Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BYRD
CUYAHOGA COUNTY CUERK OF COURTS
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Court of Appeals
vs.
Judge:
VILLAGE OF BRATENAHL, OHIO, ET AL.
Pages Filed: 16
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Case No. CA-16-105281
Relator-Appellant,
v.
Defendants-Appellees.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
APPELLANT’S REPLY MERIT BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Pronouncements as to the rationale for the trial court’s ruling or what it
considered are misplaced as the trial court’s ruling was simply a single-lined
entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The Open Meetings Act does not have a mens rea requirement and, thus, whether
a public official actually intended to violate the Act is irrelevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. CONDUCTING PUBLIC BUSINESS BY SECRET-BALLOT VOTING
(Count I). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Relator’s claim to ensure public business is not conducted by secret-ballot
voting is not moot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Conducting public business of a legislative body by secret-ballot voting
violates the Open Meetings Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. FINANCE COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES (Count II). . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. The requirements of the Open Meetings Act apply equally to a village
council and to the committees of a village council. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Simply listing the content of motions and votes in minutes, without sufficient
facts and information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the
rationale behind the decisions, does not satisfy the requirements of the Open
Meetings Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. EXECUTIVE SESSION - MOTION, VOTE and MINUTES (Count III). . . . . . 11
A. Appellees implicitly admit that, at a minimum, the minutes fail to indicate
the content of the motion and the roll call vote. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
VI. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Certificate of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case Citations
American Guaranty Co. v. Supply Co.,
115 Ohio St. 524, 155 N.E. 127 (1926). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Berner v. Woods,
2007-0hio-620 (9th Dist. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Doran v. Northmont Bd. ofEd.,
153 Ohio App.3d 499, 794 N.E.2d 760, 2003-0hio-4084 (2d Dist. 2003). . . . . . 4
Lame, Inc. v. E.G. Systems, Inc.,
2015-Ohio-686 (8th Dist. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Marbury v. Madison,
5U.S.(lCranch) 137 (1803). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Mishr v. Poland Bd. ofZoning Appeals,
76 Ohio St.3d 238, 667 N.E.2d 365, 1996-0hio-400 (1996)). . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
State ex rel. American Civil Liberties Union v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs
128 Ohio St.3d 256, 943 N.E.2d 553, 2011-Ohio-625 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati,
76 Ohio St.3d 540, 668 N.E.2d 903, 1996-Ohio-372 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8
State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council,
92 Ohio St.3d 54, 748 N.E.2d 58, 2001-0hio-130 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 11
State ex rel. Patrick Bros. v. Putnam Cty. Bd. of Comm ’rs,
2014-Ohio-2717(3dDist.2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
State ex rel. Randles v. Hill,
66 Ohio St.3d 32, 607 N.E.2d 458, 1993-Ohio-204 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Swafford v. Norwood Bd. ofEd.,
14 Ohio App.3d 346, 471 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
76 Ohio St.3d 416, 667 N.E.2d 1223, 1996-Ohio-380 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
White v. King,
147 Ohio St.3d 74, _ N.E.2d 2016-0hio-2770 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8
Court Rules
Ohio R. App. P. 12(B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Statutory Provisions
Open Meetings Act / R.C. § 121.22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
R.C. § 121.22(I)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
I. Pronouncements as to the rationale for the trial court’s ruling or what it considered
are misplaced as the trial court’s ruling was simply a single-lined entry.
Even though a trial court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment is subject to
de novo review, Lame, Inc. v. E.G. Systems, Inc., 2015-Ohio-686 |13 (8th Dist.), Appellees
wrongfully intimate some deference should be shown to the trial court’s ruling or what evidence
was actually considered by the trial court. See, e.g, Appellees Brief, at 4 (“exhibits were
appropriately considered by the trial court”). Yet, it must be noted that the trial court engaged in
no analysis or reasoning whatsoever in its ruling; instead, the trial court disposed of cross
motions for summary judgment in a single-line entry with no reasoning, explanation, etc., and
without even addressing directly the Motion to Strike. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17 n.3. Thus, it is
important for this Court to examine de novo the summary-judgment record and consider the
II. The Open Meetings Act does not have a mens rea requirement and, thus, whether a
public official actually intended to violate the Act is irrelevant.
Initially (and for the first time on appeal), Appellees contend that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in their favor on all counts alleging violations the Open Meetings
Act because “[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record that there was any intent by the
Respondents” to violate the Act. Appellees ’ Brief, at 3. But the Ohio Supreme Court has held
that “[i]ntent...is not a consideration in determining compliance with R.C. 121.22(C), which
broadly requires that ‘[a]ll meetings of any public body...be ...open to the public at all times.’”
