Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Paul L. McDonald
P L MCDONALD LAW LLC
1800 JFK Boulevard, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (267) 238-3835
Facsimile: (267) 238-3801
Email: paul@plmcdonaldlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff and
the Proposed Collective
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
Defense Counsel do not directly dispute any of the legal and factual indictments of
Plaintiff Counsel exhaustively cites existing law in the Third Circuit, consistent
precedents to support the legal contentions in Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and
Defense Counsel neither dispute, nor contradict, any of these legal authorities, but
rather endeavor to deflect by reference to a handful of cases that are easily distinguishable
factually and/or procedurally, i.e., decided at summary judgment or trial after facts had been
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relied upon, U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) Field Operations Handbook (“FOH”)
§10b03(e) to categorize, or treat, NCAA-regulated sports the same as student-run groups, and
relationships with colleges. See Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions, Ex. 4; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to
Dismiss, Ex. 3.
Defense Counsel neither dispute, nor contradict, any of Defendants’ admissions and
policies distinguishing NCAA-regulated sports from student-run groups – or, for that matter,
any of the obvious similarities between NCAA-regulated sports and work study students
employed by Defendants as detailed in the Complaint. But, Defense Counsel still maintain
that Defendants “believed” that NCAA-regulated sports are the same as student-run groups
listed in DOL FOH §10b03(e), in spite of irrefutable evidence to the contrary, in a cynical effort
to deflect from the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct and urge this Court to reduce the
statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) although “whether Defendants acted willfully
is a question of fact that is typically inappropriate for summary judgment, much less at the
motion to dismiss stage.” See Reed v. Friendly’s Ice Cream, LLC, 15-CV-0298, 2016 U.S. Dist.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions – and their Replies in Support of Defendants’ Motions to
1 See Defs’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. for Sanctions (ECF 36), at 2 (incorporating
Defendants’ motion and reply papers by reference); Opp’n to Mot. for Sanctions (ECF 38), at 1
(incorporating Defendants’ Moving and Reply papers in support of their Motion to Dismiss by
reference).
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Defense Counsel cite nothing to dispute that existing law in the Third Circuit and
• employee status and joint employment under the FLSA are fact-intensive
inquiries, requiring application of discovery to multi-factor employee and
joint employment tests, and, thus, are not ripe for determination on a
motion to dismiss;
• the particular facts and legal reasoning of unpaid prison labor cases –
in which prisoner FLSA claims for employee status are precluded by the
Thirteenth Amendment’s solitary exception for involuntary servitude as
punishment for crime – are not analogous or applicable to FLSA claims
of non-prisoners;
• a defendant cannot preclude FLSA claims, and unilaterally “opt-out” of
FLSA coverage, based on its self-serving characterization of its relationship to
plaintiff because the “economic reality” of that relationship, and plaintiff’s
employee status, are determined by applying discovery to a multi-factor
employee test, see Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
105 S. Ct. 1953, 85 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1985); and
• non-regulatory DOL guidelines cannot preclude FLSA claims. See Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S. Ct. 161 (1944).
In fact, as demonstrated in Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, this existing law in the
Third Circuit regarding fact-intensive inquiries for employee status and joint employment –
and the sole exception to such fact-intensive inquiry in cases of unpaid prison labor, i.e.,
Defense Counsel, instead, attempt to muddy the waters by implying “existing law”
encompasses any single reported case and by referencing a handful of cases that are
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1. Mere Citation to Any Single Reported Case Does Not Satisfy Rule 11
Where, As Here, Defense Counsel Have Failed to Show Consistency
with Existing Law in the Relevant Circuit
Defense Counsel contend their reliance on a single case, Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285
(7th Cir. 2016), and the only case that follows it, Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F.Supp.3d 401
(N.D. Cal. 2017) – outside the Third Circuit, and contradicting existing law in the Third Circuit
But, citation to a reported case(s), alone, cannot insulate an attorney from sanction
under Rule 11. Rule 11 obviously contemplates, and applies to, attorneys citing some case(s)
or the Rule would stipulate that only failure to cite any case is sanctionable.
applicability of a case before relying on it, including the consistency of its reasoning with
existing law in the relevant Circuit. See, e.g., Parrish v. Freight Consolidation Servs., Inc.,
No. 86 C 3013, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3632, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1987) (granting
motion for sanctions where counsel ignored the prevailing standard adopted, and reaffirmed,
by the Circuit, relying instead on a single contrarian case superseded within the Circuit “and
blatant falsehood.
