THIRD DIVISION

QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS On January 6, 2006, Rubio was charged before the RTC with qualified rape. The

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195239 accusatory portion of the Information provides:
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present: On or about January 8, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the defendant, being her father, with
VELASCO, JR. J., Chairperson, lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
- versus - PERALTA, there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
ABAD, [AAA],[3] 15 years old, against her will and consent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
BEN RUBIO y ACOSTA, Contrary to Law.[4]
Accused-Appellant. Promulgated:
March 7, 2012

Upon arraignment, Rubio pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, Rubio admitted

being the father of private complainant AAA and that she was under eighteen (18) years of age

when the alleged rape happened. Trial ensued.

Through the testimony of AAA, it was established that on January 8, 2000 at around two oclock

in the afternoon, she was sleeping inside their house with her two-year old sister and three-year
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
old brother, when the accused approached her and removed her shorts and panty. AAA tried to

DECISION push him away but he was too strong, and he succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
AAA continued resisting despite being afraid that the accused would hurt her. After some time,

the accused ejaculated outside her vagina.

The Case

At around four oclock in the afternoon of the same day, AAA went to a neighbor, a
This is an appeal from the July 26, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
certain Kuya Gene who is a Barangay Tanod, and informed him that she was raped by her own
H.C. No. 03489, which affirmed in toto the June 30, 2008 Decision[2] in Criminal Case No.
father. They then proceeded to the Barangay Hall and to the Police Headquarters to file a
117310-H of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused
complaint against her father.[5]
Ben Rubio y Acosta (Rubio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

AAA further testified that she did not tell her mother about the incident, because she knew the

latter would not believe her. AAA averred that she was first raped by her father in 1993, and
The Facts
when she reported this to her mother, she was casually told to forget about the incident,

because it would bring shame to their family.[6]

Page | 1
 Rubio filed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The decretal

Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, a medico-legal expert who examined the private complainant after the
alleged rape incident, testified that he found a shallow-healed laceration at a three oclock
position as well as a deep-healed laceration at a six oclock position on the complainants labia
portion of the July 26, 2010 Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is
hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
toto.[10]

minora which showed that she had been subjected to numerous sexual assaults.[7]
Hence, We have this appeal. The Office of the Solicitor General, for the People and by

Manifestation and Motion, opted not to file a supplemental brief. Accused-appellant entered a
For the defense, Rubio took the witness stand. He described the place where the alleged rape
similar manifestation. Thus, in resolving the instant appeal, We consider the issues and
occurred as a small house made of wood with one room, and a floor area of around 10 x 12
arguments he earlier raised in his Brief for the Accused-Appellant before the CA.
meters. At that time, three families were occupying the house including the complainants

grandmother, aunt, uncle, and cousin. Considering the cramped space, the accused asserted
Accused-appellant raises the following issues for Our consideration:
that if anything happened within its confines, such as rape, it could be easily noticed by other

persons in the room. He also declared that AAA, sometime in 1991, threatened to kill him I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
because of his alleged womanizing.[8] DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED; AND

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE.[11]
Rulings of the RTC and the CA

On June 30, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty of qualified rape, the
Our Ruling
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the

prosecution having proved the guilt of the defendant BEN RUBIO y
ACOSTA beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby meted out the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole. Accused is likewise ordered
to pay the victim the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages
without necessity of proving the same. An amount of Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is also in order to deter fathers
with perverse behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.
The Warden of Nagpayong City Jail, Pasig City, Metro Manila is
hereby directed to immediately transfer the defendant to the Bureau of
Corrections, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa.
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
Guiding Principles in Rape Cases
In deciding rape cases, We are guided by these three well-entrenched principles:
(a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more
difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and
(c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [12]

SO ORDERED.[9]