State ex rel. Randles v. Hill, 66 Ohio St.3d 32, 607 N.E.2d 458, 1993-Ohio-204 (1993). And this
is further reinforced by the language of the Act itself as it does not contain a mens rea
requirement - all that is required is a violation or threatened violated. Thus, Appellees’ present
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argument concerning whether they intentionally violated Act ignores not only the language of
the Act itselfbut also a holding of the Ohio Supreme Court directly on point.
Initially, Appellees assert that the violation of the Open Meetings Act arising from
conducting public business by secret-ballot voting has become moot because “[t]he relief sought
by Relator in Count I cannot be carried into effect because the president pro tempore’s term at
issue has ended.” Appellees’ Brief, at 6. In making such an argument, Respondents fail to
appreciate: (i) the specific relief actually sought by Relator; and/or (ii) once a violation or even a
threatened violation has been established, the Act mandates the issuance of a statutory
injunction.
Initially, Appellees conveniently ignore that the relief sought by Relator did not concern or
directly challenge Mr. Puffenberger’s status as president pro tempore of the Bratenahl Village
Council. For while secret-ballot voting for president pro tempore may have been the event
constituting an actual violation of the Open Meetings Act, Relator actually challenged in Count I
the larger and more significant issue of Respondents conducting any public business through the
Voting by the members of a public body is a formal action that must occur in a
meeting open to the public. In fact, the Ohio Attorney General has concluded that
“[vjoting by secret ballot is at variance with the purpose of the open meetings law
and only denies the people their right to view and evaluate the workings of their
government. Accordingly, a public body that is subject to the requirements of the
Open Meetings law may not vote in an open meeting by secret ballot.”
T.d.17, Amended Complaint ^53 (quoting Ohio Att’y Gen’l Opin. No. 2011-038).
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In fact, the explicit relief Relator seeks due to the use of secret-ballot voting does not even relate
to Mr. Puffenberger’s status as president pro tempore but, instead, concerns the use of secret-
Pursuant to the Open Meetings Act (R.C. 121.22), Relator is entitled to the issuance
of injunctive relief so as to preclude and prohibit Respondents from conducting any
business of the Bratenahl Village Council by secret ballot, including, without
limitation, taking votes on official business by secret ballot unless expressly
authorized to do so by the Ohio Revised Code, together with an award of a civil
forfeiture and attorney fees.
WHEREFORE, the State of Ohio, on relation to Relators, hereby pray and request
that the Court:
T.d.17, Amended Complaint ^63 & prayerfor relief (c) & (d).
Furthermore, Appellees’ argument fails to recognize that actions under the Open Meetings
Act involve issuance of a statutory injunction, a concept developed by Appellant but completely
ignored by Appellees. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-17. Because the Open Meetings Act
specifically mandates the issuance of an injunction upon proof of either: (i) a violation of any
requirement of the Act; or (ii) a threatened violation of any requirement of the Act, once either
of those criteria have been established, an appropriate injunction must issue. In rejecting a
similar contention of mootness, the Second District expressly declared “we cannot conclude that
the issues presented are moot. R.C. 121.22(I)(1) requires that the court issue an injunction where
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a violation of the statute has been proven. It is irrelevant whether the injunction is actually and
currently necessary to prevent a future harm.” Doran v. Northmont Bd. of Ed., 153 Ohio App.3d
499, 794 N.E.2d 760, 2003-0hio-4084 ^20 (2d Dist. 2003). A violation (or threatened violation)
of the Open Meetings Act has been established by the proper summary-judgment evidence and,
pursuant to the Act itself, an appropriate injunction must issue. The claim is not moot.
With respect to the merits of Count I, there is no dispute as to the one critical material fact,
viz., Appellees conducted public business of the Bratenahl Village Council through secret-ballot
voting. Instead, the entirety of Appellees’ defense is that the Open Meetings Act “does not
provide for any particular voting procedure”, Appellees ’ Brief, at 9, and, therefore, by extension,
they (and all public bodies throughout the State) may conduct all public business in any manner
not expressly prohibited in the Open Meetings Act, including by secret-ballot voting.1
In an effort to refute the unequivocal pronouncement in Ohio Att’y Gen’l Opinion No.
