.390 The rule of
law may be undermined if political actors are able to use impeachment to obtain constitutional
amendment by judicial fiat rather than by resort to Article V’s amendment procedure. Ideological
impeachment, like ideological appointment, raises the concern that political actors will attempt to revise the
Constitution under the guise of interpretation. Such changes will reflect the concerns and
preoccupations of legal elites and not the considered democratic input of supermajorities.

The rule of law is vital to solving disease and terrorism globally – the US is modeled.
Greco 05 (Michael S. Greco, President of the American Bar Association, 12/5/'5 [Miami Daily Business Review 52.42])
What makes the rule of law so important that it attracted such a distinguished community† First, because the
rule of law is so central to everything the legal community stands for, both in the United States and
around the world. And second, because we increasingly find that our nation's top international priorities-defeating
terrorism, corruption and even the spread of deadly diseases-are being undone at the ground level by
poor governance and lawlessness. As Rice eloquently told the gathering, "In a world where threats pass even through the most fortified boundaries, weak and
poorly governed states enable disease to spread undetected, and corruption to multiply unchecked, and hateful ideologies

to grow more violent and more vengeful." The only real antidote to these global threats is governments, in all corners of the world, that
operate with just, transparent and consistent legal systems that are enforced by fair and independent
judiciaries. These issues are not just the province of distant foreign governments. Building the rule of law must begin at home. Recent revelations in our own country-that the CIA has
maintained secret prisons for foreign detainees-underscore the urgent need for an independent, nonpartisan commission to investigate our treatment of such prisoners.

Disease causes extinction – no defense

Casadevall 12 (Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair
of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and
Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats.
At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a
planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three
existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of
asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent
decades have provided
unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species.
Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed
by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian
species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of
extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some
proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to
microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority
of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last

member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host.
Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much

greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et
al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

Terrorist attacks escalate – killing billions

Myhrvold 14 (Nathan P, chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic
Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of

stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can
provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that
private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held
by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is
possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so
extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the
subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a
catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear

weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility
this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger
arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most
likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in

comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless
groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result,
they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective
destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke
reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in
point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go
so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived

the world will

and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually,

recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield
weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited
themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities.
Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.
 1NC Link Zelman
Affirmation of separation of church and state causes court stripping
Bradenburg & Kay 12 (Bert, Executive Director of Justice at Stake, & Amy, author for Justice at Stake
is a nonpartisan national campaign of more than 40 partners working to keep our courts fair, “Crusading
Against the Courts The New Mission to Weaken the Role of the Courts in Protecting Our Religious
Liberties”, Justice at Stake,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/resources/CrusadingAgainstCourts_20121F89B068B.pdf)

II. Closing the Courthouse Doors: Legislative Efforts to Deny Church-State Litigants Their Day in Court
When politicians try to exceed their authority under the Constitution, courts are called upon to act as
referees. When these disputes involve church-state issues, or the outcomes offend someone’s religious
views, losing litigants have sometimes lashed out at the very idea of judicial review. In Congress and in
many states, legislators have been busy devising legislation to circumvent the courts. Such measures are often
called court-stripping efforts, because they seek to strip the courts of jurisdiction and power to uphold
the law. Since 2000 a bundle of bills have been introduced to deny church-state litigants a day in court to
argue for their constitutional rights, erect barriers to their access to the courts, evade court decisions,
and even make it an impeachable offense for a judge to hear certain church-state claims. At their core, such
court-stripping efforts threaten the whole point of Constitutional rights. As Justice Robert Jackson wrote in West Virginia v. Barnette, “The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.”6 Court-stripping in Washington Federal court-stripping efforts often throw issues of federal law
to the state courts. This raises the very real prospect that the law of the land could be different in different states:
citizens in Nebraska could have a different set of federal constitutional rights than citizens in Florida or
Montana. Such inconsistencies are why Chief Justice John Roberts called court-stripping “bad policy” in
his confirmation hearings.7 Indeed, Senator Barry Goldwater, a frequent critic of court decisions,8 called court-stripping a “frontal
assault on the independence of the Federal courts [that] is a dangerous blow to the foundations of a free society.”9 Such warnings have not
stopped numerous recent efforts to manipulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Uniqueness
 UQ - Rule of Law
The judiciary is effectively checking the executive now – upholds the rule of law
Biskupic 6/14 (Joan Biskupic, CNN Legal Analyst and Supreme Court Biographer, “Judges keep a very
close eye on Trump,” 6/14/17, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/politics/judges-trump-travel-
ban/index.html, CNN)

President Donald Trump has for months belittled federal judges on social media and tried to undermine their
legitimacy in the public eye. In a recent string of rulings against the administration's travel ban, judges have offered an implicit
rejoinder by asserting their independence and authority to limit the executive branch. None of the judges who ruled against the
ban on nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries has referred to Trump's criticism of the
courts. Their legal reasoning has responded to the administration's specific positions. Yet the language wielded
has been has been sharp, even scathing, as they rebuffed the administration's arguments about national security. They have overall
emphasized the judiciary's role in determining the law of the land. In the latest decision, the San Francisco-based 9th
US Circuit Court of Appeals on Monday acknowledged that judges traditionally defer to executive authority regarding who may enter the
country. But, the court wrote, "immigration, even for the President, is not a one-person show." Lifting a line from a 1981 Supreme Court
opinion, the judges added, "Deference does not mean abdication." Last month, the 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals employed stronger rhetoric
as it rejected the administration and its "dangerous idea -- that this court lacks the authority to review high-level government policy of the sort
here." "Although the Supreme Court has certainly encouraged deference in our review of immigration matters that implicate national security
interests, it has not countenanced judicial abdication, especially where constitutional rights, values, and principles are at stake," the court
wrote, siding with challengers of the travel ban who say it infringes religious rights. So far, the
message is that the third branch of
government intends to provide a significant check on an executive proudly disrupting the status quo. This
first big legal battle over Trump policy could foreshadow greater judicial scrutiny for his initiatives and escalating tensions between the White
House and the courts. A crucial test could come as the Supreme Court considers whether to hear the dispute over the executive order that
would suspend for 90 days the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Trump said the ban was needed to
safeguard against terrorism. Among his campaign promises, as stated on his website: "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on."

Judiciary ensures that Trump respects the rule of law in the SQ

Serewel 17 (Mahmoud Serewel studies law at the London School of Economics, “President Trump, The Rule Of Law, And The Separation Of Powers,”
2/23/27, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/president-trump-the-rule-of-law-and-the-separation_us_58aefa4de4b0ea6ee3d03651, Huffington Post) EYC

But exactly how much progress can President Trump make with this standpoint? Does he have a legal right to disregard one of the three bodies
of the Federal Government of the United States, when convenient? Does he have a legal right to disregard human rights? The
other, so
far unmentioned body of federal government, the judiciary begs to differ with President Trump’s
justifications, most famously in Washington v Trump. In this case, Judge James L. Robart found that the
‘Muslim ban’ violated four amendments to the US constitution: the First, Fifth, Tenth, and the
Fourteenth. Namely, amongst other things, Judge Robart found that this EO violated the requirement of equal protection under the law,
finding that the Trump administration showed ‘discriminatory treatment based on their country of origin and/or religion, without lawful
justification’. Judge Robart additionally reaffirmed the Tenth Amendment, showing that the Federal Government only has the legal rights
delegated to it by the Constitution, and since this EO was in violation of the constitution, it simply could not be legitimate. This is however not
the sole example of cases against President Trump. In City of Chelsea v Trump, an ongoing case, the plaintiffs have submitted that EO 136768
violates the Tenth Amendment, and what is particularly interesting is the application of the Tenth Amendment to this particular case (where
the plaintiffs believe the Government is overreaching in its attempt to influence local authority): ‘118. The Tenth Amendment prohibits the
federal government from commandeering state officials to execute federal policy, in order to ensure that “state governments remain
responsive to the local electorate’s preferences” and “state officials remain accountable to the people.” New York, 505 U.S. at 168.’ Once
again, we see the resurfacing of the issue of checks on Government (or accountability). The devolution
of power exhibited in the US legal structure helps to provide such checks, and is also evident in a further
case, City and County of San Francisco v Trump (for commentary on this case, see here). Simply put, it seems that there
are too many legal hurdles in the way for President Trump to act in the way he wants. Whilst he may try
to hide under ‘national security’, this only works to an extent and, as we have seen, judges are prepared
to ignore this justification if there are violations to the Constitution. There seems to be a sound legal
basis to prevent attempts at arbitrary government. The Constitution provides legal limits not only to the
executive’s power, but to federal government’s in its entirety, and the judiciary ensures that these legal
limits stay in place. This may limit President Trump’s progress if he continues to act in the way he does.
In other words, President Trump may choose to disrespect the rule of law and separation of powers, but
if he wishes to accomplish anything, he cannot ignore them.

The courts can stop Trump

Krauthammer 3/23/17 (Charles, Pulitzer Prize Winning reporter and author, “American Democracy: Not so Decadent After All”,
National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446039/checks-balances-american-democracy-trump-administration-courts-
congress-states-media)

Under the dark gray cloud, amid the general gloom, allow me to offer a ray of sunshine. The last two months have brought a pleasant surprise:
Turns out the much feared, much predicted withering of our democratic institutions has been grossly exaggerated. The system lives. Let
me explain. Donald Trump’s triumph last year was based on a frontal attack on the Washington “establishment,” that all-powerful, all-seeing,
supremely cynical, bipartisan “cartel” (as Ted Cruz would have it) that allegedly runs everything. Yet the establishment proved to be Potemkin
empty. In 2016, it folded pitifully, surrendering with barely a fight to a lightweight outsider. At which point, fear of the vaunted behemoth
turned to contempt for its now-exposed lassitude and decadence. Compounding the confusion were Trump’s intimations
of authoritarianism. He declared “I alone can fix it” and “I am your voice,” the classic tropes of the
demagogue. He unabashedly expressed admiration for strongmen (most notably, Vladimir Putin). Trump had just cut through the grandees
like a hot knife through butter. Who would now prevent him from trampling, caudillo-like, over a Washington
grown weak and decadent? A Washington, moreover, that had declined markedly in public esteem, as confidence in our traditional
institutions — from the political parties to Congress — fell to new lows. The strongman cometh, it was feared. Who and what would stop him?
Two months into the Trumpian era, we have our answer. Our checks and balances have turned out to be
quite vibrant. Consider: The courts Trump rolls out not one but two immigration bans, and is stopped dead in his tracks
by the courts. However you feel about the merits of the policy itself (in my view, execrable and useless but legal) or the merits of the
constitutional reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (embarrassingly weak, transparently political), the fact remains: The
president proposed and the courts disposed. Trump’s pushback? A plaintive tweet or two complaining
about the judges — that his own Supreme Court nominee denounced (if obliquely) as “disheartening”
and “demoralizing.”
 AT: Travel Ban Thumper
SCOTUS upholds the travel ban this fall
Dershowitz 6/26 (Alan, political analyst and Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, “Dershowitz:
Supreme Court will likely uphold most of Trump travel ban,” Fox News, 2017,
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/06/26/dershowitz-supreme-court-will-likely-uphold-most-
trump-travel-ban.html) ip
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear arguments in October regarding President Trump’s second travel ban may not itself tell us much about
the likely outcome of the case. But the
high court’s decision to allow parts of the ban to go forward now – even
before hearing the arguments—strongly suggests that there are a majority of justices who will uphold
the most important parts of the ban. The Supreme Court decided to permit enforcement of the ban
“with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relations with a person or entity in the United States.” The Justices thus drew the
distinction I have been urging since the president issued his initial ban. In a series of columns and TV appearances, I urged the president to
withdraw the first ban and substitute a version that excludes only individuals who do not have a green card or other connections to the United
States. The Constitution accords very different protections to U.S. persons --including green card holders -- than to individuals with no legal
status in the United States. The example I gave was of a man from Yemen who had never visited this country and has no connection to it, but
would like to take a trip to Disneyland. Such a person has no constitutional right to come into our country and he can be excluded for virtually
any reason. This does not mean that the courts would uphold a ban that expressly discriminates against Catholics, Jews, or Muslims. But a ban
that applies to countries that have a serious problem vetting potential terrorists would be valid even if all of those countries had Muslim
majorities. The
president has a right to focus on Islamic terrorism as a primary source of danger to
Americans, and Islamic terrorism comes disproportionately from Muslim majority countries. When Willie Sutton was asked “Why do you
rob banks?” his answer was “Because that’s where the money is.” Of course, not all the money is kept in banks, and not all terrorists come from
Muslim majority countries. But thepresident has wide authority to pick and choose among countries. Moreover,
the countries selected by President Trump were all previously selected by President Obama for a related
purpose. It is impossible to know whether this will have any positive effect on reducing terrorist attacks in the U.S. But under our law, the
president has no burden to prove that he is right as a matter of policy – only that he had the authority to make the decision. President Trump
recently announced that he regretted substituting the second executive order for the first one, calling the second one a politically correct
watered down version. The Supreme Court’s decision shows that he was wrong, and that I was right in urging the administration to make the
substitution. It also shows that many of the pundits, including lawyers and law professors, were wrong when they predicted that the entire ban
would be found unconstitutional. These good and decent people tend to substitute wishful thinking for hard constitutional analysis. But as
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once put it: The job of the lawyer is to predict what the courts will do in fact. But it is always difficult to
predict how the justices will divide over a contentious issue such as the travel ban. The lower courts relied heavily on what Donald Trump had
said as a candidate with regard to banning Muslims from entering. The Court’s decision to allow part of the ban to go forward suggests that
Trump’s statements will not be accorded the same weight by the Supreme Court that they were accorded by the lower courts. The high court
will recognize the implications of striking an otherwise legitimate ban because of what a president said when he was a candidate. To follow the
lower court reasoning, the very same ban could be constitutional if issued by one president and unconstitutional if issued by another. That is
not the way the law generally operates in this country. So the travel ban will now go into effect with regard to non-American persons. It is
impossible to know whether this will have any positive effect on reducing terrorist attacks in the U.S. But
under our law, the
president has no burden to prove that he is right as a matter of policy – only that he had the authority to
make the decision. The Court is likely to find that he had that authority. There are parts of the travel ban that may
face some criticism from the justices. But it is likely that the core of the ban will be upheld. The president should not take
this as a sign that he was correct in wanting to reissue the initial ban. The Supreme Court has signaled that at least parts of the initial ban would
raise serious Constitutional issues. Notwithstanding these early signs, it is still impossible to predict with certainty what the Supreme Court will
do after hearing arguments in October. We cannot even be certain of the composition of the Supreme Court in light of persistent rumors
regarding resignations. But
right now, if I had to bet widows and orphans money on the outcome of the case, I
would bet that the high court would uphold those parts of the travel ban that applies to persons with
no connection to the United States.
Recent travel ban ruling affirmed Trumps position --- increases his confidence in the
court
Dinan 6/26 (Stephen, staff writer at the Washington Times, “Trump applauds Supreme Court, feels
‘gratified’ by ruling to revive travel ban,” The Washington Times, 2017,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/26/supreme-court-revives-trump-travel-ban/) ip

The Supreme Court revived President Trump’s extreme vetting travel ban Monday, ruling that much of it
can go into effect — and along the way delivering an implicit rebuke to the army of lower-court judges who blasted the president as anti-
Muslim. In a unanimous unsigned ruling, the justices said the president has important national security
powers that the courts must respect and ruled that he likely has the power to deny entry to broad
categories of would-be visitors and immigrants. But the justices said those who already have a connection to the U.S. —
either a job offer, an admission to an educational program or a close family connection — will be exempted from the 90-day ban on travel from
six countries as well as the 120-day pause on refugees. Minutes after the ruling, both sides were fighting over what that meant. The
president said his plans will “become largely effective” and called the ruling “a clear victory for our national security.”
“My number one responsibility as Commander in Chief is to keep the American people safe,” he said in a statement. “Today’s ruling
allows me to use an important tool for protecting our Nation’s homeland. I am also particularly gratified
that the Supreme Court’s decision was 9-0.” Immigrant rights groups, meanwhile, were divided. Some took an optimistic
approach, saying approval of the exemptions will prevent few visitors from entering the U.S. under either the travel ban or the refugee pause.
Others were outraged that the court gave an imprimatur to any of the president’s policy. The Homeland Security Department said it will soon
issue guidance about how it will carry out the court’s directives. Advocacy groups said they will be watching closely and will be prepared to file
lawsuits if they think the government is refusing entry to deserving visitors, refugees and immigrants. “This order allows only a narrow sliver of
the ban to go forward. We will stop any attempt by the Trump administration to go further,” said Omar C. Jadwat, director of the Immigrant
Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union. The
court has set oral arguments on the full case for October, when
the next term begins. But all the justices Monday signaled a reluctance to follow the lead of several lower
courts, which said Mr. Trump’s campaign rhetoric regarding Muslims poisoned his executive orders.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Trump proposed a full ban on admitting any Muslims to the U.S. In January, after taking office, he issued
an executive order that imposed a 120-day pause on all new refugees, dropped the annual ceiling of refugees to 50,000 — down from the
110,000 that President Obama had set, and called for a 90-day halt in admissions from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Those
seven countries — all predominantly Muslim — had been first identified by Congress and Mr. Obama as so terror-prone and dangerous that
their citizens needed extra vetting. After courts ruled against the January executive order, Mr. Trump issued a revised order in March removing
Iraq from the targeted countries and allowing waivers that granted admission to people who the government deemed already had connections
to the U.S., such as an approved visa or family living in the country. Some legal analysts said the Supreme Court ruling did little
more than codify that latest policy. “An American individual or entity that has a bona fide relationship with a particular person
seeking to enter the country as a refugee can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded,” the justices said in the unsigned
opinion. “But when it comes to refugees who lack any such connection to the United States, for the reasons we have set out, the balance tips in
favor of the Government’s compelling need to provide for the Nation’s security.” Three members of the court — Justices Clarence Thomas,
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch — issued their own opinion saying they would have gone further and upheld the president’s entire
policy. “I fear that the Court’s remedy will prove unworkable,” said Justice Thomas, writing for the dissenters. He said the decision creates a
nightmare for the administration, which must come up with definitions of what constitutes “sufficient connection.” The court also created an
exemption to Mr. Trump’s 50,000-refugee cap, saying that anyone already in the pipeline with close connections to the U.S. must be admitted
— a striking move that garnered little explanation in the 13-page ruling. Some advocacy groups argued that meant no refugees will be blocked
because of the ban, because everyone in the pipeline already has ties to the U.S. by dint of the fact that a resettlement agency in the U.S. is
working on their case. Other groups feared that some refugees will be left on the outside and stranded in dangerous conditions. Those future
fights aside, the ruling is the first major legal victory for Mr. Trump, who had been blasted by lower courts
— chiefly Democratic-appointed judges — for showing “animus” to Muslims and for failing to justify his
national security concerns. The justices, though, said the president deserves deference when acting on
national security concerns in immigration matters, where Congress has given the executive branch
significant leeway. “The Supreme Court did what the lower court judges would not: treat President
Trump like any other president with the ‘presumption of regularity,’” Josh Blackman, associate professor at South
Texas College of Law in Houston, wrote on his blog. “The justices did not delve into the president’s Twitter account,
nor did they parse his campaign statements.” The justices did, however, signal that they expect Mr. Trump to use the reprieve
to quickly figure out and put into place new vetting policies — which was the point of the temporary pauses in the first place, according to the
administration. “Given the Government’s representations in this litigation concerning the resources required to complete the 20-day review,
we fully expect that the relief we grant today will permit the Executive to conclude its internal work and provide adequate notice to foreign
governments” within the time frame laid out by Mr. Trump, the justices said. That could make much of the case moot by October, when the
next session of the court begins.
Link
 Link - Controversial Decisions
Congress strips any court decision it dislikes
Miller 16 (Mark C, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Relations; Director of the Law and
Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, “The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflicting Institutional Wills.” Presented
at the Separation of Powers Conference, Sponsored by the School of Public and International Affairs, 2/19 and 2/20, .
http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/mlynch/Miller.pdf) KEN

Congress may also use other methods in order to attempt to silence the courts in the inter-institutional constitutional dialogue. Over the last
several decades, conservatives
in Congress have pushed for more congressional oversight of the judiciary
and its decisions. Some have even claimed that the courts are inferior to Congress, and that Congress should thus
assert more authority over the courts and over specific court decisions (see e.g. Miller, 2009a). Congressional
oversight of the executive branch is to be expected, since both branches make politically based decisions, but congressional oversight of the
judicial branch might be seen as an attempt to make the courts subservient to the will of Congress and/or the president. These
efforts
could force enormous changes in the way the federal courts participate in the ongoing constitutional
conversations among the institutions of government. One such method is court-stripping. Court
stripping means that Congress passes a statute prohibiting the federal courts from hearing a specific
case or a specific class of cases. Because court-stripping legislation has been enacted so rarely, there is a great deal of uncertainty
about the constitutionality of Congress's ability to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from hearing certain types of cases (see e.g. Fisher and
Adler, 2007, 1042-51). The heart of the issue is whether the federal courts should enjoy complete decisional and institutional independence or
instead be accountable to the will of the elected branches of government and thus perhaps to the will of the people. Historically, court
stripping had often been threatened, for example, by labor supporters and other progressives during the
conservative activist era of the Supreme Court from the 1890s to the mid-1930s (see e.g. Ross, 1994). Today, it
is the conservatives who are acting to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over a variety of types of
cases. For example, in September 2004 the Senate Republican Policy Committee distributed a report
entitled Restoring Popular Control of the Constitution: The Case for Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation. The
report stated that, "the American people must have a remedy when they believe that federal courts
have overreached and interpreted the Constitution in ways that are fundamentally at odds with the
people's common constitutional understandings and expectations" (Kyl, 2004, 1). Thus, court stripping is a
method for changing the direction of federal judicial decisions and altering the independent voice of the
courts in the inter-institutional constitutional dialogue. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Congress passed a variety of laws that
one could argue restrict judicial power. The nation generally had not seen these kinds of limits on the courts enacted into law since the
Reconstruction period following the U.S. Civil War in the 1860’s. For example, the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act reduced the ability of
federal judges to manage state prisons and force the early release of prisoners. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
limited the ability of the federal courts to hear multiple appeals from death-row inmates (see Tarr, 2006, 34). The 1996 Immigration
Reform Act limited the number of appeals available to immigrants facing possible deportation. Other limits
were placed on the discretion of the federal courts in a variety of circumstances in the mid-1990’s (see e.g. Greenhouse, 1996, 5). The
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 prohibited the federal courts from reviewing the U.S. secretary of
the treasury's official designation of particular actions as "terrorist acts" (see Curry, 2005). Some have even
interpreted various sections of the 2001 Patriot Act as containing court-stripping measures (Brandenburg and Kay, 2006, 2-8). One of the
most important recent court-stripping actions occurred when Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which attempted to strip the courts of the right to hear appeals from any
noncitizen designated as an "unlawful enemy combatant" by a military tribunal. In other words,
Congress tried to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from ruling on the question of whether detainees at
Guantanamo Bay had any constitutional rights. It also prohibited federal judges from consulting foreign
or international sources of law when interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, leaving
that power to the president alone, and it banned the invocation of treaty rights by litigants in federal
courts. Generally the Republican majority at the time supported the legislation, while most Democrats opposed it. The act therefore had
Congress agreeing with the president that the executive branch alone should determine the fate and the constitutional rights of the detainees
at Guantanamo Bay (see e.g. Fisher, 2009). The court-stripping
measures included in the legislation were in direct
response to the Supreme Court's decisions in three cases dealing with the constitutional rights of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay [Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)]. In these cases, the Supreme Court basically ruled that President Bush's proposals for trying accused terrorists
being held at Guantanamo Bay were not constitutional, rejecting the Bush administration's assertions that the detainees' fate was a question
for the executive branch alone. More specifically, the
Supreme Court held that the military tribunals set up to try
accused terrorists were not constitutional, in part because they had not been properly approved by
Congress. The Supreme Court also ruled 6-3 that detainees at Guantanamo Bay had rights to have the
federal courts hear their cases, and the Court found that even U.S. citizens suspected of being terrorists
have appeals rights. In its 2006 legislation Congress attempted to strip the courts of the ability to continue to participate in this inter-
branch constitutional conversation on the rights of accused terrorists, thus supporting the notion of executive supremacy on this issue. The
Supreme Court declared the Congressional actions to be unconstitutional in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The only thing that
ended this ping pong match between the Congress and the Supreme Court was the election of President Obama, who supported the Supreme
Court’s views on the issue. Thus, court-stripping
is clearly a way to prevent the Supreme Court from participating
in the inter-institutional conversation about the meaning of the Constitution.

Congress lashes out when the court disagrees- empirically proven.

Peabody 14 (Bruce. Professor of political science & Pre Law @ Fairleigh Dickinson University. "The Changing Relationship of Congress
and the Judiciary." British Journal of American Legal Studies 2.1 (2014): 1-2. Print.) DTL

THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP OF CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY by Bruce Peabody, Fairleigh Dickinson University Relationships
between
members of the United States Congress and the judiciary are shifting, as Democrats and Republicans
alike reassess whether the courts are political allies or foes in this highly polarized era. My research tracks what
members of the House of Representatives have had to say about judges and the judiciary in recent years – specifically, I have teamed up with a colleague to analyze
public statements published on official House websites from 2010 to 2014, a pivotal and contentious period in recent politics. A Shifting Landscape of Partisan
Criticism and Praise A decade ago, congressional representatives – mostly Republicans and conservatives – were the most prominent and frequent critics of the
state and federal judiciary. From
2003 to 2007, a Republican-controlled Congress introduced dozens of proposals
to restrict the powers of courts. GOP congressional leaders like House Majority Leader Tom DeLay
charged the judiciary with “legislating from the bench.” Over the same period, many Democrats and
liberals rose to the defense of judges and courts – maintaining their longstanding support for major civil
rights and civil liberties decisions dating from the 1950s and 1960s. Politics and judicial decisions have
obviously taken new turns in recent years. Since President Obama became president, the courts handed
down controversial major decisions in such areas as health care, campaign finance, and gun rights; and
the Tea Party has emerged as a major political force on the rightward edge of the Republican Party. As
these developments unfolded, House websites have frequently posted comments on the judiciary – and
the partisan tilt has shifted. Not surprisingly, the sheer number of remarks about the Supreme Court on House members’ websites increased after
passage in March 2010 of the Obama’s administration’s landmark health reform law, the Affordable Care Act. From 2010 to 2012, both Republican and
Democratic House members had occasional harsh words for the courts, but prior to the June 2012 decision declaring the Affordable Care Act constitutional,
Before the Supreme Court handed down its health care
Democratic critiques were rising while Republican attacks were waning.

ruling, roughly two-thirds of all positive comments about courts and judicial power came from
Republicans, who had been satisfied with previous rulings in such areas as the Second Amendment,
partial birth abortion, and campaign finance. Especially common was House Republican praise for Republican-appointed Supreme Court
Justices such as Samuel Alito and John Roberts. Already on the rise, the sheer number of remarks about the Supreme Court shot up after the Supreme Court upheld
the core of health reform as constitutional. After the end of June 2012, more than four in five House websites made some reference to courts and judicial decisions .

House Attitudes after the Supreme Court Upheld Health Reform Overall, then, the early 21st century
presents a volatile and shifting picture. No longer were congressional attitudes consistently marked by
Republican skepticism versus Democratic support for courts and judges, as had been the case since the
mid-1950s. Republican support grew as the Supreme Court moved right. However, we might wonder whether partisan
stances changed again after the Court surprised Republicans by upholding the heart of the Obama administration’s health care program.  The decision was
certainly condemned by Republicans in the House, who issued 98% of all negative comments on the ruling and became more hesitant about the judiciary thereafter.
 But GOP reactions did not amount to a simple about-face. Instead of launching a wider critique of the courts, many House GOP members continued to call the
Affordable Care Act a bad policy worthy of repeal and trained their blame on President Barack Obama and the Democrats, rather than on the Supreme Court.  In
the current Congress, Democrats rather than Republicans are still the ones most critical of the judiciary. De mocrats
are displeased by recent
Court decisions to gut key enforcement provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and eliminate many
campaign finance regulations. The Future Relationship of Congress and the Courts My work suggests
that courts and judicial decisions may well remain controversial on both sides of the congressional aisle,
and additional dynamics may translate critiques into deadlock.  At the end of President Obama’s second term, the federal
judiciary will be split, with Democratic and Republican presidents having named half of the sitting judges apiece. Only a short while ago, in 2009, nine of twelve
geographic courts of appeals had majorities of judges appointed by Republican presidents and almost six in every ten judges were GOP appointees.  The Supreme
Court of the United States also teeters very much in balance. Over the next few years, retirements are likely to prompt a major struggle over the Court’s future, with
the Senate playing a decisive role in new appointments while the House serves as a chorus for the debate.
In short, congressional
preoccupation with the judiciary is unlikely to wane given continued intense partisanship, the sense that
America’s legal future lies in the balance, and mobilization by pressure groups such as the National Rifle
Association on the right to People for the American Way on the left. We cannot yet be certain, but many
signs point not only to continuing severe critiques of judges and particular rulings from legislators on
both sides of the congressional aisle, but also to a persistent shift in how Congress relates to the
influential U.S. court system. The days of a largely supportive consensus, especially from Democrats, may be gone for a long while to come

Trump has politicized the courts --- new controversial decisions cause him to attack
the judiciary
Blake 17 (Aaron, reporter and political blogger for The Washington Post, “Trump is not-so-subtly
threatening the judicial system, and even his Supreme Court nominee is upset,” The Washington Post,
2/8, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/08/president-trump-is-not-so-subtly-
threatening-the-american-court-system/?utm_term=.a86e23485b9d) ip

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit is now weighing what to do with President Trump's travel ban. And Trump
did his best
Wednesday toput his thumb on the scales of justice. Continuing a highly unusual days-long effort by a president, Trump
issued a stark warning to the three-judge panel and, really, the entire court system: Run afoul of me,
and you may just pay a price. In a speech in front of law enforcement officials in Washington, Trump suggested to the
three judges that they would marginalize themselves politically if they decide the wrong way . Trump has
said similar things about the judge who previously halted his travel ban — albeit after the decision had come down. The comments were
oblique, but Trump's
point was crystal clear. “If these judges wanted to help the court in terms of respect
for the court, they’d do what they should be doing,” Trump said, in a comment thick with subtext. “It’s so sad.” He
added: “I don’t ever want to call a court biased, so I won’t call it biased. But courts seem to be so political, and it would be so great for our
justice system if they would read [the law] and do what’s right.” If that isn't a threat to marshal support against the
American court system and fight it politically, I'm not sure what is. Trump is basically saying: That's a
nice reputation you've got there. It'd be a shame if something happened to it. Trump has been dancing around
this idea ever since the first judge halted his executive order on Friday. In tweets spaced out over the weekend, he asserted that the judge
was overstepping his authority and suggested any future attacks might be laid at his — and other
judges' — feet. Some tweets were targeted at the judge personally. But others, tellingly, addressed the “the courts” and
“the court system” as an entity. “If something happens blame him and court system.” “The courts are making the job very difficult.”
Trump's ire isn't just directed at the judges directly involved in his case; he seems to be girding for a
showdown with other judges who might dare to try to rein in his executive power. I wrote about this potential
showdown over the weekend: It's something experts on executive authority have been chewing over. Given Trump's populist
campaign, admiration for authoritarian leaders and expressed skepticism toward the political
establishment, some think it's possible he takes on the judicial establishment, too. “They're spoiling for a fight,
and that’s what populists do,” said Daniel P. Franklin, a professor at Georgia State University. “And I think that’s the way it plays out — maybe
not on this issue, but on something.” That piece dealt with the possibility that Trump
might actually take this to its extreme
and ignore what the court tells him to do. But he can do plenty before he goes that far to try to
undermine the judiciary and send a message. Even if he doesn't intend to force a legal showdown over its authority, comments
like the ones Trump made Wednesday at the very least seem geared toward “working the refs” — i.e., sending a message that
judges, who are supposed to be apolitical, won't be immune from his political wrath. And when they
issue a decision he doesn't like, Trump is saying, they're going to pay the same price as a senator who votes the
wrong way on a bill. This is something that's troubling to those who would prefer to keep politics out of the
judiciary. But as with many other political norms, Trump is increasingly taking a hacksaw to this one.

Court “curbing” is a likely response to controversial decisions.

ALE 16 (“Court Curbing” American Legal Encyclopedia - Lawi Legal Encyclopedia combines one of the most comprehensive, up-to-date and authoritative legal
dictionaries with a wide-ranging world legal encyclopedia, to provide more factual information on more varied legal items than any other comparable legal
reference work available today, from http://lawi.us/) EYC

Efforts directed at constraining the influence of courts. Court “curbing” occurs because the courts make decisions that
disturb other public officials or the public. If court decisions are sufficiently disturbing, one or another “curbing” initiatives may
result. The courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, are vulnerable to these initiatives because they are linked
in a variety of ways to the other branches. The initiatives have two objectives. One is to apply enough
political pressure to bring about a change in decisional behavior. The other, more extreme objective is to make
structural adjustments to judicial institutions. These adjustments may keep the courts from being able to render certain kinds
of decisions at all. Policy directions of the courts can generally be kept in check through the normal processes of judicial selection. Beyond that,
the Congress determines the jurisdiction and size of federal courts. This
is true even for the Supreme Court, where
Congress has the authority to regulate or otherwise make exceptions to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. These are potentially very effective court “curbing” methods. Moreover, the executive and legislative
branches are often critical in securing compliance with court rulings. Finally, courts can be constrained by actions taken to directly nullify
particular decisions. This often takes the form of statutory reversal, but the constitutional amendment process may be accessed for this
purpose as well. Court “curbing” is not a permanent condition. Indeed, the courts are normally headed in the same policy
directions as the other branches, thus there is no need to “curb” them. Efforts to constrain the courts are usually prompted
by substantial and rapid shifts in direction by the electorate, by the lack of turnover in incumbents, or a
combination of the two. The court “packing” initiative of President Franklin D. Roosevelt is illustrative.
Economic conditions during the Depression produced extensive political realignment. The priorities of the Hoover Administration were replaced
by those of Roosevelt's New Deal. A majority of justices on the Supreme Court did not reflect these same priorities. Conflict
between
the Court and other branches resulted. The problem was aggravated because none of the sitting justices left the Court during
Roosevelt's first term. Following his reelection, Roosevelt sought to “curb” the intransigent Court by adding justices.
He wanted to “pack” the Court with justices who would support New Deal legislation. Congress declined to
adopt the plan to enlarge the Court. Although the initiative was not formally successful, subsequent decisions of the Court were more
supportive of the New Deal, even without a change in Court personnel. Congressional
control over jurisdiction can also be
used as a means of court “curbing.” Because Congress has the authority to create all lower federal
courts, it has complete control over the definition of the jurisdiction of any court it creates. If so inclined,
Congress could keep lower federal courts from ruling on one or more issues, possibly the more controversial social issues such as the busing of
school students. The Congress can also regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This approach has a downside because it might
remove from the Supreme Court the ability to fashion doctrine that applies uniformly across the nation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction has been regulated. After the Civil War, for example, the Congress wished to keep the Court from considering the
constitu-tionality of the Reconstruction Acts. It did so by withholding the Court's jurisdiction over all habeas corpus actions. The Court itself
upheld this congressional action in Ex parte McCardle (7 Wallace 506: 1869). Similar exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction have been
proposed, but have not been formally adopted. Like other court “curbing” techniques, however, threatening jurisdictional changes conveys a
political message. Occasionally, the Court's response to these messages is to modify its own decisional behavior.
 Link - Progressive Decisions
Right wing populist sentiments ensure the plan receives political backlash from both
branches
Petkova 17 (Bilyana, Postdoctoral fellow, NYU School of Law, Visiting Researcher, Yale, “Populism and
Judicial Backlash in the United States and Europe,” I·CONnect the blog of the International Journal of
Constitutional Law, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/04/populism-and-judicial-backlash-in-the-
united-states-and-europe/) ip

Common criticisms of judicial activism stretch from the somewhat outdated but nonetheless repeatedly
re-emerging argument of courts’ “counter-majoritarian difficulty”[1] to the prevalence of disagreement in plural
societies concerning the substance and scope of human rights.[2] Beyond conceptual attacks, however, it is increasingly common to
find politicians across the Atlantic who attack courts for decisions with which they simply disagree. Especially
the recent resurgence of right wing populism in the United States and Europe makes the old puzzle of
judicial legitimacy come to the fore. What should be the position of judges trying to safeguard democratic institutions, while
exercising due restraint in the face of majority rule? Beginning to answer this question would require us to parcel out the notion of judicial
backlash across two very different functions of the judiciary. Precedent Setting in Rights-based Adjudication & Issue-Specific Backlash
Somewhat of a modern reiteration of the counter-majoritarian thesis, judicial backlash, primarily theorized in the U.S.
constitutional law literature, is the perception that in departing from precedent for the sake of
(progressive) rights interpretation, courts sometimes go “too far, too fast”.[3] Doing so, judges are said to deflect
important social movement energy from more productive and legitimate channels of effectuating change in a legal status quo. In America, the
backlash narrative is primarily associated with a reassessment of the Warren Court’s legacy.[4] Regarding
racial desegregation, the ferocity of the conservative reactions that followed the landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Education led prominent commentators – including traditional supporters of a strong federal
judiciary and civil rights like Cass Sunstein–to start calling for judicial caution and minimalism. Regarding abortion,
Justice Ginsburg has similarly been concerned that “by issuing so bold and far-reaching a decision” in
Roe v. Wade the US Supreme Court triggered a bitter and divisive response that “polarized the nation to
this day.”[5] In the context of recent gay marriage decisions, the words of Ginsburg, despite of her joining the majority opinion in Obergefell,
sounded like an alarm bell for all those who feared that conservatives would once again be energized in the states to resist an item on the
progressive agenda – this time marriage equality – and obstruct it with all possible means. First, it is highly disputed whether majoritarian
concerns such as reliance on public opinion or state-level legislative consensus should have played a role in deciding these cases the way they
were decided at the time they were decided and whether such concerns should be explicitly incorporated in the doctrine like they are in U.S.
Eight Amendment cases (tying the interpretation of “cruel and unusual punishment“ to “evolving standards of decency”).[6] In Europe, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) routinely refers to “emerging consensus” or “societal trends” to either bolster its precedents or defer
to a Convention Member State court or legislature. Second, in rights-based adjudication, majoritarian concerns can also play a justificatory
rather than substantial role. As Reva Siegel has argued: “…one can acknowledge the importance of public opinion without treating majority
support as (1) indispensable or (2) sufficient to sustain a constitutional ruling…”[7] Be that as it may, backlash against the judiciary in this
context turns out on issue-specific outcomes of individual court decisions. Popular and democratic constitutionalists[8] may diverge on the
meaning and consequences of such issue-specific judicial backlash, suggesting different ways of confronting it. Conversely, the role of and
attacks on the judiciary in the context of the separation of powers differs in a non-trivial way. At stake here is systemic failure. Courts and the
Separation of Powers: Systemic Failure Courts’ role in upholding basic liberal principles and constitutional guarantees against an unrestrained
executive aims at preserving systemic integrity and should be uncontested in a democracy. If judges are deprived of the power of judicial
review, they become part of senseless institutions turned into but the extended arm of an authoritarian government. Judges’ responsibility in
preventing democracies from backsliding into authoritarian regimes is elevated in this context, even at the risk of being exposed to backlash
from incumbent politicians. Judicial deference to the political branches in times of crisis is similarly unwarranted as it puts institutional
legitimacy and systemic integrity in question. In an emergency proceeding in February 2017, the US Ninth Circuit Court upheld a district court’s
temporary stay of a presidential executive order. The executive order enacted by the Trump administration aimed at banning for ninety days
the entry into the United States of individuals from seven, primarily Muslim countries. Two states, Washington and Minnesota, challenged the
order as unconstitutional. Trump reacted with a virulent offensive on courts, and his government argued that
courts not only owe substantial deference to the political branches on immigration and national security matters but that the order
couldn’t be reviewed in court at all. The Ninth Circuit upheld jurisdiction on the basis that the states have shown that the
executive order “causes a concrete and particularized injury to their public universities”.[9] The States alleged that the “teaching and research
missions of their universities are harmed by the Executive Order’s effect on their faculty and students who are nationals of the seven affected
countries”.[10] Although an examination on the merits is still pending, the Ninth Circuit’s message was clear:

Supreme Court rulings that produce ideological division along liberal-conservative

lines are controversial – usually the progressive decisions.
Baum 16 (Lawrence Baum received his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin and joined the faculty at OSU in 1973. Baum's primary interest is in courts in the
United States. He has received OSU's Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching and the Teaching and Mentoring Award of the Law and Courts section of the
American Political Science Association. The primary focus of his research has been explanation of judges' behavior in decision making. He has presented his research
in The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (1997), Judges and Their Audiences (2006), and Specializing the Courts (2011), as well as articles in political science journals. He
has received OSU's Distinguished Scholar Award and the Lifetime Achievement Award of the Law and Courts section of the American Political Science Association,
“The Supreme Court and the Election: By Lawrence Baum,” https://polisci.osu.edu/news/supreme-court-and-election-lawrence-baum, 8/26/2016, Department of
Political Science at Ohio State University) EYC

Most Supreme Court decisions do not divide the justices along liberal-conservative lines. But the issues
that sometimes produce ideological division include some on which many people have strong feelings,
such as government regulation of abortion and funding for political campaigns. Thus, in a situation in
which the next appointment to the Court is likely to shift its collective position on some of those issues,
it would not be surprising if people gave that prospect a high priority when they decided whether to
support Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. Indeed, this appears to be true of many political leaders and
activists. More specifically, a number of conservatives who are unfavorable to Trump on other grounds
have said that the Supreme Court is so important to them that they feel compelled to support him.
Trump’s recognition of that selling point is reflected in what he said in Cedar Rapids, an argument that
he has repeated since then. It is also reflected in his issuing a list of potential nominees to the Court in
May and an additional set of names in September, lists intended to reassure conservatives that he
would choose justices who share their views. There has been less attention to the possible effect of the
Supreme Court on the voting decisions of liberals. The Court has not been as prominent a concern for
liberals as it has been for conservatives, primarily because the Court’s most visible and controversial
decisions in recent years--especially on the health care law sponsored by President Obama and on same-
sex marriage--have generally gone in the direction that liberals favor. But Clinton too has had to
overcome a lack of enthusiasm for her among activists and voters on her side of the political divide, and
she has emphasized that she would aim to select justices with liberal positions on issues such as
abortion and voting rights. Clinton used the moderator’s questions in the third presidential debate to
emphasize her commitment to appoint justices who would take liberal positions on certain issues that
come before the Court, while Trump underlined his commitment to appoint justices who would take
conservative positions

Conservatives get mad when the supreme court disagrees with them.
Meadors 15 (Marvin, M.A. in Urban Planning, Reporter @ the Huffington Post. "Why Do Conservatives Hate the Conservative Supreme
Court?" The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 23 Sept. 2015. Web. 06 July 2017. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marvin-
meadors/why-do-conservatives-hate_1_b_8180814.html>.) DTL
“I don’t think we should entrust governing our society to five unelected lawyers in Washington. Why
would you possibly hand over the rights of 320 million Americans to five lawyers in Washington to say
we’re going to decide the rules that govern you? If you want to win an issue, go to the ballot box and
win at the ballot box. That’s the way the Constitution was designed.” Senator Ted Cruz In an interview with Stephen
Colbert, Senator Ted Cruz expressed his distaste for the Supreme Court with the quote above. The two
started talking about Ronald Reagan with Colbert asking whether Cruz would be willing to work with the
other side of the aisle to accomplish things like Reagan did. Cruz replied that he never spoke with
anyone who wanted him to cooperate more than he has with President Obama, which explains his
ideological warfare with everything Democratic, culminating in his engineering the government shut down in 2013. Interesting, Cruz
defined his principles as: “Live within our means, stop bankrupting our kids and grandkids, follow the Constitution.” Of course, then he proceeded

to shred the constitution just a few moments later. When the topic veered to gay marriage Cruz
expressed how the issue should be left to the states, saying: “Under the Constitution, marriage is a
question for the states.” Of course, when Colbert pointed out that the constitution does not mention
marriage, Cruz retorted: “And that’s exactly why it’s a question for the states. Because the 10th
amendment says if it doesn’t mention it, it’s a question for the states.” It is ironic, bordering on
demagogic, how Republicans pick and choose what parts of the constitution they fetishize! Cruz next
desperately repeated: “I believe in democracy. I believe in democracy...” But he seems to know nothing about it. States rights have been an issue that conservatives
have championed for years in their culture war arguments. Hypocritically, they oppose the state’s deciding in the case of legalizing marijuana, but regardless. Cruz
seems to so readily forget how the state’s rights mantra was leaned on for decades to suppress blacks and their voting rights, and to enforce segregation. Now the
same oppressive voices, after losing the segregation battle, have turned to state’s rights arguments again as an instrument to enforce conservative values on society
in the case of gay marriage. Cruz
conveniently forgets that Section One of the 14th amendment provides for equal
protection of the laws and due process. Those guiding principles were the grounds the five justices on
the Supreme Court used to strike down state marriage bans. Interestingly, this is the same section of the
constitution which allows for birthright citizenship, which Trump so vehemently opposes. Perhaps this language
is a communist plot! Now Cruz does not just limit himself to expressing his thought that gay marriage should be decided by individual states, in the next breath he
rails against the Supreme Court itself as a body of “five unelected lawyers in Washington.” He quizically asks why should we hand over our rights to them, saying
issues should be decided at the ballot box. In his quest, he is like Don Quixote charging at the windmills! Well, issues are decided at the ballot box! We
democratically elect a president who then appoints judges to the Supreme Court when a vacancy opens with the retirement of a sitting judge. Of course, the
president selects someone he believes comports with his own philosophy. There are sometimes surprises as in the case of Justice Souter who was selected by the
first President Bush and then came to vote reliably with the court’s liberal members. Does
Cruz want to eliminate the Supreme Court? I
mean, just where does his radical thinking lead? On the one hand, he wants to “follow the constitution,”
while on the other, his beliefs are diametrically opposed to Article Three of the constitution establishing
the Supreme Court as the supreme law of the land. Conservatives, such as Cruz, just fundamentally
reject the principle of judicial supremacy, but fortunately, this doctrine protects us from conservative
tyranny.
 Link - Activism
Statistics prove – activist judges are targeted.
Peabody and Morgan 13 (Bruce, Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New Jersey, B.A., 1991,
Wesleyan University, Ph.D., 2000, University of Texas at Austin and Kyle, B.A. 2011, Fairleigh Dickinson University, "HOPE, FEAR AND LOATHING,
AND THE POST-SEBELIUS DISEQUILIBRIUM: ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES, CONGRESS, AND COURTS IN TEA PARTY
AMERICA," Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies, Accessible at: http://www.bcu.ac.uk/law/research/centre-for-american-studies/british-journal-american-
legal-studies/current-issue) KEN

As an extension of this last observation we note, fourth, that there are reasons to think the
early part of the twenty-first century
ushered in a span in which criticism of courts increased in profile and intensity.41 Thus, from 2003-2008,
Congress averaged nearly three times as many court-curbing bills (over 13 such bills every year) compared to the
period from 1984- 2002 (an average of about 4.5 per year).42 The spike in especially conservative critiques of
courts in the early twenty-first century can be attributed, in part, to high-profile state and federal
cases43 and the emergence of entrepreneurial leaders in the U.S. Congress who targeted these decisions and
the purportedly “activist” judges who wrote them.44

Historical precedent proves – activist judges get stripped of their judicial power
Smith 7 (Jean Edward, biographer and the John Marshall Professor of Political Science at Marshall University, 7-26-2007, "Stacking the
Court," New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/opinion/26smith.html?_r=2&utm_source=huffingtonpost.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=
pubexchange_article) KEN

WHEN a majority of Supreme Court justices adopt a manifestly ideological agenda, it plunges the court
into the vortex of American politics. If the Roberts court has entered voluntarily what Justice Felix Frankfurter once called
the “political thicket,” it may require a political solution to set it straight. The framers of the Constitution did not
envisage the Supreme Court as arbiter of all national issues. As Chief Justice John Marshall made clear in Marbury v. Madison, the court’s
authority extends only to legal issues. When the court overreaches, the Constitution provides checks
and balances. In 1805, after persistent political activity by Justice Samuel Chase, Congress responded with
its power of impeachment. Chase was acquitted, but never again did he step across the line to mingle
law and politics. After the Civil War, when a Republican Congress feared the court might tamper with
Reconstruction in the South, it removed those questions from the court’s appellate jurisdiction. But the
method most frequently employed to bring the court to heel has been increasing or decreasing its membership.
The size of the Supreme Court is not fixed by the Constitution. It is determined by Congress. The original Judiciary Act of
1789 set the number of justices at six. When the Federalists were defeated in 1800, the lame-duck Congress reduced
the size of the court to five — hoping to deprive President Jefferson of an appointment. The incoming
Democratic Congress repealed the Federalist measure (leaving the number at six), and then in 1807 increased
the size of the court to seven, giving Jefferson an additional appointment. In 1837, the number was increased to nine, affording the
Democrat Andrew Jackson two additional appointments. During the Civil War, to insure an anti-slavery, pro-Union
majority on the bench, the court was increased to 10. When a Democrat, Andrew Johnson, became
president upon Lincoln’s death, a Republican Congress voted to reduce the size to seven (achieved by
attrition) to guarantee Johnson would have no appointments. After Ulysses S. Grant was elected in 1868,
Congress restored the court to nine. That gave Grant two new appointments. The court had just declared
unconstitutional the government’s authority to issue paper currency (greenbacks). Grant took the opportunity to appoint two justices
sympathetic to the administration. When the reconstituted court convened, it reheard the legal tender cases and reversed its decision (5-4).
The most recent attempt to alter the size of the court was by Franklin Roosevelt in 1937. But instead of simply requesting that Congress add an
additional justice or two, Roosevelt’s convoluted scheme fooled no one and ultimately sank under its own weight. Roosevelt claimed the
justices were too old to keep up with the workload, and urged that for every justice who reached the age of 70 and did not retire within six
months, the president should be able to appoint a younger justice to help out. Six of the Supreme Court justices in 1937 were older than 70. But
the court was not behind in its docket, and Roosevelt’s subterfuge was exposed. In the Senate, the president could muster only 20 supporters.
Still, thereis nothing sacrosanct about having nine justices on the Supreme Court. Roosevelt’s 1937 chicanery has
given court-packing a bad name, but it is a hallowed American political tradition participated in by Republicans and
Democrats alike. If the current five-man majority persists in thumbing its nose at popular values, the election of a Democratic president
and Congress could provide a corrective. It requires only a majority vote in both houses to add a justice or two. Chief
Justice John Roberts and his conservative colleagues might do well to bear in mind that the roll call of presidents who have used this option
includes not just Roosevelt but also Adams, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Grant.

Republicans will label everything activist

Chemerinsky 10 (Erwin. Most Cited Legal Scholar in the United States, Former Dean of Law @ UCI, Current Dean of Law @ UCB. “A
Stunning Example of Judicial Activism: The Supreme Court Overturns Decades of Precedents on Campaign Spending." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
N.p., 23 Jan. 2010. Web. 05 July 2017. <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2010/01/24/A-stunning-example-of-judicial-activism-
The-Supreme-Court-overturns-decades-of-precedents-on-campaign-spending/stories/201001240177>.) DTL

The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision holding that corporations and unions can spend unlimited amounts of
money in election campaigns is a stunning example of judicial activism by its five most conservative
justices. In striking down a federal statute and explicitly overturning prior decisions, the court has changed the nature of elections in the United States. At the
same time, the conservative justices have demonstrated that decades of conservative criticism of judicial

activism was nonsense. Conservative justices are happy to be activists when it serves their ideological agenda. Since Richard Nixon ran for president in
1968, a central feature of Republican and conservative rhetoric has been to attack judicial activism. The

phrase is never defined with any precision and has often been used to refer to decisions that
conservatives simply don't like. But if judicial activism has any meaning, it surely refers to decisions that overturn laws and overrule precedents.
In contrast, judicial restraint occurs when courts defer to the other branches of government and follow precedents. By this definition, judicial activism

can be good or bad. Brown vs. Board of Education was activist in that it declared unconstitutional laws in
many states requiring the segregation of the races in education. To do so, the justices overruled a 58-year-old precedent
upholding such laws. But virtually all agree today that Brown was one of the greatest moments in Supreme Court

history. To conservatives, though, the phrase "judicial activism" has come to mean any decision with a
liberal outcome. President George W. Bush declared: "The judges ought not to take the place of the legislative branch of government. ... I don't believe in
liberal activist judges. I believe in strict constructionists." The 2008 Republican platform declared that "[j]udicial activism is a

grave threat to the rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring
the Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the public."
The court's campaign-finance decision makes this conservative rhetoric laughable. The ruling, which grew out of a
conservative nonprofit corporation's attempt to air an anti-Hillary Rodham Clinton documentary during the 2008 primary, throws out a key component of the
McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Among other things, the law banned corporations from paying to broadcast "electioneering
communications" for or against candidates in the final weeks of presidential primaries and general elections. McCain-Feingold was a continuation of statutes that
have existed since 1906 limiting corporate spending in federal election campaigns. The act was intended to prevent the enormous wealth of corporations from
For years, conservatives
distorting elections and protect corporate shareholders from having their money used for purposes with which they disagree.

have argued that judicial restraint requires deferring to the choices of the elected branches of
government. No such deference was evident when the court's five most conservative justices struck
down this provision of the McCain-Feingold law on Thursday. Nor did the decision defer to judicial
precedent. In 2003, in McConnell vs. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld this same law. In fact, in an earlier case in
1990, the court said that legislatures may restrict corporate spending in election campaigns. The court's decision on Thursday expressly overruled these decisions.
What changed over the last eight years? In the 2003 decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined with John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer to make up the majority. Mrs. O'Connor's replacement, Samuel A. Alito Jr., voted the other way and joined with conservatives John G. Roberts Jr.,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas to declare the same law unconstitutional. For decades, conservatives have argued that judicial restraint
requires that courts protect rights only if they are stated in the text of the Constitution or were clearly intended by the document's framers. This,
for
example, is the core of the conservative attack on Roe vs. Wade. But there is not the slightest shred of
evidence that the framers of the First Amendment meant to protect the rights of corporations to spend
money in election campaigns. The conservatives were glad to abandon the "original meaning" when it
served their purposes. The conservative majority, which in recent years has dramatically limited free speech in other areas -- such as for government
employees and for students -- was willing to expand the free speech of corporations. There is no way to see this other than as the

conservative justices using judicial review to advance the traditional conservative ideological agenda.
Almost 10 years ago, in Bush v. Gore, the five conservative justices for the first time decided a presidential election. One would have thought that

decision would have laid to rest the notion that judicial activism is a tool of liberal judges and revealed
that the real judicial activism today comes from the right. Perhaps Thursday's decision finally will convince those who doubted it.
 Link – Zelman
Reassertion of separation of church and state causes judicial impeachment
Bradenburg & Kay 12 (Bert, Executive Director of Justice at Stake, & Amy, author for Justice at Stake
is a nonpartisan national campaign of more than 40 partners working to keep our courts fair, “Crusading
Against the Courts The New Mission to Weaken the Role of the Courts in Protecting Our Religious
Liberties”, Justice at Stake,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/resources/CrusadingAgainstCourts_20121F89B068B.pdf)
KEN

IV. PunishingHeresy: The Drive to Demonize and Impeach Noncompliant Judges For those seeking to use
the courts to impose their own religious views in violation of the Constitution, any judge who doesn’t
obey their wishes, even if simply upholding settled law, is a target. Such judges are increasingly finding
themselves, and their courts in general, the object of impeachment threats and venomous speech. A typical
example is U.S. Senator Sam Brownback’s 2004 warning on the Senate floor that a federal court decision on late-term abortion was “yet
another example of why we need to reign in an increasingly reckless judiciary . . . through impeachment, when necessary at both the Federal
and State level.”167 Interest groups have followed suit with their own hyperbole, as when Andrea Lafferty of
the Traditional Values Coalition said that “many judges . . . view themselves as the real rulers of our
nation.”168 Most Americans disagree, regardless of their religion, ideology or political affiliation. Former Senator John C. Danforth, an
Episcopal minister, argues that “conservative Christians approach politics with a certainty that they know God’s
truth, and that they can advance the kingdom of God through governmental action,” while moderate Christians
“support the separation of church and state, both because that principle is essential to holding together a diverse country, and because the
policies of the state always fall short of the demands of faith.”169 And as the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained, a
judge may
not be impeached over unpopular decisions.170 But as the Terri Schiavo episode demonstrated, broad
American acceptance of the need for an independent judiciary has not deterred attempts to use religion
to punish, intimidate and demonize the courts. In the five years from 2002 to 2006, there have been 58
impeachment threats against judges, compared to 42 in the five years from 1997 to 2001. A similar surge in anti-court
rhetoric has sought to undercut the very legitimacy of the courts. These threats and catcalls have often
stemmed from anger over decisions involving church-state issues. Attacks Against Federal Courts Recent
federal church-state decisions have frequently triggered impeachment threats. After the Ninth Circuit’s
2002 Pledge of Allegiance decision, for example, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich dared
Congress to remove the judges who had issued the opinion “and settle the issue of one nation under
God once and for all.”171 Religious conservatives likewise called for the impeachment of the district court judge who handled the Roy
Moore case. “There needs to be some impeachment of judges like. . . Myron Thompson,” said Jerry Falwell,
founder of the group Moral Majority.172 Impeachment threats grew hysterical at the 2005 “Confronting the Judicial War on
Faith” conference, organized by the Judeo Christian Council on Constitutional Restoration in the midst of the Schiavo episode. There,
Michael Schwartz, chief of staff to U.S. Senator Tom Coburn, said he was “in favor of mass
impeachments, if that’s what it takes.”173 “I don’t want to impeach judges, I want to impale them!”174
 Link Magnifier
Congress goes all out – key to re-election
Clark 9 (Tom S, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Emory University, October 2009, "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and
Judicial Legitimacy," Midwest Political Science Association,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d3d264893fc0bdd12db507/t/58d3fa831b10e32d585205fc/1490287235641/ClarkAJPS2009.pdf) KEN

The typical Court-curbing bill is what might be characterized as an institutional assault on the Court
rather than a case-specific effort to reverse a Court decision. That is, Court-curbing bills are generally wholesale-level
responses to (potentially) a series of retail-level problems. Indeed, seen as position-taking endeavors, this empirical finding makes sense.
Legislators seeking to garner political support and earn position-taking points with their constituents
might find it more "profitable" to introduce a broad bill than a narrowly focused bill directed at a sin gle
decision. Indeed, in an interview for this research, one congressman observed that Court curbing could
be done with a "sledgehammer" or a "scalpel." The congressman noted that while the "scalpel" might be easier to enact and have
more direct policy consequences, the "sledge hammer" gets a lot of public attention, so it is generally used.

Stripping happens all the time to the fullest extent it can – statistics prove
Clark 9 (Tom S, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Emory University, October 2009, "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and
Judicial Legitimacy," Midwest Political Science Association,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d3d264893fc0bdd12db507/t/58d3fa831b10e32d585205fc/1490287235641/ClarkAJPS2009.pdf) KEN

The results of this analysis are reported in the first three columns of coefficients in Table 1. As
these results make clear, the
number of laws struck down each year is inversely related to Court curbing the previous year. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient associated with CourtCurbing indicates that an increase
in the level of Court curbing in one year is associated with a decrease in the number of laws held
unconstitutional the following year. In addition, the negative and statistically significant coefficient associated with CourtOutlook,
in each model indicates that as the level of public support for the Court decreases, the Court strikes down fewer laws. These two finding
provide direct support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 outlined above. Indeed, the substantive effect of these results is
considerable. Figure 2 shows the actual number of laws held unconstitutional during each decade as well as the predicted number of laws
that would have been struck down with minimal Court curbing each year. It also shows the predicted number of laws that would have been
struck down under a higher level of Court curbing each year. In particular, the figure shows the predicted number of laws held unconstitutional
each decade with CourtCurbingt for each year set at the observed minimum and the observed maximum for that decade. This figure shows
that Court curbing has deterred between 10 and 20 constitutional invalidations each decade?-as many
as two invalidations per year in some instances. Given that only about two laws are held unconstitutional each year, this
finding is indeed substantial. Between 1877 and 2006, 284 laws were held unconstitutional; the model predicts that an additional 143 laws
would have been struck down had there been no Court curbing, an over 50% increase in the frequency of judicial review. By contrast, we see
that additional Court curbing in any given decade might not have deterred many more laws; under the observed maximum level of Court
curbing each decade, only an additional few laws would have been deterred. This sug gests Congress generally uses Court
curbing to the fullest extent it can.

Backlash against a controversial plan causes court stripping.

Norton 6 (Helen Norton is a Prof. of Law at the University of Maryland, “Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction,”
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1372&context=articles, p. 1026-1027, Wake Forest Law Review) EYC

Not only are these efforts increasingly successful, they are likely to reemerge in future proposals to
shape subject matter jurisdiction and thus the balance of judicial power. The House's passage of two
separate court-stripping bills in the same Congress represents a high-water mark in the court-shaping
movement, as does its passage of the Pledge Protection Act in successive Congresses. Indeed, some of
the dynamics that helped thwart earlier court-stripping measures appear to have diminished or
disappeared altogether. 97 In the past, for example, the courts - and especially the Supreme Court - may
have survived congressional attack due to their comparatively strong public reputation. 98 Shifting
perceptions of government institutions may weaken that shield, as one survey found that a majority of
respondents agreed "that "judicial activism' has reached the crisis stage, and that judges who ignore
voters' values should be impeached. Nearly half agreed with a congressman who said judges are
"arrogant, out-of-control and unaccountable.'" 99 Other recent polls also suggest a drop in public
support for the courts, including the Supreme Court, at least in some quarters. 100 Changes in public
opinion, accompanied by proponents' sheer political power, may encourage further jurisdictional
realignment.

Attacks are read as a lack of support by the public – causes judicial withdrawal
Clark 9 (Tom S, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Emory University, October 2009, "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and
Judicial Legitimacy," Midwest Political Science Association,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d3d264893fc0bdd12db507/t/58d3fa831b10e32d585205fc/1490287235641/ClarkAJPS2009.pdf) KEN

That the Court has preferences over policy outcomes is an uncontroversial claim resting on a large body of empirical scholarship, the
paradigmatic example of which is Segal and Spaeth (2002). Moreover, that
courts have preferences for institutional
legitimacy is similarly well demonstrated in the literature (Baum 2006; Caldeira 1987; Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 1995;
Carrubba 2009; Hausseger and Stephenson 2004; Vanberg 2005). This study departs from the literature on institutional legitimacy in an
important way?I argue that congressional hostility towards, and attacks on, the judiciary indicate a lack of
judicial legitimacy and public prestige. In particular, the justices be lieve that legislative attacks on the Court are
signals about a lack of public support for the Court. Thus, while the justices have their own information
about public opinion and the Court, they can, and do, update their beliefs by observing political activity
concerning the Court. In an interview, one Supreme Court justice commented, "The Court is pretty good
about knowing how far it can go? Congress is better than we are, especially the House. They really have
their finger on the pulse of the public." Similarly, another justice commented,"We read the newspapers
and see what is being said? Probably more than most people do. We know if there is a lot of public
interest; we have to be careful not to reach too far, a sentiment echoed by numerous other Court
insiders
 AT: Legal Restrictions Check
No checks on court stripping – it’s constitutional
Schramm 5 (Jennifer Schramm is a senior associate in the Complex Litigation Group, was a part of a team in a National Coordinating Counsel role
representing a global safety products manufacturer at trial and in extensive settlement negotiations, The Effect of Congressional Preferences on the Composition of
the Supreme Court’s Docket,” https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/politics/documents/schramm_thesis.pdf, p. 8, Department of Politics New York University)
EYC

Statutory cases have a lower threshold for congressional constraint given that it is easier for Congress to override decisions in these cases. In
Constitutional cases, the
Supreme Court is protected by Articles II and III of the Constitution, which indicate
that Justices have life tenure, are protected from salary reductions, and always have at least some
original jurisdiction. However, what this fails to account for is the punitive legislation that Congress can
use against the Court should it not agree with the Court’s decision. The Court can be stripped of its
appellate jurisdiction, have its funding reduced, can be packed, 1 and Justices can be impeached, all as
the result of Congressional backlash to a decision (Epstein et al, 2001). Where previous studies fall short is in their failure to
engage in a comprehensive study of Constitutional cases in relation to the political preferences of the enacting and sitting Congresses.
I/L
 I/L – Rule of Law
Court stripping decks the rule of law
Baucus and Kay 82 (Max, United States Senator (D. Mont.). Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee; ranking minority member of
the Separation of Powers Subcommittee; member of the Court's Subcommittee; B.A., 1964, LL.B., 1967, Stanford University AND Kenneth R,
Chief Minority Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. B.A., Oberlin College, 1973; J.D., University of
Denver, 1976. “The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress”, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 988) KEN

This brings us back to the second objective. While the proponents claim that they want to restore more traditional and stable judicial decision
making, it is difficult to imagine any set of proposals more inconsistent with the goals of certainty or
stability than the court stripping bills. The simple fact is that the court stripping proposals remove federal court
jurisdiction while offering state court judges no real indication of what judicial standard they should
follow. It is ironic that those who are complaining about judicial usurpation of the legislative function are promoting legislative solutions
devoid of any substantive direction and inviting further and potentially more disparate pronouncements.
Such a vacuum of substantive standards is an open invitation to judicial activism in its purest form. The more helpful solutions
would be ones that actually set a new substantive standard for the courts to follow. Not only do the
court stripping bills fail to provide a substantive legal standard, but they preclude the Supreme Court
from enforcing its previous decisions. 68 The sponsors of these bills realize that they cannot directly reverse a constitutional
decision of the Supreme Court. Instead, the sponsors are actually promoting an open invitation to state court
judges to alter or reverse the controlling Supreme Court decisions. 69 They want to withdraw the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction and give the state courts a knowing wink and say, "go ahead-they can't
touch you now." 70 This Congressional wink is not responsible legislation. It is an open invitation to the state courts to
overrule decisions of the Supreme Court. Likewise it is an open invitation for the general disrespect of the
rule of law. In fact, the jurisdiction bills are more than an invitation to such disrespect-their success
depends on it. The court stripping bills would have no substantive impact unless state court judges were
willing to seize advantage of this opportunity. This aspect of the court stripping bills was recently criticized by the conference
of state court chief justices. By a resolution adopted at their midyear meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, the chief justices raised serious
concerns about the impact of these bills on state courts. Their resolution observed in part: "These proposed statutes give the appearance of
proceeding from the premise that state court judges will not honor their oath to obey the United States Constitution, nor their obligations to
give full force to controlling Supreme Court precedents." 7It is difficult to see how such proposals restore more
traditional and stable decision making to our judicial system. A court stripping bill would throw a given
body of law into total disarray. In the name of restoring "constitutional" decision making to the courts,
the proposals in fact leave open the possibility of fifty unconstitutional decisions being pronounced by
the state courts. Not only do the jurisdiction bills fail to restore traditional "constitutional" judicial conduct, they also fail to
provide any logical or consistent conception of how constitutional rights should be addressed by the
courts. Today a citizen can vindicate a constitutional right in either state or federal court and in either instance has the right to appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. But if Congress engages in court stripping, the current judicial system would
fragment leaving four alternative and independent judicial systems for vindicating constitutional rights.
Depending on which constitutional right was in question, the judicial process would be: 1) In state or lower federal court with a right of appeal
to the Supreme Court (The current jurisdictional scheme); 2) In state or lower federal court with no right of appeal to the Supreme Court; 3)
Only in a state court with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court; or 4) Only in a state court with no right of appeal to the Supreme Court.7 2
 AT: Stripping Fails
Congressional backlash will crush judicial legitimacy --- even an unsuccessful attack
will gut judicial review
Martin 1 (Andrew D., Prof of Political Science at Washington University, Statuatory Battles and Constitutional
Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court)
But the large policy payoff in the constitutional cases. What does the ability of the President and Congress to
attack through overrides or other means constitutional court decisions imply in terms of the cost of the
justices bear? If an attack succeeds and the court does not back down, it effectively removes the court from
the policy game and may seriously or, even irrevocably harm its reputation, credibility, and legitimacy.
Indeed, such an attack would effectively remove the court from policy making, thus incurring an infinite cost. With
no constitutional prescription for judicial review, this power is vulnerable, and would be severely
damaged if congress and the president were effective in attack on the Court. But even if the attack is
unsuccessful, the integrity of the court may be damaged, for the assault may compromise its ability to
make future constitutional decisions and, thus, more long-lasting policy. One does not have to peer as far
back as scott v. sandford to find examples; Bush v. Gore (2000, U.S.) may provide one. To be sure, the new
President and Congress did not attack the decision, but other members of government did of course,
unsuccessfully at least in terms of the ruling’s impact. Yet, there seems little doubt that the critics(not to
mention the decision itself) caused some major damage to the reputation of the court, the effects of
which the justices may feel in the not-so-distant future.
 AT: No Support (Congress)
Congress has proposed stripping before
Miller 06 (Mark C, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Relations; Director of the Law and
Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, “When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts”,
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1666&context=caselrev) KEN

Concerns over the annual appropriations process led Chief Justice Roberts to also argue that the
independence of the courts is under attack. He wrote in his 2005 annual report, "In recent years, the budget for the federal
judiciary and the ever-lengthening appropriations process have taken a toll on the operations of the courts. 57 The Chief Justice went on to
complain about the overly high rents that the judicial branch pays to the federal General Services Administration for courthouses and other
office space. He continued, "Escalating rents combined with across-the-board cuts imposed during fiscal years 2004 and 2005 resulted in a
reduction of approximately 1,500 judicial branch employees as of mid-December [2005] when compared to October 2003." 58 At this point, it is
worth quoting the new Chief Justice at some length on his views of the intersection of judicial independence and the appropriations process:
The federal judiciary, as one of the three coordinate branches of government, makes only modest requests of the other branches with respect
to funding its vital mission of preserving the rule of law under our Constitution. Those of us in the judiciary understand the challenges our
country faces and the many competing interests that must be balanced in funding our national priorities. But the courts play an essential role in
ensuring that we live in a society governed by the rule of law, including the Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty. In order to preserve
the independence of our courts, we must ensure that the judiciary is provided the tools to do its job. 59 Some
politicians are quite
open about advocating that the Congress use its power of the purse to influence the decisions of the
federal courts. Former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) said in the spring of 2005 after the
Schiavo controversy, I have asked the Judiciary Committee to look at the Schiavo case and the actions of
the judiciary. . . . The legislative branch has certain responsibilities and obligations given to us by the
Constitution. We set the jurisdiction of the courts. We set up the courts. We can unset the courts. We
have the power of the purse.60 Some conservatives in Congress had become so angry with a host of what they perceive to be
improperly liberal activist decisions of the federal courts and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, that in 2003 they created a new House caucus
on judicial accountability. According to a press release issued by the new organization, this new House Working Group on Judicial Accountability
will educate members of Congress and the public about judicial abuses, especially judicial activism.6 1 Congressman
Steve Chabot
(R-Ohio), a founding member of the Working Group, defined judicial activism in the following way: "Judicial activism occurs
when judges exceed the authority given to them under Article III of the Constitution. When judges substitute their own political
views for the law, the ramifications can be felt by communities across our nation. 62 Former Minority Leader of the House
Tom DeLay (D-Tex.) said at the time, "When it comes to judicial abuses, they're going to take no
prisoners. 63 Founding members of the new Working Group later introduced legislation to require that a
two-thirds vote in both houses could override any constitutional decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
that struck down a federal statute as unconstitutional. 6
 AT: No Support (Trump)
Trump will lashout – that triggers our rule of law internal link
Michaelson 2/8 (Jay, legal affairs columnist at The Daily Beast. He primarily covers law, religion, sexuality, and environmental issues, with
an occasional arts review now and then. Jay often appears on CNN, NPR, MSNBC, and other outlets, and has a second career as a rabbi and
meditation teacher. He holds a J.D. from Yale and a Ph.D. in Jewish Thought from Hebrew University, "President Trump to Judges: Drop Dead,"
Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/president-trump-to-judges-drop-dead) KEN

No president has ever sounded as authoritarian toward courts as this one. And with his next attorney
general, he can do great harm to the independent judiciary. If Donald Trump has his way, federal judges
will be treated like Senator Elizabeth Warren: forced to sit down and shut up. In a series of comments since a
Seattle judge placed a temporary hold on his travel ban, Trump has escalated his attack on the
institutions of democracy: last week, the free press; this week, the independent judiciary. “The courts seem to be so
political,” Trump said to a gathering of law enforcement officers Tuesday, “and it would be so great for our justice system if they would
be able to read a statement and do what’s right.” Trump also complained “It’s really incredible to me that we have a
court case that is going on so long” (actually, the first cases were filed two weeks ago). And, echoing his “Second Amendment
People” campaign rhetoric, Trump accused judges of “taking away our weapons, one by one.” It’s no coincidence that
Trump’s comments come as the confirmation process for attorney general nominee Senator Jeff Sessions winds down: it’s Sessions, after all,
who co-authored the ban itself. That fact seems to have been conveniently forgotten by Republicans who have opposed the ban but still plan to
vote for Sessions.And, of course, Trump’s
comments Tuesday were but the latest in a week of court-bashing.
These are truly unprecedented statements. Even the court-packing scheme of FDR and Andrew
Jackson’s alleged pronouncement “John Marshall made his decision; now let him enforce it!” do not
approach this level of contempt for the rule of law. Of course, presidents have often vociferously disagreed with judicial
rulings, but even Richard Nixon reserved his most acerbic comments for private (albeit taped) conversations, not public statements like these.
Even Judge Neil Gorsuch, Trump's nominee to sit on the Supreme Court, called his remarks "disheartening" and "demoralizing" in a
conversation with Senator Richard Blumenthal. In public, presidents
have generally deferred to courts, as the guardians
of the rule of law, while expressing confidence that their views would prevail in the end—not calling a
judge a “so-called judge” or an opinion “ridiculous.” Now, some of this is just Trump being Trump. It’s probably best to take
his from-the-hip comments with a grain of salt. But let’s remember the substance of the debate, and the power that
Trump and Sessions wield. In fact, contrary to Trump’s assertion that this is all political, the legal, constitutional problems with the
ban are legion. First, it is wildly overbroad. Trump and Sessions (with input, according to reports, from White House senior advisor, Stephen
Miller) imposed a seven-nation travel ban that included people who had already cleared exhaustive vetting procedures, people with approved
visas, and people with green cards. (It may also be under-inclusive, omitting countries like Saudi Arabia, but that is a separate matter.) Second,
it arguably discriminates on the basis of religion. While the ban is explicitly based on nationality, not religion, it banned people from Muslim-
majority countries after a heated campaign in which Trump had called for a ban on Muslims. GET THE BEAST IN YOUR INBOX! Enter your email
address By clicking “Subscribe,” you agree to have read the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy SUBSCRIBE Third, it was rolled out hurriedly, with a
minimum of consultation, leading to immediate and widespread chaos, imposing harms on hundreds of thousands of people. There have been
reports that government officials have even defied court orders, which, if true, would be extremely serious violations. These are not political
questions; they are legal ones. Trump was right to read, at his Tuesday remarks, from the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which indeed
grants him broad latitude in matters of immigration and national security. But broad latitude doesn’t mean unchecked latitude. For example, in
Trump’s reading of the law, he could order that only white people be let into the country. Would that be constitutional? In other words, the
judges hearing these cases—whether they have upheld, partially upheld, or rejected the ban—are doing their jobs. The ban brings up serious
First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and statutory questions. To
strongly disagree with a judge’s interpretations of those
questions is any politician’s prerogative. To accuse them of illegitimacy is authoritarian. And however the Ninth
Circuit rules on the temporary stay, it seems clear that this issue, in one form or another, is headed for the Supreme Court. Will Trump
delegitimize the Court, too, if it does not rule as he likes? Is there no limit to his contempt? It’s
also best not to minimize Trump’s
remarks because of the power that he wields. First, the Trump-Sessions Justice Department has extremely
wide discretion to pursue or ignore legal claims. Already, there are reports that the department intends to set aside the
consent decree regarding pervasive racism in the Baltimore Police Department. That has an immediate effect on the ground, on real people.
Now multiply that by a thousand, with a DoJ siding with police reflexively, as Trump promised today. Second, the Trump administration has the
power to shape the federal judiciary—beginning, of course, with the Supreme Court, but perhaps more importantly with district judges,
appellate judges, immigration court judges, and administrative judges. To be sure, Judge Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s pick for the Supreme Court, is
an outstanding, if arch-conservative, jurist. But down the line, the clear signal is that lower court judges will be picked on the basis of ideology
rather than independence (or competence). We’re going to have immigration courts presided over by the likes of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Third, as
the Washington Post’s Aaron Blake noted, it’s entirely foreseeable that the Trump administration will simply not
comply with judicial orders it doesn’t like. It hasn’t disobeyed the current stay on the travel ban; people from the affected
countries are again being admitted, as long as their papers are in order. But at the very least, Trump’s rhetoric puts courts on
notice that their orders might not be obeyed in the future. That would be, by definition, illegal. As Blake
gamed out in his piece, it’s not clear what would happen next. Contempt of court is an impeachable offense, but would the GOP-led House of
Representatives ever impeach Trump? Or would they, as seems far more likely, adopt his rhetoric that the court orders in question were
political, and thus not legitimate? Trump’s comments over the last week bring us one step away from a
constitutional crisis. And surely he knows this. His base loves attacks on “the courts” or “the media.” They don’t know and don’t care
about the legal niceties of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Trump is scaring and warning them into acceptance of
his own unlimited authority—and it’s a very easy sell. Again, if Trump’s remarks were just the childish ravings of a blogger
somewhere, they would be nothing to get upset about. But this is the president of the United States we’re talking about—and, if Republican
senators don’t stand up to creeping authoritarianism, the attorney general as well. The real threat to democracy isn’t the
tweets. It’s the power Trump has to fulfill them.