974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), clearly establishes that a prisoner – and only a prisoner –
cannot prove any set of facts, applied to any multi-factor employee test, to establish
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Defense Counsel chide Plaintiff Counsel for “ignoring” Benjamin v. B & H Educ., Inc.,
877 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2017), asserting that Benjamin recognized prison inmates, in Hale v.
Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993), and homeless persons in rehabilitation programs, in
Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1996), to be similarly situated under the FLSA.
Thus, Defense Counsel imply, there is no exception permitting only a motion to dismiss a
prisoner’s well-pleaded FLSA complaint, but rather the well-pleaded FLSA complaints of
But, both Benjamin and Williams were decided at summary judgment. Thus, neither
summary judgment or trial that undermine, rather than support, the premise of
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. See Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions, at 26 n.16, 30 n.18; also
Defense Counsel’s repeated failure to disclose the procedural posture of such cases is
sanctionable on grounds that Defense Counsel either (i) did not bother to read these cases,
in entirety as opposed to quotations out of context, or (ii) endeavor to mislead this Court.
From among all reported FLSA cases, across all Circuits, Defense Counsel only cite
a single case that affirmatively states that employee status is not fact-intensive: Berger,
843 F.3d at 294 (“We briefly conclude by addressing Appellants’ argument that employment
status is an inherently fact-intensive inquiry and thus should not be decided at the motion-
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Defense Counsel attempt to deflect from the fact-intensive nature of employee status,
recognized in all Circuits except for the Seventh Circuit, by reducing the question of
employee status to whether, or not, “expected compensation” falls under the FLSA.
But, as Defense Counsel well know, expectation of compensation is just one factor in
the multi-factor employee tests applied in each of the cases cited in Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions, at 7-11; “‘[n]either the presence nor absence of any particular factor is
dispositive’” in a multi-factor employee test, see Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139668, at *13-14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016) (Baylson, J.); and absence of
compensation, at the outset, does not preclude a finding of employee status under the FLSA.
could ever bring a FLSA claim for minimum wages. Such a result would be illogical.
Defense Counsel attempt to deflect from the fact-intensive nature of joint employment
by citing four cases: Katz v. DNC Servs. Corp., No. 16-5800, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17002
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2018); Richardson v. Bezar, No. 15-0772, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135294
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2015); Garcia v. Nunn, No. 13-6316, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127318 (E.D.
Pa. Sep. 23, 2015); and Attanasio v. Cmty. Health Sys., 863 F. Supp. 2d 417 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
In each, plaintiffs either pleaded that defendants were “entirely self-governing,” see,
e.g., Katz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17002, at *9, thus, undermining shared control, and/or
failed to plead “details as to the mechanics of the defendant’s alleged control,” see, e.g.,
Attanasio, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 424, such that an inference of shared control over terms and
conditions of labor, rather than unilateral discretion over the same, could not be drawn.
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In spite of pleading deficiencies, the only case, among the four, where the court denied
leave to amend was Richardson because plaintiffs “failed to file any response to the Motion
to Dismiss despite being granted an extension of time to do so,” and appeared “not interested
Here, Plaintiff has done the opposite, and pleaded, in great detail, the mechanics of
NCAA bylaws, by which Defendants mutually agree to shared control, and restrict
unilateral discretion, regarding “essential aspects of the [member] clubs’ labor relations,
including but not limited to the selection, retention, and termination of the players, the
terms of individual player contracts, dispute resolution and player discipline,” and each
Defendant school grants the NCAA “authority over not only its own labor relations but also,
on its behalf, authority over the labor relations of the other member clubs.” See, e.g.,
North American Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1980).