2011-038 that “a public body”, i.e., any public body, “that is subject to the requirements of the
Open Meetings law may not vote in an open meeting by secret ballot,” Appellees claim the
Opinion applies only to the Ohio Board of Education which specifically requested it. Appellees ’
underlying legal principles - be they in a formal legal opinion or in a court decision - are not
constrained or limited only to the particular facts of a case; legal principles have universal
application beyond the specific facts giving rise to the pronouncement thereof. Appellees’
1 Appellees actually recognize the need for the Court to declare whether, consistent with
the letter and spirit of the Open Meetings Act, public bodies may conduct all public business by
secret-ballot voting. See Appellees ’ Brief, at 9 (“the plain and unambiguous language of R.C.
121.22(C) does not provide for any particular voting procedure, therefore, such intent should be
inferred here by thejudiciary”).
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argument is akin to saying that the well-established legal proposition that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of thejudicial department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), only has application when an individual appointed as a justice of the
peace seeks to compel the issuance of mandamus in the Supreme Court for the delivery of his
commission. While that was the precise factual posture of Marbury, it is beyond cavil that the
legal principle pronounced therein has much wider and universal application.
Additionally, Appellees completely ignore the remedial nature of the Open Meetings Act
and the direction of the Ohio Supreme Court cited to and quoted by Appellant concerning
statutory construction of remedial statutes. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19 (in interpreting remedial
statutes, courts “often go quite beyond the letter of the statute. What is within the intention is
within the statute though not within the letter; and what is within the letter but not within the
intention is not within the statute” (quoting American Guaranty Co. v. Supply Co., 115 Ohio St.
524, 537, 155 N.E. 127 (1926)(quoting 2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed. Lewis),
Section 585)).
Appellees also ignore the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly found violations
of the Open Meetings Act even when the conduct of public officials was not expressly prohibited
under a strict reading of the Act. While Appellant cited in her brief to the holdings of the Ohio
Supreme Court in White v. King, 147 Ohio St. 3d 74,_ N.E.3d_ , 2016-0hio-2770, and State
ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 668 N.E.2d 903 (1996), see
Appellant’s Brief, at 20, Appellees elected to avoid even addressing these cases which
completely repudiate their argument. Thus, even though serial in-person communications and
serial electronic communications via e-mail are not expressly prohibited by the language of the
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Act, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that when public officials conduct public business
through either method, they have violated the Open Meetings Act.
To conclude that Appellees did not violate the Open Meetings Act when they conducted
the public business of the Bratenahl Village Council by secret-ballot voting necessitates this
Court to reject and repudiate the clear, well-reasoned and extensively-set-forth logic within Ohio
Att’y Gen’l Opin. No. 2011-038. Furthermore, to ratify the conducting of public business by
secret-ballot voting would permit all public bodies throughout the State of Ohio to undertake all
of the public’s business by secret ballot, including critical or controversial votes on public
expenditures, appropriations, etc. Allowing for the interpretation Appellees posit would result in
an absurd result that would effectively nullify the Open Meetings Act and its core purpose of
transparency and accountability.2 But “[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a
2 Respondents also make a fleeting effort to justify their action by making a passing
reference to the authority within R.C. 731.45 for a legislative authority to determine its own rules
and the conclusory assertion that “Village Council followed its own past practice of using a
secret ballot to elect president pro tempore.” Appellees ’ Brief, at 8. Of course, there was not any
proper summary-judgment evidence even purporting to establish the fact of past history and,
thus, such a conclusory assertion must be rejected.
But even assuming arguendo that the general rule-making authority within R.C. 731.45
could supersede the Open Meetings Act, such rules are not established in an ad hoc manner. For
the Bratenahl Village Council has already adopted rules for its proceedings which do not even
purport to authorize the conducting of public business by secret ballot. See Codified Ordinance
of Bratenahl, Chapter 121 (copy available on-line as a public document for whichjudicial notice
can be taken at http://www.bratenahl.org/180/Ordinances). In fact, Section 121.03(h) of the
Codified Ordinances expressly requires that meetings be conducted in conformity with state law:
The Ohio Revised Code, the Codified Ordinances of the Village of Bratenahl,
including Chapters 127, Code of Conduct, and 129, Code of Ethics, the Ohio Ethics
Law, and, if none of the aforementioned laws are applicable, then Robert's Rules of
Order as revised from time to time, shall govern all proceedings of the Bratenahl
Village Council and its Committees and it shall be the duty of the presiding officer or
chairperson thereof to adhere to and enforce such rules.