Even if there’s no court stripping, it triggers our internal link

Zeitz 2/14 (Joshua, historian, contributing editor at Politico Magazine, and New York Times best-selling author, "How Donald Trump Could
Pressure the Supreme Court," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/how-donald-trump-could-pressure-the-
supreme-court-214778) KEN

Now, with members of the press corps present, FDR let loose another volley. The
Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the interstate
commerce clause, the president argued, limited his ability to address the structural causes of the Great
Depression and to alleviate the human suffering that flowed from it. “We are facing a very, very great national nonpartisan
issue,” he argued. “We have got to decide one way or the other … whether in some way we are going to … restore to the federal government the powers which
exist in the national governments of every other nation in the world. … We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.”
Conservatives were outraged at this attack on the nation’s highest court, a point that resonated in press coverage of the showdown between the court and the
White House. In an underhanded compliment, Arthur Vandenberg, a senator from Michigan, offered that he did not “think the president has any thought of
emulating Mussolini, Hitler or Stalin, but his utterance as I have heard it is exactly what these men would say.” Henry Stimson, a cabinet member under presidents
William Howard Taft and Herbert Hoover (and, later, during World War II, under FDR as well) judged the statement “dangerous and inflammatory.” The “horse-and-
buggy” press conference was just the opening shot in a longer battle. In 1937, on the heels of winning a landslide re-election victory, Roosevelt

attempted to pack the high court with additional justices and thereby achieve a pro-New Deal majority.
The maneuver generated a powerful backlash, giving rise to a congressional opposition coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans and costing Roosevelt a
working majority in Congress. So the story goes. For
President Donald Trump, who has in recent weeks crossed several
lines in his denunciation of federal judges who suspended his travel ban, the standard narrative seems
to offer a clear warning: tangle with the judiciary at great political risk. But that’s not all that history
suggests. True, Roosevelt’s unsuccessful assault on the judiciary catalyzed a powerful opposition bloc. But it also cowed key
members of the court, paving the way for a complete reversal of prevailing jurisprudence, to FDR’s
benefit. Judges enjoy lifetime tenure, but they are not immune to political pressure. In 1937, the court
accommodated the president in the interest of saving the institution. The same could just as easily
happen today.

Court packing means Trump can shape the judiciary

Zeitz 2/14 (Joshua, historian, contributing editor at Politico Magazine, and New York Times best-selling author, "How Donald Trump Could
Pressure the Supreme Court," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/how-donald-trump-could-pressure-the-
supreme-court-214778) KEN

With resistance building, on March 29, 1937, the court stunned political observers when it upheld a Washington
state law that was essentially identical to the New York statute that it had invalidated several months
earlier. Owen Roberts provided the “switch in time that saved nine,” as the popular phrase later went. Perhaps at the urging of Chief Justice
Hughes, who had dissented in the earlier case, Roberts changed his vote to take the wind out of FDR’s sails. It’s impossible to know; as some
historians have noted, Roberts appears to have indicated his decision to reverse course before FDR announced his court-packing plan. It’s
possible that he was motivated more by the president’s overwhelming popularity, as evident by the election results, than by a fear of a war
between the executive and judiciary branches. Whatever the motivation, the ruling augured more cooperation from the high court. Not long
after, disinterested in waiting out FDR’s second term in the minority, Van Devanter announced his
resignation. On most matters, FDR could fashion a certain majority of five or six—it seemed likely that both Roberts and Hughes (and
whomever he appointed to replace Van Devanter) would line up with the liberals. He no longer needed to pack the court. But the
president didn’t abandon his scheme. Instead, he fought tooth and nail for it, then watched it die a slow death. Roosevelt spent down
considerable political capital on what proved to be a doomed mission. In its wake, a functioning bipartisan majority of conservative
congressmen ground the president’s domestic policy to a halt. As Henry Wallace, FDR’s agriculture secretary and, later, vice president, would
observe that the “whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight.” But Wallace was only half right. The
conservative coalition did stop the further expansion of the New Deal. But in another, key way, FDR’s
gambit worked: With
Hughes and Roberts now inclined to support the administration on key issues, and with Roosevelt’s ally,
Hugo Black, now sitting in Van Devanter’s seat, the court upheld many of the most important New Deal
initiatives that Congress had already passed, including Social Security, a new version of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the
National Labor Relations Act (which gave workers the right to join unions and bargain collectively) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (which
established maximum hours and wages for workers). One by one, the Four Horsemen retired—now in the minority,
they saw little reason to wait out FDR’s second and third terms. In their wake, FDR molded the court in his
image. More broadly, the Roosevelt Court embraced an expansive view of the Commerce Clause, conferring upon the federal government
the right to regulate even those economic activities that were only tangentially related to the interstate sale of goods and services. In 1942 the
justices went so far as to rule that a farmer growing wheat on a small plot just 23 acres in size—wheat that was to be wholly consumed by his
livestock—fell under the purview of federal regulation. That expansive reading of the Commerce Clause outlived FDR and formed the legal basis
for major liberal reforms over the next 75 years, including civil rights, environmental protection and consumer protection laws.

Controversial court hearings empirically result in executive backlash

Bredemeier 6/13 (Ken, The University of Texas at Dallas, ”Trump Attacks Latest Court Ruling Against
Travel Ban” https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court/3898453.html)mlm

U.S. President Donald Trump is assailing the latest federal appellate court decision blocking his executive
order restricting travel from six majority-Muslim countries where terrorist attacks have occurred. "Well, as
predicted, the 9th Circuit did it again - Ruled against the TRAVEL BAN at such a dangerous time in the history of our country," Trump posted on
his Twitter account Tuesday, adding, "S.C." in
an apparent reference to the government's appeal to the Supreme
Court. Monday's decision in San Francisco was the second against Trump's attempts to curb travel from Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria
and Libya. Earlier, the Virginia-based 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Maryland judge's ruling blocking parts of the order. ‘Not a one-
person show’ In the San Francisco ruling, a three-judge panel said that while the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act gives the president
broad powers to both control entrants to the United States and protect U.S. security, "immigration, even for the president, is not a one-person
show." The 4thCircuit focused largely on statements and tweets made by President Trump that indicated
his order was a ban on Muslims, something he advocated during his campaign for president. But the 4th
Circuit was only ruling on the portion of the law restricting travel from the six countries for 90 days. "In suspending the entry of more than 180
million nationals from six countries, suspending the entry of all refugees, and reducing the cap on the admission of refugees from 110,000 to
50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year, the president did not meet the essential precondition to exercising his delegated authority: The
president
must make a sufficient finding that the entry of these classes of people would be 'detrimental to the
interests of the United States,'” the judges wrote.
 I/L – Rule of Law (9th Circuit)
Causes him to break up the 9th Circuit Court
Dolan 17 (Maura, Contact reporter for the Los Angeles Times, “Q&A Has the 9th Circuit gone
'bananas'? And can Trump break it up?,” Los Angeles Times, 4/27,
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-9th-circuit-20170427-htmlstory.html) ip

President Trump, angry about a judge’s decision to temporarily block enforcement of his order against “sanctuary” cities, has
called for
breaking up the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Never mind that the sanctuary city ruling came from a trial judge on the
district court bench in San Francisco — not the 9th Circuit appellate court. “It’s the 9th Circuit going bananas,” White House
Chief of Staff Reince Priebus told reporters after the judge blocked Trump’s order, which threatened to cut federal
funds to jurisdictions that limit cooperation with immigration agents. Trump tweeted: “First the Ninth Circuit rules against
the ban & now it hits again on sanctuary cities-both ridiculous rulings. See you in the Supreme Court!”
The sanctuary ruling will not even get to the 9th Circuit until Trump appeals the lower court’s decision. There are generally three levels of
courts in the federal system: district courts, where trials are held; intermediate appellate circuit courts, which hear appeals from the lower
courts; and the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of disputes. That the 9th Circuit received blame for a decision it didn’t
make reflected its long-held status as a whipping boy for conservatives. Efforts to break it up stretch
back decades. The parade for change began with a senator from Washington state whose state kept losing fishing cases in the 9th Circuit.
Contentious rulings by the court over the years increased the fomentation. The 9th Circuit, for example, was
the source of a ruling that the mention of God in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Constitution. The
Supreme Court overturned the decision. Conservative critics justify a proposed breakup on the grounds that the 9th
Circuit — the largest of the U.S. appeals courts in terms of judges and the population covered — is just too unwieldy. They
contend that cases would move more quickly if the court were split into more circuits. But the main beef
is political. Judges appointed by Democratic presidents outnumber Republican appointees on the 9th Circuit by about two to one. Judge
Alex Kozinski, a Republican with libertarian views appointed by President Reagan, has been quoted as saying, “You’d have to believe in the
tooth fairy to say this has nothing to do with politics.” Ninth
Circuit critics believe that creating a separate circuit of the
most conservative Western states would result in more conservative rulings. California now has more cases in the
9th Circuit than any other state. A new circuit also could mean more judicial appointments for the sitting
president — in this case, Trump.

Republicans will support Trumps plan to break up the 9th circuit

Rozsa 4/27/17 (Matthew, History MA from Rutgers, reporter, “Donald Trump wants to “break up” the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
because his unconstitutional executive orders keep getting struck down”, Salon http://www.salon.com/2017/04/27/donald-trump-wants-to-
break-up-the-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals-because-his-unconstitutional-executive-orders-keep-getting-struck-down/) dsk

President Donald Trump has made it clear that he is not happy about Judge William Orrick from the US District Court for the Northern District
of California issuing a temporary halt against his sanctuary cities order — and he is
thinking of breaking up a circuit court that
would hear his appeal next as a result of it. “There are many people that want to break up the 9th Circuit.
It’s outrageous,” President Trump told The Washington Examiner in an interview published on Wednesday. He added, “Everybody
immediately runs to the 9th Circuit. And we have a big country. We have lots of other locations. But they
immediately run to the 9th Circuit. Because they know that’s like, semi-automatic.” Trump offered no specifics
on what he would do. Trump also used the opportunity to denounce sanctuary cities, where undocumented immigrants are protected from
immigration authorities that would try to deport them. “Sanctuary cities have been very, very dangerous, very, very bad. And, you know, we’ve
done a great job on law enforcement, we’ve done a great job at the border. And all of our most talented people say sanctuary cities are a
disaster,” Trump told The Washington Examiner. One concern about the 9th Circuit Court of appeals is that it covers a very
large area, including nine western states and two territories. It also has a left-wing reputation in terms
of its rulings, in part because 18 of its 25 active judges were appointed by Democratic presidents. As Ed Kilgore writes in New York
Magazine, Trump’s
suggestion about breaking up the 9th Circuit is “by no means a novel idea for a Republican;
conservatives have always disliked the 9th Circuit as “too liberal,” much as the 5th Circuit has an unsavory
reputation among liberals as being too conservative. With judicial appointments depending on who is president when vacancies occur and how
confirmations are handled by the Senate, you just can’t keep the circuits balanced in any way.” Donald
Trump wants to "break up"
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals because his unconstitutional executive orders keep getting struck down

That sets a precedent which undermines the American judiciary and rule of law
Bannon and Sobel 17 (Alicia, serves as Senior Counsel in the Brennan Center's Democracy Program,
Nathaniel, special assistant to the director in the Brennan Center's Democracy Program, “A Test of
American Democracy,” The American Prospect, 5/19, http://prospect.org/article/test-american-
democracy) ip
This week, after years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a federal appeals court decision striking down North Carolina’s restrictive
2013 voting law. The lower court had ruled that parts of the law illegally “target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision.” That
outcome is a victory not only for North Carolina voters but also for our democracy. For
the political process to function, state
and federal lawmakers must respect baseline democratic norms—the laws and traditions that guard the
integrity of our democracy against extreme political gamesmanship and threats to minority rights. When state
lawmakers cross those lines, as they did in North Carolina, it is up to the courts to protect core democratic
values and the rule of law. But in North Carolina, and in other states around the country, lawmakers are again trying to
manipulate the “rules of the game” to their own advantage, this time putting the state judiciary in their
crosshairs. These attacks on the courts magnify the heightened politicization of the federal bench.
President Trump’s assault on the legitimacy of a “so-called judge,” his assertion that the courts would be
to blame for a terrorist attack, and his call to break up the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals after it ruled
against the administration, all contribute to a political environment where state and federal lawmakers
may feel less constrained by the conventions that ensure the courts are an independent check on the
political branches. Since North Carolina Democrats won control of the governor’s mansion last November, along with a majority on the
state’s highest court, the Republican-controlled legislature has proposed, and passed, a slew of bills focused on entrenching partisan interests
in the state’s courts. It’s a worrying trend that risks normalizing political interference with the courts . Already
this year, the legislature has twice overridden the governor’s veto on bills that made it through both chambers, and several other problematic
bills have passed the House. One new law, for example, reduces the size of North Carolina’s intermediate appellate court by three seats—a
seemingly small change with big political ramifications. Several Republican-appointed judges are expected to hit the state’s mandatory
retirement age in the next few years, and the new law effectively prevents the state’s Democratic governor from filling those slots. Unlike
previous court reform efforts, the bill was passed without input from the court of appeals, its judges, or
the courts’ administrative body. In a dramatic move just days before the legislature overrode the governor’s veto, Judge Doug
McCullough—a Republican who was expected to step down later this month when he reached the mandatory retirement age—resigned in
protest so that the governor would be able to appoint a new judge to fill the seat before the bill became law. McCullough said, “I did not want
my legacy to be the elimination of a seat and the impairment of a court that I have served on.” Unfortunately, similar hijinks are
cropping up around the country. A Brennan Center analysis found that lawmakers in at least 15 states
have introduced 41 bills targeting state courts, often to achieve overtly political goals. These measures
range from efforts to manipulate the way judges reach the bench to brazen attempts to unseat sitting
judges, to restrictions on courts’ jurisdiction and power. In Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, and North Carolina, bills have
passed; in Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma, bills have been voted out of a chamber of the legislature. One particularly troubling
new trend is a group of bills that would allow state legislatures to—in one way or another—refuse to enforce
court decisions. This includes a bill that passed the Arizona House of Representative that would give lawmakers the authority to prohibit
the use of state resources to implement federal court rulings, and a Washington bill that would empower the legislature to override state court
decisions. So far this year, nine such bills have been introduced in seven states. The
potential ramifications of these political
power grabs are significant. State courts hear more than 95 percent of all cases nationwide. Judges’ decisions affect
everything from consumer rights to the environment to education funding—and because few state judges enjoy life
tenure, and most state constitutions can be changed relatively easily, state benches are more vulnerable to manipulation than their federal
counterparts. When the lines between judging and politics start to blur, it risks eroding public trust in our
judiciary. In June 1937, after FDR moved to pack the Supreme Court after it struck down his signature New Deal legislation, his own party
rejected the effort as “an invasion of judicial power such as has never before been attempted in this country.” It’s hard to imagine a
political leader so strongly defying his or her own party today. But that’s what American democracy
desperately needs: politicians willing to put a stop to the present metastatic greed for partisan power,
especially when the integrity of the judiciary is on the line.

Breaking up the 9th Circuit Court ensures massive federal overreach

Goldman 17 (Brian, attorney at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe. Ian Samuel is lecturer at Harvard Law
School, “Opinion: Why it would be bad for Trump to break up the 9th Circuit Court,” The Mercury News,
5/12, http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/12/opinion-why-it-would-be-bad-for-trump-to-break-up-
the-9th-circuit-court/) ip

President Trump’s ban on immigration from six majority-Muslim nations returns this week to theNinth Circuit—the same federal appeals
court that blocked his first travel ban in February. Perhaps fearing a similar result this time, the president recently
declared that he is “absolutely” considering breaking up the 151-year-old court, which, he says, “has a
terrible record of being overturned” by the Supreme Court. To borrow a line from the president: Wrong. Since John
Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005, the Ninth Circuit has never been the most-reversed court of appeals. Last year,
it decided 6,896 cases; the Supreme Court reviewed just 11 of them, about 0.2 percent. Even among the tiny handful of cases
the Supreme Court chose to hear, it reversed in eight (about 72 percent). That’s in line with the Supreme Court’s fairly high
rate of reversing all the courts it reviews (about 70 percent). The Supreme Court is like the principal’s office that way: most days you don’t get
called in, but when you do, it’s usually not to receive an award for good behavior. Proposals to split the Ninth Circuit aren’t new. The usual
justification is size: its jurisdiction extends from Guam to Montana. But
the court’s scope is an enormous benefit. For one
thing, it
allows the West’s expansive federal lands and technology industry to enjoy one stable body of
law administered by one court. (Should different legal rules really govern Google and Amazon?) And the Ninth Circuit has
used its resources to become the most accessible federal court in the country: It is the only one to
livestream video of all of its proceedings online, including Monday’s hearing. Other features, like its
best-in-breed mediation program, resolve many cases quicker and at lower cost to the public and the
parties—all because of its scale. The Ninth Circuit is busy. An influx of immigration appeals has yielded a
greater backlog of cases than in many other courts. But imagine, as in one current proposal, that California, Hawaii, Oregon, and
the Pacific territories were split off, and a new circuit created from the remaining states of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada and
Washington. That would
move about a third of the judges and a third of the cases into a new circuit, keeping
the heavy caseload per judge the same everywhere. We’re lawyers, not mathematicians, but we can’t figure out how that
would speed things up. If a highway is congested, renaming the lanes doesn’t make the cars go faster. If the complaint is that the Ninth Circuit
is “too liberal,” this is especially strange: it would create a new “Twelfth Circuit” with an even larger majority of judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. Whereas about two-thirds of today’s Ninth Circuit judges were appointed by Democrats, in the Twelfth, it would be
three-fourths—and the Ninth would still have a majority, even after President Trump fills open seats. We have living constitutionalists in
Arizona and Montana, just as we have originalists in California and Oregon. The gerrymandering wouldn’t work. Punishing
an
independent court because of partisan politics makes us queasy. With its distinctive geography,
economics and demographics, the West often keeps the federal government in check, and its court has
done the same. Washington doesn’t like to be told no, so the president’s desire for retaliation isn’t a surprise. But
the Ninth Circuit has long protected the public from the government’s ill-reasoned fits of pique. We
hope the public will return the favor this time.
Dissolving the 9th circuit court of appeals gives Trump the power he needs to silence
opposition
Werrell 4/27/17 (Zachary, Campaign consultant and manager for various political figures, “It’s Time for Trump to Dissolve the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals”, The Resurgent, http://theresurgent.com/its-time-for-trump-to-dissolve-the-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals/) dsk

Recently, Congress has considered legislation to break up the 9th Circuit into multiple Courts (with President Trump now
signaling support) seeing as it represents 40% of the land mass and 20% of the Population of the United States. Justices Kennedy and Thomas
have even testified before Congress that the Court is simply too large. But simply breaking up the 9th Circuit Court doesn’t go far enough. The
reason for dissolving the Court, as opposed to just breaking it up, is to free the new Courts and the subjugate States from
the absurd “precedent” of the Court (to the extent that exists for Circuit Courts in our Common-Law system). The 9th Circuit has
been creating laughable “precedents” like those outlined above, most of which will never be overturned by new iterations of the Court nor the
Supreme Court. If we simply break up the 9th Circuit Court, both new Courts will be bound by the “precedent” set by the old 9th Circuit.
Without completely starting from scratch, the new 9th or 12th would practically still be bound to forcing Arizona to not require citizenship to
vote. To further ensure the eradication of the bad “precedent” of the 9th Circuit, it would be worthwhile to also consider rearranging large
portions of the districts west of the Mississippi to incorporate States currently covered by the 9th, as thiswould create a legal
condition where the other Courts’ precedent would be enforceable by the new Courts in the affected
territory. And beyond simply breaking the current 9th Circuit, it would be a massive political signal that
Judicial Tyranny is on notice. If enacted (or even seriously considered) this proposal would not just shake things up,
it would knock the whole table over. And on that note, beyond the 9th Circuit-centric reasons for dissolving the Court, I believe
the Right needs to start forcing such ‘Constitutional Crises’ as this to halt the runaway advances of the
Left. I professionally engage in electoral battles for seats in the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, but am increasingly of the
opinion that long-term, such battles and victories will be largely meaningless unless Judicial Tyranny is
checked in a serious way. We have a runaway train of Federal Unconstitutionality barreling down the tracks. Fighting over what
degree to pull the brake lever of that train is no longer the best means to halt its advance… our best bet is to start throwing boulders on the
tracks. In the most analogous example, FDR
used the threat of the Legislative Branch’s authority over the Courts
(packing the Court) to force a Constitutional Crisis to great political effect for his political aims – though it
was used in a manner damaging to the Republic and the Constitution. We on the Right must stop shying away from such acute measures.
Dissolving the 9th Circuit Court for its pathetic record and playing politics is equally shocking and without precedent, but like packing the Court,
is completely legitimate under the Constitution. It’s time the Right start thinking out of the box, and start taking big swings at the ball while we
still can. The Right currently holds both Houses of the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, and we ought to
make good use of that power before the next election cycle. If we fail to make large-scale structural changes in as favorable a political
environment as today’s, we may lose our chance forever. There is an unprecedented opportunity with President Trump
and the Congress to finally start responding to years of the Left weaponization of the Courts for their
political ends. I say its high time we disarm the Left and take away their most powerful political weapon. President Trump and the
Congress, dissolve the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
 AT: No 9th Breakup
Breaking up the ninth circuit is a possibility
Hensch 4/27 (Mark, Reporter citing Senator Ted Cruz, “Cruz: Breaking up 9th Circuit Court ‘a possibility’”, The Hill,
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/330935-cruz-breaking-9th-circuit-court-a-possibility) dsk

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) says that breaking up the 9th U.S Circuit Court of Appeals is “certainly a possibility .” “The
9th Circuit is the largest federal court of appeals,” he said Thursday on “The Jack Riccardi Show.” “I think that’s a topic I can easily see the
[Senate] Judiciary Committee taking up, and we’ll have to see whether we have to votes to do that or not.” Cruz added that California’s
inclusion in the court’s jurisdiction has given it a liberal tilt. “I think many of the Western states are weighted down by California,” the 2016 GOP
presidential candidate said. “California has a ton of very liberal, left-wing judges that they put on the 9th Circuit. I think a lot of the other
Western states would love to be freed from that corrosive left-wing influence.” President Trump said Wednesday he has
“absolutely”
considered proposals to break up the 9th Circuit after earlier that day slamming its “ridiculous rulings” against him. “There
are many people that want to break up the 9th Circuit,” he said, accusing people of going "judge shopping" there. “It’s
outrageous.” “Everybody immediately runs to the 9th Circuit,” Trump added of cases against his administration. “Because they know, that’s
like, semi-automatic.” The 9th Circuit earlier this year blocked Trump's executive order barring immigration from certain Muslim-majority
countries and banning all Syrian refugees from the U.S. Earlier Wednesday, Trump railed against the 9th Circuit over a judge
blocking his order withholding funds from sanctuary cities. A district judge in San Francisco, not the appeals circuit, on Tuesday blocked
enforcement of that executive order. The 9th Circuit will hear the White House’s appeal of the lower court’s ruling, which would
affect cities refusing to enforce federal immigration laws. Republicans have criticized the court’s makeup
because Democratic presidents have appointed 18 of its 25 judges. The 9th Circuit Court covers Arizona, California, Alaska, Nevada, Idaho,
Oregon, Montana, Washington and Hawaii, as well as Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.

Breakup is a real possibility

Jenkins 4/26 (Aric, reporter, “President Trump Is 'Absolutely' Considering Breaking Up the Ninth Circuit Court”, Time Magazine,
http://time.com/4756872/donald-trump-ninth-circuit-court/) dsk

Republicans would need 60 votes in the Senate. Watch the "Fox & Friends" clip above. President Donald Trump
said on Wednesday that
he is considering splitting up the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit after its recent rulings that
have blocked two of his executive orders. "There are many people that want to break up the Ninth
Circuit. It's outrageous," Trump said to the Washington Examiner in an interview at the White House. "Everybody immediately runs to
the Ninth Circuit. And we have a big country. We have lots of other locations. But they immediately run to the Ninth Circuit. Because they know
that's like, semi-automatic." On Tuesday, a California judge temporarily blocked the president's efforts to withhold federal funds from so-called
"sanctuary cities," or municipalities that limit their cooperation with immigration enforcement agencies.“If there was doubt about the scope of
the order, the president and attorney general [Jeff Sessions] have erased it with their public comments,” Judge William H. Orrick of United
States District Court wrote in his ruling. Two other judges on the Ninth Circuit earlier this year blocked different versions of Trump's proposed
travel ban, which targeted Muslim-majority countries. The
Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction over nine west coast states and
two U.S. territories. Eighteen of the court's 25 judges were appointed by Democratic presidents."You
see judge shopping, or what's gone on with these people, they immediately run to the Ninth Circuit,"
Trump added. "It's got close to an 80 percent reversal period, and what's going on in the 9th Circuit is a
shame."
 I/L - Funding
Congress can cut off funds for judiciaries it dislikes
Miller 16 (Mark C, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Relations; Director of the Law and
Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, “The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflicting Institutional Wills.” Presented
at the Separation of Powers Conference, Sponsored by the School of Public and International Affairs, 2/19 and 2/20, .
http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/mlynch/Miller.pdf) KEN

When the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress becomes highly conflictual, Congress
has a variety of weapons at its disposal in order to signal its disapproval to the Court. One of its biggest weapons
is the power of the purse. In order to protect the independence of the federal courts, the U.S. Constitution gives all federal judges life terms
and it prevents Congress from reducing the salaries of federal judges. However, Congress
is under no obligation to provide
annual cost of living increases to them. It is also under no obligation to pay for law clerks, computers, or
even air conditioning for the justices. Although they rarely follow through, Congress members seem routinely to
threaten to cut the budget of the courts when they disagree with specific court rulings. Congressman Steve
King (R-Iowa), a vocal critic of the Supreme Court, has been quoted as saying, “When their budget starts to dry up,
we’ll get their attention” (quoted in Marcus, 2005, A19). Former Majority Leader Tom DeLay was even blunter when he
said, “We set up the courts. We can unset the courts. We have the power of the purse” (quoted in Klein, 2005,
A9). Sometimes Congress does follow through with these threats. In her work, Toma found that from 1946 to 1977, Congress
rewarded the Supreme Court with budget increases when it handed down conservative decisions and
attempted to punish the Court for its liberal decisions by withholding budget increases (Toma, 1991). For
example, in 1964 Congress increased the salaries of lower federal judges by $7,500 per year, but allowed only a $4,500 increase for Supreme
Court justices, clearly signaling Congressional unhappiness with the justices of the high court (Schmidhauser and Berg, 1972, 9). Although it is
not entirely clear that Congress was acting intentionally with regards to the courts, the budget for the judiciary has recently experienced some
large cuts. In the automatic sequester cuts that went into effect in March of 2013, the federal courts saw their $6.97 billion annual budget cut
by over $322 million, for a 5 percent reduction. The cuts required furloughs and lay-offs for many employees of the federal judicial branch.
Some courts would only hear cases three or four days per week because the funding for federal prosecuting attorneys was also cut (see
Schoenberg and Zajac, 2013). Congress eventually restored the funding for the federal courts and prosecutors, but only after enormous
lobbying efforts by lawyers, judges, and others interested in the well-being of the federal judiciary.

Congress withdraws funding if it doesn’t like Supreme Court decisions

Miller 06 (Mark C, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Relations; Director of the Law and
Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, “When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts”,
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1666&context=caselrev) KEN

There have been many instances in which Congress has used various mechanisms to attack the federal
courts for decisions with which a determined legislative majority has disagreed.3° While to my knowledge
Congress has not yet deliberately defied the protections inherent in the Compensation Clause, the legislative branch has used other means to
attack the courts and to attempt to influence court decisions. Even though the
Compensation Clause prevents Congress from reducing
any judicial salaries that have already vested, 31 the clause neither requires Congress to provide any annual cost of living
adjustments for federal judges nor prevents Congress from canceling future announced judicial salary
increases. 32 Thus, judicial salaries have always been a point of contention, and Congress has sometimes
used judicial salaries to send a clear message to the courts. For example, in 1964, Congress increased the salaries for
lower federal judges by $7,500 per year but increased the salaries for Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court by only $4,500 per year. As
Schmidhauser and Berg explain, "The $3,000 differential clearly reflected a direct Congressional reprimand to the Supreme Court. This crude
rebuff clearly stemmed from congressional dissatisfaction with several controversial decisions rendered by the Court. 33 Clearly, judicial salary
issues have added to the tensions between the courts and Congress. Federal judges often feel that Congress does not provide adequate
compensation for them. As Professor Paul M. Bator has remarked, "federal judges, as a group, complain more about their pay than any other
group I have ever encountered." 34 There is probably a great deal of truth to the fact that federal judges feel that they are underpaid. In 2003,
Judges Coffin and Katzmann noted that, "Since 1969, federal judicial salaries have lost twenty-four percent of their purchasing power., 35
Various congressional actions regarding annual cost of living adjustments for federal judges have not made federal judges feel better about
their financial situations. For example, in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, Congress blocked previously announced "automatic" cost of living
increases for various governmental officials, including federal judges, that had been provided for in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.36 Congress
was really attempting to prevent the automatic pay raises for its own members from going into effect, but the legislation blocked federal
judicial pay increases as well as the pay raises for legislators. When
federal judges sued to recover their blocked
"automatic" pay increases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the
proposed "automatic" pay raises had not vested, and thus, there was no violation of the Compensation
Clause in the legislative actions. 3 7 Although the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the case, Justice Breyer wrote a
strongly worded dissent to the denial of certiorari, which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined.38 This concern with judicial salaries and other
budgetary resources is not new, of course. Although he was speaking more broadly of his frustration with congressional budgeting practices,
Chief Justice Warren stated in 1969 that, "It is next to impossible for the courts to get something from Congress. " 39
In his annual year-end reports on the State of the Judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist often complained about Congress's approach to judicial
salary issues. In his 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused most of the report on what he termed, "the
most pressing issue facing the Judiciary: the need to increase judicial salaries." 40 The Chief Justice went on to say, [I]n order to continue to
provide the nation a capable and effective judicial system we must be able to attract and retain experienced men and women of quality and
diversity to perform a demanding position in the public service. The fact is that those
lawyers who are qualified to serve as
federal judges have opportunities to earn far more in private law practice or business than as judges. In
order to continue to attract highly qualified and diverse federal judges-judges whom we ask and expect
to remain for life-we must provide them adequate compensation. 41 In a quite lengthy discussion of the subject, the
Chief Justice also noted that judicial salary issues had been discussed in thirteen of the last nineteen end-of-year reports on the state of the
judiciary.42 In his 2002 Annual Report, the Chief Justice reiterated the same sentiment: "At the risk of beating a dead horse, I will reiterate what
I have said many times over the years about the need to compensate judges fairly.' '43 Judicial salary issues remain important to the Supreme
Court and to all federal judges. In his first annual report, Chief Justice Roberts also raised the judicial salary issue: A more direct threat to
judicial independence is the failure to raise judges' pay. If
judges' salaries are too low, judges effectively serve for a
term dictated by their financial position rather than for life. Figures gathered by the Administrative Office show that
judges are leaving the bench in greater numbers now than ever before.
 I/L – Court Packing
Court packing is a logical escalation
Mystal 4/7 (Elie, received a degree in Government from Harvard University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. He was formerly a litigator at Debevoise &
Plimpton but quit the legal profession to pursue a career as an online provocateur, “Court Packing Is The Way To Save The Court From The U.S. Senate,”
http://abovethelaw.com/2017/04/court-packing-is-the-way-to-save-the-court-from-the-u-s-senate/) EYC

The Senate confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees is broken. “Borked,” if you will. It doesn’t matter who broke it: I say Garland, you say Gorsuch. Either
way, the Senate has shown it is completely unable to look past the politics of the nominees and make a fair assessment of their judicial qualifications. We know
why. One Supreme Court appointment can lurch our country to the right or the left. At this point, it would
be malpractice for either party to confirm a nominee who might frustrate their party’s political agenda
for the next 25 years. The way to fix this is to nerf the power of any individual appointment. In order to
do that, we need more Supreme Court justices. A lot more. Enough justices that the divine timing of death
and retirement does not create a political crisis for the party out of executive power. The Constitution does not
require nine Supreme Court justices. In fact, the Constitution is silent on how many judges should be on the Supreme

Court. We’re at nine because of the Judiciary Act of 1869. Maybe we’re due for an update? The lower courts handle things differently. The “progressive” Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the largest circuit court, operates with 29 judges. The influential D.C. Circuit has 11. The “conservative” Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 17
active judges. The number nine holds no mathematical magic. At the circuit court level, a three-judge panel is assigned to each case.
Generally, it’s a random wheel; all federal circuits use some kind of random assignment structure to create the appearance of neutrality. The three judges render
their ruling. If the parties don’t like the panel’s decision, they can seek rehearing “en banc.” If en banc rehearing is granted, the full court will look at the case and
render an opinion. A packed Supreme Court could similarly hear cases in three-judge panels, at least initially, with the possibility of a party seeking en banc review.
This would allow the Court to take more cases. And while you’d surely see a lot of 2-1 panel rulings, it would be a rare day that an “en banc” rehearing resulted in a
10-9 split along “party lines.” Most Supreme Court cases are too complicated to break so cleanly. “Court packing”
gets a bad rap, mainly because Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to do it in order to bully the Court into authorizing the New Deal. The Judicial Procedures Reform Act
of 1937 would have given Roosevelt the authority to appoint six new Supreme Court justices, and it went down in flames. Partisan court packing is
the next
logical escalation now that the GOP has changed the filibuster rules in order to install Neil Gorsuch in the
seat the Republicans stole from President Barack Obama. The Democrats will likely be back in power (someday), and on that day they’re unlikely to just sit
there and watch someone they perceive to be an illegitimate justice destroy women’s rights and gay rights and whatever else with a bunch of 5-4 decisions. If you
really think court packing won’t be on the table, you have no idea how much liberals value civil rights. The thing about going “nuclear” is that it leads to mutually
assured destruction. But court packing doesn’t have to be partisan, and if we do it right it will fix our whole pathetic confirmation process. Let’s say we had a
bipartisan committee come up with five “conservative” justices and five “liberal” ones to add to the Court. That would swell its numbers to 19, yet preserve the
current balance of conservatives and liberals. Now let’s say that Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Anthony Kennedy leaves the Court, and President Trump gets to nominate
the replacement.

There are zero legal barriers to court packing.

McMaken 16 (Ryan McMaken is the editor of Mises Wire and The Austrian, “Congress Should "Pack" the Supreme Court,”, 11/23/2016,
https://mises.org/blog/congress-should-pack-supreme-court, MisesInstitute) EYC

However, there
is no reason why the Congress could not go in the opposite direction and appoint
multiple new members to the Supreme Court. It certainly has the Constitutional authority to do so. As
was the case with Franklin Roosevelt's so-called "court-packing" plan, enormous reforms to the Supreme Court
require nothing more than a change in statute, or in come cases, Senate inaction. This move would help to make it abundantly clear the fact
that the Supreme Court is a political institution just as it was always intended to be. It would also be
helpful in asserting Congressional supremacy over the Court. Apart from the Constitutional mandate
that there be a Supreme Court — of indeterminate nature — it is totally a creature of Congressional
regulation. If Congress wishes it, it could fill the Scalia vacancy, and then add three or more seats in recognition of the approaching deaths
and (possible) current senility of Justices Breyer (age 78) Kennedy (age 80), and Ginsburg (age 83). As justification, Congress need
only explain that the 3 new seats will allow for new justices to be ready and already trained on "day
one" following the next death or resignation on the Court. Congress can elect to then not fill the Ginsburg vacancy (for
example) and allow the court to slowly revert to nine judges.
Impact
 ! - Disease
Extinction – modeling proves
Bar-Yam 1 (Yaneer, Complex systems scientist studying social and economic systems, president of the New England Complex Systems
Institute. Transition to Extinction: Pandemics in a connected world. July 3, 2016. http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition)

The video (Figure 1) shows a simple model of hosts and pathogens we have used to study evolutionary dynamics. In the animation, the green
are hosts and red are pathogens. As
pathogens infect hosts, they spread across the system. If you look closely,
you will see that the red changes tint from time to time — that is the natural mutation of pathogens to
become more or less aggressive. Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly
expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it
spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That
the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In
the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation
[8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding
airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range
transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long
range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more
transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to
survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which
pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is
not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels
of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we
wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is
a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that
isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about
evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected
world. Thetraditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the
potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the
connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point
about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be
destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how
close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in
West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa
stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers
of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis
didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and
well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more
connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like
the U.S.
have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can
be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a
mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport
infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very
well prove unstoppable. Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. Long range
transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.
Disease spread controls the direction of every impact --- it has played a role in every
state collapse in history – pandemics go nuclear
Morris 13 (Ian, professor of history at Stanford University, “The Measure of Civilization: How Social Development Decides the Fate of
Nations,” 3/22/2013, Carnegie Council, Lexis) KEN

There are several periods when we get discontinuities, when we get collapses in social development scores. You can see several very clear
examples on this graph. When we look back at the history of what happens when we get these great collapses in social
development, every time we see the same five forces involved: Mass migrations that the societies of the day cannot cope with. This is
always in the mix. The mass migrations often lead to huge epidemic diseases, as previously separate disease pools get
merged. Epidemic diseases regularly killing half the population, it would seem, tend to lead to state failure. Governments
cannot cope with catastrophe on this scale. The collapse of the governments tends to lead to breakdown in
long-distance trade. Famines ensue, many, many more people die. And then, always there in the mix in some way, although it
varies in every case, is climate change. It always plays into this. Now, I'm sure you don't need me to tell you these are forces that plenty of
people are talking about as threats we are facing in the early 21st century. It seems to me perfectly possible that the 21st century is going to
see another collapse of the kind we have seen so many times in the past. So in some ways it's possible the
21st century might be a
rerun of what has happened many times before—but with one big difference: We now have nuclear
weapons, which ancient people didn't have. The Romans would have loved nuclear weapons. Luckily, they didn't have them. I think if we
do stumble into a collapse on the scale that I'm talking about here, we should seriously expect there is a possibility of these
being used. It's quite possible that the 21st century will see a disaster that dwarfs anything we have seen
earlier.

Err neg on probability and magnitude

Zakaria 5 (Fareed, Indian-American journalist and author. He is the host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS and writes a weekly column for The
Washington Post, “A Threat Worse than Terror,” 10-31-2005, Newsweek, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/103105.html)
KEN

A flu pandemic is the most dangerous threat the United States faces today," says Richard Falkenrath, who until recently
served in the Bush administration as deputy Homeland Security adviser. "It's a bigger threat than terrorism. In fact it's
bigger than anything I dealt with when I was in government." One makes a threat assessment on the basis of two factors: the probability

of the event, and the loss of life if it happened. On both counts, a pandemic ranks higher than a major terror attack, even one

involving weapons of mass destruction. A crude nuclear device would probably kill hundreds of thousands. A flu
pandemic could easily kill millions. Whether this particular virus makes the final, fatal mutation that allows it to move from human to human, one day some virus
will. The basic factor that is fueling this surge of viruses is China's growth. (China is the natural habitat of the influenza virus.) As China develops, it urbanizes, and its forests and wetlands
shrink. That forces migratory birds to gather closer together-and closer to human habitation--which increases the chances of a virus spreading from one species to the next. Also, growth

Every day the chances

means a huge rise in chicken consumption. Across thousands of homes in China every day, chickens are slaughtered in highly unhygienic ways. "

that this virus or another such virus will move from one species to another grow," says Laurie Garrett, author of "The
Coming Plague," who has been writing brilliantly on this topic for years. Nobody really disputes that we are badly unprepared for this threat. "If something like this
pandemic were to happen today," says Falkenrath, "the government would be mostly an observer, not a manager." The government can't even give intelligent advice to its citizens

During the cold war,

because it doesn't actually know what to say. We don't know whether people should stay put, leave cities, stay home or go to the nearest hospital.

hundreds of people in government participated in dozens of crisis simulations of nuclear wars, accidents and
incidents. These "tabletop exercises" were conducted so that if and when a real crisis hit, policymakers would not

be confronting critical decisions for the first time. No such expertise exists for today's deadliest
threat.
 AT: Burnout
No burnout
MacPhee et al. 13 (Ross D. E., Ph.D. in Physical Anthropology from University of Alberta, Former chairman of the Department of
Mammalogy at the American Museum of Natural History, Professor at Richard Gilder Graduate School, Alex D. Greenwood, Head of the
Department of Wildlife Diseases at the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research, Professor of wildlife diseases in the Department of
Veterinary Medicine of the Freie Universität Berlin, “ Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction,” Hindawi Publishing Corporation,
http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijeb/2013/571939/)

Infectious disease, especially virulent infectious disease, is commonly regarded as a cause of fluctuation
or decline in biological populations. However, it is not generally considered as a primary factor in causing the
actual endangerment or extinction of species. We review here the known historical examples in which disease has, or has been assumed to have had, a major deleterious impact on animal
species, including extinction, and highlight some recent cases in which disease is the chief suspect in causing the outright endangerment of particular species. We conclude that the role of

disease in historical extinctions at the population or species level may have been underestimated.
Recent methodological breakthroughs may lead to a better understanding of the past and present roles of infectious disease in influencing
population fitness and other parameters. 1. Background Although lethal epi- or panzootics are obvious risk factors that can lead to population fluctuation or decline in particular circumstances, infectious diseases are seldom
considered as potential drivers of extirpation or extinction—that is, of the complete loss of all populations or subunits comprising a given biological species. For example, in conservation biology, infectious disease is usually
regarded as having only a marginal or contributory influence on extinction, except perhaps in unusual circumstances (e.g., [1–4]). In their examination of 223 instances of critically endangered species listed by the IUCN
(International Union for Conservation of Nature) as allegedly threatened by infectious disease, Smith et al. [4] found that in the overwhelming majority of cases there was no conclusive evidence to support infectious disease as a
contributing threat. Although this record should improve with increasing awareness of the effects of infectious diseases on wildlife, as this paper illustrates progress has so far been slow. Both of the authors of this paper are
primarily concerned with mammals, which is the group that will receive the bulk of attention here. However, at the pragmatic, data-gathering level, the issues concerned with properly accounting for and evaluating the effects of
infectious diseases on natural populations differ little from one phylogenetic grouping to another. First, narrowing down extinction events or even catastrophic population declines to single causes is almost always problematic. In
most real cases, extinction is multicausational, even if one cause can be identified as being predominantly responsible [5]. Habitat fragmentation and climate change are currently regarded as the leading prime movers behind most
instances of extreme endangerment, to which other stressors such as pollution, invasive competitors, and so forth, might be of greater or lesser importance in particular circumstances. Disease, however, is rarely mentioned as a
possible contributing factor in such contexts (but see [6]). Another difficulty is lack of knowledge about pathogen diversity and susceptibility in wildlife. In the absence of sufficient means of detection and characterization, it is
difficult to assess or to give quantitative expression to the degree to which pathogens might influence population decline or extinction. Thus it has been estimated that only a small fraction of bacterial diversity has been identified
at even the most basic systematic level. This problem is exacerbated in the case of viruses, which often evolve rapidly and defy, in any case, classical methodologies for identifying “species” [7]. For example, bat viruses have only
recently begun to be described systematically, even though many chiropterans are known vectors of numerous zoonotic diseases and corporately represent the second largest grouping (by species richness) of mammals after

unless a species is
rodents [8, 9]. A similar lack of knowledge affects our understanding of parasites and fungi that affect wildlife. The foregoing difficulties are compounded when one considers that,

studied extensively during and up to the actual extinction event affecting it, all extinction studies are
retrospective. Retrospective investigation of losses in which disease is possibly implicated is often
severely hindered by limitations in the number and quality of samples available for study, as well as the
inability to satisfy Koch’s postulates—especially if both host and pathogen became extinct
simultaneously [10]. Performing isolation, reisolation, and reinfection experiments to directly establish that a particular pathogen was indeed the causative agent behind a given infection is either very difficult or
impossible to do retrospectively. Isolation and recreation of the 1918 H1N1 influenza A virus [11], for example, were performed by sequencing from extractions derived from individuals thought to have died of the disease in WWI,
not by directly isolating the infectious virus from tissues (as would be required to formally comply with Koch’s postulates). Although most studies will have to be correlative rather than dispositive, one can nevertheless test
hypotheses concerning plausible causal agents and examine samples for presence/absence of specific pathogens [12]. Forensically, decay, degradation, and chemical changes in DNA post mortem produce severe methodological
challenges to retrieving and accurately determining sequences [13]. In addition, in any retrospective investigation involving “ancient DNA,” pathogen nucleic acids will be less abundant than those of the host, and this dilution effect
will make sequence retrieval even more complex [10]. For example, relatively abundant mitochondrial DNA is generally easier to retrieve from fossils or historical samples than lower copy per cell nuclear DNA. Pathogen nucleic
acids are generally even lower copy than host DNA sequences in a given extraction. These and other factors reviewed here may help to explain the paucity of conclusive studies of disease-mediated extinction, except in the very
few instances in which sampling and methodological roadblocks could be overcome. Nonetheless, in favorable circumstances it should be possible to genetically analyze ancient pathogens with sufficient accuracy to make the
endeavor worthwhile, especially because next-generation sequencing methods are beginning to make such endeavors ever more feasible [14–18]. Why should the possible role of infectious disease in endangerment and extinction
be regarded as a critical issue in modern conservation? Whether or not disease was ever a major cause of extinction in the fossil record [19], in our times it plays an acknowledged but perhaps underestimated role. Pathogen-driven
population declines have been identified in a wide array of invertebrate and vertebrate taxa (cf. [20]), suggesting that the phenomenon is probably universal. Yet without the kinds of monitoring methods now available, some and
perhaps most of these declines would have gone undetected, or attributed to other causes. Further, the processes forcing such declines are as diverse as the pathogens themselves and are far from being clearly understood. The
apparent increase in zoonotic diseases during the last few decades [21] may be objectively real or merely due to better monitoring, but it seems highly likely that loss or reduction of pristine habitats and the overall impact of
invasive species should promote the introduction of opportunistic pathogens into wildlife with increasing frequency. Thus, understanding the dynamics of disease-mediated species declines may be critical to conservation missions
concerned with a wide variety of species and habitats. Recent advances in molecular biology and microbiology have permitted the detection and identification of hosts of novel microorganisms, many of which are pathogenic, and
the technology needed to assess threat levels is becoming increasingly available. 2. Disease as an Agent of Extinction: Some Considerations Although the fossil record clearly establishes that the fate of all species is to eventually die
out, it is obvious from the same record that the rate of disappearance of individual species varies significantly [22]. As already noted, inferences about how (as opposed to when) an individual species disappeared must be
developed inductively and retrospectively. An important guideline is that apparent causes of extinction that are diachronic (repeatedly affect species across time) are inherently more plausible than ones that are claimed to have
occurred only once, or apply to only one taxon. Although this means that explanations about individual extinctions are not strictly testable, they can nevertheless be evaluated in terms of likelihood, which is the approach currently
taken by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and several other conservation organizations interested in compiling extinction statistics [23, 24]. It is an accepted tenet in conservation biology that any severe,
continuing threat to a species might eventually contribute to its extinction [25]. From this perspective, it is also accepted that diseases presenting with very high levels of mortality—as in the case of a highly transmissible infection
that is newly emergent in a population—can cause outright endangerment. But are there conditions under which a disease, probably in combination with other threats, might so imperil a species to cause its complete
disappearance? MacPhee and Marx [19] considered this issue from the standpoint of model pathogenic features that a disease-provoking organism might exhibit in forcing the extinction of a given species. These features include:
(1) a reservoir species presenting a stable carrier state for the pathogen, (2) a high potential for causing infections in susceptible species, affecting critical age groups, (3) a capacity for hyperlethality, defined here as mortality rates
in the range of 50–75%. Only under the most extreme conditions is it conceivable that a species would suffer extinction in a single epizootic event. Much more likely would be repeated outbreaks over a period of years gradually
reducing the fitness level of the species, with final disappearance potentially caused by stochastic events (such as causally unassociated climate change). One way in which this condition might be achieved would be through a
stable carrier (i.e., a species other than the target, living in similar circumstances in the same environment, and in which the infection is inapparent or at least sublethal). A well-studied example is the transfer of simian acquired
immunodeficiency virus from one species of macaque to another [26]. Although this instance occurred under captive conditions, repeated outbreaks of distemper in lions and African wild dogs have long been thought to be due to
transfer from domestic dogs (although the mechanism is debated; see [27]). Obviously, for a disease to have a very severe impact, it would be necessary for the pathogen to occur in highly lethal, aggressive strains that strongly
impact the target species before attenuated strains arise and become common. High potential for causing infections in a susceptible species is usually associated with the ability to successfully enter the organism through a major
portal, such as the respiratory tract, where it can be lodged and transmitted easily (e.g., via aerosol). To achieve hyperlethality and produce serious mortality, all age groups within a species would probably have to be susceptible,

In large-bodied mammals, a fundamental consideration is

not just the very young or very old (or the immunocompromised), with death the usual outcome.

that any process that deleteriously affects young individuals will have a pronounced effect on
survivorship because of the lengthy intervals in birth spacing [19]. Lethality in the range of 50–75% is obviously
extremely high and thus extremely unusual, although historically seen in Ebola infections in humans and in experimental
transmission studies from pigs to macaques [28]. High percentages may have also been achieved in rinderpest outbreaks among East African bovids in the early 20th century [29], although quantitative data on this are largely

lacking. An important issue here, however, is whether pathogens causing this level of lethality could
maintain themselves in nature long enough to seriously imperil a species. Speculatively, a possible outcome with
hyperlethal infections producing a rapid, fatal outcome is that affected populations would be reduced
to small numbers of widely dispersed and/or relatively or completely immune individuals. Under these circumstances,
the epizootic would necessarily abate as it ran out of new hosts, leading to the conclusion that
exceptionally lethal diseases cannot be indefinitely maintained in a population or species under normal circumstances. However, if
reservoirs exist from which the pathogen could repeatedly emerge, in principle epizootics might resurge
year after year until population sizes were reduced below viable levels (~50–500 individuals). At this point stochastic
effects might intervene and lead to complete loss of the species. Among possible examples of this “perfect storm” of circumstances and consequences
is the loss of Christmas Island rats, detailed elsewhere in this paper. Among birds, the severe impact of avian malaria on Hawaiian honeycreepers is also pertinent and discussed later in this paper. Although a number of
honeycreeper species survive at high elevations, above the limit at which introduced Culex mosquitos can survive, there are multiple adventitious threats, such as deforestation and competition from invasive species, which add to
their endangerment picture [30].
 ! – Terrorism
Attacks will escalate – terrorists will get WMD
Asal et al 12 (Victor, Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at
Albany–SUNY—AND Gary Ackerman, Member of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland—AND R. Karl Rethemeyer, Professor
in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany–SUNY, “Connections Can
Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Vol. 35, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis)

The State of the Literature A recent survey of over 120 books, journal articles, monographs, and government
reports dealing with CBRN terrorism10 revealed that there are a disproportionate number of studies
and publications dealing with the potential for terrorists to attain a CBRN weapons capability and the
response to the consequences of a CBRN attack, as opposed to the terrorists’ motivations for using CBRN
weapons. Within that portion of the literature that does delve into aspects of intentionality, the closest thing to a consensus among
scholars is the following set of assertions: 1. There is a wide variety of motivational incentives that might make
the acquisition and/or use of CBRN weapons attractive to terrorists. These range from (a) ideological or
psychological imperatives, such as an apocalyptic worldview or a fetishistic relationship toward
technology, to (b) operational or instrumental objectives, such as the ability to inflict mass casualties or
contaminate large areas, to perhaps most importantly, (c) the singularly tremendous psychological effects exerted on

targeted societies by CBRN agents. There are also a host of corresponding disincentives to using these weapons,11 including possible alienation
of supporters and the lack of certainty in the scope of consequences relative to conventional weapons such as high explosives. 2. Many terrorist

organizations have considered CBRN use. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that a multiplicity of
terrorist organizations and individuals representing different backgrounds and espousing different
ideologies have either considered using CBRN weapons or have attempted to acquire a CBRN weapons
capability. This includes, among others, terrorist organizations and individuals motivated by ethno-nationalist,
Marxist, right-wing, animal rights, and religious causes. 3. Technical and knowledge-sharing innovations
are making it easier for terrorist entities to achieve a CBRN capability, which could facilitate the decision
to pursue these weapons. The prospects for acquiring a CBRN capability are increasing, both as a result of
technological advances and the diffusion of knowledge. The Internet, access to technical schools and
universities, and the spread of “dualuse” technologies into many countries are major contributors.12
These dynamics facilitate terrorists’ awareness of CBRN weapons and provide new opportunities to
acquire them, which might shift their weapons selection calculus toward CBRN.

Lone wolves will use WMDs---extinction

Gary A. Ackerman 14 & Lauren E. Pinson, Gary is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence
Studies, Lauren is Senior Researcher and Project Manager for the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism, An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves
and Autonomous Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 26, Issue 1
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and whether these are
overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue
contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or supplement
the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological
development. Recent
and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale
engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to new possibilities
for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small
autonomous cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of
CBRN weapons-relevant technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety
of the technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required
to operate it. Thus, for example, whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical
weapons might have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive
equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors, 5 the same
processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage, purchased
commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.¶ The rapid global spread and
increased user-friendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively
small scale of harm a single individual or small autonomous group could historically cause. 6 From the limited
reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against
us (as on September 11), the number of people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political
entity could kill with a single action has increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been
asserted that “over time … as the leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach
its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win.” 7 Nowhere is this
trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional weapons.¶ These new
technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of information
networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to
become familiar with core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are
undoubtedly a boon to would-be purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes,
people who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or
legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual identities on the Internet.¶ All of this can spawn,
it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in some quarters as “super-empowered
individuals.” 8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e., they constitute a single (and often
singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only on their
own resources. Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or
technology systems, and act as an individual or a “lone-wolf.” 9 The end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals
chooses to attack the system, “the unprecedented nature of his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent
it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social
systems that govern modern life.” 10 It almost goes without saying that the
same concerns attach to small autonomous
cells, whose members' capabilities and resources can be combined without appreciably increasing the
operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies seeking to detect such
behavior.¶ With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs, the most likely means by which to accomplish this level of
system perturbation is through the use of CBRN agents as WMD. On the motivational side, therefore, lone actors
and small autonomous cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more established
terrorist groups—who are usually more conservative in their tactical orientation—because the extreme
asymmetry of these weapons may provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve
their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The inherent technical challenges presented by CBRN weapons may also
make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that
might have to be concerned with a variety of constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other factors beyond a
“perceived potential to achieve mass casualties” might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, 12
including a fetishistic fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrator's belief system.¶ Others
are far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for using CBRN
agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in today's networked, tech-
savvy environment. 13 Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are “less constrained” in motivations, more challenging
plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney cautions against making presumptions about the ease
with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the Internet. 15 However, even most of these pundits
concede
that low-level CBR attacks emanating from this quarter will probably lead to political, social, and
economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This raises
an essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons
or an actor's capability (or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these
weapons invariably exert a stronger psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terrorism—than the
traditional gun and bomb. This is surely not lost on those lone actors or autonomous cells who are as
interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties.¶ Proven Capability and Intent¶ While legitimate debate can be had as
to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN weapons, possibly the best argument for
engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete one of all—that these
actors have already demonstrated
the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN weapons, in some cases even close to the point of
constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr.
Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001 “anthrax letters,” which
employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread
disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government facilities. 16¶ Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small
autonomous cells highlight the need for further exploration. Among the many extant examples: 17¶ Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-
Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what
motivated him.¶ In 1996, Diane Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives were unclear.¶
In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agent—bacillus anthracis, the
causative agent of anthrax.¶ In 1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over 100
razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.¶ In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing samples of the
mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese government agencies to persuade authorities to look into
potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea.¶ In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack shop's products and killed 42
people.¶ In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO
headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported.¶ In 2011, federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who
were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service
agents.¶ Two recent events may signal an even greater interest in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's
Anders Breivik's treatise, his references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level
and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching
impacts driven by fear. 18 Whether or not Breivik would actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following
in several (often far-right) extremist circles and his treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
released two issues of Inspire magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to
target non-combatant populations and, on the other, permit the use of chemical and biological weapons.
The combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon selection of lone actor jihadists
in Western nations. 19
 ! – ROL (Military Constraint)
US rule of law key to check the military, loss ensures nuclear war.
Kellman 89 (Barry, Professor, DePaul University College of Law; J.D. Yale, 1976. DUKE LAW JOURNAL JUDICIAL ABDICATION OF MILITARY
TORT ACCOUNTABILITY: BUT WHO IS TO GUARD THE GUARDS THEMSELVES?) KEN

In this era of thermonuclear weapons, America

must uphold its historical commitment to be a nation of law. Our
strength grows from the resolve to subject military force to constitutional authority. Especially in these times
when weapons proliferation can lead to nuclear winter, when weapons production can cause cancer, when soldiers die unnecessarily
in the name of readiness: those who control military force must be held accountable under law. As the Supreme Court recognized a generation ago, the Founders
envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They
knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders. ... We cannot close our eyes to the fact that today the peoples of many nations are ruled
by the military. We
should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power subservient to
civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution.' Our fears may be rooted in more recent
history. During the decade of history's largest peacetime military expansion (1979-1989), more than 17,000 service personnel were killed in training accidents. 2
In the same period, virtually every facility in the nuclear bomb complex has been revealed to be contaminated with radioactive and poisonous materials; the clean-
up costs are projected to exceed $100 billion. 3 Headlines of fatal BIB bomber crashes, 4 the downing of an Iranian passenger plane, 5 the Navy's frequent
accidents6 including the fatal crash of a fighter plane into a Georgia apartment complex,7 remind Americans that a tragic price is paid to support the military
establishment. Other commentaries may distinguish between the specific losses that might have been preventable and those which were the random consequence
of what is undeniably a dangerous military program. This Article can only repeat the questions of the parents of those who have died: "Is the military accountable to
anyone? Why is it allowed to keep making the same mistakes? How many more lives must be lost to senseless accidents?"8 This Article describes a judicial
concession of the law's domain, ironically impelled by concerns for "national security." In three recent controversies involving weapons testing, the judiciary has
disallowed tort accountability for serious and unwarranted injuries. In United States v. Stanley, 9 the Supreme Court ruled that an Army sergeant, unknowingly
drugged with LSD by the Central Intelligence Agency, could not pursue a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights. In Allen v. United States, 10
civilian
victims of atmospheric atomic testing were denied a right of tort recovery against the government
officials who managed and performed the tests. Finally, in Boyle v. United Technologies, 1 the Supreme
Court ruled that private weapons manufacturers enjoy immunity from product liability actions alleging
design defects. A critical analysis of these decisions reveals that the judiciary, notably the Rehnquist Court, has abdicated its responsibility to review civil
matters involving the military security establishment. Standing at the vanguard of "national security" law,13 these three decisions elevate the task of preparing for
war to a level beyond legal accountability. They suggest that determinations of both the ends and the means of national
security are inherently above the law and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed
by these determinations. This conclusion signals a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. The very
underpinnings of constitutional governance are threatened by those who contend that the rule of law
weakens the execution of military policy. Their argument-that because our adversaries are not restricted by our Constitution, we should
become more like our adversaries to secure ourselves-cannot be sustained if our tradition of adherence to the rule of law is to be maintained. To the contrary, the

judiciary must be willing to demand adherence to legal principles by assessing responsibility for
weapons decisions. This Article posits that judicial abdication in this field is not compelled and certainly
is not desirable. The legal system can provide a useful check against dangerous military action, more so than
these three opinions would suggest. The judiciary must rigorously scrutinize military decisions if our 18th century

dream of a nation founded in musket smoke is to remain recognizable in a millennium ushered in under
the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear holocaust.
 ! – ROL (Impact Filter)
Rule of law is an impact filter --- solves multiple global challenges like climate change,
economic crisis and conflict
Jiet 12 (Lim Wei, Legal Associate at Sreenevasan Advocates & Solicitors - Sreenevasan Advocates &
Solicitors, previously at the University of Malaya, “A World Without The Rule of Law,” LexisNexis Annual
Essay Challenge,” https://www.academia.edu/3437214/A_World_Without_The_Rule_of_Law_-
_LexisNexis_Annual_Essay_Challenge) ip

Thus, from the ashes of World War 2, the rule of law is rejuvenated with an illuminating beacon called human
rights. Entrenched in many international documents15, it is now accepted that rights such as the freedom of speech
are inseparable from any true rule of law. It is when these rights are not respected, do we open the
floodgates to a world of genocide, torture and disrespect towards humanity. Furthermore, legitimate
aspirations and the dignities of men would never be realized without adequate social, economic,
educational rights.16 In a challenging age of volatile climate change and environmental degradation, a
rule of law which disregards “green rights”17 will spell doom for Mother Earth. Having said that, the rule of law
will not stand when traditional concepts that centre on fair procedures and equal playing fields are not taken into perspective. Firstly, unclear
and unintelligible laws will create constant anxiety to the common man in every of his actions for he does not know what the law prescribes.
Secondly, if laws are not equally applied, the influential class of society can unfairly escape from facing the
music while the common man is then encouraged to disobey the law. Thirdly, people will be stripped off the right to a fair trial where they
may be guilty before proven so, uninformed of their grounds of arrest and lack legal representation to defend themselves. Alas, justice is not
truly justice if it takes too long, if it is too expensive for people to use, or if it is not available to all.18 The rule of law becomes a theoretical
construct than practical reality when real access to legal rights depend on a person’s background while poor litigants are forced to accept
inexperienced lawyers in criminal trials; against weak public legal aid systems and inherently cost intensive common law system.19 Sadly,
today, even
liberal democracies throw human rights as well as fair procedures out the window in times of
emergency and 21st century terrorism. Through the comfort of retrospective lenses, Americans have flocked people
of Japanese origins to internment camps20, British courts have legitimised arbitrary executive
detention21 and Malaysian authorities flouted almost every single procedure on the book in exercising the
Internal Security Act.22 Drawing lessons on Guantanamo Bay, trials by military commission deliver a sucker punch on the rule of law as offenses
are defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without independent review.23 As we observe closer, not only does a world
without the rule of law threaten the rights of men but it actually devours the entire spirit of democracy
itself. As Justice Learned Hand said: “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law and no court
can save it”.24 Therefore, the greatest challenge to a world without the rule of law is how it tries to rebuild these entrenched traditions from
scratch, especially when the heartbeat of democracy has long died in iron-fisted regimes. Like cancer, the
breakdown of the rule of
law spreads to all spheres, even towards the economic pulse of the nation. When there are no clear
commerce regulations and an impartial judiciary to enforce contracts, foreign investors will not risk the
capital which is essential in improving the socio-economic wellbeing of citizens. But the world presents a new
twist today: during times of economic crisis, the state itself relaxes the rule of law and interferes with the
market with dirty hands reeking of political opportunism. This creates a rent-seeking state where interest groups
pump in millions in persuading politicians to grant preferential or oppose harmful regulations; relegating
rational policymaking in favour of personal benefits, as evidenced in the General Motors and Chrysler bailouts.25
Furthermore, a lax rule of law also breeds unaccountability in public procurement, unfair accumulation of
wealth via cronyism or even blocking access of international economic aid because of pure greed. Perhaps the
disaster most people can relate to is not the vertical clash between government and men, but a Hobbesian world where man fight against man
in a “state of nature” where life is “solitary, poorer, brutish and short”.26 When there is no conflict resolution and rules are not enforced,
crimes skyrocket to an all time high and the security of all will be at risk to leave a trail of dejection and despair. Slowly, what would normally be
crime ceases to be thought as crime and lawlessness becomes routine. Then, people recognise that
the only alternatives to
the rule of law are corrupting influences like the power of money, influence and guns27, which they would have
to inevitably adapt to. This perpetuates a vicious cycle of instability and crime. Alas, what countries inherit is a barren
desert of hopelessness where there is no peaceful settlement of disputes. More and more actors, both private and institutional,
turn to criminal elements to achieve their ends where it is now cheaper, quicker and less risky than the
doors of the court – creating a “lost meaning of legality”.28 As the state’s legitimacy crumbles and realistic democratic
means of redress is lacking, the boiling point forces protesters to take the streets or mobilize along ethnic,
religious or linguistic lines.29 From a global context, harrowing scenarios emerge from the weak rule of law. World vigilantes
masquerading under the “Coalition of the Willing” declare wars against other nations without the
authorisation of the United Nations Security Council, an act that blatantly undermines the post-1945 consensus on the
prohibition of force.30 Slobodan Milosevic massacred 200,000 people in Serbia over 9 years31, as the entire world stood idly and did nothing.
When these crimes against humanity go unpunished by international tribunals, it renders the next round
of war atrocities much easier and inevitable. Plus, the well-regarded “democratic peace theory”32 rings a
chilling possibility of international conflicts when more countries disregard the rule of law and
consequently, democracy. Modern developments and the wave of globalization have posed new challenges that force a rethink into
the concept of a hypothetical world without the rule of law. The nation state is being redefined as regional blocs like the European Union
possess enormous powers to enact policies which affect the lives of an entire continent. International institutions such as the World Trade
Organisation have slowly replaced national laws with decision-making by anonymous officials, sometimes exhibiting a very large democratic
deficit.33 Multi-millionbusiness contracts now insert clauses on alternative dispute resolutions instead of
litigation in court, risking decisions that substitute market forces for the rule of law. The traits of
globalization like electronic transfer of money, softening of borders and offshore banking – all equally
facilitate markets in drugs, arms, explosives, fissile material and human trafficking, presenting complex international crime and terrorism
activities34, unlike anything we’ve dealt before.
 ! – Turns Case
Court stripping causes progressive rollback – takes out the aff
Zeitz 2/14 (Joshua, historian, contributing editor at Politico Magazine, and New York Times best-selling author, "How Donald Trump
Could Pressure the Supreme Court," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/how-donald-trump-could-
pressure-the-supreme-court-214778) KEN

The lessons for today are mixed. Should Trump continue his war of words with “so-called” federal judges (or, as his senior
policy aide, Stephen Miller, recently termed them: “unelected judges”) —orshould he escalate matters and attempt to circumvent
the courts—he will no doubt produce a powerful political backlash. He’ll also create a constitutional crisis. But how many circuit
court judges and Supreme Court justices will balk at hitting back? How many will follow the path of
Justice Owen Roberts and choose capitulation in the service of avoiding an all-out brawl between the
executive and judicial branches, as Roberts is widely assumed to have done. Liberals revere Franklin Roosevelt, and with good
reason. But it bears remembering that he fought a bare-knuckle political fight to remold the court. Ironically, Trump
could well achieve the same end, if only to achieve a court that applies a far narrower reading of the
Commerce Clause and thereby throws into contention decades of progressive liberal achievements.

Takes out precedent – Congress shapes the Courts

Devins 8 (Neal, Law Prof at William and Mary, Congressional Responses to Judicial Decisions,
scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2671&context=facpubs)

As the above discussion makes clear, the Supreme Court does not speak the last word on the meaning of
federal statutes or the Constitution. Congress can nullify Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes by
enacting a new statute or amending an existing law. On constitutional issues, the dynamic is more complex.
Congress can respond to Supreme Court constitutional rulings through a variety of techniques, rannging
from the enactment of the very same statute to the confirmation of Supreme Court justices who are
likely to distinguish or overturn disfavored rulings. Through these varied responses to Supreme Court
rulings, Congress plays a critical role in shaping constitutional values.

Court stripping causes rollback

Miller 09 (Mark is Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Professor of History, Director of Law and Society Program, at Clark University, ‘Constitutionalism and
Democracy: View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions Between Congress and the Federal Judiciary,”
https://books.google.com/books?id=xt0QZo2ztUgC&pg=PP1&lpg=PP1&dq=Constitutionalism+and+Democracy+:+View+of+the+Courts+from+the+Hill+:+Interaction
s+Between+Congress+and+the+Federal+Judiciary&source=bl&ots=j_k3NvwqvA&sig=rYqISohp5XBA9s1tYoNpwI_ZhAI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjrifqF7PXUAhWL6
IMKHUxRD2AQ6AEIMDAC#v=onepage&q=when%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20or%20another%20federal%20court%20issues%20a%20constitutionally%20based
%20decision%2C%20the%20only%20way%20for%20Congress%20to%20overturn%20that%20&f=false, p. 100) EYC

In theory, when the Supreme Court or another federal court issues a constitutionally based decision, the
only way for Congress to overturn that decision is through a constitutional amendment. In fact, a variety of
amendments to the Constitution have been enacted mainly to overturn Supreme Court decisions,
including the Eleventh Amendment, the Civil War amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth), the Sixteenth
Amendment, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. In addition, a variety of constitutional amendments designed to

overturn specific Supreme Court decisions have been proposed but never ratified. For example, there have been
efforts to pass constitutional amendments prohibiting abortion, prohibiting flag burning, allowing prayer in schools, and prohibiting gay marriage. To date, none of
these proposed amendments have received the two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress necessary to send them to the states for ratification. Even when
Congress enacts a constitutional amendment, however, the inter-institutional conversation does not end. As Comiskey has noted, “ Because
the courts
can rule on disputes over the meaning of an amendment’s terms, amendments do not always end the
constitutional dialogue on the subjects they address” (2008, 207). Some of the most persistent proposals for constitutional
amendment proposals have been aimed at prohibiting burning of the American flag as a form of political protest. Votes on proposed constitutional amendments to
prohibit flag burning have been taken nearly every year since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Texas v. Johnson (1989) and United States v. Eichman (1990) allowing
it. Almost every year since these cases were handed down, one house of Congress has gotten the necessary two-thirds vote to pass the proposed amendment, but
the other house has failed to reach that threshold. Thus the proposed amendment has never been sent to the states for ratification because it has never gotten the
necessary vote in both houses of Congress at the same time. In
reality, Congress can also take statutory steps to reverse the
policy announced by the Court, if not the constitutional decision itself. Davidson notes that the same
partisan and ideological fights that Congress engages in over a wide variety of policy issues clearly spill
over into issues of constitutional interpretation. “Partisan and ideological allegiances are as divisive as
ever,” he writes, “and are especially salient in congressional responses to pressing constitutional
questions” (1993, 118). But one Democratic member of Congress warned that Congress should not rush to overturn constitutionally based decisions of the
Supreme Court. This member said to me, “The President has said that he has an equal role in interpreting the Constitution with Congress and the Supreme Court,
but that is not true. Congress and the President must follow the Supreme Court in constitutionally based cases because the job of the courts is to interpret the
Constitution. We can’t just ignore court rulings on the Constitution like the President has tried to do.” Of
the twenty-three Supreme Court
decisions studied by Robert Dahl (1957), in effect seventeen were reversed by Congress. Likewise, Joseph Ignagni
and James Meernik (1994) found that in the years 1954– 90 Congress had in effect reversed the policy direction in thirteen of the sixty-five decisions they studied.
For example, in 1978 the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the offices of a newspaper from police searches if the police had a
search warrant. Congress responded by passing legislation granting additional protections to newspapers (see Peretti 1999, 142). Using a different methodology,
Pickerill (2004, 41) found that in almost half of the cases he studied, Congress acted to save statutes found to be unconstitutional by the courts. Pickerill argues that
although at times Congress will directly confront the Court’s constitutionally based decisions, “it is much more common for Congress to amend legislation in a
manner that makes clear concessions to the Court’s decision” (2004, 49).
 ! - Turns Case (Milliken)
The disad turns case – Congress prevents hearing of desegregation cases which guts
enforcement and prevents any future civil rights work
Jones 94 (Chip, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can (and should) Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction in School Desegregation Cases, 47 SMU L. Rev.
1889, http://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2388&context=smulr) KEN

The starting point for any discussion of Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts begins with Article III of the
Constitution.19 Section 1 of this article establishes one Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."'20 Like much of the Constitution, this section represents a compromise between those wanting a strong national government
and those wanting a federation of empowered states. 21 Since
the framers could not agree on the extent or the
necessity of federal courts with original jurisdiction, they settled on vesting Congress with the power to
create courts of original jurisdiction on an as-needed basis.22 A plain reading of the Constitution suggests
that no constitutional limitation exists to prevent Congress from eliminating federal district and
appellate courts.23 Yet, while Congress has debated stripping the lower federal courts of original jurisdiction, it rarely takes such action.
24 In theory, Congress could end the litigation of desegregation lawsuits , as they now exist, by stripping federal
courts of original jurisdiction. 25 The "exceptions clause" 26 specifically grants to Congress power to
control the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Little precedent exists, however, for anticipating how a modern
court would judge a statute using this power since Congressional exercise of the power is rare.27
Neg Case Cards
 AT: Solvency – No Social Change
Court action blocks social change:
- Weak litigation
- Rollback
- Demotivation and squo preservation
- Tradeoff with protest

Barkan 13 (Steven, Professor and chairperson of the Sociology department at the University of Maine,
“Beware of Lawyers Bearing Gifts, or Why Social Movements Should Be Wary of Litigation”,
https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/beware-of-lawyers-bearing-gifts-or-why-social-
movements-should-be-wary-of-litigation/)mlm
First and foremost, this body of work reaches very disparate conclusions. Some studies conclude that litigation can well be a very effective
strategy for achieving movement goals, while other studies conclude that litigation is a weak strategy in this regard and may
well thwart movement goals for other reasons. As Michael McMann[1] summarizes this evidence, “how law matters for social
movements is infinitely more complex, mixed, variable, and contingent than can be captured in simple position statements.” Second, to the
extent social movements might have only modest success in achieving their goals through litigation, as many
scholars assert, certain issues explain this situation. The courts are often unsympathetic to social movement claims, and
legal doctrine and rules of judicial procedure may pose obstacles that limit or entirely prevent legal
mobilization from winning legal victories. Further, legal mobilization is often costly in both time and money, and social
movements may lack sufficient amounts of these precious resources to enable their legal mobilization to
succeed. Third, even if social movements do win favorable court rulings, this outcome may then motivate
the targets of the rulings to launch their own legal and other efforts to thwart the rulings’ impact, as
notoriously happened after both the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision and the 1973 Roe v.
Wade decisions. After both cases, opponents of school desegregation and abortion rights respectively fought back with every means,
legal and illegal, at their disposal. School desegregation was not finally achieved for at least a decade, and only
then because of the civil rights movement, while the anti-abortion rights movement has been able in
many ways to limit the practical availability of legal abortions in the forty years since Roe. Fourth, any
legal victories won by social movements may ultimately prove Pyrrhic. Many such victories achieve only minor
changes in existing social, political, and economic conditions. Moreover, the fact that they are victories may serve to
placate social movement members and to convince the news media, the public, and other external
parties of the legitimacy of the existing political and economic order. In the long run, then, successful legal
mobilization may ironically help to preserve the status quo rather than to change it significantly. A fifth
observation should be of special interest to social movement scholars, particularly those who came of
age during the protest era of the 1960s and early 1970s or who study movements from that era. An article of faith among many
scholars, going back at least to Gamson’s[2] Strategy of Social Protest, Piven and Cloward’s[3] Poor People’s Movements, and nonviolent
activist David Dellinger’s[4] More Power Than We Know, is that protest works
and is, in fact, the most powerful resource
social movements have and strategy they can deploy to achieve social change. Explicit or implicit in this
understanding is the idea that social movement strategies that do not involve protest will be much less
likely, and perhaps not at all likely, to be able to win important movement goals. To the extent that
protest is indeed important for social movement success, legal mobilization may limit such success
because it channels activists’ time, money, and energy into legalistic efforts and away from protest.
Moreover, the attorneys who handle social movement litigation may pressure their movement clients to shun protest for fear
it may generate bad publicity and anger judges and thus help produce judgments against their clients. For all these reasons, legal
mobilization may thus well be, as political scientist Gerald Rosenberg has famously called it, “the hollow
hope.” Reflecting this view, Cary Coglianese[5] argued that the contemporary environmental movement erred in using a legalistic strategy
aimed at achieving relatively narrow goals in lieu of grassroots organizing and protest tactics. Commenting on the 1960s and 1970s social
movements, Joel Handler[6] similarly lamented the choice of legal mobilization: “In sum, social-reform groups find it difficult to obtain tangible
results directly from law-reform activity. It can be accomplished, … but, on the whole, special circumstances are needed.”