From among all reported FLSA cases, across all Circuits, Defense Counsel offer only
Defense Counsel have offered no nonfrivolous argument for this Court to join these
two outliers and radically reverse or change law in the Third Circuit.
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Indeed, because Defense Counsel did not “state expressly that he or she is arguing
for a reversal or change of law,” their legal contentions must be warranted by existing law
in the Third Circuit in order to comply with Rule 11(b)(2). See Amboy Bancorporation v.
Jenkins & Gilchrist, Civil Action No. 02-CV-5410, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68831, at *8-9
Defense Counsel attempt to escape the procedural corner they backed themselves
into by chiding Plaintiff Counsel for “ignoring” Mary Ann Pensiero v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90
(3d Cir. 1988) and Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1992), which
Defense Counsel contend relieve them of the obligation to “state expressly that he or she
But, the case relied upon in Pensiero and Langer – Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) – was superseded by the 1993 amendment
to Rule 11. See, e.g., Assoc. Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Cohn, No. C-93-1570-DLJ, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14746, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 1994); Hanson v. Loparex, Inc., No. 09-1070
(SRN/FLN), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117014, at *12-13 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2011).
The 1993 amendment to Rule 11 established an objective standard for arguments for
change of law to eliminate the “pure-heart” justification for frivolous arguments. While the
Advisory Committee Notes do not direct courts to require that arguments for change of law be
viewed with greater tolerance under the rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes.
Given this, it was within the discretion of the District of New Jersey to view absence
and it was reasonable for Plaintiff Counsel to rely upon Amboy Bancorporation.
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Indeed, here Defense Counsel have attempted to muddy the waters to give the
misimpression that Berger and Dawson are consistent with existing law rather than radical
departures from it. They ought to be held to the Amboy Bancorporation standard.
Defense Counsel’s assertion that Plaintiff does not dispute time-barring of the
Defense Counsel’s entire argument for reducing the statute of limitations under
29 U.S.C. § 255(a) rests on the premise that Defendants interpreted, and relied upon, DOL
FOH §10b03(e) to categorize, and treat, NCAA-regulated sports the same as student-run
groups, and student-run interscholastic Club Sports, that ordinarily do not implicate employer-
employee relationships with colleges. Therefore, Defense Counsel contend, Defendants could
But, the Complaint clearly pleads facts that not only demonstrate that Defendants,
by their own admissions and policies published on their websites, have never believed
this disingenuous argument of Defense Counsel, but also demonstrate the obvious similarities
between NCAA-regulated sports and work study students, whom Defendants recognize, and
treat, as employees. Indeed, the Complaint pleads that NCAA-regulated sports are like
work study programs, but on steroids. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss, at 1-3,
Moreover, the employee status of Scholarship Athletes is not some new controversy,
which Defendants could not have anticipated, or reflected upon, these past several years.
To the contrary, for more than a decade, a debate has raged out in the open, and behind
closed doors, among NCAA members in response to serious concerns and questioning about
the exploitation of Scholarship Athletes for the enormous, and exclusive, financial benefit of
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of, and true intent behind, mischaracterization of Scholarship Athlete employee status.
what existing law in the Third Circuit demands to determine whether Defendants’ conduct
warrants a three year statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). “[W]hether Defendants
acted willfully is a question of fact that is typically inappropriate for summary judgment,
much less at the motion to dismiss stage.” See Reed v. Friendly’s Ice Cream, LLC, 2016 U.S.
It is bad enough that Defense Counsel, in the face of Defendants’ own admissions and
policies contradicting Defense Counsel’s factual premise, persist in pushing an argument that
Worse, still, Defense Counsel, again, rely on cases decided at summary judgment or
trial that undermine, rather than support, Defense Counsel’s premise that willfulness
In six cases, Defense Counsel, again, fail to disclose procedural posture: Brock v.
Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1986) (summary judgment); Lugo v. Farmer's Pride,
802 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (summary judgment); Parada v. Banco Indus. de Venez.,
753 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary judgment); Stokes v. BWXT Pantex, L.L.C., 424 F.