Thus, rather than attempting to repudiate the requirements of state law (and the Open Meetings
Act, in particular), the rules of the Bratenahl Village Council expressly incorporate the
, (continued on next page)
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statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd result.” Mishr v. Poland Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 76 Ohio St.3d 238, 240, 667 N.E.2d 365, 1996-0hio-400; see R.C. 1.47(C)(“[i]n
enacting a statute, it is presumed that...[a] just and reasonable result is intended”). This Court
should not condone the absurd interpretation posited by Appellees which would make a nullity of
the Open Meetings Act; the reasoning and logic of Ohio Att’y Gen’l Opin. No. 2011-038 is
consistent with the purposes of the Act and should, accordingly, be adopted by this Court.
In light of the undisputed evidence that the members of the Village of Bratenahl
conducted public business when they voted, on three separate occasions, by secret ballot during
the course of the council meeting of January 21, 2015, Respondents either violated or threatened
to violate the Open Meetings Act. Thus, pursuant to R.C. § 121.22(I)(1), Relator-Appellant was
entitled to summary judgment on this claim and an appropriate statutory injunction should have
issued precluding Respondents and their successors-in-office from conducting public business of
the Village of Bratenahl by secret-ballot voting. Accordingly, the trial court committed
A. The requirements of the Open Meetings Act apply equally to a village council
and to the committees of a village council.
The minutes of the Finance Committee undisputedly contained only a listing of roll call
rationale therefor. In order to legally justify these perfunctory minutes, Appellees argue for the
first time on appeal that a different legal standard applies depending upon whether one is dealing
requirements thereof and the mayor, as the presiding officer, failed to comply with his duty to
ensure adherence to such requirements.
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with a village council versus the committee of that village council. See Appellees ’ Brief, at 11-12
(“[t]here is an obvious distinction between legislative acts of a village council and acts that are
course, for this proposition, Appellees have offered no legal authority because there is no such
authority. In fact, a similar proposition was expressly rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court as
being “meritless”:
Respondents counter that they need not provide full and accurate minutes of any
committee meetings because the village council does not conduct official business
at these meetings, and they do not constitute council meetings. Respondents’
assertion is meritless.... [Cjommittee meetings are meetings for purposes of R.C.
121.22 because they are prearranged discussions of the public business of a public
body by a majority of the public body’s members
State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council, 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 748 N.E.2d 58, 2001-
Ohio-130.3
The Open Meetings Act does not establish one set of standards for a council and another
set of standards for a committee of a council. The Act applies to “public bodies” as defined in
R.C. 121.22(B)(1) which includes not only the council itself, see R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(a), but also a
“committee or subcommittee” thereof, see R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(b). See Long, 92 Ohio St.3d at 58
political subdivision, e.g., a village council, as a ‘public body’ for purposes of the Sunshine
Law”); State ex rel. American Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 943 N.E.2d 553, 2011-Ohio-625 ^42; Berner v. Woods, 2007-
3 With respect to inconvenient case law, Appellees either ignore it completely (as in the
instances of White v. King and Cincinnati Post) or completely mischaracterize such cases. As an
example of the latter, Appellees wrongfully declare that “Long involved a challenge to the
minutes of a full village council, not a village council committee.” Appellees ’ Brief, at 11. But
Long did involve a challenge to the minutes of a village council committee and the Supreme
Court rightfully concluded the same legal standard applied to committees as applies to councils.
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Ohio-620 |14 (9th Dist.). The Open Meetings Act applies equally to all “public bodies”,
B. Simply listing the content of motions and votes in minutes, without sufficient
facts and information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the
rationale behind the decisions, does not satisfy the requirements of the Open
Meetings Act,
Appellees implicitly admit that the meeting minutes from the Finance Committee do not
constitute “a full and accurate record of [the] proceedings” when they cite to sources other than
the minutes themselves. See Appellees’ Brief, at 12-14 (“the public is given the opportunity to
hear the Finance Committee Chairperson explain the events and particular items discussed at the
recent Finance Committee meeting and make Finance Committee recommendations to the
Council as a whole and to the public in attendance on the record at the regularly-scheduled
Council meeting.... [T]he minutes from the regularly-scheduled Village Council meetings the
Council”).
sufficient information concerning the Finance Committee, Respondents ignore the actual issue at
hand, viz., whether the official minutes of the Finance Committee contain sufficient facts and
information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the rationale behind the decisions
of the Committee beyond simply stating the roll call votes. The legal requirement as clearly
pronounced by White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 667 N.E.2d 1223,
1996-Ohio-380, and Long is that the minutes themselves must contain sufficient facts, etc.
4 In addition to misstating the clear and unequivocal holding from Long, Appellees’ new
found argument that a different legal standard applies to a village council versus the committee
of that village council is also refuted by their admissions in the pleadings. See Amended
Complaint ^66, 67 & 77; Answer ^66, 67 & 77.