Legal strategies fracture intersectional movements—legal reform incentivizes single-

axis analyses and divide broad-based social movements
Spade 13 (Dean, PhD, prof of law at Seattle Univ, “Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform,” Signs,
Vol. 38, No. 4, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory (Summer 2013), pp. 1031-1055,
University of Chicago Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/669574)KC

Third, I take up the assertion from many critical traditions that legal
equality or rights strategies not only fail to address
the harms facing intersectionally targeted populations but also often shore up and expand systems of
violence and control. They do this in at least three ways: by mobilizing narratives of deservingness and
undeservingness, by participating in the logics and structures that undergird relations of domination,
and by becoming sites for the expansion of harmful systems and institutions. Activists and scholars have
argued that the use of criminalization to combat domestic violence and human trafficking constitutes a
co-optation of feminist resistance that expands criminal enforcement systems that target and endanger
women and queers of color. This analysis illustrates the danger that legal reforms can expand violent
systems by mobilizing the rhetoric of saving women combined with frameworks of deservingness that
reify racist, ableist, antipoor, and colonial relations. I further argue that equality and legal rights strategies
can be divisive to social movements. I use three examples of movement splits to illustrate this: the divide
between reproductive rights and reproductive justice, the divide between disability rights and dis- ability
justice, and the divide between the gay and lesbian rights framework and the racial and economic
justice–centered queer and trans resistance formations that have critiqued it and created alternatives.
For each of these examples, I trace how rights strategies mobilize single-axis analyses that, their critics argue, both fail
to meet the needs of constituents facing intersectional harm and reify harmful dynamics and systems.
Fourth, I observe that these critical traditions strategically reject narratives that declare that the US legal system has broken from the founding
violences of slavery, genocide, and heteropatriarchy. Critics refute the notion that such founding violences have been eradicated by legal
equality. They instead trace the genealogies of purportedly neutral contemporary legal and administrative systems to these foundations,
arguing that the state-making, racializing, and gendering functions of founding violences like enslavement and settler colonialism continue in
new forms. This analytical move exposes the fact that declarations of legal equality do not resolve such violence and generates demands like
prison abolition and an end to immigration enforcement that throw the US legal system and the nation-state form into crisis.

Courts don’t produce social change and instead actually hinder social movements that
could actually accomplish change
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald Rosenberg, 2008, is professor of political science and lecturer in law, University of Chicago. “The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? Second Edition,” p. 422-424, google books) EYC

Given the constraints and the conditions, the Constrained Court view is the more accurate: U.S. courts can almost never be
effective producers of significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the
other branches of government. Problems that are unsolvable in the political context can rarely be solved
by courts. As Scheingold puts it, the “law can hardly transcend the conflicts of the political system in which it
is embedded” (Scheingold 1974, 145). Turning to courts to produce significant social reform substitutes the
myth of America for its reality. It credits courts and judicial decisions with a power that they do not have. In contrast to this
conclusion, it might be suggested that throughout this book I have asked too much of courts. After all, in all the cases examined,
court decisions produced some change, however small. Given that political action appeared impossible in many instances,
such as with civil rights in the 1950s, same-sex marriage in the 1990s, and reform of the criminal justice system tem more generally, isn’t
some positive change better than none? In a world of unlimited resources, this would be the case. In the
world in which those seeking significant social reform live, however, strategic choices have costs, and a
strategy that produces little or no change and induces backlash drains resources that could be more
effectively employed in other strategies. In addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change
may be mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts. In
general, then, not only does litigation steer activists to an institution that is constrained from helping them, but also
it siphons off crucial resources and talent, and runs the risk of weakening political efforts. In terms of
financial resources, social reform groups don’t have a lot of money. Funding a litigation campaign means
that other strategic options are starved of funds. In civil rights, while Brown was pending in June 1953, Thurgood Marshall
and Walter White sent out a telegram to supporters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People asking for money,
stating “funds entirely spent” (quoted in Kluger 1976, 617). Compare this to the half-million-dollar estimates of the cost of the freedom rides,
largely due to fines and bail (Sarratt 1966, 337). Further, the legal strategy drained off the talents of people such as
Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg. As Martin Luther King, Jr., complained: plained: “to accumulate resources for legal
actions imposes intolerable hardships ships on the already overburdened” (King 1963, 157). In the abortion field, reliance on the
Court seriously weakened the political efficacy of pro-choice forces. After the 1973 decisions, many pro-choice
activists simply assumed they had won and stopped their pro-choice activity. According to J. Hugh Anwyl, at one time executive director of
Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, pro-choice activists went “on a long siesta” after the abortion decisions (quoted in Johnston 1977, 1). This
view was concurred in by a National Abortion Rights Action League activist, Janet Beals: “Everyone
assumed that when the
Supreme Court made its decision in 1973 that we’d got what we wanted and the battle was over. The
movement afterwards lost steam” (quoted in Phillips 1980, 3).’ Jackson and Vinovskis found that, after the decisions, “state-level
pro-choice groups disbanded, victory seemingly achieved” (Jackson and Vinovskis 1983, 73). By 1977, a survey of pro-choice and anti-abortion
abortion activity in thirteen states nationwide found that abortion rights advocates cates had failed to match the
activity of their opponents (Johnston 1977, 24). The political organization and momentum that had changed laws nationwide
dissipated in celebration of Court victory. The pro-choice movement was harmed in a second way by its reliance on
Court action. The most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment, banning federal funding even for most medically necessary abortions,
was passed with the help of a parliamentary maneuver by pro-choice legislators. Their strategy, as reported the following day on the front
pages of the New York Times and Washington Post, was to pass such a conservative bill that the Court would have “no choice” but to overturn
it (Tolchin 1977; Russell 1977). This reliance on the Court was totally unfounded. With hindsight, Karen Mulhauser, former
director of NARAL, suggested that “had we made more gains through the legislative and referendum processes, and taken a little longer at it,
the public would have moved with us” (quoted in Williams 1979. 12). By winning a Court case “without the organization needed to cope with a
powerful opposition” (Rubin 1982, 169), pro-choice forces vastly overestimated the power and influence of the Court.

Court victories act as a “fly-paper” and lure movements into litigation where their
goals are crushed.
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald Rosenberg, 2008, is professor of political science and lecturer in law, University of Chicago. “The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? Second Edition,” p. 427, google books) EYC

If this is the case, then thereis another important way in which courts affect social change. It is, to put it simply, that
courts act as “fly-paper” for social reformers who succumb to the “lure of litigation.” If the constraints of the
Constrained Court view are correct, then courts can seldom produce significant social reform. Yet if groups advocating
such reform continue to look to the courts for aid, and spend precious resources in litigation, then the courts also limit
change by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless
legal ones where it is not. Even when major cases are won, the achievement is often more symbolic
that real. Thus, courts may serve an ideological function of luring movements for social reform to an
institution that is structurally constrained from serving their needs, providing only an illusion of
change.
Courts can’t produce social change – constitutional rights inherently limited, courts
are not independent, courts discourage legislative social reform
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald Rosenberg, 2008, is professor of political science and lecturer in law, University of Chicago. “The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? Second Edition”, p. 10-12, google books) EYC

The view of courts as unable to produce significant social reform has a distinguished pedigree reaching
back to the founders. Premised on the institutional structure of the American political system and the
procedures and belief systems created by American law, it suggests that the conditions required for
courts to produce significant social reform will seldom exist. Unpacked, packed, the Constrained Court view maintains
that courts will generally not be effective producers of significant social reform for three reasons: the
limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary’s inability
to develop appropriate policies and its lack of powers of implementation. The Constitution, and the set of beliefs
that surround it, is not unbounded. Certain rights are enshrined in it and others are rejected. In economic terms, private control over the
allocation and distribution of resources, the use of property, is protected (Miller 1968). “Rights” to certain minimums, mums, or equal shares of
basic goods, are not. Further,judicial discretion is bound by the norms and expectations of the legal culture.
These two parameters, believers in the Constrained Court view suggest, present a problem for litigators pressing the courts
for significant social reform because most such litigation is based on constitutional claims that rights are
being denied.; An individual or group comes into a court claiming it is being denied some benefit, fit, or protection from arbitrary and
discriminatory action, and that it is entitled to this benefit or that protection. Proponents of the Constrained Court view suggest that this has
four important consequences for social reformers. First, they argue, it limits the sorts of claims that can
be made, for not all social reform goals can be plausibly presented in the name of constitutional rights.
For example, there are no constitutional rights to decent housing, adequate levels of welfare, or clean air, while there are constitutional rights
to minimal governmental interference in the use of one’s property. This may mean that “practically significant but legally irrelevant policy
matters may remain beyond the purview of the court” (Note 1977, 436). Further, as Gordon don (1984, 111) suggests, “the legal forms we use
set limits on what we can imagine as practical outcomes.” Thus,
the nature of rights in the U.S. legal system, embedded
in the Constitution, may constrain the courts in producing significant social reform by preventing them
from hearing many claims. A second consequence from the Constrained Court perspective is that, even
where claims can be made, social reformers must often argue for the establishment of a new right, or
the extension of a generally accepted right to a new situation. In welfare rights litigation, for example, the Court was
asked to find a constitutional right to welfare (Krislov 1973). This need to push the courts to read the Constitution in an expansive or “liberal”
way creates two main difficulties. Underlying these difficulties is judicial awareness of the need for predictability in the law and the politically
exposed nature of judges whose decisions go beyond the positions of electorally accountable officials. First, the Constitution, lawyers, judges,
and legal academics form a dominant legal culture that at any given time accepts some rights and not others and sets limits on the
interpretation and expansion of rights. Judicial
discretion is bound by the beliefs and norms of this legal culture,
and decisions that stray too far from them are likely to be reversed and severely criticized. Put simply,
courts, and the judges that compose them, even if sympathetic to social reform form plaintiffs, may be
unwilling to risk crossing this nebulous yet real boundary.’ Second, and perhaps more important, is the role of precedent
and what Justice Traynor calls the “continuity scripts of the law” (Traynor 1977, 11). Traynor, a justice of the California Supreme Court for
twenty-five years, Chief Justice from 1964 to 1970, and known as a judge open to new ideas, wrote of the “very caution of the judicial process”
(1977, 7). Arguing that “a judge must plod rather than soar,” Traynor saw that the “greatest judges” proceed “at the pace of a tortoise that
steadily makes advances though it carries the past on its back” (1977, 7, 6). Constrained by precedent and the beliefs of the dominant legal
culture, judges, the Constrained Court view asserts, are not likely to act as crusaders. Third,
supporters of the Constrained Court
view note, as Scheingold (1974) points out, that to claim a right in court is to accept the procedures and
obligations of the legal system. These procedures are designed, in part, to make it difficult for courts to hear certain kinds of cases.
As the Council for Public Interest Law (CPIL) puts it, doctrines of standing and of class actions, the so-called political question doctrine, the need
to have a live controversy, and other technical doctrines can “deter courts from deciding cases on the merits” (CPIL 1976, 355) and can result in
social reform groups being unable to present their best arguments, or even have their day in court. Once
in court, however, the
legal process tends to dissipate significant social reform by making appropriate remedies unlikely. This can
occur, McCann (1986, 200) points out, because policy-based litigation aimed at significant social reform is usually “disaggregate (di … into
discrete conflicts among limited actors over specific individual entitlements.” Remedial
decrees, it has been noted, “must not
confuse what is socially or judicially desirable with what is legally required” (Special Project 1978, 855). Thus,
litigation seldom deals with “underlying issues and problems” and is “directed more toward symptoms than causes” (Harris and Spiller 1976,
26). Finally,
it has long been argued that framing issues in legally sound ways robs them of “political and
purposive appeal” (Handler 1978, 33). In the narrow sense, the technical nature of legal argument can denude issues of emotional,
widespread appeal. More broadly, there is the danger that litigation by the few will replace political action by the many and reduce the
democratic nature of the American polity. James Bradley Thayer, writing in 1901, was concerned that reliance on litigation would sap the
democratic process of its vitality. He warned
that the “tendency of a common and easy resort” to the courts,
especially in asking them to invalidate acts of the democratically accountable branches, would “dwarf
the political capacity of the people” (Thayer 1901, 107). This view was echoed more recently by McCann, who found that litigation-
prone activists’ “legal rights approach to expanding democracy has significantly narrowed their conception of
political action itself” (McCann 1986, 26). Expanding the point, McCann argued that “legal tactics not only absorb scarce resources that
could be used for popular mobilization … [but also] make it difficult to develop broadly based, multiissue grassroots roots associations of
sustained citizen allegiance” (McCann 1986, 200). For these reasons, the Constrained Court view suggests that the nature of rights in the U.S.
constrains courts from being effective producers of significant social reform. Thus, Constraint I: The
bounded nature of
constitutional rights prevents courts from hearing or effectively acting on many significant social
reform claims, and lessens the chances of popular mobilization.
 AT: Solvency - No Enforcement
Brown v Board proves – the Supreme Court fails to enforce decisions
Strauss 17 (Valerie, Education reporter for the Washington Post “Brown v. Board is 63 years old. Was
the Supreme Court’s school desegregation ruling a failure?” The Washington
Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/05/16/the-supreme-courts-
historic-brown-v-board-ruling-is-63-years-old-was-it-a-failure/?utm_term=.55ec2c56bcd0) ALH
The historic Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education turns 63 years old on Wednesday, May 17, 2017. The decision famously
ordered the desegregation of public schools in the United States, declaring segregated schools “inherently unequal” and unconstitutional, but
all these years later, segregation is far from being eliminated. In fact, 2016
federal data showed that poor, black and
Hispanic children are becoming increasingly isolated from white, affluent children in America’s public
schools. Given that, how should Brown v. Board be evaluated? Given persistent school segregation, was it a failure? This post addresses that
question. It was written by Richard Rothstein, a research associate at the Economic Policy Institute, a non-profit created in 1986 to broaden the
discussion about economic policy to include the interests of low- and middle-income workers. He is also a fellow at the Thurgood Marshall
Institute of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and he is the author of books including “Grading Education: Getting Accountability Right, and “Class
and Schools: Using Social, Economic and Educational Reform to Close the Black-White Achievement Gap.” His newest book, published this
month, is “The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America.” He was a national education writer for The
New York Times as well. By Richard Rothstein Sixty-three years ago on Wednesday, the Supreme Court prohibited school segregation. In
the
South, Brown v. Board of Education was enforced slowly and fitfully for two decades; then progress
ground to a halt. Nationwide, black students are now less likely to attend schools with whites than they
were half a century ago. Was Brown a failure? Not if we consider the boost it gave to a percolating civil rights movement. The
progeny of Brown include desegregation of public accommodations and the mostly unhindered right of African Americans to compete for jobs,
to vote, and to purchase or rent homes. Brown’s greatest accomplishment was its enduring imprint on the national ethos: the idea of second-
class citizenship for African Americans, indeed for any minority group, is now universally condemned as a violation of the Constitution and of
American values. None of these transformations came easily, and none are complete, but none would have happened were it not for Brown.
Yet the decision could not accomplish its stated purpose. Today, nearly half of all black students attend
majority black schools, with over 70 percent in high-poverty school districts. New York is the most
segregated state: two-thirds of its black students attend schools that are less than 10 percent white. A
growing number are “integrated” with low-income Hispanics and other recent immigrants, but still
isolated from the mainstream. Because schools remain segregated, we have little chance to substantially
boost the achievement of black children, especially those from low-income families. Of course, some children
will always surmount their disadvantages and excel. But when separate schools concentrate students who are in poorer health and more
frequently absent, who may be homeless or in unstable housing, and whose parents are less-educated, achievement lags when teachers are
overwhelmed by non-academic challenges. If more than a few pupils in a single classroom act-out from the stresses of economic insecurity,
neighborhood violence, or parental incarceration, behavioral issues steal time from instruction. Added social, psychological, and academic
services for these children can reduce (but not eliminate) their challenges, but funding for such services is inadequate everywhere. Seemingly
permanent segregation is not what we expected. In 1954, a few hours after Brown was announced, Thurgood Marshall, leader of the NAACP’s
Legal Defense Fund, told reporters that it would take, at most, five years for schools to desegregate nationwide. He
didn’t anticipate
the massive resistance of Southern states to the decision, yet that’s no longer the most important factor
impeding integration. Rather, schools remain segregated mostly because their neighborhoods are
segregated. Had civil rights lawyers been able to attack neighborhood rather than school segregation,
they would have accomplished more for educational equality than by focusing on schools directly. When
its school desegregation drive began during the Depression, the NAACP was struggling, with members’ contributions counted more often in
dimes than dollars. But in 1930, a wealthy benefactor gave the organization an extraordinary grant of $100,000 (about $1.4 million in today’s
currency) to fight school segregation. The NAACP’s top lawyer was Howard University law school dean Charles Hamilton Houston. His protégé
was Thurgood Marshall. Concluding
that a frontal challenge to K-12 segregation was too radical, they began by
suing to admit African Americans to public law schools — figuring that if Supreme Court justices
understood nothing else about equality, they might comprehend that adequate legal education was
necessary to practice law. By 1935, Houston and Marshall had persuaded a court to order the whites-only University of Maryland law
school to admit African Americans. The civil rights lawyers then proceeded to force desegregation of other graduate schools. Only after a 15-
year campaign were they ready to attack K-12 segregation, in lawsuits leading to Brown. The gripping tale of their perseverance, courage, and
realism was masterfully recounted in Richard Kluger’s 1975 book, Simple Justice. Philanthropic funding alone did not lead the NAACP to focus
on school, not housing segregation. When their campaign began, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal had not yet begun to enforce metropolitan
segregation. When it did so, it employed administrative guidelines, less conspicuous than laws segregating schools. The federal government’s
residential race policy was explicit, unhidden, and just as unconstitutional as school segregation laws, but it only unfolded gradually as the
nation recovered from the Depression and then suburbanized. As I describe in my recent book, The Color of Law, the policy began in 1933 with
the New Deal’s Public Works Administration that built segregated housing in cities where segregation had not previously been known. Initial
projects were for middle-class white families who had lost homes in the Depression. Civil rights leaders had to press to get any housing for black
families, so were less focused on its segregation. Projects constructed for African Americans were always segregated—in the North, Midwest,
and West, not only in the South. At the time, white ethnic immigrants, rural migrant and black workers frequently lived in walking distance from
downtown factory jobs. Certainly there were racially and ethnically homogeneous pockets, but rigid separation was rare. Even in the South,
urban neighborhoods were more integrated than today. In Atlanta, the Public Works Administration razed a downtown neighborhood, “the
Flats,” whose population was almost evenly split between whites and blacks. But the government replaced it with public housing for white
families only. In his autobiography, Langston Hughes described his integrated Cleveland neighborhood high school where, during World War I,
he dated a Jewish girl and his best friend was Polish. But during the New Deal, federal and local government built separate projects for whites
and blacks in that same neighborhood — and in cities across the country — creating and reinforcing a pattern of racial separation that might
not otherwise have evolved. Then, during World War II, workers of both races flocked to jobs in defense plants, but found no lodging available.
To keep assembly lines running, the federal government had to create housing. The West Coast’s largest shipbuilding center was Richmond,
California. Few African Americans lived there before the war (some domestic servants worked for white families), so there was no established
segregation. By war’s end, Richmond’s population had multiplied tenfold, with inflexible segregation established by racially separate war
housing. Just south of Richmond in Berkeley, black-designated buildings were placed along the railroad tracks while white-designated buildings
were placed inland near shopping and white residential areas. The pattern, too, was repeated almost everywhere. Suburbanization for
whites-only, by explicit federal command, followed. It is well-known that the Federal Housing
Administration had a “redlining” policy, generally refusing to insure mortgages in black neighborhoods.
Less familiar is that the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration guaranteed
development loans for entire suburban communities, provided that no homes be sold to African
Americans. One of the first and largest was Levittown, 17,000 low-cost homes in Nassau County, New York. William Levitt could never have
independently amassed the capital for its design and construction. Instead, he obtained government-guaranteed bank loans by agreeing to
exclude black buyers and to place language in every deed prohibiting re-sales to African Americans. The Federal Housing Authority also insisted
upon zoning ordinances that banned future mixed-income development. Such practices everywhere created suburban white nooses around
increasingly black cities. When middle-class whites left for federally subsidized and racially exclusive suburbs,
their monthly mortgage payments were often less than their prior public housing rents. By the mid-1950s, almost every whites-only public
housing project had vacancies, while black-designated projects had long waiting lists. Soon, with whites no longer needing it, all public housing
was opened to African Americans. As industry left cities for suburbs where nearby whites could find employment, poverty became more
concentrated in urban black neighborhoods and public housing was transformed from a middle-class program addressing housing shortages to
a welfare program for the (mostly minority) poor. In 1948, the Supreme Court prohibited courts from evicting black families who moved to
white neighborhoods and in 1968, the Fair Housing Act banned future housing discrimination. The Act’s enforcement has been imperfect, but
some African Americans have successfully integrated suburban communities. But even with perfect enforcement, most would have been, and
were, unable to do so. Racially restricted single-family homes that sold in the 1940s and ‘50s for twice national median income now sell for
three times that much. Working-class black families who could have bought suburban homes when they were first built can no longer afford
them. Most Americans have forgotten this history, aided by Supreme Court opinions that declare
residential segregation to be “de facto,” resulting mostly from private discrimination. But de facto segregation
is mythical. In reality, neighborhood segregation has resulted from intentional government policy, as unconstitutional as the “de jure” school
segregation imposed by Southern legislatures prior to 1954. The governmentally-sponsored residential segregation imposed by federal, state,
and local authorities in the mid-twentieth century established a segregated landscape in every metropolitan area that has never been
remedied. Once the Supreme Court decided Brown, children
of either race could attend their neighborhood schools if
the decision were obeyed. But if courts were now to recognize that residential segregation is rooted in
unconstitutional policy, undoing it would be daunting. Children can easily walk to nearby schools but
families can’t easily pick up and move to integrated and now-unaffordable neighborhoods, when no
longer barred from doing so. On May 17, 1954, when Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues predicted rapid school desegregation,
they said that they would now turn attention to housing. But their resources were soon consumed by defending Brown, as state after state
sabotaged it. And it was already too late for straightforward attacks on neighborhood segregation — the government’s scheme to segregate
metropolitan areas was by then mostly complete, with residential patterns solidified. Dismantling de jure residential segregation is
incomparably more difficult now than it would have been 70 or 80 years ago. But that’s no excuse for avoiding it. Unless we desegregate
neighborhoods, Brown’s promise of integrated education will remain unattainable. The Color of Law asserts that “letting bygones be bygones”
is not a policy worthy of a constitutional democracy. The
achievement gap with which educators struggle can never be
closed until we recognize that some of the most important education policy dilemmas cannot be
addressed in isolation. Fundamentally, education policy is housing policy.

States fail to implement court orders – costly and difficult

Huneeus 11 (Alexandra, Assistant Professor at University of Wisconsin Law School, “Courts Resisting
Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights”, Cornell
International Law Journal,
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1777&context=cilj) ALH

The more separate institutional actors a Court order calls on to act, then, the lower the compliance rate.
But current theories on compliance fail to explain this marked trend. Under international law, it is the nation state as a whole that features on
the international plane. Most empirical studies of the IAS, and of international human rights regimes more generally, similarly hinge compliance
decisions on the interests or capacity of a single actor.9 6 Compliance is explained as reflecting a government's "political will."'9 7 In a
thoughtful comparative study of the European and InterAmerican Systems, Courtney Hillebrecht argues that governments use compliance with
regional human rights courts as a signaling mechanism:
Through compliance, states perform their commitment to
human rights on the international stage, proving that their commitment is not mere "cheap talk."9 8
Such a theory speaks well to variation in compliance between states: Different human rights policies and
levels of commitment result in different compliance levels. However, it has little traction explaining,
without further elaboration, why all states are more likely to comply with some types of remedies than
others. Compliance with an order to investigate would seem to be just as important to signaling commitment to human rights as compliance
with orders to compensate. Indeed, all studies that explain compliance through "political will" similarly focus on a single will, that of the
executive, or of the government as a single entity. 9 9 A second compliance theory focuses not on executive will, but procedural ambiguity in
working towards implementation. The Center for Justice and International Law, the leading NGO in Inter-American litigation, has published two
books on compliance. 100 These analyses argue that states have failed to specify in their internal laws how rulings can be implemented, and the
resulting "interpretive and normative grey areas and empty spaces" impede compliance. 10 1 Turning to the
judicial arena, for example, Viviana Krsticevic argues that it is often unclear, according to the state's internal laws, what role judges play in the
implementation of orders to compensate, and the ambiguity makes payments lag. In that most problematic type of order-orders to investigate
and punish-judges face many obstacles of criminal procedure, such as statutes of limitations, double jeopardy, res judicata, and amnesties. 1 0
2 Krsticevic argues that legislatures need to rewrite laws so that these criminal procedures no longer impede compliance. 10 3 But the
procedural argument has limits as a complete explanation for compliance.
The lack of clear rules can inhibit compliance, but
it can also provide an opening for officials to exercise discretion. Some judiciaries, such as those in Argentina and
Bolivia, have overcome procedural hurdles through judicial interpretation, without help from the
legislature.10 4 Others have chosen to shirk Court orders despite national laws that seem to mandate
implementation. 10 5 More is at play here than the law on the books. A third theory emphasizes not what the remedial order requires or
whom it addresses, but rather its degree of clarity. Jeffrey Staton and Alexia Romero find that "the clarity of IACHR remedies influences
reactions of state governments to these remedies."'1 6 But this theory, too, cannot single-handedly account for the drop-off in compliance as
orders invoke action by more distinct state actors. 1 0 7 As the authors note, about
half of the orders to prosecute are what
they classify as "clear," and the other half are vague. Yet compliance with such orders does not vary: It is
zero. A final explanation is that States comply with orders that are "easier" to carry out, and balk at
more difficult orders. 10 8 Thus, they do not carry out the tasks that require a greater amount of effort
(including cost) on the part of the state. Without more elaboration, however, the so-called difficulty thesis begs the question of
what, exactly, makes implementation difficult, for that becomes the true impediment. As noted above, it is not always the case that an order is
inherently more difficult to carry out just because it involves action by more actors. Or, put differently, and as will be argued below, it
is the
coordination of a task between distinct state actors with differing political wills and institutional
settings that poses the challenge to implementation.
Congress circumvents Supreme Court decisions through policy changes
Blackstone 17 (Bethany, “An Analysis of Policy-Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme
Court Constitutional Decisions” Law and Society Review”) ALH
Members of Congress can respond to Supreme Court decisions in a variety of ways. While recent scholarship has focused much attention on
the initiation of institutional attacks in response to unfavorable constitutional decisions, members of Congress fre quently
attempt to counter decisions on policy grounds. By system atically analyzing responsive proposals, I have demonstrated that
most responsive proposals attempt to reverse, at least partially, the impact of Supreme Court decisions but that most responses work within
the constraint of the legal rules announced by the Court. The orthodoxy of judicial supremacy is partially true. To fully reverse a legal rule
announced by the Supreme Court, Congress may need to rely on the constitutional amendment process. However, the assumption of judicial
supremacy overlooks the fact that Congress can dramatically alter the impact of a Supreme Court ruling by
engaging in statutory revision. The analysis provides additional support for the governance as dialogue conceptualization of the
policymaking process. As Fisher (1988:245) persuasively argues, "Courts are the ultimate inter preter of a particular case, not the larger issue of
which that case is a part." This restriction on the Court's pursuit of policy frees Congress to shape the impact of Supreme Court decisions
through ordinary legislation.
Analyses of congressional responses to the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions should take seriously the options available to Congress when it dislikes the Court's constitu
tional decisions. The pervasive assumption in the empirical separation of powers scholarship that
Congress is powerless to do anything about the Court's constitutional decisions is contradicted by the
data here. This is an area of research ripe for growth and accumulation. The regularity with which Congress considers and passes legislative
responses to the Court's constitutional decisions may provide a means to bridge subsets of the separation of powers literature that have
developed separately. For example, responses to constitu tional and statutory cases are often considered separately. However, most of
the proposals considered here are not fundamentally dif ferent than the responses to statutory cases.
Certainly, in constitu tional cases, Congress behaves as though it is constrained by the legal confines
announced by the Supreme Court, but it is likely that the bigger obstacles to a policy-based response are
the vagaries of the legislative process than the matter of whether a case was decided on statutory or
constitutional grounds. It is not readily apparent that modifying the policy impact of a constitutional deci sion is substantially harder
than reversing a statutory interpreta tion. Future research should attempt to empirically evaluate that Congress treats statutory cases and
constitutional cases differently, instead of assuming that the two sets of cases are incomparable. There
are also obvious
connections between this work on policy based responses to the Court's constitutional decisions and the
proposal of institutional attacks. The power of institutional attacks may be in the information that they convey to the Court, not in
their passage or implementation (Clark 2009; 2011). Responsive proposals may work similarly, but they have the
added impact of changing the Court's policy.

States circumvent federal court decisions

Kulesza 17 (Christopher, professor at Purdue University, “State Responses to U.S. Supreme Court
Campaign Finance Decisions”, Oxford University Publications) ALH

. However, in recent years,

federal courts have been much more active in invalidating campaign finance
policies even when they appeared to be settled law, leading to conflict with states that want more
expansive campaign finance regulation. These decisions have preempted traditional state policymaking
and limited some of the policy experimentation in the laboratories of democracy that can lead to more effective
regulation (Kulesza, Witko and Waltenburg 2016). Because these court rulings involve federal courts deferring or not deferring to state courts,
they naturally involve questions of federalism. Just as importantly, court
rulings that preempt state policymaking are
similar to congressional or executive acts that preempt state policy authority. States will attempt to
resist these encroachments on state authority in some cases. There are some critical differences between states resisting
federal courts rather than the Congress or President. First, the latter institutions can provide resources to obtain the support of the states.
Second, the courts cannot be directly lobbied and pressured on a routine basis in the same way that the president, or particularly, the Congress
can, nor can judges be removed from office very easily. Naturally, when courts are the target of state resistance, legal
arguments and strategies will be important. And states are 486 C. F. Kulesza et al. developing new legal arguments to use
to defend their laws in the Courts, and also crafting innovative policy to resist, but not directly run afoul of federal court rulings. Though our
treatment was necessarily brief, we explained that similar dynamics are found in other areas where the
courts are a key policymaker, such as abortion. Because some activists, candidates, and public officials appear to want to do
away with campaign finance law entirely, we can be sure that such cases will continue to be heard in the federal courts, leading to more conflict
between states and the federal courts in the future. Some proponents of campaign finance reform expected that if Hillary Clinton had won the
2016 presidential election this would have led, through one or more Supreme Court appointments, to a Court that would be more supportive of
limiting the way that the Buckley v. Valeo ruling constrains state lawmakers and voters in pursuing stronger campaign finance laws. However,
Donald Trump’s election means that this will not happen. The justice who appears likely to replace Antonin Scalia, Neil Gorsuch, will likely
interpret the Constitution in a manner similar to Scalia (Torres-Spelliscy 2017). Moreover, if President Trump is given the opportunity to replace
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Anthony Kennedy, the Court is likely to become even more supportive of deregulation of campaign finance
policy.
Thus, we can be quite certain that the courts will continue to view state laws skeptically, and that
some states will attempt to resist the deregulatory court rulings.

Supreme Court decisions have been historically circumvented by lower court

redefinitions
Ferrey 16 (Steven, “Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When the Lower Federal Courts Don’t
Follow the Supreme Court”, Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative
Law,http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=mjeal) ALH
The Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.2 reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts—every appellate court that
had decided a case.3 How rare is this? There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit
court in the country, as it did there.4 Further, it, in effect, reversed the courts of appeal in a unanimous Supreme Court opinion.5 There is a
tortuous judicial history. Every federal court of appeals in the country had closed access for private parties to CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery,
fundamentally frustrating private clean up of U.S. hazardous waste. Then, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion to reopen this broad
legal boulevard, by overturning the unanimous decisions of every federal appellate court.6 This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the
circuit court interpretations of one of America’s most essential statutes, but also reallocated billions of dollars among private parties. However,
in the decade since this Supreme Court decision, several federal trial and circuit courts have openly
circumvented the Supreme Court’s command, to reopen CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery to private
parties. Can this lower court circumvention happen under Article III of the Constitution? The Supreme Court, in
its Atlantic Research decision, did not define an ordinary adverb used in its opinion that it thought was not subject to ambiguity: “voluntarily.”7
Lower court re-
However, when billions of dollars are involved, every undefined term is subject to reconstruction and interpretation.
interpretation of “voluntarily” has created uneven and contradictory terrain in the national legal
landscape. The Superfund’s two cost recovery mechanisms, Sections 107 and 113, are not identical, or even similar, cost redistribution
mechanisms for plaintiffs who incur costs to remediate hazardous waste.8 They impose funda- mentally opposed types of liability, they require
different standards of proof, and their different statutes of limitations are often fatal to claimants.9 Section 113 can leave a party with no legal
remedy whatsoever because of lack of prior litigation against the claiming party.10 These two statutory cost recovery provisions are not
interchangeable.11 They alter the outcome of how billions of dollars of waste liability are allocated in America.12
What is the impact
of lower court subterfuge of a unanimous Supreme Court opinion that consciously reversed all of these
same lower federal courts? The impact of some recent lower court decisions has been to discourage
private party remediation (99% of all U.S. cleanup activities) of hazardous waste sites.13 These
inconsistent lower court decisions have created confusion and chaos in hazardous substance
remediation across the United States, affecting an estimated 450,000—600,000 contaminated waste
sites in the U.S.14 There are huge financial impacts: Addressing remaining contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter
trillion dollars,15 or an expenditure of $6-8 billion annually for forty years.16 For every single site EPA remediates itself, private parties clean up
100 sites.17 Private party cost recovery through Superfund is the critical artery that must support the vital signs of the cost recovery process.
The Supreme Court decision did not control all residual discretion exercised by the lower courts, though.
Several lower federal courts have circumvented the core element of the Supreme Court’s decision by re-
defining a term that the Supreme Court thought needed no definition.18 The lower federal courts that did not choose
to follow the Atlantic Research decision have done so by implementing one of three interpretive mechanisms in order to circumvent CERCLA
Section 107’s private party cost recovery: • Defining costs incurred as not “voluntarily” undertaken,19 • disqualifying costs incurred at a point in
time after settlement with EPA,20 or • reverting to the overturned rationale of choosing a prudential ability to disqualify claims.21 Each of
these three legal mechanisms employs a different theory, but equally circumvents the Supreme Court’s key decisions on Superfund liability.
Section II examines the two relevant cost recovery provisions of the Superfund statute, focusing on their critical differences. Section II.C.
analyzes the 2004 and 2007 Supreme Court watershed decisions that overturned the federal circuit courts’ holdings that had closed off Section
107 recovery for potentially responsible parties (PRPs). These two Supreme Court decisions sought to right the listing U.S. Superfund vessel.
Sections III through V analyze how the lower federal courts have since circumvented and compromised the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision.22
Section III asks “what’s in a word?” In particular, some lower courts have creatively defined the term used by the Supreme Court, “voluntarily,”
to disqualify a very large portion of the class of private parties for which the Supreme Court
reestablished legal cost recovery access in Atlantic Research. Section IV analyzes the second mechanism by which some lower
federal courts block the Atlantic Research decision. Some lower federal courts allow cost recovery for costs incurred before a settlement with
the government, and disqualify and block costs incurred thereafter. Other federal courts disagree. This appears to be a false distinction not
embodied in the statute, based on timing of when the expenditure is made. Section V examines trial courts and circuit courts that block private
party access to Section 107 Superfund cost recovery, contrary to Atlantic Research, based on nothing but their own discretion. Shifting plaintiffs
to Section 113 of the Superfund imposes a much more significant burden and often no, or at least less, remuneration on good faith plaintiffs
than allowing their use of Section 107. Notably, in the two 2004 and 2007 Supreme Court decisions, the Court mandated just the opposite
balance, opening up Section 107 and restricting Section 113. This inversion of the law by lower federal courts, based on judicial discretion, and
not the Superfund statute, is exactly what the Supreme Court thought it had overruled unanimously. This article analyzes different federal
courts’ applications or rejections of each of these three mechanisms to circumvent the Supreme Court’s Atlantic Research decision. Section III,
IV, and V compare and contrast elements of each legal mechanism. A notable distinction is that one mechanism operates on the timing of
remediation expenditures, another on how settlors craft their settlements, and the third on the prudential preferences of certain courts. Each
mechanism renders Section 107 of CERCLA allocation of hazardous substance response costs unavailable to “any . . . parties” for whom the
Supreme Court declared the statute clearly provided a remedy under the plain meaning of Section 107. These
three mechanisms
circumvent plain meaning and create an inconsistent patchwork of jurisprudence in federal courts.
Section VI contrasts and integrates the impacts of all of the new theories recently created by the lower
courts regarding Superfund cost recovery.

States circumvent Supreme Court decisions on education – school prayer, libraries,

and Brown v Board prove
Hall 13 (Matthew, Professor at University of Notre Dame, “The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,
the Separation of Powers, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fear of Nonimplementation”, Midwest Political
Science Association) ALH

Consequently, the Court may have little control over the distribution of public resources or the
administration of public agencies, but it can influence policy by immunizing people from criminal and civil liability. Thus, “the Court
may not hold the sword or the purse of our society, but it does hold the keys to our jail, and every time it turns a key it wields great power”
(163). The Court’s decision in Brown, however, occurred in a very different institutional context. In
Brown, the Court ruled that
public schools must desegregate. Of course, lower courts play no inherent role in the administration of
public schools; the judiciary’s involvement in this policy process started only after litigants challenged
segregation. Accordingly, the actual desegregation of schools had to be administered by local school boards and other nonjudicial actors.
Lower-court judges could try to encourage implementation by issuing injunctions or, in extreme
situations, holding resisters in contempt, but implementation ultimately depended on the cooperation
of nonjudicial public officials who tend to follow popular preferences. Consequently, most public schools
in the Deep South remained segregated for a decade after Brown due to intense public pressure (Klarman
2004). Only in the border states, where popular opposition was weaker, did the Court’s ruling have any effect (Hall 2011, 127–30; Rosenberg
2008, 72–107).
In other words, the Court’s decision was not implemented because it was a lateral ruling
that faced strong public opposition. Similar patterns appear in lateral rulings related to school prayer,
censorship in school libraries, and minority set-aside programs (Hall 2011, 130–47). Notice that whether a case is
vertical or lateral is determined by the institutional context of the case, not by any action on the part of the justices. Lower courts are
inherently involved in convicting abortionists, regardless of the content of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Similarly, public
schools were
not administered by lower courts before Brown, and there is nothing the justices could have written in
their opinion to change that fact. This institutional context shapes the options available to the justices in
any given case. Of course, the Court always has the option of approving the status quo by dismissing a case, upholding a statute, and so
on, and this option would avoid nonimplementation problems. But almost every case offers the opportunity for the justices to alter policy, and
their likelihood of success may well influence whether they take that opportunity.

States tried circumventing Court education rulings

American Immigration Council 16 (“Public Education for Immigrant Students: Understanding
Plyler v. Doe”, American immigration Council,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/plyler-v-doe-public-education-immigrant-
students) ALH

In the three decades since the Plyler ruling was issued, states and localities have passed numerous
measures and adopted unofficial policies that violate the spirit if not the letter of the decision. For example: In 1994,
California voters enacted Proposition 187, which prohibited public elementary and secondary schools
from admitting any student who was not lawfully present in the United States, and which required schools to
notify federal immigration authorities within 45 days of any student reasonably believed to be in violation of federal immigration laws. The
measure was subsequently struck down in federal court for violating Plyler. In 2006, the school district in
Elmwood Park, Illinois, denied enrollment to a student who had overstayed the tourist visa on which he
had originally entered the country. The district ultimately permitted the student to enroll, however, after the Illinois State Board of
Education threatened to withhold funding. In 2011, the Alabama legislature enacted a measure requiring school
administrators to determine the immigration status of all newly enrolling students, and to submit an annual
report to the state Board of Education setting forth all data obtained under the requirement. The federal government and numerous private
plaintiffs have sought to enjoin this provision as part of a larger challenge to H.B. 56, the omnibus measure in which it was enacted. A federal
district court in Alabama declined to enter a preliminary injunction against the provision upon finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing to
appeal. However, a federal appellate court subsequently blocked implementation of the provision pending
resolution of an appeal. The provision was permanently blocked in October 2013 when Alabama agreed to a settlement
in the lawsuit. In addition to formal measures, local school districts have routinely adopted unofficial policies
designed to circumvent Plyler. For example, schools have required immigrant students or parents to submit
Social Security numbers or provide other additional documents prior to enrollment. In a “Dear Colleague” letter
sent in May 2011, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice reminded school administrators that they may not deny
enrollment to students who are unwilling or unable to provide a Social Security number, or who provide a foreign birth certificate at the time of
enrollment.

Court decisions are not implemented for a laundry list of reasons.

Rosenberg 8 (Gerald Rosenberg, 2008, is professor of political science and lecturer in law, University of Chicago. ““The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? Second Edition,” p. 85-88, google books) EYC

In the preceding pages I

have discussed political leadership and cultural and social beliefs as obstacles to court-
ordered civil rights. The Supreme Court, acting alone, could not hope to overcome these constraints.
However, they are not specific to courts. They exist as barriers to all change, including that produced by segments of state or national
government. I turn now to the particular constraints built into the American judicial system, constraints that made courts singularly ineffective
institutions for successfully producing direct change in civil rights. The Constraints of the Legal Bureaucracy Proponents of the Constrained
Court view suggest that specialization, expertise, and political connections are lacking in courts and arc
crucial for successful implementation of significant social reform. Given the political and social
opposition to civil rights, and the complexity of the issue, the need for such knowledge and skills was
high. It appears, however, that courts are not equipped to deal with the complex issues involved in areas such
as civil rights. On the one hand, many issues involve a sophisticated understanding of a whole range of social processes. In education
these might include the learning process itself, the role of families, and the community view of the schools. As one commentator supportive of
civil rights has noted, the courts have "lacked an awareness of the complex, multifaceted processes of
education" and have "disregarded the development of children and the perspectives of families and
communities" (Lightfoot 1980, 4). Court decisions, then, may not. have been implemented or, if implemented,
may not have worked, because they were not appropriate to the problem. Similarly, judges may not be aware of, or
be able to deal with, the political trade-offs necessary to implement any public policy. Judges are not sup-posed to telephone politicians, school
administrators, local businessmen, or others, and cut a deal. Their
decisions, therefore, are likely to overlook political
realities that are crucial for implementation. In this regard, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that
community preparation and participation in planning, key elements to successful school
desegregation, were utterly lacking in court-ordered desegregation plans (USCCR 1959, 309-10). Judge Brown,
writing on the record after the issuance of the first HEW guide-lines implementing Title VI, summed up these problems: These executive
standards, perhaps long overdue, are welcome . . . [without them] the Federal judge [was put] in the middle of school administrative problems
for which he was not equipped. . . . By the 1964 Act and the action of HEW, administration is largely where it ought to be—in the hands of the
Executive and its agencies with the function of the Judiciary confined to those rare cases presenting justiciable, not operational, questions.
(Price v. Dennison In-dependent School District 1965, 1013-14)20 The record of court attempts at school desegregation
before 1964 demonstrates that effective implementation of civil rights decisions requires information
and knowledge that judges don't have and political compromises that they ought not to make. Thus,
courts were simply not equipped to achieve direct results in civil rights. The judiciary, like other large
political institutions, is afflicted with many bureaucratic problems. However, as proponents of the Constrained Court
view argue, the constraints imposed by the structure and process of the legal bureaucracy make courts a singularly
ineffective institution in producing significant social reform. Among these constraints is the inability to
respond quickly. The time. between the initiation of a suit, the exhaustion of all appeals, and the issuance of a final decree can be years.
This is no less the case when judges act in good faith. Delay is built into the judicial system and it serves to limit the
effectiveness of courts. Delay occurs for many reasons. One is overloaded court dockets. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the Fifth Circuit, responsible for most of the South, had the nation's most congested dockets (Note 1963, 101). Appeals to that court
were naturally delayed. Second, the judicial system allows for many appeals and will bend over backwards to hear a claim.2' Numerous appeals
can serve as a tactic to delay final decision. Another reason for delay is the complicated nature of many civil rights
suits. Questions of whether the suit is properly a class action, whether local remedies have been exhausted, or whether a different court is
the more appropriate forum can keep cases bouncing around lower courts for years. Even if a lower court enjoins certain actions as
discriminatory, it may stay the injunction pending appeal. Fourth,
higher courts rarely order action. Normally, they
remand to the lower court and order it to act. The time involved here, even assuming good faith, can
add up. Finally, if a final order does not have a direct effect, if the discrimination is not remedied, the
plaintiff's only judicial remedy is to return to court and re-start the process. Opponents of civil rights were well
aware of the inherent delays of the judicial system. A popular Southern saying, "litigate and legislate," shows awareness of the slowness of
judicial proceedings (quoted in Rodgers and Bullock 1972, 72). Soon after Brown was decided, the attorney general of Mississippi (later
governor), Coleman, remarked: "We could keep the Court busy for years" (quoted in Sarratt 1966, 18 l ). And years later Judge Wisdom's
comment that "we shall not permit the courts to be used to destroy or dilute the effectiveness of the Congressional policy expressed in Title VI"
(U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education 1966, 859-60) bears witness to this structural reality. Even
if political leaders had no
intention of following adverse court decisions, the confrontation could he postponed for years. Examples of
delay in final judgments abound." In higher education, the average case took about two and a half years from initial claim to final judgment
(USCCR 1961a, 269). Final judgment, of course, did not guarantee admission or, later, graduation. In elementary and secondary education, de-
lays were legion. Among the most noteworthy were Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. Prince Edward County, two of the original school desegregation
cases, commenced in 1951 and 1952 respectively, which were still being litigated in 1963. Other cases noteworthy for seemingly interminable
litigation include Singleton V. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, in which approximately thirty opinions and orders were issued over a
seven-year period, and U.S. v. Montgomery County Board of Education (1969), in which there were seventy-seven docket entries between 1964
and 1969. And the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that delay in reaching final decisions in the courts
was a major reason for the failure to end discrimination against blacks in the field of voting (USCCR 1963a,
25). Perhaps the most remarkable example is the eight-year effort of Alabama to incapacitate the NAACP. While Alabama eventually lost, it
managed to effectively paralyze the NAACP in Alabama for eight crucial years. In sum, delay is built into the. judicial system. Even when all
parties act in good faith, judicial proceedings can drag on for years. This
structural constraint of courts made them
particularly poor institutions for directly affecting civil rights .
Discretion, interpretation, and bias means enforcement of Supreme Court ordered
civil rights fail.
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald Rosenberg, 2008, is professor of political science and lecturer in law, University of Chicago. “The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? Second Edition,” p. 88-91, google books) EYC

The American judicial system vests considerable discretion in lower-court court judges. Only rarely do appellate court judges issue final orders.
In almost most all cases, they remand to the lower court for issuance of the final decree. This leaves
lower-court judges with a great deal of discretion. Review can be gained only on appeal, which further delays final action.
This pattern is particularly pronounced in federal-state court relations. Studying this relationship, ship, Beatty found
that “one of the most unique characteristics of our dual judiciary is the ability of state courts to avoid, delay or evade the mandates of the
Supreme Court” (Beatty 1972, 260). The inability of appellate courts to readily review lower-court action was a
principal tool used by some lower courts to delay civil rights (Note 1963, 100). Discretion is, of course,
subjective and it is often difficult to characterize abuses. Different judges react differently to similar cases and this is
inevitable. table. While there is some awareness of the role of discretion in courts, its existence is more often denied or hidden. Haines, for
example, writes of New York City’s efforts to prepare annual comparisons of how different judges handled similar
cases in 1914 and 1915: “The results showing to what extent justice is affected by the personality of the judge
were so startling and so disconcerting that it seemed advisable to discontinue the comparative tables of
the records of the justices” (Haines 1922, 96). Yet at times the abuse of discretion becomes so obvious that there is no hesitancy to so
characterize it. Many lower-court judges systematically and continually abused their discretion to thwart
civil rights. At the height of the 1960 New Orleans school crisis, Congressman Otto Passman, addressing the Louisiana legislature, summed
up lower-court reactions: “It is not pleasant to contemplate, but it appears to be true that at least some federal
judges take their orders directly from the Supreme Court” (quoted in Sarratt 1966, 246). The awareness of the power of
discretion, and the use to which some judges would put it, led Southern segregationists to fight to vest control of civil rights in lower-court
judges. Arguing for South Carolina in Brown II, S. E. Rogers asked for district court control, admitting in response to questions that this would
result in no desegregation, “perhaps not until 2015 or 2045” (quoted in Peltason 1971, 16). Another attorney, out of court, commented that
“local judges know the local situation and it may be 100 years before . . . ]civil rights is] feasible” (quoted in Sarratt 1966, 200). On the
state-federal level, state court evasion of Supreme Court mandates was “at least twice as high during
the 1960s as in either the 1930s or the 1940s” (Beatty 1972, 283). In areas such as civil rights where feelings
run high, the discretion accorded lower-court judges virtually insures its abuse. There are many ways in which
discretion can be abused (Murphy 1959a). One, of course, is delay, referred to earlier. Another is outright refusal to follow the
law. Lower-court judges routinely upheld statutes designed to evade compliance with Supreme Court mandates. As late as 1966 Judge Scarlett
of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia attempted tempted to reverse Brown by declaring that blacks were not
intelligent enough to go to school with whites (discussed in Stell v. Board of Education for City of Savannah 1967). A third way was to
read the cases as narrowly as possible. In Briggs v. Elliott, for example, the federal district court held: “The Constitution, , in
other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination” crimination” (1955, 777). While this was a technically correct
reading of Brown, its impact was to allow segregation to continue as long as defendants could allege that they were not discriminating, that
segregation resulted from the “free choice” of all concerned. Another
abuse of discretion, discussed above, was to find
that local conditions prevented implementation of the law at the present time. One way in which this
was done was for private groups to encourage violence, or at least not discourage it, and then use the
violence to show that conditions were not appropriate for civil rights (Peltason 1971, 159). Finally, courts could and
did refuse to follow the logic of Brown into other areas. While this was legally defensible before the Supreme Court so ruled, it was clearly an
abuse of discretion after the Court applied Brown across the board. The tools of abuse of discretion-delay, and narrow interpretation (or
purposeful misinterpretation)-can be effectively harnessed by biased judges. Unfortunately, throughout the South there were many biased
judges (Peltason 1971; USCCR 1969, 39-46; Note 1963). These were judges who made their decisions based on their own segregationist views
and not on the law. And given the structure of the judicial system, such judges could delay civil rights for years. Southern judges were in a
difficult position. The “fifty-eight lonely men” (Peltason 1971) who formed the federal judiciary in the Southern states were required to
dismantle a social system they had grown up with and were part of. A non-biased judge who felt duty-bound to follow the law could never
forget, Peltason concludes, that “any action of his against segregation will threaten his easy and prestigious acceptance by the community”
(Peltason 1971, 9). Even as pro-civil-rights a judge as John Minor Wisdom was sympathetic, pathetic, finding it “not surprising that in a
conservative community a federal judge may feel that he cannot jeopardize the respect due the court in all of his cases” by vigorously
supporting civil rights (Wisdom 1967, 419). Even
with the best of judges, civil rights cases reflected the “customs
and mores of the community” (Wisdom 1967, 418). It is no surprise, then, that study of hundreds of cases in Southern federal district
courts found judges influenced by their social and political environment (Vines 1964). The severity of the problem can best be understood by a
few examples .21 Judge Elliott of the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Georgia did not want “pinks, radicals and black voters to
outvote those who are trying to preserve our segregation laws” (quoted in Note 1963, 101 n.71). Federal District Judge Cox, of the Southern
District of Mississippi, characterized the freedom riders as “counterfeit citizens from other states deliberately seeking to cause trouble here”
(Note 1963, 101 n.71). Speaking from the bench in March 1964, he referred repeatedly to black voter-registration applicants as “a bunch of
n*****s” who were “acting like a bunch of chimpanzees” (quoted in Southern Regional Council 1964, 19-20).24 Federal Judge Armistead stead
Dobie of the Fourth Circuit saw civil rights as influenced by “a foreign Communistic anthropologist” (quoted in Peltason 1971, 23), an obvious
attack tack on Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal whose classic work on segregation in the United States, An American Dilemma, was cited in
footnote 11 in Brown. Judge Dawkins of the Federal District Court in Shreveport, Louisiana, defended his enjoining the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights from holding hearings on alleged voter discrimination in his district in 1959 by stating, “lilt’s all part of the game” (quoted in Peltason
1971, 133). In the Dallas school desegregation case, started in 1955 and still pending in 1960, in which the federal district court was reversed six
times, Judge Davidson complained that the “white man has a right to maintain his racial integrity, and it can’t be done so easily in integrated
schools” (quoted in Sarratt 1966, 201). He also warned against the perils of breaching segregation: “When the President’s guard was shot, when
the halls of Congress were shot up, they were not from Negroes that were raised in the South. They were from the integrated people of Puerto
Rico” (quoted in Peltason 1971, 121). State judges were, if anything, more biased. Chief Judge J. Edwin Livingston of the Alabama Supreme
Court, speaking in 1959 to several hundred students and business leaders, announced: “I’m for segregation in every phase of life and I don’t
care who knows it…. I would close every school from the highest to the lowest before I would go to school with colored people” (quoted in
Peltason 1971, 66). Alabama circuit judge Walter B. Jones wrote a column in the Montgomery Advertiser which he devoted to the “defense of
white supremacy.” In those pages in June 1958 he told his readers that in the case against the NAACP, over which he was presiding, he intended
to deal the NAACP a “mortal blow” from which it “shall never recover” (quoted in Peltason 1971, 65, 67). It is no wonder, then, that despite
clear Supreme Court rulings, Alabama was able to keep the NAACP in litigation for eight years. As Leon Friedman, who talked with scores of civil
rights lawyers in the South concluded, “the states’ legal institutions were and are the principal enemy” (Friedman 1965, 7). Biased judges posed
a serious obstacle to civil rights in the South. Yet, as the Constrained Court view suggests, the very process by which judges are selected
suggests that they will reflect the mores and beliefs of the dominant cultural and political leadership. The
existence of biased
judges was inevitable. Given the tools of discretion, delay, and interpretation available to judges,
resistance to Supreme-Court-ordered civil rights was to be expected. As Judge Wisdom put it, “difficulties in the
judicial performance of inferior federal courts are built into the system (Wisdom 1967, 419; emphasis added).

Local courts make the aff useless – they rule the precedent doesn’t apply
Re 16 (Richard M., Assistant Professor, UCLA School of Law, "Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below," Georgetown Law Journal,
https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/11/narrowing-supreme-court-precedent/pdf) KEN

Imagine that you are a judge on a court of appeals and that a party has just cited your least favorite
Supreme Court precedent. Much to your chagrin, you have concluded that the precedent, though ambiguous,
is most persuasively interpreted as controlling in the case before you.2 This situation presents several options. First,
you could follow the precedent, even though it is misguided and would inflict injustice. Alternatively, you might
purport to overrule the precedent, despite the norm that lower courts lack authority to displace the rulings of higher courts. Finally, you
could narrow the precedent from below by interpreting it not to apply, even though you think that the
precedent is best read to apply.3 That last approach would acknowledge that the precedent must remain
binding in circumstances where it unmistakably applies, while also reducing the precedent’s scope of application in cases of
precedential ambiguity. Judges regularly confront the dilemma described above,4 but they don’t have a great deal of explicit guidance on what
to do. The
Supreme Court has plainly said that lower courts lack authority to overrule its decisions,5 but
the Court has not made a similarly categorical or salient statement regarding narrowing from below.
Lower courts themselves rarely issue precedential statements on the propriety of narrowing from below; the few cases that do discuss the idea
tend to reject it in favor of a strict model of vertical stare decisis, wherein the Supreme Court speaks and the lower courts follow as closely as
they can. As Judge Michael Boudin recently put it on behalf of the First Circuit, “a lower federal court such as ours must follow its best
understanding of governing precedent, knowing that in large matters the Supreme Court will correct misreadings.”6 Meanwhile, scholars have
heaped critical attention on the question of whether lower courts can legitimately engage in “anticipatory overruling” of higher court
precedent.7 By comparison, lower courts’ authority to narrow higher court precedent has received little
attention.8 It’s easy to understand the general sense of antipathy associated with narrowing from below. In a pyramidal judicial system,
vertical stare decisis is thought to be very strong.9 Indeed, the entire point of having a Supreme Court is arguably to
foster uniformity,10 and the Court has come to achieve that goal primarily through the promulgation of
national precedent.11 These circumstances suggest that narrowing from below presents challenges that do
not arise in connection with horizontal narrowing, or a court’s narrowing of its own precedent.12 For example, narrowing from below
can undermine the authority of higher courts and generate legal disuniformity as varying jurisdictions
construe higher court precedent in divergent ways.13 So narrowing from below could easily be viewed as
a subversion of stare decisis that is far more troubling than “stealth overruling,” or horizontal narrowing.14 Yet
narrowing from below happens all the time,15 sometimes with the Supreme Court’s blessing. Consider two salient examples.
First, lower courts narrow ambiguous precedents that have become outdated in light of new events or technologies. Recent Fourth
Amendment rulings supply powerful examples, as lower courts have construed dated precedents to be inapplicable to new digital surveillance
techniques.16 In reviewing these decisions, the Court has exhibited not alarm, but approval.17 Second, lower courts sometimes
narrow from below in order to provoke the Court to reconsider its own decisions. In the context of car searches
incident to arrest, for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court narrowly interpreted a widely followed Supreme Court ruling.18 The Arizona court’s
outlier interpretation was strained—but it successfully prompted the Justices to reconsider a ruling that the Court itself had come to
question.19
 AT: Solvency - No Modeling
SCOTUS international influence is declining
Liptak 8 (Adam, American journalist,lawyer, and instructor in law and journalism, “U.S. Court Is Now
Guiding Fewer Nations”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html) ALH

WASHINGTON — Judges around the world have long looked to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court for guidance, citing and often following them in hundreds of their own rulings since the Second
World War. But now American legal influence is waning. Even as a debate continues in the court over whether its decisions
should ever cite foreign law, a diminishing number of foreign courts seem to pay attention to the writings of
American justices. “One of our great exports used to be constitutional law,” said Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean of the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. “We are losing one of the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had.” From 1990
through 2002, for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court cited decisions of the United States Supreme Court
about a dozen times a year, an analysis by The New York Times found. In the six years since, the annual citation rate
has fallen by half, to about six. Australian state supreme courts cited American decisions 208 times in
1995, according to a recent study by Russell Smyth, an Australian economist. By 2005, the number had fallen to 72. The story is
similar around the globe, legal experts say, particularly in cases involving human rights. These days, foreign courts in developed
democracies often cite the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning equality, liberty and
prohibitions against cruel treatment, said Harold Hongju Koh, the dean of the Yale Law School. In those areas, Dean Koh said, “they tend not to
look to the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court.” The rise of new and sophisticated constitutional courts elsewhere is
one reason for the Supreme Court’s fading influence, legal experts said. The new courts are, moreover, generally
more liberal than the Rehnquist and Roberts courts and for that reason more inclined to cite one another. Another reason is the
diminished reputation of the United States in some parts of the world, which experts here and abroad said is in part a
consequence of the Bush administration’s unpopularity around the world. Foreign courts are less apt to justify their
decisions with citations to cases from a nation unpopular with their domestic audience. “It’s not
surprising, given our foreign policy in the last decade or so, that American influence should be declining,” said Thomas Ginsburg,
who teaches comparative and international law at the University of Chicago. Aversion to Foreign Law The adamant opposition of
some Supreme Court justices to the citation of foreign law in their own opinions also plays a role, some
foreign judges say. “Most justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their judgments,” Aharon Barak, then the
chief justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, wrote in the Harvard Law Review in 2002. “They fail to make use of an important
source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of
different legal systems.” Partly as a consequence, Chief Justice Barak wrote, the United States Supreme Court “is losing the
central role it once had among courts in modern democracies.” Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia said
that his court no longer confined itself to considering English, Canadian and American law. “Now we will take information from the Supreme
Court of India, or the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, or the Constitutional Court of South Africa,” he said in an interview published in 2001 in
The Green Bag, a legal journal. “America” he added, “is in danger of becoming something of a legal backwater.” The signature innovations of
the American legal system — a written Constitution, a Bill of Rights protecting individual freedoms and an independent judiciary with the power
to strike down legislation — have been consciously emulated in much of the world. And American constitutional law has been cited and
discussed in countless decisions of courts in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and elsewhere. In a
1996 decision striking down a law that made it a crime to possess pornography, for instance, the Constitutional Court of South Africa conducted
a broad survey of American First Amendment jurisprudence, citing some 40 decisions of the United States Supreme Court. That same year, the
High Court of Australia followed a 1989 decision of the Supreme Court in a separation-of-powers case, ruling that a judge was permitted to
prepare a report for a government minister about threats to aboriginal areas because the assignment did not undermine the integrity of the
judicial branch. Sending American ideas about the rule of law abroad has long been a source of pride. “The United States Supreme Court is the
oldest constitutional court in the world — the most respected, the most legitimate,” said Charles Fried, a law professor at Harvard who served
as solicitor general in the Reagan administration. But there is an intense and growing debate about whether that influence should be a one-way
street. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in a speech before her retirement from the Supreme Court, advocated taking as well as giving. “I suspect
that with time we will rely increasingly on international and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be domestic issues,” Justice O’Connor
said. “Doing so may not only enrich our own country’s decisions; it will create that all-important good impression. When U.S. courts are seen to
be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law model for other nations will be enhanced.” But many judges and legal
scholars in this country say that consideration of foreign legal precedents in American judicial decisions is illegitimate, and that there can be no
transnational dialogue about the meaning of the United States Constitution. The Constitution should be interpreted according to its original
meaning, said John O. McGinnis, a law professor at Northwestern, and recent rulings, whether foreign or domestic, cannot aid in that
enterprise. Moreover, Professor McGinnis said, decisions applying foreign law to foreign circumstances are not instructive here. “It may be
good in their nation,” he said. “There is no reason to believe necessarily that it’s good in our nation.” In any event, said Eric Posner, a law
professor at the University of Chicago, many Americans are deeply suspicious of foreign law. “We are used to encouraging other countries to
adopt American constitutional norms,” he wrote in an essay last month, “but we have never accepted the idea that we should adopt theirs.”
“It’s American exceptionalism,” Professor Posner added in an interview. “The view going back 200 years is that we’ve figured it out and people
should follow our lead.” Fiery Debate Yet citations to foreign and international law in recent Supreme Court decisions ignited an enormous
furor in Congress and in the popular consciousness. “The
opinion of the world community,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote
for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 decision that struck down the death penalty for juvenile offenders, “while
not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”
Justice Kennedy cited, among other things, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, and the Criminal Justice Act from the United Kingdom.

US Supreme Court rulings have ripple effects in other countries – same-sex marriage
ruling proves
Katz 15 (Gregory Katz is an editor of US News and World Report, “US same-sex marriage ruling likely to influence other countries as pace of change
quickens,” https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/06/27/us-same-sex-marriage-ruling-likely-to-impact-other-countries, US News and World Report)
EYC

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriages has no legal force outside the United
States, but gay rights activists in many parts of the world believe the court ruling will help their cause. In the Philippines,
in India, in Australia and elsewhere, gay rights advocates think the U.S. ruling may help change attitudes,
just as American activists — and judges, educators and legislators — had earlier been influenced by the easy acceptance of same-sex marriage
in some European countries, where the laws were changed smoothly without much fuss. In today's wired world, political movements
cross national boundaries in the blink of an eye, and the trend toward legal acceptance of same-sex marriage is gaining pace,
though still rejected outright in some parts of the globe. The U.S. is neither laggard nor leader in this movement, which reflects a fundamental
change in public views in many parts of the world, but theruling of its highest court is expected to have a ripple effect
elsewhere. In the Philippines, activists seeking to win legal recognition for same-sex marriages believe the U.S. ruling will be useful,
particularly since the country's legal setup is largely based on the U.S. system, said Sylvia Estrada Claudio, a gender rights advocate and
professor at the University of the Philippines. "This ruling will have positive repercussions for our own movements here," she said. The
Philippines' civil code limits marriage to a union between a man and a woman — but the constitutionality of this proviso is being challenged by
a lawyer, Jesus Nicardo Falcis III. Countries are taking different routes to the same conclusion: the U.S. pathway relied on a Supreme Court
ruling to establish that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, while Ireland last month used a popular vote that showed strong
public backing, despite the country's deep Catholic roots. Influence is a two-way street. Five years ago, Argentina became the first country in
Latin America to legalize gay marriage. Activists there said they believe their example helped influence the U.S., and that Friday's U.S. ruling will
in turn shape attitudes and actions in other Latin American countries. "The U.S. decision will have a big impact in other
countries," said Esteban Paulon, president of the Argentine Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals, adding that his
organization contributed documentation to U.S. legal groups arguing the case before the Supreme Court. "Sometimes U.S. influence is negative,
but we believe in this case it will be positive and accelerate the process of approving gay marriage in other parts of the world." Twenty-one
countries now allow same-sex marriage, according to the Pew Research Center, and Mexico permits it in some states, with many other
countries offering various legal rights that fall short of marriage to same-sex couples. In most of those countries, well-organized advocacy
groups are lobbying for full marriage rights.

US courts are no longer modeled by the international community – especially true in

the case of human rights questions
Liptak 08 [Adam, former First Amendment/Supreme Court professor and lawyer, reporting for the
New York Times; “U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations” 09/17/08;
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html]/MR

WASHINGTON — Judges around the world have long looked to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court for guidance, citing and often following them in hundreds of their own rulings since the Second World War. But now
American legal influence is waning. Even as a debate continues in the court over whether its decisions should ever cite foreign law,
a diminishing number of foreign courts seem to pay attention to the writings of American justices. “One
of our great exports used to be constitutional law,” said Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs at Princeton. “We are losing one of the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had.” From
1990 through 2002, for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court cited decisions of the United States Supreme Court about a dozen times a year,
an analysis by The New York Times found. In the six years since, the annual citation rate has fallen by half, to about six. Australian state
supreme courts cited American decisions 208 times in 1995, according to a recent study by Russell Smyth, an Australian
economist. By 2005, the number had fallen to 72. The story is similar around the globe, legal experts say,
particularly in cases involving human rights. These days, foreign courts in developed democracies often cite
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions
against cruel treatment, said Harold Hongju Koh, the dean of the Yale Law School. In those areas, Dean Koh said, “they tend not to
look to the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court.” The rise of new and sophisticated constitutional courts elsewhere is
one reason for the Supreme Court’s fading influence, legal experts said. The new courts are, moreover, generally
more liberal than the Rehnquist and Roberts courts and for that reason more inclined to cite one
another. Another reason is the diminished reputation of the United States in some parts of the world,
which experts here and abroad said is in part a consequence of the Bush administration’s unpopularity around the world. Foreign courts
are less apt to justify their decisions with citations to cases from a nation unpopular with their domestic
audience. “It’s not surprising, given our foreign policy in the last decade or so, that American influence
should be declining,” said Thomas Ginsburg, who teaches comparative and international law at the University of Chicago. Aversion to
Foreign Law The adamant opposition of some Supreme Court justices to the citation of foreign law in their own opinions also plays a role, some
foreign judges say. “Most justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their judgments,” Aharon Barak, then the
chief justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, wrote in the Harvard Law Review in 2002. “They fail to make use of an important source of
inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different legal
the United States Supreme Court “is losing the central role
systems.” Partly as a consequence, Chief Justice Barak wrote,
it once had among courts in modern democracies.””

No modeling and no impact – democratic states won’t model non-compliance and

authoritarian ones won’t model anything
McGinnis & Somin 7 [John O. McGinnis, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
and Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, “Global
Constitutionalism: Global Influence on U.S. Jurisprudence: Should International Law Be Part of Our
Law?” 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175, 2007]/MR

To many judges in national courts faced with cases for decision involving the meaning of their own
constitutional charters of rights, it has seemed appropriate and useful over recent years to reach for the
exposition of analogous problems written by judges and decision makers in the courts of other
countries, international or regional courts, or other bodies. Doing so has not generally been viewed as evidencing any
illegitimate loyalty or deference to non-binding texts. Still less has it been seen as exhibiting obedience to the norms of
other countries or the international community or to the opinions of judges and others outside the
municipal court hierarchy. 47 Instead, references to such elaborations have occurred because these expositions have been found
helpful and informative in the development of the municipal decision maker's own opinions concerning apparently similar problems presented
by the municipal constitution or other laws….After
the sharp exchanges in the Supreme Court and in the Congress up
to 2005, the reliance upon foreign and international legal materials in constitutional decisions of the
Supreme Court appears to have receded. Perhaps no one thought that any foreign analogies presented to
the Court were sufficiently close and useful to warrant their mention. This would seem surprising when it is
remembered that during the past four years the Court has had to grapple with important questions of fundamental principles and values in a
number of cases involving detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Perhaps those Justices who are inclined to inform
their minds about reasoning on common problems expressed in foreign courts and tribunals have
noticed the fuss that such citations commonly cause in the Court, in Congress, and in sections of society
of this country. Perhaps they decided instead to accept Justice Scalia's advice to Justice Breyer in their public conversation-that it was
alright for Justice Breyer to inform himself on international legal developments but just "don't put it in your opinions. 75 For some
judges, such a course might seem to be a path of prudence and wisdom. For others, it might seem a
surrender to intellectual dishonesty and a departure from decisional transparency.

The US is not realistically modeled by all countries

McGinnis & Somin 7 [John O. McGinnis, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
and Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, “Global
Constitutionalism: Global Influence on U.S. Jurisprudence: Should International Law Be Part of Our
Law?” 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175, 2007]/MR

At this level of influence, it is not reasonable, nor is it logical, to demand a direct and local democratic
component for such international law principles. In a world of nearly seven billion people, how would that be
humanly possible, except by authority delegated to representatives of nation-states, to agree on any principles or rules for
international questions? To expect such rules to be 134. Id. at 180-81. [Vol. 98:433 HeinOnline -- 98 Geo. L.J. 456 2009-2010
2009 HART MEMORIAL LECTURE internationally answerable, in some direct way, to the opinions of local communities,
or even to national communities in a country of great population such as the United States, is to indulge
in a romantic concept of democracy. The building of international law is essential for the extension to all human beings of the
benefits of the rule of law. It is necessary for devising effective support for universal human rights. In such matters, romance must give way to
reality. The
United States, as a major actor and potential beneficiary of the spread of international law, including the law of human
rights, will
in its own interests support this development locally and not seek to frustrate it by unrealistic
demands for direct accountability of international law to all citizens of the United States. If this were
demanded by one nation, it would necessarily be required by all.