Page | 2
As a result of these guiding principles, the credibility of the victim becomes the single most
[13]
important issue.
Core Issue: Credibility of the Victim-Complainant
When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence.[14] The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
[15]
appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. As this Court held in People v.
Gabrino:
We have held time and again that the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with
finality. As We have reiterated in the recent People v. Combate, where
there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then We do not disturb
and interfere with its assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses. This is clearly because the judge in the trial court was the one
who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their
demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during
trial. Accordingly, the trial court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case,
is in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during
trial.[16]
Accused-appellant alleges that the testimony of the victim is replete with material
inconsistencies and questions her credibility, to wit:
1. AAA first testified that she returned to their house on September 15,
1997[17] but during cross-examination she stated that she returned to
the house of her parents in 1999.[18]
2. AAA alleged at one point that the accused-appellant had physically
beaten her once prior to the sexual assault subject of the instant
case[19] but she then categorically stated that accused-appellant never
laid a hand on her.[20]
3. AAA at first alleged that there was a store in their house at the time of
the rape,[21] but later said it was already closed.[22]
Although there are inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, inaccuracies and
[23]
inconsistencies in the rape victims testimony are to be expected. This Court finds that these
inconsistencies are not material to the instant case. We held, Rape victims are not expected to
make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that they might in fact
be trying to obliterate it from their memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will
not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.[24]
There is no showing that the trial courts findings were tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight; hence, the trial courts finding as to the credibility of the victim is final and binding on
this Court.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that testimonies of child victims are given full weight
and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. In People v. Perez, the Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that
no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by
the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of
tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to
any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[25]
Elements of Qualified Rape Duly Proved
The elements of rape as provided in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
Page | 3
 d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)
And one of the aggravating circumstances that would qualify the crime and raise the
penalty to death is:
ART. 266-B. Penalties
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony of the victim-complainant is as follows:
Q: On January 8, 2000 at about 2 o`clock in the afternoon, do you recall
where you were?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you then at the said date and time?
A: I was at our room, sir.
Q: What were you doing in your room at that time?
A: I was sleeping, sir.
Q: While you were sleeping was there anything unusual that happened?
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Ben Rubio removed my shorts and my panty, sir.
Q: What did you do when Ben Rubio removed your shorts and your panty?
A: I pushed him, sir.
Q: How did you know that it was Ben Rubio who removed your shorts and
panty when you said you were sleeping at that time?
A: When I woke up he was already in front of me, he was laying [sic] face
down, sir.
Q: You said Ben Rubio, if he is inside the courtroom will you be able to
identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you point to him?
Interpreter:
The witness pointed to the only accused seated on the first bench of the
courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants, who, when asked,
identified himself as Ben Rubio.
Q: You said that when Ben Rubio removed your shorts and panty you
pushed him, were you able to push him?
A: No, sir because he was stronger than me.
Q: Was he able to remove your shorts and panty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after he was able to remove your shorts and panty?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina, sir.
Q: What did you do when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: I resisted, sir.
Q: How did you resist?
A: I moved my body but I was not able to resist because he was stronger
than me, sir.
Q: Did you shout?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because if I shout he would hurt me, sir.[26]
The testimony of AAA stated that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with her,
and, thus, being AAAs father, he is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. The
fear towards her father was more than enough to intimidate her to submit to his lewd advances
without shouting for help.[27]
The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to convict. [28] The complainants
testimonyif credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of thingsmay suffice to support a conviction of rape. [29]This Court finds that the testimony
of AAA is straightforward and convincing with no inconsistency with regard to the material
elements of the crime of rape.
Furthermore, the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were
stipulated upon during pre-trial; thus, there is no further need to prove them during trial.
Page | 4
 The presence of healed or fresh hymenal laceration is not an element of
[34]
Accused-appellant seeks to deny the charge against him by stating that the victim did not shout rape. However, it is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. [35] Thus, the findings of

during the alleged bestial act. The Court has declared repeatedly that [f]ailure to shout or offer Dr. Reyes corroborate and support the testimony of AAA.

tenacious resistance [does] not make voluntary [the victims] submission to [the perpetrators]

lust. Besides, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape.[30] Proper Penalties

Accused-appellant further claims that it is unlikely that rape was committed, because the house Since all the elements of qualified rape were duly alleged and proved during the trial, the proper

where it allegedly occurred only has one room and was then being occupied by three families. penalty should be death according to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, with the effectivity of

This is of no consequence. This Court has reiterated that lust is no respecter of time and Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
[31]
place. Rape may even be committed in the same room where other family members also Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to

sleep.[32] Besides, it must be noted that the rape occurred in the early afternoon and not in the Section 2 of the Act, the penalty to be meted out should be reclusion perpetua without eligibility

evening when the rest of the occupants are presumably sleeping in the cramped space. for parole.