App'x 324 (5th Cir. 2011) (bench trial); Reich v. Gateway President, 13 F.3d 685 (3d Cir.
1994) (bench trial); Callahan v. City of Sanger, No. 14-cv-600-BAM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
two cases: Hanscom v. Carteret Mortg. Corp., Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-2483, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89706 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2008) (summary judgment); Baugh v. CVS RX Servs., No. 15-
00014-MAK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181552 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2015) (summary judgment).
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Defense Counsel’s rant regarding Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528
(2d Cir. 2015) further demonstrates their intent to obfuscate at least, mislead at worse.
First, Defense Counsel imply that the multi-factor employee test articulated in Glatt is
some sort of “intern” test that cannot be analogized to, or modified for, different settings.
But, there is no “intern” test under the FLSA, let alone an “intern” classification.
There are only employee tests. In Glatt, the question was not whether plaintiffs were interns –
they were. The question was whether they were employees within the meaning of the FLSA
Moreover, Defense Counsel acknowledge that Glatt has been applied outside the
context of interns attempting to land their first job in Corporate America, including
application to students at schools. In Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199
(11th Cir. 2015), cited by Defense Counsel, former nursing students, who had attended a
master’s degree program at the defendant school, alleged they had been employed by the
defendant school during the program and were owed pay. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
Glatt test, vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant school, and
remanded. In Benjamin v. B & H Educ., Inc., cited by Defense Counsel, cosmetology students
alleged they had been employed by defendant schools during their educational program and
were owed pay. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Glatt test while affirming the district court’s
Dismiss, at 2 n.3, “[t]he Glatt primary beneficiary test aims to differentiate academic/
educational experience from compensable work, and it has been applied to students in a
range of school and corporate settings in the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.”
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Second, Defense Counsel chide Plaintiff Counsel for a “description of the Glatt test
and “no one factor is dispositive and every factor need not point in the same direction,”
such that the Glatt test need not be rigid in articulation or application.
Given this, Plaintiff Counsel’s summary of the Glatt test was plainly fair, including
See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss, at 2 n.3. (emphasis supplied) Glatt factor 1 regarding
Glatt factor 7 clearly is only relevant to Corporate America, and not to any school setting.
The nursing students, in Schumann, no more expected a paid job at the defendant school
upon graduation than the work study students employed by Defendants, here, expect a
Third, Defense Counsel chide Plaintiff Counsel for not “bother[ing] to actually apply
The Complaint clearly pleads facts that demonstrate that the five Glatt factors
articulated by Plaintiff Counsel – Glatt factors 2-6 – weigh in favor of Scholarship Athletes
as employees of Defendants as much as, and arguably more than, work study students
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The Complaint alleges that in both work study programs and NCAA-regulated
sports:
• student performance outside the classroom is: (i) non-academic in
nature; (ii) unrelated/irrelevant to an academic degree program; (iii) not
for academic credit; and (iv) supposed to be restricted to 20 hours per
week, recorded on timesheets maintained by the supervising staff of
the NCAA member school, to limit interference with academic studies;
• student performance primarily benefits NCAA member schools, and
provides no comparable academic or learning benefit to the student;
and
• NCAA member schools hire supervisory staff for the express and full-
time purpose of controlling and directing student performance, both as
to the result to be achieved and details by which that result is achieved.
In fact, by engaging in a debate regarding the ultimate outcome of the Glatt test before
discovery has been applied, Defense Counsel only further undermine the premise, and
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In the end, the only case that Defense Counsel have ever offered – here, and in
Berger and Dawson, before2 – granting a motion to dismiss a well-pleaded FLSA complaint,
Defense Counsel are fully aware that Vanskike only applies to, and precludes the
Defense Counsel are fully aware that Vanskike has been relied upon 14 times in
existing law in the Third Circuit – all cases involving employment-based claims of
detainees or prisoners. 3 See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 24), at 6 (citing Tourscher and
Defense Counsel’s insistence that Vanskike be applied here is not only legally frivolous,
but also deeply offensive to all Scholarship Athletes – and particularly to African-Americans. 4
The Thirteenth Amendment invokes the inhumanity of the slavery that it ended,
as well as the racial disparities of the criminal justice system and prison industrial complex
to which it gave rise as documented in the Oscar-nominated film, “13th” (Netflix 2016).