International Courts no longer model the Supreme Court because of our super
conservative rulings
Liptak ’08 (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html Liptak is a radical dude who covers the
Supreme Court for the New York Times) TEJ

Judges around the world have long looked to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
for guidance, citing and often following them in hundreds of their own rulings since the Second
World War. But now American legal influence is waning. Even as a debate continues in the court
over whether its decisions should ever cite foreign law, a diminishing number of foreign courts
seem to pay attention to the writings of American justices. “One of our great exports used to be
constitutional law,” said Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs at Princeton. “We are losing one of the greatest bully pulpits we
have ever had.” From 1990 through 2002, for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court cited
decisions of the United States Supreme Court about a dozen times a year, an analysis by The
New York Times found. In the six years since, the annual citation rate has fallen by half, to about
six. Australian state supreme courts cited American decisions 208 times in 1995, according to a
recent study by Russell Smyth, an Australian economist. By 2005, the number had fallen to 72.
The story is similar around the globe, legal experts say, particularly in cases involving human
rights. These days, foreign courts in developed democracies often cite the rulings of the
European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions against
cruel treatment, said Harold Hongju Koh, the dean of the Yale Law School. In those areas, Dean
Koh said, “they tend not to look to the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court.” The rise of new and
sophisticated constitutional courts elsewhere is one reason for the Supreme Court’s fading
influence, legal experts said. The new courts are, moreover, generally more liberal than the
Rehnquist and Roberts courts and for that reason more inclined to cite one another. Another
reason is the diminished reputation of the United States in some parts of the world, which
experts here and abroad said is in part a consequence of the Bush administration’s unpopularity
around the world.
 AT: Legitimacy Adv – Legitimacy High Now
Court legitimacy high now – ideological splits reinforce legitimacy
Gibson & Nelson 15 (James, B.A. in political science from Emory University; Michael, B.A from
Pennsylvania State University, “Is the U.S. Supreme Court's Legitimacy Grounded in Performance
Satisfaction and Ideology”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12107/abstract) mlm

The overwhelming weight of the evidence we present in this article is that

the legitimacy of the Supreme Court is not much
dependent upon the Court making decisions that are pleasing to the American people. Nor is the Court's
legitimacy connected to the ideological and partisan cross-currents that so wrack contemporary American politics.
Whether desirable or undesirable, it seems that the current Court has a sufficiently deep reservoir of goodwill that
allows it to rise above the contemporary divisions in the American polity. These empirical conclusions have
enormous theoretical importance. It seems that the Court as currently configured is unlikely to consistently disappoint either the left or the
right. As we have documented above, the current Supreme Court makes fairly conservative policy, but it clearly does not make uniformly
conservative pol icy. Thus, even the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have made many decisions that should be pleasing to liberals, even if
conservatives should be slightly more pleased with the Court. Perhaps a court closely divided on ideology cannot produce the consistent
decisional fuel needed to ignite a threat to the institution's legitimacy. Some
worry that an ideologically divided Court
undermines the institution's legitimacy (e.g., Liptak 2011). Perhaps the truth is exactly the opposite: An ideologically
divided court is able to please both liberals and conservatives with its decisions, and therefore decisional
displeasure does not build to the point of igniting challenges to the institution's legitimacy. This then takes us
to the Court's so-called counter majoritarian dilemma, a problem in which many legal 173 scholars are currently interested. At least a portion of
this rekindled interest has been stimulated by the Court's decision in Citizens United. The counter majoritarian nature of the decision is
reflected in evidence that the American people, by a fairly substantial majority, disagree with the substance of the Court's ruling. Let
us
assume that people do not question the legitimacy of decisions made by courts when they agree with
those decisions. Legitimacy only comes into play when there is an objection precondition.20 So we will
assume that the 27% of the American people (according to an interest group poll, cited by Pildes 2010) who agree with the Court's decision
cede legitimacy to the institution. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the American people op pose the ruling. But let us assume that about half of this
two-thirds extends legitimacy to the Supreme Court and is therefore willing to accept decisions with which they disagree. If we add this 32% to
the 27% supporting the decision, then a fairly sizeable 59% is unlikely to be willing to support schemes to attack the Court or to try to overrule
its decision. Thus, the constituency for curbing the Court on most decisions is the fairly small minority who oppose the decision and who do not
extend legitimacy to the Court.
These calculations explain why a coalition for attacking the Court is difficult to
assemble and, in conjunction with the evidence that the Court today is issuing both liberal and
conservative opinion, may provide a clue as to why the Court's legitimacy is currently so stable
 AT: Legitimacy Adv – Partisanship Turn
Partisanship turns the case- the aff is perceived as a partisan ruling that destroys
SCOTUS legitimacy.
Rodriguez 16 (Lucas. Contribtor @ Stanford Politics. "The Troubling Partisanship of the Supreme Court – Stanford Politics."Stanford
Politics. Stanford Politics, 08 Jan. 2016. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://stanfordpolitics.com/the-troubling-partisanship-of-the-supreme-court-
da9fd5a900ac>.) DTL

Extreme party polarization has infected all realms of American government, most notably Congress. It’s no secret that
Congress has grown to be a largely ineffective body as a result of increased partisanship, but this dysfunction has had a significant ripple effect. Generally,

when individuals want to see change enacted, they will lobby members of Congress in the hopes of
spurring some legislative remedy. However, this course of action is now blocked by Congressional
gridlock. As a result, more people have turned to the Courts to try to get change enacted. Recently, it
seems as if the largest, most politically charged issues facing the nation have been decided by the
Supreme Court. For the past 15 years, the Court has been the only branch of government to meaningfully
address issues involving same-sex marriage, affirmative action, campaign finance, and labor unions. For
these type of issues, there arguably does not exist a real objective, non-partisan approach, forcing the Justices to involve themselves in these polarizing battles. In
the 20th century and even the 19th century, legislation passed at the federal level was the vehicle for impactful change, but partisanship has stopped that trend .

Instead, the Court has been forced to deal with these highly political issues that only further exploit and
expose its partisan divide. The unfortunate truth is that such polarization will have dire consequences
for the Court if it persists. Primarily, it raises questions about the legitimacy of the Court as the
supposed “apolitical” branch of the government. If the justices remain this polarized, how can we
possibly separate Constitutional law from normal politics? The framers of the Constitution intended the Court to be insulated from
the chaotic politics that the consume the executive and legislative branches of government. This separation creates public respect for the Court as an authority on
the Constitution and a body that can legitimately have the “final say” on some issues. Such respect is crucial, because, in the end, the Court has no real ability to
enforce its decisions. It must rely on the executive to carry out its orders, and the legislature to acknowledge its supremacy. Faith in the Court is thus indispensable.
Unfortunately, as a recent Gallup poll shows, that faith is on the decline. The
amount of Americans who have a “great deal” or “fair
amount” of faith in the Court is at an all time low. Chief Justice Roberts himself has noted, “the Court is ripe for a
similar refocus on functioning as an institution, because if it doesn’t, it’s going to lose its credibility and
legitimacy as an institution.” As long as partisanship remains, public approval will only continue to drop,
further damaging the Court’s reputation and belittling its authority. Constitutional law itself also faces a serious threat in
partisanship. Although our interpretation of the Constitution has largely evolved and changed over time, one of the main purposes of the document is to provide
some sort of constancy to our society. However, if this sort of partisanship continues, the Court’s “interpretation” of the Constitution will simply be based on which
party has a majority of Justices presiding at a given time. This, in turn, jeopardizes the idea of precedent. Normally when the Court is presented with an issue on
which the Supreme Court has previously ruled, it is expected to respect that prior Court’s decision (absent compelling evidence suggesting the decision should be
reversed). Yet, now we’re confronted with a situation in which overturning precedents could become the norm. Presidential hopefuls Hillary Clinton and Bernie
Sanders have both stated that, if elected, they would appoint justices committed to overturning Citizens United. The merits of that particular decision aside, we
cannot have a Court that continuously goes back on decisions it made just a couple years earlier. Such a regime would be confusing for lawmakers and would
delegitimize the Constitution as an authoritative document. One
of the distinguishing factors of Constitutional law, when
compared to regular statutory law, is that it is much harder to change. However, if the Court constantly
alters its interpretation of the Constitution then Constitutional law becomes more and more like the
normal laws politicians deal with on a day to day basis, potentially causing some to question the
importance of the document. Again, Roberts shares this same concern, stating in a 2006 interview that “the rule of law is threatened by a steady
term after term after term focus on 5–4 decisions.” Significantly, the composition of the Court could be greatly altered in the next 4 years. Of the current 9 Supreme
Court justices, 4 will be over 77 years old by the time the next President is inaugurated. According to a 2006 study done by the Harvard Law Journal, the average
retirement age for Supreme Court justices is 78.7. Therefore, it’s logical to assume that at least one, if not two justices may indeed choose to retire within the next 4
years. Depending on who retires, whoever is elected President in 2016 could potentially establish a significant conservative or liberal coalition within the Court, thus
dictating the kinds of decisions we can expect to see for the next 10 years. While
all this may be concerning, it’s not really news.
Party polarization is infecting all parts of American government and this is but one example of the kind
of trouble it can cause. Until we somehow find a way to fix polarization, perhaps starting by changing
the rhetoric we use when discussing our political opponents, it will only continue to cause harm at all
levels of the American political system.

Ruling on controversial decisions destroys Supreme Court credibility

Rubin 15 (Jennifer. Reporter @ The Washington Post. "Opinion | Roberts’s Supreme Court: More Unpopular than Ever." The Washington
Post. WP Company, 06 Oct. 2015. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/10/06/robertss-supreme-
court-more-unpopular-than-ever/?utm_term=.a5632acf857d>.) DTL

Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts shied away from striking down Obamacare for fear the court’s long-term credibility might be hurt if it countermanded legislation enacted by the

popularly elected branches. Now, ironically, in the wake of two rounds of Obamacare rulings, gay marriage and other
controversial issues, the court is less respected than ever, according to a Gallup poll: Half of Americans
(50%) disapprove of the job the U.S. Supreme Court is doing, while slightly fewer (45%) approve. Although the high court’s approval rating is
similar to what it has been in recent years, the current disapproval rating is at a new high. Fewer Americans (5%) now have no opinion about the court. . .

. This July, Democrats’ approval of the Supreme Court reached a record high of 76%, while Republicans’ approval hit a record-low 18% after the

court handed down major decisions legalizing same-sex marriage and upholding the Affordable Care Act.
Two months later, this wide gulf continues to exist in Republicans’ (26%) and Democrats’ (67%) approval ratings of the court, but the division is not as extreme as it was in July. It is tempting to
think that had the court simply ruled as conservatives wanted, its overall approval would have gone up. (“Already, the court’s highest and lowest partisan approval scores in the past 15 years
have come from Republicans,” Gallup says.) But in that event, it would be Democrats tipping the scales toward an overall disapproval rating. So is this a matter of the court not being able to
win in a highly polarized country no matter what it does? Perhaps this is the new normal. When the court was viewed as carrying out a lofty mission of enforcing the Constitution, it earned

Now that the opinions read like political statements and “liberal” justices predictably vote one
wider respect.

way and “conservatives” the other, it has become like any other government entity — mistrusted.
Citizens think everything has become hopelessly partisan — from the Internal Revenue Service to the courts. The “fix” is in, many suspect.
Conservative legal scholars and observers would say Roberts had it wrong in perceiving that the court would lose stature if it struck down the health care statute. In fact, they argue the court is
obligated to do so when a state or federal law runs afoul of the Constitution. Rather the mistake here, conservatives felt, was in Roberts’s transparent effort to reach a particular outcome
(sustaining the law) by virtue of the taxing authority. His equally specious reasoning in deciding that subsidies could continue even in exchanges set up by the feds also seem guided by the

outcome. In the gay marriage case, again, disappointed defenders of states’ power to ban
desire to reach a particular

gay marriage resented the court moving to stamp out the last vestiges of democratic protection for
“traditional marriage.” In short, conservatives think the court is playing politics — and favoring the other side. They point to
the liberal justices who, unlike Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy, are entirely predictable in favoring the left’s desired policy outcomes. It is tempting to conclude that conservatives simply
did not like the results reached in the Obamacare and gay marriage cases. There is certainly something to that, just as enthusiasm for the court from the left stemmed from winning on issues
they cared deeply about. But that does not mean the court is destined to be in low repute. Justices, for one thing, might consider clamping down on their public nonjudicial pronouncements

. Justices need to continually examine their own reasoning and question

which sound an awful lot like political ruminations

whether uniform adherence to outcomes favoring one side in the political debate is indicative of their
subsuming law to politics. And in decisions — whether in majority, concurrence or dissent — justices would be well advised to avoid
personal screeds and to take pains to explain, again and again, why judicial decision-making is different
than politics. If it’s not and the two have become irreparably blurred, the court will permanently lose the respect of the citizenry. With that, the temptation to stack the court with
political hacks and evade its rulings will only increase.
 AT: Legitimacy Adv – Alt Cause
Garland filibuster is an alt cause.
DeCosse 17 (David. Director of Ethics @ Santa Clara University. "Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Harmed." San Francisco Chronicle.
N.p., 01 Feb. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Legitimacy-of-the-Supreme-Court-harmed-
10901673.php>.) DTL

With the nomination of Donald Trump’s pick, Neil Gorsuch, to the U.S. Supreme Court, it’s time to
acknowledge one other casualty of our divisive presidential election: the wounded legitimacy of the
Supreme Court itself. The sin at the heart of the matter was committed before the election: The Senate Republicans’
unprecedented nonresponse to President Barack Obama’s nominee for the vacancy created by the
death of Justice Antonin Scalia — Merrick Garland. You don’t have to be a constitutional lawyer to find
the arguments in favor of this nonresponse to be preposterously partisan — and the very opposite of
the fairness demanded by the Constitution. Despite the well-established practice in treating the nominees of a president to a hearing, the
Senate Republicans kept churning up reasons for inaction that were transparent excuses for partisan motives. We have to stop and consider the

lasting implications for the court’s legitimacy of this do-nothing-ism by the Senate. American moral philosopher John
Rawls said that a simple notion underlies what makes democratic political power legitimate — the Golden Rule. That is: When dealing with constitutional essentials,
treat other citizens the way you would like to be treated — and assume that others think of themselves as free, equal and sharing in common standards of human
reason. We can see how Rawls’ standard challenges the Senate Republicans’ tactic. Assuming
reciprocity, why not have the Senate
Democrats, the next time they are in the majority, adopt the same tactic: Any GOP president’s nominee
for the Supreme Court in an election year, when the majority of the court hangs in the balance, would
get no hearing. No Republican would agree to such a principle. And that refusal confirms what is wrong
about such an abuse of the Constitution: It violates the fundamental conditions of equality and
reciprocity on which legitimacy depends. To be sure, the observance of correct constitutional procedures is a crucial dimension of legitimacy.
On such grounds, Trump has a legitimate claim to the presidency. But other, ethical aspects of legitimacy cannot be dismissed out of hand. In the case of the
election, these aspects pertain to such matters as the unjust practice of voter suppression .
In the case of the Senate GOP’s refusal to
consider Garland, the departure from fair procedures and the spirit of fair play (which sounds quaint but refers to the
ethical glue that keeps us as a people bound by the Constitution) erode the basis of legitimacy. In an authoritarian style of government,
procedures can be a waste of time — the sort of frivolous concerns of people who don’t get the big picture (like getting our preferred free-marketer or antiabortion
supporter on the Supreme Court). But embedded in procedures are fundamental matters of human dignity and the justification of the exercise of political power. If
you can’t give citizens reasons that both you and they could accept, then you are breaking faith with the people who constitute the political community. The

legitimacy of the Supreme Court likely to take shape in a Trump presidency has been undermined. His
election didn’t resolve the problem but perpetuated it. A correction is called for.

Garland filibuster has turned the Supreme Court into nothing but political posturing.
Feingold 17 Russ, HUUUUGE loser, 16-year-long member of Senate Judiciary Committee. "If Gorsuch Is Confirmed, the Legitimacy of the
US Supreme Court Won't Recover | Russ Feingold." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 20 Mar. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017.
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/judge-gorsuch-confirmation-legitimacy-us-supreme-court>. DTL

While Russia’s involvement in our elections is unquestionably horrible, and it will likely take many more drip, drip, drips before we know the full extent of it, our
democracy is facing an equally devastating threat much closer to home. On
Monday, when Judge Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing
is scheduled to begin, the Republicans will attempt to complete their cynical political takeover of the US
supreme court, launched last year when they failed to confirm or to even give a hearing to Judge
Merrick Garland. Never before has Senate leadership so openly and intentionally played political games
with our highest court. Already, the legitimacy of the supreme court has taken a severe blow because of
it. But, if Gorsuch is confirmed, it would lock in a dangerous precedent from which the legitimacy of our
highest court might never recover. Republican senators abandoned their constitutional responsibilities and blocked Judge Garland’s nomination
last year, for 293 days, leaving the court without a deciding vote on critical issues. They offered no legal justification for their actions, fully admitting that their sole
intention was to orchestrate a coup of the supreme court by betting that a Republican would win the White House. Some even pledged to keep the seat vacant for
four more years in the event that a Democrat won the White House. The severity of this action and what it will mean for the court if Gorsuch is confirmed cannot be
understated.
Confirming Gorsuch would endorse and normalize unconstitutional political games. It would
encourage both parties to use and expand this strategy in the future, at the expense of our highest court
and its critical role in our judicial system. This time it was the last year of a president’s term, next it will be the year before midterm
elections. It won’t be long before it extends to the whole two-year presidential campaign, amounting to three years of any presidential term where a supreme court
seat cannot be filled. Advertisement And
it is not just the supreme court that will be affected, as the strategy will be
used to block appointments to lower courts. This is a slippery slope that ends with decimating the
legitimacy of an entire branch of government, and the resulting checks and balances on which our
democracy depends. I have always considered the supreme court our country’s safety valve. When everything else fails, the court is there to protect the
constitution and protect our civil rights. But today, the most important safety valve is the US Senate, specifically those senators with the conviction to fight for the
legitimacy of the supreme court. Judge Gorsuch might be qualified. He might be a fine judge. But the vacancy on the supreme court does not belong to him. When
President Trump took office, he had three options for filling the vacancy. He could have renominated Judge Garland, rectifying the wrong committed by the
Republican party last year. He could have worked with both parties to nominate a consensus candidate, at least recognizing the need to reaffirm the legitimacy of
the court by not validating the Republicans’ coup. Or he could do what he did – nominate a partisan judge, completely validating the Republicans’ coup and locking
it in as a precedent. Preventing this precedent and its resulting slippery slope now falls to the Senate. Democratic and independent senators, and any Republicans
who still care about the legitimacy of the supreme court, must filibuster Gorsuch’s nomination. They must demand that Judge Garland be renominated, or at a
minimum, that a consensus candidate be selected with input from both parties – a nominee that will restore confidence in our nomination process, our judicial
branch and our system of checks and balances. Merely delaying Gorsuch’s hearing until after an investigation into Russia’s involvement is completed is not enough.
His nomination represents a completely separate threat to our country from Trump’s troubling ties to Russia. The Republicans’ judicial coup spat in the face of our
constitution, and a nomination that locks that in as a precedent cannot be accepted under any circumstances. It
is not hypocritical to try to right
this wrong. It would be unconstitutional not to. The Senate, specifically Senate Democrats and
independents, and any Republicans who care about our constitution, must do everything in their power
to block Gorsuch’s nomination and demand the legitimacy of our supreme court be restored through the
nomination of a consensus candidate.

Court disapproval high now- legitimacy already declining.

Davidson 16 (John Daniel. Senior Correspondent @ The Federalist, Contributor @ WSJ. "Americans Are Losing Confidence In The
Supreme Court." The Federalist. N.p., 04 July 2016. Web. 08 July 2017. <http://thefederalist.com/2016/06/29/americans-are-losing-confidence-
in-the-supreme-court/>.) DTL
Americans are beginning to lose confidence in the Supreme Court. Traditionally, the court has been unique
among our political institutions in that Americans tend to have more confidence in it than they do in
Congress or the presidency. Indeed, for decades the judiciary as a whole has enjoyed greater public trust than the other branches of government.
That’s beginning to change. Last fall, the court’s disapproval rating hit a new high of 50 percent, continuing a long decline from

favorable opinion ratings as high as 77 percentin the 1990s. Such ratings have of course always been somewhat partisan. Republican views of the

court plummeted after recent decisions on same-sex marriage and the Affordable Care Act, while
Democrats’ opinion of the court improved. But something beyond mere partisanship is at play. Americans increasingly view the Supreme
Court not as a revered body of judges considering questions of law, but as ideologues engaged at the front lines of America’s culture wars. Last year, a Pew

poll noted a major shift in how Americans view the Supreme Court’s ideology, with nearly as many respondents saying
the court is liberal (36 percent) as it is middle-of-the-road (39 percent). At the same time, the number of those who say the court

is conservative (18 percent) declined sharply to its lowest point since 2007. Monday’s raft of contradictory opinions helps explain
why this is happening. If Americans increasingly don’t believe the Supreme Court cares all that much about

matters of law, perhaps it’s because the court’s rulings increasingly appear to be motivated by politics
and preferred policy outcomes rather than the rule of law or even consistent legal reasoning. Taken together,
the Monday decisions make clear that the court’s liberal majority favors some rights over others, and will say just about anything to achieve the outcome it desires.
The Non-Logic of the Court’s Abortion Decision Consider the big abortion ruling in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which blocked parts of a Texas law
designed to impose more stringent regulations on abortion clinics. Specifically, it blocked two provisions of the 2013 Texas law, one that required abortion clinics to
meet the standards of an ambulatory surgery center and one that required physicians performing abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby (within 30
miles) hospital. These requirements no doubt held abortion clinics to a higher standard of care than previous state regulations did. But of course that was the point,
even if it meant some clinics would have to close, as some subsequently did. The Texas legislature passed the law in the wake of the trial of Kermit Gosnell, the
Philadelphia abortionist who ran a veritable house of horrors, severing the spines of infants after they were born, clogging toilets with human remains, operating on
women with dirty instruments, and actually butchering mothers and children alike. In May 2013, a jury convicted Gosnell on three counts of murder, one count of
involuntary manslaughter, and numerous lesser counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The timing of his conviction is important.
The Texas law was introduced in a special legislative session called after Gosnell’s trial and conviction, in June 2013. Lawmakers explained at the time that the new
regulations were to ensure something like Gosnell never happened in Texas. That of course is the entire point of a lawmaking body, to decide how best to protect
the lives and liberties of the people in its jurisdiction. In its ruling Monday, the majority opinion by Justice Breyer conceded “Gosnell’s behavior was terribly wrong.”
But then Breyer made an astonishing claim that seemingly repudiates every regulatory scheme from gun control laws to speed limits. As bad as Gosnell was, Breyer
wrote, “there is no reason to believe that an extra layer of regulation would have affected that behavior. Determined wrongdoers, already ignoring existing statutes
and safety measures, are unlikely to be convinced to adopt safe practices by a new overlay of regulations.” With legal reasoning like that, it’s hard to believe the
Supreme Court would uphold state regulations on just about anything. Yet the majority justified its position on the basis that the Texas rules amounted to an
“undue burden” on women exercising their right to an abortion. In a blistering dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas attacked the very basis of the majority’s logic: The
majority’s furtive reconfiguration of the standard of scrutiny applicable to abortion restrictions also points to a deeper problem. The undue-burden standard is just
one variant of the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny approach to constitutional adjudication. And the label the Court affixes to its level of scrutiny in assessing whether the
As the Court
government can restrict a given right—be it ‘rational basis,’ intermediate, strict, or something else—is increasingly a meaningless formalism.

applies whatever standard it likes to any given case, nothing but empty words separates our
constitutional decisions from judicial fiat. Thomas also noted that “the majority’s undue-burden balancing
approach risks ruling out even minor, previously valid infringements on access to abortion.” The logical
consequence of “second-guessing medical evidence and making its own assessments of ‘quality of care’ issues,” Thomas added, is
that “the majority reappoints this Court as ‘the country’s ex officio medical board with powers to
disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States.’” The Second
Amendment Is Now A Second-Class Right The court would apply no such “undue-burden balancing approach” to Second Amendment rights in a 6-2 decision
involving two Maine men who were barred from owning firearms under federal law because they were convicted of misdemeanor assault under state law. Both
petitioners argue the Maine law did not require prosecutors to show that they intentionally used force, and that because their crimes were reckless in nature, their
convictions should not bar them from owning firearms. Thomas, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that reckless behavior doesn’t rise to the level of malicious
intent meant to trigger the federal weapons ban. In a sole dissent, Thomas noted that the majority’s reasoning “expands [the federal ban]’s sweep into patently
unconstitutional territory.” He then gave some poignant examples: We treat no other constitutional right so cavalierly. At oral argument the Government could not
identify any other fundamental constitutional right that a person could lose forever by a single conviction for an infraction punishable only by a fine. In enacting [the
federal firearms law], Congress was not worried about a husband dropping a plate on his wife’s foot or a parent injuring her child by texting while driving. Congress
was worried that family members were abusing other family members through acts of violence and keeping their guns by pleading down to misdemeanors…
Instead, under the majority’s approach, a parent who has a car accident because he sent a text message while driving can lose his right to bear arms forever if his
wife or child suffers the slightest injury from the crash. Religious Liberty Isn’t Worth the Supreme Court’s Time Treating some rights as more equal than others is
now endemic among Supreme Court justices. Consider a case the court declined to hear this week, about a Washington state law that makes it illegal for
pharmacies to refuse to dispense medications for religious reasons. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Thomas, wrote a dissenting
opinion warning that the court’s refusal to hear the case was an “ominous sign” for religious liberty. At issue in the case is whether privately owned pharmacies can
opt out of providing services or medicines that conflict with the owner’s religious beliefs, such as contraceptives or emergency abortifacients. In fact, the state
regulation requiring pharmacies to provide “morning-after” contraception is what the challengers in the case, a group of Christian pharmacy owners, say violates
their religious freedom. A federal appeals court said the regulations rationally further the state’s interest in “patient safety,” and left it at that, which was apparently
good enough for five Supreme Court justices. “Circuit held that the regulations do not violate the First Amendment, and this Court does not deem the case worthy
of our time,” Alito wrote. “If this is a sign of how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value religious freedom have cause for great
concern.”
The Court Is Sinking to the Level of Congress and the White House So no wonder Americans are
beginning to lose confidence in the highest court in the land. Like our other branches of government,
the Supreme Court increasingly doesn’t take its duties and responsibilities seriously. President Obama has
accustomed us to such behavior. What are Americans to conclude about their government when they see, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack by an avowed
follower of the Islamic State, that the president will barely admit it was an “attack” at all, let alone an attack inspired by and carried out in the name of ISIS. Or when
the best response congressional Democrats could muster to the Orlando attack was to stage a campus-style “sit-in” on the floor of the House—not to demand more
robust action against ISIS, but to insist on gun-control legislation that would undermine Americans’ constitutional rights under the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth
amendments. So it is now with the Supreme Court. On
major, hot-button social issues like gun control, Obamacare,
abortion, and gay marriage, a growing share of Americans don’t really believe the liberal justices of the
Supreme Court—and even some supposedly conservative justices—are all that interested in the U.S.
Constitution anymore.

Legitimacy in smithereens
Kleske 17 (Andrew. Editor @ San Diego Union Tribune "Poll: U.S. Supreme Court Has Lost Its
Legitimacy."Sandiegouniontribune.com. N.p., 26 Apr. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/letters-
to-the-editor/sd-supreme-court-legitimacy-poll-20170426-story.html>.) DTL

): Any ruling by the current justices will not be recognized or upheld by

Regarding “Court weighs state aid to church group” (April 20

the people, because a Supreme Court seat was stolen, the judicial branch of our government was
hijacked and the properly nominated nominee was virtually kidnapped. A criminal investigation should ensue, including the aiding
and abetting of said activity by the new president stepping over the correct nominee, Merrick Garland. That said, the issue of state monies toward anything related to a church — whether a
playground for kids, pavement for a parking lot or money for salaries — negates the separation of church and state. Make no mistake: The end game is to help Betsy DeVos send “chosen” kids

to private schools with public money . The only entities entitled to public monies are those that separate church and
state. Anything less is unconstitutional. Unfortunately, we no longer have a Supreme Court to rule on
this or any other case.

Politicization of the Court destroys legitimacy.

Worden 16 (Skip. Political Scientist, writes about political federalism. "Political Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court: Undercutting the
Court's Legitimacy." LinkedIn. N.p., 6 Oct. 2016. Web. 8 July 2017. <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/political-ideology-us-supreme-court-
undercutting-courts-worden>.) DTL
As the U.S. Supreme Court began its 2016 term with eight justices, the
Court stood “at the threshold of an ideological
transformation unmatched in nearly a half century.”[1]Not since 1968, when Richard Nixon was elected U.S. President, had such an
opportunity presented itself. Nixon’s four nominations ended the liberal majority begun by Franklin Roosevelt’s eight.[2] The conservative majority begun with
Nixon’s nominations was up for grabs with the 2016 presidential election. I submit that the legitimacy of the ideological dimension
itself dwarfs the matter of which ideology is dominant on the Court. Even if a victory by Hillary Clinton would “shake the
foundations of the court’s marble palace, leading to [the] first liberal majority since the Vietnam [War] era,”[3] it is even more astounding that

the result of a U.S. presidential election would have such an impact on the highest court in the United
States. In other words, the importance of political ideology in the judicial deliberations and decisions is
itself worthy of recognition. I submit that there being politically conservative and progressive justices on
the bench gradually wears down the Court’s legitimacy as an institution premised on specialized legal
education and training. Politically ideological opinion is something that any person can have, so if it is salient in judicial opinions at the highes t level,
the question arises from a democratic standpoint: Why shouldn’t the people or their elected representatives decide the questions ? Why should the

political ideologies of nine people have such extraordinary influence? The democracy deficit here stems
from the fact that the people or their elected representatives are not able to impart their political
ideologies directly. Even if the Court’s nine justices were elected, the question would still be why should the political ideologies of just nine people have
such influence relative to the political ideologies of the electorate or at least its representatives? In short, if a political election can have a judicial impact as large as
in 1968 and 2016, then it follows that the Court is at least in part political rather than fully judicial [i.e., of jurisprudence]. Just
because justices can
make rational arguments in legalese does not legitimate the power of the associated political ideologies.
That is to say, the political ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court justices are not better or more legitimate
than are the ideologies of the popular sovereign (i.e., the People) simply because the justices are skilled in oral
and written legal argumentation. The U.S. Supreme Court could be limited to oral arguments and the writing of majority and minority opinions,
while the deciding of the cases is done by popular referendum or Congressional majority (or supermajority). In other words, the high Court could be willowed down
to performing its unique skills, while the People or their elected representatives would function like a jury—hence being able to use the Court’s oral and written
arguments in making a ruling.
The Court’s justices would then be charged with writing the majority and minority
opinions. Hence, the justices would serve the People, rather than imposing a few ideologies. Put another
way, the Court’s legal oral and writing skills could be used to justify the ideologically-tinged decisions
made by the People or at least their elected representatives.

Public opinion of the courts low

Severino 12 (Carrie. Chief Counsel and Policy Director @ Judicial Crisis Network. "How the Court Can Retain Legitimacy." POLITICO. N.p.,
30 Sept. 2012. Web. 08 July 2017. <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/09/how-the-supreme-court-can-retain-legitimacy-081814?o=1>.) DTL

The press tends to cover the Court like a boxing match, focusing almost exclusively on the identities of
who won and who lost, spending little time analyzing the legal issues decided, and even less on how the
ruling was (or was not) faithful to the Constitution or the role of the courts. For example, every individual’s court
victory over a large corporation is compulsively cast as a David vs. Goliath story, which, of course, says
nothing at all about whether David had the Constitution on his side. Legal academics on the other hand,
have often been very explicit in attacking the Constitution as a sexist, racist, or homophobic document
designed to protect the rich and oppress the masses. Others take a softer route and simply call the quaint 200-year-old document
“out of touch” with today’s society. Judges who interpret our laws faithfully aren’t treated much better. If their character isn’t called into question, they are
caricatured as “cramped” rule followers, out of touch with reality — the legal equivalent of flat-earthers. All of these attacks only amplify the
perception that courts are political entities, acting as super-legislatures and trumping the will of the
elected branches. But the judicial branch is not simply engaged in legislation by other means. To the
extent that we have judges that fulfill their constitutional role reliably and regardless of public pressure,
the Court will enjoy the legitimacy it deserves rather than riding the polls like the other two branches. Yes,
public opinion will always be fickle, but if the people can trust the Court to be the humble interpreter of the law and Constitution, they will be empowered to
change problems at their root — in the laws (and lawmakers) themselves — rather than expecting the Court to swoop in and save them when they disagree with
the direction the country is headed. That
will put the power in our government back squarely where it started and
where it belongs — with the people and with their will expressed in the Constitution.
CP Supplements
Dicta CP Supplement
 Follow On
Dicta are legally different but practically the same as a court decision - in addition,
large amounts of dicta become rulings soon later.
Chaudhary 16 (Vratika. Graduate R n nn nesearch Associate @ University of Florida. "Difference Between." Difference Between Similar
Terms and Objects. N.p., 20 June 2016. Web. 04 July 2017. <http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/legal-miscellaneous/difference-
between-holding-and-dictum/>.) DTL

What is holding and dictum? Aholding or ratio descendi is the opinion given by the court for a decision that binds
the lower courts (vertical hierarchy) and the court itself (horizontal hierarchy) under all circumstances. This binding that holds the courts is
called Stare decisis. On the other hand, a dicta or obiter dicta are those part of court’s opinion (opinion in passing),

that are not binding the lower courts or later courts and hence, and gives the lower court an option to
disregard the higher court’s opinion. In the American legal system, dictum and holding are entitled to a
very different weight. A decision reached based on Stare decisis is considered precedentary and has to
be obeyed, whereas a dicta doesn’t have to be obeyed, it just has to be given a respectful consideration. Types of Dictum Dicta can
be of these types: Dictum Proprium – a personal dictum that is expressed by a judge delivering an opinion.

Gratis Dictum – an assertion made by a person who has no obligation to do so, or discussion raised by
the court of a point not mentioned in the record. Judicial Dictum – an opinion offered by a court, on a
question or point that is directly involved in the case, but which is not essential to the court’s decision.
Obiter Dictum – A comment made by the court while delivering its decision, but which is not necessary
to the decision itself. Simplex Dictum – a statement that is unproven, or dictatorial. Holding vs Dicta- What is the
debate? A dictum in theory is very clear that all the cases should be treated as individual. Research findings suggest

that there is a dramatic difference between dicta- in-theory—where the lines separating dictum from
holding is important, and dicta-in-practice, where the distinction between dicta and holding becomes
blurred (David & Klein, 2013). According to a study conducted by Klein and Devins, a lower court may identify a
statement from a higher court as dictum but it does not mean that the lower court is unwilling to act as
if the statement were a holding. In fact, 32% of the cases that were studied in this research are examples of unambiguously positive citations, in
which the statement in question is cited in support of a particular proposition, and the citing court does not suggest that it is free to disregard the statement.
Problem- when dicta gets elevated to become a holding There are plethoras of judicial decisions, which are controversial
because of dicta taking place of holdings. For instance, in a 2009 case, the Court of Appeals of Oregon justified a decision this way: “We base
that conclusion on two factors…. Second, in Moore v. Motor Vehicles Division, the [Oregon] Supreme Court (in dictum) stated, “An administratively imposed penalty
based on [a legally unauthorized] procedure would be invalid.” In light of the fore- going, we allow the petition for reconsideration and now hold that the
suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license is reversed.” The
evidence suggests that the distinction between holding and
dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely irrelevant. Lawyers, judges, and
academics refer to “dicta” all the time. From a practicing lawyer’s viewpoint, nothing can be achieved by
asking a lower court to treat higher court language as nonbinding opinion. From the perspective of lawyers and law
scholars, law in practice is, what lower courts make it. Whether a higher court might one day reject a statement as dictum

makes little difference if at the moment, the statement is equal to binding precedent. Why does confusion exist
between holding and dicta This confusion exists for three main reasons. 1.Catch 22- as long as some judges, some lawyers, or Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
blur the distinction between the two concepts that lack of clarity will exist and spread .
Lower courts and later courts appear to be
following the higher court, and that court is more likely to issue dicta and higher courts seem to be less
restrained by the holding/dicta distinction. The stress on words, phrases, and quotations, instead of focusing on the causal facts of each
case and its issues, and holdings of judicial opinions, makes the lawyers and judges more prone to confuse holdings and dicta. Way from here- Road to less
confusion Regardless
of how one defines holding or dicta, it is clear that judges and lawyers and law
students generally confuse the two. As is clear above, dictum is regularly elevated to holding. The
underlying causes of the confusion, which are discussed above can and do serve as a commencing point
for formulating proposals that may stop the repeated confusion between holding and dicta. Increasing
education regarding the distinction will help. That education could occur in law schools, in continuing legal education seminars for practicing lawyers, and at judicial
training conferences. Within law schools, students should be warned about the dangers of relying on the words and phrases they find in judicial opinions, especially
when taken out of context. Other measures must include reducing judicial caseloads which would make it easier for judges and their clerks to spend the time doing
research which is necessary to distinguish between holding and dicta—both in the opinions they read and in those they write. Read more: Difference Between
Holding And Dictum | Difference Between http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/legal-miscellaneous/difference-between-holding-and-
dictum/#ixzz4lqBEGBbm
 Dicta Solves
Dicta is good and has more versatility than the plan.
Garner 14 (Bryan A. Editor in Chief @ Black’s Law Dictionary "LawProse Lesson #165: "Ruling" vs. "opinion" vs. "judgment," Etc. —
LawProse." LawProse. N.p., 27 May 2014. Web. 04 July 2017. <http://www.lawprose.org/lawprose-lesson-165-ruling-vs-opinion-vs-judgment-
etc/>.) DTL

Ruling, order, opinion, judgment, decree, and verdict: What are the differences? Although these terms are sometimes used
interchangeably, they shouldn’t be. A ruling is the outcome of a court’s decision, whether on some particular point of law (such as the admissibility of evidence) or
on the case as a whole. A ruling may lead to an order–a court’s written direction or determination, which may be either interlocutory (on an intermediate matter),
or more broadly, final (and therefore dispositive of the entire case). An
opinion is a court’s written statement of the relevant
facts, the applicable points of law, the reasoning that led to the court’s decision, and dicta, everything
not directly germane to that reasoning. In British English, opinion may have this meaning, but the usual BrE equivalent is judgment [or
judgement]. Instead, in BrE opinion typically refers to advice given by a barrister about the facts of a case or

a legal memorandum prepared by a solicitor and given to the barrister. On this side of the pond, a judgment is a
court’s final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties. It “includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Traditionally, a court of law renders a judgment. A decree, traditionally, is a judgment rendered by a court of equity, admiralty,
divorce, or probate.
Today, the term judgment is more common in that sense, and decree refers more
broadly to any court’s grant of relief. The relief granted needn’t be equitable in nature. A verdict is returned by a jury, which decides whether
the facts satisfy the elements of a claim or offense. The word is used loosely when a court reaches a decision in a nonjury trial–the better practice being to use
verdict for juries only.

liberal activists by splitting the court into two or three different circuits (see here and here).
State Courts CP Supplement
 States Courts Key – Education
Federal courts should defer to states courts on issues of positive rights and education
– states courts are closer to communities and are more democratically accountable
Elder 9 (Sonja, Duke University School of Law, J.D. ; Duke University Sanford Institute of Public Policy,
“STANDING UP TO LEGISLATIVE BULLIES: SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATE COURTS, AND EDUCATIONAL
RIGHTS”, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1344&context=dlj) mlm
Finally, there is concern about the policymaking competence of Article III courts. These concerns come in two varieties: federalist and
interbranch. The federalist concern, as the Supreme Court put it in Rodriguez, says that a
key reason the federal courts should
stay out of local policy issues like education is their incompetence regarding the policymaking that
school funding inevitably requires.49 There is little question that crafting a constitutional school funding system, like the remedial
phase of much public law litigation, is “essentially part of a process of policy design and implementation.”50 Yet that does not necessarily mean
that courts should stay out; courts routinely
deal with complex and controversial issues. In their continued
struggle to desegregate American schools, even the federal courts made use of some unusual tools, such
as special masters, that substantially improved the courts’ competence in designing remedies.51
Additionally, state courts have smaller jurisdictions and closer ties to the community, so their competence in
crafting appropriate remedies in positive rights cases is arguably much greater than that of their federal
counterparts.52 The interbranch concern pertains to the comparative competence of the branches; most state constitutions “do
not reflect the same level of trust in state legislative decision making as does the federal Constitution in
congressional decisionmaking.”53 This lack of trust is eminently reasonable. Some states have only part-time legislatures54 or ones
that only meet biennially.55 Even in those states where serving as a representative is a full-time job, legislatures are often understaffed56 and
rarely have the time to fully research national trends or best practices. Many states have constitutional provisions limiting the actions of the
legislature such as bans on special legislation, which were enacted to combat legislative abuses and corruption.57 In sum, unlike the situation
between Congress and the Article III courts, many state legislatures do not possess an institutional competency greater than that of their state
courts; therefore, interbranch concerns about competence do not apply to the state courts in the same blanket way they are applied to the
federal courts, and federalist concerns are, by definition, inapplicable to state courts dealing with state issues. * * * For the Article III courts, the
Constitution may require a stricter separation of powers, but this doctrine should not be applied wholesale to state courts without considering
the reasoning behind it. State
courts, unlike Article III courts, enforce positive rights, are not courts of limited
powers, are generally democratically accountable, and are more competent than federal courts relative
to their legislative counterparts in overseeing policy implementation. This broader view of the separation of powers
doctrine at the state level means that state courts should see themselves as empowered and obligated to be as involved as is necessary to
ensure that all students are receiving a constitutionally adequate education.
Amendment CP Supplement
 Overturns Supreme Court Decisions
Amendments overturn Supreme Court decisions to preserve Constitutional and
democratic principles
Schaffner 5 (Joan, George Washington School of Law Associate Professor, “THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE
AMENDMENT: TO PROTECT THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE OR DESTROY CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY?”
54 Am. U.L. Rev. 1487, pg 1516-1517) MFE

Because the judicial branch has the ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation and construction, the
only “check” on judicial power
of constitutional interpretation is the constitutional amendment process. The amendment process
should be used to overturn the Court only when it acts beyond its powers or inconsistently with constitutional
principles. Otherwise, the careful balance of powers among the branches is compromised. The history of amending the Constitution
to overrule Supreme Court decisions is consistent with this view and is particularly relevant here. While the
U.S. Supreme Court is not being overturned by the FMA, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Goodridge decision is in jeopardy. Goodridge was the catalyst
for the fervor behind the proposed marriage amendment. Moreover, the FMA will forever prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing the issue. Only

four constitutional amendments have been adopted to overrule the Supreme Court. They are: (1) the
Eleventh Amendment, which overruled Chisolm v. Georgia; (2) the Thirteenth Amendment and, most specifically, the first sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment,188 which overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford; (3) the Sixteenth Amendment, which overruled Pollack v. Farmer’s Loan &

Trust Co.; and (4) the Twenty- Sixth Amendment, which overruled Oregon v. Mitchell (“[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”). Interestingly, several amendments to the Constitution have been proposed to alter the Supreme Court’s authority in this area;
not one has succeeded. MUSMANNO, supra note 31, at 92-95. Yet another arguably unconstitutional bill in flagrant violation of Marbury was introduced in the
House in 2004 to allow Congress, if two thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress. As we will see, each
amendment was in harmony with the basic principles that underlie the
Constitution—individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism. Moreover, in the cases where
fundamental liberty interests were at stake, the amendment reestablished individual rights in light of
the Court’s limited interpretation of those rights. Without analyzing the propriety of the individual
Supreme Court decisions, the following will demonstrate that, unlike the FMA, the use of the
amendment power to overrule these cases was proper and consistent with basic democratic
principles.
 Solves Federalism
Constitutional amendments check federal power
Schaffner 5 (Joan, George Washington School of Law Associate Professor, “THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE
AMENDMENT: TO PROTECT THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE OR DESTROY CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY?”
54 Am. U.L. Rev. 1487, pg 1520) MFE

Whenever a federal constitutional amendment is designed to expand individual rights of liberty and
equal treatment under the law, thereby setting a new federal floor for individual rights, the power of
the state is confined. For this reason, the Court in Dred Scott and Mitchell, to protect its legitimacy, refused to interpret individual rights expansively
against the states with the expectation that Congress, the states, or the people would act to “correct” its decisions and expand individual rights through a more
democratic process—constitutional amendment. It
is appropriate and consistent with democratic principles to set a new
federal floor for individual rights by a constitutional amendment overruling a Court decision in which the Court
felt restrained to expand those rights.
 Solves Rights
Constitutional amendments are durable and stable in preserving rights
Ehling 12 (October 4, Matt, A television TV producer, documentary filmmaker, writer and MinnPost
contributor, and has won the John R. Finnegan Freedom of Information Award, “Minnesotans need to
better evaluate when (and why) to amend their constitution”, MinnPost,
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/10/minnesotans-need-better-evaluate-when-and-
why-amend-their-constitution) MFE

Rights can either be granted by statute (through legislative action) or through a constitution's provisions. The former
tend to be more specific in nature, and can change with social needs and desires. The latter tend to be broader philosophical

statements that guarantee individual rights by permanently restraining governmental powers. There has been
just one amendment made to the U.S. Constitution that has exclusively constrained individual conduct, and it was short-lived. The most durable and

stable constitutional amendments have been those that have secured broad-based rights for the
people. One can recognize this by looking to the earliest history of the U.S. Constitution. As originally written, the federal constitution
contained almost no guarantees of individual rights, save for the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." Because of this, a
political struggle ensued, and the Constitution was ratified under the terms of a brokered deal that added 10 rights-based amendments to the
original text. These amendments constituted the Bill of Rights — a group of amendments that has survived for over 200 years

because of its close correlation to our nation's guiding philosophy of securing individual liberty. In similar
fashion, a long tenure has attended America's three post-Civil War amendments. These largely rights-based amendments (which abolished slavery,

expanded the voting franchise, and guaranteed additional due process) have become central parts of America's constitutional

tradition.
 Solves Education
A constitutional amendment solves the aff
Lurie 13 (October 16, Stephen, Writer for the Atlantic, “Why Doesn't the Constitution Guarantee the
Right to Education?”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-
doesnt-the-constitution-guarantee-the-right-to-education/280583/) MFE
Each of the countries ahead of the U.S. has a fundamental commitment in common, one that the America doesn’t: a constitutional, or statutory, guarantee of the
right to education. By centralizing education as a key focus of the state, these countries establish baseline requirements that set the frame for policy and judicial
challenges, as well as contribute to what the Pearson report calls a “culture” of education: where “the cultural assumptions and values surrounding an education
system do more to support or undermine it than the system can do on its own.” As
the U.S. is about to embark on another national
attempt at education reform in the Common Core, evidence suggests that a constitutional
amendment, that rare beast, is both timely and vital to improved results. Comparing the American to the
international approach to educational rights suggests that this reform might be a wise one. *** Looking at the
fundamental guarantee of education doesn’t just mean looking up the ladder. Thanks to the new Constitute Project, searching the global expanse of constitutions
for a particular theme is now possible. “Education” is found in 174 country constitutions—i.e. nearly every single one. For some context, that’s just less than “free”
(appearing 176 times), and just more than another term missing from the U.S. Constitution, “health” (170 times). Every country that bests us in the education
rankings either has a constitutional guarantee to education, or does not have a constitution but has ensured the right through an independent statute. Each has
constructed law around education as a fundamental right of citizens, at least until the age of adulthood. Finland, the world leader, succinctly asserts, “Everyone has
the right to basic education free of charge.”(Chapter 2, Section 16). South Korea’s Article 31 on Education has six sections. Switzerland’s constitution mentions
education more than two dozen times. For countries with no formal constitution, many have included the right in supplementary documents like the Human Rights
Act of the United Kingdom (1998) or the Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act (2005). Others still, like New Zealand, form the basis for the right to
education by incorporating international laws like the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, whose Article 13 provides expansive
assurances of education. In addition, each of these countries—well, almost every country in the world—is also party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the most widely accepted human rights treaty in history. The convention, which prohibits among other things the kidnapping and sexual exploitation of children,
vigorously asserts the right of a child to education. Of UN members, only Somalia and the United States have not ratified that agreement. There
simply
hasn’t been a movement in the U.S. to establish the rights of children in respect to equal, free, and
adequate education. One of the few pending constitutional amendments (meaning approved by Congress but not by 3/4ths of States) is the Child Labor
Amendment of 1924, limiting and prohibiting labor for those under 18. Though the amendment failed to gain ratification from enough states, including Louisiana
who rejected it multiple times, child labor was effectively nixed by FDR in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 14 years later. When it comes to the rights of children in
education, traditional interpretation has deemed the 10th amendment sufficient to shift responsibility to the states, and the 14th amendment adequate to ensure
fairness. The Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), though, ran directly counter to that logic, denying appellant
claims that unequal education funding violated a fundamental right and the Equal Protection Clause. Even as America assumes the responsibility for education rests
somewhere, its clear that the
right to that education has clearly fallen through the cracks. Of the over 11,000 proposed
amendments to the Constitution, there have only been a couple that directly address the right of an
education (rather than various rights within school, such as the School Prayer Amendment). Though likely incomplete, Congress.Gov records indicate that
there have only been two proposals—one by Rep. Major Owens (D-NY) and repeated efforts by Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL)—for an education amendment, ever.
The now-infamous Jackson Jr. introduced an identical education amendment in every Congress from
1999 to 2012 “regarding the right of all citizens of the United States to a public education of equal high
quality.” Though one year joined by 37 cosponsors (all Democrats), that was the extent of the support. In each case, the resolution was referred to and killed in
the House Judiciary Committee. Despite his annual persistence, though, even Jackson’s push didn’t seem too concerted in light of his particularly buckshot approach
to constitutional reform. In a House session in 2003, for example, Jackson introduced seven different constitutional amendments on everything from voting to the
environment and taxes. Take that in comparison to the four separate resolutions regarding “parental rights” introduced in the 112th Congress alone. Those
Republican lead efforts assert that the educational rights at stake are not those of children, but of “the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children” as
“a fundamental right.” It’s hard to understand how the fundamental right in education is that of the “educators,” but that’s exactly what the record of constitutional
reform suggests. When
it comes to non-constitutional legislation, federal lawmakers have obsessed over
logistical concerns. With no central basis for reform, national initiatives have long offered varying
approaches to improve disparate school systems. The idea is that the problems of the American
education system are solved with policy and metrics, by technical requirements, and uniting standards.
They assume that the American value on education is implicitly ingrained. The basis for this thinking is founded, in the
modern era, in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, implemented as part of the War on Poverty, and periodically reauthorized since. This act, and
its descendants like No Child Left Behind, begins its work—funding, setting standards, and outlining federal requirements—from a rather bizarre premise. In

striking out to reform education, their “purpose” is to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high quality education.” Yet, picking the procedural fight—the “ensuring” of a right that has no
legal basis—hasn’t enabled practical solutions to vast educational inequality. A
real solution, as international precedent and
common sense suggest, is to finally promote education as a national value through a constitutional
amendment. If there is something still sacred to both of our political parties, it is certainly based in the fundamental assurances of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights (even if there is vast disagreement of which amendments to care for, and how to interpret them). When it comes to education, the Pearson study confirms
that the one of the greatest boons to education is a supportive national culture: where our national culture revolves around constitutional rights, the course of
action is natural. An emotional attachment isn’t the only benefit of adopting a national right to education—the benefits for students are tangible. The Southern
Education Foundation’s 2009 report “No Time to Lose” thoroughly details the harmful disparities of the current education system and how a constitutional
amendment could help. Besides the important ability to catalyze a national discourse on education and legitimize federal leadership, a constitutional amendment
provides a vital opportunity for court challenge. As influential as the decision in Brown v. Board proved to be for de jure
discrimination, relying on the 14th Amendment for equal protection has proven inadequate to
ensuring de facto educational equality across race, state, and income. When there is a constitutional guarantee to
education, the report and history suggest, direct litigation can produce lasting results. If a true right is established, soft forces and hard

law can begin to fundamentally alter the immense flaws of the education system nationwide. This is the exact
phenomenon that plays out time and again in other countries—and particularly the ones besting American education. The constitutional guarantee develops a
national culture of education, a baseline for rights, and allows—if necessary—for legal protection of that standard. Such
an amendment won’t be
a panacea for American education, but without it the U.S. will stay average in the rankings and yet
remain that one country left behind.
 Solvency Segregation
Constitutional amendment solves better than 14th amendment Court ruling
Lurie 13 (October 16, Stephen, Writer for the Atlantic, “Why Doesn't the Constitution Guarantee the
Right to Education?”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-
doesnt-the-constitution-guarantee-the-right-to-education/280583/) MFE
Each of the countries ahead of the U.S. has a fundamental commitment in common, one that the America doesn’t: a constitutional, or statutory, guarantee of the
right to education. By centralizing education as a key focus of the state, these countries establish baseline requirements that set the frame for policy and judicial
challenges, as well as contribute to what the Pearson report calls a “culture” of education: where “the cultural assumptions and values surrounding an education
system do more to support or undermine it than the system can do on its own.” As
the U.S. is about to embark on another national
attempt at education reform in the Common Core, evidence suggests that a constitutional
amendment, that rare beast, is both timely and vital to improved results. Comparing the American to the
international approach to educational rights suggests that this reform might be a wise one. *** Looking at the
fundamental guarantee of education doesn’t just mean looking up the ladder. Thanks to the new Constitute Project, searching the global expanse of constitutions
for a particular theme is now possible. “Education” is found in 174 country constitutions—i.e. nearly every single one. For some context, that’s just less than “free”
(appearing 176 times), and just more than another term missing from the U.S. Constitution, “health” (170 times). Every country that bests us in the education
rankings either has a constitutional guarantee to education, or does not have a constitution but has ensured the right through an independent statute. Each has
constructed law around education as a fundamental right of citizens, at least until the age of adulthood. Finland, the world leader, succinctly asserts, “Everyone has
the right to basic education free of charge.”(Chapter 2, Section 16). South Korea’s Article 31 on Education has six sections. Switzerland’s constitution mentions
education more than two dozen times. For countries with no formal constitution, many have included the right in supplementary documents like the Human Rights
Act of the United Kingdom (1998) or the Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act (2005). Others still, like New Zealand, form the basis for the right to
education by incorporating international laws like the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, whose Article 13 provides expansive
assurances of education. In addition, each of these countries—well, almost every country in the world—is also party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the most widely accepted human rights treaty in history. The convention, which prohibits among other things the kidnapping and sexual exploitation of children,
vigorously asserts the right of a child to education. Of UN members, only Somalia and the United States have not ratified that agreement. There
simply
hasn’t been a movement in the U.S. to establish the rights of children in respect to equal, free, and
adequate education. One of the few pending constitutional amendments (meaning approved by Congress but not by 3/4ths of States) is the Child Labor
Amendment of 1924, limiting and prohibiting labor for those under 18. Though the amendment failed to gain ratification from enough states, including Louisiana
who rejected it multiple times, child labor was effectively nixed by FDR in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 14 years later. When it comes to the rights of children in
education, traditional interpretation has deemed the 10th amendment sufficient to shift responsibility to the states, and the 14th amendment adequate to ensure
fairness. The Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), though, ran directly counter to that logic, denying appellant
claims that unequal education funding violated a fundamental right and the Equal Protection Clause. Even as America assumes the responsibility for education rests
somewhere, its clear that the
right to that education has clearly fallen through the cracks. Of the over 11,000 proposed
amendments to the Constitution, there have only been a couple that directly address the right of an
education (rather than various rights within school, such as the School Prayer Amendment). Though likely incomplete, Congress.Gov records indicate that
there have only been two proposals—one by Rep. Major Owens (D-NY) and repeated efforts by Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL)—for an education amendment, ever.
The now-infamous Jackson Jr. introduced an identical education amendment in every Congress from
1999 to 2012 “regarding the right of all citizens of the United States to a public education of equal high
quality.” Though one year joined by 37 cosponsors (all Democrats), that was the extent of the support. In each case, the resolution was referred to and killed in
the House Judiciary Committee. Despite his annual persistence, though, even Jackson’s push didn’t seem too concerted in light of his particularly buckshot approach
to constitutional reform. In a House session in 2003, for example, Jackson introduced seven different constitutional amendments on everything from voting to the
environment and taxes. Take that in comparison to the four separate resolutions regarding “parental rights” introduced in the 112th Congress alone. Those
Republican lead efforts assert that the educational rights at stake are not those of children, but of “the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children” as
“a fundamental right.” It’s hard to understand how the fundamental right in education is that of the “educators,” but that’s exactly what the record of constitutional
reform suggests. When
it comes to non-constitutional legislation, federal lawmakers have obsessed over
logistical concerns. With no central basis for reform, national initiatives have long offered varying
approaches to improve disparate school systems. The idea is that the problems of the American
education system are solved with policy and metrics, by technical requirements, and uniting standards.
They assume that the American value on education is implicitly ingrained. The basis for this thinking is founded, in the
modern era, in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, implemented as part of the War on Poverty, and periodically reauthorized since. This act, and
its descendants like No Child Left Behind, begins its work—funding, setting standards, and outlining federal requirements—from a rather bizarre premise. In

striking out to reform education, their “purpose” is to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high quality education.” Yet, picking the procedural fight—the “ensuring” of a right that has no
legal basis—hasn’t enabled practical solutions to vast educational inequality. A
real solution, as international precedent and
common sense suggest, is to finally promote education as a national value through a constitutional
amendment. If there is something still sacred to both of our political parties, it is certainly based in the fundamental assurances of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights (even if there is vast disagreement of which amendments to care for, and how to interpret them). When it comes to education, the Pearson study confirms
that the one of the greatest boons to education is a supportive national culture: where our national culture revolves around constitutional rights, the course of
action is natural. An emotional attachment isn’t the only benefit of adopting a national right to education—the benefits for students are tangible. The Southern
Education Foundation’s 2009 report “No Time to Lose” thoroughly details the harmful disparities of the current education system and how a constitutional
amendment could help. Besides the important ability to catalyze a national discourse on education and legitimize federal leadership, a constitutional amendment
provides a vital opportunity for court challenge. As
influential as the decision in Brown v. Board proved to be for de jure
discrimination, relying on the 14th Amendment for equal protection has proven inadequate to
ensuring de facto educational equality across race, state, and income. When there is a constitutional
guarantee to education, the report and history suggest, direct litigation can produce lasting results. If a
true right is established, soft forces and hard law can begin to fundamentally alter the immense flaws of
the education system nationwide. This is the exact phenomenon that plays out time and again in other countries—and particularly the ones
besting American education. The constitutional guarantee develops a national culture of education, a baseline for rights, and allows—if necessary—for legal
protection of that standard. Such
an amendment won’t be a panacea for American education, but without it the
U.S. will stay average in the rankings and yet remain that one country left behind.
 Solves Balance of Power
Constitutional Amendments solve separation of powers
Rotunda & Safranek 96 (Ronald D., U.S. legal scholar and professor of law at Chapman University School
of Law, & Stephen J., legal scholar,
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1487&context=mulr, Vol. 80:227, p.
231-232) MFE

Constitutional conventions, like constitutional amendments proposed by Congress, should not be taken lightly. However, the
convention method does not threaten constitutional rights as feared by critics. The convention method
is a necessary and integral part of the Constitution that must remain available to state legislators, and the
people they serve, to ensure that Congress serves the people, rather than its own self-interest. As Abraham Lincoln noted in his

first inaugural address: I will venture to add that, to me, the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to

originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take, or reject, propositions,
originated by others, not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such, as they would wish to either accept or refuse. The convention
method of amendment is a critical component of the constitutional balance of power because it acts as
a safety valve for proposing amendments. Congress has proposed numerous constitutional amendments
and some of these amendments have directly limited state power. However, none of the proposed amendments have directly limited
congressional power. The framers of the Constitution anticipated that Congress would be reluctant to make

proposals that would reduce its own powers. Thus, the framers created the convention method as an
important safety valve to propose needed amendments when federal lawmakers impede reform. Indeed,
history has shown that even the looming possibility of a convention can be enough to force Congress to act. Without this safety valve, the Seventeenth

Amendment, providing for the direct popular election of Senators, might never have come to be.
 AT Concon Turn
A constitutional convention wouldn’t cause a runaway convention and is key resolve
deficit funding
Billups 15 (Andrea, Marshall University, “34 States Call for Constitutional Convention — and Possible
Rewrite” http://www.newsmax.com/US/constitutional-convention-Boehner-balanced-
budget/2014/04/11/id/565155/)mlm

Even with Michigan recently becoming the 34th state to call for a Constitutional Convention, it's not at all certain
that a rewrite of the nation's founding document is close at hand. House Speaker John Boehner is reviewing whether the action by Michigan
has triggered the constitutional mandate that Congress call such a convention. Republican Rep. Duncan Hunter of California recently asked
Boehner for clarification as to where the state count stands, and if Michigan has tipped the two-thirds majority needed to make the convention
call. "With the recent decision by Michigan lawmakers, it is important that the House — and those of us who support a balanced budget
amendment — determine whether the necessary number of states have acted and the appropriate role of Congress should be in this case,"
Hunter wrote to Boehner. Boehner spokesman Michael Steel told The Washington Times that the Republican leader will have his lawyers
review the request. What
may give the speaker pause in his decision is that several states long ago rescinded
their calls for a convention, although there is nothing in the Constitution that allows them to do that. Also,
states have made the requests in differing forms, with some calling to confine such a convention to
specific amendments, such as one requiring a balanced federal budget. For example, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
New Hampshire called for a convention in the 1970s, and all later rescinded the requests. While they were not the only states to rescind the
measure, since 2010 the four states have again called for a convention to specifically deal with a balanced-budget amendment. The resulting
confusion, and lack of clear guidance in the Constitution, will have to be sorted out by the congressional leadership since Article 5 says that
Congress "shall call a convention for proposing amendments" when requested by enough states. Under Article 5 of the Constitution, such a
convention can be convened when requested by two-thirds of the states, and it is one of two ways to propose amendments to the nation's
founding document. The other method — by which all previous constitutional amendments have been initiated — requires a two-thirds vote in
both houses of Congress. Ratifying amendments then require three-fourths of the states to approve. Many
but not all of the states
have called for a convention that would specifically seek to balance the budget. "A balanced budget
amendment is long overdue and remains an effective tool to address runaway spending and deficits,"
Hunter said.

Social security fails

Kotlikoff 15 (Laurence, William Fairfield Warren Professor at Boston University, a Professor of
Economics at Boston University, “Hey, candidates: Social Security is broken”
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2015/08/05/cnbc-social-security/30271595/)
mlm

Social Security is the best and worst of public policies. Its goals are noble – give people retirement income and protection
against disability, excessive longevity, premature death, and even divorce. But Social Security's execution is horrendous. The system is
possibly the most complicated and the least user-friendly public institution ever devised by man. It's also
incredibly unfair, both within and across generations. (Trust me. I just co-authored a book to help people navigate the system.) That's the
bad news. But here's the really bad news: Social Security is flat broke. The just-released 2015 Trustees of the Social Security and
Medicare trust funds report has a secret little table that apparently the political appointees, euphemistically called "trustees," haven't bothered
to view.
It's tucked deep inside the report in appendix table VI.F1. It says the system is $25.8 trillion in the
red. That's almost a year and a half of U.S. GDP. Detroit went bankrupt in large part because its pensions were some 20%
underfunded. Social Security has that beat. It's 32% underfunded. We need to raise the system's 12.3% payroll tax by almost one third – by 4
cents on every dollar we earn – to pay, through time, all the system's promised benefits. And if we don't hike the system's tax by one third
starting today and keep it there forever, we'll need to raise the tax by even more down the road. Unfortunately, we
don't have some
other source of net revenue to cover Social Security's shortfall. The overall U.S. fiscal enterprise is, in
fact, in worse shape than Social Security. It's not 32%, but 58% underfunded. And its red ink is 12 times GDP — $210 trillion at
last count. This is our nation's fiscal gap — the present value difference between everything the government plans to make in expenditures and
hopes to collect in taxes.
Aff Cards
AT: Court Stripping DA
 Non Unique
Non-unique --- Trump is already attacking the judiciary
Lithwick 17 (Dahlia, writes about the courts and the law for Slate, and hosts the podcast Amicus.
Jurisprudence, “Why Trump Has Declared War on the Judiciary,” Slate, 2/10,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/02/why_donald_trump_has_dec
lared_war_on_the_judiciary.html) ip

There is no longer any doubt that President Trump is at war with the federal judiciary. The more the courts align
against him, crossing virtually all ideological and political divisions to do so, the more he insists they are partisan and
“political” and willfully endangering the country. The only questions remaining are how this will affect the Neil Gorsuch
nomination and why Trump is waging this particular war. It started with an attack on the federal judge—George W. Bush
appointee James Robart—who last week issued a temporary stay on the president’s travel ban. Trump took
to Twitter to refer to him as a “so-called” judge, then informed his followers that Robart himself should
shoulder the blame should a terror attack occur. The outcry against Trump’s not-so-veiled threats was swift and bipartisan.
But the president didn’t stop. On Wednesday, the day after the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments over the travel ban,
Trump accused the judges—who at that point were still considering the case—of playing politics. “It’s a sad day,” Trump said, at a meeting with
police chiefs. “I think our security is at risk today, and it will be at risk until we get what we are entitled to.” Citing the text of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the legislation he claims gives him the unreviewable power to do what is best for national security, he sneered at the
judges: “A bad high school student would understand this.” For good measure, the
president added: “I don’t ever want to call
a court biased and we haven’t had a decision yet. But courts seem to be so political, and it would be so
great for our justice system if they would be able to read a statement and do what’s right.” In a half-
sentence-long feint at decorum, Trump said, “I will not comment on the statements made by certainly one judge.” He then continued as per
usual: “But I have to be honest that if these judges wanted to, in my opinion, help the court in terms of respect for the court, they’d do what
they should be doing. It’s so sad.” He
also took to Twitter to suggest, again, that a future terror attack would be
the responsibility of the judges hearing the appeal: To be clear, what the president is doing is blaming the
court for politicizing the court. By acting like a court. Nobody should be surprised that there are now reports of
threats against the federal judges who heard the appeal at the 9th circuit. Those threats have prompted
federal and local law enforcement to increase security protection for those judges. The White House dispatched
Leonard Leo, one of Trump’s principal advisers on his Supreme Court nomination, to assure CNN that it was a “huge stretch” to connect
President Trump’s ongoing attacks on judges with any physical threats to judges. “President Trump is not threatening a judge, and he’s not
encouraging any form of lawlessness,” Leo said. “What he is doing is criticizing a judge for what he believes to be a failure to follow the law
properly.” Maybe, but the judicial independence salami is getting sliced awfully thin these days. No matter how
often or how loudly you say that attacks on individual jurists don’t threaten the judiciary or judicial independence, anybody with eyes can see
that is what’s happening. On Wednesday, we learned that—among other things—Neil Gorsuch has eyes. Trump’s Supreme Court nominee
about broke the jurisprudential internet when reports emerged that he’d told Sen. Richard Blumenthal that Trump’s attacks on the judiciary
were “demoralizing” and “disheartening.” Sen. Ben Sasse said Thursday that Gorsuch’s comments were directly connected to Trump’s attacks
on the 9th Circuit judges: “Frankly, he got pretty passionate about it. I asked him about the ‘so-called judges’ comment, because we don’t have
so-called judges or so-called presidents or so-called senators. And this is a guy who kind of welled up with some energy and he said any attack
on any—I think his term to me was ‘brothers or sisters of the robe’—is an attack on all judges.” Although Gorsuch’s own spokesman confirmed
his remarks, Trump responded by insisting that Blumenthal was lying and by noting that Blumenthal didn’t serve in Vietnam. And look at that
squirrel over there! And then Sean Spicer insisted, in a tetchy exchange with the press, that Gorsuch’s comments about attacks on the judicial
branch had absolutely nothing to do with Trump’s attacks on the judicial branch. In a vintage alternate-fact word salad special, Spicer said that
Gorsuch “literally went out of his way to say I’m not commenting on a specific instance. So to take what he said about a generalization and
apply it to a specific is exactly what he intended not to do.” The crazy-like-a-fox crowd, which holds that each of Trump’s dumb moves has some
secret genius purpose, posits that this has all been good news for Gorsuch. It was masterminded from on high, the theory goes, and allows the
nominee to appear both independent and principled, with no cost at all to the president. I’m not sure this is right. For one thing, Trump has
now tied his nominee to a larger debate about the rule of law and the role of the judiciary. That’s a debate
the Senate will now take up in Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, and one that the nominee will not be able to sidestep with claims that the issue
may come before him at the Supreme Court. For another, I suspect that Gorsuch will be alarmed enough by the fact that his colleagues on the
federal bench are receiving death threats and extra security details that he will find it very hard to do anything but continue to condemn the
president, albeit in the mildest possible terms. To do anything less is to quite literally permit an ongoing call for reprisal against jurists who
disagree with the president. What is Trump’s grand plan here? Mostly, I continue to believe that his attacks on
the judicial branch are deliberately destabilizing for their own sake and that they are deliberately
politicizing a branch of government about which Gorsuch cares a good deal. Whether that is being done—as former Assistant
Attorney General Jack Goldsmith has suggested—because Trump wants to lose in court or because Trump and Steve Bannon want to
delegitimize the court system more generally feels immaterial. No judge will stand for it. They are well aware of the stakes here. The
president’s surrogates can mince words and dodge this mess for a long time. But as almost every judge in the country lines up in defiance to
Trump’s posturing, and in fact begins to resist it for its own sake, it becomes ever harder for Neil Gorsuch to avoid wading in to this fight.
At
this point, staying on the sidelines during Trump’s war against the judiciary feels like an abdication of
fundamental responsibilities.

Trump tweets undermine the credibility of the judicial branch

Elahi 17 (Shayan, Civil Rights Attorney and Columnist, “When Trump's tweets undermine our judicial
system,” The Hill, 2/23, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/320833-when-trumps-
tweets-undermine-our-judicial-system) ip

Just a month into his presidency, it has become painfully clear that anyone who criticizes President Trump — or is
perceived by him to be an obstacle — becomes an object of his public ridicule. No one can say we weren't
warned. His Twitter rage and subsequent statements against federal Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over the
Trump University case, became a flashpoint in the presidential campaign. Liberals saw it as a racially charged
attack on a federal judge, while some on the right characterized it as merely legal strategy and excused Trump's arguing that Curiel's
ethnicity was an inherent conflict of interest. But we cannot let our judiciary be undermined by the highest office
holder in the land, the chief executive of a co-equal branch of government. In America, even presidents
are answerable to the courts and the law of the land. We've seen examples where individuals have
gotten into trouble for tweeting from the courtroom. In Arkansas, a circuit judge held a reporter in contempt for tweeting
the verdict. Jurors in many other states have tweeted about cases, which has even led to motions for a new trial. Is the president an
exception? He may have the honor of being known as the "leader of the free world," but is he immune to being treated as a
litigant while occupying the White House, even when his name is on the style of the case? There is no question that the
president can be civilly sued and deposed, as President Clinton was. The Supreme Court has found presidents may be protected from liability
regarding official actions while in office so they can "perform their designated functions effectively without fear." However, the court has not
extended such protection to unofficial conduct. Trump has almost 25 million people following his personal account, @realDonaldTrump.
Those tweets, widely repeated in the news and social media, are often openly hostile and contemptuous
of the judiciary. They are undoubtedly unofficial conduct. He has tweeted that "the legal system is
broken" and derided a federal district judge who blocked his travel ban as a "so-called judge." Speaking to
sheriffs and police chiefs about the travel ban — then under review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which eventually upheld the ruling),
Trump said "a bad high-school student would understand" the ban, bemoaning why it was taking the Ninth Circuit so long to rule. These
tweets and statements are, in effect, acts of subversion and public derision that chip away at the
authority and respect of the courts. The president, who is a named party in the Washington state case that temporarily blocked
his immigration order, has a responsibility to comport himself in a manner expected of a litigant. He and his attorneys can be held responsible
for any actions that undermine the interest of justice. If an ordinary citizen or officer of the court behaved in this manner, he or she would
certainly be taken to task, and rightfully so. Consider
the monumental public policy disaster that results when the
president mocks the coequal judicial branch. Consider what it does to our country's integrity and
reputation worldwide. Our political leaders must demand that when Trump behaves in this manner, the
courts hold him responsible for his words. This must be done to preserve the integrity of our justice
system, which will long outlast the Trump presidency.
The Judiciary does not threaten Trump
Patterson 6/9 (Richard North Patterson “Trump assaults the rule of law,” 6/9/17 https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/09/trump-assaults-
rule-law/w4jL2MmvVZQLj4f3evTZyO/story.html) EYC

Faced with James Comey’s testimony, President Trump and his defenders beckon us down a
constitutional and moral rabbit hole. His pleas on behalf of former National Security Adviser Michael
Flynn, they tell us, were the vague wishes of a legal naif. The FBI investigation of Trump and Russia is,
they say, a witch hunt designed to politicize the law, an assault on his civil liberties. This is pernicious —
and dangerous. The legal system does not unfairly threaten Trump; Trump threatens the rule of law as
surely as did Richard Nixon. One cannot vindicate the presumption of innocence by shutting down an
inquiry which addresses whether an American president violated his oath to uphold the Constitution by
committing criminal acts. This is not the case of an unconstrained federal government targeting a
private citizen or lower officeholder. Trump is the world’s most powerful man; he can direct — or
misdirect — the affairs of our country, then use the unique and awesome powers of his office to
immunize his actions. The FBI investigation is all that stands between the rule of law and a president
seemingly bereft of any belief that his responsibilities transcend himself. To suggest that it be
foreshortened abets the blockade of truth which, based on what we know already, he apparently means
to perpetrate.
 Rule of Law Low
The US isn’t upholding the Rule of Law --- multiple warrants
Friedersdorf 14 (Conor, an American journalist and a staff writer at The Atlantic, “America Fails the
'Rule of Law' Test,” The Atlantic, 7/11, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/how-
america-fails-the-rule-of-law-test/374274/) ip

The U.S. Army field manual* defines "the rule of law" as follows: "Therule of law refers to a principle of governance in
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation
in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." Going by that definition, the
U.S.
government does not operate according to the rule of law. A panel of former executive-branch
employees, many of whom served in the U.S. military or the CIA, made this point bluntly in a recent report on drones.
"Despite the undoubted good faith of US decision-makers, it would be difficult to conclude that US targeted strikes are
consistent with core rule of law norms," they declared. "From the perspective of many around the world,
the U.S. appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person it determines is a member of al-
Qaida or its associated forces, in any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret evidence,
evaluated in a secret process by unknown and largely anonymous individuals—with no public disclosure of which organizations are considered
'associated forces,' no means for anyone outside that secret process to raise questions about the criteria or
validity of the evidence, and no means for anyone outside that process to identify or remedy mistakes or abuses." Just so.
Unfortunately, the U.S. government violates "rule of law" norms in other areas too. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court does not operate with "procedural and legal transparency." The Office of Legal Counsel adopts
highly contestable yet totally secret interpretations of statutes that dramatically affect policy outcomes. Citizens and corporations
are served with secret court orders and often feel confused about whether they are even permitted to
consult with counsel. Laws against revealing classified information are not enforced equally—powerful actors
routinely leak official secrets with impunity, while whistleblowers and dissidents are aggressively persecuted for the mere
"mishandling" of state secrets. The director of national intelligence committed perjury without consequence. President
Obama has blatantly violated a duly ratified, legally binding treaty that requires him to investigate and prosecute acts of torture. He
also violated the War Powers Resolution by participating in the military overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi without securing the
approval of Congress. And he won't even clarify exactly what groups he considers us to be at war with! That is only a partial list. The rule of
law's erosion in post-9/11 America was begun by the Bush administration and continued by the Obama
administration. Congress has failed to stop it. The Washington, D.C., establishment has done far too little to object. Partisan
voters all across America have excused the transgressions of their side. This cannot go on indefinitely without causing
serious harm to our country.