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“[M]inutes are those that are approved as the minutes, not information from additional sources.”
State ex rel. Patrick Bros. v. Putnam Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2014-Ohio2717 ^34 (3d Dist.). Thus,
requiring or necessitating that the public attend one meeting of a public body in order to ascertain
what occurred at a meeting of another public body lacks any legal basis and, consistent with the
White and Long, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.
Furthermore, is well-established, that just “[a]s a court speaks only through its journal, a public
board, commission, or other deliberative body speaks through its minutes or its written record of
resolutions, directives, and action.” Swafford v. Norwood Bd. of Ed., 14 Ohio App.3d 346, 348,
471 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1984). Thus, efforts to rationalize the deficiencies in the meeting
misplaced.
In light of the minutes of the Finance Committee from the first part of 2016 only
containing “a record of mere roll call votes” and, thus, failing to provide any substantive
indication of the decision-making process of the Committee, the members thereof have failed to
comply with their legal duty under the Open Meetings Act to order keep and maintain “a full and
accurate record of [its] proceedings” consistent with the Act, White and Long. Thus, pursuant to
R.C. § 121.22(f)(1), Relator-Appellant was entitled to summary judgment on this claim and an
appropriate statutory injunction should have issued. Accordingly, the trial court committed
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V. EXECUTIVE SESSION - MOTION, VOTE and MINUTES (Count III)
A. Appellees implicitly admit that, at a minimum, the minutes fail to indicate the
content of the motion and the roll call vote.
Appellees actually acknowledge that the official minutes, i.e., the transcript, of the
meeting of August 19, 2015, do not contain the actual motion or any recorded roll call vote for
entering executive session at the beginning of the meeting. Again, Appellees cite to items
outside the official minutes in an effort to establish the content of any motion or that a roll call
vote was actually held. See Appellees’ Brief, at 14 (“as evidence by the audio recording..., the
motion and roll call vote to hold executive session were clearly taken”). In relying exclusively
upon records other than the official minutes to establish what supposedly happened, Appellees
have effectively admitted that the minutes themselves do not fully and accurately set forth the
actions of the Village Council, viz., the content of any motion or the roll call vote thereon.
As noted above, “minutes are those that are approved as the minutes, not information
from additional sources.” Patrick Bros., 2014-Ohio-2717 ^34. Appellees have not cited to a
specific line entry in the official minutes, i.e., the transcript, of the meeting of August 19, 2015,
wherein the specific content of the motion is set forth or the roll call vote is recorded. Reliance
upon audio recordings or notes of the clerk is not a proper and legitimate substitute for the
official minutes. See Long, 92 Ohio St.3d at 57-58 (rejecting audio recordings as substitute for
inadequate or inaccurate minutes). The duty under the Open Meetings Act is to prepare, file, and
maintain “full and accurate minutes” for council meetings. By Appellees own admission, the
minutes from the meeting of August 19, 2015, fail to contain the content of the motion to enter
executive session or the roll call vote thereon; Appellees have violated the Open Meetings Act as
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Thus, pursuant to R.C. § 121.22(I)(1), Relator-Appellant was entitled to summary
judgment on this claim and an appropriate statutory injunction should have issued. Accordingly,
the trial court committed reversible error when it granted summary judgment in favor of
VI. CONCLUSION
The proper and relevant summary-judgment evidence is undisputed; thus, this Court’s de
novo review simply calls upon the application of law to the undisputed facts. As established by
the pleadings and supporting evidentiary materials, there is no genuine issue of material fact
Bratenahl under the Open Meetings Act. Such undisputed evidence establishes multiple
violations or threatened violations of the Open Meetings Act such that the judgment of the trial
court must be REVERSED and either the case REMANDED for entry of an appropriate statutory
injunction and further proceedings or, alternatively, this Court may ENTER THE
APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT itself pursuant to Ohio R. App. P. 12(B) and REMAND for
further proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was or will be served by e-mail upon the following
on the 12th day ofMarch 2017:
David J. Matty
Shana A. Samson
Mark B. Marong
Matty, Henrikson & Greve
55 Public Square, Suite 1775
Cleveland, OH 44113
dmatty@mhglegal. com
ssamson@mhglegal. com
mmarong@mhglegal. com
/s/ Curt C. Hartman_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Electronically Filed 03/12/2017 23:04 / FILING OTHER THAN MOTION / CA 16 105281 / Confirmation Nbr. 1010657 / CLAXY