2 Jackson Lewis was defense counsel in Berger; Constangy was defense counsel in Dawson.
3 See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 1999); Northrop v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 1:CV-08-0746, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124931 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2008); Kounelis v.
Sherrer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2005); Wofford v. Lanigan, Civil Action No. 14-5723, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 172583 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2015); Planker v. Christie, Civil Action No. 13-4464, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6804 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2015); Shabazz v. N.J. Comm'r of Dep't of Corr., Civil Action No.
13-4968, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68294 (D.N.J. May 19, 2014); Banks v. Roberts, No. 1:06-CV-01232,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39658 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2007); Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App'x 776 (3d
Cir. 2013); Carey v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 06 - 1578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124933 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2008); Urbanski v. Horn, CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-4647, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15031 (E.D.
Pa. Sep. 25, 1998); Wilkerson v. Samuels, No. 3:12-CV-1462, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186147 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 13, 2012); Loyal v. Lanigan, Civil Action No. 15-5769, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116050 (D.N.J.
Aug. 30, 2016); Stile v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 16-3832, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114445 (D.N.J.
Aug. 25, 2016); Stile v. United States of America, No. 16-3832 (RMB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145388
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016).
4 Plaintiff, and Plaintiff Counsel, are African-American.
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“Texans players enraged over Bob McNair’s ‘inmates’ comment and these are the facts,”
So, Defense Counsel have engaged in disingenuous efforts here – and in Berger and
Dawson, before – to obfuscate that, when boiled down, Defendants assert the legal right to
treat Scholarship Athletes under NCAA-defined amateurism the same as unpaid prison labor
misleading those courts regarding the limited applicability of Vanskike to prisoners. Indeed,
the Thirteenth Amendment, exhaustively discussed in Vanskike as the ground for dismissal,
Defense Counsel try the same here, falsely stating “there is no ‘prisoner exception’ to
the FLSA” in spite of the Thirteenth Amendment. Defense Counsel never even acknowledge
the Thirteenth Amendment when discussing Vanskike in their moving and reply papers.
But, here and now, Defense Counsel’s sanctionable conduct is laid bare, and the crux
of their argument that Defendants have the legal right to treat college athletes the same as
unpaid prison labor is obvious. See, e.g., Sally Jenkins, “Are college athletes the same as
prisoners? These judges seem to think so,” The Washington Post, Jan. 5, 2017, attached to
Defense Counsel are asking this Court to create, out of whole cloth, a FLSA exemption
for NCAA-defined amateurism, neither enumerated nor defined in the statutory language
of the FLSA, and to give such unprecedented exemption the same claim preclusion effect as
This Court should reject Defense Counsel’s invitation to engage in judicial activism,
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Respectfully submitted,
s/ Paul L. McDonald
Paul L. McDonald
P L MCDONALD LAW LLC
1800 JFK Boulevard, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (267) 238-3835
Facsimile: (267) 238-3801
Email: paul@plmcdonaldlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff and the
Proposed Collective
Dated: February 20, 2018
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 20, 2018, the foregoing document was served on
counsel by filing via the CM/ECF system, which will send an email notice to registered parties.
s/ Paul L. McDonald
Paul L. McDonald
P L MCDONALD LAW LLC
ERRATUM
Please note the following Erratum in Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Failure to
On page 23, the third full paragraph from the bottom contains an incorrect reference to
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Paul L. McDonald
Paul L. McDonald
P L MCDONALD LAW LLC
1800 JFK Boulevard, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (267) 238-3835
Facsimile: (267) 238-3801
Email: paul@plmcdonaldlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff and the
Proposed Collective