Trump undermines the rule of law --- unprecedented behavior proves

Leonhardt 17 (David, journalist and columnist writing for The New York Times, “The Lawless
Presidency,” The New York Times, 6/6, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/opinion/the-lawless-
presidency.html) ip

Democracy isn’t possible without the rule of law — the idea that consistent principles, rather than a ruler’s whims, govern
society. You can read Aristotle, Montesquieu, John Locke or the Declaration of Independence on this point. You can also look at decades of
American history. Even
amid bitter fights over what the law should say, both Democrats and Republicans
have generally accepted the rule of law. President Trump does not. His rejection of it distinguishes him
from any other modern American leader. He has instead flirted with Louis XIV’s notion of “L’état, c’est moi”: The state is me —
and I’ll decide which laws to follow. This attitude returns to the fore this week, with James Comey scheduled to testify on Thursday about
Trump’s attempts to stifle an F.B.I. investigation. I realize that many people are exhausted by Trump outrages, some of which resemble mere
buffoonery. But I think it’s important to step back and connect the dots among his many rejections of the
rule of law. They are a pattern of his presidency, one that the judicial system, Congress, civic institutions and principled members of
Trump’s own administration need to resist. Trump’s view of the law, quite simply, violates American traditions.
Let’s walk through the major themes: LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLITICIZED. People in federal law enforcement take pride in trying to remain apart
from politics. I’ve been talking lately with past Justice Department appointees, from both parties, and they speak in almost identical terms.
They view the Justice Department as more independent than, say, the State or Treasury Departments. The Justice Department works with the
rest of the administration on policy matters, but keeps its distance on law enforcement. That’s why White House officials aren’t supposed to
pick up the phone and call whomever they want at the department. There is a careful process. Trump has erased this distinction. He pressured
Comey to drop the investigation of Trump’s campaign and fired Comey when he refused. Trump has called for specific prosecutions, first of
Hillary Clinton and more recently of leakers. The attorney general, Jeff Sessions, is part of the problem. He is supposed to be the nation’s head
law-enforcement official, but acts as a Trump loyalist. He recently held a briefing in the White House press room — “a jaw-dropping violation of
norms,” as Slate’s Leon Neyfakh wrote. Sessions has proclaimed, “This is the Trump era.” Like Trump, he sees little distinction between the
enforcement of the law and the interests of the president. COURTS, UNDERMINED. Past administrations have respected
the judiciary as having the final word on the law. Trump has tried to delegitimize almost any judge who
disagrees with him. His latest Twitter tantrum, on Monday, took a swipe at “the courts” over his stymied travel ban. It joined a
long list of his judge insults: “this so-called judge”; “a single, unelected district judge”; “ridiculous”; “so
political”; “terrible”; “a hater of Donald Trump”; “essentially takes law-enforcement away from our
country”; “THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION IS AT STAKE!” “What’s unusual is he’s essentially challenging the legitimacy
of the court’s role,” the legal scholar Charles Geyh told The Washington Post. Trump’s message, Geyh said, was: “I should be able to do
what I choose.” TEAM TRUMP, ABOVE THE LAW. Foreign governments speed up trademark applications from
Trump businesses. Foreign officials curry favor by staying at his hotel. A senior administration official urges people to buy Ivanka Trump’s
clothing. The president violates bipartisan tradition by refusing to release his tax returns, thus shrouding his
conflicts. The behavior has no precedent. “Trump and his administration are flagrantly violating ethics
laws,” the former top ethics advisers to George W. Bush and Barack Obama have written. Again, the problems extend beyond
the Trump family. Tom Price, the secretary of health and human services, has used political office to enrich himself. Sessions failed
to disclose previous meetings with Russian officials. Their attitude is clear: If we’re doing it, it’s O.K. CITIZENS,
UNEQUAL. Trump and his circle treat themselves as having a privileged status under the law. And not
everyone else is equal, either. In a frightening echo of despots, Trump has signaled that he accepts democracy only
when it suits him. Remember when he said, “I will totally accept the results of this great and historic presidential election — if I win”?
The larger message is that people who support him are fully American, and people who don’t are something less. He tells elaborate lies about
voter fraud by those who oppose him, especially African-Americans and Latinos. Then he uses those lies to justify measures
that restrict their voting. (Alas, much of the Republican Party is guilty on this score.) The efforts may not yet have swung major
elections, but that should not comfort anyone. They betray the most fundamental democratic right, what Locke called
“the consent of the governed.” They conjure a system in which the benefits of citizenship depend on
loyalty to the ruler. Trump frequently nods toward that idea in other ways, too. He still largely ignores the victims of terrorism
committed by white nationalists. TRUTH, MONOPOLIZED. The consistent application of laws requires a consistent
set of facts on which a society can agree. The Trump administration is trying to undermine the very
idea of facts. It has harshly criticized one independent source of information after another. The Congressional Budget Office. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics. The C.I.A. Scientists. And, of course, the news media. Trump attacks the media almost daily, and McClatchy has
reported that these attacks will be part of the Republicans’ 2018 campaign strategy. Trump has gone so far as to call journalists “the enemy of
the people,” a phrase that authoritarians have long used to paint critics as traitors. “To hear that kind of language directed at the American
press,” David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, has said, “is an emergency.” All
Americans, including the president, should feel
comfortable criticizing the media. (I certainly do.) Specific media criticisms are part of the democratic cacophony. But Trump is
doing something different. He demonizes sources of information that are not sufficiently supportive.
He tells supporters that they can trust only him and his loyal mouthpieces to speak the truth. La vérité, c’est
moi. The one encouraging part of the rule-of-law emergency is the response from many other parts of
society. Although congressional Republicans have largely lain down for Trump, judges — both Republican and Democratic appointees —
have not. Neither have Comey, the F.B.I., the C.B.O., the media or others. As a result, the United States remains a long way from
authoritarianism. Unfortunately,
Trump shows no signs of letting up. Don’t assume he will fail just because
his actions are so far outside the American mainstream. The rule of law depends on a society’s
willingness to stand up for it when it’s under threat. This is our time of testing.
 No Link
The Supreme Court doesn’t respond to external pressure
Khan 6 (Ronald, Professor or Politics at Oberlin, “The Constitution May Be Undemocratic, but Not Supreme Court Decision-making: The
Difference between Legal and Political Time”, Oberlin College,
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=schmooze_papers) dsk

Because of the above factors, as well as the special nature of the Court’s mutual construction process, Kersch argues that scholars of APD
must recognize this distinctiveness of the Supreme Court in their theories and empirical work. Moreover, he
states, “Neither the legalist nor the political models do justice to this distinctive developmental process (p. 68).” It is quite clear from Keck’s
analysis that the Court as the maker of legal decisions is a unique actor in American political development,
but one that is not autonomous of long term social, political, and economic factors in APD. Most importantly,
the Court set the tone
with its law and principles for how the overall society should view affirmative action. Then politics, such as the growth of
conservative political action can influence Court choices in the future. However, the Court is distinctive in that it does not
simply respond to political pressure like more directly electorally accountable institutions . Moreover the
presence of the feedback loop has important implications for whether path dependence is one of increasing returns. It suggests that it is not.
For Brandwein the
Supreme Court is distinctive because the mutual construction process allows it to have a
moderating influence in the process of American political development. Brandwein argues that the Court was
distinctive because of its (a)politicalness; it was able to take a middle path that provided for stability in a transitional period.
While Radical Republicans and Democrats represented two extreme views, the Waite Court avoided both extremes and used the concept of
state neglect to make a compromise. This moderate path tended to leave the door open for properly worded indictments and properly
fashioned laws, instead of shutting down the possibility of federal legislation altogether. Gillman finds the Supreme Court distinctive
and different from legislatures; he does not view them as “little legislatures.” Nor do Justices act like elected officials. Rather,
Gillman likens them to bureaucratic agencies and independent regulatory commissions whose members are appointed by political branches of
the government for the purpose of carrying out policy ends. Justices
are seen as specialized policy-makers, not elected
officials. Changes in “institutional behavior” can often be linked to “changing goals and agendas of other
power holders in the regime” (p. 2). Gillman is presenting what we shall call an “institutional” or “temporal” attitudinalism, which
influences the Court due to the politics of retrenchment. Although Gillman offers evidence that the Court is influenced by external factors such
as the politics of retrenchment, legalist internal norms do inform Court choices. According to his view, there is not an automatic retrenchment-
Court doctrine change process. Therefore, for Gillman, court
action can never be explained simply by external factors.
For Gillman, the internal legal principles and institutional norms peculiar to the Supreme Court work against
the Supreme Court simply being like legislatures, or even bureaucracies and independent agencies.
 I/L Turn
Lash out against the courts increases resolve – that internal link turns rule of law and
thumps their link
Davis 2-8 (Julie Hirschfeld, White House correspondent at The New York Times. She has covered politics from Washington for 19 years,
writing on Congress, three presidential campaigns and three presidents. She joined the Times in 2014 after stints at Bloomberg News, the
Associated Press, The Baltimore Sun and Congressional Quarterly. Julie is the 2009 winner of the Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for
Distinguished Reporting of Congress for her coverage of the federal response to the 2008 financial meltdown, 2-8-2017, "Supreme Court
Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary ‘Demoralizing’," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trump-
immigration-ban.html) KEN

WASHINGTON — Judge Neil M. Gorsuch, President Trump’s nominee for the Supreme Court, privately expressed dismay on
Wednesday over Mr. Trump’s increasingly aggressive attacks on the judiciary, calling the president’s
criticism of independent judges “demoralizing” and “disheartening.” The remarks by Judge Gorsuch, chosen by
Mr. Trump last week to serve on the nation’s highest court, came as the president lashed out at the federal appellate
judges who are considering a challenge to his executive order banning travel from seven predominantly
Muslim countries. The president called their judicial proceedings “disgraceful” and described the courts as “so political.” Those remarks
followed Mr. Trump’s weekend Twitter outburst in which he derided a Seattle district court judge who blocked his travel ban as a “so-called
judge” whose “ridiculous” ruling would be overturned. Judge Gorsuch expressed his disappointment with Mr. Trump’s comments about the
judiciary in a private conversation with Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, as he paid courtesy calls on Capitol Hill to build
support for his confirmation. An account of the discussion was confirmed by a White House adviser working to advance the Gorsuch
confirmation, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. The spectacle of a Supreme Court
nominee breaking so starkly with the president who named him underscored the unusual nature of Mr.
Trump’s public feud with the judiciary. Speaking to a group of sheriffs and police chiefs on Wednesday, the president said the
appellate judges had failed to grasp concepts even “a bad high school student would understand.” “This is highly unusual,” said
Michael W. McConnell, a former federal judge who directs the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford University. “Mr. Trump is
shredding longstanding norms of etiquette and interbranch comity.” Presidents have traditionally tried
to refrain from even appearing to intervene in court cases that concern them or their policies, or from
impugning the motives and qualifications of jurists charged with deciding them, according to judges and
legal experts from across the political spectrum. The tradition is important to preserving the separation of
powers that is a pillar of American democracy, establishing an independent judiciary to serve as a check on the executive branch, they
argued. Mr. Trump’s rhetorical battle with the judiciary may also end up harming his cause in a case that
may end up before the Supreme Court, by potentially stiffening the resolve of judges who feel their
independence is under attack. Mr. McConnell called Mr. Trump’s comments “extremely self-defeating
and self-destructive” because of their potential to sway judges to rule against Mr. Trump. “Judges who
hear criticism of this sort are not going to be inclined to knuckle under; it’s going to stiffen their spines
to be even more independent,” said Mr. McConnell, who was nominated to his judgeship by President George W. Bush. Jeffrey
Rosen, the president of the National Constitution Center, a nonprofit organization in Philadelphia devoted to explaining the
Constitution, said there was a rich history of presidents strongly criticizing judges on matters of law. “But
those criticisms were based on constitutional disagreements about the rulings, and it’s hard to think of a
president who has challenged the motives of specific judges by name repeatedly, especially before a case is
decided, or used the same kind of invective as Mr. Trump has toward the court,” Mr. Rosen said.
 No Backlash
Congressional backlash will not lead to jurisdiction stripping measures
Devins 11 (Neal Devins is a Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, “Should the Supreme Court Fear
Congress?,” http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Devins_Final1.pdf, Minnesota Law Review, p. 1358-1362) EYC

Unlike the Warren era (where a potent coalition of lawmakers was truly upset with Court decision making), today’s Congress is not at all
disappointed with Rehnquist Court decision making. Its anticourt rhetoric, for reasons detailed in Part II, is tied to lawmaker incentives to
strengthen ties with their political base.118 Unless and until the goals of social conservatives are also acceptable to majorities in both houses of
Congress and the White House, the current wave of attacks against the judiciary should be seen as symbolic
politics. Indeed, even if the social conservative agenda becomes the dominant agenda in Congress and
the White House, there is good reason to think that elected officials would steer away from
jurisdiction-stripping measures.119 First, median voters have historically backed judicial independence. For example, although
most Americans are disappointed with individual Supreme Court decisions, there is a “reservoir of support” for the power
of the Court to independently interpret the Constitution.120 Consequently, even though some Supreme
Court decisions trigger a backlash by those who disagree with the Court’s rulings, the American people
nonetheless support judicial review and an independent judiciary.121 Indeed, even President George W. Bush and
Senate majority leader Bill Frist backed “judicial independence” after the federal courts refused to challenge state court factfinding in the Terri
Schiavo case.122 Second,
there is an additional cost to lawmakers who want to countermand the courts
through coercive court-curbing measures. Specifically, powerful interest groups sometimes see an
independent judiciary as a way to protect the legislative deals they make.123 In particular, interest groups who
invest in the legislative process by securing legislation that favors their preferences may be at odds with the current legislature or executive
(who may prefer judicial interpretations that undermine the original intent of the law). Court-curbing
measures “that impair
the functioning of the judiciary” are therefore disfavored because they “impose costs on all who use
the courts, including various politically effective groups and indeed the beneficiaries of whatever
legislation the current legislature has enacted.” 124 Third (and correspondingly), lawmakers who disapprove of court
decision making can usually express that disapproval without pursuing court-curbing legislation. This is especially true of federalism rulings.
Rather than foreclose democratic outlets, federalism rulings can be circumvented by both Con-gress and the states.125 Congress can
advance the same legislative agenda by making use of another source of federal power and/or enacting
a scaled-down version of the bill.126 Interest groups, moreover, need not rely exclusively on Congress.
They can also turn to the states to enact state versions of the very law that Congress could not enact.127 Rights-based rulings, in contrast,
severely limit lawmaker responses. Consider, for example, abortion rights. After Roe, neither federal nor state lawmakers could regulate
abortion in the first trimester.128 Likewise, Supreme Court decisions on school busing and school prayer could not be nullified through
legislation.129 At the same time, rights-based rulings do not completely foreclose democratic outlets. Congress can eliminate federal funding
and otherwise express its disapproval of the Supreme Court.130 Fourth, jurisdiction-stripping measures do not nullify
Supreme Court rulings (or, for that matter, any court ruling). Consequently, since proponents of court-stripping cannot
count on state courts to back their policy agenda, these bills may not accomplish all that much.131
Accordingly, interest groups may be better off pursuing their substantive agenda through funding bans,
constitutional amendments, the enactment of related legislation, and the appointment of judges and
Justices. Courtcurbing measures, in contrast, seem more a rhetorical rallying call than a roadmap for
change.

The Supreme Court should not fear backlash from Congress

Devins 11 (Neal Devins is a Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, “Should the Supreme Court Fear
Congress?,” http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Devins_Final1.pdf, Minnesota Law Review, p. 1339-1340) EYC

But should the Supreme Court fear Congress? In the pages that follow, I will argue that the Court need not moderate
its decision making in anticipation of a political backlash by today’s Congress. To make this point, I will
highlight differences between today’s Congress and the Congress that the Warren Court confronted in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the late 1950s, Southerners (who opposed school desegregation) and
anti-Communist lawmakers formed a coalition in response to Supreme Court rulings. These lawmakers
truly wanted to undo what the Court had done, and had very strong feelings about Congress’s power to
independently interpret the Constitution.16 Today, Congress is polarized along ideological lines. Party
identification is especially important—with Democrats and Republicans each seeking to send symbolic
messages that reinforce their status with both party leaders and their political base.17 Proposed
jurisdiction-stripping measures are cut from this cloth. The purpose of these bills is to make a symbolic
statement. That statement can be made whether or not these measures are enacted.18

There is a high level of congressional reliance and respect for SCOTUS that a few
controversial decisions cannot change
Devins 11 (Neal Devins is a Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, “Should the Supreme Court Fear
Congress?,” http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Devins_Final1.pdf, Minnesota Law Review, p. 1345) EYC

That Congress was poised to act, of course, does not mean that Congress would have acted. After all,
Congress did not enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 1957. Congress, moreover, had signaled its support for an independent Court through
word and deeds.
FDR’s Court-packing plan was ultimately rebuked, and an “uninterrupted expansion of
federal court jurisdiction . . . revealed a high degree of congressional respect for and reliance on the
federal courts that a few unpopular decisions simply could not erode.”44 More than that, there are numerous veto
points in the legislative process. In addition to a possible presidential veto, proposed legislation must clear committees and gain approval by
both the House and Senate.45 Procedural obstacles placed by committee leaders, party leaders or members can also result in the tabling of
proposed legislation.46

The last attempt at court packing failed – this attempt dates back around 100 years
ago.
Hall 14 (Kermit Hall earned a BA from Akron City University in 1966, an MA from Syracuse University (1967), and a PhD from the University of Minnesota
(1972). Between his MA and PhD he served as a captain in the U.S. Army in Vietnam. In 1980 he received a Master of Science in Law from Yale Law School. After a
career in teaching, Hall moved into administration in 1992, serving as a dean at the University of Tulsa and at Ohio State, as provost at North Carolina State, and
then as president of Utah State from 2000 to 2004. In the early winter of 2004 he became president of the University at Albany, which is part of the State University
of New York. “The Least Dangerous Branch: Separation of Powers and Court Packing,”
https://books.google.com/books?id=tQQSBAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false, google books, p. 116-117)

For many years, students of the Supreme Court have concerned themselves with the possibility that
Presidents can "pack" the Court.' Behind that concern is an often unstated fear that if Presidents can
pack the Court, they can dictate the Court's decisions on vital matters concerning the proper
constitutional distribution of powers or the constitutional rights of citizens.2 It is "entirely understandable"3 that
Presidents try to appoint Justices who share their views. Yet our society cherishes the impersonality of the law. It is therefore
appropriate to question whether one individual has the ability to acquire excessive influence over "the
supreme Law of the Land" by capturing the most powerful constitutional court in the world.5 This
Article examines the efforts of one President, Franklin Roosevelt, to pack the Court. The choice of Roosevelt may
surprise some readers, since his titanic struggle with the Court over the New Deal, the spectacular failure of his infamous
"Court-packing" bill1,6 and his ultimate success at staffing the Court with New Dealers are well known. But Roosevelt had
other goals he hoped to achieve through the Court, and few scholars have systematically examined his
success or failure in achieving those ends.' In addition to securing judicial approval for the New Deal, Roosevelt had two specific
goals he hoped to effect through his judicial appointments. First, he sought to fortify the Court's role as the ultimate
protector of individual (noneconomic) liberties.8 And in the last six years of his tenure, he also sought,
as previous Presidents did with great success, a Court supportive of wartime executive authority.9 This
Article compares and contrasts Roosevelt's complete success at winning the Court's blessing for the New Deal with his success or lack thereof at
attaining his goal of securing a Court compliant with his wartime actions. The study has three objectives: first, to assess, insofar as we can learn
from one notable case, the ability of Presidents to pack the Court; next, to shed light on the factors governing their ability to do so; and finally,
to examine the Court's ability to restrain executive actions in wartime, an area where the Court has often displayed great deference to
Presidents."' The term "pack" is often defined as: "to influence the composition of (as a political agency) so as to bring about a desired
result."11 If we use this definition of Court packing, "Every president who has made nominations to the Supreme Court has been guilty of
Court-packing in some measure" because they all try to "influence the com-position of [the Court] so as to bring about a desired result."12 To
test whether Presidents can pack the Court in some meaningful sense, we must redefine "pack" as: to influence the composition of [the Court)
and thereby bring about a desired result." For several reasons, Roosevelt was better positioned to pack the
Supreme Court than any President since George Washington. First, Roosevelt appointed" a total of nine
Justices," more than any President since Washington. He ultimately "filled" seven seats. (Two pre-Roosevelt Justices remained on the Court
at the time of Roosevelt's death: Owen Roberts, a Hoover appointee, and Harlan Stone, appointed initially by Coolidge.15) Second,
Roosevelt took great care in selecting his Justices.16 Third, unlike some Presidents, he knew exactly
what qualities he was seeking. In order to achieve the three policy goals described above, Roosevelt specifically sought
Justices who possessed: an unwavering belief in the constitutional-ity of economic regulatory and social
welfare legislation; an adher-ence to a generally libertarian and egalitarian constitutional philosophy; and a willingness to support broad
executive authority to lead the nation in war." A final factor in Roosevelt's favor was a friendly Senate ready to
confirm his nominees."' He never had to compromise significantly on the above criteria in selecting
Justices. The next two sections examine how and whether he succeeded in packing the Court, thereby achieving his goals of winning judicial
approval for both the New Deal and his exertions of wartime execu-tive authority. As the New Deal cases are by far the better known, the
treatment of them is somewhat abridged and the wartime cases more elaborately described. Following the discussion of these cases is a
section summarizing and comparing the findings on the two is-sue areas and a concluding section assessing their implications.

Past attempts at jurisdiction-stripping bills have failed [this card is kinda sketch]
Fellow 6 (Laura Fellow is aJ.D. candidate at the College of William & Mary School of Law. She graduated from Brigham Young University with a Bachelor of
Arts in political science. “Congressional Striptease: How the Failure of the 108th Congress’s Jurisdiction Stripping Bills Were Used for Political Success,”
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1192&context=wmborj, William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Volume 4, Issue 3)

[L]egal scholars and commentators . . . have rendered a near-unanimous judgment... [that

proposals to make exceptions to Supreme
Court jurisdiction] are ill-conceived and unconstitutional. But that consensus judgment has failed to deter or dampen political
support for proposals [to divest Article III federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction]. Such proposals continue to be made periodically, in seeming
correlation to corresponding denouncements of some perceived instance of excessive "activism" by the Court.' Written
nearly twenty years ago
as part of an impassioned plea to stop politically motivated jurisdiction-stripping measures, the situation
described above is still on point, with one exception. In the past, congressional proposals to limit federal court jurisdiction have
"reflect[ed] a substantive disagreement with the way the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or both have resolved particular issues."' 2
However, the trickle of court-curbing bills before the 108th Congress was somewhat unique3 in that it was simply the mere possibility of action
that prompted a congressional response.4 This Note does not focus on the various judicial ends Congress can hope to achieve through
jurisdiction-stripping bills, such as freezing existing federal decisions in time or safeguarding against a potentially disagreeable decision. Rather,
in light of the 108th Congress's preemptive attacks on federal court jurisdiction, it attempts to answer the question of why, despite
eternal failure,5 the 108th Congress proposed and considered two jurisdiction-stripping bills, the
Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts.6 Unlike other academic musings on the jurisdiction-
stripping topic, this Note does not presume success for either the Marriage Protection Act of 2004 or the
Pledge Protection Act of 2003; failure of these bills is a central premise of the analysis, comfortably
assumed given the past track record of congressional efforts to curtail federal court jurisdiction.7

Congress won’t court strip

Gibson 12 (James, Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government Department of Political Science, “Public
Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is the Court Invincible?*”,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107587) mlm

The degree of legitimacy of political institutions is extremely consequential. For better or for worse, the decisions of
legitimate institutions tend to “stick”—to draw the acquiescence of citizens, even those citizens who disagree with the institution’s policy
decisions. No political institution could succeed were it dependent upon always pleasing its constituents with its policy decisions.
For
courts—tasked with a countermajoritarian function in the American political system—displeasing the
majority is a regular occurrence. The Supreme Court’s current level of legitimacy contributes mightily to making the Court truly the
court of last resort on the policy issues it decides. Some threats to the legitimacy of the Supreme Court do exist. Some
members of Congress routinely introduce “court-curbing” legislation, often focusing on the Court’s soft
underbelly, its dependence on Congress for its case jurisdiction. Yet such efforts typically draw the
support of only the most radical members of Congress and legislation of this ilk is rarely even brought to
the floor for debate. Generally, with the possible exception of the failure to raise the salaries of federal judges, few serious
threats to the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court have surfaced. And there is no evidence that
such proposals by gadflies have any degree of support among the American people.
 AT: Court Packing
No court packing – all hype and no approval
Allen 17 [Charlotte, reporter and analyst for The Weekly Standard; 5/12/17
http://www.weeklystandard.com/no-trump-is-not-packing-the-courts/article/2008036]

Trump announced his nominees to fill 10 of the 120 vacancies on federal district and
On May 8 President
appellate courts. All 10 have conservative pedigrees. They were on a list supplied by the conservative Heritage Foundation (the same list
from which Trump picked Neil Gorsuch). Or they were vetted by the conservative Federalist Society—or in the case of Notre Dame law
professor Amy Coney Barrett, nominated by Trump for the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals—had clerked for the late conservative Justice
Antonin Scalia. Here's the headline on the Associated Press story that was picked up by media across the country within minutes of Trump's
announcement: "Trump Begins Effort to Pack Courts With Conservatives" And here's the story's lead sentence: President Trump will name
nearly a dozen judges as nominees for key posts as he works to pack the nation's federal courts with more conservative voices. Pack?
"Packing the court" has a specific meaning that anyone who has studied American history ought to know. It refers to
Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts in 1937 to add more justices to the nine-member Supreme Court so as to
dilute the then-conservative majority whose rulings had struck down several of Roosevelt's New Deal
laws as unconstitutional. Roosevelt proposed to expand the high court by up to six members by adding
an additional, presumably liberal, justice for every sitting justice over the age of 70. Roosevelt's proposal
got nowhere, thanks to strong bipartisan opposition in Congress. Nor have historians, even liberal historians,
been kind to Roosevelt's blatant efforts to manipulate Supreme Court rulings in his favor. But now, the phrase
"pack the courts," at least to perpetually Trump-outraged progressives, seems to be synonymous with the phrase "appoint conservative
judges." Hence this statement by Nan Aron, head of the ultra-liberal Alliance for Justice, to the New York Times the day before Trump's
announcement: The Trump administration has made clear its intention to benefit from Republican obstructionism and to pack the federal
courts with ultraconservatives given a stamp of approval by the Federalist Society. Since many in the mainstream media seem to pick up their
vocabulary straight from the mouths of liberal ideologues such as Aron, "pack the courts" duly worked its way into the AP story.

Court packing good – checks power imbalance

Mystal 5/7 [Elie, JD from Harvard, reporting for Above the Law; 5/7/17
http://abovethelaw.com/2017/04/court-packing-is-the-way-to-save-the-court-from-the-u-s-senate/]

The Senate confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees is broken. “Borked,” if you will. It doesn’t matter who
broke it: I say Garland, you say Gorsuch. Either way, the Senate has shown it is completely unable to look past the
politics of the nominees and make a fair assessment of their judicial qualifications. We know why. One
Supreme Court appointment can lurch our country to the right or the left. At this point, it would be malpractice for
either party to confirm a nominee who might frustrate their party’s political agenda for the next 25 years. The way to fix this is to
nerf the power of any individual appointment. In order to do that, we need more Supreme Court
justices. A lot more. Enough justices that the divine timing of death and retirement does not create a
political crisis for the party out of executive power. The Constitution does not require nine Supreme Court justices. In fact,
the Constitution is silent on how many judges should be on the Supreme Court. We’re at nine because of the
Judiciary Act of 1869. Maybe we’re due for an update? The lower courts handle things differently. The “progressive” Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the largest circuit court, operates with 29 judges. The influential D.C. Circuit has 11. The “conservative” Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has 17 active judges. The number nine holds no mathematical magic. At the circuit court level, a three-judge panel is assigned to each
case. Generally, it’s a random wheel; all federal circuits use some kind of random assignment structure to create the appearance of neutrality.
The three judges render their ruling. If the parties don’t like the panel’s decision, they can seek rehearing “en banc.” If en banc rehearing is
granted, the full court will look at the case and render an opinion. SPONSORED CONTENT Do You Want To Ski In The Winter And Hike & Bike In
The Summer While Practicing Corporate M&A Law In Colorado? If you have an entrepreneurial spirit and enjoy business development and
A packed Supreme Court could similarly hear
plenty of client contact, this is a role you should consider. KINNEY RECRUITING
cases in three-judge panels, at least initially, with the possibility of a party seeking en banc review. This
would allow the Court to take more cases. And while you’d surely see a lot of 2-1 panel rulings, it would be a rare day that an
“en banc” rehearing resulted in a 10-9 split along “party lines.” Most Supreme Court cases are too complicated to break so cleanly. “Court
packing” gets a bad rap, mainly because Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to do it in order to bully the Court into authorizing the New Deal. The
Judicial Procedures Reform Act of 1937 would have given Roosevelt the authority to appoint six new Supreme Court justices, and it went down
in flames. Partisan court packing is the next logical escalation now that the GOP has changed the filibuster rules in order to install Neil Gorsuch
in the seat the Republicans stole from President Barack Obama. The Democrats will likely be back in power (someday), and on that day they’re
unlikely to just sit there and watch someone they perceive to be an illegitimate justice destroy women’s rights and gay rights and whatever else
with a bunch of 5-4 decisions. If you really think court packing won’t be on the table, you have no idea how much liberals value civil rights. The
thing about going “nuclear” is that it leads to mutually assured destruction. SPONSORED CONTENT Upcoming Practical Law Free CLE: Equity
Compensation for Partnerships and LLCs, IP & IT Provisions in M&A Transactions, and More Looking to take a deeper dive into hot button
issues, emerging trends and reoccurring topics that come across your desk? Practical Law webinars provide substantive guidance in an
interactive format – with free CLE for viewing the live version of the webinar. THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW But court packing doesn’t
Let’s say we had a bipartisan
have to be partisan, and if we do it right it will fix our whole pathetic confirmation process.
committee come up with five “conservative” justices and five “liberal” ones to add to the Court. That
would swell its numbers to 19, yet preserve the current balance of conservatives and liberals. Now let’s say
that Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Anthony Kennedy leaves the Court, and President Trump gets to nominate the replacement.
Do you really think we’d see Senators going to the mattresses over the nomination? It wouldn’t make any sense to filibuster a
qualified candidate, or refuse to hold a hearing on a president’s choice, because over the course of 19 people evolving and dying and
retiring, no one justice would be indispensable. No one person would hold the future of, say, voting rights on their
aging shoulders. The Supreme Court would still have a lot of power, but the individual justices would
have less power. Which would be kind of nice since they are unelected, unaccountable, and appointed for life. More justices would also
lead to more diversity on the Court. Not just in terms of identity politics — though it would be cool if the Supreme Court was big enough to
encompass a full range of the ethnic, religious, and orientation backgrounds experienced in our pluralistic society — but in terms of diversity
of thought. With Gorsuch confirmed, we have nine justices who went to two law schools (Harvard or Yale). We’ve got basically three
judicial philosophies represented (originalists, not, and whatever Anthony Kennedy is feeling that day). We know what Gorsuch means for
women’s rights in this country, because the math is not hard to see. In the immortal words of Kermit the Frog: we need more dogs and cats and
chickens and things. If we had more people from more schools of thought, it’d be a lot harder to say, “Well, we know how the Republican
justices will vote on abortion. We know how the Democratic justices will rule on affirmative action.” The
facts of the case and the
disposition of the law would matter more, while the judicial philosophies of each individual justice
would matter less. This would be a good thing! Elections would still matter. Over the course of eight years, a successful
president could still have a real impact on the shape of 19-member Supreme Court. But those changes would happen gradually. The Court
wouldn’t “lurch.” The law would be stable. A Court shaded to the left or right would represent the slow movement of our
politics in one direction or another over a generation, not the short-term happenstance of who had a coronary how many months before an
election. And the Senate could get back to making the confirmation process about qualification and not politics.

Empirically, court packing plans have only caused decreased popularity and legislative
stalls for the president
Menaker no date (Richard G. Menaker and Hermann LLP, “FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Study in Irony”, The Gilder Lehrman Institute
of American History, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/new-deal/essays/fdr%E2%80%99s-court-packing-plan-study-irony) dsk

Under scrutiny, the change in the Supreme Court’s outlook emerges as a peculiar chapter in a complicated story, with more twists to it than a
simple switch by a swing man in reaction to Roosevelt’s plan to pack the Court. As the legal historian Barry Cushman has persuasively
suggested, constitutional
doctrine was already evolving in a direction favorable to a more interventionist
role for government well before Roosevelt introduced the court “reform” bill. Most of the earlier decisions
invalidating New Deal legislation were 9-0 or 8-1 rulings, not 5-4 squeakers. Those decisions reflected a view shared by even the more
progressive justices that the new laws had been sloppily drawn and poorly defended. Roosevelt’s draftsmen soon learned from these mistakes
and avoided them in subsequent legislation that the Court sustained. While it is certainly true that the eventual breakup and replacement of
the Four Horsemen eased the Court in that direction, the fact remains that technically tighter draftsmanship greatly
helped the New Deal cause in the Court’s later rulings. Accordingly, it seems unlikely the court-packing plan
played much of a role in inducing the Supreme Court to change direction. On the other hand, there is also
little doubt the plan had a harmful effect on Roosevelt’s legislative program for the balance of the New Deal. Six
months after achieving the most one-sided electoral victory in modern times, the Democrats were divided and in disarray; the
unpopularity of the court-packing plan had undermined the President’s moral authority and given lukewarm
party members an excuse to abandon him. Never again would the Democratic leadership gather the momentum that had
brought such consistent legislative successes during the first four years of the administration. “The whole New Deal,” declared Henry Wallace,
“really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight.” Perhaps the most vexing question is why Roosevelt did not just drop the plan
when the battle with the Court was clearly won. No one knows the answer for sure. A most gregarious of presidents, FDR was also among the
most guarded and inscrutable. Was it a misplaced feeling of empowerment derived from the 1936 elections? Was it the sort of internal
stubbornness that had won the day with Congress in the past? Robert H. Jackson, a Roosevelt confidant and future Supreme Court appointee,
reached this general assessment: “The
President was not a legalistic-minded person. He was not an economic-
minded person. He was a strong thinker in terms of right and wrong, for which he frequently went back to quotations
from the Scriptures. Certain things just were not right in his view.” Having witnessed so many rulings by the Supreme Court that, in his view,
just were not right, Roosevelt had set upon a remedial course that he stuck with to the end. How the drama played out is a study in the
capriciousness of history.
 AT: Trump Lashout
Recent travel ban increased Trumps confidence in the court
Dinan 6/26 (Stephen, staff writer at the Washington Times, “Trump applauds Supreme Court, feels
‘gratified’ by ruling to revive travel ban,” The Washington Times, 2017,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/26/supreme-court-revives-trump-travel-ban/) ip

The Supreme Court revived President Trump’s extreme vetting travel ban Monday, ruling that much of it
can go into effect — and along the way delivering an implicit rebuke to the army of lower-court judges who blasted the president as anti-
Muslim. In a unanimous unsigned ruling, the justices said the president has important national security
powers that the courts must respect and ruled that he likely has the power to deny entry to broad
categories of would-be visitors and immigrants. But the justices said those who already have a connection to the U.S. —
either a job offer, an admission to an educational program or a close family connection — will be exempted from the 90-day ban on travel from
six countries as well as the 120-day pause on refugees. Minutes after the ruling, both sides were fighting over what that meant. The
president said his plans will “become largely effective” and called the ruling “a clear victory for our national security.”
“My number one responsibility as Commander in Chief is to keep the American people safe,” he said in a statement. “Today’s ruling
allows me to use an important tool for protecting our Nation’s homeland. I am also particularly gratified
that the Supreme Court’s decision was 9-0.” Immigrant rights groups, meanwhile, were divided. Some took an optimistic
approach, saying approval of the exemptions will prevent few visitors from entering the U.S. under either the travel ban or the refugee pause.
Others were outraged that the court gave an imprimatur to any of the president’s policy. The Homeland Security Department said it will soon
issue guidance about how it will carry out the court’s directives. Advocacy groups said they will be watching closely and will be prepared to file
lawsuits if they think the government is refusing entry to deserving visitors, refugees and immigrants. “This order allows only a narrow sliver of
the ban to go forward. We will stop any attempt by the Trump administration to go further,” said Omar C. Jadwat, director of the Immigrant
Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union. The
court has set oral arguments on the full case for October, when
the next term begins. But all
the justices Monday signaled a reluctance to follow the lead of several lower
courts, which said Mr. Trump’s campaign rhetoric regarding Muslims poisoned his executive orders.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Trump proposed a full ban on admitting any Muslims to the U.S. In January, after taking office, he issued
an executive order that imposed a 120-day pause on all new refugees, dropped the annual ceiling of refugees to 50,000 — down from the
110,000 that President Obama had set, and called for a 90-day halt in admissions from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Those
seven countries — all predominantly Muslim — had been first identified by Congress and Mr. Obama as so terror-prone and dangerous that
their citizens needed extra vetting. After courts ruled against the January executive order, Mr. Trump issued a revised order in March removing
Iraq from the targeted countries and allowing waivers that granted admission to people who the government deemed already had connections
to the U.S., such as an approved visa or family living in the country. Some legal analysts said the Supreme Court ruling did little
more than codify that latest policy. “An American individual or entity that has a bona fide relationship with a particular person
seeking to enter the country as a refugee can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded,” the justices said in the unsigned
opinion. “But when it comes to refugees who lack any such connection to the United States, for the reasons we have set out, the balance tips in
favor of the Government’s compelling need to provide for the Nation’s security.” Three members of the court — Justices Clarence Thomas,
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch — issued their own opinion saying they would have gone further and upheld the president’s entire
policy. “I fear that the Court’s remedy will prove unworkable,” said Justice Thomas, writing for the dissenters. He said the decision creates a
nightmare for the administration, which must come up with definitions of what constitutes “sufficient connection.” The court also created an
exemption to Mr. Trump’s 50,000-refugee cap, saying that anyone already in the pipeline with close connections to the U.S. must be admitted
— a striking move that garnered little explanation in the 13-page ruling. Some advocacy groups argued that meant no refugees will be blocked
because of the ban, because everyone in the pipeline already has ties to the U.S. by dint of the fact that a resettlement agency in the U.S. is
working on their case. Other groups feared that some refugees will be left on the outside and stranded in dangerous conditions. Those future
fights aside, the ruling is the first major legal victory for Mr. Trump, who had been blasted by lower courts
— chiefly Democratic-appointed judges — for showing “animus” to Muslims and for failing to justify his
national security concerns. The justices, though, said the president deserves deference when acting on
national security concerns in immigration matters, where Congress has given the executive branch
significant leeway. “The Supreme Court did what the lower court judges would not: treat President
Trump like any other president with the ‘presumption of regularity,’” Josh Blackman, associate professor at South
Texas College of Law in Houston, wrote on his blog. “The justices did not delve into the president’s Twitter account,
nor did they parse his campaign statements.” The justices did, however, signal that they expect Mr. Trump to use the reprieve
to quickly figure out and put into place new vetting policies — which was the point of the temporary pauses in the first place, according to the
administration. “Given the Government’s representations in this litigation concerning the resources required to complete the 20-day review,
we fully expect that the relief we grant today will permit the Executive to conclude its internal work and provide adequate notice to foreign
governments” within the time frame laid out by Mr. Trump, the justices said. That could make much of the case moot by October, when the
next session of the court begins.
 AT: 9th Circuit Court
Trump can’t break up the 9th Circuit --- needs to pass congress first
Fox News 17 (“Judge Nap Explains Why Break-Up of 9th Circuit Court Probably Won't Happen,” Fox
News Insider, 4/27, http://insider.foxnews.com/2017/04/27/judge-napolitano-can-trump-break-ninth-
circuit-court-appeals) ip

President Donald Trump made waves yesterday by saying that he is "absolutely" thinking about breaking
up the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The remark came after a federal judge in California blocked the Justice Department from
withholding federal funds from "sanctuary cities." That ruling, if appealed by the Trump administration, would go next to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Trump criticized "judge-shopping," arguing that liberal opponents will challenge in the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction, expecting a
favorable outcome. "We'll see 'em in the Supreme Court," Trump said. Judge Andrew Napolitano weighed
in this morning,
explaining that the Ninth Circuit is the largest one in the nation, serving the 15 westernmost states,
including Alaska and Hawaii. Napolitano said "judge-shopping" is done by both sides and that's why
there is a Supreme Court. He said that a split-up of the circuit, which has been discussed for years,
would need to go through Congress. Since Democrats would filibuster the action, it "probably" would
not happen, Napolitano said, since Republicans would need 60 votes in the Senate.

No breakup – too many hurdles, disagreement over the concept, & other ways to
rearrange the courts
Phillips 17 [Amber, political analyst for The Fix writing for the Washington Post, “Trump keeps throwing
shade on the 9th Circuit. But he probably won’t be able to break it up”; 06/13/17
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/28/can-trump-absolutely-break-up-a-
federal-court-thats-standing-in-his-way/?utm_term=.93a69a3c6afc]/MR

The president doesn't have the unilateral power to change federal courts, but Congress can mix the
courts up however it wants to. “The Constitution only requires there be a Supreme Court,” said Cornell
law professor Josh Chafetz, my go-to source for understanding the Constitution in plain language. “It
doesn't say anything about how the lower courts have to be organized.” Lawmakers in Washington
could theoretically decide the 9th Circuit, which is headquartered in San Francisco and accepts cases
from lower courts in nine states stretching from Nevada to Alaska and to the territory of Guam, should
be split up. Maybe they create a new circuit court in Reno, Nev., or Fairbanks, Alaska. A member of
Congress can write a bill doing just that, and if it passes Congress, Trump can sign it, and, presto, now
there are two courts where there was one. Play Video 2:36 Trump's sanctuary city order frozen over
administration's hard-line talk A federal judge halted President Trump's executive order that would
withhold federal funds from jurisdictions that don't cooperate with immigration authorities, on April 25.
He called the administration's position on the order "schizophrenic." (Video: Jenny Starrs/Photo: Jeff
Chiu/The Washington Post) This has happened before. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed a bill
splitting up the heavily trafficked U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in the South. Now the western
half is under the 5th Circuit and the eastern half is under the 11th Circuit. There have been a couple of
bills introduced in Congress over the years to do this to the 9th Circuit. The hurdles of breaking up a
court But but but. Chafetz has a hard time seeing Congress wanting to break up the court. Reorganizing
a court is a dangerous undertaking for a politician — a little like trying to poke a fire ant hill with a stick
without getting bitten. This issue doesn't just get at the foundation of America, it IS the foundation of
America. We're talking about the independence of the three branches of government and the various
checks they have on each other. Ask almost any lawmaker in Washington, and they'll say an
independent judiciary is good for democracy. And they'll also say that politicians who tried to exert their
power over the courts are bad for democracy. It's common belief, for example, on both the right and left
that President Franklin D. Roosevelt overstepped his bounds when he tried to expand the Supreme
Court to as many as 15 justices after the court knocked down key pieces of his New Deal legislation.
(Congress put a hard stop to that idea.) Today, it's difficult to see how Congress — which is controlled by
Republicans — convinces Americans they are breaking up this court for any reason other than to help
create a more favorable judicial landscape for the president. People had been advocating for the 5th
Circuit to break up for years because it was overwhelmed, Chafetz said. But since so much civil rights
legislation passed through it, whether to break apart or keep together the court became a symbol in a
broader political battle. It's easy to see the status of the 9th Circuit take on the same symbolism with
regard to Trump's administration. Say Trump supporters want to break it up, it's almost certain that
Trump opponents will want to keep it. And Senate Democrats can filibuster any hypothetical 9th Circuit
legislation. Here's a workaround to changing the 9th Circuit without breaking it up Even if Congress and
Trump agreed to split up the court, it'd still be mostly filled with Democratic appointees. They'd just rule
on fewer cases from a different city. (Though some scholars say the 9th Circuit's liberal reputation is
“overblown.") To really change the make up of the court, Trump and Congress would have to impeach
these judges, or expand the court's size, then appoint newer, ostensibly more conservative judges.
Changing judgeships would be an even more difficult political sell than breaking a court in two but
keeping the same judges, Chafetz says. But someone is selling it somewhere.
 Judicial Legitimacy bad
Judicial independence fails, provides zero accountability, and allows their war impact.
Neitzke 06 [Stephen, Direct Democracy League, Aug 16, “Judicial Independence: Zero Accountability,”
online]

From the beginning, judicial independence has been more a sophistry of plausible falsehood, underpinned by
unethical intent, than a worthy principle of democratic governance. It is described as a device to protect the righteous,
impartial judicial power from coercion by powerful individuals in government. But it has always meant zero accountability. And,
at too many crucial times, the judiciary has proven itself all too willing to rule in favor of the class-race elite, at the expense of the ordinary
people. Behind the lofty-sounding label of 'impartiality', the original intentions for judicaial independence clearly included its providing a
corruption machine for ensuring profits and power to the right people, as well as keeping the rabble and their excessive democracy down. The
18th Century "gentlemen" lived the unexamined life of bigoted elitism. Over time, the sophistry of 'judicial independence' allowed SCOTUS to
create the near-zero social justice environment of the Gilded Age -- ensuring obscenely excessive profits and power to the superrich -- and then
torepeat that environment through the 1920s and into the Great Depression. FDR rebuilt the Court,
reinstituting it for social justice. Now, however, SCOTUS and too much of the lower federal bench again
represent the interests of the superrich, their fascist corporate sleaze, and their predator politicians.
Worse, SCOTUS is directly guilty of the unconstitutional, felonious, and treasonous creation of the Bush-Cheney Usurpation, which is the most
Judicial independence is one of our Constitution's
criminal, corrupt, and incompetent US national government in our history.
systemic problems. It is helping unscrupulous, ideologically-driven judges to destroy our constitutional
governance to benefit the superrich, and it must be ended.
 AT: Disease - Burnout
Burnout prevents extinction or large death-tolls
Sandberg and Snyber-Beattie 14 (Anders, University of Oxford and Andrew, Academic Project
Manager at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, “From Human Extinction to Super
Intelligence, Two Futurists Explain,” Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/682658-from-
human-extinction-to-super-intelligence-two-futurists-explain/)

In the near future, what

do you think the risk is that an influenza strain (with high infectivity and lethality) of animal
origin will mutate and begin to pass from human to human (rather than only animal to human), causing a pandemic?
How fast could it spread and how fast could we set up defences against it?

Snyder-Beattie: Low
probability. Some models we have been discussing suggest that a flu that kills one-third of the
population would occur once every 10,000 years or so.

Pathogens face the same tradeoffs any parasite does. If the disease has a high lethality, it typically kills
its host too quickly to spread very far. Selection pressure for pathogens therefore creates an inverse
relationship between infectivity and lethality.

This inverse relationship is the byproduct of evolution though – there’s no law of physics that prevents such a disease. That
is why engineered pathogens are of particular concern.
 No Disease
No disease impact
Ridley 12 (Matt, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of The
Economist, and award-winning science writer, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About
End Times”, Wired, August 17 http://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all/)

Repeatedly throughout the past five decades, the imminent advent of a new pandemic has been
foretold. The 1976 swine flu panic was an early case. Following the death of a single recruit at Fort Dix, the Ford administration
vaccinated more than 40 million Americans, but more people probably died from adverse reactions to the vaccine than died of swine flu.

A few years later, a fatal virus did begin to spread at an alarming rate, initially through the homosexual community. AIDS was soon, rightly, the
focus of serious alarm. But not all the dire predictions proved correct. “Research studies now project that one in five—listen to me, hard to
believe—one in five heterosexuals could be dead from AIDS at the end of the next three years. That’s by 1990. One in five,” Oprah Winfrey
warned in 1987.

Bad as AIDS was, the broad-based epidemic in the Americas, Europe, and Asia never materialized as feared, though
it did in Africa. In 2000 the US National Intelligence Council predicted that HIV/AIDS would worsen in the developing world for at least 10 years
and was “likely to aggravate and, in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation and political destabilization in the
hardest hit countries in the developing and former communist worlds.”

Yet the
peak of the epidemic had already passed in the late 1990s, and today AIDS is in slow retreat
throughout the world. New infections were 20 percent lower in 2010 than in 1997, and the lives of more than 2.5
million people have been saved since 1995 by antiretroviral treatment. “Just a few years ago, talking about ending the AIDS epidemic in the
near term seemed impossible, but science, political support, and community responses are starting to deliver clear and tangible results,”
UNAIDS executive director Michel Sidibé wrote last year.

The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its
ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of
Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same
year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in
1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic
in 50 years.

In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of
other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up
to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands,
hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.”
Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012.
In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of
global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described
at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the
moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by
late 2007, when the
disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret
Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode.

The truth is, a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Mass migration to cities means the
opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined,
despite media hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are
declining as living standards slowly improve. It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are
thriving—but only by being mild enough that their victims can soldier on with work and social engagements,
thereby allowing the virus to spread. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science
to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.
 AT: WMD Terrorism
No WMD or escalation
Weiss 15 (Leonard, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation in Washington, DC, former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown
University and the University of Maryland, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March/April 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87)

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of
millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world.
Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive,
reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to
obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear
weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a
combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing
mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10
people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly
chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply
their “trade.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass
murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the
prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of
conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no
guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a
group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has
previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear
terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

Nuclear terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends,
fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of
coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins,
2008: 26)

The three ways terrorists might get a nuke

To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider the
three possibilities for terrorists
to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture
one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring.

Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which
have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic
locks (including so-called “permissive action links” that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked
storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We
know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such
protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of
an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an
unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons
with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn’t impossible,
especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on
some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The
Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such
weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of
certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a
possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its
cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks
by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in
connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s,
used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists,
and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan
is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to
have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from
unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a
sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012).

However, theweapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of
uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to
seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during
various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of
terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.)

Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic
terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not
intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it’s also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is,
not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons,
intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of
surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping
the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately
led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior
government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear
activities.

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists
obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are
at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it
cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be
sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its
detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation
becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer,
making the transfer a low-probability event.
Although these first two ways in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is no available
data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a weapon, nor has there been any public information suggesting that any
nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group), the probabilities cannot be said to be zero
as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an
appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium
separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities
in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still
capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been
produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an
implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical
problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would
require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some
(presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing
that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive
device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if
one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at
some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating
this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely,
according to one well-known weapon designer,4 would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the
device.

There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to
steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario
would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state
are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges.
Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a “gun type” design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been
promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU
onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would
depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a
scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less
likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because
of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, stealing
that much
highly enriched material (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) is a major problem for
any thief and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched
material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that
have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient
for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a
means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent
paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the
issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be
successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue.
There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first
raised it in the early 1970s5 and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from
information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the
terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such
material by terrorist groups, there is only one known case of a major theft of HEU. It involves a US government contractor
processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The
theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the
contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The
circumstances
under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the
contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it
involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials,
especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability
of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there
has been a significant
effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of
nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the
Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure
as the weapons themselves.

Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons?

A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a
weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there
is little to no
evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability.
And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion
of HEU from the plant.

There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum
Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries,
including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural
uranium supplies, but thenuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical
weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now
a small organization under continuing close surveillance.

What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to
operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would
nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore
past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would
itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely
ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at
any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS.

Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and
infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the
group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy
them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky
nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to
the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.
 AT: Lone Wolf Terrpros,
No lone wolf terror
Becker, 12/14/14 [The Foreign Policy Essay: Wolves Who Are Lonely By Michael Becker Sunday,
December 14, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in political science at Northeastern
University. His research focuses on international security, conflict, and terrorism. He can be reached at
becker.m@husky.neu.edu.http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/12/the-foreign-policy-essay-wolves-who-
are-lonely/]

the fear surrounding lone wolves is unwarranted and based on ignorance of how they operate.
But much of My research

-actor terrorists tend to conform to certain distinct patterns that can be useful in preventing
shows that lone future

attacks lone wolves are not nearly as threatening as either their name or the hype
. Perhaps more important, my findings indicate that

around them suggest. Becker photoThe concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the sophisticated videos produced by the Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can

It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against the United States has become more common in
become radicalized with troubling ease.

the past several years . And several lone-actor attacks—including the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13—have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently,

there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf “profile.” They can be young or old; black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds,

I recently undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in the United

how can such a protean enemy be countered?

States between 1940 and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns in the targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security

First, similar to our recent experience with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse
implications.

than the thing itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and many others
only succeed in killing one person the lone wolf himself Many lone wolves are incompetent
: (they are almost invariably men).

loners with no experience discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they exhibit behavior that, in
retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening Take Dwight Watson, a.k.a. the “Tractor Man.” In .

2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington, D.C., and threatened to blow up explosives After near the National Mall.

two days, he surrendered unceremoniously and it was revealed that he never had any weapons Part of at all.

the reason for the low casualty rate in lone-wolf attacks is that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have
significant resources at their disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor lone ,

wolves have to do all the work of terrorism themselves finding a target, planning an attack, gathering —

supplies, doing reconnaissance, actually carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan .

This disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose: firearms. Globally , at the organizational level,

most terrorist attacks are bombings , but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part, this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United Stat es, but lone wolves’ preference for firearms obtains globally as

a lone gunman likely to produce fewer fatalities

well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And —while still potentially able to cause multiple casualties—is than a well-made and

Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability to select meaningful
well-placed bomb.

targets The expertise needed to conduct a successful attack on a hardened target—not an easy task—is
.

reflected in the targets most lone wolves choose and how they conduct themselves Lone wolves tend to .

choose unhardened, undefended targets suspect like college campuses, churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I

that this tendency is due to two factors: the more personal motives that—alongside their political
ideologies—inform lone wolves’ violent tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack , a task made

The targets lone wolves choose tend to be congruent with the ideologies that they say
easier by choosing a softer target.

motivate them: so anti-abortion lone wolves go after clinics or doctors who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these

What should all

small-ball targets tend to be found in or near places well known to perpetrators—the square in their hometown, the synagogue they pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are usually the scene of the crime.

these patterns mean to counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are not
as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only rarely deadly. What is more, when
they do manage to kill people, their incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit the number of
deaths concern about lone wolves is probably overblown,
. As a result, policymakers’ and the allocation of resources for counterterrorism purposes should take account of this. In some
 Even if the threat were more severe, there are too many potential targets
sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism.

and too many potential lone wolves to expect law enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them
all.
AT: Roberts Centrism DA
 N/U – Squo Ruling Reinstates Ban
The ban will be reinforced- they only interpret the legal standards, not external
tweeting
Severino 6/27 (2017, Rachel Martin, NPR Radio Host interviews Carrie Severino, Chief Council for the
Judicial Crisis Network, “Supreme Court Will Rule On Trump's Travel Ban In The Fall”, National Public
Radio, http://www.npr.org/2017/06/27/534528585/supreme-court-will-rule-on-trumps-travel-ban-in-
the-fall

We will have to wait until the fall, but yes, the Supreme Court will rule on President Trump's travel
ban. For now, the president is celebrating what he sees as a victory. That's because the high court has allowed parts of the ban to be
enforced. So if you're a traveler from one of the six Muslim-majority countries named in this ban and you don't have, quote, "bona fide" ties to the U.S., you
could be turned away at the border. That goes against what lower courts had ruled. Carrie Severino has been following this closely. She

is chief counsel for the conservative Judicial Crisis Network. She joins us in our studios in Washington. Thanks so much for coming
in this morning. CARRIE SEVERINO: Thanks for having me. MARTIN: Elsewhere in the program, we heard from the state attorney general in Hawaii, Douglas Chin.
And he played down the idea that this is a victory for the Trump administration. Let's listen. DOUGLAS CHIN: I think what you have is six justices that are saying that
if you do have a connection to the United States, that you are allowed to come into the country, notwithstanding any travel ban that's been put forward by the U.S.
MARTIN: So he's saying that it's a victory for his side, in part, because some people, now, from those countries, will be allowed to come to the U.S., at least in this
temporary status. Do you see it that way? SEVERINO: Well, no. I
think the lower - what this really showed is a unanimous
Supreme Court - three justices would have gone even farther - but a unanimous Supreme Court said that
the lower court orders went way too far on this. The 9th Circuit and the 4th Circuit opinions, I think, were revealed by the Supreme Court
to have been based not so much on the legal standards, which do give the president a lot of leeway in national security areas. It's a very high-order level-of-
importance issue, of course, for the president and his duties. The
Supreme Court recognized that the lower courts didn't even -
they didn't give that sufficient credit, was what the order seemed to say. And also, that they went far beyond the case at hand.
They didn't just say, we're going to issue a stay as to the people in this case or people like them, which is what the Supreme Court pared it back to. They blocked the
order altogether. That is something that no justice in the Supreme Court said was allowable. And that really, I think, was a rebuke to these lower courts for what I
would say is a very politicized ruling. At this point, we
have a court that, I think, is going to look at it and apply the same
legal standards that they ought to apply to any president's order. Now, I don't know what that means in October in terms of
the ultimate result. But in the meantime, I think it does show that the president has a lot of leeway in national security matters. MARTIN: Although, states who had
filed suit said that they had standing to do so. Their harm they suffered was because foreign students couldn't come, those teachers couldn't come, and now they
can. So it is a victory for that side and... SEVERINO: It's not now they can. They actually - the stay has been in place throughout. So they always, actually, were able
to continue to do so under the stays that the 4th Circuit and the 9th Circuit had issued. So what's different now, is that now the order has been allowed to go into
effect as of the Supreme Court's statement. MARTIN: So let me ask you about the substance of this case. The argument against the ban centers around this idea of
intent - right? - that President Trump, by his own admission, has called over and over for a ban on Muslims coming into this country. In fact, in a tweet not that long
ago, he railed against his own Justice department for - his words - watering down the original travel ban. Do you think the court should just ignore the president's
words on this? SEVERINO: I think the court should apply the standards they apply to all executive orders. And those standards don't mean we look into the
president's tweeting, we look to the president's campaign statements that - six, 12 months ago even... MARTIN: You think those should not be relevant here?
SEVERINO: That's not what the court - I'm saying this is - that's the legal standards. What has happened in the courts below is that they applied a different legal
standard than has been applied historically to other presidential orders. They should apply - they should look at the order and what the order actually says, in much
the same way that, when they're looking at legislation, they need to actually look at what the law is doing. What is the law requiring? It is that, within the
Constitution or consistent with other laws - not trying to get into the minds and mind reading on the legislators' intent. The same process applies here. It's
not
a matter of, let's try to figure out what Donald Trump has in his heart of hearts. It's, well, what does the
order actually say? And is this order within the president's authority? And that's something that the
court has the legal requirement to look at, not all those other things. MARTIN: You don't see a difference, then, between any
kind of contradiction, between what the president has said and the four corners of the executive order? SEVERINO: Whether there's a contradiction or not isn't
actually for the court to look at. They're not supposed to be mining all of these other areas and say, oh, well, he said this once here, and he says this here. Their job
is actually to apply the order because what will become the law in the policy of the country is actually what's in the order. It's not the president's tweet. It's not the
president's campaign statements, etc. So the the court is actually interpreting the law. And that's what should be
enforced and will be enforced by immigration officials, etc. Not - they're not looking at the president's
tweets and saying, well, what should we do next? They're looking at the actual executive order. And
that's what the courts need to look at as well. MARTIN: Are you confident the court will see it that way come fall when they hear oral
arguments? SEVERINO: Well, I think the decision from yesterday shows that they already are looking at it this

way. They didn't address all of those external issues. They looked at the legal standards. I think that's exactly what they
should look at. As I said, we don't know what they'll rule in terms of the final merits decision. But I think they should look at the legal standards, not the
political surroundings.

Courts won’t rule against the ban in the status quo – empirics prove
Long 7/5 (Katy Long, writer, broadcaster & researcher on migration & citizenship, “Don’t count on the
Supreme Court to stop Trump’s travel ban,” The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/07/05/dont-count-on-the-
supreme-court-to-stop-trumps-travel-ban/?utm_term=.cdfa49258907) JZ
Until then, liberal America will hold its breath, hoping that come October, the justices will be convinced to strike down Executive Order 13780.
Yet it
would be unwise, especially in the long-term, to trust the Supreme Court to hold back a rising tide
of nationalist populism. The fate of Chinese migrants in the 1880s — who appealed to U.S. law as a
defense against their arbitrary exclusion — should remind us that the courts are not always the allies of
those who fight exclusion based on popular prejudice. In the 1870s, economic insecurity among the
white working classes sparked protests against Chinese migrants and gave rise to populist anti-
immigrant parties. Newspapers and agitators warned constantly of the “yellow peril,” but it was Chinese migrants who were most
frequently imperiled. The largest mass lynching in American history took place in Los Angeles on Oct. 24, 1871, when 17 Chinese immigrants
were killed. Anti-Chinese racism soon gained the force of law. Despite having signed a treaty with China in 1868 recognizing
“a person’s inherent and unalienable right to change his home and allegiance,” within 20 years Congress had completed the near-total
exclusion of Chinese migrants. The 1875 Page Act — which banned all Chinese suspected of being forced laborers, convicts or prostitutes —
was followed, in 1882, by the Chinese Exclusion Act, barring all Chinese immigration for 10 years. The prohibitions against Chinese immigration
to the United States were not fully lifted until 1965. The parallels between these measures and the 2017 travel ban are striking. The initial laws
were relatively narrow in scope. An array of exemptions and exclusions created exceptions, allowing — at least initially — some additional
Chinese migrants to enter the country. The 1882 Act officially applied to only Chinese laborers. This allowed merchants, students and
government officials, as well as their families, to travel to the United States so long as they could certify their credentials. It also applied only to
new immigrants. Those who had already entered the country could remain, and could even return from abroad — if they carried with them the
appropriate papers. To preserve these exemptions, the Chinese appealed to the courts, trying to ensure that only the letter of the law was
enforced and not the wider spirit of discrimination in which it had been passed. At first, writs of habeas corpus were used to protect against
unlawful detention of those entitled to enter the United States. By the mid-1880s, thousands of writs had brought the entire judicial system in
California to a near standstill. Then in 1884 the test case of Chew Heong v. United States reached the Supreme Court. Chew Heong was a
Chinese laborer living in the United States who had left the country before the Exclusion Act had been passed. He returned to San Francisco in
1884, but was refused entry on the grounds that he had no return certificate. In a 7-to-2 ruling, the Supreme Court determined Heong should
be readmitted, because he never could have obtained a certificate that had not yet been invented before he left. The Chinese celebrated, but
California’s newspapers eviscerated the ruling. How dare the justices not bend the law to the will of the people? In dissenting from the court’s
judgment, Justice Stephen Field prophesied that the ruling would trigger a popular revolt. “I can only express the hope that Congress will, at an
early day, speak on the subject in terms which will admit of no doubt as to their meaning.” Field’s wish was granted. Four years later, Congress
passed the Scott Act. Under newly stringent terms, a Chinese migrant who left the United States no longer had the right to return. Caught in
this newly-tightened bureaucratic net, Chinese migrants again flocked to the courts. In 1887, Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese migrant who had lived
in San Francisco since 1875, left for a visit to China. Before leaving the United States, he had armed himself with the required return certificate,
insuring him — he thought — reentry into the country. But while Ping was en route back to the United States, Congress passed the Scott Act.
Upon arrival, he was refused entry. The grounds for appeal were obvious. How could he have known when he left his home that — under not-
yet-passed legislation — he would never be able to return? But this time the courts were indifferent to his plea. The Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that under the Scott Act, Chae Chan Ping no longer had any right to enter the country. The court’s reasons for ruling against Ping
should be chilling to opponents of the travel ban. The justices noted Congress had made its intentions clear, and the court could not intervene
to change the direction of federal immigration policy. Besides, the court believed that the exclusion of the Chinese was “essential to the peace
of the community on the Pacific coast, and possibly to the preservation of our civilization there.” Chae Chan Ping was deported. Of course, 1882
is not 2017. The Chinese Exclusion Acts were passed by Congress; the travel ban by a presidential executive
order. And in targeting Muslims, Trump’s travel ban may violate First Amendment prohibitions against religious discrimination. The Chinese
could find no such constitutional refuge with which to protest their exclusion. Nevertheless, the history of Chinese exclusion
offers a cautionary tale. The power of the judiciary to put a stop to popular government policy is limited,
especially when it comes to immigration. With the judiciary thus restrained, the political branches can discriminate at will. What
starts out as a narrowly defined measure can, if propelled by favorable political and popular winds, slowly swell into near-total prohibition. All
this is a reminder that however the Supreme Court rules on the travel ban, this debate will continue.
 UQ O/Ws Link
Kennedy means the ban won’t be reinstated
Flanagin 6/5 (2017, Jake, Quartz reporter, “Trump’s travel ban will live or die on the vote of the
Supreme Court’s wildcard justice”, Quartz Media, https://qz.com/998865/anthony-kennedy-trumps-
travel-ban-will-live-or-die-on-the-vote-of-the-scotus-wildcard-justice/) MFE

One of the greatest anxieties of liberals in the United States is domination of the country’s Supreme
Court by ideological conservatives. Such a rightward swing would put decades of social progress at
risk─perhaps most notably, the decision in Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortion nationally─and would certainly create more room for president Trump to pursue
an uncompromising, hard-right agenda. Several of the nine sitting justices are rumored to be weighing retirement ,
including 81-year-old Anthony Kennedy, a conservative appointed by Republican president Ronald Reagan who, in recent years, has become an unlikely hero of the
American left. On paper, the court is split five-to-four, conservative to liberal; but Kennedy is generally
considered a judicial wildcard. He voted with the conservative-dominated minority against the Affordable Care Act in 2010, but has sided with the
majority on legalizing same-sex marriage and upholding abortion rights. For such departures with conservative social doctrine, he

has been lauded for a non-partisan commitment to rule of law. Understandably, the prospect of Kennedy
leaving the bench terrifies liberal observers of the court. In that event, the president would likely appoint a
less yielding conservative, forming an unbreakable right-wing judicial majority, perhaps for decades
after his presidency ends. According to Reuters, liberal activists have approached a number of Kennedy’s former clerks and other acquaintances,
asking them to urge the justice to stay on─at least through the mid-term elections in 2018. It is then that Democrats have an opportunity to form a majority in the
Senate, where constitutional authority to confirm judicial appointments would make it difficult for Trump to appoint a more inexorable conservative. A
test of
Kennedy’s resolve may arise in the court’s consideration of the president’s executive order banning
entry to the US by citizens of six Muslim-majority countries. The Department of Justice has asked the court to overturn a decision
handed down by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld a freeze on the travel ban, and allow parties to proceed with oral arguments. So-called “emergency
application” of the ban in the interim would also overturn a nationwide injunction issued by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in January. The
government
requires a five-vote majority for the order to survive. We can expect the four liberals to oppose the
ban, and if Kennedy swings left, it will bring a decisive end to months of struggle between the
executive and judicial branches on one of Trump’s tent-pole campaign promises. The possibility boils down to a key
bit of legalese, according to Bloomberg’s legal-affairs columnist, Noah Feldman. Lower-court decisions have focused on the existence

of “animus,” Feldman explains, or “illegitimate prejudice” in the crafting of the order; and, as it happens, animus is one
of Kennedy’s favorite instruments for batting down cases. “If Kennedy reads Trump’s executive order
temporarily blocking immigration from six predominantly Muslim countries as an exercise of anti-
Muslim animus, the ban will fall at the court,” he writes. Kennedy first identified animus as a contemporary means to invalidate
unconstitutional laws in his 1996 opinion in Romer v. Evans, in which the justice sided with the majority in striking down an

amendment to the Colorado state constitution which forbade the state legislature and city governments
from adopting anti-discrimination laws to protect LGBT Americans. The amendment’s “sheer breadth” was “so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that [it] seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects,” he wrote in an opinion that could very well substitute
“Muslims” for “gay people.” Kennedy
has applied the animus argument in a number of landmark cases since,
including United States v. Windsor, which struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), and
Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalize same-sex marriage in all 50 states. In Feldman’s view, it’s not a legacy Kennedy is likely
to forego so close to retirement age: “I find it almost impossible to believe that Kennedy, at 80, would want to sign an opinion closing his eyes to animus, which he
himself did so much to make into a constitutional touchstone.” The question remains, however, whether Kennedy’s animus towards animus is enough to inspire
another four years, at the least, on the court. Because, given the ideological nature of the Trump administration, its a concept that will surely rear its head again.

The other justices will perceptually join the majority opinion- it’s strategic
Johnson 16 (November, Timothy R., Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. He is the coauthor (with Christopher P. Gilbert,
David A. M. Peterson, & Paul A. Djupe) of Religious Institutions & Minor Parties in the United States,
“The Supreme Court Decision Making Process”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-98) MFE

Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1998) support these findings in their empirical analysis of opinion
circulation on the Court. They find that an opinion goes through more drafts as the ideological
heterogeneity of a majority coalition increases, as the number of suggestions given to the opinion writer by other justices increases, as
the number of threats made to the opinion writer increases, and as the number of times other justices say they are yet unable to join an opinion increases. This
suggests to Wahlbeck et al. that, “Opinion authors’ actions are shaped by the interplay of their own policy preferences and the actions of their colleagues” (p. 312).
Wahlbeck and his colleagues also find evidence that the decision to join a majority opinion is a strategic
choice as well (1998). Specifically, they demonstrate that the decision to join is determined by how acceptable a
majority opinion is to a specific justice, whether that justice can attain concessions from the opinion
writer, and the past relationship between the opinion writer and the justice deciding whether to join.
Finally, Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000) provide evidence that how the chief justice assigns opinions, how justices respond to initial opinion drafts, and how
coalitions form are all processes grounded in strategic interaction.6 This means that the
process through which the Court makes
decisions is a product of interactions and interdependencies between the justices. If, on the other hand, justices
simply voted for their most preferred outcomes, there would be no evidence of bargaining and
accommodation behind the scenes of the decision-making process. More recently Black, Schutte, and
Johnson (2013) and Johnson et al. (2005) demonstrate that justices use the rules of the game in a
strategic manner. The former analyze how a justice can use threshold issues to keep the Court from deciding a case far from her preferred outcome.7 In
addition, Johnson and his colleagues find that chief justices (as well as senior associate justices) can and do manipulate the voting rules during the Court’s
conference discussions to move a decision closer to their preferred outcomes .
Both of these recent works extend and enhance
empirically the theoretical concept that justices are strategic political actors. Justices Account for Institutional Rules The
final tenet of our account suggests that, although justices are goal-oriented and consider their colleagues’ preferences when making decisions, they must also
account for the institutional context within which they decide cases (Slotnick, 1978; Danelski, 1978; Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 1996). Institutions are the rules (either
formal or informal) that structure interactions between social actors (Knight, 1992). In the context of the Court, legal institutions may constrain a justice’s ability to
make certain decisions. That is, the “rules of the game” may prevent the justices from always making decisions that equate with their most preferred outcomes. The
reason for this is simple: Supreme Court justices comply with institutional rules and norms (like precedent) because the Court must at least have the aura of acting
as a legal, nonpolitical, institution (Hoekstra & Johnson, 2003; Epstein & Knight, 1998; Black & Owens, 2012). For instance, Knight and Epstein (1996) argue that
justices adhere to the norm of respecting precedent. While their findings are far from general (they analyze only 13 cases), the evidence is nonetheless compelling.
Indeed, if respect for precedent were not a norm, then Knight and Epstein would not have found evidence that the justices frequently discuss past cases in their
private deliberations. That the justices make such references to precedents in private memos suggests that they act as if they, themselves, are constrained to follow
these decisions. The question, however, is why do the justices feel constrained by precedent? For Knight and Epstein the answer is simple: “compliance

with this norm is necessary to maintain the fundamental legitimacy of the Supreme Court” (1996, p. 1029). In
other words, they argue that if the Court frequently ignored its own legal precedents its credibility as a judicial

institution might be questioned, and it could potentially lose legitimacy—its main source of power.
Respecting precedent is an informal norm, but the Court must also follow certain formal rules such as those set out in the Constitution. Because the Constitution
gives Congress the power to override Supreme Court decisions, the justices must account for the preferences of Congress when deciding where to set policy in a
particular area of law (see, e.g., Clark, 2009; Ringsmuth & Johnson, 2013). Other codified rules are found in Article III of the Constitution; these include the Court’s
jurisdiction to hear certain cases,8 the requirement that a party must have standing (Flast v. Cohen [1968]) to be heard in the Supreme Court, and that a case must
be justiciable before the Court will consider ruling on it.9 Four
key aspects of the Court’s decision-making process are
considered: agenda setting, oral arguments, conference, and opinion writing. Each demonstrates quite
clearly that justices on our nation’s highest court are strategic actors.

Kennedy, not Roberts is the determiner & votes against the ban
de Vogue 6/5 (2017, Ariene, CNN Supreme Court Reporter, “Has Trump finally found a court that will
endorse the travel ban once and for all?”, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/04/politics/trump-travel-
ban-supreme-court/index.html) MFE
But what if the court does not take Tushnet's off ramp and eventually digs into the merits of the case?
Kennedy could, as usual, be a critical vote. Here's why: Challengers say the order is motivated by
religious animus in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The President's intent, they
say, is evident from statements he made on the campaign trail referring to a so-called "Muslim Ban." In
its opinion that upheld a halt of the ban, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ringing
endorsement of that argument. "Then-candidate Trump's campaign statements reveal that on
numerous occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim sentiment, as well as his intent, if elected, to ban
Muslims from the United States." In briefs filed with the Supreme Court, however, Wall insists that the
courts were wrong to look at Trump's campaign statements. Instead, he argues, they need to look only
at the face of the order. In doing so, they will find the order is neutral with respect to religion and is
necessary to support national security determinations. "It is religion-neutral in operation," Wall wrote.
"It draws distinctions among countries based on national-security risks identified by Congress and the
Executive (Branch), not religion." That's where Kennedy could come in play. Would he consider the
campaign statements? Sessions: Taking travel ban to Supreme Court Sessions: Taking travel ban to
Supreme Court 00:58 Challengers say he would, based upon a concurring opinion he wrote in 2015 in a
case called Kerry v. Din. "Justice Kennedy's separate opinion in that case raised the prospect that courts
could look behind the neutral justifications offered by the government in immigration cases in which the
plaintiffs claim that the relevant officials acted in bad faith," said CNN contributor Stephen I. Vladeck of
the University of Texas School of Law. "Here, the question is whether Justice Kennedy would look at an
array of statements by Candidate Trump, President Trump, and his advisers and surrogates as evidence
that the travel ban was in fact motivated by inappropriate anti-Muslim bias," he said. Not surprisingly, in
blocking the order, the Fourth Circuit relied in large part on what Kennedy wrote in Din. In its opinion,
the majority of the Fourth Circuit said: "Kennedy explained that where a plaintiff makes 'an affirmative
showing of bad faith' ... courts may 'look behind' the challenged action." In his legal filings, Wall said the
Court of Appeals got it wrong and rested on a "misreading of a statement in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Din." Wall said, in essence, that Kennedy was not endorsing a "wide-ranging search for
pretext."