Medical Findings Corroborate Rape The trial court correctly awarded PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, but the amount of

moral and exemplary damages awarded has to be modified consonant to current jurisprudence.

Accused-appellant also questions the conclusion of the medical examination done by Dr. Reyes. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory

He alleges that since the hymenal lacerations have already healed, then these could not have upon the finding of the fact of rape.[36] Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case

been due to what AAA claimed, and that even if there were lacerations, it could not be without need of further proof other than the fact of its commission, for it is assumed that a rape

determined if he was the one who caused them. victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. [37] According to

prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be PhP 75,000. [38] Likewise,

We are not convinced. exemplary damages should have been PhP 30,000, and this is awarded in order to serve as

public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse. [39]

We must bear in mind that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in

a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03489 is

the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely corroborative in character and hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is increased to
[33]
not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape. PhP 75,000 and exemplary damages to PhP 30,000. The civil indemnity and damages shall

earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid. [40] Costs

against accused-appellant.

Page | 5
 On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a

SO ORDERED. complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa

Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil
ADMISSION AND CONFESSION\
Case No. 05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.

SECOND DIVISION
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square meter parcel of
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO G.R. No. 186979
DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES land located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Petitioners, Present:
Sale dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad
- versus - NACHURA,
Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES,
It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance; and when
Respondents. Promulgated:
they did, they found out that the lands Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April
August 11, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein

petitioners.
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale

allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the

August 14, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR. SP No. 97668 and its
Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No. 329427
Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2009 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names of

Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429
The impugned Decision affirmed the resolution dated November 16, 2006 [3] and Order
in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.
dated January 5, 2007[4] of the trial court, which respectively denied petitioners Motion to Set for

Preliminary Hearing the Special and Affirmative Defenses[5] and motion for reconsideration.[6]
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the

signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were
The antecedents:
forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively.[7]

Page | 6
 In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars [8] claiming ambiguity in
respondents claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal. Finding no merit in
the motion, the trial court denied the same and ordered petitioners to file their answer to the
[9]
complaint.
In their answer,[10] petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute
grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action
inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of
Estate and Sale was not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal
heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the
title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the
other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3) respondents claim is barred
by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted
that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing
as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon
which respondents anchor their purported title.[11] They appended the sworn statement of
Amadeo Razalan declaring, among other things that:
(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang nasabing lupa kay Socorro
Limos at Rosa delos Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang ang tagapagmana ni
Donata Lardizabal;
xxxx
(4) Ang aming lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay may tatlong (3)
anak na patay na sina Tomas Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa
Razalan;
(5) Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay sina; 1.
Soledad Razalan; 2. Ceferina Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4.
Amadeo Razalan. Ang mga buhay na anak ni Clemente Razalan ay sina 1.
Rogelio Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomasa
Razalan ay sina 1. Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;
x x x x[12]
Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of the
following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;
2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco
Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;
3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, if not when? [A]nd her
heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are
(b) Eduardo Partido married to Elisa Filiana, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido
married to Lorlita Loriana, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan
Partido married to James Dil-is and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido married to
Nemesia Aczuara, and all residents of Camiling, Tarlac.
4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming
to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the Succession by a
Sole Heir with Sale dated January 24, 2000, executed before Atty. Rodolfo V.
Robinos.
5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extra[j]udicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004 allegedly executed in
favor of the plaintiffs, Sps. Francisco/Arwenia Odones;
6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted
by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2
brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the
Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have
executed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
8. That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca
Razalan and Dominador Razalan did not file any letters (sic) of administration
nor declaration of heirship before executing the alleged Extra[j]udicial
Succession of Estate and Sale in favor of plaintiffs.[13]
Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to
file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses, [14] arguing
that respondents failure to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an
implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on
the affirmative defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to
present evidence on the admitted facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to be
admitted by petitioners were not material and relevant to the issue of the case as required by
Page | 7
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized that the only attendant issue was
[15]
whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioners base their TCTs is valid.
In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1
to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners
Answer, to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant
for respondents to make another denial. The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and
7 in the Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession
of Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo
Razalan attached to respondents Reply.[16] Petitioners moved for reconsideration[17] but the
same was denied in an Order dated January 5, 2007.[18]
Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the impugned resolution and order.
On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by
petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown hearing.[19]
Their motion for reconsideration[20] having been denied,[21] petitioners are now before this Court
seeking a review of the CAs pronouncements.
In essence, petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are
indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the
Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said affirmative defenses must be
conducted pursuant to our ruling in Gochan v. Gochan.[22]
We deny the petition.
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been
joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already
been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after
service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion,
the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters for which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
xxxx
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be
deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized,
however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion
of the court.
As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to
determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an
expeditious administration of justice.[23]
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with
the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion. [24] Corollarily, this discretion
carries with it the determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such
fault.
Page | 8
 As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners Request for Moreover, jurisprudence[27] has always been firm and constant in declaring that when

Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon

already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the is unnecessary, erroneous, and improvident.

complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once

again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no In any event, a perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed

purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same.

mode of discovery which is to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which

will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. [25] In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that

the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a
allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.[28]
forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose

Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title,

hence, the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the lands true
purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is
owner.[29] Thus, the real party-in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership adverse to that
[26]
pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.
of the registered owner.[30]

Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were

already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be The herein complaint alleged: (1) that respondents are the owners and occupants of a parcel of

compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a land located at Pao 1st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT No. 11560 in the name of Donata

response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied Lardizabal by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale; and (2) that petitioners

admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. fraudulently caused the cancellation of OCT No. 11560 and the issuance of new TCTs in their

names by presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale with the forged signatures of Donata Lardizabal

In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners Request and her husband, Francisco Razalan.

for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the

implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied The absence of any transaction between petitioners and respondents over the land is of no

admission attributable to respondents failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing moment, as the thrust of the controversy is the respondents adverse claims of rightful title and

is imperative loses its point. ownership over the same property, which arose precisely because of the conflicting sources of

their respective claims.

Page | 9
 owner whereas in this case, the respondents claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents

As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the status of herein are enforcing their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject land and not

petitioners predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal, these issues go into as heirs of the original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, the filiation of

the merits of the parties respective claims and defenses that can be best determined on the herein respondents to the original owner is not determinative of their right to claim title to and

basis of preponderance of the evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial. A preliminary ownership of the property.

hearing, the objective of which is for the court to determine whether or not the case should

proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address such issues. WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated August 14, 2008 and its Resolution dated March 9, 2009 are

Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder hereby AFFIRMED.

of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead

the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion
SO ORDERED.
of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is HEARSEAY

only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,

that the latter may dismiss the complaint.[31] In this case, no such order was issued by the trial

court.

Equally settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be

established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to VELASCO JR., J.:
[32]
dismiss. The Case

Finally, we cannot subscribe to petitioners contention that the status of the heirs of Donata
Lardizabal who sold the property to the respondents must first be established in a special
proceeding. The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. Del Rosario[33] and in Reyes v.
This is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution
dated January 22, 2013[1] and November 7, 2013,[2] respectively, of the Court of Appeals,
Cagayan De Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 00911-MIN. The CA Decision reversed the
Decision dated September 14, 2004[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in Davao City-
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 27,354-99, a suit for damages thereat which Nilo B. Rosit (Rosit)
commenced against Dr. Rolando Gestuvo (Dr. Gestuvo).

Enriquez[34] that the petitioners invoke do not find application in the present controversy. Factual Antecedents

On January 15, 1999, Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray soon taken the next day
at the Davao Doctors Hospital (DDH) showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred
In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries,[4] who, on January 19, 1999, operated on
Rosit.
special proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that in Yaptinchay and Enriquez,
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to
plaintiffs action for annulment of title was anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original
immobilize the mandible. As the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo

Page | 10
cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were smaller
titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that the latter would
not be able to afford the same.[5]
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was in pain. X-
rays done on Rosit two (2) days after the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was
aligned but the screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo
referred Rosit to a dentist. The dentist who checked Rosit, Dr. Pangan, opined that another
operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu.[6]
Alleging that the dentist told him that the operation conducted on his mandible was improperly
done, Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional
operation as well as the expenses of the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave Rosit P4,500.
Rosit went to Cebu on February 19, 1999, still suffering from pain and could hardly open his
mouth.
In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed by Dr. Gestuvo and replaced
them with smaller titanium plate and screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's molar that was
hit with a screw and some bone fragments. Three days after the operation, Rosit was able to eat
and speak well and could open and close his mouth normally.[7]
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of the
operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the
P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the plate and screws that Dr. Pangan
installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.[8]
Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees with the RTC against Dr. Gestuvo
and DDH, the suit docketed as Civil Case No. 27,354-99.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC freed DDH from liability on the ground that it exercised the proper diligence in the
selection and supervision of Dr. Gestuvo, but adjudged Dr. Gestuvo negligent and ruled, thus:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the plaintiff Nilo B. Rosit to have preponderantly
established his cause of action in the complaint against defendant Dr. Rolando G. Gestuvo only,
judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against said defendant, ordering the defendant
DR. ROLANDO G. GESTUVO to pay unto plaintiff NILO B. ROSIT the following:
the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY NINE PESOS
a) and 13/100 (P140,199.13) representing reimbursement of actual expenses incurred by
plaintiff in the operation and re-operation of his mandible;
the sum of TWENTY NINE THOUSAND AND SIXTY EIGHT PESOS (P29,068.00)
b)
representing reimbursement of the filing fees and appearance fees;
the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as and for
c)
attorney's fees;
d) the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
e) the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
f) the costs of the suit.
For lack of merit, the complaint against defendant DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL and the
defendants' counterclaims are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Cost against Dr. Rolando G. Gestuvo.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court applied the res ipsa loquitur principle holding that "the need for expert,
medical testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence."
Therefrom, both parties appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its January 22, 2013 Decision, the CA modified the appealed judgment by deleting the awards
made by the trial court, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Gestuvo is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 14,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Davao City, rendered in Civil Case No. 27,354-99 is
hereby MODIFIED. The monetary awards adjudged in favor of Nilo B. Rosit are hereby
DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Unlike the RTC, the CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the
testimony of an expert witness is necessary for a finding of negligence. The appellate court also
gave credence to Dr. Pangan's letter stating the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross
negligence in his emergency management of Rosit's fractured mandible.
Rosit's motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's November 7, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue
The ultimate issue for our resolution is whether the appellate court correctly absolved Dr.
Gestuvo from liability.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
In Flores v. Pineda,[9] the Court explained the concept of a medical negligence case and the
elements required for its prosecution, viz:
A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There are four elements
involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one's conduct. The
standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge of the
profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of duty occurs
when the physician fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the
patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for negligence. (emphasis
Page | 11
supplied)
An expert witness is not necessary as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable
To establish medical negligence, this Court has held that an expert testimony is generally
required to define the standard of behavior by which the court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient. This is so considering
that the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of a patient is usually a matter of
expert opinion.[10]
Solidum v. People of the Philippines[11] provides an exception. There, the Court explained that
where the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur is warranted, an expert testimony may
be dispensed with in medical negligence cases:
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony
applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with
the facts. x x x
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of
a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part
of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the
body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under
the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the
requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the
following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. [12]
In its assailed Decision, the CA refused to acknowledge the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine on the ground that the foregoing elements are absent. In particular, the
appellate court is of the position that post-operative pain is not unusual after surgery and that
there is no proof that the molar Dr. Pangan removed is the same molar that was hit by the screw
installed by Dr. Gestuvo in Rosit's mandible. Further, a second operation was conducted within
the 5-week usual healing period of the mandibular fracture so that the second element cannot be
considered present. Lastly, the CA pointed out that the X-ray examination conducted on Rosit
prior to his first surgery suggests that he had "chronic inflammatory lung disease compatible,"
implying that the injury may have been due to Rosit's peculiar condition, thus effectively negating
the presence of the third element.[13]
After careful consideration, this Court cannot accede to the CA's findings as it is at once
apparent from the records that the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are present.
The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved that one of the screws installed
by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself referred Rosit to
Dr. Pangan. In fact, the affidavit of Dr. Pangan presented by Dr. Gestuvo himself before the trial
court narrated that the same molar struck with the screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo was examined
and eventually operated on by Dr. Pangan. Dr. Gestuvo cannot now go back and say that Dr.
Pangan treated a molar different from that which was affected by the first operation.
Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed the same in the
proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him to
undergo a corrective surgery.
Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large as, in fact, he cut the same
with a saw.[14] He also stated during trial that common sense dictated that the smallest screws
available should be used. More importantly, he also knew that these screws were available
locally at the time of the operation.[15] Yet, he did not avail of such items and went ahead with the
larger screws and merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws were already at the
proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is apparent that he negligently placed one of the
screws in the wrong area thereby striking one of Rosit's teeth.
