Herminio Astorga vs Antonio Villegas
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
56 SCRA 714 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;When to
be Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order
to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority
of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a
petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An
Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted.
When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House
Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator
Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back
to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino
made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the
Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter
approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it
became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had
no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and
as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and
the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that
they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal
of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further
maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is
not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire
whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal
for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments
into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC
also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never
made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to
fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
Casco Philippine Chemicals v. Gimenez Constitutional Law. Political Law.
7 SCRA 347
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law),
the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues, and was
thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on Resolution No. 1529 of
the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the separate importation of
urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the petitioner sought for a
refund of the margin fees.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee
HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by law. RA 2609 only
exempts urea formaldehyde and not the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde as they are different, the former being a finished product. The
enrolled bill which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the
courts. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I printing of
the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there
have been any error in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by a judicial decree.
case no. 45 Congress Power to discipline its members
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)
F:The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent the
12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the
Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On February
5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 havingbeen declared
guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of
certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate
regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner’s
complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to
reinstate him in his official position?
Held. The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't
to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to
the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or
its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
a gross usurpation of power. Precedents have held that where a member has
been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective
of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.
PLANAS VS. COMELEC
49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21,
1972, the president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines
under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention approved its
proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73
submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution
as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December 7, 1972,
Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No.
73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in
the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order
temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and
open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president
announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained
from deciding the cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent
motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.
ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the
proposed constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long
list of cases decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2,
Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority
of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree
itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to
postulate any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as
Jus Cogens.
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in
separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators
and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators
were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for
the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the
House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these
three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of
the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of
said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution.
The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of
the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of
the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is
predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too
well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in
determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term
is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not
always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on
the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to
be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme
intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no
logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed
to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal
then into that of ratification.
Araneta v. DinglasanConstitutional Law. Political Law. Delegation of Powers.
84 PHIL 368
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental
question. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is
of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of
his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit
the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of
Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the
national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act
is already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and
effect
HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act
has to be sought for in its nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be
subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution
provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited period”.
It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is
contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge
of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the
power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25,
2013 which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not
Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner
and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of
petitioner submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could
be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner
lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14,
2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which
petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10,
2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC
First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision,
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation
alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise
contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law
because she was not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to
the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally
construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as
petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27
March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that
the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case
of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted
records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that
she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither
did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.