That means it won’t be reinstated- all dems needed was one more justice
Liptak & Shear 6/26 (2017, Adam, Covers US Supreme Court for NY Times, & Michael D., New York
Times Author, “Supreme Court Takes Up Travel Ban Case, and Allows Parts to Go Ahead”, New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban-case.html)
MFE

. “Today’scompromise will burden executive officials with the task of deciding — on peril of contempt —
whether individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the United States have a sufficient
connection to a person or entity in this country,” Justice Thomas wrote. Based on the dissent, those three justices are likely
to vote in favor of the Trump administration. The court’s four-member liberal bloc — Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — are likely to vote against it. That
leaves the ultimate fate of the ban in the hands of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy.
Uniqueness overwhelms the link--Roberts has allied himself definitively with the
liberal justices—& the case won’t be heard anyways
Economist 6/26 (SM, “The Supreme Court’s curious compromise on the travel ban,” The Economist,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/06/shrewd-justice)KC
We don’t know the legal grounds on which these six justices find the travel ban potentially flawed—it could be the First Amendment’s ban on
religious discrimination (as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held), limits to a president’s power to control immigration under the
Immigration and Naturalisation Act (as the Ninth Circuit held), or something else. But if there was no plausible legal basis for lifting the ban on
these individuals, the court would have given Mr Trump a freer hand to stop them. Second, the
timetable suggested by the
Supreme Court means that the October hearing may never happen. Here’s why. If the travel ban goes
into (partial) effect in three days, as specified by Mr Trump’s clarification on June 14th, it will run its
course in 90 days, expiring on September 27th, 2017. That’s five days before the justices take their seats
for their next term. There is no need to judge the legality or constitutionality of a ban that has expired.
Why did the justices fail to note this oddity? Perhaps because it is not their job to implement the executive order, and they opted not to
presume that Mr Trump will put it into effect when he said he would. But there’s another possibility: the administration gave them
an opportunity to avoid addressing the ban more quickly, and they took it. Look at this parenthetical from today’s
order: “(The Government has not requested that we expedite consideration of the merits to a greater
extent.)” The implication is clear: we could have held a special hearing in July—an unusual but not
unprecedented move—but nobody asked us to. So, despite granting Mr Trump’s plea to hear his case
and largely lifting the lower-court stays on the travel ban, Chief Justice John Roberts apparently worked
out an ingenious compromise with his liberal brethren and the swing justice, Anthony Kennedy, that
injects the Supreme Court only minimally into a big question on the scope of executive power in the
Trump era. The chief justice has avoided making politically volatile judicial pronouncements on
presidential immigration powers, anti-Muslim bias and the justiciability of tweets, and has positioned
himself somewhere to the left of the court’s new conservative triumvirate.
 Thumper: Gerrymandering
Supreme Court will hear highly politicized gerrymandering case
Diaz & de Vogue 6/20 (2017, Daniella, CNN Politics Reporter, & Ariane, CNN Supreme Court
Reporter, “Supreme Court to hear partisan gerrymandering case”, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/19/politics/supreme-court-partisan-gerrymandering/index.html) MFE

The Supreme Court will take up the most important gerrymandering case in more than a decade, it
announced Monday. The case involves district lines in Wisconsin that challengers say were drawn

unconstitutionally to benefit Republicans. The case could have a major impact on how district lines are
drawn up nationwide. The court has said that too much partisanship in map drawing is illegal, but it has
never said how much is too much. Steve Vladeck, CNN Supreme Court analyst and professor of law at the University of Texas School of Law, told
CNN that this case could have "enormous ramifications." Does gerrymandering cause polarization? " Although a majority of the court has

suggested that states can violate the Constitution if they draw legislative districts primarily to benefit
one political party, the justices have never been able to identify the specific point at which states cross
the constitutional line. In this case, a lower court held that Wisconsin had indeed crossed that line," he told
CNN. He continued: "If the justices agree, it would be the first time the court has articulated a constitutional

rule in this context, which could -- and likely would -- have enormous ramifications nationwide." "This
will be the biggest and most important election law case in decades. However the Court rules will affect elections for years
to come," Josh Douglas, a law professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law who specializes in election law and voting rights, told CNN. The court --

after orders were released -- issued a separate order granting Wisconsin's request to freeze the current
maps until the Supreme Court hears the case next term. The order was 5-4. This move is a victory for Wisconsin. This is
the second time justices have acted on gerrymandering this year. Earlier this year, justices sided with Democrats and civil rights

groups who challenged the North Carolina maps arguing that they unnecessarily packed African-
Americans into two districts. This made it easier for African-Americans to re-elect incumbents to those
two seats, but diluted their votes in surrounding areas.

Supreme Court to hear controversial gerrymandering case

Wolf 5/25 (Richard Wolf, Supreme Court correspondent for USA Today, “Supreme Court forced to
confront the ‘unsavory’ politics of district lines,” USA Today,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/05/25/supreme-court-faces-decision-politics-
election-districts/102020210/) JZ

WASHINGTON — A Supreme Court that prides itself on trying to remain above politics will be forced to
rule soon on what one justice calls the "always unsavory" process of drawing election districts for
partisan gain. A case headed its way from Wisconsin, along with others from Maryland and North
Carolina, will present the court with a fundamental question about political power: How far can
lawmakers go in choosing their voters, rather than the other way around? Should the court set a
standard — something it has declined to do for decades — it could jeopardize about one-third of the
maps drawn for Congress and state legislatures. That could lead to new district lines before or after the
2020 Census, which in turn could affect election results and legislative agendas. “If the court makes a
broad, sweeping decision … this could have a massive impact on how maps are drawn,” says Jason
Torchinsky, a lawyer for the Republican National Committee. “It will make more districts more
competitive." The issue is reaching the high court at a time when both Republicans and Democrats have
improved the art of drawing congressional and legislative maps to entrench themselves in office for a
decade at a time. Computer software increasingly helps them create safe districts for their most
conservative and liberal candidates, whose success invariably leads to more partisan gridlock in
government.
 No Hearing
The ban will just go away- it’s legally only effective for 90 days
Epps 6/26 (2017, Garrett, Professor of constitutional law & legal creative writing at the University of
Baltimore, “Trump's Limited Travel Ban Victory”, The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-trump-administrations-limited-
victory/531708/) MFE

So maybe the whole thing could just ... go away? That’s the wish expressed by the court. For one thing, the per
curiam noted that the order, by its own terms, became effective March 16, and thus “expired” on June 14. On June 14, Trump
issued a memorandum stating that the “effective date” should be read to mean the day on which courts
allow the order to take effect. The court, however, rather pointedly added a “question presented”:
“Whether the challenges ... became moot on June 14.” The opinion also noted that the executive branch is now, courtesy of the
Ninth Circuit, free to complete the promised studies. In Section 2(b) of the order itself, the study is supposed to be completed “within

20 days of the effective date of this order.” Said the Court Monday, “the executive review directed by that
subsection may proceed promptly, if it is not already underway. [The order] instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to
complete this review within 20 days, after which time foreign governments will be given 50 days further to bring their practices into line with the Secretary’s
directives. … Given the Government’s representations in this litigation concerning the resources required to complete the 20-day review, we
fully expect
that the relief we grant today will permit the Executive to conclude its internal work and provide
adequate notice to foreign governments within the 90-day life of 2(c).” In other words, by October
there may be no case, no order, and no national-security rationale, and we can all get a beer.
 No Link
Education not just liberal endeavor – new bill proves
Fain 6/12 (Paul Fain, News Editor of Inside Higher Ed, “Bipartisan Bill on Competency-Based
Education,” Inside Higher Ed, https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/06/12/bipartisan-bill-
competency-based-education) JZ

A bipartisan bill introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives last week would create a
demonstration project for competency-based education programs. The project would grant statutory
and regulatory flexibility to participants, such as in the application of federal financial aid rules, while
also creating new requirements aimed at accountability and transparency. Co-sponsors of the proposed
legislation are Luke Messer, a Republican from Indiana, and Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat. Both
serve on the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. The House passed a similar bill in 2014,
but the U.S. Senate did not follow suit. Dubbed the Advancing Competency-Based Education Act of
2017, the proposed legislation would require an annual evaluation of each competency-based education
program in the project to measure quality, student progress toward degrees and their ability to pay off
loans and find employment after graduation. It also would require accrediting agencies for participating
institutions to set standards for competency-based education. Information gleaned from the project
could be used by Congress as it seeks to reauthorize the Higher Education Act, which is the law that
governs federal financial aid. "Nowadays more and more college students are older, returning for a
degree after years in the work force and pursuing their studies while working full-time simultaneously,"
Polis said in a written statement. "That’s why with the input of forward-thinking schools, like Colorado
State University Global, this legislation will allow more students to get credit for what they know, rather
than how much time they spend in the classroom."

Education is bipartisan – recent bill shows

North Dakota Office of the Governor 4/11 (“Burgum, Baesler applaud innovative education
bill,” North Dakota Office of the Governor, https://www.governor.nd.gov/news/burgum-baesler-
applaud-innovative-education-bill) JZ

BISMARCK, N.D. (April 11, 2017) – Gov. Doug Burgum, Superintendent of Public Instruction Kirsten
Baesler, state legislators and others participated today in a ceremonial signing of Senate Bill 2186, which
promotes innovative approaches to education in North Dakota. “This bill takes a crucial step in the right
direction, empowering local school districts to better shape educational delivery to meet the needs of
the 21st century,” Burgum said. “We are excited to put control of education back where it belongs – in
the hands of teachers, students and parents.” The bill allows teachers and schools – with the approval of
their school board – to submit a request to waive sections of law related to K-12 education, provided
their plan improves education delivery or administration, increases educational opportunities or
improves the academic success of students. After review, the state superintendent may approve or deny
the plan. “This bill promotes the sharing of creative education practices among our schools,” Baesler
said. “This bill gives our schools the opportunity to prepare multi-year innovation plans, with the
support of the school board, teachers, school staff, parents and members of the community. Innovation
requires us to take a close look at our current practices, and think about ways to make them better.”
The bipartisan bill was backed by the Department of Public Instruction (DPI), North Dakota United, the
North Dakota Council of Educational Leaders, the North Dakota School Boards Association, the
governor’s office and parents seeking innovative, student-centric education. The bill’s prime sponsor,
Sen. Nicole Poolman, R-Bismarck, an English teacher at Century High School, said education has changed
dramatically over the last 20 years in terms of content and instructional methods, but what hasn’t
changed are the state rules and structures by which schools must abide. “By giving schools more
flexibility today, we will create better outcomes and opportunities for students tomorrow,” Poolman
said. Sen. Erin Oban, D-Bismarck, also a bill sponsor, noted the bill had broad-based support from both
rural and urban legislators, Democrats and Republicans, and people of different generations and
backgrounds. “We already have great education here for North Dakota kids, but we can do better,”
Oban said, adding that by the governor signing the bill into law, “I think we are going to take a big,
important step forward in education.” The bill’s other sponsors were Sen. Diane Larson, R-Bismarck;
Rep. Dennis Johnson, R-Devils Lake; Rep. Cynthia Schreiber-Beck, R-Wahpeton, and Rep. Ron
Guggisberg, D-Fargo. The governor signed the bill April 3. It becomes effective Aug. 1. Burgum, who
joined Baesler earlier in the day at Simle Middle School in Bismarck to present a DPI education
innovation award to teacher Ryan Townsend’s science students, will host an innovative education
summit with Baesler on June 8 at Legacy High School in Bismarck.

No link: the Supreme Court does not make political decisions

Washington Post 5/30 (Washington Post Editorial Board, “The Supreme Court rises above politics,”
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-rises-above-
politics/2017/05/30/9a6a1e92-4571-11e7-98cd-af64b4fe2dfc_story.html?utm_term=.d55634db6e75)
JZ

In the country’s tense political atmosphere, the political branches of government too often operate on
the principle that “because the other side is for it, we must be against it.” Thankfully, the judicial branch
has not reached that low, instead evincing more dedication to professional restraint than it often gets
credit for. Five-to-four decisions, and judges and justices ruling along ideological lines corresponding to
the party of the president who appointed them — these certainly occur, and they get attention, fueling
suspicions that the court is incapable of separating its work from raw politics. Significant fractures
among the justices exist, and they may yet become more visible on the next decision day: The court still
has the Trinity Lutheran case to decide, on whether church properties can be excluded from a Missouri
state initiative to help nonprofits renovate playgrounds. The Supreme Court enjoys a higher public
approval rating than the other branches, but it is lower than it used to be — and may decline further,
now that the Senate has eliminated filibusters on judicial nominees, clearing the way for more
ideological appointments. Yet none of this is cause for indulging in a self-defeating cynicism that
proclaims it impossible for judges to rise above the bitter partisanship that has infected the other two
branches. In fact, as Tuesday’s rulings showed, much of the court’s work is cooperative, not
confrontational. That is true even though the justices consider hard cases: Each of the rulings handed
down Tuesday reversed findings from a lower appeals court. It would have been all too easy for less
thoughtful justices to split on, say, whether there should be more opportunity to hold police liable for
using force. Instead, they unanimously overturned a ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit. It is jurists’ task to continue to cultivate a culture of professional responsibility, and it is society’s
to expect them to do so. This must be done in the full knowledge that no judge is perfect; they may at
times allow personal preferences to color their reading of the law. Though they will never reach it, they
deserve respect as long as they are pursuing the judicial ideal.
 Link Turn: Career Training
Career training in particular is bipartisan
Fain 5/17 (Paul Fain, News Editor of Inside Higher Ed, “Bipartisan Push on Career Education,” Inside
Higher Ed, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/17/representative-virginia-foxx-and-center-
american-progress-both-call-focus-nondegree) JZ

The liberal Center for American Progress rarely sees eye to eye with the conservative Foxx, who
reiterated Tuesday that she’d rather the federal government have no role in education. But the think
tank on Wednesday released a “Marshall Plan” for jobs and community investment that includes a
strong emphasis on workers without a college degree, including those with some credits but no
credential. This group has struggled since 2000, the center said, with a 2 percent decline in real
compensation compared to a 3 percent increase for those who hold at least a bachelor’s degree.
Likewise, non-degree-holding Americans are less likely to be employed. “The share of prime-age (25- to
54-year-old) non-college graduates who do not have a job is 26.6 percent -- almost double what it is for
college graduates,” the center said. “Moreover, the jobless rate has risen a stunning five percentage
points -- from 21.1 percent to 26.6 percent -- since 2000.” The group said Democrats must do more to
help Americans without college degrees. “Progressives have not done enough about job conditions and
the dignity of work for people who don’t go to college,” Neera Tanden, the center’s president, told The
New York Times. With its job plan, the center called for a “large-scale, permanent program of public
employment and infrastructure investment.” This effort, which would resemble the Works Progress
Administration’s approach during the Great Depression, would seek to increase employment and wages
for non-degree holders while providing more federal support services for low-income workers. “The low
wages and low employment rates for those without college degrees only exist because of a failure of
imagination,” the group said. “There is no shortage of important work that needs to be done in our
country.” The Trump administration has called for the creation of five million apprenticeships. In
another case of strange bedfellows, that push was echoed by a similar proposal by the Progressive Policy
Institute. The center’s new report also encourages an expansion of apprenticeship opportunities. “Some
individuals may be hired into paying public jobs in which their primary duty will be to complete
intensive, full-time training for high-growth, in-demand occupations,” it said. “These ‘public
apprenticeships’ could include rotations with public and private entities to gain on-the-ground
experience and lead to guaranteed private-sector employment upon successful completion of training.”
 Link Turn: Desegregation
Desegregation is supported by Republicans
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are
responsible for the education of their children. +Maintaining American preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all
students can reach their potential. Today’s education reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of
schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local
control of our schools, and it wisely sees consumer rights in education – choice – as the most important driving force for renewing our schools. Education is much
more than schooling. It is the whole range of activities by which families and communities transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge and skills, but
ethical and behavioral norms and traditions. It is the handing over of a personal and cultural identity. That is why education choice has expanded so vigorously. It is
also why American education has, for the last several decades, been the focus of constant controversy, as centralizing forces outside the family and community have
sought to remake education in order to remake America. They have not succeeded, but they have done immense damage Attaining Academic Excellence for All
Since 1965 the federal government has spent $2 trillion on elementary and secondary education with no substantial improvement in academic achievement or high
school graduation rates (which currently are 59 percent for African-American students and 63 percent for Hispanics). The U.S. spends an average of more than
$10,000 per pupil per year in public schools, for a total of more than $550 billion. That represents more than 4 percent of GDP devoted to K-12 education in 2010.
Of that amount, federal spending was more than $47 billion. Clearly, if money were the solution, our schools would be problem-free. More money alone does not
necessarily equal better performance. After years of trial and error, we know what does work, what has actually made a difference in student advancement, and
what is powering education reform at the local level all across America: accountability on the part of administrators, parents and teachers; higher academic
standards; programs that support the development of character and financial literacy; periodic rigorous assessments on the fundamentals, especially math, science,
reading, history, and geography; renewed focus on the Constitution and the writings of the Founding Fathers, and an accurate account of American history that
celebrates the birth of this great nation; transparency, so parents and the public can discover which schools best serve their pupils; flexibility and freedom to
innovate, so schools can adapt to the special needs of their students and hold teachers and administrators responsible for student performance. We support the
innovations in education reform occurring at the State level based upon proven results. Republican Governors have led in the effort to reform our country’s
underperforming education system, and we applaud these advancements. We advocate the policies and methods that have proven effective: building on the basics,
especially STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and math) and phonics; ending social promotions; merit pay for good teachers; classroom discipline;
parental involvement; and strong leadership by principals, superintendents, and locally elected school boards. Because technology has become an essential tool of
learning, proper implementation of technology is a key factor in providing every child equal access and opportunity. Consumer Choice in Education The Republican
Party is the party of fresh and innovative ideas in education. We support options for learning, including home schooling and local innovations like single-sex classes,
full-day school hours, and year-round schools. School
choice – whether through charter schools, open enrollment
requests, college lab schools, virtual schools, career and technical education programs, vouchers, or tax
credits – is important for all children, especially for families with children trapped in failing schools.
Getting those youngsters into decent learning environments and helping them to realize their full
potential is the greatest civil rights challenge of our time. We support the promotion of local career and technical educational
programs and entrepreneurial programs that have been supported by leaders in industry and will retrain and retool the American workforce, which is the best in
the world. A
young person’s ability to achieve in school must be based on his or her God-given talent and motivation,
not an address, zip code, or economic status.
 Link Turn: Education Reform
Education is a bipartisan issue – specifically federal regulation & increasing availability
to low-income families
Phenicie 6/20 (Carolyn, “Come Together: New Poll Finds High Bipartisan Support for Improving Early
Education”, The 74, https://www.the74million.org/article/come-together-new-poll-finds-high-
bipartisan-support-for-improving-early-education) ALH

The political mood in the United States has soured dramatically in recent months, but there’s still one
issue that draws bipartisan support: early childhood education. Seventy-nine percent of voters in a new
poll want Congress and the Trump administration to work together to improve the quality of child care
and preschool and make it more affordable, according to a new poll from the First Five Years Fund, an early childhood education advocacy
group. “Voters understand that birth through age 5 is a critical time in a child’s development that truly builds the foundation for later success in
school and life,” Kris Perry, executive director of the First Five Years Fund, said on a webinar. Only about 1 in 5 people surveyed, or 21 percent,
said Congress and Trump are paying enough attention to early childhood education. Majorities
of respondents from both
parties, as well as those who identified as independent, supported different specific options for federal
help, including making child care and early education more affordable; helping states and communities
expand services for children from low- and middle-income families; providing voluntary home visiting programs to
first-time parents; and increasing child care tax credits. It is “incredibly important” that support for specific ideas exists across the political
spectrum, said Jay Campbell, a pollster with Hart Research, a Democratic-aligned firm that conducted the study with GOP firm Public Opinion
Strategies. “It is incredibly easy for people to say, ‘Yes, early education is important, yes I value education.’ It’s a lot harder to say I specifically
support a policy that … comes out of taxpayers’ own pockets,” he said. More voters said
quality early childhood education
was an “extremely” or “very” important issue than said the same of reducing taxes, reducing the federal
deficit, strengthening the military, or securing borders. It was on par in importance with reducing health
care costs and growing the number of good-paying jobs. Most of those surveyed, 57 percent, said they would have a more
favorable opinion of their member of Congress if he or she voted to increase funding for early education, while only 6 percent said such a vote
would negatively impact their perception of a lawmaker. That
figure, and the high percentage of respondents who say
different branches of the federal government should work together, shows that early childhood may be
an exception to the conventional wisdom that Democratic voters don’t want legislators to work with the
Trump administration on any issue, Campbell said.

Education policy is bipartisan

Jeffries 2/2 (Shavar, Civil-rights attorney & the president of Democrats for Education Reform, “AFTER
DEVOS: CAN EDUCATION POLICY RETURN TO ITS BIPARTISAN ROOTS?,” ozy,
http://www.ozy.com/pov/after-devos-can-education-policy-return-to-its-bipartisan-roots/75506)KC

With Senate Democrats (and a few Republicans) expressing opposition to the nomination of Betsy
DeVos for U.S. Education Secretary, we have heard substantial discussion from Democrats and
progressives about what they are against in education policy. But an oppositional strategy alone does
not meet the challenges our young people face in a global labor market in which education and training
are more important than ever. Progressives, instead, must pursue a positive agenda that ensures the
competitive viability of our children and our nation as a whole. In recent history, education policy has
been set in the center, with a strong bipartisan consensus that wedded choice, innovation and
accountability. This consensus recognized greater parental choice and brought external pressure on
bureaucracies that had increasingly grown stale and incompetent in meeting student needs. But it also
understood that choice and innovation are only as sound as their capacity to realize the gains in student
achievement that justify public investments in the first place, so a parallel commitment to accountability
has also been a hallmark of modern reform efforts.
 Link Turn: Religious Education
Separation of Church and state is bipartisan in the Courts
Green 14 (December, Steven K., Fred H. Paulus Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Religion, Law, and Democracy at Willamette University, “The Separation of Church and State in the
United States “, Oxford Research Encyclopedia,
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199329175-e-29) MFE

For approximately fifty years, separation

of church and state was the touchstone for church-state jurisprudence,
endorsed by liberal and conservative justices alike. Particularly in the earlier years, justices opined that the
separation must be “absolute,” “uncompromising,” “high and impregnable,” and “complete and
permanent,” although the rhetoric was usually more absolute than the ultimate holdings. (In fact, in Everson, the
Court upheld the state reimbursement of transportation expenses for children to attend parochial schools.) While some judges and lawyers may have disagreed
with the Court’s rhetoric, few contested the underlying principle.6 The pedigree of separation of church and state says little about its content, however. Like judges,
many Americans have disagreed about what the principle means in practice. For some, it means that religious bodies have no official status or formal role in the
government, such that each institution acts independently of the other. The government may not maintain a state religion, directly finance religious activities, or
coerce actions either on behalf of or against religion. Beyond these core prohibitions, however, the government has significant leeway to interact with religion: it
may acknowledge religious traditions and customs, use religious symbols and discourse in ecumenical ways, and financially assist activities of religious bodies that
advance the commonweal. The Constitution does not prohibit communal expressions of faith, such as prayers in legislative halls or on public school football fields.
This view also permits the government to facilitate private religious activity as a means of enhancing the religious liberty right contained in the Free Exercise Clause.
Here, separationism becomes the rationale for protecting the independence of religious institutions, such as by preventing civil courts from adjudicating internal
church disputes and affording religious bodies broad discretion over employment matters. Under this perspective, the
superior value inherent in
“separation” is the goal of minimizing government interference with religious actions and choices. One
could term this a minimalist view of church-state separation.7 The more familiar understanding of
separation of church and state, however, has been the so-called “strict separationist” position, represented in the above
language from the Everson decision. This perspective is weighted toward the nonestablishment side of the religion

clauses, and it advocates a broader understanding of separation to ensure that all government
functions remain secular. The government may not encourage religious fealty, support religious institutions financially or otherwise, or use religious
means to accomplish public policy. In practical terms , this has meant prohibiting public school–sponsored religious

expression, disallowing government financial aid to religious schools and charities, prohibiting the
government’s use of religious symbols and discourse, and reducing if not eliminating regulatory
exemptions for religiously based conduct. From the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the Supreme Court adhered to the
stricter separationist position, striking prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, barring most
funding of parochial schools, and striking the government’s display of the Ten Commandments and
other religious symbols.8

Moderate Christian conservatives support separation of Church and state- 2 reasons

Bradenburg & Kay 12 (Bert, Executive Director of Justice at Stake, & Amy, author for Justice at Stake
is a nonpartisan national campaign of more than 40 partners working to keep our courts fair, “Crusading
Against the Courts The New Mission to Weaken the Role of the Courts in Protecting Our Religious
Liberties”, Justice at Stake,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/resources/CrusadingAgainstCourts_20121F89B068B.pdf,
pg. 16) MFE
Most Americans disagree, regardless of their religion, ideology or political affiliation. Former Senator John C. Danforth, an Episcopal minister, argues that
“conservative Christians approach politics with a certainty that they know God’s truth, and that they can advance the kingdom of God through governmental

action,” while moderate

Christians “support the separation of church and state, both because that principle
is essential to holding together a diverse country, and because the policies of the state always fall
short of the demands of faith.”169 And as the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained, a judge may not be impeached over unpopular
decisions.

Turn: Conservatives dislike religion in schools

Laats 14 (Adam Laats, Professor in Education at Birmingham University, “Conservatives: Keep Religion
Out of Schools,” I Love You but You’re Going to Hell: Awkward Conversations about School and Society,
https://iloveyoubutyouregoingtohell.org/2014/01/14/conservatives-keep-religion-out-of-public-
schools/) JZ

Do American religious conservatives want more Jesus in public schools? That’s usually the assumption,
from Kountze, Texas to San Diego, California. Recently in the pages of The American Conservative, Leah
Libresco argued the conservative case against more religion in public schools. When religion is used by
the state, she points out, it puts religion in the service of the state, not vice versa. One commenter
pointed out the paucity of this sort of sentiment among religious conservatives in the past thirty years.
Fair enough. But let’s not forget how common such notions were among religious conservatives,
especially for those from the Baptist tradition, throughout American history. For example, as historian
Jon Zimmerman argued in his 2002 book Whose America, the battle over weekday religious education in
public schools pitted conservative Christians against liberal Christians. Both sides wanted more good
religion in public schools, but they disagreed bitterly over the content of that religious education.
Conservatives and self-identified “fundamentalists” often made the case that no religion was better
than false religion for public school students. Similarly, we need to remember the response among
conservative evangelicals to the Supreme Court’s anti-prayer ruling in Engel v. Vitale. In that important
1962 decision, SCOTUS ruled that public schools could not lead students in even the blandest, most
ecumenical prayer. As I argued in a recent article in the Journal of Religious History, many conservative
evangelical intellectuals were well pleased. The National Association of Evangelicals approved of Engel.
So did Presbyterian fundamentalist Carl McIntire. As William Culbertson of the Moody Bible Institute put
it, “The public as a whole and Christians who sense the necessity for safeguarding freedom of worship in
the future are always indebted to the Court for protection in this important area.” For Culbertson as for
the other conservative Protestants who agreed with him, it would be better for public-school students
not to pray at all in school rather than for them to chant the pablum imposed by the New York Regents.
That Regents prayer, after all, offered only the thinnest gruel of religion; it crushed any orthodoxy in its
well-meaning goal of ecumenicalism. “Almighty God,” students prayed, “we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country.” As Leah
Libresco argues in her recent conservative indictment of public-school prayer, that sort of religiosity
does not teach young people the religion of their families. It only teaches them a confusing lesson about
the vague existence of a higher power. For religious conservatives, the words of a prayer matter. Better
by far to ban meaningless prayers from public schools than to embrace a state-directed vision of the
Almighty.
 Link Turn: STEM
Republican Party calls for STEM programs
Strauss 12 (August 28, Valerie, Washington Post Reporter in Washington D.C., “What GOP platform
says on education”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/post/what-gop-platform-says-on-education/2012/08/28/4b993bce-f15a-11e1-892d-
bc92fee603a7_blog.html?utm_term=.5bbe5b69b585) MFE

Here’s what the 2012 Republican Party platform calls for regarding education: Education: A Chance for Every Child Parents are responsible
for the education of their children. We do not believe in a one size fits all approach to education and support providing broad education choices to parents and
children at the State and local level. Maintaining American preeminence requires a world-class system of education, with high standards, in which all students can
reach their potential. Today’s education reform movement calls for accountability at every stage of schooling. It affirms higher expectations for all students and
rejects the crippling bigotry of low expectations. It recognizes the wisdom of State and local control of our schools, and it wisely sees consumer rights in education –
choice – as the most important driving force for renewing our schools. Education is much more than schooling. It is the whole range of activities by which families
and communities transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge and skills, but ethical and behavioral norms and traditions. It is the handing over of a
personal and cultural identity. That is why education choice has expanded so vigorously. It is also why American education has, for the last several decades, been
the focus of constant controversy, as centralizing forces outside the family and community have sought to remake education in order to remake America. They have
not succeeded, but they have done immense damage Attaining Academic Excellence for All Since 1965 the federal government has spent $2 trillion on elementary
and secondary education with no substantial improvement in academic achievement or high school graduation rates (which currently are 59 percent for African-
American students and 63 percent for Hispanics). The U.S. spends an average of more than $10,000 per pupil per year in public schools, for a total of more than
$550 billion. That represents more than 4 percent of GDP devoted to K-12 education in 2010. Of that amount, federal spending was more than $47 billion. Clearly, if
money were the solution, our schools would be problem-free. More money alone does not necessarily equal better performance. After years of trial and error, we
know what does work, what has actually made a difference in student advancement, and what is powering education reform at the local level all across America:
accountability on the part of administrators, parents and teachers; higher
academic standards; programs that support the
development of character and financial literacy; periodic rigorous assessments on the fundamentals,
especially math, science, reading, history, and geography; renewed focus on the Constitution and the writings of the Founding
Fathers, and an accurate account of American history that celebrates the birth of this great nation; transparency, so parents and the public can
discover which schools best serve their pupils; flexibility and freedom to innovate, so schools can adapt to the special needs of their students and hold teachers and
administrators responsible for student performance.
 Link Turn: Test Reform
Test reform is perceived as bipartisan
Hammond 5/25 (Kurt Hammond, Senior Public Information Officer of Representative Paul Harris,
“Renewed bipartisan push gives hope to nearly 16,000 high school seniors,” Washington State House
Republicans, http://paulharris.houserepublicans.wa.gov/2017/05/25/renewed-bipartisan-push-gives-
hope-to-nearly-16000-high-school-seniors/) JZ

Nearly 16,000 current high school seniors have not passed the English Language Arts (ELA), math, or
biology assessment according to the Washington State School Directors Association. “Throughout this
policy debate, I keep coming back to one simple question,” said Rep. Sharon Tomiko Santos (D-Seattle),
chair of the House Education committee. “What’s best for kids? As lawmakers we should be adopting
state education policies that focuses on success for our 1.1 million students and provides opportunities
for every child to learn. Delinking assessments is the best policy for our kids.” While most lawmakers
agree a fix should be adopted this session, the legislative impasse is centered on how to solve the
problem. The GOP-led Senate is backing SB 5891, which would delay only the science requirement for
four years, but would provide no relief for seniors that have not passed the ELA or math assessments.
The Democratic-controlled House has endorsed HB 1046, sponsored by Rep. Drew MacEwen (R-Union),
which would put a permanent end to the standardized assessment requirement for all three subject
areas. “This bill would not only save our state tens of millions of dollars, but it would also put a stop to
an ineffective system that has diverted students away from learning,” said MacEwen. “Our job is to help
create lifelong learners, not lifelong test-takers. Requiring them to pass a federally designed test that
was never intended to be linked to graduation is an unnecessary burden we should not be imposing. If
we simply trust the curriculum and our great teachers, I believe students will be adequately prepared for
the important next steps of life. Let’s get this bill passed and to the governor’s desk.”
 Link Turn: Miminizing Vouchers
Turn: Republicans are against school vouchers
Hudson 5/17 (Lisa Hudson, correspondent for The National Pulse, “Why Conservatives Should Rethink
Their Support for School Vouchers,” The National Pulse,
https://thenationalpulse.com/commentary/conservatives-should-rethink-support-school-vouchers/) JZ

From that perspective, the long-term picture looks bleak. But resisting entanglement with the
government, an entity notoriously hostile to religion, is imperative. To maintain academic freedom and
integrity, religious schools must reject any form of public control however innocuous it might initially
seem. If not, both private and religious schools become quasi-public institutions and the demise of both
will almost certainly follow. Preventing the continued secularization of religious schools should be
incentive enough for administrators to take a stance in opposition to government-issued vouchers.
Government involvement dictates that education in parochial schools will not remain unscathed, and
the unwillingness of government to limit its own power and its growing disaffection toward Christianity
makes state-issued vouchers and religious education irreconcilable. The bait has been set. What remains
to be seen is whether private and religious school leaders will see the hook before it’s too late.
 Partial travel ban is bipartisan
Travel Ban is a win for Republicans
Von Spavosky 6/28 (Hans A. Senior Legal Fellow @ The Heritage Foundation, Reporter @ Fox News. “Trump's Travel Ban: Don't Be
Fooled, the Supreme Court Handed the President a Big Victory This Week." Fox News. FOX News Network, 28 Jan. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017.
<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/06/28/trumps-travel-ban-dont-be-fooled-supreme-court-handed-president-big-victory-this-
week.html>.) DTL

There seems to be some debate over the extent of the victory that the Trump administration won on
Monday when the Supreme Court stayed (or lifted) almost all of the injunctions issued against his revised
executive order temporarily suspending entry of foreigners from six terrorist safe havens. But there is no
doubt about it – this was a significant and substantial victory despite the fact that the Court left a small
portion of the injunctions issued by the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal in place. The Court accepted the
case for review, and oral arguments on the substantive merits of the claims will be heard when the Court starts its new term in October. Most importantly for the national security and safety
of the nation, the Court slapped down the appeals courts by dissolving large portions of the injunctions issued against the executive order until the Court hears the case. The March 6 executive
order suspended for 90 days the entry of foreigners from six terrorist safe havens -- Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan -– while the government determines if it has the vetting
procedures in place to prevent terrorists from getting into the country. The executive order applied a 120-day suspension to refugees for the same purpose, and capped the number of
refugees allowed into the country at 50,000. The Court lifted the injunctions on foreigners or refugees who have no connection to the U.S. According to the Court, the “interest in preserving
national security is ‘an urgent objective of the highest order’” and to prevent the government from “pursuing that objective” by not allowing these restrictions“against foreign nationals
unconnected to the United States would appreciably injure its interests, without alleviating obvious hardship to anyone else.” But the Court left in place the portion of the injunctions that

The building of the

would apply to any foreigner “who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Related Image Expand / Collapse

U.S. Supreme Court is seen after it granted parts of the Trump administration's emergency request to
put his travel ban into effect immediately while the legal battle continues, in Washington, U.S., June 26, 2017.
(REUTERS/Yuri Gripas) Some have painted this as setback to the administration, but that is also not true – it simply recognizes the procedures that the Trump administration had already put in

As the Court pointed out, the executive order “itself distinguishes between foreign nationals who
place.

have some connection to this country, and foreign nationals who do not, by establishing a case-by-case
waiver system primarily for the benefit of individuals in the former category.” Section 3(c) of the executive order provides
special consideration for foreigners who have “significant contacts,” “significant business or professional obligations,” or family in the U.S., or who are admitted students or have employment

This is not much different than what the Court outlines would satisfy the “bona fide
offers in the country.

relationship” standard. The Court says that for individuals, “a close familial relationship is required.” For
entities, “the relationship must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course rather than for the purpose of evading” the executive order. Thus, students admitted to American

No doubt to
universities and workers “who accepted an offer of employment from an American company or a lecturer invited to address an American audience” would qualify.

the annoyance of the advocacy groups who have filed these challenges, those who enter into a
relationship “simply to avoid” the executive order will not qualify. For example, according to the Court, a “nonprofit group devoted to
immigration issues may not contact foreign nationals from the designated countries, add them to client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion.” The other
important detail to keep in mind is that this does not mean that foreigners who meet the “bona fide relationship” requirement must be automatically granted a visa and admitted. They just
have to be considered despite the ban on entry of other foreigners. Thus, the government will still be able to deny entry due to individual security issues or other problems that are routinely
considered. Something else that seems to have gotten lost in the reporting: this was a “per curiam” decision. That means that all nine justices agreed to lift the injunctions. The fact that none

The only partial dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas

of the justices disagreed is another sign of how far out-of-line the lower court decisions were.

(joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch) was to tell the Courtthat it should have lifted the
injunctions in their entirety. He warned that the “bona fide relationship” standard set up by the Court will “invite a flood of litigation until this case is finally resolved on
the merits, as parties and courts struggle to determine what exactly constitutes a ‘bona fide relationship,’ who precisely has a ‘credible claim’ to that relationship, and whether the claimed
relationship was formed ‘simply to avoid’” the executive order. Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch may be right about the flood of litigation, but we might have seen a similar such floodcontesting the

The
very similar standards in the waiver program outlined in Section 3(c) of the executive order. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court in large part agreed with the president.

tenor of this decision shows that the challengers will have a very hard time in the Fall convincing the
Court that the president acted outside his statutory and constitutional authority. Or that federal judges
should substitute their judgment for that of the president when it comes to national security.
 No I/L: Roberts
Roberts knows partisanship is inevitable- empirical evidence shows he doesn’t care
about centricity
Epps 14 (August 27, Garrett, Professor of constitutional law & legal creative writing at the University of
Baltimore, “The Extreme Partisanship of John Roberts's Supreme Court”, The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/john-robertss-dream-of-a-unifying-court-has-
dissolved/379220/) MFE

“Politics are closely divided,” John Roberts told scholar Jeffrey Rosen after his first term as chief justice.
“The same with the Congress. There ought to be some sense of some stability, if the government is not going to polarize completely. It’s a high
priority to keep any kind of partisan divide out of the judiciary as well.” No one who observes the chief justice would doubt he was sincere in his wish for greater
unanimity, greater judicial modesty, a widely respected Supreme Court quietly calling “balls and strikes.” But human beings are capable of wishing for mutually
incompatible things—commitment and freedom, for example, or safety and excitement.
In his desire for harmony, acclaim, and
legitimate hegemony, the chief was fighting himself. As he enters his 10th term, his quest for a non-
partisan Court seems in retrospect like the impossible dream. The Supreme Court’s 2013 term began with
oral argument in a divisive, highly political case about campaign finance and concluded with two 5-4
decisions of divisive, highly political cases, one about public-employee unions and the other about
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act. In all three cases, the result furthered a high-
profile objective of the Republican Party. In all three cases, the voting precisely followed the partisan makeup
of the Court, with the five Republican appointees voting one way and the four Democratic appointees
bitterly dissenting. In all three cases, the chief voted with the hard-right position. By the end of the term, the
polarization Roberts had seen in the nation had clearly spread to the Court. In fact, the clerk’s final gavel
on June 30 did not signal even a momentary respite from the bitterness.

Roberts doesn’t care about centricity

Hananel 16 (February 4, Sam, Covering the Supreme Court & legal affairs for The Associated Press in
Washington, “Roberts: Partisan confirmation fights hurt court's image”, San Diego Tribune,
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-roberts-partisan-confirmation-fights-hurt-courts-
2016feb04-story.html) MFE

Roberts, now in his 11th year on the court, said criticism of the court doesn't bother him, but he said much of it seems to
be based on a perception that the justices are influenced by politics. "If we uphold a particular political
decision, that remains the decision of the political branches, and the fact that it may lead to criticism of
us is often a mistake," he said. "We do have to be above or apart from the criticism because we, of course,
make unpopular decisions — very unpopular decisions." In fact, the justices do line up frequently with the
positions of the party of the president who appointed them. Controversial decisions on gay marriage, capital
punishment, health care and campaign finance have been marked by deep ideological differences between liberal and

conservative justices.

Justice Roberts prefers to pick the majority vote- PC inevitable from wins
Stern 16 (Mark Joseph Stern, writer for Slate on law and LGBTQ issues, “The Chief Justice’s Biggest
Decision,” Slate,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/john_roberts_can_either_mo
derate_his_views_or_let_himself_drift_into_irrelevance.html) JZ
These outlier votes do not mean that Roberts will race to join a majority. In the 2013 term, he voted
with arch-conservative Justice Samuel Alito 93 percent of the time—and with Ginsburg just 71 percent
of the time. (That 71 percent figure is very low by Supreme Court standards; most cases aren’t very
close.) But these rare defections do show that the chief will occasionally tiptoe out of his comfort zone if
doing so lets him shape the majority’s decision. Roberts likes to speak for the court, especially in high-
profile cases, and he hates feeling as though institutional power is slipping from his grasp. Moreover,
he’s an ineffective and unsatisfying dissenter, often coming across as little more than a poor sport. In
one dissent, he posed 40 questions to the majority, which were meant to sound dazzlingly devastating
but came across as petty, nitpicky, and confused. And in his notoriously mean-spirited marriage equality
dissent, Roberts went out of his way to denigrate same-sex couples, ordering them not to “celebrate the
Constitution,” because the decision “had nothing to do with it.” Top Comment This is an interesting
piece. It begins by suggesting John Roberts do something if he wants to stay relevant, and then goes on
to prove that John Roberts already does this. More... 91 CommentsJoin In This is a man who likes to win.
What happens when he can’t—or at least can’t win while adhering to his deeply conservative values?
Perhaps the chief will consign himself to the role of a dissenter on his own court, mastering the craft and
planting seeds for the day when the court’s balance shifts again. Perhaps he will join Alito on the far-
right flank, using dissents to mold a new conservative orthodoxy that could come into vogue when the
pendulum swings again. But a bitter retreat would be uncharacteristic of the chief, who is more elastic—
and maybe more forgiving—than both his critics and admirers give him credit for. Three terms ago, his
more liberal colleagues decided, 5–4, that the Constitution barred mandatory sentences of life without
parole for juveniles. Roberts wrote the principal dissent, condemning the decision as a “gratuitous” and
implausible “bait and switch.” In January, the court vastly expanded that ruling and applied it
retroactively. This time, Roberts didn’t have to pen an outraged dissent. Instead, he joined the majority.
 No I/L: Democracy
Impact non-unique—democracy decked by Trump’s 50th day in office—6 warrants
Klaas 3/10 (Brian, comparative ptx fellow @London School of Economics, “How President Trump has
already hurt American democracy — in just 50 days,” Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/03/10/how-president-trump-has-
already-hurt-american-democracy-in-just-50-days/?utm_term=.480d6fe15494)KC

Today, March 10, is President Trump’s 50th day in office. Since his inauguration on Jan. 20, Trump has
governed in a way that poses a unique threat to the integrity of American democracy. Democracy is
bigger than partisanship. Therefore, this is not a critique of Trump’s policy proposals. Rather, it’s a sober
assessment of American democracy at a pivotal moment — and a call for Americans of all political
stripes to press all politicians to agree, at minimum, on preserving the bedrock principles that make the
United States a democracy. The call is urgent. In just 50 days, Trump’s presidency has already
threatened American democracy in six fundamental ways: 1. Trump has attacked the integrity of
voting, the foundation of all democratic systems. Without any evidence, Trump has repeatedly claimed
that millions of people voted illegally in 2016. This claim is not true. Every serious study that has
assessed voter fraud, including studies conducted by Republican presidents, has concluded that the
scale of the problem is negligible. Nonetheless, on his sixth day in office, Trump called for a major
investigation into voter fraud — now largely forgotten by many Americans. Unfortunately, his assertion
has not been forgotten by a large swath of Trump’s base. Tens of millions likely now believe Trump’s
claim — which will certainly prove an important “alternative fact” when, in the future, attempts are
inevitably made to make it harder for certain Americans to vote. 2. After attacking the integrity of his
own election, Trump has also undermined the credibility of his own office. Democracy will not function
if Americans cannot be sure that the president’s claims are at least grounded in evidence-based reality.
And yet, in just 50 days, Trump has made at least 194 false or misleading claims — an average of about
four daily. (March 1 was the only day without one, so far.) Recently, Trump’s early morning tweet-storm
alleging that former president Barack Obama personally ordered a wiretap of Trump Tower has not
been backed up by a shred of evidence. Key Republican senators and representatives have expressed
their bafflement at the accusation. Yet there have been no consequences for the president baselessly
accusing his predecessor of criminal action. Rep. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.) went so far as to chide reporters
for asking questions about the wiretap claim, saying, “I think a lot of the things he says, I think you guys
sometimes take literally.” How can democracy function when people can’t take the president literally?
3. Trump’s administration has repeatedly flouted ethics guidelines without consequence. When Trump
failed to discipline Kellyanne Conway for brazenly giving a “commercial” for Ivanka Trump’s jewelry and
clothing line, the Office of Government Ethics had to send an extraordinary letter reminding Trump that
ethics rules apply to the executive branch. Trump has also failed to meaningfully separate himself from
his business interests. Most recently, Trump received 38 lucrative trademarks from China, not just a
likely violation of the Constitution’s emoluments clause but also a benefit that will call into question
whether Trump’s foreign policy will pursue what is best for the American people or what is best for his
profits. That conflict of interest is precisely why democracies set ethics guidelines — and why it
threatens democracy to violate them. 4. Trump has attacked the independent judiciary. When U.S.
District Judge James Robart defied Trump’s travel ban, Trump called him a “so-called judge” and
insinuated that he would lay blame for a terrorist attack squarely at the feet of the judiciary. Presidents
routinely object to individual court decisions, but it threatens democracy to go one step further and
demonize any judge that dares cross the president. After all, the judiciary is charged with upholding the
law and the Constitution — not blindly affirming the president’s worldview. 5. Crucially, Trump has
accelerated a long-term trend, prodding tens of millions of Americans to further lose faith in basic
institutions of American government. Any experts in federal agencies are now the “deep state.” Trump’s
team has begun suggesting that the nonpartisan, independent Congressional Budget Office — a trusted
authority for Democrats and Republicans since 1974 — is simply a group of hacks. There is virtually no
authority trusted by both Democrats and Republicans anymore. Instead, the opposing sides are all too
inclined to view government as captured by evil partisans rather than disagreeing patriots. Rep. Steve
King (R-Iowa) made this view explicit, recently calling for a “purge” of leftists from government in an
astonishingly totalitarian tweet. Public trust is part of the lifeblood of democracy, and it is draining faster
than ever. 6. Finally, Trump has attacked a cornerstone of every democracy: the free press. He has called
legitimate media organizations “fake news” no fewer than 22 times on Twitter in the first 50 days — and
many more times in speeches. Worse, Trump called the press the “enemy of the American People,”
language that echoes Mao and Stalin rather than Ronald Reagan or John F. Kennedy. Trump only views
the press as a legitimate player in American democracy insofar as it is willing to affirm his narrative. To
Trump, negative polls are fake. Unfortunately, his attacks are working. A recent Quinnipiac poll showed
that 81 percent of Republicans agree that the media is “the enemy of the American people.” Eighty-six
percent of Republicans trust Trump to tell the truth rather than the media (up from 78 percent just two
weeks earlier). Throughout history, the blurring of the line between fact and fiction has been a critical
precursor to the breakdown of democracy and the creeping advance of authoritarianism.
 No I/L: Economy
The ban won’t have economic effect
Saraiva & Jamrisko 2/21 (Catarina Saraiva, Bloomberg reporter, Michelle Jamrisko, Bloomberg
economy reporter, “Trump’s Travel Ban Won’t Hit the US Economy, at Least This Year,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-21/trump-s-travel-ban-won-t-hit-the-u-s-
economy-at-least-this-year) JZ

Two-thirds of economists surveyed by Bloomberg said the ban, which has for the moment been
temporarily suspended by the courts, will have "little to no effect" on 2017 gross domestic product. Nine
said it would have a moderately negative impact and only one said it would have a significantly negative
effect. Trump issued the executive order on Jan. 27, temporarily banning immigration from seven
Muslim-majority countries and blocking for 120 days all refugees in a bid to keep potential terrorists
from entering the U.S. Many of the economists surveyed simply don't see the ban "sticking," in the
words of Mikhail Melnik from Kennesaw State University in Georgia. The ban already has been put
through the judicial wringer, having been granted a temporary delay by a judge in Seattle earlier this
month and facing several other lawsuits around the country. Trump said Feb. 16 that a new order will be
issued this week, tailored to address the objections of the federal appeals court that upheld the Seattle
decision. The new order will almost certainly trigger a fresh round of legal challenges and the legality of
the ban is expected to ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court. "It is doubtful that the ban will
stick," Melnik said. "But if it does, it will have a rather limited economic impact."

Travel ban won’t have an effect on the economy

Stannard 3/20 (James Stannard, contributor to World Finance, “Trump’s travel ban won’t ruin the US
economy,” World Finance, https://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/government-
policy/trumps-travel-ban-wont-ruin-the-us-economy) JZ
The least convincing of the aforementioned arguments is the idea a trade war would have a devastating impact on the US economy. Simply put,
the US would hardly feel any negative effects as a result; the six banned states account for less than 0.5
percent of US trade in goods each year. Professor Dhillon said: “The only way that this is going to create a huge problem for
trade would be if other Muslim countries, in solidarity with these countries, decided to do something all together. “You have OPEC as an
example… but of course this depends on how important crude oil is to the US economy right now.” Fears
for the future of US
tourism, meanwhile, do have sturdier statistical foundations. Nevertheless, the travel ban itself may not
be the only cause of the dips reported by Hopper and Forward Keys. For example, Steve Blackburn of the North
America Travel Service said his company experienced a similar, albeit smaller, dip in the same January-February time frame. Blackburn said
while “one or two clients” have made “a handful of negative comments” regarding Trump, holidaymakers might be deterred by
other factors instead, “such as the dollar against sterling rate of exchange”. In his view, the ban has not “directly
affected” his business at all, but did concede this may not be the case everywhere. Protests against Trump’s travel ban have extended around
the world On the other hand, the brain drain argument is not without merit; it only takes one genius, from anywhere, to change the world. This
led Google to publicly condemn any measures that “create barriers to bringing great talent to the US”. Nevertheless, a
major hole in the
brain drain argument is the fact the ban would only cause aggregate workforce skill levels to decline
very slightly. This is because the barrier that it builds is very minor in the grand scheme of things; in
2015, the six banned countries constituted less than 3 percent of total US legal immigration. To put this
in perspective, India’s contribution was double that and Mexico’s five times as much. India’s technology
institutes are also a key reason for the country’s citizens getting 70 percent of the 85,000 H-1B work visas issued by the US each year. Until
Trump starts putting limits on the US’ major sources of immigration, neither Silicon Valley nor the wider economy has too much to worry about.
“Few seem to be motivated by the fact the ban may restrict trade, tourism and talent… instead, they dislike its Islamophobic connotations” It
could be argued the travel ban has already indirectly limited high-skilled immigration. After all, it contributes to the US’ hostile image, which
could discourage the smartest individuals in non-banned areas like Europe and India from moving to the US. But, as Professor Dhillon explained:
“People don’t believe everything they read… America is still attractive and… the economic incentive is still there. It’s only when the scale of the
kind of discrimination or racism increases a lot that people will be discouraged.” Althoughthe ban will probably have a
negative effect on the economy to some degree, it will most likely cause less damage than many people
fear. That said, while most economic arguments fail to hold much water, it is understandable why they have been made: opponents of the
ban want to prove Trump wrong from every possible angle, especially socially and economically. Few seem motivated to oppose the ban simply
for its possible restrictions to trade, tourism and talent. Instead, they rally against its Islamophobic connotations.

Travel ban doesn’t hurt the economy and protectionism thumps.

Saraiva 17 (Catarina, and Michelle Jamrisko. Reporters @ Bloomberg. "Trump's Travel Ban Won't Hit the U.S. Economy, at Least This
Year." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 21 Feb. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-21/trump-s-travel-
ban-won-t-hit-the-u-s-economy-at-least-this-year>.) DTL
The U.S. economy should be able to weather President Donald Trump's temporary travel ban, economists say,
though any broadening of immigration and visa restrictions could hurt the labor force and productivity. Two-thirds of economists surveyed by

Bloomberg said the ban, which has for the moment been temporarily suspended by the courts, will have
"little to no effect" on 2017 gross domestic product. Nine said it would have a moderately negative impact and only one said it would
have a significantly negative effect. Trump issued the executive order on Jan. 27, temporarily banning immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries and
blocking for 120 days all refugees in a bid to keep potential terrorists from entering the U.S. Many of the economists surveyed simply don't see the ban "sticking," in
the words of Mikhail Melnik from Kennesaw State University in Georgia. The ban already has been put through the judicial wringer, having been granted a
temporary delay by a judge in Seattle earlier this month and facing several other lawsuits around the country. Trump said Feb. 16 that a new order will be issued
this week, tailored to address the objections of the federal appeals court that upheld the Seattle decision.
The new order will almost certainly
trigger a fresh round of legal challenges and the legality of the ban is expected to ultimately be decided
by the Supreme Court. "It is doubtful that the ban will stick," Melnik said. "But if it does, it will have a
rather limited economic impact." Measuring the economic impact of the Trump administration's immigration policy promises to be a
complicated and ongoing affair, particularly with the courts' suspension. In the meantime, many economists have tried to gauge potential impacts, including Brian
Schaitkin of the Conference Board, who outlined the current role that immigrants targeted in Trump's order play in the U.S. economy. Schaitkin finds that the
citizens from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen who are banned for at least 90 days under the original order are a "small but disproportionately
skilled and well-educated cohort," according to his Feb. 14 blog post. Immigrants in the labor force from those countries are almost four times as likely as the
average American to hold a Ph.D., and almost half have bachelor's degrees — compared with less than a third of the U.S. workforce, he wrote. While labor-market
participants from those seven countries have a similar industry makeup as the overall workforce, they also play an outsize role in filling much-needed health-care
jobs as the U.S. population ages, Schaitkin writes.
What might more significantly impact the health of the U.S. economy is
further restrictions of this kind on immigration. "Of more concern is President Trump's apparent belief that protectionism can succeed,"
said Tom Fullerton, an economics professor at the University of Texas at El Paso. "Raising protectionist barriers and/or withdrawing

from Nafta could easily cause a re-birth of stagflation due to ensuing supply chain disruptions." The most
important market news of the day. Get our markets daily newsletter. Top of Form Sign Up Bottom of Form Trump's order provisionally revoked about 60,000 visas
and raised concern that the administration will implement further barriers to immigration. More
longer-term restrictions mean the U.S.
economy could suffer from a slide in workforce growth and productivity, thereby reducing U.S. potential
growth — the economy's 'speed limit,' Daan Struyven, a Goldman Sachs economist, wrote in a Feb. 15 research note. In the absence of
immigration, the level of the U.S. working-age population probably would fall by 0.2 percent per year between 2020 and 2030, based on Census projections,
Struyven wrote. More efficient task specialization among immigrants, as well as a greater share of patent applications than with native-born Americans, means the
loss of immigrants hurt productivity. In turn, the ban could further threaten potential growth that's already low at 1.75 percent for the coming years, the Goldman
report estimates.

The travel ban doesn’t affect the tourist econ

Porter 7/6 (Tom Porter, 7-6-2017, "Tourism to the U.S. has risen despite Trump's travel ban,"
Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-travel-ban-tourism-us-632848) JD

The number of visitors traveling to the U.S. has risen, despite concerns that Trump's hardline anti-
immigrant policies could hurt U.S. tourism. The U.S. Travel Association said Wednesday that
international travel to the country was 5.2 percent higher in May this year than in the same month in 2016, with
foreign arrivals to the U.S. having increased 6.6 percent the previous month. The report produced by the
association and Oxford Economics, comes amid concerns that Trump’s travel ban and anti-immigrant stance may hurt the U.S. tourism industry.
Security measures have targeted flights to the U.S. from several Middle Eastern countries, with passengers banned from taking laptops and
tablets onto flights as hand luggage. “There is widespread talk of daunting challenges to the US travel market—
perception of the country abroad is mentioned most, but the strong dollar and slowing global economy are -factors as well—yet the
resilience of our sector continues to -astound,” said U.S. Travel Association president and chief executive Roger Dow. “Tourism
marketing efforts at the federal, state and local level undoubtedly deserve a large -measure of credit, and policymakers need to be aware of the
large dividends these programs are paying for economic activity, jobs and tax revenues,” he added. The
U.S. Travel Association
expects travel to grow by about 1.8 percent until November, but while growth in domestic travel bookings remains
strong, a slowdown is expected later this year.
 No I/L: Terrorism
Trumps ban is put in place to prevent terrorism
Chumley 5/15 (Cheryl K. Chumley, 5-15-2017, "Trump travel ban: It’s not the Muslims. It’s the
terrorists," Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/16/trump-travel-
ban-its-not-muslims-its-terrorists/) JD

Once again, judges listening to the latest challenge to President Donald Trump’s travel ban focused on
whether the order unconstitutionally discriminates against Muslims. What a crock. The left, for some odd
reason, has a thing for terrorists. Or for open borders. Or both. How can it be discriminatory to want to keep out
citizens of countries that are known hot spots for terror? That these countries happen to be mostly Muslim isn’t Trump’s
choosing. If he wanted to keep out the Muslims, as the left likes to intone, he would’ve included India
among the list of affected countries. But the order — neither Trump’s first, nor his now-challenged revised
second — mention religion. The three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, predictably enough, given the liberal leanings
of that court, honed right in on the Muslim angle, though, while hearing arguments from executive order opponents — opponents that include
civil rights groups and the state of Hawaii. And judges and opponents did so by going back in time and picking selective statements made by
Trump on the campaign trail. As CNBC reported, 9th Circuit Judge Richard Paez said that many of Trump’s remarks about banning Muslims from
America came “during the midst of a highly contentious campaign.” So, he wondered, how much weight should they be given? Well, how about
little-to-none? Better would be for a judge, as a gate guard of the Constitution, to give weight to the actual document before him for
constitutional consideration. Why go back in time? But Hawaii’s Neal Katyal, an attorney opposing the ban, responded with this, CNBC
reported: “The government has not engaged in mass, dragnet exclusions in the past 50 years. This is something new and unusual in which
you’re saying this whole class of people, some of whom are dangerous, we can ban them all.” This
is such a gross
mischaracterization of Trump’s executive order. The order simply names nations that have already been
identified by the federal government as terror hot spots — by even the Barack Obama White House as
breeding grounds for terror. And then it takes that information and packages it as a temporary travel ban — a 90 day temporary
travel ban — on people trying to come to America from those countries. The order further puts a halt to refugees entering the country as well.
But the bans are temporary, aimed only at allowing U.S. immigration agencies an opportunity to catch
up with border issues to better watch who’s coming in, and whether they mean to come to do harm to
American citizens. It’s common-sense national security. But the panel of judges who heard this latest challenge is made up
entirely of Bill Clinton appointees. Meanwhile, the whole argument of the opposition has been to point to Trump’s campaign rhetoric as proof
positive of his executive order’s inherent racism. Judges aren’t looking at the merits of the order, the text of the document. They’re reviewing
the past campaign statements of the president and trying to peer into his heart to determine true intent. This isn’t just a shot to common
sense. It’s a dangerous trend of judicial activism. If judges
are allowed to overlook what’s in front of them in paper
form and instead, base constitutional decisions on what’s been said in the past, then it won’t be long
before our entire court system becomes little more than a sham.

The claims about the lack of terrorist attacks are wrong

Sherlock 17 (Ruth Sherlock, Washington Dc Nick Allen Chiara Palazzo, 7 FEBRUARY 2017, "White
House releases list of 78 attacks after Donald Trump accuses media of 'under reporting' terrorist
incidents," Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/06/white-house-prepares-response-
blocking-travel-ban-states-warn/) JD

The White House released a list of 78 terror attacks around the world on Monday, saying most of them
did not get sufficient attention from the media. The release came after President Donald Trump appeared to accuse the
media of covering up terrorist attacks by not reporting them. "You’ve seen what happened in Paris and Nice. All over Europe it's happening,"
the president told military commanders at Central Command. "It’s gotten to a point where it's not even being reported.
And in many cases the very, very dishonest press doesn’t want to report it. They have their reasons, and you understand that.” Mr Trump
offered no evidence for the claim. Sean
Spicer, Mr Trump's spokesman, later said the president was accusing the
media of "under reporting" rather than not reporting terrorist attacks. Before issuing the list, he said: "There’s
several instances. There’s a lot of instances that have occurred where I don’t think they've gotten the coverage it deserved. "Protest
gets
blown out of the water and yet an attack or a foiled attack doesn't necessarily get the same coverage."
The list includes incidents like a truck massacre in Nice that killed dozens and received widespread attention, as well as less high-profile
incidents in which nobody was killed. One of the listed incidents was the fatal stabbing of British tourist Mia Ayliffe-Chung in Australia in August
2016, which Queensland Police specifically determined to be a murder case rather than a terrorist attack. "Networks
are not devoting
to each of them the same level of coverage they once did," a White House official said. "This cannot be allowed
to become the 'new normal.'"
 Limited Travel Ban Fails- Terrorism
The limited travel ban triggers terrorism- it’s inevitable
Joseph 6/26 (2017, Cameron, Reporter for New York Daily News, “Supreme Court lets part of
President Trump's travel ban go into effect”, New York Daily News,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/supreme-court-lets-part-trump-travel-ban-effect-article-
1.3278530) MFE

“We have seen far too often in recent months that the threat to our national security is real and becoming increasingly dangerous. Groups like ISIS and
Al Qaeda seek to sow chaos and destruction in our country, and often operate from war-torn and failed countries while leading their global
terror network. It is crucial that we properly vet those seeking to come to America from these locations, and failing to do so puts us all in danger,” Attorney General
Jeff Sessions said in a statement. Refugee rights groups decried the decision to let part of the ban go into place. “It’s devastating
to families and communities across the country,” said Tina Luongo, the attorney-in-charge of criminal practice at the Legal Aid Society.
“Right now I imagine there is enormous panic for family members here and abroad trying to figure out what

this means. There’s real fear as to what will happen next.” Gorsuch's support for Trump travel ban is a telling decision Ahmed Al-Nasi, an official in Yemen’s
Ministry of Expatriate Affairs, said he was disappointed by the Supreme Court’s action. “ We believe it will not help in confronting

terrorism and extremism, but rather will increase the feeling among the nationals of these countries
that they are all being targeted, especially given that Yemen is an active partner of the United States in
the war on terrorism and that there are joint operations against terrorist elements in Yemen,” he told Reuters.
 Limited Travel Ban Fails: Structural Violence
The limited travel ban results in Islamophobic violence
AP 6/26 (2017, Associated Press is an accredited news source, “Opponents: Limited Travel Ban Still
Stokes Islamophobia”, US News, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/minnesota/articles/2017-
06-26/opponents-limited-travel-ban-still-stokes-islamophobia) MFE

Officials of the Minnesota chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations say the limited travel ban allowed by the Supreme
Court still stokes hatred of Muslims. CAIR-MN executive director Jaylani Hussein says Monday's decision "emboldens"
what he calls the Trump administration's "Islamophobic policies" The Supreme Court is allowing the
Trump administration to go forward with a limited version of its ban on travel from six mostly Muslim
countries. The justices will hear full arguments in October. CAIR-MN civil rights director Amir Malik (ah-MEER' MAL'-ick) says the
limited ban might not have much effect in Minnesota, since it does not affect university students or immigrants with ties to the state. But Malik says it's

disappointing for refugees who have been waiting for years to come to the United States.
 Limited Travel Ban Fails: Economy
Even a partial travel ban hurts the economy- perception is key.
Rios 17 (Simon. Reporter @ WBUR"'Need Some Clarity Soon': Anxieties Rise For Some After High Court Partially Revives Trump Travel
Ban." WBUR 90.9. N.p., 27 June 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/06/27/supreme-court-travel-ban-anxieties>.) DTL

Many refugees and immigrants from six majority-Muslim nations who have been looking to settle in
Massachusetts — or any other part of the United States — have just two days to get here. That's after
the Supreme Court on Monday revived portions of President Trump's temporary travel ban, at least until
the full court reviews the ban in the fall. Refugee advocates in Massachusetts say they are trying to figure out what to do next as the court
said some people are exempt from the ban. But it is unclear just who qualifies as an exception. 'Immigrants Are Anxious' For Abdi Yusuf, there's a simple word that
describes the feelings not just of his own Somali community, but of all immigrants: angst. "Of course they're anxious," Yusuf said. "Yeah, all immigrants are anxious.
Absolutely. This is a departure from the U.S. tradition of welcoming refugees and immigrants." Yusuf is head of the Somali Development Corporation. It's an agency
in Roxbury that helps resettle refugees from the small East African nation. Somali is one of the six mostly-Muslim nations — the others are Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan
and Yemen — whose citizens will now likely be blocked from entering the U.S. for 90 days. President Trump also wants to suspend the entire American refugee
program for 120 days. Yusuf says it's hard to find answers for local Somalis worried about the fate of their relatives in refugee camps. "What
can you say?
You just have to wait and see and hope that Donald Trump will find whatever he's looking for," he said.
What Trump says he's looking for are ways to improve the vetting process for those who want to enter
the U.S. Lower courts had blocked Trump's executive order earlier this year, but the Supreme Court is
now allowing part of it to proceed with an important exemption: those who already have a "relationship with a person or
entity in the U.S." Some say the ban could hurt the Massachusetts economy. But that's debatable. "It does affect Massachusetts
because of the world-class universities and hospitals and corporations that are operating here," said Jessica Vaughan, with the Center for Immigration Studies, a
Washington-based group that supports tighter controls on immigration. But she says the travel ban will provide greater benefits in the long run. "The reality is that
when our immigration system becomes safe because we do better vetting, that's going to benefit the commonwealth of Massachusetts also," Vaughan argued. Ban
Reinstatement Is 'Still Very Confusing' Some advocates for refugees say the American vetting process is among the strongest in the world. Jeffrey Thielman, of the
International Institute of New England, is one of them. He spent much of Monday trying to figure out just who will be exempt from the travel ban. "I guess if you
have a brother or a sister or a parent in the country, then maybe you're in," he said. "So it's still very confusing, and we're going to need some clarity soon."
says the organization is
Thielman's group resettles hundreds of immigrants annually from countries including those under the temporary travel ban. He

hoping the relationship it has with refugees meets the standard set by the Supreme Court, but how that
standard is interpreted is up to the Trump administration. Massachusetts takes in roughly 2,400 people
each year, including refugees, asylum-seekers and human trafficking victims. The state Office for
Refugees and Immigrants says that number is expected to decrease by about 25 percent in the coming
fiscal year. "We're going to have fewer refugees than we've had in the past several years," Thielman said. "And that's going to be a sad thing, because we're a
place that welcomes refugees. "And the refugees who come here get into the workforce pretty quickly, and they fill

jobs that people need to have filled here." Thielman added that you can't grow the economy without
immigration. Although the travel ban might not have much impact because of the small numbers, he
says it sends a message that people aren't welcome. In the meantime, his group has just two days to respond before the ban goes into
effect.
 No Impact UQ
Impact non-UQ: travel industry already chilled by uncertainty over travel ban
McCormick 2/23 (Mike McCormick, director of the Global Business Travel Association, “Uncertainty
over Travel Ban Puts Business Travel and the Economy at Risk,” Global Business Travel Association,
http://blog.gbta.org/2017/02/23/uncertainty-over-travel-ban-puts-business-travel-and-the-economy-
at-risk/) JZ

Earlier this month, GBTA released data showing the dramatic bottom line impact President Trump’s
executive order banning travel to the United States from seven Muslim-majority countries has had on
business travel. In the week following the ban, approximately $185 million in business travel bookings
were lost as the uncertainty surrounding travel in general had a rippling effect on traveler confidence.
Given that for every 1 percent impact on business travel spending annually, the United States gains or
loses 71,000 jobs, nearly $5 billion in GDP, $3 billion in wages and $1.2 billion in tax collections, a loss in
business travel also leaves a lasting negative impact on our economy. Every quarter, GBTA releases a
U.S. business travel forecast providing projections for the next two years for prospects for domestic and
international outbound business travel for the United States. In our last forecast released in October, we
noted that ongoing global uncertainty and added heartburn from a presidential election unlike any we
had ever seen were causing many businesses to stay in a holding pattern, taking an extremely cautious
wait-and-see approach and begging the question of whether many of these companies would be ready
when growth picked up. The current state of uncertainty over the travel ban could cause a similar
impact on business travel. The Trump administration has announced they are working on a new
executive order that is expected to be released soon. It is still unclear if President Trump will rescind the
original order, which is currently on hold after the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court’s
injunction. International outbound business travel was already identified as a weak point for the U.S.
business travel market in our outlook before news of the travel ban was released. The biggest driver of
our economic recovery of the past seven years from the most recent downturn was international
outbound travel as U.S. businesses found top line growth and business opportunity from new markets
all over the world. It seems clear that this is an area presidential policies should work to bolster rather
than diminish. Cancelled business trips are typically not rescheduled, so every business trip cancelled
results in permanently lost travel industry revenues, decreased future employment rates and lost
economic benefit to our country.
 A2: Econ
Impact non-unique: perception of the travel ban has already chilled the tourism
industry
Dorgan 5/26 (Byron Dorgan, former US senator, “Just the threat of Trump’s travel ban is having this
chilling effect,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/26/threat-of-trumps-travel-ban-has-chilling-
effect-commentary.html) JZ

The seven-nation travel ban announced in January has been blocked by the Federal Courts, most
recently on Thursday by the Fourth Circuit, but it has already had an impact on destination tourism
travel to the U.S. These actions have set in motion consequences that could affect our country for years
to come. International travel to the U.S. creates and supports a large number of jobs in the travel
industry. Since the January White House travel ban announcement, international tourism to the United
States has seen a substantial decline. The result of that is jeopardizing the jobs and economic growth
that comes from the U.S. travel industry. Clearly, in this new age of terrorist threats, we need to carefully vet international
arrivals to the U.S. That makes sense. Our safety and security depend on it. But at the same time there are powerful reasons we should be
encouraging travel to the United States by citizens of other countries who want to see America. The opportunity for others to learn about our
people and our country is another important way to make us more secure. In addition to the proposed travel ban, the actions taken against
some international travelers in recent months have sent the same negative message about travel to the U.S. For example, on February 26th,
French historian Henry Rousso, who had travelled to our country more than thirty times, was landing in Houston to speak at a Texas A&M
Conference. "Estimated spending by international travelers to the United States is $246 billion a year. Travel and tourism supports 8.1 million
American jobs with a significant portion of that coming from international travelers who spend an estimated $4,400 per person during their
U.S. trips." As he was going through the immigration screening process at the airport that afternoon, he was pulled aside, put in a small
adjoining room and spent the next ten hours being questioned by U.S. immigration officials and was threatened with deportation. At 1:00 a.m.,
ten hours after his plane landed in Houston, he was released. Henry Rousso said he is unsure whether he will ever again return to the United
States. This is just one story about one international traveler to the United States. There are many, many other similar stories. Does it really
matter? It matters more than we know. International travel and tourism to the United States is a powerful
job generator for our economy. Estimated spending by international travelers to the United States is
$246 billion a year. Travel and tourism supports 8.1 million American jobs with a significant portion of
that coming from international travelers who spend an estimated $4,400 per person during their U.S.
trips. We have some unfortunate experience with periods where the U.S. stopped welcoming
international tourism. The decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks is commonly referred to as the "lost decade" for the U.S. travel
industry. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the message from the U.S. to the rest of the world was that
we weren't anxious to have visitors from abroad. As a result, international travel to the U.S. collapsed
along with the jobs and economic opportunities. It took well over a decade for the U. S. to return to pre
9/11 numbers in international visitors. The U.S. tourism and travel industry and the Americans who
worked in those jobs paid a high price for that.

Decline doesn’t cause war.

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, former International Affairs Fellow in India at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University, Adjunct Staff Member @
RAND Corporation, Security Studies Program @ MIT, country director for South Asian affairs in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Research Fellow @ the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, former research associate in the Department of National
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, BA from Wichita State University & an MA from the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from
International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research
Paper No. 2015-­­8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International
Rivalries,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict Or might downturns encourage ?

austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy This paper provides new evidence that economic ?

stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals the biggest step . For states that view each other as military threats,

possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the
competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the
evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic
downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy This is true controlling for all of the .

main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and

as well as many other possible confounding variables This research questions existing
international systemic changes), .

theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and argues that instead in certain

peace may result from economic troubles ∂

circumstances ∂ . Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state
possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or
where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.∂ This definition draws on a
growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as
situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains fur ther:∂ The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign
enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in
decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3∂ Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010

Economic
that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and∂ Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 ∂ Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?∂

crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels Economic crises lead to austerity . (1)

pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures Economic crises . (2)

also encourage strategic reassessment so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that ,

defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation ,

where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats,

economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during
periods of economic normalcy Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from
. (4)

international economic cooperation Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased .

investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble This search is made easier if tensions are .

reduced during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of
with historic rivals. (5) Finally,

resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy
views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory
policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy . This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur
in practice.

No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

Drezner 14 Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the
Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses adog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and
violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would
lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic
downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms
races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and
even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest

otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in
2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the
start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that
the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen
conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in
violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the
crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might
have been expected."43

Tons of empirics prove

Miller, 2k (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of
Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director & Senior
Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a
cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates
poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or
sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor
might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership
who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and
setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying
ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since
the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political
impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and
negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of
violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using
one form of violence to abort another).

Diversionary theory is wrong – leaders focus inward & withdraw from foreign policy
Bennett & Nordstrom 2000 D. Scott Bennett, Ph.D., The U of Michigan, Distinguished prof of
Political Science, & Timothy Nordstrom, Associate prof. Director of Graduate Studies @ U of Mississippi,
February 2000, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No.1
INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND EXTERNAL BEHAVIOR: IMPROVEMENTS By coming at externalization from the substitutability perspective, we
hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular
problem of model specification where the dependent variable has not been fully developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems
with studies of externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices; Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this (and the
importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that it
is shortsighted to conclude that a leader will uniformly
externalize in response to domestic problems at the expense of other possi- ble policy choices (1985, 130). We
hope to improve on the study of externalization and behavior within rivalries by considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic
conditions.5 In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of exter- nalizing, leaders may internalize when
faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the attention of the public or relevant elites through military
action, leaders may actually work to solve their internal problems internally. Tying internal solutions to the external
environment, we focus on the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile
relationships in the international arena to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of
spreading finite resources across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning inward
for some time may free up resources required to jump-start the domestic economy or may simply provide leaders the
time to solve internal distributional issues. In our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domes-
tic product [GDP] per capita growth) as a source of pressure on leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when studying
rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble that is applicable beyond just the United States or just advanced industrialized
democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as election cycles and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important
to all countries at all times. At a purely practical level, GDP data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on
inflation or unemploy- ment.6 Second, we believe that fundamental economic
conditions are a source of potential political
problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or worsening economic conditions may lead to
mass dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an early stage
before they turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe
that it may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators of the potential to
divert. Once the citizens of a country are
so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict (rioting or engaging in
open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting foreign policy
actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high level, that attempt has actually failed and we
are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts and further diversion.

The economy is resilient post-2008 – reforms & regulations make collapse improbable
FSB ’14 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors & makes
recommendations about the global financial system – “FSB Plenary meets in London” – 31 March 2014
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_140331.htm

The global economy has been improving and monetary policy in the US is in early stages of , the a

normalisation A comprehensive programme of regulatory reforms and

process, after an extended period of exceptional accommodation.

supervisory actions since the crisis has made the global financial system more resilient. Currently, European authorities are putting

Emerging markets have coped well with occasional bouts of

in place a comprehensive set of measures to strengthen further the region's financial system. relatively to date

turbulence reflecting the positive impact of

, in part recent reforms both past and more .