In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was too long or improperly placed,
both facts are the product of Dr. Gestuvo's negligence. An average man of common intelligence
would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw would cause severe
pain. Thus, the first essential requisite is present in this case.
Anent the second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine application, it is sufficient that the
operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by Dr.
Gestuvo. No other doctor caused such fact.
The CA finds that Rosit is guilty of contributory negligence in having Dr. Pangan operate on him
during the healing period of his fractured mandible. What the CA overlooked is that it was Dr.
Gestuvo himself who referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. Nevertheless, Dr. Pangan's participation
could not have contributed to the reality that the screw that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's
molar.
Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution of the person injured was satisfied in this case. It was not shown that Rosit's lung
disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered because one of the
screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar.
Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in the instant case and no
expert testimony is required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to make an "informed consent"
What is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to inform Rosit that such smaller screws
were available in Manila, albeit at a higher price.[16] As testified to by Dr. Gestuvo himself:
Court This titanium materials according to you were already available in the Philippines since
Alright. the time of Rosit's accident?
Witness Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
Did you inform Rosit about the existence of titanium screws and plates which
Court
according to you is the screws and plates of choice?
Witness No, your Honor.
xxxx
The reason I did not inform him anymore Judge because what I thought he was
Witness already hard up with the down payment. And if I will further introduce him this screws,
the more he will not be able to afford the operation.
Page | 12
 xxxx
This titanium screws and plates were available then it is up to Rosit to decide whether
Court to use it or not because after all the material you are using is paid by the patient
himscll, is it not?
Witness Yes, that is true.
Li v. Soliman[17] made the following disquisition on the relevant Doctrine of Informed Consent in
relation to medical negligence cases, to wit:
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far
back into English common law. x x x From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved
into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a
proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative
treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing
the probable risks against the probable benefits.
xxxx
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment."The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it." (emphasis supplied)
The four adverted essential elements above are present here.
First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the risks of using the larger screws
for the operation. This was his obligation as the physician undertaking the operation.
Second, Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose these risks to Rosit, deciding by himself that Rosit could
not afford to get the more expensive titanium screws.
Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the larger screws are not appropriate
for the operation and that an additional operation replacing the screws might be required to
replace the same, as what happened in this case, Rosit would not have agreed to the operation.
It bears pointing out that Rosit was, in fact, able to afford the use of the smaller titanium screws
that were later used by Dr. Pangan to replace the screws that were used by Dr. Gestuvo.
Fourth, as a result of using the larger screws, Rosit experienced pain and could not heal
properly because one of the screws hit his molar. This was evident from the fact that just three
(3) days after Dr. Pangan repeated the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo, Rosit was pain-free
and could already speak. This is compared to the one (1) month that Rosit suffered pain and
could not use his mouth after the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo until the operation of Dr.
Pangan.
Without a doubt, Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding material information which would have been
vital in the decision of Rosit in going through with the operation with the materials at hand. Thus,
Dr. Gestuvo is also guilty of negligence on this ground.
Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is not admissible
The appellate court's Decision absolving Dr. Gestuvo of negligence was also anchored on a
letter signed by Dr. Pangan who stated the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross
negligence in his emergency management of Mr. Rosit's fractured mandible.[18] Clearly, the
appellate court overlooked the elementary principle against hearsay evidence.
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[19] the Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that "an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand." Here, Dr.
Pangan never took the witness stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit. Thus, the affidavit is
inadmissible and cannot be given any weight. The CA, therefore, erred when it considered the
affidavit of Dr. Pangan, mpreso for considering the same as expert testimony.
Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert
witness, the Court is not bound by such testimony. As ruled in Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile:[20]
Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in
favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts
and circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not revicwable in the absence of an abuse
of that discretion.
Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence or not will not bind the
Court. The Court must weigh and examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits
thereof.
As discussed above, Dr. Gestuvo's negligence is clearly demonstrable by the doctrines of res
ipsa loquitur and informed consent.
Damages
For the foregoing, the trial court properly awarded Rosit actual damages after he was able to
prove the actual expenses that he incurred due to the negligence of Dr. Gestuvo. In Mendoza v.
Spouses Gomez,[21] the Court explained that a claimant is entitled to actual damages when the
damage he sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and he
adequately proved the amount of such damage.
Rosit is also entitled to moral damages as provided under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, [22] given
the unnecessary physical suffering he endured as a consequence of defendant's negligence.
To recall, from the time he was negligently operated upon by Dr. Gestuvo until three (3) days
from the corrective surgery performed by Dr. Pangan, or for a period of one (1) month, Rosit
suffered pain and could not properly use his jaw to speak or eat.
The trial court also properly awarded attorney's fees and costs of suit under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code,[23] since Rosit was compelled to litigate due to Dr. Gestuvo's refusal to pay for Rosit's
damages.
As to the award of exemplary damages, the same too has to be affirmed. In Mendoza,[24] the
Court enumerated the requisites for the award of exemplary damages:
Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded: First, they
may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
Page | 13
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Third, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
The three (3) requisites are met. Dr. Gestuvo's actions are clearly negligent. Likewise, Dr.
Gestuvo acted in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner when he was
in breach of the doctrine of informed consent. Dr. Gestuvo had the duty to fully explain to Rosit
the risks of using large screws for the operation. More importantly, he concealed the correct
medical procedure of using the smaller titanium screws mainly because of his erroneous belief
that Rosit cannot afford to buy the expensive titanium screws. Such concealment is clearly a
valid basis for an award of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated January 22, 2013 and
Resolution dated November 7, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00911-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, the Decision dated September 14, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in Davao City in Civil Case No. 27,345-99 is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which
affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in
Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto
Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number
CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-
type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together
with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type
jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8
meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the
RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead
of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the
venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence
of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of
the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there
was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as
these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime
in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that
his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that
her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she
thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one
Page | 14
month. She went to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did
not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court
where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with
other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was
Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the
TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had
brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said
criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial
court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by
counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was
marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-
M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers
per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep
and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on
the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep.
In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that
he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the
incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the
plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of
the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning
they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to
the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was
to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the
two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering
the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE
OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
Page | 15
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse
Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the
Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15 evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the
Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof. TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due
process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that
respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in
the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
21 Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on
petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same
issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.22 Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in
the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition."
We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no
have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the
opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
testimony may be entitled.29
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to
the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23 On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to
how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their
contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed
to object on their admissibility.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic.
but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as The allegations read:
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the
be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon
Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of was then driving the same;
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the
same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-
and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner
Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio
PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should
Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a
not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake
Page | 16
 "6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle
was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its
driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor
vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered
a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this
case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from
July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described
motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the
reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of
existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers;
x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when
the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident
was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond
the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an
accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained
of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author
of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review
thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Page | 17
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant
our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus
which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial
court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct,
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicle.
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. 43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before
he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its
employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient
proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim.
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that
Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court.
was incumbent on them.44
Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could
explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from
the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with
upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day
their supervisory functions.
after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference
between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility
of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said
prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee
Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden
affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place. supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption.
xxxx

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the
thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit
was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Page | 18
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:

From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very
good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of
evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the
safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles
assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed
to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents
similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for
the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner
Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned.
The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular
supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and
established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact
that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of
PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of
the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing
and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under
the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral
damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must,
likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1)
the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary
damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

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