Economy more resilient than predicted – has taken shocks & still growing
Eisenbeis 11 – (3/31/11, Bob, PhD, Cumberland Advisors’ Chief Monetary Economist, former
Executive Vice President & Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, current member
of the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee & the Financial Economist Roundtable, “This Market
Is Showing Incredible Resilience In The Face Of Many Crises,” The Business Insider, lexis)

No, not shock and awe as in how the military uses the terms, but rather shock as a characterization of
what has hit the US and world economies recently and awe in terms of how resilient both have been.
Just think of the variety of shocks that financial markets have had to digest and synthesize. First there
was the financial crisis, the shutdown of the commercial-paper and mortgage markets, and broad
concerns about systemic risk. Then there were failures of major private-sector and government-
sponsored institutions, government injections of capital, and guarantees of bank liabilities. Europe has
been wrestling with its own debt and fiscal finance problems, and these have caused politicians both in
Europe and the US to face the hard realities that governments “ local, state, and federal “ cant continue
to run increasing deficits forever; and the public has sent a strong reaffirmation of that fact. We see the
US fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, that have sapped our military capabilities and have not
been particularly well received in that part of the world. Then, the self-immolation of a street vendor
culminated in the toppling of an autocratic Egyptian government. Demands for freedom and
liberalization have spread farther and faster in the Middle East than one could have imagined. Now, a
third military front has been opened in Libya, and there is much concern and confusion both in the US
and the rest of the world as to what the objectives are and how to define success. And then there are
the triple disasters of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor farm meltdown, which promise to
further worsen Japans deficit, in order to finance rebuilding. Oh, and did I mention the flooding in
Australia and major quake in New Zealands capital? The global political economy is facing as much
uncertainty as has ever been experienced in recent times. Yet, in the face of all these events, the US
stock market has essentially regained its lost value. To be sure, the job market is lagging and has a long
way to go to recoup the 7.4 million or so jobs that were lost during the recession. The housing market
faces a glut of excess supply that will take a long while to work off. However, corporate profits are at an
all-time high, interest rates are low, and inflation has so far remained contained. Real economic growth
has been positive and has increased at a steady, albeit modest, pace. State tax revenues are recovering.
Consumer spending on services, durables, and nondurables are all positive and have been for the last
few quarters. Who would have guessed that outcome, despite the best efforts of politicians and
economic policy makers? An individual investor, however, is likely to be shell-shocked to the point of
numbness by now. Witness the reaction to assertions about the municipal bond market that have
triggered large sell-offs “ especially by uninformed investors. Both risk and uncertainty are still high, and
one wonders where the next shock will come from. Will it come from Europe or the UK, as policy makers
begin to raise interest rates out of concern for domestic inflation, which is clearly on the increase? Will
the surprise come from the FOMC, in an early truncation of its most recent QE II purchases of
government securities? Will it come from a pullback in US consumer spending, as food and energy costs
continue to rise? (Consumer confidence has recently taken a large hit, due in no small part to the
increases in headline-inflation components.) Or will it come in the form of an external shock due to an
acceleration and spread of the turmoil in the Middle East, which would further threaten world energy
supplies? What are the best policies for governments to follow under such circumstances? First, they
should recognize that the real economies dont seem to be as fragile as many fear. US GDP is currently at
an all-time high, in both real and nominal terms, “ and exceeds its level at the onset of the financial
crisis. This means that somebody is making something, somebody is selling services, and most people
are still working. The economies of the world will pick up again when governments act to remove
imbalances, that is, when fiscal responsibility is restored, tax and spending programs are brought into
balance, promises that cant be kept are revoked, central-bank balance sheets are restored to normal,
and clear strategies for dealing with political unrest and their implications for energy policies are
formulated and articulated. When all this is done, uncertainty will be reduced and risks clarified. Then
businesses can begin investing and hiring again.

Countries are too stable or it’s empirically denied

Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011

(Samuel “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”,
November,
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4,
ldg)
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic
we see no
lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet

evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and
unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite
correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of
conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with
emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state
prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine . Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of
absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in
income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous
independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust
correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample
sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state
capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-
defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit
both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with
transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example,
conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly.
The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when
prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory
by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted
above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an
inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological
theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971).
Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity

price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets , but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political
stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that
successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the

If a nation is so fragile that a

counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous.

change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price
shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19
B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in

the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and
conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and,
most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of
published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true

when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater
flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase
of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly,
almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre
and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying
shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover
robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or
empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the
aggregate, the
consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than
ambiguous ones.20

2008 disproves conflict

Barnett, columnist for World Politics Review, 2009

(Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” World Politics Review,
8/252009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-
bl.aspx, 9-26-11, zml)

So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban
riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil
conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-
power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power
cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest
scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power
(inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that
Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments
of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on
basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and
investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the
previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public
budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation
on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we
say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic
crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right
political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there
were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much
protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars."
Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional
efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed
by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing
disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And
looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as
disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be
sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes,
even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the
continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of
experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of
"economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of
globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging
interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which
America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say
that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II
international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the
blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace.
That's what the Internet is for.
 A2: ISIS Terrorism
ISIS does not pose an existential risk & instability is inevitable.
Fisher 16 — Max Fisher, Editor at the Atlantic, Middle East Correspondent for Vox News, 2016 (“Fear
itself: why Obama wants to change how Americans think about terrorism,” Vox News, January 13th,
Accessible Online at http://www.vox.com/2016/1/13/10762268/state-union-obama-terrorism-isis,
Accessed On 02-12-2016)

Changing how Americans think about ISIS You could see this play out particularly in Obama's discussion
of what is legitimately the scariest yet also the most overhyped threat facing Americans: the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria. Yes, the speech was careful to note that groups such as ISIS do pose a danger
that demands to be taken seriously. But rather than just ticking through his policies and his proposals for
engaging those dangers, and beyond even just downplaying the threat ISIS poses, Obama repeatedly
attempted to reframe Americans' understanding of the nature of that threat — even when that meant
raising some hard truths. "For even without ISIL, instability will continue for decades in many parts of
the world—in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in parts of Central America, Africa, and
Asia," he said. "Some of these places may become safe havens for new terrorist networks; others will fall
victim to ethnic conflict, or famine, feeding the next wave of refugees." This is a remarkable admission
from a sitting president: that ISIS and its threat are rooted, at least to some extent, in abstract forces
such as the internal instability of far-off failed states. This is not a narrative that lends itself well to
politics, because it doesn't present an emotionally satisfying narrative, a clear villain, or certainly an
obvious solution. Particularly unusual was Obama's statement that this instability "will continue for
decades," which he echoed elsewhere in the speech, referring to Middle Eastern threats as rooted
partially in "a transformation that will play out for a generation." Obama is asking Americans to take on
a truth that is widely held as dull conventional wisdom by serious observers of foreign policy yet
considered taboo in American politics and on TV news: that there are some forces in the world outside
of American control. The dangers facing Americans, he said, are "not because of diminished American
strength or some looming superpower." Rather, "In today’s world, we’re threatened less by evil empires
and more by failing states."

ISIS doesn’t cause great power war — the threat is overblown.

Beauchamp 16 — Zach Beauchamp, Writer for ThinkProgress & Vox, M.Sc. in international relations
from the London School of Economics, 2016 (“Obama's radical honesty about ISIS,” Vox, January 12th,
Accessible Online at http://www.vox.com/2016/1/12/10758750/state-of-the-union-2016-isis, 09-28-
2016)

But as we focus on destroying ISIL, over-the-top claims that this is World War III just play into their
hands. Masses of fighters on the back of pickup trucks and twisted souls plotting in apartments or
garages pose an enormous danger to civilians and must be stopped. But they do not threaten our
national existence. That’s the story ISIL wants to tell; that’s the kind of propaganda they use to recruit.
We don’t need to build them up to show that we’re serious, nor do we need to push away vital allies in
this fight by echoing the lie that ISIL is representative of one of the world’s largest religions. We just
need to call them what they are — killers and fanatics who have to be rooted out, hunted down, and
destroyed. This cuts against the common portrayal of ISIS as a peril to the United States on part with the
existential threats of past eras. A phrase you hear all the time in the American media — including from
some Republican presidential candidates — is that ISIS poses an "existential threat" to the United States.
That the group, or the ideology it stands for, could destroy the United States itself. Obama is trying to
undercut this narrative. While he admits that ISIS "can do a lot of damage," he's also correct that ISIS
isn't capable of actually toppling the US; in fact, it's actually losing control of its own territory in Syria
and Iraq. A group that can't fight off the Iraqi military and various Syrian rebel groups in its backyard
simply doesn't have the firepower to pose a fundamental threat to the United States. That's not to say
that ISIS poses no danger to Americans — Obama is clear that it does — but rather appears intended to
modulate American fears of ISIS that have perhaps, in his view, exceeded their actual threat. While
recent opinion polls show that terrorism is one of the American public's top issues, the fact is that
terrorism actually only kills a tiny number of Americans per year (a number roughly comparable to the
amount killed by their own furniture). Of course, such groups would like to kill many more Americans
than that, and will continue trying to do that, but their actual toll is thankfully still far short of anything
that can existentially threaten the US. ISIS is a danger, sure — but Obama is attempting to put the threat
in its proper context.

No ISIS WMD threat

Matthew Cottee 14, research analyst with the Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Programme at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies; & Dina Esfandiary, research associate with the Non-
Proliferation & Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/15/14,
“The very small Islamic State WMD threat,” http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-
threat7729

With ISIS running amok over such a large swathe of territory, it’s no surprise that these kinds of fears
are growing. But it is
important to be realistic about the threat. It remains unlikely that the group will be able to acquire and
effectively use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. For a start, concerns that terrorists could buy or steal
a nuclear device from a country that possesses them are exaggerated and have been comprehensively discredited
Very few countries sponsor terrorism or wish to be seen as doing so, and nuclear forensics would make it relatively
straightforward to find the source of any given device. The consequences for any state conducting such business
would be severe. Some of the hysteria surrounding ISIS and WMD is based on the theft in July of around 40 kilograms of
uranium compounds from Mosul University. But if this was a targeted attempt to acquire nuclear material—rather than part of a
broader raid on the university—it suggests that the thieves’ knowledge of nuclear bomb-making lacks sophistication. The stolen
material cannot be turned into a viable nuclear device: The uranium was low-grade and would have to be further
enriched and then weaponized, requiring obscure raw materials and technologies, a delivery means, and facilities that would take years and a
significant sum of money to develop. It took the United States, with its vast resources and advanced knowhow, six years to develop a nuclear
device. It took China roughly 10 years and Pakistan more than two decades. Needless to say, even for an established country, developing a
nuclear weapon is not simple. The most likely threat is a radiological device of some kind. It is relatively simple to develop a so-
called “dirty bomb,” in which explosives are combined with a radioactive source like those commonly used in hospitals or extractive industries.
But the radioactivity released by a dirty bomb would have only limited health effects, causing more
disruption than destruction. If ISIS used its stolen uranium in a dirty bomb, the weapon’s blast would be more
deadly than the radiation it released.

Reject threat exaggeration

Joseph S. Nye 2/4, former US assistant secretary of defense & chairman of the US National Intelligence
Council, University Professor at Harvard University. “Five Truths about Terrorism,” Project Syndicate,
2/4/16, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/terrorism-not-biggest-threat-to-americans-by-
joseph-s--nye-2016-02
Terrorism is a problem for the United States, as the attack in San Bernardino, California in December showed. But it has been blown out of proportion,
both by the presidential candidates and by a news media that adheres to the old adage, “If it bleeds, it leads.” To put terrorism in proper perspective,

Americans – and others – should bear in mind the following considerations.¶ Terrorism is a form of theater. Terrorists
are more interested in capturing attention and putting their issue at the forefront of the agenda than in
the number of deaths they cause per se. The Islamic State (ISIS) pays careful attention to stagecraft. The
barbaric beheadings that are broadcast and disseminated through social media are designed to shock and outrage – and thereby capture attention. By exaggerating their

effect and making every terrorist act a lead story, we play into their hands.¶ Terrorism is not the biggest
threat facing people in advanced countries. Terrorism kills far fewer people than auto accidents or
cigarettes. Indeed, terrorism is not even a big threat – or a small one, for that matter. One is likelier to be
struck by lightning than to be killed by a terrorist.¶ Experts estimate that an American’s annual risk of
being killed by a terrorist is one in 3.5 million. Americans are more likely to die in an accident involving a
bathtub (one in 950,000), a home appliance (one in 1.5 million), a deer (one in two million), or on a commercial airliner (one in 2.9
million). Six thousand Americans die annually from texting or talking on the phone while driving. That is several
hundred times more than die from terrorism. Radical Islamic terrorism kills fewer Americans than attacks by disgruntled

workplace and school shooters. Terrorism is not World War III.¶ Global terrorism is not new. It often takes a generation for a wave of
terrorism to burn out. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the anarchist movement killed a number of heads of state for utopian ideals. In the 1960s and 1970s, the “new left” Red
Brigades and Red Army Faction hijacked planes across national borders and kidnapped and killed business and political leaders (as well as ordinary citizens).¶ Today’s jihadist extremists are a
venerable political phenomenon wrapped in religious dress. Many of the leaders are not traditional fundamentalists, but people whose identity has been uprooted by globalization and who

ISIS’s parochial nature limits the

are searching for meaning in the imagined community of a pure Islamic caliphate. Defeating them will require time and effort, but

range of its appeal. With its sectarian attacks, it cannot even appeal to all Muslims, much less Hindus, Christians, and
others. ISIS will eventually be defeated, just as other transnational terrorists were.¶ Terrorism is like jiu jitsu. The smaller
actor uses the larger actor’s strength to defeat it. No terrorist organization is as powerful as a state, and few terrorist

movements have succeeded in overthrowing one. But if they can outrage and frustrate citizens of the state into taking self-defeating actions, they can
hope to prevail. Al-Qaeda succeeded in luring the US into Afghanistan in 2001. ISIS was born in the rubble of the subsequent US-led invasion of Iraq.
 A2: Structural violence
Impact nonunique—Trump’s inauguration & issuing of travel ban EXO triggered
impact already
Buncombe 4/25 (Andrew, Independent’s US editor, “Donald Trump: Islamophobic incidents at US
borders 'rise by 1,000%' since president took office,” Independent,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-islamophobia-us-borders-and-
council-on-american-islamic-relations-a7702351.html)KC

The number of incidents of alleged Islamophobia involving US Customs and Borders Protection officials
has increased by around 1,000 per cent since Donald Trump took office, according to a Muslim activist
group. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) said preliminary data collated from its branches across the country, found that
instances in which officials were accused of profiling Muslims accounted for 23 per cent of its caseload
in the first three months of 2017. Of the 193 CBP cases recorded from January-March 2017, 181 were
reported after the January 27 signing of the Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States Executive Order, also known as the Trump administration’s Muslim travel ban. In the
first three months of 2016, the group reported 17 cases. “These are incidents which are reported to us and which we examine,” Corey Saylor,
director of CAIR’s group that monitors alleged Islamophobia, told The Independent. “We look at these very carefully. Around 50 per cent, we
we reject.” Mr Saylor said allegations of Islamophobia being levelled at border officials was nothing new. Yet, he said he believed the
election of Mr Trump and the signing of two executive orders designed to crackdown on undocumented
migrants and to refuse entry to citizens from six Muslim-majority countries, was behind the spike in
incidents. In the aftermath of Mr Trump’s orders, which have been halted by the courts, there were
widespread reports of chaos at US airports, and of people being turned away as they sought to board
flights to the US at foreign airports. Mr Trump vowed during his election campaign that he would make it more difficult for people
from certain countries to reach the US as party of tighter security, despite immigrants from countries such as Syria and Somalia already having
to endure screening that can take several years. Mr Saylor said he appreciated the difficult job being faced by border officials, but asked that
they did it without breaching the US constitution. He said customs officials routinely asked questions of Muslim traveller that were both
invasive and made little common sense. He cited testimony of a Customs and Border Protection official from a 2013 lawsuit, who said: “Look to
the Muslim woman as an indicating factor. By the way she wears her hijab. If the hijab is a solid colour it indicates religiosity. If it’s a patterned
scarf, with colours, it’s more likely that she is less religious.” US Customs and Borders Protection did not immediately respond to inquiries.

Impact has already been triggered by June ruling

Hilal 6/28 (Maha, PhD, Michael Ratner Middle East fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in DC, “The
Supreme Court’s ‘Muslim Ban’ Decision Is Terrifying,” Foreign Policy in Focus, http://fpif.org/the-
supreme-courts-muslim-ban-decision-is-terrifying/)KC

I’m a U.S. citizen. I’m also Muslim. And the Supreme Court decision on the Trump administration’s Muslim travel
ban scares me. In a June 26 ruling, the court decided to leave in place parts of the Muslim ban while the
merits of the case are debated, effectively barring individuals from six Muslim-majority countries
without a “bona fide” relationship in the U.S. — say, with family members, an employer, or an
educational institution — into the country. This decision may also prevent entry for all refugees for 120
days. The ruling has been hailed as a victory for the Trump administration — not just on the legal end, but
also in the degree to which it instills fear in Muslims. The fear is real, and not just for those who may be directly impacted,
but for the larger community, too. After all, what the travel ban is ultimately meant to do is to hold all Muslims
collectively responsible for the actions of a (miniscule) few. As a Muslim American of Egyptian descent,
will I be legally impacted by the decision? In theory, no. But will I think twice about leaving the
country, knowing that I could return to the possibility of being harassed, interrogated, and/or denied
entry back into the U.S.? Absolutely. Because after almost 16 years of the war on terror, you come to
learn — or become conditioned to fear — that one day you could be next. The distinction between
citizen and non-citizen becomes ever more perilous when you “look Muslim,” have a Muslim sounding
name, or work on issues relating to Muslims. This doesn’t mean I’ll experience the same consequences as Muslim non-citizens,
but neither does my citizenship reassure me that my fellow Muslim Americans and I will be protected, especially in light of this administration’s
history over the last few months alone. And that’s exactly the intent of policies like these — they target some while causing others to reel back
in fear that they too will be impacted. They generate enough fear to make anyone with any relationship with a targeted group censor
themselves and modify their behavior. The
government wins not only because of whom it targets directly, but
because of who else becomes an indirect target. These are precarious times for Muslims. And while we’re told to trust in our
democracy and our judicial system, decisions like these — which come on the heels of a long history of discriminatory, racist, and Islamophobic
policies under several administrations — magnify the legitimate fear that one will either be targeted by state violence or become a target of
societal violence. Worryingly, not a single judge dissented from the unsigned Supreme Court ruling — and in fact, three conservative judges,
including the newly seated Neil Gorsuch, concurred that they would’ve gone even further and implemented the ban in full.
 A2: Terrorism
No nuke terror or escalation
Weiss 15 (Leonard, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford
University, & a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control & Non-
Proliferation in Washington, DC, former professor of applied mathematics & engineering at Brown
University & the University of Maryland, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March/April 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87]
If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the

Although there has been much commentary on the

United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world.

interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010),
and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working
seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is
virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a
population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one
accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim

.” If
when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade

public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not
going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their
goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons;

it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired
device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate
activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While
absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is
reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008: Nuclear
terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances,
terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory.

consider the
Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26) The three ways terrorists might get a nuke To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism,

three possibilities for terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear
weapon state; manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring. Stealing nukes.
Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which have
multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks (including
so-called “permissive action links” that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked storage facilities, armed guards,

and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have
such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining
states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its
own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a
theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such
layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn’t impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider. The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories,
circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase
nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even
work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes. Because of the large number of terrorist groups

operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a
weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into
chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security
concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes,

Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the

not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover,

Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting
their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple
locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the
weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in
their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such
times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised
trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security
breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United
States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it’s also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of
an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources
tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the
1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment
of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the

accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined
many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at

least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it
cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be sure
that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation (see
Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This

is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event. Although these first two ways
in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is no available data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a
weapon, nor has there been any public information suggesting that any nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group), the probabilities

cannot be said to be zero as long as nuclear weapons exist. Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group
would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is

very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that
sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-

weapon states, particularly Japan. But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the

construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult
technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would
require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel
rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical

skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability

that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under
high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical

success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,4 would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to
build the device. There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some
material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario would require intimate

knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds
another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success. The situation is different in
the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a “gun type” design is
the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a
subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the
geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an
intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry

stealing that
a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension. In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms,

much highly enriched material (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) is a major problem for any
thief and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched
material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since
had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive

purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for
machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B.
C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to
carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the
nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early
1970s5 and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a
democracy for reducing it. Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups,

there is only one known case of a major theft of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo,
Pennsylvania in the 1970s at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government with the probable

The
involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010).

circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about
the contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it
involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for
making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two

there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years
decades,

through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the
Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves. Are terrorists even
interested in making their own nuclear weapons? A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a

weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist
groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium
enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. T here is one stark example of a

terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a
membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum

Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in
chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small

organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as
terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly

dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate

that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the
Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive
ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at
any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear

proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant
risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional
explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its
operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of
course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a

successful effort.

No WMD terrorism – lack of desire & capability – empirically the threat is overblown
Mueller 11. John Mueller, Professor & Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon
Center for International Security Studies & Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”,
8/2/2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-
qaeda?page=show, CMR

many preferred to engage in massive

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead,

extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make
an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan,
suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear

fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a
decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it
was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008,
 Few, it seems,
Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear."

found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for
research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now
have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first

reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining
about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The
full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination,

let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to
fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and
transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy,
cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention

from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11
was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly
threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security
measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run

obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly

red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The

lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been
found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the
country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan
to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues.
Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing
that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide
for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the

no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in
civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed,

the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda
is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since
9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential , or elephantine, threat. And the

likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11
included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so.

Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum

Shinrikyo, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience,
however, cannot be very encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance),

Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to biological
weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. The
group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal
shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the
future. No elephants there, either.

No Nuclear Terrorism Impact — problems with acquisition, theft, construction &

delivery.
Mearsheimer 14 — John J. Mearsheimer, Ph.D. in Government from Cornell, Distinguished Service
Professor of Political Science & chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, co-
director of the Program on International Security Policy, faculty member in the Committee on
International Relations graduate program, member of the Advisory Council of The National Interest,
former Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, 2014 (“America Unhinged,” The National
Interest, No. 129, Jan/Feb, Available Online at
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf, Accessed 08-10-2015)

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is
terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is
no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United
States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable
future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist
organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—
most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the
1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled. What about the possibility that a terrorist
group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances
of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear
weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon.1 Political
turmoil in a nuclear armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the
United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might
also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as
well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a
bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making
sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the
target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear
terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main
remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

Zero risk of nuclear terrorism – no motive, tech, expertise, or money

Probability of success is 3.33 x 10-8 percent

Mueller 13 [John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, November 27, “Calming Our
Nuclear Jitters,” http://issues.org/26-2/mueller/AKG]

In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even
less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they,
unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to
be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to
manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely,
highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable
series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is
exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be
immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required
substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including
brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or
incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that
once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts
it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists
were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably
have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by
security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling
routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and
careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled,
some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward
money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been
discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large
and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select
team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be
assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated
among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back
home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of
course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk,
because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an
intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists
to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel
Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly
conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that
precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good
blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work
is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields
verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos
Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to
machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose
basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems
associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think
that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to
tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the
process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to
be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with
increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If
the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then
have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be
received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling,
maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this
extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive
equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for
free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a
considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for
cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are
also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically
equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a
terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and
that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each
individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes
vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario
considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic
terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when
they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or
even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability
estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the
terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted
effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more
realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be
able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might
take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a
generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a
country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or
that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the
donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign
intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere.
However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any
weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as
technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear
explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques:
Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and
a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb
but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the
knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the
chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this
context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons
would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used
in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be
disassembled.

Conventional attacks better serve their interests, materials are locked down, & even
when they weren’t, nobody bothered to steal them
Cheryl Rofer 15, worked as a chemist at Los Alamos National Laboratory for 35 years, where she
directed programs in environmental remediation & plutonium storage; CEO of Nuclear Diner, an expert
blog on nuclear issues, “But What If The Terrorists Had A Nuclear Bomb?” Nov 18 2015,
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/11/18/but-what-if-the-terrorists-had-a-nuclear-bomb/

The probability of terrorists having fission weapons or RDDs is vanishingly small. The consequences could be
enormous in the case of a fission weapon, much less in the case of an RDD. The fear stoked by repeated articles of this type would be the greatest consequence of an RDD. ¶ A number of
people at non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to eliminating nuclear weapons spread fearful images: cities annihilated or paralyzed, tens of thousands dead. I sympathize with the ideal of eliminating nuclear
weapons, but I question whether fear and exaggeration are the way to sell that ideal. I’d rather work from the facts and slog through the difficult actions that will be needed to eliminate nuclear weapons. ¶ Although I share their
goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, I cannot ally myself with those groups for a number of reasons. First, they ignore the realities of physically dealing with those weapons taken out of service. Second, they ignore the
international events that drive the perceived need for nuclear weapons. Third, their messaging is all wrong, starting with that fear.¶ Even if all nuclear nations decided to eliminate nuclear weapons this afternoon, those very
physical objects, something like 17,000 of them, would still exist. They contain dangerous materials that need to be handled safely, which means that physically eliminating them will take some time. The facilities in which they are
now decommissioned are aging and overloaded with work. But the NGOs argue for closing down those facilities and against budgets for improving them.¶ After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent rattling of nukes, the
US can’t unilaterally say we’re removing nuclear weapons from our arsenal. It’s nice to dream of a bold move that is reciprocated by Russia, but it’s hard to believe that any of that can happen right now. The downside of such a
move by the United States, both domestically and geopolitically, is much to large for any president to take it.¶ Fear in messaging is manipulative and develops an attitude of helplessness in the people who receive it. It’s realistic to
recognize the enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons and agree that eliminating them from our future would be a good thing. Fearing that one’s city may be nuked at any time seems less conducive to taking action towards
eliminating them. I would like to see the NGOs do some serious studies of what it will take to deal with the weapons taken out of service and then write and support legislation for those measures. A few successes of that kind

might do a lot more to gain supporters.¶ Focus on Terrorists¶ The focus on terrorist RDDs and real-thing fission weapons doesn’t make
much sense in relation to historical terrorist activity. Terrorists want the simplest way to get the
greatest effect. Kalashnikovs and explosive vests worked quite well in Paris. Or boxcutters for 9/11.¶ From J. M. Berger, an
expert on terrorism:¶ Al Qaeda’s love of elegance was a distraction.¶ Terrorism is inherently improvisational.¶ Occasionally terror groups

discuss nuclear weapons internally or threaten vague horrors. None I am aware of has shown any real intention
(acquiring materials, for example) of building an RDD or fission weapon. Jeffrey Lewis and Peter Zimmerman figured up what it would take for a
terror group to build a fission weapon: at least 19 people. Since current estimates for the Paris attacks are as high as 20, the number to build a fission weapon is likely higher, and they would include

some very specific kinds of expertise. Learning to handle a gun is much easier.¶ Building an RDD would require less than a
fission weapon, but it still needs specialized materials. International programs have been collecting the radioactive

sources that would make the best RDDs. Hospitals are turning to accelerators to eliminate the radioactive sources that could be used. Although recent articles have
mentioned depleted (or even enriched) uranium as a possible RDD material, neither is radioactive
enough to be a threat. That’s another problem: reporters often don’t understand what they are writing about and err on the side of sensationalism.¶ Material for a fission
weapon has always been hard to obtain. Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there were
concerns about the security of materials. The program sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, authors of the latest
article, has locked down much of that material. Most egregiously, chunks of plutonium metal were scattered across the

Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, but they have been cleaned up. During the decade they lay out on the
steppe, nobody picked them up. The area is now patrolled by drones.

Terrorists wouldn’t get their hands on nukes even in the event of a coup – US safety
measures check
Kerr & Nikitin 16 —Paul K. Kerr & Mary Beth Nikitin, Kerr is an analyst in nonproliferation & Nikitin is
a specialist in nonproliferation, 2016 (“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”, Congressional Research Service,
June 14th, Accessed Online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, Accessed 07-13-2016, SP)

During former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s January 2005 confirmation hearing, then Senator
John Kerry asked what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic
coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “[w]e have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try
to deal with it,” suggesting that the United States had plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case
of a loss of control by the Pakistani government153 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports
about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, “Pakistan possesses adequate
retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty,” emphasizing that Islamabad’s nuclear
weapons have been under “strong multilayered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational,
administrative and command and control structures since 1998.”154 The issue of U.S. contingency plans
to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto’s
assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan’s government.155 Responding to a
report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help
secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson stated on November 8,
2009, that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.” Pakistan will never “allow
any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,” the spokesperson
said, adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal with U.S. officials.”156 Then Secretary of Defense Gates stated in January 2010 that the United
States has “no intention or desire to take over any of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”157 The United States
reportedly offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistan soon after September 11, 2001.158 U.S.
assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included
the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of
nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel
reliability.159 As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps
three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.160 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad
is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general. Former
Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed Permissive Action Links (PALs) for its
warheads without U.S. assistance.161 PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be
detonated. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview
that there has been U.S. assistance in securing Pakistani nuclear weapons, explaining that the United
States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable
time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their
nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty
sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”162 Rolf Mowatt Larssen, former Director of
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in May
2009 that “there’s not a lot of transparency into” how Islamabad spends the U.S. funds, but he
nevertheless characterized them as “money well spent.”163 A Pakistani official said in November 2009
that Pakistan reserves the right to “pick and choose” the nuclear security measures it will undertake,
adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are “non-intrusive.”164

Climate change turns terrorism

Doherty 4/19 (Ben, Walkley award winner, reporter on foreign/immigration policy, “Climate change
will fuel terrorism recruitment, report for German foreign office says,” the Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/apr/20/climate-change-will-fuel-terrorism-
recruitment-adelphi-report-says)KC

Climate change will fuel acts of terrorism and strengthen recruiting efforts by terrorist groups such as
Islamic State and Boko Haram, a report commissioned by the German foreign office has found. Terrorist
groups will exploit the natural disasters and water and food shortages expected to result from climate
change and allow them to recruit more easily, operate more freely and control civilian populations,
argues the report by Berlin thinktank Adelphi. “Terrorist groups are increasingly using natural resources
– such as water – as a weapon of war, controlling access to it, and further compounding, and
exacerbating resource scarcities,” Lukas Rüttinger writes in the report, titled Insurgency, Terrorism and
Organised Crime in a Warming World. ‘Disaster alley’: Australia could be set to receive new wave of
climate refugees Read more “The scarcer resources become, the more power is given to those who
control them, especially in regions where people are particularly reliant on natural resources for their
livelihoods. “As climate change affects food security and the availability of water and land, affected
people will become more vulnerable not only to negative climate impacts but also to recruitment by
terrorist groups offering alternative livelihoods and economic incentives.” The Adelphi report cites
several examples where the impacts of climate change are already spurring or exacerbating terrorism. In
the drought-ravaged region around Lake Chad in central Africa, food and water shortages, near-
economic collapse, and weak governments are providing a ripe recruiting ground for Islamist
fundamentalist group Boko Haram. “In north-eastern Nigeria, the region closest to Lake Chad and where
Boko Haram is strongest, 71.5% of the population live in poverty and more than 50% are malnourished
… This kind of economic deprivation provides an ideal breeding ground for recruitment by Boko Haram.”
In Syria, the now six-year civil war and rise of Isis was, not caused, but exacerbated by one of the worst
and widest droughts in the country’s history, which drove hundreds of thousands from the land, and
sent millions into extreme poverty and food insecurity. Isis is using water as a weapon of war, the report
argues, controlling dams to harm enemies and expand its own territory. “In 2015, Islamic State closed
the gates of the Ramadi dam to more easily attack regime forces further downstream. Weaponisation of
water can also take the form of using it as a source of funding by taxing it, as Isis did in Raqqa. In other
instances, Isis did not cut the supply, but rather used water to flood land in order to expel people from
their homes.” And in Afghanistan, a country riven by internecine conflicts and acutely vulnerable to
climate change, more than half of local conflicts are over land and water. Diminishing rainfall and
advancing desertification are likely to spark further violent clashes between nomads and pastoralists
over access to pastures and water and food. Rüttinger told the Guardian climate change alone did not
cause terrorism, but “creates an environment where terrorism can thrive” and exacerbates existing
tensions and conflicts. Former US deputy undersecretary of defence Sherri Goodman told the Guardian
this month that climate change was a “threat multiplier” for unstable regions around the world, but
that its impacts would be felt globally, and by countries distant from the source conflict. “Climate is a
threat multiplier because it aggravates others tensions and conflicts that already exist.” Militaries
around the world, across the Americas, UK, Europe, and the Asia Pacific, have highlighted the “threat
multiplier” impact of climate change and extreme weather events. The Global Military Advisory Council
on Climate Change has warned the impact of global warming will drive massive refugee movements of
an “unimaginable scale”, and that climate represents “the greatest security threat of the 21st century”.
Child migrants in Sicily must overcome one last obstacle – the mafia Read more The US secretary of
defence, James Matthis, told his confirmation hearing in January climate change posed a real and
current security threat to American troops. “Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world
where our troops are operating today. It is appropriate for the combatant commands to incorporate
drivers of instability that impact the security environment in their areas into their planning.” In March,
the United Nations, in passing a resolution on the Lake Chad crisis, emphasised the
“interconnectedness” of the climate and security challenges in the region, emphasising “the adverse
effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the region”.

Large economies recover from terror attacks – no tangible economic impact

Bandyopadhyay et al ’15 ( Subhayu research officer, St. Louis Federal Reserve (Todd Sandler, &
Javed Younas, June, “The Toll of Terrorism,” Finance and Development Journal, lpc)

Economic researchers have found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that rich, large, and diversified economies
are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist attacks than small, poor, and more specialized
economies. If terrorism disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified economy, resources
can easily flow to another unaffected sector. In addition, richer economies have more and better
resources to devote to counterterrorism efforts, which presumably reduces the number of terrorist
activities with which they must cope. In contrast, small developing economies, which are specialized in
a few sectors, may not have such resilience. Resources such as labor or capital may either flow from an
affected sector to less productive activities within the country or move to another country entirely.
Moreover, developing economies are likely to lack specialized resources—such as surveillance
equipment or a technologically advanced police force or army—that can be employed in
counterterrorism. This allows the terrorist threat to persist, which can scare away potential investors.
A terrorist attack against such a nation is likely to impose larger and more lasting macroeconomic costs.
The dramatic attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, for example, caused an estimated
$80 billion in losses. Large as they were, however, the losses were a tiny fraction (less than 0.1 percent)
of the nearly $10.6 trillion 2001 U.S. GDP. Similarly, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) found
rather modest effects on average in 177 nations from transnational terrorist attacks during 1968–2000.
Per capita GDP growth was reduced by 0.048 percent on an annual basis.
No Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism –Too Many Obstacles
Mearsheimer 14 [January 2nd, John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, nationalinterest.org/article/america-
unhinged-9639?page=show]

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all.
Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a
spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another
attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single
instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American
soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in
the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that
a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of
that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon
because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a
nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States
already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to
acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there
are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and
then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist
group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear
attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat.
And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly
secure custody.
 Impact Turn: Canada Global Warming
Trumps travel ban will increase the Canadian tech sector
Vomiero 17 (Jessica Vomiero, FEB 3, 2017, "Trump travel ban could prove beneficial for the Canadian
tech sector”, http://mobilesyrup.com/2017/02/03/trump-travel-ban-good-for-canadian-tech/) JD

Despite the apparent turmoil being experienced by Americans affected by the Trump travel ban, Toronto immigration lawyers claim that
it may present a golden opportunity for Canada’s tech sector. The order, which bans travel from seven Muslim-
majority countries to the United States for a period of approximately 90 days, has reportedly affected travellers and
separated families around the world. Silicon Valley firms in particular are concerned that the order could
disrupt the flow of foreign talent into the U.S. American tech firms have often turned to foreign workers
to fill a gap in global digital skills, reports the CBC. The CBC goes on to state that Canada’s tech sector could
come out on top amidst all the confusion, with Canadian tech companies looking to recruit some of the
foreign tech talent currently barred from entering the United States. Immigration lawyers told the national
broadcaster that while Canadian tech firms don’t often have the means to compete with the glamour of the Valley, they provide the stability
that foreign recruits may consider to be more valuable at this time.

The Canadian tech sector is k2 clean energy

Meyer 17 (Carl Meyer, March 29th 2017, "Here's how Canadian clean tech companies can gain an
edge," National Observer, http://www.nationalobserver.com/2017/03/29/news/heres-how-canadian-
clean-tech-companies-can-gain-edge) JD

The message to Canadian clean tech firms is clear: any major growth strategy will likely have to involve going
abroad. That's the main conclusion emerging from new research released Wednesday by a think tank housed at Simon Fraser University. The
United States, India and China, the largest electricity markets in the world, were “collectively responsible for half of global clean energy
investment in 2016,” says the research by Clean Energy Canada, an initiative of the Centre for Dialogue at the B.C. university. But
in
Canada, where over 80 per cent of the power grid is already driven by emissions-free sources, clean
energy investment was down for the second year in a row, said the report, “The Transition Takes Hold: Tracking the
Energy Revolution 2017.” "Canada is home to numerous clean energy technology and service companies, which
are cutting their teeth at home but must ultimately look abroad if they are to continue growing," said the
report. Investment deals fell from over $4 billion (all figures CAD) to just over $2 billion relative to 2015, the report stated. Some provinces have
reached significant amounts of renewables A spokesman from the think tank said this was mainly because a lot of major markets in Canada,
such as Quebec, Ontario and B.C., have reached their capacity when it comes to renewable energy
supply needs. “We saw a real surge in clean energy investment in projects being built over the past four
to five years, predominantly in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia,” said Dan Woynillowicz, policy director at Clean Energy Canada, in
an interview. Those provinces have now built out significant amounts of renewables, he said. “We need to be looking
at what technologies, services, and expertise Canadian companies have that they can be selling into those other markets.” But the report said
"activity in the sector isn’t going to grind to a halt," as there is potential for Canadian growth in the renewables sector in Alberta and
Saskatchewan, which have both set objectives to boost their renewable energy by 2030, 30 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. Woynillowicz
also said Canada has a particular edge when it comes to energy storage technology. A June 2016 report by the group profiled 10 companies
developing and testing energy storage systems using flywheels, compressed air, thermal, hydrogen and battery systems.

China needs Canada to solve climate change

EM 17 (Energy Mix, 3-20-2017, "Canada to Partner with China on Climate Action," No Publication,
http://tsss.ca/channels/energy-cities-climate-change/canada-to-partner-with-china-on-climate-action-
mckenna-tells-dc-audience) JD

Canada is turning its attention to China as a lead partner for efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions and
tap into a burgeoning clean energy economy, Environment and Climate Change Minister Catherine McKenna said in Washington, DC last week.
“Climate change is a big challenge and it’s not going to be solved by Canada, that’s for sure,” McKenna told an audience at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We’re going to do our part,” she added, “but we need to be working with all
partners.” Speaking as the U.S. administration unveiled measures to gut climate and environment programs and review clean vehicle
standards, McKenna said China has been “very active in terms of climate negotiations, playing a positive role,” the National Observer reports.
She added that she heard a lot about solutions to air, water, and soil pollution when she took part in a
Canadian delegation to China last December. “China is taking climate action because they see an
opportunity to play a leadership role, but they are also taking climate action because people can’t
breathe,” she said.

There is scientific consensus that warming is real, anthropogenic, & deadly.

Stern ‘15 (Stern studied the Mathematical Tripos & was awarded a is Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics at Peterhouse, Cambridge,
& his DPhilEcon in economics at Nuffield College, Oxford with thesis on the rate of economic development & the theory of optimum planning in
1971 supervised by James Mirrlees, “Why Are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change”, MIT Press, Apr 17,
2015, pg 9-10)

The increase in concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere to date has corresponded to an average warming
across the Earth's surface (combined land and ocean temperature) of around 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century (see figure 1.1
from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), the usual period of reference and one that will be used in this book. Similar
results are reported by NASA in the US and the Met Office Hadley Centre in the UK. The 2011 Berkeley Earth Surface
Temperature study further confirmed the patterns of temperature increase.6 If the world continues to emit GHGs along a
"business as usual" path, concentrations of GHGs could rise to the region of 750 ppm CO2 by around the end of the
century. At these levels of GHG concentrations, some climate models suggest a median temperature increase over
the next one or two centuries of about 4°C or more, with substantial probabilities of well above 4°C.7 The physical and human
geography of the planet would likely be transformed with temperature increases of 4°C or more: deserts, coast-
lines, rivers, rainfall patterns—the reasons we live where we do—would be redrawn. One way of trying to grasp what might
happen with global increases in temperature is to look at past periods of changes in CO2 concentrations or temperature. In the period
following the industrial revolution beginning approximately 200 years ago, the intensifying use of fossil fuels has
rapidly increased CO2 concentrations in the atmo-sphere. Before this, CO2 concentrations were driven
according to naturally occurring processes on timescales of many thousands or even millions of years.
The planet has not seen CO2 levels as high as the current 400 ppm for at least 800,000 years' and likely not
for around 3 million years. Global mean temperatures regularly exceeding 4°C above preindustrial have likely
not been seen for at least 10 million years, perhaps much more." The last time CO2 levels exceeded 750 ppm,
with surface temperatures well beyond 4°C above preindustrial figures, was likely about 35 million years ago during the Eocene
epoch, when the planet was entirely ice-free. Today that would drive a sea level rise of 70 meters. Modern
Homo sapiens is probably no more than 250,000 years old and has not experienced anything like this. Our own
civilizations, living in villages and towns, appeared after the last ice age during the Holocene period. The early
Holocene, between around 12,000 and 7,000 years ago, saw rapid changes in ice sheets, sea levels, and temperature." Following this transition,
over the last seven or eight millennia, temperatures have been remarkably stable, fluctuating in a range of plus or minus 1.5°C around an
average.' These Holocene temperatures allowed our societies to develop: grasses were cultivated to become cereals,
thus requiring sedentary populations to tend and protect crops until harvest, and allowing both surplus and storage. This provided time
and opportunity to develop villages and towns and much of the skills of civilization, culture, and ways of
life as we know them. We are already on the upper edge of that range of Holocene temperature fluctuation, in large
measure as a result of changes brought about by humans. A temperature increase of 3-4°C would be well outside that range. It seems possible
that we
have not seen sustained temperatures around 3°C above preindustrial for around 3 million years.
We appear to be embarked on a massive experiment of which the consequences are hard to predict
and the effects may be irreversible.
Canada is k2 china clean energy
Rand 17 (Tom Rand, 1-16-2017, "Canadian companies can clean up in China," ArcTern Ventures,
http://www.arcternventures.com/news-2/2017/1/21/5l8cl5h7mnfxsjxkxzq2jr2p92vlxs) JD

The global economic outlook may look hazy for 2017, but
there are still lots of opportunity for Canadian exporters to
clean up in China, according to those who watch the Chinese market. For companies that focus strategically on the
right products and services, the market for Canadians to export clean technology, or cleantech, to China, still
has room to grow, says Tom Rand, managing partner of ArcTern Ventures, a Toronto firm that invests in cleantech startups. “We have
something like 1.3 per cent of the market share for cleantech in China. About five years ago we had 1.8 per cent,” explains Mr. Rand, who is
also senior adviser of the Cleantech Venture Group at Toronto’s MaRS Discovery District. “While that market share has gone down, the
absolute amount of our exports has gone up.” True, overall growth in China is expected to be anemic in the coming year – but that is by Chinese
standards. The Chinese government is still committed to an annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent between
now and 2020. “China growing more slowly than it has in earlier years is still a huge economy growing
rapidly. Even if we can get a small increase in our market share there it’s still significant,” says Danielle Goldfarb, director of the Conference
Board of Canada’s Global Commerce Centre. Greg Nuttall, president and chief executive officer at Toronto-based Woodland Biofuels Inc., which
has built a demonstration plant in Sarnia, Ont., and is talking to potential partners in China about expansion there. Biofuels
is an
example of a cleantech field where Canada can be competitive in China, as opposed to solar and wind,
which China produces locally. (Photo: Woodland Biofuels) Mr. Rand says a 1.8-per-cent share of China’s cleantech market
makes sense for the Canadian sector. “We can achieve that [market share] just for showing up. We should be aiming much
higher,” he says. Last February, Canada and China signed a joint declaration on clean technology co-operation.
They committed to look at setting up more demonstration projects and making it easier for small and
medium-sized companies to collaborate in both countries. This is helpful for the Canadian cleantech sector because it is
made up of about 800 companies, mostly small or medium-sized firms. Mr. Rand says the key for Canada’s sector, which employs about 55,000
people, is to focus on products and services that are strong points for Canadian companies, rather than those that the Chinese can produce at
home. The biggest opportunities are in energy storage – building the next generation of batteries – and in
non-traditional fuels such as biofuels, he says. “China is moving beyond the traditional solar and wind
cleantech, which they make anyway, toward much broader needs. We can innovate; they can mass-produce.
Typically China seeks its innovation from abroad rather than at home, and in Canada our cleantech
companies can innovate,” Mr. Rand adds.
 Impact Turn: Democracy Scenario
The spread of democracy is dangerous – causes conflict & doesn’t work
Hobsbawm 9 (Eric J., “Spreading Democracy”, Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/23/spreading-democracy/) ALH

We are at present engaged in what purports to be a planned reordering of the world by the powerful states. The
wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are but one part of a supposedly universal effort to create world order by "spreading
democracy." This idea is not merely quixotic — it is dangerous. The rhetoric surrounding this crusade
implies that the system is applicable in a standardized (Western) form, that it can succeed everywhere,
that it can remedy today’s transnational dilemmas, and that it can bring peace, rather than sow
disorder. It cannot. Democracy is rightly popular. In 1647, the English Levellers broadcast the powerful idea that "all government is in
the free consent of the people." They meant votes for all. Of course, universal suffrage does not guarantee any particular political result, and
elections cannot even ensure their own perpetuation — witness the Weimar Republic. Electoral democracy is also unlikely to
produce outcomes convenient to hegemonic or imperial powers. (If the Iraq war had depended on the freely expressed
consent of "the world community," it would not have happened.) But these uncertainties do not diminish the appeal of electoral democracy.
Several other factors besides democracy’s popularity
explain the dangerous and illusory belief that its
propagation by foreign armies might actually be feasible. Globalization suggests that human affairs are evolving toward a
universal pattern. If gas stations, iPods, and computer geeks are the same worldwide, why not political institutions? This view underrates the
world’s complexity. The relapse into bloodshed and anarchy that has occurred so visibly in much of the world has also made the idea of
spreading a new order more attractive. The Balkans seemed to show that areas of turmoil and humanitarian catastrophe required the
intervention, military if need be, of strong and stable states. In the absence of effective international governance, some humanitarians are still
ready to support a world order imposed by U.S. power. But
one should always be suspicious when military powers
claim to be doing favors for their victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states. Yet
another factor may be the most important: The United States has been ready with the necessary combination of megalomania and messianism,
derived from its revolutionary origins. Today’s United States is unchallengeable in its techno-military supremacy, convinced of the superiority of
its social system, and, since 1989, no longer reminded — as even the greatest conquering empires always had been — that its material power
has limits. Like President Woodrow Wilson (a spectacular international failure in his day), today’s
ideologues see a model society
already at work in the United States: a combination of law, liberal freedoms, competitive private
enterprise, and regular, contested elections with universal suffrage. All that remains is to remake the world in the
image of this "free society." This idea is dangerous whistling in the dark. Although great power action may have morally or politically desirable
consequences, identifying with it is perilous because the logic and methods of state action are not those of universal rights. All established
states put their own interests first. If
they have the power, and the end is considered sufficiently vital, states
justify the means of achieving it (though rarely in public) — particularly when they think God is on their side. Both
good and evil empires have produced the barbarization of our era, to which the "war against terror" has
now contributed. While threatening the integrity of universal values, the campaign to spread democracy will not
succeed. The 20th century demonstrated that states could not simply remake the world or abbreviate historical transformations. Nor can
they easily effect social change by transferring institutions across borders. Even within the ranks of territorial nation-states, the conditions
for effective democratic government are rare: an existing state enjoying legitimacy, consent, and the ability to mediate
conflicts between domestic groups. Without such consensus, there is no single sovereign people and therefore no legitimacy for arithmetical
majorities. When this consensus — be it religious, ethnic, or both — is absent, democracy has been suspended (as is the case with democratic
institutions in Northern Ireland), the state has split (as in Czechoslovakia), or society has descended into permanent civil war (as in Sri Lanka).
"Spreading democracy" aggravated ethnic conflict and produced the disintegration of states in
multinational and multicommunal regions after both 1918 and 1989, a bleak prospect. Beyond its scant chance
of success, the effort to spread standardized Western democracy also suffers from a fundamental paradox.
In no small part, it is conceived of as a solution to the dangerous transnational problems of our day. A growing part of human life now occurs
beyond the influence of voters — in transnational public and private entities that have no electorates, or at least no democratic ones. And
electoral democracy cannot function effectively outside political units such as nation-states. The
powerful states are therefore trying to spread a system that even they find inadequate to meet today’s
challenges. Europe proves the point. A body like the European Union (EU) could develop into a powerful and effective structure precisely
because it has no electorate other than a small number (albeit growing) of member governments. The EU would be nowhere without its
"democratic deficit," and there can be no future for its parliament, for there is no "European people," only a collection of "member peoples,"
less than half of whom bothered to vote in the 2004 EU parliamentary elections. "Europe" is now a functioning entity, but unlike the member
states it enjoys no popular legitimacy or electoral authority. Unsurprisingly, problems
arose as soon as the EU moved beyond
negotiations between governments and became the subject of democratic campaigning in the member
states. The effort to spread democracy is also dangerous in a more indirect way: It conveys to those who
do not enjoy this form of government the illusion that it actually governs those who do. But does it? We
now know something about how the actual decisions to go to war in Iraq were taken in at least two
states of unquestionable democratic bona fides: the United States and the United Kingdom. Other than
creating complex problems of deceit and concealment, electoral democracy and representative assemblies had little to
do with that process. Decisions were taken among small groups of people in private, not very different
from the way they would have been taken in non-democratic countries. Fortunately, media independence could not
be so easily circumvented in the United Kingdom. But it is not electoral democracy that necessarily ensures effective
freedom of the press, citizen rights, and an independent judiciary.
 A2: Democracy k2 Heg
Liberal institutions are key to US power – not democracy
Odom 7 (William, “American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It”, Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society) ALH
I begin by stating the obvious: America presides over an empire, but it has acquired this empire inadvertently. It is not a traditional type of
empire, but rather, a sui generis one; that is, it is a regime type heretofore unknown. Four characteristics define America’s
inadvertent
empire. First, it is ideological, not territorial. Its ideology is Classical Liberalism, not democracy. Our
founding fathers did not use the word democracy in the Constitution. They sought to limit the state and
guarantee individual rights. Once rights were secure, voting would follow, not the other way around.
The American empire, therefore, consists of constitutional states, not dictatorships and illiberal
democracies. Second, the American empire has been a money making, not a money losing regime. Throughout the Cold War, when the
defense budget on average consumed 7.2 percent of GDP, the United States sustained unprecedented growth. So too did
Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Both had their longest periods of peace and greatest prosperity, parallel to America’s prosperity during the
Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, however, Japan and Europe did not get rich at our expense. In fact, throughout this period we have
maintained between 20 and 30 percent of the world’s Gross Product. Third, countries have fought to join the American empire, not to leave it
(although since the U.S. invasion of Iraq this dynamic may be changing). Consequently, the American empire has no formal boundaries or
membership. Any country with a constitutional order, stable property rights, and effective dispute adjudication in autonomous courts may
consider itself a member (Switzerland and Austria, for example, are included). Some countries with constitutional orders that are not yet
mature Liberal regimes also belong because they are within our military alliances. Of the roughly forty countries that can claim membership,
only about two dozen have stable constitutional systems, that is, systems that have lasted a generation or more. The others, mostly new
members of NATO, are committed to constitutional development. However, they are still struggling to last for more than a generation without
a relapse, which constitutes the usual standard for assessing whether or not a lasting constitutional order has been achieved. Fourth, our
military alliances in Europe and Northeast Asia have supplied supranational political-military governance
for our allies, many of whom were once at enmity amongst themselves. These U.S. military umbrellas provide our
allies the mutual trust that, in turn, lowers business transaction costs, and permits these states to capture greater gains from trade. Today,
these trust-inducing and economic roles are still needed in both regions, even without an external military threat. Beyond
military
alliances, the United States created a governing network of economic and judicial institutions—the World
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, international courts, and others. These
organizations have also facilitated economic growth through rule-based decision making rather than by imperial dictates. These practices have
lowered the costs to the United States of managing both the international organizations in which it participates, as well as its military alliances.
Consequently, when American leaders belittle and condemn these organizations, they endanger the very foundations of this remarkable system
of mutually beneficial Liberal governance. The cost is not just damage to our ideals. It also involves billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses.
How and why is this true? The reasons are straightforward. As Nobel Laureate economist Douglass North has demonstrated,2 governance by
rule-based, third-party enforcement actually lowers transaction costs for business and makes long term economic growth possible. This is why
the United Nations, NATO, the WTO, and other such international institutions reduce the price America must pay to manage this unique
international system. To
sum up, whether domestic or international, Liberal institutions—not democracy—
are the key source of American power at home and abroad. Democracy does become an indispensable
component of constitutional regimes, but it is Liberal institutions on which such regimes ultimately rest.
Aff Case Cards
 AT: No Enforcement
Brown v Board is the exception – states comply with Supreme Court decisions –
proven with gay marriage
Graham 15 (David A., staff writer at The Atlantic, “Can States Ignore the Supreme Court On Gay
marriage?”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/nullification-
again/397373/) ALH

In the 1950s, after Brown v. Board of Education, some Southern states tried to pass laws to avoid
integrating schools. It didn’t work, because nullification is not constitutional. Yet futile hope springs eternal.
Since the ruling, a handful of officials have suggested that states need not issue licenses for same-sex
marriages. The two most notable voices are two Republican candidates for president, Mike Huckabee
and Ted Cruz. Here’s Cruz, speaking to NPR: They cannot ignore a direct judicial order. The parties to a case cannot ignore a direct judicial
order. But it does not mean that those who are not parties to case are bound by a judicial order .... The entire premise of the decision on
marriage was that in 1868, when the people of the United States ratified the 14th Amendment, that we were somehow silently and unawares
striking down every marriage law across the country. That's a preposterous notion. That is not law. That is not even dressed up as law. This is a
little slippery to interpret—Cruz’s words are opaque, so that it’s unclear whether he’s actually arguing that officials should refuse to issue
marriage licenses, or simply making an intellectual argument that they could. (Or perhaps it’s a dogwhistle!) Is he right? “It’s ridiculous,” said
David Vladeck, a professor of law at Georgetown. “The Supreme Court says the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to issue licenses .… That
is the law of the land. We have something in the Constitution called the Supremacy Clause,” which states that the Constitution is the ultimate
authority in the U.S. One argument here is that the ruling only applies to the Sixth Circuit, as that’s where the case the justices decided
originated. That might hold true if it was a statutory, rather than constitutional ruling, Vladeck said—but it wasn’t. “Ted Cruz ought to know
that. I knew Ted Cruz before he became the new Ted Cruz, and he was an able lawyer,” Vladeck said. “My guess is this is just political posturing
of the worst kind.” Now, a state—say, Texas, where Attorney General Ken Paxton has told clerks they can refuse to issue same-sex marriage
licenses—could try its luck: “You don’t have to obey a red light,” Vladeck cracked. But it’s pretty easy to guess what would happen: A plaintiff
would bring a civil-rights suit; courts would rule in their favor; and the state would probably have to pay for the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees, under
a federal law. Mike Huckabee takes a slightly different approach: “I'm not sure that every governor and every attorney general should just say,
well, it's the law of the land because there's no enabling legislation.” The former Arkansas governor has been trying this line for some time, but
it hasn’t gotten any more correct since I wrote about it in January. Huckabee is claiming that there needs to be an affirmative law authorizing
gay marriage, but that’s wrong. The justices ruled only that provisions banning same-sex marriage are illegal, not that all marriage laws have to
be rewritten. By analogy, the Supreme Court’s decision overturning bans on mixed-race unions in Loving v. Virginia didn’t eliminate all marriage
laws. Really, the
only way a state or jurisdiction could legally circumvent the Court’s ruling would be to
stop issuing marriage licenses altogether. “But that would be self-defeating, particularly among people
who view marriage as the foundation of American society,” Vladeck noted. There’s some precedent for that,
though it’s not pretty. After Brown, some whites pulled their children out of public schools and opened all-white “segregation academies”—
effectively reconstituting the public schools as private ones and avoiding integration orders.
Virginia tried to close public schools
that integrated. When that was ruled unconstitutional, Prince Edward County simply closed down its
entire public-school system. Elsewhere in the South, the resistance was less elaborate—governors like
Orval Faubus and George Wallace simply tried to block integration, sometimes by literally standing in
the doorway. They were overruled by the federal government. Nullification, Now Coming to the Supreme Court? Unlike
in the 1950s and 1960s, it seems unlikely that the government will send in troops to enforce the Court’s
ruling on marriage. That’s because they won’t have to, which is a positive sign for the rule of law in
the United States. But there may be a period of litigation as marriage-equality opponents exhaust every possible path (and possibly their
states’ coffers) fighting against the ruling.

Brown didn’t fail because of lower court noncompliance – federal courts followed the
Supreme Court
Todd 15 (James A., “Neither Sword Nor Purse: The Development of Supreme Court Influence Over
Lower Courts”, ProQuest) ALH
And even inthe area of schools, specifically, the picture of widespread lower court noncompliance in the
South is mistaken. Federal judges within the crucial Fifth Circuit, such as John Minor Wisdom, J. Skelly Wright, and Frank
Johnson, sought to apply Brown faithfully by interpreting the decision to require affirmative integration
before the Supreme Court did (Garrow 2000, 1226). The Fifth Circuit then consisted of Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas. The Fourth Circuit (the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia), as noted above in the Briggs v. Elliott (1955) case,
initially read Brown only to require “permissive transfers” from segregated to integrated schools. However, after the Court’s opinion in Green,
the Court of Appeals eventually approved busing as an appropriate response to the imperatives of Brown I and II, in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
School District. Combs (1982) suggests that the Court strategically used denials of certiorari from 1954 to 1973 rather than confront the
constitutional implications of de facto segregation in the North. Combs finds that Northern federal appellate courts then took the lead, given
the Court’s ambiguous mandate in Brown about de facto school segregation, in communicating the implications of Brown to district courts.
Vines (1964) examines the 291 federal district court cases from eleven Southern states for the period of
1954 to 1962 in which African-American plaintiffs had sued to challenge some instance of racial
inequality. Over half of the cases (52.7%) involved segregation in education, and the district courts ruled
against the school districts in 60.7% of the cases. In the remaining non-education cases, black plaintiffs won just over half of
the cases (51.3%). If Brown was ultimately not successful in providing for societal integration, as Rosenberg (2008) has argued, it would
seem that the cause of failure was not widespread resistance by the inferior federal judiciary. A more recent
study by Sanders (1995) evaluates 132 federal district court cases on Equal Protection for minorities from 1944 to 1964 and found that cases
decided after the Brown decision improved the likelihood of a liberal, pro-equality outcome by 39%, irrespective of the court’s geographical
location. Sanders concludes that “adherence
to Brown’s principles was not substantially lower (or higher) in the
South after 1954 than it was in other regions” (744). Giles and Walker (1975) characterize the state of federal court-
supervised school desegregation in 1970 as “an intensely political question gradually eroding into
technical applications of Supreme Court established national legal policy” (936). Romero and Romero (2003) find
that federal appellate courts were pro-minority rights even before Brown, and that Brown only amplified this tendency. Vines (1963) draws the
conclusion that “the function of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in race relations cases has been to revise district court decisions decided in
response to local values and against the national viewpoint” (314). And the much more recent study of Haire, Lindquist, and Songer (2003), in
their review of circuit court monitoring of district courts in civil rights cases from 1971 to 1999, reveals that “circuit courts tend[ed] to reverse
decisions below in order to further their own preferences as well as the preferences of the circuit’s principal at the Supreme Court” (162).
Indeed, it is after their review of civil rights cases that Haire, Lindquist, and Songer are able to apply a principal-agent construct to the Supreme
Court-Court of Appeals relationship. It appears that Court
doctrine against the segregation of public places found
reception in the federal courts of all parts of the country, just as had pro-national Commerce Clause doctrine in the late
19th Century. This doctrine was adopted and amplified in the Courts of Appeals, bringing district courts in
compliance, just as they had done in the case of contributory negligence doctrine in railroad injury cases.

The majority of states courts complied with Brown

Todd 15 (James A., “Neither Sword Nor Purse: The Development of Supreme Court Influence Over
Lower Courts”, ProQuest) ALH
As for state court reaction to Brown, the results are mixed, reinforcing the commonly assumed lack of parity (discussed in Chapter 3) between
state and federal courts when it comes to implementation of pro-national doctrines. Walter Murphy (1959) concedes that “when
pressed,
no state supreme court has yet failed to concede that the School Desegregation cases are the law of the
land and binding on lower courts” (1959, 1019-1020). Unlike federal courts, however, Murphy finds that state courts were more
reluctant to expand Brown to other areas of segregation. He also finds them to be more tolerant of state officials’ attempts to evade
desegregation. Romero and Romero (2003), however, compare state court and federal court implementation of Brown, and conclude that
“…Brown made a significant difference in federal district court decisions, shifting overall outcomes from
generally unsympathetic to strongly in support of minority claims, regardless of region. But [from 1954 to 1964] it had
no such impact at the state level” (810). Vines (1965) calculates a 35.8% success rate for African-American litigants in civil rights cases in
Southern state supreme courts from 1954 to 1963, compared to 51.3% in federal district courts. Expanding his scope beyond civil rights, Beatty
(1972) reviews general state court evasion of Supreme Court decisions from 1959 to 1969. Using as his measure of non-compliance (“evasion”)
whether the Supreme Court had to engage in a second review of a state court case or whether a state court judge dissented by stating that the
decision violated the Court’s original order (“quasi-evasion”), Beatty
finds that in 72.9% of cases state courts—even in
the South, even during the contentious aftermath of Brown, complied with the Court’s order on
remand. He further finds that in the 27.1 % of cases that were evasive—where the state court did not comply
with the initial Court order, necessitating a second Court order—the evasion could often be explained by
the fact that the Court had been “ambiguous or merely suggestive, thus giving the lower court greater
discretion” in its initial order (262-263). Beatty concludes that “on second appeal the supremacy of the
Supreme Court ultimately prevailed” (285). It appears that state courts responded best to Court directives
that gave them very little interpretive leeway, suggesting once more the need for clarity in Court opinions.

Ideology doesn’t affect court compliance – only clarity of Supreme Court decision
Todd 15 (James A., “Neither Sword Nor Purse: The Development of Supreme Court Influence Over
Lower Courts”, ProQuest) ALH

The research on lower court implementation of the rights-of-the-accused decisions of the Court paint a
picture of fairly routine compliance, particularly in federal courts. Canon (1973; 1975), in two early studies, seized on
the potential for non-compliance by state Supreme Courts with the Mapp, Escobedo, Miranda, and Gault decisions. In his 1975 study of state
court “contumacy” in the face of these decisions, Canon recognizes that policy
implementation consists of a “multi-level
chain of authoritative communication [that is] influenced by the interpretations and glosses passed
down the chain” (52). This is the essence of the communication theory of compliance discussed in Chapter 4. In looking at state court
responses for evidence of “explicit, negative evaluation[s]” of these four decisions from 1961 to 1972, Canon presents evidence of
approximately 100 hostile state treatments of these decisions (or 5% of the total of opinions), across 32 states concentrated in no particular
region, compared to twodozen favorable receptions of them largely concentrated in Western states. Romans (1974),
in a more
systematic study of coerced confession cases in state courts from 1958 to 1968, finds that even
conservative state supreme courts systematically complied with Miranda but that this was not the case
with Escobedo. He argues that the difference between the two was not ideological—both were liberal
decisions not likely to be favored by conservative proponents of strict policing. The difference was that Miranda
provided clear guidance to lower courts, while Escobedo did not. Escobedo exemplifies the clarity theory of lower court
compliance. Romans describes the decision as “poorly constructed” and noted that it “failed to explain
clearly the rationale, intent, or ultimate goal of the Court” (1974, 42). On top of the Romans study of state courts, Songer
and Sheehan (1990) find that Miranda had a strong impact on the behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals.

The Supreme Court can enforce rulings – remedies state legislature

Mataconis 15 (Doug, B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers, J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, “Huckabee and Carson:
States Can Refuse to Comply With Supreme Court Rulings on Marriage”, Outside the Beltway, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/huckabee-
and-carson-states-can-refuse-to-comply-with-supreme-court-rulings-on-marriage/) ALH

While it is true that, at times, courts at the Federal and state level have ruled in a way that leaves it open to the legislature to craft a remedy,
this does not mean that courts are without power to enforce their rulings. For one thing, when courts do
defer to the legislature in this manner it is usually to give that body an opportunity to fix a defect in the
law before the court steps in and rules on the matter itself. This has happened in the case of school
desegregation, rulings regarding tax and fiscal issues at the state level, and in other areas that involve complex issues of public policy. It
has also happened in some same-sex marriage cases at the state level, in Massachusetts and New Jersey, for example, where the Courts initially
gave the legislature the opportunity to craft a remedy such as civil unions before handing down an all-encompassing ruling. Even in then,
though,the court made it clear that it would step in again if the remedy the legislature crafted proved to
be insufficient to meet the constitutional objections it had found. This is, ultimately, what happened in
New Jersey. This isn’t the only way that a Court can enforce its rulings, though, and its hardly the most common. In most cases, if the
Court finds that a state or federal law unconstitutional, it issues an injunction barring the enforcement
of the statute and, in most cases, requiring state officials to act in a certain manner based on the Court’s
ruling. In those cases, the legislature is always free to go back and amend its laws to bring them into
compliance with the Court’s rulings, but that is not necessary to bring a court’s rulings into effect. Instead,
what happens is that the offending statute remains on the books but entirely unenforceable. For example, the Supreme Court struck down
bans on interracial marriage in 1967 but it wasn’t until a referendum in 2000 that the State of Alabama actually removed its laws banning those
marriages from the books. More recently, the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down state laws criminalizing sodomy, but
many states still have those laws on their books even though they cannot be enforced. If a state official refuses to comply with a
courts rulings in these types of cases, or seeks to enforce a statute that has been declared
unconstitutional, then the Court has the legal authority to issue further rulings seeking to enforce its
rulings. This was, of course, quite a common practice during the Civil Rights Era due to the fact that government officials in the south and in
other parts of the country were refusing to comply with Court rulings on school desegregation and other issues. In more than one case, of
course, this required the Executive Branch to assist the Court in enforcement of its orders, such as when
President Eisenhower sent
Federal troops to Little Rock and Federalized the Arkansas National Guard in order to enforce court
rulings on desegregation. Ultimately, the state officials seeking to defy the Supreme Court’s rulings on
this issue found that they had no option but to comply, although the presence of Federal troops on their
streets was no doubt highly persuasive in that regard. Whatever the case, though, state officials who
purported to ignore the Supreme Court’s ruling on same-sex marriage would quickly find themselves in
the same position as Orval Faubus, George Wallace, and others who thought they could get away with
ignoring Court orders.

Presidents cannot ignore court decisions, no matter how much they disagree with
them – empirically enforce them anyway
Denniston 11 [Lyle, Congressional and SCOTUSblog correspondent writing for the Huffington Post,
“Can the President Ignore Supreme Court Rulings?”; 10/28/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-
denniston/gingrich-supreme-court_b_1017418.html]/MR

Presidents in general have tended to see it as their duty to obey Supreme Court rulings, and, at times, even to
enforce them. For example, President Dwight Eisenhower called out the military in 1957 to enforce the Supreme Court’s order to racially
integrate the Little Rock, Ark., public schools. Eisenhower told the nation: “Whenever normal agencies prove inadequate to the task and it
becomes necessary for the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to use its powers and authority to uphold Federal Courts, the
President’s responsibility is inescapable.” The Gingrich comment might be understood in a way that he did not explicitly mention: as an
argument in favor of allowing each of the three branches of the government to decide for itself what the limits of the Constitution are as they
apply specifically to that branch’s powers. A year after the Little Rock crisis, the Supreme Court reinforced the duty to desegregate those
schools and others in the Deep South. In doing so, it issued what is probably its most fervent claim to have the last
word on the Constitution’s meaning. Citing Marbury v. Madison (1803) and its comment that it is the judiciary that is to
“say what the law is,” the Court in the Cooper case remarked that the Marbury decision “declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution...[That] is a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system.” Although Abraham Lincoln, before he became president, was already deeply troubled about the Supreme
Court’s Dred Scott decision enforcing slavery, he said in a Springfield, Ill., speech within weeks after that ruling in 1857: “We think [the
Court’s] decisions on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases
decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in
that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution.” Candidate Gingrich has made clear that his suggestion that the Supreme Court be
ignored was aimed, in its most vigorous form, at two decisions by the Justices: the 2004 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld striking down
President George W. Bush’s military commission plan for Guantanamo detainees, and its 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, allowing
Guantanamo detainees a constitutional right to challenge their detention in a federal habeas corpus court. President Bush, though unhappy
with both, offered no resistance to either. The
Gingrich comment might be understood in a way that he did not
explicitly mention: as an argument in favor of allowing each of the three branches of the government to
decide for itself what the limits of the Constitution are as they apply specifically to that branch’s powers.
That is called the theory of “departmentalism,” and it can be traced all the way back to Thomas Jefferson. It is plain, though, that the current
Supreme Court does not accept that theory, and that, of course, is at the heart of Mr. Gingrich’s complaint.
Supreme Court decisions HAVE to be enforced – net better for rights and
constitutionality
Spurgeon 14 [James, masters in communications and political researcher for IVN “The Executive
Branch Has An Obligation to Enforce All Laws”; 02/26/14, https://ivn.us/2014/02/26/executive-branch-
obligation-enforce-laws/]/MR
According to Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), the Supreme Court ruled that the president (as the Executive) must obey the law
and cannot dispense with the law’s execution even if he or she disagrees with it. Even during the Whiskey Rebellion (1791-1794), President
George Washington stated, “[I]t is my duty to see the Laws executed: to permit them to be trampled upon with impunity would be repugnant
though we may cheer about progress when an executive — whether it’s a governor, attorney general, or
to that duty.” So,
even a president — decides not to enforce a discriminatory law against same-sex marriage, we must also be
wary. We are giving our approval for one person to decide if a law is enforced or not. This can set a
dangerous precedent. If a law is detrimental to the citizens then it should be either ruled unconstitutional in the courts (if it violates
part of the Constitution) or repealed/amended through the legislative process. Our government was set up so that one person does not have
any executive that fails to enforce the laws that have been passed by the legislature has
full authority. And,
failed to uphold their responsibilities of the office. If a law has been passed that is harmful to the people
then we have legal ways of reversing it. We have the freedom of speech and assembly that is guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. We can elect new legislators and an executive so that they can repeal the law. We can send a lawsuit
allowing an executive to have the sole
through the court system so it can rule on the constitutionality of the law. Regardless,
authoritarian role of determining whether a law is enforced or defended is not a legal option and is
dangerous to overall society.
 AT: No Modeling
International influence of SCOTUS is up – analysis of citations prove
Aft 13 (Aaron B., Editor of Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, “Respect My Authority: Analyzing
Claims of Diminished U.S. Supreme Court Influence Abroad”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1449&context=ijgls) ALH

While not exhaustive, the data available from citation analysis challenges the view that the U.S. Supreme
Court wields diminished influence abroad. That view appears to be largely based on anecdotal evidence,
and the preceding sections are intended to provide some much-needed context in which to accurately assess these assertions. By focusing
on measurable indicators and accounting for more intangible avenues of influence and exchange, the
foregoing has shed some light on what influence the U.S. Supreme Court actually wields in the emerging
global judicial community. This Note has reviewed the frequency of citation to U.S. precedent in Canada
and Australia and placed that data in perspective vis-A-vis frequency of citation to both foreign and
municipal precedent. In addition, the discussion presented an overview of the various activities the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
engage in that place them in contact with counterparts and colleagues across the globe. Regarding the contention of waning Supreme Court
influence abroad, an analysis of actual citation practice undermines the validity of its contenders' anecdotal
evidence. As noted, in absolute numbers the citation to foreign precedent by the SCC and HCA represents only a fraction of the total
number of citations to judicial authority employed by these two courts. Thus, any measurable influence occurs within a relatively minor
the data does not necessitate the conclusion that U.S.
segment of the jurisprudence of these courts, and even then
influence is waning. Indeed, in the case of Australia, the number of citations to U.S. authority trends up.
Citation to U.S. authority by the SCC remained fairly consistent from 1945 to 2008, and citation to U.S. authority trended up between 1945 and
1994. The fact that SCC citation to U.S. Supreme Court authority most frequently referred to decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts
undermines claims that citation to the U.S. Supreme Court has diminished because of political differences over the last decade. Nor does the
SCC's slight decrease in U.S. Supreme Court citations and slight increase in U.S. state court citations necessarily speak to a diminishing influence
of the U.S. Supreme Court. This is especially true in light of changes in the type of cases appearing on the SCC's docket. One
could
reasonably conclude that changes in citation to the U.S. Supreme Court are a result of municipal law
maturing to the point at which continued reference to foreign authority, whether from the United
States or elsewhere, is less helpful than reliance on domestic precedent.207 Such an inference does not
necessarily speak to a diminishing influence, at least no more so than it speaks to a diminishing need for
direct reliance on foreign authority to decide cases involving established legal principles. Perhaps if citation to
foreign authority were shown to increase, but citation to the U.S. Supreme Court dropped off in favor of other non-municipal authority, the
claims of diminishing influence would appear more credible. That is not the case at present, at least with regard to the U.S. Supreme Court's
influence on Canadian jurisprudence. Rather, concluding that municipal jurists have simply opted for established domestic authority over
foreign decisions may even speak to a lasting influence, if the domestic principles were initially derived from foreign sources.
The data
pertaining to Australia cut more strikingly against the claims of diminishing influence. Citation to U.S. authority,
and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, represents a small segment of the HCA's overall citation. Indeed, citation to non-municipal authority
other than U.K. decisions has been consistently outpaced by citation to secondary sources. For example, in 1996 citation to secondary sources
accounted for 10.5% of all citations by the HCA, as compared to citation to nonU.K. foreign authority accounting for only 5.4%. Yet within this
small segment of HCA citation,
the data reflects a possible increase in U.S. influence. Unlike the citation practice
of the SCC, the HCA demonstrated an upward trend in the citation to U.S. authority. With the exception of the
decade 1951 to 1960, the percent of cases citing U.S. authority trends up, peaking at 41% in the decade 1991 to 1999. And citation to U.S.
authority increased to 310 citations per year for 2001 to 2002 from the average of 211 citations per year for 1991 to .2000. By
comparison, the percent of cases citing authority from Canada and New Zealand also trend upward over
the twentieth century. Far from supporting assertions of diminishing influence, the data points in the
opposite direction: that of increasing relevance, if not influence, of the U.S. Supreme Court at a time
when the HCA was increasingly open to the use of foreign authority. The fact that HCA citation to U.S. authority
spread to additional legal areas at the same time the frequency of citation increased further supports an inference of increased relevance and
influence.
Supreme Court decisions set border-crossing precedents in human rights cases and
spurs international activism– Windsor proves
Katz 15 [Gregory, writer for the Associated Press, “US Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Likely to Influence
other Countries and Pace of Change Quickens”; 06/27/15,
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/06/27/us-same-sex-marriage-ruling-likely-to-
impact-other-countries]

LONDON (AP) — The landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriages has no legal force outside the United States, but gay
rights activists in many parts of the world believe the court ruling will help their cause. In the Philippines,
in India, in Australia and elsewhere, gay rights advocates think the U.S. ruling may help change attitudes,
just as American activists — and judges, educators and legislators — had earlier been influenced by the easy acceptance of same-sex marriage
political movements
in some European countries, where the laws were changed smoothly without much fuss. In today's wired world,
cross national boundaries in the blink of an eye, and the trend toward legal acceptance of same-sex
marriage is gaining pace, though still rejected outright in some parts of the globe. The U.S. is neither
laggard nor leader in this movement, which reflects a fundamental change in public views in many parts
of the world, but the ruling of its highest court is expected to have a ripple effect elsewhere. In the
Philippines, activists seeking to win legal recognition for same-sex marriages believe the U.S. ruling will be useful, particularly since the
country's legal setup is largely based on the U.S. system, said Sylvia Estrada Claudio, a gender rights advocate and professor at the University of
the Philippines. "This ruling will have positive repercussions for our own movements here," she said. The Philippines' civil code limits marriage
to a union between a man and a woman — but the constitutionality of this proviso is being challenged by a lawyer, Jesus Nicardo Falcis III.
Countries are taking different routes to the same conclusion: the U.S. pathway relied on a Supreme
Court ruling to establish that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, while Ireland last
month used a popular vote that showed strong public backing, despite the country's deep Catholic roots.
Influence is a two-way street. Five years ago, Argentina became the first country in Latin America to legalize gay marriage. Activists there said
U.S. ruling will in turn shape attitudes and actions in
they believe their example helped influence the U.S., and that Friday's
other Latin American countries. "The U.S. decision will have a big impact in other countries," said Esteban
Paulon, president of the Argentine Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals, adding that his organization contributed
documentation to U.S. legal groups arguing the case before the Supreme Court. "SometimesU.S. influence is negative, but we
believe in this case it will be positive and accelerate the process of approving gay marriage in other parts
of the world." Twenty-one countries now allow same-sex marriage, according to the Pew Research Center, and Mexico permits it in some
states, with many other countries offering various legal rights that fall short of marriage to same-sex couples. In most of those countries, well-
organized advocacy groups are lobbying for full marriage rights. These movements, and startup campaigns incubating in other countries as well,
may get a real but hard-to-measure boost from the U.S. Supreme Court. In Australia, where parliament may vote on a same-sex marriage law
later this year despite opposition from Prime Minister Tony Abbott, legislators who back the measure said the U.S. ruling leaves Australia alone
among developed, English-speaking nations in its refusal to legalize marriages between same sex couples. Opinion polls show backing for the
measure has increased in Australia in the month since Ireland endorsed same-sex marriage. Opposition leader Bill Shorten — capitalizing on the
momentum building in other countries — introduced the bill in Parliament just days after Ireland voted. He said Saturday that Australians
should see the U.S. ruling as "a call to action." Legislator Janet Rice, Greens Party leader, called the U.S. ruling "the loudest call yet for marriage
equality in Australia ." Still, staunch opposition remains, with Australian Marriage Forum president David van Gend calling the U.S. Supreme
Court decision proof of "moral dementia." "We must not let that happen here," van Gend said. The issue is different in India, where activists
believe the U.S. ruling may make Indian judges and legislators feel uncomfortably isolated by the 2013 Indian Supreme Court decision to
reinstate a colonial-era law making homosexuality a crime. The law calls homosexuality an "unnatural offense" punishable by 10 years in jail. In
the past, police have used it to harass people and demand bribes from gays. Ashok Row Kavi, head of the Humsafar Trust advocacy group, said
the U.S. ruling may force India's highest court to take a fresh look at the issue. "In the light of globalization, the (Indian) Supreme Court
judgment is being cited as a totally reactionary judgment," he said. "A judgment that goes against the whole concept of human rights which had
been on a progressive upsurge in India." At gay pride parades in Dublin, Paris and other cities Saturday, the U.S. ruling was hailed by many as a
watershed. "Soon in all countries we will be able to marry," said Celine Schlewitz, a 25-year-old nurse taking part in the Paris parade. "Finally a
freedom for everyone." The
U.S. ruling boosted street celebrations Saturday in Dublin, where Ireland mounted
the biggest gay rights parade in the country's history. Led by rainbow banners and drag queens, more than 60,000 people
paraded through Dublin at the culmination of a weeklong gay rights festival in the Irish capital. While the mood was already high following
Ireland's referendum last month to legalize gay marriage — becoming the first nation to do so by popular vote — many marchers said the
Supreme Court decision provided a bonus reason to celebrate. "Everybody seems to be gay in Dublin today," said Sen. David Norris, Ireland's
most prominent gay rights activist. He quipped that Ireland was pleased to see the United States, though the Supreme Court judgment, "start
In other countries where gay sex is treated as a crime, beleaguered activists said they took
to catch up to us."
heart from the U.S. ruling even though same-sex marriage is not on the horizon. In most cases, activists
seek to decriminalize homosexuality before pressing for marriage rights and other benefits. In the
deeply conservative Arab world, where homosexuality is regarded as a crime in many countries, some
clerics warned that the U.S. ruling would lead to the collapse of civilizations. In Jordan, where
homosexuality is not illegal but is considered taboo, one member of the small gay community said the
U.S. ruling is "a victory for human rights in general and gives everyone hope." He is hopeful same-sex marriage will
one day be legal in Jordan. "In this region, we are going through the dark ages, and when we come out, we will move toward full rights," he
said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he feared the consequences of being identified as gay. Marriage equality is also not part of
the conversation in many parts of Africa, where more than two-thirds of the countries treat homosexuality as a crime. That is true of
Cameroon, which has pursued dozens of prosecutions in recent years under an anti-gay law imposing up to five years in prison for same-sex
acts. Lambert Lamba, a leading Cameroonian activist who has been imprisoned on accusations of violating anti-gay laws, said he was "exulting"
in the U.S. ruling. "It's a giant step for the fight in the United States," he said. "And it confirms for me that we can take giant steps in Cameroon
as well."
 AT: No Social Change
Brown proves – Court decisions are more than just rulings – they spur nationwide
social change
Johnson ND [Dr. Berman E., author of several constitutional analyses for AACC, “Supreme Court
Decisions that Changed America”;
http://www.aacc.nche.edu/Resources/aaccprograms/diversity/brownvboard/Pages/supremecourt.aspx
]/MR

Reactions to the Brown Decision The reactions to the Brown decision were mild at first, but they soon turned to
violent protests in towns and cities throughout the nation. The federal government had to send National Guard troops to
quell the violence in the South and to insure that African American students could peaceably enroll in public schools and colleges. Many
public officials devised various schemes to maintain segregated schools, including the proliferation of
private schools and even the suspension of compulsory school attendance. In some communities, busing
school children from one neighborhood to another was used to end segregation. The forced busing of
school children generated the greatest period of racial violence the nation had ever seen. The Brown
decision encouraged African Americans and liberal white Americans to attack segregation in nearly
every segment of American life and culture. Equal rights in education thus became indisputably linked
with social justice. By the 1960s a full-scale Civil Rights Movement developed nationwide, and despite the pleas
of non-violent leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King, the Movement was marked by violence and riots in
nearly every large city. African Americans and liberal white Americans demonstrated against segregated restaurants, hotels, and
interstate travel. They also boycotted businesses, employers, and goods and services which promoted segregation. Clashes with the local police
the Brown decision on education spilled over into
were common and the police reacted with unmitigated violence. In short,
social issues that had never been addressed before, and it resulted in a constitutional revolution that
lasted throughout the 1960s. Many blacks and some whites lost their lives in the confrontations, federal troops had to be called into
many northern cities where several city blocks were on fire, property damage ran over a billion dollars, and it became brutally apparent that
America would never again be the same. Aftermath of the Brown Decision With federal intervention, the violence subsided by the early
1970s as major concessions were gradually made to install equal rights, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A
number of federal statutes were passed for the first time to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, immigration status, and disability. The Brown decision encouraged protests and delivered gains among other Americans
who were traditionally denied equal rights such as women, senior citizens, the physically disabled, and other minority ethnic groups. The
decision also had profound international consequences as it resonated with people worldwide who
were oppressed, and inspired many nations to build a better, equitable, and more inclusive society. By the
mid-1970s, a more open society began to emerge in America where many vestiges of segregation were outlawed or abandoned. The nation
thus began to live out its creed, imbedded in the spirit of the Constitution, that all people are equal under the sight of God. Today, though far
from perfect, the United States is a world leader and strong proponent for civil rights and human rights.

Judicial decisions give movements direction by becoming a source of ideas for activist
struggles and defining previously poorly defined legal barriers against progress
Barnes 16 (Jeb, PhD., prof of PoliSci at USC, “Courts and Social Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-90)KC
Judicial mobilization studies start with fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of judicial decisions and, as a result, end up with
very different insights about their role in social policy. Instead of seeing judicial decisions as policy commands, judicial mobilization studies
envisage judicial decisions as inherently ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Under this view, measuring the gap between the
aspirations of judicial decisions and policy outcomes is a nonstarter, because the meaning of judicial decisions, while not wholly pliable, is
typically vague and contestable and must be constructed from the bottom up. Accordingly, judicial decisions are better
understood as a source of ideas and normative claims for activists, who can use the language of rights
and court decisions as a part of ongoing (and highly contingent) struggles to disrupt entrenched status
quos and pursue new policies. Consistent with Scheingold’s call to eschew the myth of rights and embark on the study of the
politics of rights, judicial mobilization scholars see the handing down of judicial decisions as “perhaps best viewed as the
beginning of a political process in which power relationships loom large and immediate” (1974, p. 85). This
conception of judicial decisions suggests that testing the courts’ influence on social policy does not hinge on whether they trigger significant
shifts in the short term or across groups that fall under the decision and those that do not, but how effectively activists use decisions and the
language of rights in the long term as the opportunity structure for policymaking opens and closes over time. By definition, this type of analysis
requires careful process tracing to assess the longitudinal effects of judicial decisions and different metrics of success. Perhaps most
importantly, the role of the courts and judicial decisions should be assessed at various steps in the movement-building process from raising
consciousness and mobilizing interests to setting agendas and eventually creating coalitions that can negotiate new rules and implement
change. Failure or only partial success at the implementation stage should not discount success at other stages. The point of this type of
analysis is not to estimate the average marginal effect of judicial decisions on policy or politics but trace how judicial
decisions act as
part of a shifting matrix of factors that contribute to the building of social movements and creation of
policy. Envisaging judicial decisions as socially constructed raises the possibility that courts do not shape
policy from the top down by prescribing the behavior of litigants; instead, the causal arrow may be
reversed (Edelman, 1992; Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999). The argument is that organizations are often confronted with
vague laws before courts have had a chance to interpret them. In civil rights, organizations reacted to sweeping anti-
discrimination statutes by creating formal rules and bureaucratic structures, such as “Equal Employment Opportunity Polies,” “Affirmative
Action Offices,” and formal grievance procedures. Some of these responses may have advanced the underlying goals of workplace equality, but
others may have engendered only symbolic compliance that ostensibly follows the letter of the law while preserving the status quo or, even
worse, offers legal window dressing for discriminatory practices. Over time, courts serve to ratify and legitimate these practices, which then are
copied by lagging organizations. The net result is a form of capture in which court-based social policy is not what judges say it is but what well-
organized interests, especially businesses, say it should be. Roughly parallel dynamics have been suggested in connection with environmental
regulation and some consumer safety laws (e.g., Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2003; Talesh, 2012). The basic differences between gap and
judicial mobilization studies can be illustrated by returning to Figure 1, which depicts the percentage of African American children attending
elementary and secondary school with white children in the South from 1954 to the early 1970s. Whereas gap studies would emphasize the
lack of immediate change in policy outcome following Brown I and Brown II, judicial mobilization studies would look at the long-term trend of
the curve, beginning by pointing out the figure should be traced back much earlier. This longer time frame would place any time lag following
the Court’s decisions in better perspective, emphasizing how the school desegregation cases sought to challenge a deeply entrenched system of
social oppression. From this vantage, the shift from 1954 to the early 1970s was quite dramatic, reversing policy and social practice dating back
centuries. More importantly, the question is not how much of the eventual shift in policy can be attributed to the courts alone, but rather how
litigation, judicial decisions, and the language of rights contributed to each step in the fight for desegregation in multiple forums and over many
years. How, for example, did activists use litigation, court rulings, and the language of rights to help frame their demands, raise consciousness,
mobilize interests, set agendas, and build reform coalitions that pressured Congress and the president to act? On these dimensions, it seems
that courts and judicial decisions are much more likely to be consequential (see Feeley, 1992; Francis, 2014; McCann, 1992). It is worth noting
that Rosenberg explicitly recognizes this possibility in The Hollow Hope, acknowledging that courts can have both direct and indirect effects on
social policy.

No tradeoff between litigation and pursuit of extralegal tactics and turn: even if
judicial activism fails, this serves to fuel social movements—wage gap movement
proves
Barnes 16 (Jeb, PhD., prof of PoliSci at USC, “Courts and Social Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias,
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-90)KC
Michael McCann’s Rights at Work (1994) provides a fuller account of judicial mobilization and is often seen as a foil to Rosenberg’s The Hollow
Hope. As such, it provides a useful lens to further explore the differences between gap and judicial mobilization studies. The substantive focus
of Rights at Work is the pay equity movement, which traces its roots to the 1970s when unions and individual workers
began bringing novel gender discrimination lawsuits. Unlike prior litigation that centered on employment practices that paid women less than
men for the same job, these suits
contended that job categories dominated by women are systemically paid less
than analogous jobs occupied by men and that this practice constituted discrimination, as women were denied equal pay for jobs
of comparable worth. In a few high-profile cases, including a 5-4 Supreme Court decision (County of Washington, Oregon v. Gunther), judges
seemed sympathetic to the comparable worth argument. These partial
judicial victories, however, were short-lived, the
wage gap persisted, and, by the time McCann wrote his book in the 1990s, many felt that the movement had run out of steam.
Analytically, The Hollow Hope and Rights at Work are mirror opposites. Whereas Rosenberg takes on high-profile cases that most would
assume were integral to successful social policy movements, McCann does the reverse. He explores the role of litigation and judicial decisions in
a movement where the court victories were partial and the movement was seen as falling short of its ultimate goal. However, McCann does
not treat these decisions as policy commands to be followed or not; instead, he shows how activists
used these decisions to
mobilize women. So, for example, media coverage of the early court victories was widespread, and political
activists used this publicity as part of organizing campaigns based on slogans like “Raises, Rights,
Respect” and “Help Defend Working Women’s Rights.” These campaigns helped alter the expectations
of some women workers and provided a language for articulating grievances and common interests,
which is essential to social movements. Equally important, activists were not caught in the myth of
rights or the political flypaper of litigation—they understood that the language of rights and lawsuits
were only one tool in the fight for equality that needed to be combined with other forms of pressure
and advocacy. Consistent with this sophisticated view of courts and litigation, some unions used the
threat of lawsuits and lingering uncertainty in the law on comparable worth to gain wage concessions
and advance legislative campaigns, thereby parlaying partial court victories into advances in other
forums. While the final policy results were not a complete success—McCann insists that the wage gap
has significantly closed at least as an indirect result of the comparable worth movement even if it has
not been eliminated (1994, pp. 43–44)—the contributions of litigation and the courts to raising
consciousness, building coalitions, and changing women’s perceptions of fairness in the workplace
were substantial and lasting. McCann sums up his findings in a “process-based Path Model” of legal mobilization, which contrasts
with Rosenberg’s Constrained Court Model. In McCann’s model, court decisions can be used to advance movements when there is a confluence
of political opportunities and organizational resources, which provide a favorable environment for advocacy. Within this advantageous
opportunity structure, advocates can
use the language of rights and even modest court victories to help build
consciousness about shared interests that helps lay the foundation for collective action (McCann, 1994, p.
136). McCann stresses “both the specific meaning and relative power of particular legal conventions are shaped by extralegal discourse and
situational factors. The relationship among [these] factors is dialectical and interactive rather than linear and mechanical” (p. 137). Under these
circumstances, estimating the independent effects of litigation and judicial decisions is intractable, but tracing how litigation and the courts
contribute to movement building and policy change more holistically is useful and illuminating.

Empathy shown by dissenting judges spurs “ordinary people” into action driven by the
same empathy – creates social change
McClain 09 [Linda, Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of
Law; expanding on remarks delivered as a participant of the panel, “Beyond Legislatures: Social
Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities of Demosprudence,” at the symposium, “The Most
Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st Century,”; 2009, http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-
archive/bulr/volume89n2/documents/mcclain.pdf]/MR

Empathy is a way of knowing that is a “catalyst for action.” The relevant action, in Henderson’s analysis, is
reaching a legal conclusion that will address the harm that another is suffering, whether ordering the
desegregation of schools or, as in Shapiro v. Thompson, affording poor people their constitutional right to travel
to another state to be with family or to improve their lot.56 The third element of Guinier’s definition of a demosprudential
dissent is “facilitative,” or, in effect, catalytic.57 Guinier explains: “[T]he dissenting opinion speaks to non-
judicial actors, whether legislators, local thought leaders, or ordinary people, and encourages them to
step in or step up to revisit the majority’s conclusions.”58 While Henderson introduces greater attention to
empathy to encourage better judging and opinions informed by appreciation for “our common
humanity,”59 Guinier urges dissenting Justices to view their dissents as an opportunity to expand the arena of democratic action and
accountability.60 Guinier, in her concluding pages, turns to majority opinions as a form of demosprudence.61 Although legal

academics criticized Brown for its lack of “well-developed legal reasoning,” they fail to see its “
demosprudential quality”; its very “accessibility and forcefulness were the inspiration for a social
movement that gave the opinion its legs.”
AT: Dicta CP
 Dicta Fails
Dictum fails – 4 warrants
Leval 6 (Pierre N., Senior United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta”, New York University Law Review, Volume 81 Issue 4,
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-4-Leval.pdf) dsk

However poorly courts are designed for lawmaking generally, their structural
limitations particularly disfavor lawmaking
through dictum. Why? A number of reasons: 1. Absence of Briefing and Adversity Our readiness to trust a court's rulings of
law depends on the assumption that the adverse parties will each vigorously assert the best defense of its positions. The court reaches its
decision only after confronting conflicting arguments powerfully advanced by both sides. When, however, the court asserts rules outside the
scope of its judgment, that salutary adversity is often absent. In many instances the court will have no briefing
whatsoever on the issue, because the par- ties usually have no interest in a question whose resolution will not affect the result of their case. 2.
Concreteness Conditions that best favor lawmaking by courts are those where the dispute is framed by concrete facts. Two of the most
difficult challenges in lawmaking are understanding the facts that call for regulation and understanding what effect the imposition of any rule
will have on those facts. When the assertion of a proposition of law determines a case's outcome, the court necessarily sees how that
proposition functions in at least one factual context, at least with respect to the immediate result. In contrast, when
a court asserts a
rule of law in dictum, the court will often not have before it any facts affected by that rule. In addition, the
lack of concrete facts increases the likelihood that readers will misunderstand the scope of the rule the
court had in mind. 3. The Lack of Appeal Another weakness of law made through dicta is that there is no available
correction mechanism. No appeal may be taken from the assertion of an erroneous legal rule in dictum. Frequently, what's more, no
party has a motive to try to get the bad proposition corrected. No party will even ask the court to
reconsider its unfortunate dicta. 4. Insufficient Judicial Scrutiny My experience as a judge has shown me that
assertions made in dictum are less likely to receive careful scrutiny, both in the writing chambers and in the concurring
chambers. When a panel of judges confers on a case, the judges generally focus on the outcome and on the reasoning upon which the outcome
depends. Judges work under great time pressure. When the concurring chambers receive the writing judge's draft for their review, they are
likely to look primarily at whether the opinion fulfills their expectations as to the judgment and the reasoning given in support. There is a high
likelihood that peripheral observations, alternative explanations, and dicta will receive scant attention. Of
cardinal importance to this point is Leval's rule of restaurant selection: If a restaurant's location assures that customers will come whether the
food is good or bad, it will be bad. This is a corollary of a broader rule: Stuff you get for free ain't worth more than you paid for it. The rule
applies loosely to dicta. When a court justifies a judgment in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court necessarily confronts the
cautionary realization that the rule relied upon determines the outcome of the litigation. The court metaphorically "pays the price" of the rule it
has declared. When
a rule is uttered in dictum, the court pays no price; the statement comes free, as it has
no consequence for the case. In my experience, when courts declare rules that have no consequence for the case, their
cautionary mechanism is often not engaged. They are far more likely in these circumstances to fashion defective
rules, and to assert misguided propositions, which have not been fully thought through. I cannot tell you how many times I
have read briefs asserting an improbable proposition of law and citing a case as authority. The proposition sounds so dubious that I
immediately look it up to see if the cited court can really have made this ruling. So often I find the proposition is indeed there, but was uttered
in dictum-where the court paid no price, and consequently paid little attention.

Dicta rulings are dangerous for legal precedent --- they undermine the rule of law and
ensure miscommunication with lower courts
Jones 14 (RonNell Anderson, professor of law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah, “The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta,” Georgia Law Review, Vol. 48, p. 719,
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=faculty_scholarship) ip
A. GENERAL DANGERS OF DICTA The type of dicta that is seen in the Court's press characterizations is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, it is
without question that this language about the nature of the media partakes of the quintessential components of dicta-"[a] judicial comment
made while delivering a judicial opinion... [but] unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential. 61 On the other hand,
whereas many traditional examples of dicta involve the Court speaking in the hypothetical by discussing facts not
before them and thus hinting at an expansion of the holding beyond the actual facts presented, 62 the press-characterizing dicta does the
opposite. The Court is not taking a narrow holding and using the dicta to illegitimately broaden it, but
instead is issuing a broad holding and using dicta to hint at special treatment for a narrow subset of the
parties included within that broad holding. That is, the Court in these cases is not hypothesizing that the press is the party before them-the
party is in fact a media entity-but instead is hypothesizing that the case could implicate special rights for the press, which the Court's holding
makes clear that it does not. The primary, central feature of dicta remains prominent: the Court is speaking
through factual and analytical propositions that serve no role in "justifying the judgment. '63 Like all dicta from the
Court, those press-characterizing dicta are largely defined in the negative64 -they are unnecessary, not controlling, and not
the holding.65 It is this negative definition that renders the presscharacterizing dicta, like all dicta, constitutionally
problematic. The case or controversy requirement of Article III, which sets forth the confines of the Court's constitutional job description,
66 is ignored when an opinion speaks to matters other than the actual controversy being resolved in that opinion. 67 Dicta are not given
the precedential weight of holdings precisely because of this substantial justiciability flaw. The
statements involve questions not directly presented, and therefore the Court is in a poor practical position to
address them well and a poor constitutional position to address them legitimately.68 Although dicta are statements about the law,
they are not law; "[t]he issues so addressed remain unadjudicated. 69 As numerous scholars have noted, this ultra vires
behavior presents risks to the accuracy, authority, and legitimacy of the law. 70 Dicta are often less
carefully considered and less thoroughly reasoned than holdings and are, by definition, less accurate
reflections of the state of the law.7 1 The use of dicta "undermines the rule of law, first by reducing
predictability and legal clarity, and second by inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine."72 Because the
Court is speaking to matters unconnected to the holding, the care that it takes may be diminished. Beyond this, the use of
dicta creates significant difficulties for lower courts that are seeking guidance from and applying the
doctrine set forth in the Court's opinions.73 A lower court may have difficulty distinguishing between
holding and dicta and, erring on the side of caution, choose to follow dicta, even though the language does not
have the force and effect of law.7 4 As these other courts "look to the Supreme Court in formulating their own judicial opinions,"
"[t]his exacerbates the confusion between holding and dicta," setting off a potential "ripple effect" of
one court using dicta as holding, and a subsequent court citing that holding as precedent.7 5 Different
choices on this question by various lower courts can lead to disturbing inconsistencies in the law from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. 76 Indeed, when the Supreme Court fails to define and distinguish between dicta and
holding with precision, it may enable lower courts to avoid stare decisis by defining portions of the
opinion as dicta or holding, depending on whether the proposition supports the court's preferred
conclusion. 77 All told, the practice of the Court making unnecessary, nonprecedential judicial comments
carries with it substantial practical concerns and is of questionable constitutional validity, no matter
what topic the Court is discussing in the dicta.

Dictum is bad --- result in careless and sloppy rulings

Leval 6 (Pierre, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “JUDGING UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION: DICTA ABOUT DICTA,” New York University Law Review, 81(4), p. 1260,
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-4-Leval.pdf) ip
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS I turn now to practical considerations, which reinforce the wisdom of this
constitutional structure. How
well do courts do their job when dictum is treated as holding? In their structure and
manner of operation, courts are poorly equipped to promulgate law, and even more poorly equipped to do so in dictum.
When they make law in dictum, the likelihood is high that it will be bad law.26 A. Structure of Courts As
Lawmakers Brandeis observed that "[c]ourts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede" legislation. 27 Think what a
lawmaking body should do before promulgating laws. By their structure and manner of operation, courts lack the ability to perform
those tasks. If we were designing an ideal body to promulgate laws for society, it would not look at all like a federal court. The ideal
lawmaking body would be designed to undertake a broad, integrated study of the area requiring attention. It would issue public notices so that
affected persons could make submissions and participate in hearings. It would seek advice from experts. It would employ a staff to make a
detailed, independent study. It would deliberate and wait as long as it considered useful before promulgating a new rule. A court functions very
differently. It focuses on whatever fragmentary portion of an area of law the case of the moment happens to place before it. Usually, the only
input the court receives is from the litigants. 28 The court is barred from researching the facts privately on its own.29 It rarely employs neutral
experts. 30 It works with a tiny staff, whose attention is spread over the multitude of cases and areas on which the court will need to rule. And
the court is under pressure to make its adjudication promptly after the submission of the case. The poor design of courts for the task of
lawmaking suggests that lawmaking by courts is best limited to where the lawmaking inescapably results from the court's performance of its
duty to decide the case. This is never true when law is made by dictum, which is
always-by definition-superfluous to the
court's performance of its job. B. Structure with Regard to Dictum However poorly courts are designed for lawmaking generally,
their structural limitations particularly disfavor lawmaking through dictum. Why? A number of reasons: 1. Absence of Briefing
and Adversity Our readiness to trust a court's rulings of law depends on the assumption that the adverse parties will each vigorously assert the
best defense of its positions.
The court reaches its decision only after confronting conflicting arguments
powerfully advanced by both sides. When, however, the court asserts rules outside the scope of its judgment, that salutary
adversity is often absent. In many instances the court will have no briefing whatsoever on the issue, because the parties usually have no
interest in a question whose resolution will not affect the result of their case. 2. Concreteness Conditions that best favor
lawmaking by courts are those where the dispute is framed by concrete facts. Two of the most difficult challenges
in lawmaking are understanding the facts that call for regulation and understanding what effect the imposition of any rule will have on those
facts. When the assertion of a proposition of law determines a case's outcome, the court necessarily sees how that proposition functions in at
least one factual context, at least with respect to the immediate result. In contrast, when
a court asserts a rule of law in
dictum, the court will often not have before it any facts affected by that rule. In addition, the lack of
concrete facts increases the likelihood that readers will misunderstand the scope of the rule the court
had in mind. 3. The Lack of Appeal Another weakness of law made through dicta is that there is no available
correction mechanism. No appeal may be taken from the assertion of an erroneous legal rule in dictum.
Frequently, what's more, no party has a motive to try to get the bad proposition corrected. No party will even
ask the court to reconsider its unfortunate dicta. 4. Insufficient Judicial Scrutiny My experience as a judge has shown me that
assertions made in dictum are less likely to receive careful scrutiny, both in the writing chambers and in
the concurring chambers. When a panel of judges confers on a case, the judges generally focus on the outcome and on the reasoning
upon which the outcome depends. Judges work under great time pressure. When the concurring chambers receive the writing judge's draft for
their review, they are likely to look primarily at whether the opinion fulfills their expectations as to the judgment and the reasoning given in
support. There
is a high likelihood that peripheral observations, alternative explanations, and dicta will
receive scant attention. Of cardinal importance to this point is Leval's rule of restaurant selection: If a restaurant's location assures that
customers will come whether the food is good or bad, it will be bad. This is a corollary of a broader rule: Stuff you get for free ain't worth more
than you paid for it. The rule applies loosely to dicta. When a court justifies a judgment in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court
necessarily confronts the cautionary realization that the rule relied upon determines the outcome of the litigation. The
court
metaphorically "pays the price" of the rule it has declared. When a rule is uttered in dictum, the court
pays no price; the statement comes free, as it has no consequence for the case. In my experience, when
courts declare rules that have no consequence for the case, their cautionary mechanism is often not
engaged. They are far more likely in these circumstances to fashion defective rules, and to assert misguided
propositions, which have not been fully thought through. I cannot tell you how many times I have read briefs asserting an
improbable proposition of law and citing a case as authority. The proposition sounds so dubious that I immediately look it up to see if the cited
court can really have made this ruling. So often I
find the proposition is indeed there, but was uttered in dictum-
where the court paid no price, and consequently paid little attention.

Dicta results in messy, flawed decisions

Leval 6 (Pierre N., Senior United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta”, New York University Law Review, Volume 81 Issue 4,
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-4-Leval.pdf) dsk

You might well ask, "So what? Are you wasting our time, Judge Leval, carping about technicalities? What does it matter whether a proposition
becomes established as law when it is first uttered in a court's dictum, or later when it is uttered as a holding justifying the court's ruling?" The
distinction is not a mere technicality. It is by no means inevitable that rules initially expressed in gratuitous, nonbinding dictum would be
ultimately adopted when it came time for the court to decide the issue. An important aspect of my point is that courts are more likely
to exercise flawed, ill-considered judgment, more likely to overlook salutary cautions and
contraindications, more likely to pronounce flawed rules, when uttering dicta than when deciding their
cases. The practices I discuss impair the quality and reliability of our performance. Giving dictum the force of law increases
the likelihood that the law we produce will be bad law. 18 My criticism is directed no less against myself than others.
Insufficient attention to the distinction between holding and dictum and to the importance of the distinction has become endemic. This comes
perhaps in part from a gradual change in the self-image of courts. Once, the perception of the judicial function was relatively modestto settle
disputes under an existing body of rules; judges were not seen as making law through their opinions, but rather as finding the common law,
which existed already, waiting only to be discovered. 19Gradually, first with the advent of stare decisis, and with the central role courts have
increasingly played in resolving important social questions, we have come to see ourselves as something considerably grander-as lawgivers,
teachers, fonts of wisdom, even keepers of the national conscience. This change of image has helped transform dicta from trivia into a force.
The second aspect of the problem-the acceptance of prior dictum as if it were binding law-results in
some part from time pressures on an overworked judiciary, the everincreasing length of judicial
opinions, and the precision-guided weaponry of computer research-all of which contribute to our taking
previously uttered statements out of context, without a careful reading to ascertain the role they played
in the opinion.a
 Not Binding
Dicta are not binding and don’t solve.
Turley 11 (Jonathan. Professor of Law @ George Washington University "Holdings, Dicta, And Stare Decisis." JONATHAN TURLEY. N.p., 14
Nov. 2011. Web. 04 July 2017. <https://jonathanturley.org/2011/10/23/holdings-dicta-and-stare-decisis/>.) DTL

Holdings, or ratio decidendi (Latin for “the rationale for the decision), are those parts of a court’s opinion that are
binding on lower courts and later courts. This binding is referred to as the doctrine of stare decisiswhich
provides hierarchical (vertical) and temporal (horizontal) continuity throughout the judicial system. Obiter Dicta (Latin for a statement “said in
passing”), or dicta, are those parts of a court’s opinion that are not binding on lower courts and later courts.

Dicta may suggest an interpretation of the law that may prove useful in future cases. Distinguishing holdings and
dicta is sometimes difficult and in some court opinions, intentionally so. Sub-categories of dicta, such as judicial dicta, and their different levels of authority, make
the determination even more perilous. Dissenting opinions are always considered dicta. Vertical stare decisis refers to the power of
higher courts to bind the decisions of lower courts. All courts are bound by vertical precedent to follow the holdings in the decisions of the Supreme Court. Vertical
stare decisis is generally considered absolute. Horizontal stare decisis refers to the power of a court to bind itself. The
Supreme Court while not
bound by its prior decisions, does give them “substantial weight” in deliberations. There is a strong
presumption that prior judicial articulations of the law are correct and generally should be followed.
Horizontal stare decisis preserves a stable doctrine and prevents cycling. While “we hold that …” or “the rule is …” are frequently giveaways to holdings, it is no
guarantee in the holdings/dictum debate. In United States v. Rubin (1979), J. Friendly, in a concurring opinion, wrote: A
judge’s power to bind is
limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and
uttering the word “hold”. Consider the example found in Minor v. Happersett (1875), a Supreme Court case dealing with the constitution of the State
of Missouri that ordains: “Every male citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote.” The following passage is from J. Waite’s opinion: The Constitution does
not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers
of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth,
citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children
born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As
to this class there have been doubts, but never as
to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. Portland Examiner contributor
Dianna Cotter claims the reference to the natural-born citizen clause in this passage is part of the holding. The Wikipedia entry correctly identifies this reference as
obiter dictum
AT: State Courts CP
 Federal Best
Federal court decisions are superior to state circuit courts – salience and
reinterpretation
Hinkle 15 (Rachael, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University at
Buffalo, “Into the Words: Using Statutory Text to Explore the Impact of Federal Courts on State Policy
Diffusion”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12160/abstract) mlm

Although the empirical results presented here do not fully support all proffered hypotheses, this study provides evidence that federal
courts can influence the diffusion of state policies when those policies have federal constitutional
implications. More importantly, it sheds light on the nuances of that influence. Looking at the decision to adopt separately
from how laws are drafted reveals variation in the way federal courts influence these two aspects of
state policymaking. Both the type and source of court rulings have different effects on these two decisions. First, cases ruling a
previous statute constitutional and unconstitutional do not necessarily have a symmetrical impact. Second,
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court appear to have differing influence on the two decisions. In both models, there is more compelling
evidence that constitutionalrulings have an impact than that un constitutional rulings influence policy
adoption and formation. For the adoption decision, court rulings that Policy is unconstitutional have a
statistically significant effect only when issued by the Supreme Court, whereas only unconstitutional rulings from a
different circuit show evidence of influencing the extent of borrowed text in a newly adopted policy. Moreover, even this latter significant
effect is smaller than its constitutional counterpart. That is, a different circuit ruling that a law is constitutional increases the predicted amount
of bor rowed text by 2.71%, whereas an unconstitutional ruling from the same source decreases the predicted borrowed text by only 1.37%. A
constitutional ruling has nearly twice the impact of an unconstitutional ruling. Over all, these findings suggest that court
rulings
affirming a law's constitutionality carry greater informational value for subsequent state lawmakers
looking to take advantage of their peers' experience. Not surprisingly, there is broader evidence that the Supreme
Court influences the decision to adopt a policy more than circuit courts. Supreme Court rulings are the
most salient and informative court opinions. They have the broadest and most authoritative relevance as a matter of legal
doctrine, and it is also possible that state legislators are more likely to be aware of Supreme Court opinions. Consequently, it makes sense that
both constitutional and unconstitutional rulings from the Supreme Court have a substantial impact on the probability of adoption, resulting in a
relative change of around 27% in both cases. The comparative effect sizes of constitutional rulings in the borrowed text model, however, are
counterintuitive. As expected, constitutional rulings from a different circuit have the smallest effect on the amount of borrowed text. Yet the
impact of a constitutional ruling from the same circuit is significantly larger than that from a Supreme Court ruling. These results suggest that
there may not be a discrepancy between the knowledge of relevant circuit law and Supreme Court
opinions. Perhaps the greater likelihood a new law will face scrutiny from the relevant circuit court (
compared to the low probability of Supreme Court review) may explain policy makers' greater proclivity for incorporating text from policies that
have already been declared constitutional by their own circuit
 SCOTUS over rules
The Supreme Court can overturn decisions with stealth overrulings – guts solvency
Hasen 11 (Richard L., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 8-1-2011, "Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law," University of California, Irvine School of Law Research Paper,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1750398) KEN

As Barry Friedman has pointed out in a recent Georgetown Law Journal article,6 the Supreme Court does not always move the law in such a
prominent fashion. Despite the Citizens United ruling, and maybe now more because of the public reaction to it, express overrulings of
precedent are rare. The Roberts Court also has engaged in “stealth overruling.” Stealth overruling occurs when the
Court does not explicitly overrule an existing precedent. Instead, it “fail[s] to extend a precedent to the
conclusion mandated by its rationale”7 or it “reduc[es] a precedent to nothing.”8 Using the example of the
Roberts Court’s treatment of Miranda v. Arizona, 9 Friedman demonstrates how the Court has been able to greatly reduce the
precedential force of the Miranda case without incurring public scrutiny and criticism. Friedman is critical of
stealth overruling on a number of grounds, most importantly because “stealth overruling obscures the path of
constitutional law from public view, allowing the Court to alter constitutional meaning without public
supervision.”10
 AT: PQD
PQD violations are inevitable – the Supreme Court is inherently political
Miller 16 (Mark C, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Relations; Director of the Law and
Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, “The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflicting Institutional Wills.” Presented
at the Separation of Powers Conference, Sponsored by the School of Public and International Affairs, 2/19 and 2/20, .
http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/mlynch/Miller.pdf) KEN

As a political scientist, I clearly see

the Supreme Court as political in nature, because its decisions have
enormous consequences for public policy in this country. This is especially true when the U.S. Supreme Court
interprets the U.S. Constitution. By its very nature, constitutional interpretation in our society means making
crucial political and public policy choices. As the Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the early 1800’s, almost every legal
issue in the U.S. eventually becomes a political issue, and almost every political one eventually becomes a legal one
(Tocqueville, 1966, 99- 102).
AT: Amendment CP
 Amendments Fail – General
The amendment process fails
Manfredi & Lusztig 98 (Christopher, a professor of political science and current Provost and Vice-
Principal Academic at McGill University; Michael, professor in the Department of Political Science at
Southern Methodist, “Why Do Formal Amendments Fail? An Institutional Design Analysis”,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054046) mlm
In this paper we have offered a systematic explanation for the failure of comprehensive constitutional modification by examining the
institutional environment in which such change takes place. To reiterate our model: we
suggest that an institutional
environment characterized by amending process rigidity, interpretive fluidity, and institutional
inclusiveness contributes to a high level of indeterminacy about the redistributive impact of proposed
comprehensive modifications. We further argue that constitutional actors respond to this phenomenon by ex
pressing regulative and interpretive rule demands in order to reduce the level of indeterminacy. The
result is constitutional failure through amending process overload. The Canadian case offers an excellent illustration of
the model: contrary to what one might expect, comprehensive constitutional modification has become more difficult precisely because the
success in 1982 defined a specific amending formula and laid the foundation for institutional inclusiveness and interpretive fluidity. The
cross-national utility of the model is suggested by its applicability to the failure of the ERA in the United
States. There are other notable cases of failed constitutional amendments that are consistent with our
model. Australia's rigid amending formula (which requires passage by the federal Parliament and ratification by referendum of a majority of
voters in a majority of states, as well as a majority of voters nationwide) has long conspired to make amendments in that country difficult to
achieve.43 Of forty-two proposed constitutional amendments, only eight have been passed; among the most important failures was a proposed
bill of rights that was defeated in 1988. In
addition to the rigidity of the amending formula, commentators have
noted that the vehemence with which interest groups mobilize to protect their constitutional interests is
an important aspect of Australia's constitutional failures.44 A more recent example is the failure of the
abortive U.S. balanced budget amendment. Most noteworthy about this case, perhaps, is the defection
of key initial supporters in the conservative movement over fears that interpretive ambiguities might
have unintended consequences. Rather than mandating greater fiscal responsibility, these defectors suggested, the amendment
could lead to judicially imposed tax increases.45 This last example suggests that the model's utility will be enhanced even further as the
judicialization of politics continues to grow as a global phenomenon.46 There is a final way in which the model may be relevant to the analysis
of world politics.

Constitutional law fails – implementation and interpretation

Divellec et al. 16 (Armel, University professor - Paris 2 university, “PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION IN GERMAN AND FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW” http://www.u-paris2.fr/en/search/thesis-defenses/parliamentary-opposition-german-and-french-constitutional-law)
mlm

Parliamentary opposition is certainly an evidence of parliamentarism, but it is not easily defined because of its extreme institutional and
behavioural variability, to such an extent that constitutional law fails to be realized. This opposition is partially unwritten as its
foundation and practice have preceded its the official recognition by strict law. But, by definition, formal law cannot cover all the
oppositional phenomenon’s configuration possibilities, as proven by the importance of conventions
beyond written law. Despite everything, its institutionalization was finally required. The vocation of constitutional law is indeed to fix
fulcrums for political game, but the question of the juridicity of such a phenomenon must be dealt with. The aim of this work consists of
underlining the delicate connection between constitutional law and the parliamentary opposition in Germany and France. If law struggles
(imperfectly) to capture it, then in return the opposition mobilizes the juridical instruments that are placed at its disposition. However, this
since constitutional law does not limit itself to writing and because some
relationship is ambiguous,
determinant variables have influenced the implementation of juridical texts. Thus the “performance” of
the oppositional phenomenon is not assured, even if it was recognized by the law. The examination of
the legal significance of the opposing minority tends to reveal the intrinsic tensions of constitutional law
and its political character. Far from being purely static, normativy seems to conceal a certain dynamic.

The constitution is nearly impossible to amend – the Supreme Court is the only actor
who can make the goals of amendments possible by interpreting current ones
differently
Posner 14 [Eric, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, “The US Constitution is Impossible
to Amend”; 5/5/14
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constit
ution_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html]/MR
In most countries, we could seriously consider the changes to the Constitution that Stevens proposes—or, for that matter, a different set of
Any proposal to amend the Constitution is idle because it’s
amendments from the Tea Party. But in our country, we can’t.
effectively impossible. The problem starts with Article 5 of the Constitution. It provides that an amendment can be
proposed either by a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate or by a convention, called into being by Congress, after a request
from two-thirds of the states. That’s version A and version B of step one. If an amendment makes it through either one, then comes step two:
ratification by three-quarters of the states. In
other words, an amendment requires a supermajority twice—the pig must
pass through two pythons. By contrast, ordinary legislation requires the approval of a simple majority in each
house. The founders made the amendment process difficult because they wanted to lock in the political
deals that made ratification of the Constitution possible. Moreover, they recognized that, for a government to function
well, the ground rules should be stable. But they also understood that the people will need to change those ground
rules as new challenges and problems surface with the passage of time. They didn’t mean for the dead hand of the
past to block necessary progress. But the founders blundered. They made passing an amendment too hard. In the 220-plus years since
ratification of the Constitution, more
than 11,000 amendments have been proposed, but only 27 have been
enacted. The first 10 amendments were added immediately to appease critics of the Constitution during the ratification debates. The three
critical post-–Civil War amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th), which expanded individual rights, are also a special case because the Southern
states were coerced into ratifying them. From 1870 to today, only 12 amendments have been enacted. And since 1971, only a single
amendment has been ratified—a trivial change that prohibits Congress from giving itself a raise that takes effect before the following election—
and that ratification took place 203 years after the proposed amendment was submitted to the states in 1789. Still, how do we know that
amendment is too hard rather than just hard enough? One reason is that the cumbersome national amendment process in the United States
makes us an outlier. Most liberal democracies—including the nice, stable ones in Western Europe—amend their constitutions with great
frequency. Germany amends its Basic Law almost once per year, and France a bit more than once every two years. Indeed, most states in the
U.S. amend their constitutions every couple of years. Many have completely replaced their original founding documents. The procedures for
amendment in states and most liberal democracies are much easier than they are for the U.S Constitution. For example, in Germany, an
amendment requires a two-thirds majority in each House, and that’s it. In all these cases, no one complains about the lack of constitutional
stability. In setting the bar for amendment so high, the Framers didn’t foresee that as the country became more populous and diverse, it would
become harder for people to reach the near-consensus required for change. The Senate began with 20 members; now it has 100. The House
increased from 59 to 435. And the U.S. population has increased from 4 million to more than 300 million. The clubby atmosphere at the
founding, in which horse-trading was easy, has given way to a wildly heterogeneous political environment where mutual suspicion prevails. The
difficulty of forging coalitions that can overcome the strict voting thresholds for amendment in Article 5 has increased exponentially. In the mid-
19th century, many people regarded the Constitution as an “agreement with hell” because it permitted slavery, and in the early 20th century,
there was a widespread view that the Constitution was drafted to advance the economic interests of the political elites. These attitudes
sparked significant constitutional amendment. Today, the Constitution is no longer treated as a fallible legal instrument that must be updated
to keep with the times. It is a totem. The easiest way to see the problem is to observe that no serious political movements that seek
constitutional amendment have existed in years. Amendment proposals today are symbolic; no one takes them seriously. The last
constitutional amendment that kindled serious public debate was the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s. Asked recently what amendment
she would make to the Constitution, that’s the one Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg chose. But it was Justice Antonin Scalia who gave the broader
and better answer—amend the process of amendment, to make it easier. According to the Legal Times, “[Scalia] once calculated what
percentage of the population could prevent an amendment to the Constitution and found it was less than 2 percent. ‘It ought to be hard, but
not that hard,’ Scalia said.” Because
Article 5 is a dead letter, people must find different ways to change the
Constitution. Mainly, they entreat the Supreme Court to do so. But because the Supreme Court cannot
itself amend the Constitution, these entreaties take the form of begging the court to “interpret” the
Constitution in a new way. That’s why people hire lawyers to formulate their proposals as already
reflected in the Constitution rather than argue that the Constitution got the position wrong and so
should be changed.
 Amendments Fail – Circumvention
Amendments will be circumvented – republican legislatures
Aaron 14 (Henry, The Bruce and Virginia MacLaury Chair Senior Fellow - Economic Studies,
“Constitutional Solutions to Our Escalating National Debt: Examining Balanced Budget Amendments”
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/constitutional-solutions-to-our-escalating-national-debt-
examining-balanced-budget-amendments/) mlm

But balanced budget amendments

suffer from a different and equally serious problem: they can be gamed
and circumvented in ways that would render them ineffective in achieving their stated objective and
would simultaneously degrade governmental efficiency, which is not something that any of us would wish. The problem is
that one can achieve a given impact on the private economy in any number of different ways that are recorded quite differently in budget
accounts. Suppose a Congressional majority wishes to expand support for people with low earnings. It can provide a direct wage subsidy
financed by new taxes. It can provide an earned income tax credit equal to a portion of earnings (as it has actually done). This credit can be
counted as a reduction in revenues, as an expenditure, or as part one and part the other, with the decision entirely contingent
on a Congressional rule, which is what Congress has done. It could mandate that state governments provide such subsidies, with or
without incentives that relieve states of some or all of the cost of the mandate. It could mandate that employers supplement earnings,
according to a stated formula backed by tax incentives to defray some or all of the added costs. One can achieve pretty much the same results
by any of these devices. Yet the impact on the budget is quite different. Method 1) raises both spending and taxes. It could run afoul of the limit
in H.J.Res 1 on the share of ‘economic output’ that the government could spend, but methods 2), 3), and 4) would not do so. Method 2) could
run afoul of the balanced budget requirement in H.J. Res. 1 or 2, as could method 1) if the new taxes were not as large as the wage subsidy, but
methods 3) and 4) would go unnoticed by a balanced budget rule. The four methods I have listed above are far short of the menu that a clever
advocate of wage subsidies could design to circumvent a balanced budget requirement. That menu would include loan guarantees and all
manner of regulations, some of which would work through indirection.
The key point is that if members of Congress want
to do something, they or their staffs are smart enough to find a way to do it. A balanced budget amendment
forecloses some ways of achieving given objectives but it does not foreclose others. Confronted with a super majority requirement that sixty
percent of the full membership of both Houses vote to raise taxes to pay for increased spending, the clever legislator can propose a tax credit
that lowers taxes and, under H.J.Res 1 and 2, requires only a simple majority of those present and voting to achieve the same end. A tax credit
may work adequately as a means of boosting net wages, but it is not so effective a way to pay for stealth bombers. Those who are reluctant to
use federal power to muscle state legislatures into implementing Congressional will may change their minds when a balanced budget
amendment makes direct federal action too difficult. In plain English, members
of Congress intent on achieving a pet goal
will work hard to circumvent a balanced budget amendment. Those who have marveled at the capacity of
private citizens to manipulate tax laws and of Congress to find room for pet initiatives within pay-go
budget rules should not expect less imagination when they turn their minds to circumventing a balanced
budget amendment.

4th Amendment proves – legal institutions circumvent well-established amendments

constantly and “legally”
Van Buren 14 [Peter, State Department whistleblower on waste and mismanagement during the Iraqi
reconstruction in his first book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds
of the Iraqi People, writing for MotherJones, “4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Won’t Protect You
Anymore”; 06/26/14 http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/how-fourth-amendment-not-
protect/]/MR
The Constitutional Borderline Begin at America’s borders. Most people believe they are “in” the United States as soon as they step off an
international flight and are thus fully covered by the Bill of Rights. The truth has, in the twenty-first century, become infinitely more
complicated as long-standing practices are manipulated to serve the expanding desires of the national security state. The mining of words and
concepts for new, darker
meanings is a hallmark of how things work in Post-Constitutional America. Over the
years, recognizing
that certain situations could render Fourth Amendment requirements impractical or
against the public interest, the Supreme Court crafted various exceptions to them. One was the “border search.” The idea was that
the United States should be able to protect itself by stopping and examining people entering the country. As a result, routine border
searches without warrants are constitutionally “reasonable” simply by virtue of where they take place.
It’s a concept with a long history, enumerated by the First Congress in 1789. Here’s the twist in the present era: the definition of
“border” has been changed. Upon arriving in the United States from abroad, you are not legally present in the country until allowed
to enter by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials. You know, the guys who look into your luggage and stamp your passport. Until
that moment, you exist in a legal void where the protections of the Bill of Rights and the laws of the United States do not apply. This concept
also predates Post-Constitutional America and the DHS. Remember the sorting process at Ellis Island in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries? No lawyers allowed there. Those modest exceptions were all part of constitutional America. Today, once reasonable searches at the
The “border” is now a strip of land circling the country and
border have morphed into a vast “Constitution-free zone.”
extending 100 miles inland that includes two-thirds of the US population. In this vast region, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) can set up checkpoints and conduct warrantless searches. At airports, American
citizens are now similarly subjected to search and seizure as filmmaker Laura Poitras—whose work focuses on national security issues in
general and Edward Snowden in the particular—knows firsthand. Since 2006, almost every time Poitras has returned to the US, her plane has
been met by government agents and her laptop and phone examined. There are multiple similar high-profile cases (including those of a
Wikileaks researcher and a Chelsea Manning supporter), but ordinary citizens are hardly exempt. Despite standing in an American airport, a
pane of glass away from loved ones, you are not in the US and have no Fourth Amendment rights. How many such airport searches are
conducted in the aggregate is unknown. The best information we have comes from a FOIA request by the ACLU. It revealed that, in the 18-
month period beginning in October 2008, more than 6,600 people, about half of them US citizens, were subjected to electronic device searches
at the border. Still, reminding us that it’s possible to have a sense of humor on the road to hell, the CBP offers this undoubtedly inadvertent pun
at its website: “It is not the intent of CBP to subject travelers to unwarranted scrutiny.” (emphasis added) Making It All Constitutional In-House
the Department
Here’s another example of how definitions have been readjusted to serve the national security state’s overriding needs:
of Justice (DOJ) created a Post-Constitutional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that allows it to
access millions of records of Americans using only subpoenas, not search warrants. Some background: a warrant
is court permission to search and seize something. As the Fourth Amendment makes clear, it must be specific: enter Thomas Anderson’s home
and look for hacked software. Warrants can only be issued on “probable cause.” The Supreme Court defined probable cause as requiring a high
standard of proof, or to quote its words, “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” A
subpoena on the other hand is nothing more than a government order issued to a citizen or organization to do something, most typically to
produce a document. Standards for issuing a subpoena are flexible, as most executive agencies can issue them on their own without interaction
with a court. In such cases, there is no independent oversight. The Department of Justice now claims that, under the Fourth Amendment, it can
simply subpoena an Internet company like Facebook and demand that they look for and turn over all the records they have on our Mr.
Anderson. Their explanation: the DOJ isn’t doing the searching, just demanding that another organization do it. As far as its lawyers are
concerned, in such a situation, no warrant is needed. In addition, the Department of Justice believes it has the authority to subpoena multiple
records, maybe even all the records Facebook has. Records on you? Some group of people including you? Everyone? We don’t know, as sources
of data like Facebook and Google are prohibited from disclosing much about the information they hand over to the NSA or other government
outfits about you. It’s easy enough to miss the gravity of this in-house interpretation when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. If the FBI today
came to your home and demanded access to your emails, it would require a warrant obtained from a court after a show of probable cause to
get them. If, however, the Department of Justice can simply issue a subpoena to Google to the same end, they can potentially vacuum up every
Gmail message you’ve ever sent without a warrant and it won’t constitute a “search.” The DOJ has continued this practice even though in 2010
a federal appeals court ruled that bulk warrantless access to email violates the Fourth Amendment. An FBI field manual released under the
Freedom of Information Act similarly makes it clear that the Bureau’s agents don’t need warrants to access email in bulk when it’s pulled
directly from Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, or other service providers. How far can the use of a subpoena go in bypassing the Fourth Amendment?
Recently, the inspector general of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued a subpoena—no court involved—demanding that the Project
On Government Oversight (POGO) turn over all information it has collected relating to abuses and mismanagement at VA medical facilities.
POGO is a private, non-profit group, dedicated to assisting whistleblowers. The VA subpoena demands access to records sent via an encrypted
website to POGO under a promise of anonymity, many from current or former VA employees. Rather than seek to break the encryption
surreptitiously and illegally to expose the whistleblowers, the government has taken a simpler, if unconstitutional route, by simply demanding
the names and reports. POGO has refused to comply, setting up a legal confrontation. In the meantime, consider it just another sign of the
direction the government is heading when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. Technology and the Fourth Amendment Some observers
suggest that there is little new here. For example, the compiling of information on innocent Americans by J. Edgar Hoover’s low-tech FBI back in
the 1960s has been well documented. Paper reports on activities, recordings of conversations, and photos of meetings and trysts, all secretly
obtained, exposed the lives of civil rights leaders, popular musicians, and antiwar protesters. From 1956 to at least 1971, the government also
wiretapped the calls and conversations of Americans under the Bureau’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO). But those who look to
such history of government illegality for a strange kind of nothing-new-under-the-sun reassurance have not grasped the impact of fast-
developing technology. In scale, scope, and sheer efficiency, the systems now being employed inside the US by the NSA and other intelligence
agencies are something quite new and historically significant. Size matters. To avoid such encroaching digitization would essentially mean
withdrawing from society, not exactly an option for most Americans. More of life is now online—from banking to travel to social media. Where
the NSA was once limited to traditional notions of communication—the written and spoken word—new possibilities for following you and
intruding on your life in myriad ways are being created. The agency can, for instance, now collect images, photos, and video, and subject them
to facial recognition technology that can increasingly put a name to a face. Such technology, employed today at casinos as well as in the secret
world of the national security state, can pick out a face in a crowd and identify it, taking into account age, changes in facial hair, new glasses,
hats, and the like. An offshoot of facial recognition is the broader category of biometrics, the use of physical and biological traits unique to a
person for identification. These can be anything from ordinary fingerprinting to cutting-edge DNA records and iris scans. (Biometrics is already
big business and even has its own trade association in Washington.) One of the world’s largest known collections of biometric data is held by
the Department of State. As of December 2009, its Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) contained more than 75 million photographs of
Americans and foreigners and is growing at a rate of approximately 35,000 records per day. CCD also collects and stores indefinitely the
fingerprints of all foreigners issued visas. With ever more data available, the NSA and other agencies are creating ever more robust ways to
store it. Such storage is cheap and bounteous, with few limits other than the availability of electricity and water to cool the electronics.
Emerging tech will surely bypass many of the existing constraints to make holding more data longer even easier and cheaper. The old days of
file cabinets, or later, clunky disk drives, are over in an era of mega-data storage warehouses. The way data is aggregated is also changing fast.
Where data was once kept in cabinets in separate offices, later in bureaucratically isolated, agency-by-agency digital islands, post-9/11 sharing
mandates coupled with new technology have led to fusion databases. In these, information from such disparate sources as license plate
readers, wiretaps, and records of library book choices can be aggregated and easily shared. Basically everything about a person, gathered
worldwide by various agencies and means, can now be put into a single “file.” Once you have the whole haystack, there’s still the problem of
how to locate the needle. For this, emerging technologies grow ever more capable of analyzing Big Data. Some simple ones are even available
to the public, like IBM’s Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness software (NORA). It can, for example, scan multiple databases, geolocation
information, and social media friend lists and recognize relationships that may not be obvious at first glance. The software is fast and requires
no human intervention. It runs 24/7/365/Forever. Tools like NORA and its more sophisticated classified cousins are NSA’s solution to one of the
last hurdles to knowing nearly everything: the need for human analysts to “connect the dots.” Skilled analysts take time to train, are prone to
human error, and—given the quickly expanding supply of data—will always be in demand. Automated analysis also offers the NSA other
advantages. Software doesn’t have a conscience and it can’t blow the whistle. What does all this mean in terms of the Fourth Amendment? It’s
Prior to
simple: the technological and human factors that constrained the gathering and processing of data in the past are fast disappearing.
these “advances,” even the most ill-intentioned government urges to intrude on and do away with the
privacy of citizens were held in check by the possible. […] In Post-Constitutional America, the old words
that once defined our democracy are twisted in new ways, not discarded. Previously unreasonable
searches become reasonable ones under new government interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.
Traditional tools of law, like subpoenas and warrants, continue to exist even as they morph into monstrous new forms. Americans are told (and
often believe) that they retain rights they no longer have. Wait for the rhetoric that goes with the celebrations of our freedoms this July 4th.
You won’t hear a lot about the NSA then, but you should. In pre-constitutional America the colonists knew that they were under the king’s
thumb. In totalitarian states of the last century like the Soviet Union, people dealt with their lack of rights and privacy with grim humor and
in America, ever exceptional, citizens passively watch their rights disappear in the service
subtle protest. However,
of dark ends, largely without protest and often while still celebrating a land that no longer exists.
 Amendments Fail – Timeframe
Constitutional amendments fail – symbolic and lengthy process
Posner 14 (Eric, professor at UChicago Law School, “The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible to Amend”,
Slate,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constit
ution_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html) ALH
In his new book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution, John Paul Stevens argues for amending the Constitution
to promote democracy and rights. Stevens, who served on the Supreme Court from 1975 to 2010, knows a lot about the nation’s founding
document and thinks that it needs a major retooling. He’s right that there are many problems with it. But he’s wrong to think that amending
the Constitution is the solution. He’s wrong because it is nearly impossible to enact new amendments. That is the
problem that needs a solution. Stevens wants to abolish the death penalty, allow for more gun control and campaign finance
regulation, and give judges the power to block gerrymandering. He would also allow the federal government to order around state officials and
enable people to sue state governments for damages. The six amendments he proposes would overturn Supreme Court decisions, many of
which Stevens dissented from when he served on the court. In
most countries, we could seriously consider the changes
to the Constitution that Stevens proposes—or, for that matter, a different set of amendments from the Tea Party. But in our country, we
can’t. Any proposal to amend the Constitution is idle because it’s effectively impossible. The problem
starts with Article 5 of the Constitution. It provides that an amendment can be proposed either by a two-thirds majority in both
the House and the Senate or by a convention, called into being by Congress, after a request from two-thirds of the states. That’s version A and
version B of step one. If an amendment makes it through either one, then comes step two: ratification by three-quarters of the states. In other
words, an amendment requires a supermajority twice—the pig must pass through two pythons. By contrast, ordinary
legislation requires the approval of a simple majority in each house. The founders made the amendment process
difficult because they wanted to lock in the political deals that made ratification of the Constitution possible. Moreover, they recognized that,
for a government to function well, the ground rules should be stable. But they also understood that the people will need to change those
ground rules as new challenges and problems surface with the passage of time. They
didn’t mean for the dead hand of the
past to block necessary progress. But the founders blundered. They made passing an amendment too hard. In
the 220-plus years since ratification of the Constitution, more than 11,000 amendments have been
proposed, but only 27 have been enacted. The first 10 amendments were added immediately to appease critics of the
Constitution during the ratification debates. The three critical post-–Civil War amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th), which expanded individual
rights, are also a special case because the Southern states were coerced into ratifying them. From 1870 to today, only 12 amendments have
been enacted. And since 1971, only a single amendment has been ratified—a trivial change that prohibits Congress from giving itself a raise
that takes effect before the following election—and that ratification took place 203 years after the proposed amendment was submitted to the
states in 1789. Still, how do we know that amendment is too hard rather than just hard enough? One reason is that the
cumbersome
national amendment process in the United States makes us an outlier. Most liberal democracies—
including the nice, stable ones in Western Europe—amend their constitutions with great frequency.
Germany amends its Basic Law almost once per year, and France a bit more than once every two years.
Indeed, most states in the U.S. amend their constitutions every couple of years. Many have completely replaced
their original founding documents. The procedures for amendment in states and most liberal democracies are much easier than they are for the
U.S Constitution. For example, in Germany, an amendment requires a two-thirds majority in each House, and that’s it. In all these cases, no one
complains about the lack of constitutional stability. In setting the bar for amendment so high, the Framers didn’t foresee that as the country
became more populous and diverse, it would become harder for people to reach the near-consensus required for change. The Senate began
with 20 members; now it has 100. The House increased from 59 to 435. And the U.S. population has increased from 4 million to more than 300
million.
The clubby atmosphere at the founding, in which horse-trading was easy, has given way to a
wildly heterogeneous political environment where mutual suspicion prevails. The difficulty of forging coalitions
that can overcome the strict voting thresholds for amendment in Article 5 has increased exponentially. In the mid-19th century, many people
regarded the Constitution as an “agreement with hell” because it permitted slavery, and in the early 20th century, there was a widespread view
that the Constitution was drafted to advance the economic interests of the political elites. These attitudes
sparked significant
constitutional amendment. Today, the Constitution is no longer treated as a fallible legal instrument
that must be updated to keep with the times. It is a totem. The easiest way to see the problem is to observe that no
serious political movements that seek constitutional amendment have existed in years. Amendment proposals today are
symbolic; no one takes them seriously. The last constitutional amendment that kindled serious public debate was the Equal
Rights Amendment in the 1970s. Asked recently what amendment she would make to the Constitution, that’s the one Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg chose. But it was Justice Antonin Scalia who gave the broader and better answer—amend the
process of amendment,
to make it easier. According to the Legal Times, “[Scalia] once calculated what percentage of the
population could prevent an amendment to the Constitution and found it was less than 2 percent. ‘It
ought to be hard, but not that hard,’ Scalia said.” Because Article 5 is a dead letter, people must find different ways to
change the Constitution. Mainly, they entreat the Supreme Court to do so. But because the Supreme Court cannot itself
amend the Constitution, these entreaties take the form of begging the court to “interpret” the
Constitution in a new way. That’s why people hire lawyers to formulate their proposals as already
reflected in the Constitution rather than argue that the Constitution got the position wrong and so
should be changed.

There’s a delay deficit – amendments take two years to ratify.

Ma 11 (Dan, Research Associate at Case Western Reserve University, 2-2-2011, "A Statistical Look at the Amendments to the United States
Constitution," Introductory Statistics, https://introductorystats.wordpress.com/2011/02/02/a-statistical-look-at-the-ammendments-to-the-
united-states-constitution/) KEN

The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the United States. The framers of the Constitution were aware that changes to the
Constitution would be necessary from time to time. A two-part process was set up for proposing and ratifying amendments to the Constitution.
There are currently 27 amendments to the Constitution. The first 10 amendments are known collectively as the Bill of Right. The most recent
amendment, the 27th, was ratified in 1992. On average, how long did it take to ratify an amendment (the average time
from proposal to enactment)? How speedy or lengthy was the process? In this post, we first informally discuss the time from
proposal to enactment for these amendments. Then we look at the 27 amendments in more details through descriptive statistics, which entails
describing the data graphically and using numerical summaries. We also discuss the notion of resistant statistic. In particular, median is
resistant to extreme data values while mean is not. The following tables show the dates for the amendments and the time span (in months)
from proposal to enactment. An Informal Look The time it took an amendment to become law varied. The 26th amendment (establishing 18 as
the national voting age) only took 3 months and 8 days. No doubt, this one was propelled by popular demand. The longest one was the 27th
amendment (restricting the power of Congress to set its own salary) took over 202 years! Obviously the 27th amendment is an outlier. The next
longest one was the 22nd amendment (presidential term limit) and it took 3 years and 11 months. In fact, nine of the amendments took a year
or less to become law. Except for 16th, 22nd and 27th, all of the amendments took less than 3 years to become the law of the land. As long as
an amendment made it out of the starting gate, the process to enactment was quite speedy. Descriptive Statistics Since the 27th amendment is
an extreme data value, we exclude it from the analysis. It seems that the road to enactment for the 27th amendment had a long and tortuous
journey, which we do not want to focus on here. Including the 27th will make any graph excessively wide, thus providing no insight. So we
will focus on the overall pattern of the first 26 amendments. We use this strategy for data analysis: 1. start with a
graphical display of the data, 2. look for the overall pattern and note any deviations from that pattern, and 3, use numerical summaries to
describe certain aspects of the data (see [1]). All the numerical summaries are calculated using the calculator TI83 plus. To display one-variable
data such as the time to enactment for the amendments to the Constitution, we can use histogram, stemplot, or boxplot. In this post, we use
histogram and stemplot to display the data. Once we have a graph, we describe the distribution of the time to enactment (the overall pattern)
by noting its shape, center and spread and noting any outliers (individual values that fall outside of the overall pattern). Then we discuss the
numerical summaries of center and spread in more details. The following is a frequency distribution of the time to enactment data. Figure 1 is a
histogram and Figure 2 is a stemplot. What is the overall pattern of the distribution of the time to enactment of the 26 amendments? Shape:
The distribution is roughly symmetric (it is a little skewed but the skewness is not pronounced). Center: The midpoint of the distribution is 22
(taking the average of the 13th and 14th leaves in the stemplot). Spread: The spread is from 3 to 47 months. There are no obvious outliers or
other striking deviations from the overall pattern. What are some numerical summaries that we can use to describe the distribution of the time
to enactment for the amendments? There are two types of measures to consider, the measures of center and the measures of spread. A
measure of center is a numerical summary that attempts to describe what a typical data value might look like. A measure of spread is a
numerical summary that describes the degree to which the data are spread out. Two common measures of center are mean and median. The
mean time to enactment for an amendment is =20.35 months. The median time to enactment is 22
months. With either notion of center, the average time to enactment is just a little under two years
 Con-con Turn
A constitutional convention isn’t happening now but is close – six more states are
needed
Davis-Cohen 16 (Simon, sudied Scientific Literacy at Western Washington University's Fairhaven
College “Corporate America Is Just 6 States Short of a Constitutional Convention”,
http://inthesetimes.com/article/18940/alec-balanced-budget-corporate-constitutional-convention) mlm

In February, Republican presidential hopeful Sen. Ted

Cruz (Texas) signed on to a call for a constitutional convention to
help defeat “the Washington cartel [that] has put special interest spending ahead of the American
people.” Cruz, along with fellow Republican presidential aspirants Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.) and Gov. John Kasich (Ohio), has
endorsed an old conservative goal of a Constitutional amendment to mandate a balanced federal
budget. The idea sounds fanciful, but free-market ideologues associated with the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), a secretive group of right-wing legislators and their corporate allies, are close
to pulling off a coup that could devastate the economy, which is just emerging from a recession. Their scheme could leave
Americans reeling for generations. A balanced budget amendment would prevent the federal government from following the Keynesian
strategy of stimulating the economy during an economic depression by increasing the national debt. (Since 1970, the United States has had a
balanced budget in only four years: 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.) Article V of the Constitution lays out two routes for changing the law of the
land: An amendment can be proposed by Congress or by a constitutional convention that is convened by
two-thirds of the states (34). Either way, three-fourths of the states (38) have to ratify it. Previously, changes
to the country’s founding document have been achieved by the first process. But as of today, 28 states—six shy of the two-
thirds threshold required by Article V—have passed resolutions calling for a constitutional convention to
consider a balanced budget amendment.

The passage of a constitutional amendment would trigger a constitutional convention

Cunningham 17 (McKay, Professor of Constitutional Law and Property Law at Arizona Summit Law
School, “Constitutional convention idea is a bad one, rife with uncertainty”,
http://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/readers-opinion/article130502289.html) mlm

In this moment in our nation’s history, we are deeply divided. There is little agreement between our two major political parties. Eroding
confidence in our governing institutions includes flagging respect for Congress, the presidency and the courts. The U.S. Constitution
alone remains sacrosanct in public opinion. It is a unifying document to which all lay claim. It is
America’s civic religion because it epitomizes what is fair and just. Given the current climate of division,
we need the one remaining emblem of our national unity more than ever. Nevertheless, Idaho’s lawmakers are
now considering legislation that would call for a constitutional convention, which would allow for wholesale revision of the document at the
center of our representational democracy. Some lawmakers are especially motivated by the prospect of addressing multiple issues in a
convention. The special-interest groups pressing Idaho legislators for a state-called constitutional convention claim that 28 states have already
signed on. If six more join, they say, the Constitution will be opened for possible revision. Idaho has been targeted as a vulnerable state that
could be convinced to join the push to revise the Constitution. But Idaho’s lawmakers are flirting with enormous risks posed by a constitutional
convention. We have, of course, amended the Constitution. In every instance, however, we used the first approach outlined in
Article V for amending the document. A long historical precedent beginning in 1791 guides the amendment process under this approach. But no
rule or law limits the scope of a state-called constitutional convention. Without
established legal procedures, the entire
document would be laid bare for wholesale revision. Article V itself sheds no light on the most basic procedures for such a
convention. How many delegates does each state get at the convention? Is it one state, one vote, or do states with larger populations, like
California, get a larger share of the votes? The Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear — it will not intervene in the process or the
result of a constitutional convention. The game has neither rules nor referees. Even a convention called for
the putative
purpose of drafting a balanced budget amendment could easily spread into rewriting the Second
Amendment. Worse still, it could devolve into horse-trading, like striking the Second Amendment in
order to gain enough votes to pass a balanced budget amendment. Even if the Idaho Legislature mandates that its
delegates confine both their debate and their vote to a singular topic, neither courts nor Congress has the power to enforce such a mandate,
making it more illusory than binding. The prospect of a runaway convention is more than just an academic
concern. The only state-called constitutional convention in our history began as an effort to amend our governing document, but ended by
scrapping it altogether. Idaho’s Legislature is toying now with the possibility of reaching similar results. For our country’s sake, I hope Idaho
lawmakers resist the special-interest groups that are pushing for a constitutional convention and instead reaffirm the integrity of the document
at the heart of our divided nation.

A constitutional amendment would represent the wants of cooperate interests slash

the social safety net to cute social security and Medicare
Keefe 6/14 (Josh, covers money and politics for IBTimes, “The Koch Brothers Want A New Constitution
— And They’re Closer Than You Think” http://www.ibtimes.com/political-capital/koch-brothers-want-
new-constitution-theyre-closer-you-think-2552039) mlm
The Wisconsin Assembly votes Wednesday on whether to call for a convention to change the U.S. Constitution. While that in itself is surprising
— the American people have never exercised their legally enshrined right to convene a new Constitutional convention — what’s more
surprising is that pro-businessgroups with ties to the Koch brothers have pushed for similar legislation in
more than 30 states, and they’ve been remarkably successful: A dozen states have passed bills calling for
a convention that would produce an altered Constitution that would likely limit federal spending and
power. According to Article V of the Constitution, just two thirds (34) of the 50 state legislatures need to call for a convention for the
purposes of “proposing constitutional amendments” (no governor’s signature is required). Those amendments would then need to be ratified
by three quarters of the states, currently 38, to become law. But beyond those very basic requirements, nobody knows what the rules for a
convention would be, since one hasn’t occurred since the original in 1787. That single instance, Constitutional law experts warn, provides a
harrowing precedent: Delegates tore up the Articles of Confederation they had convened to improve, and produced a whole new governing
document. Read: Why Is This Mega-Donor Spending Millions To Defeat Tammy Baldwin? The Wisconsin legislation, which is supported by Gov.
Scott Walker, was introduced by Republican Sen. Chris Kapenga, who introduced similar legislation in January 2014 as a member of the
Assembly. His bill would call a convention to pass constitutional amendments that would require the federal government to balance the
budget, something that Congress will simply never do on its own, Kapenga told International Business Times. “For the country to continue
spending at this rate, where expenditures are exceeding revenues consistently, is not sustainable,” Kapenga said. “Whether it’s Democrats or
Republicans in charge in Washington, it’s not getting fixed, and no solutions are being proposed to deal with it...I think this is the only option
left But while proponents of this kind of legislation say that Congress is incapable of reining in a nearly
$20 trillion national debt, opponents believe that the Article V movement is an astroturf effort backed
by corporate interests that would eliminate environmental and labor regulatory bodies and slash taxes
and spending by forcing the federal government to drastically reduce its reach. “It’s not just about a balanced
budget,” said Wisconsin Democratic Rep. Chris Taylor. “Mostly I think they are going at the social safety net, they are
going to go after Social Security and Medicare because it’s so unpopular to cut those programs, and this
is how they do it.” One of the two main groups pushing an Article V convention is the Convention of States, a project by Citizens for Self-
Government, a nonprofit that doesn’t disclose its donors and has a variety of connections to David and Charles Koch, the billionaire industrialist
brothers whose eponymous company is one of the country’s worst polluters and who have become synonymous with both overt and covert
political spending in pursuit of limited government.

Slashing social security exacerbates poverty and income inequality

Romig 16 (Kathleen, Master’s degree in Social Policy from University College Cork, “Social Security
Keeps 22 Million Americans Out of Poverty: A State-By-State Analysis”
http://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-keeps-22-million-americans-out-of-
poverty-a-state-by-state) mlm

Social Security benefits play a vital role in reducing poverty in every state. WITHOUT SOCIAL SECURITY,
22.1 MILLION MORE AMERICANS WOULD BE POOR. Without Social Security, 22.1 million more Americans would be poor,
according to the latest available Census data. Although most of those whom Social Security keeps out of poverty are elderly, nearly a third are
under age 65, including 1.1 million children. (See Table 1.) Social Security is particularly important for elderly women
and minority families, who have fewer retirement resources outside of Social Security. Depending on their
design, reductions in Social Security benefits could significantly increase poverty, particularly among the elderly. Social Security Lifts 15
Million Elderly Americans Out of Poverty Most people aged 65 and older receive the majority of their income from Social
Security.[2] Without Social Security benefits, 40.5 percent of elderly Americans would have incomes below the official poverty line, all else
being equal; with Social Security benefits, only 8.8 percent do. (See Figure 1.) These benefits lift 15.1 million elderly Americans above the
poverty line. Social Security is important for children and their families as well as for the elderly. About 6.5 million children under age 18 (9
percent of all U.S. children) lived in families that received income from Social Security in 2015, according to Census data. This figure includes
children who received their own benefits as dependents of retired, disabled, or deceased workers, as well as those who lived with parents or
relatives who received Social Security. In all, Social Security lifts 1.1 million children out of poverty. Social
Security records show
that 3.1 million children under age 18 qualified for Social Security payments themselves in December 2015.
(See Appendix Table 2.) Of these, 1.2 million were the survivor of a deceased worker. Another 1.6 million received
payments because their parent had a severe disability. And 331,000 children under 18 received payments because their
parent or guardian was retired.[3] Elderly Women and Minorities Particularly Vulnerable to Poverty Social Security is especially important for
elderly women and minority families. Women tend to earn less than men, take more time out of the paid workforce, accumulate less savings,
and receive smaller pensions. Women also live longer than men, on average, so many outlive their spouses and savings, leaving them
increasingly impoverished as they age. Social Security brings 8.8 million elderly women out of poverty, as Table 2 shows. African Americans and
Latinos have lower-than-average lifetime earnings, as well as fewer opportunities to save for retirement and earn pensions. Without
Social Security, the poverty rate among elderly Latinos would approach 50 percent, and the poverty rate
among elderly African Americans would exceed 50 percent. Social Security Reduces Poverty in Every
State Social Security reduces elderly poverty dramatically in every state in the nation, as Figure 2 and Appendix Table 1 show.[4] Without
Social Security, the poverty rate for those aged 65 and over would meet or exceed 40 percent in more than
half the states; with Social Security, it is less than 10 percent in two-thirds of states. Social Security lifts more than 1 million elderly people out
of poverty in California, Florida, and Texas, and over half a million in Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.