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cross the empiricalsubfields of political sci- To advance and extend the methodologicaldebate
ence, we find in recent years a renewed and on this generalquestion,I examinetwo sets of specific
growinginterestin "historicalmacro-analysis" issues.First,what defines "history"as a distinctobject
(Katznelson1997,82), whichseeks to understandand of study? What are the implicationsof such a con-
causally explain processes with an importanttempo- ception of history for developing explicit theoretical
ral dimension,such as the formationand evolution of models? Is there an inherentincompatibilitybetween
formal and informalsocial institutions.This trend has modelingand the quest for explanationand narration
givenriseto "historicalinstitutionalism"(foroverviews of "history,"as some observers suggest (e.g., Elster
see Hall and Taylor1996;Immergut1998;Robertson 2000)? Based on an inclusiveconceptionof modeling
1993;Thelen 1999), which manifestsitself in much of and an explicit conception of "history"as processes
the newer literatureon the welfarestate and state for- rendereddistinctiveby the importanceof temporality,
mation in comparativepolitics and in the literature I arguethatmodelingsuchprocessesis particularlydif-
on American political development. In international ficultbut,nonetheless,possibleanddesirable.Farfrom
relations,manifestationsof this trend toward histor- being inherentlyfutile, modelinghistory is extremely
ical scholarshiprange from the interest in domestic useful, not least because models, by emphasizingthe
and internationalinstitutionsto the postmortemde- general,help us clarifywhatis historicallyand contex-
bate over the nature of the Cold War.Does this in- tually specificwhen we examinethe historicalrecord.
terestin historicalprocessesmerelyexpandthe subject Consequently,the "historicturnin the humansciences"
matter of political science or does it raise particular (McDonald 1996a)need not lead us away from what
methodological problems that require a distinct ap- scholarsof very differentpersuasionshave identified
proachto theorizingandto the presentationof empiri- as the particularstrength and source of progress of
cal informationto test the plausibilityor validityof our Americanpoliticalscience:the explicitmodelingof the
explanations?1 politicalphenomenawe seek to explain,so as to facil-
itate scrutinyof the deductivelogic of the explanation
Tim Blithe is the 2001/2002 Lindt Fellow of Columbia University, (see, e.g., Milner1998,and Waever1998).
completing a Ph.D. in the Department of Political Science on the Second,becausemost historicalworkin politicalsci-
impact of partisan politics on business confidence in the context of ence is narrativein form, I examine the relationship
globalization and variations in political and economic institutions. In between models and narrativesand, more generally,
2002/2003, he will be a James Bryant Conant Fellow at the Center for
European Studies at Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cam- the strengthsandweaknessesof narrativesas a type of
bridge, MA 02138 (tim.buthe@columbia.edu, http://www.buthe.net). "presentationof the results"of our analysis(Skocpol
For fruitful discussions and helpful comments on various ear-
lier versions of this paper I thank Jim Alt, Ruth Ben-Artzi,
1995, 44). Here, my focus differs from much recent
Charles Cameron, Derek Chollet, Lewis Edinger, Peter Hall, Robert
work that concentrateson narrativesas a source of
Keohane, Robert Lieberman, Sarah Lindemann, Solomon Major, empiricalinformationfor the analyst,either broadly,
Walter Mattli, Paul McDonald, Helen Milner, Andrew Nathan, conceptualizingall empiricalinformationas "text"to
Matt Nelson, Dan Nexon, Jamie O'Connell, Jack Snyder, Hendrik be interpreted(Ricoeur[1971]1979),ormorenarrowly,
Spruyt, Barry Weingast, the members of the Institutions Workshop
at Columbia University, and, especially, Ira Katznelson. I also thank concentratingon specificoralandwritten"histories"in
three anonymous reviewers for exceptionally thoughtful comments the formof narrativesas constitutiveelementsof ideas
and constructive criticisms. I have benefited from financial support and norms (e.g., Anderson [1983] 1991; Finnemore
from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the Depart- 1996;FinnemoreandSikkink1998)withinterestingim-
ment of Political Science at Columbia University and, during the
final stages of this research while an Exchange Scholar at Stanford
plicationsfor policy (e.g., Van Evera 1994,36f). These
works have been joined by predominantlymethod-
University, from the hospitality of Stanford's Department of Political
Science. ologicalcontributions(e.g., Heise 1993;Lustick1996),
1 Throughout this paper I subsume
epistemological issues under which often seek to raise social scientists'awareness
"methodological" ones. of historians'carefullydeveloped methods to discern
481
482
483
484
cause a change in preferencesby making altogether Gibbons 1992, 55ff, 173ff), and the extensive form
new outcomes available,which forces a reorderingof used to depict and analyze such dynamic games in-
the outcomes.The rise of Keynesianismprovides an deed "take[s]sequenceinto account"(Bateset al. 1998,
illustrationof this phenomenon.At the outset of the 14)-although it is based on a truncatedconceptionof
Great Depression,certainsocial actors failed to rank temporalityin that, withinsuch game models, "actual
firstamongtheirpreferencesa Keynesiandemand-side chronologyis importantonly insofar as it influences
stimuluspolicyandfailedto influencepolicymakersac- what one player knows about the actions of the sec-
cordingly,even thoughwith hindsightthe adoptionof ond" (Kreps 1990, 18). Models of historicalprocesses,
such a policy would have been the outcome that max- in contrast,need to derivethe constitutionof the actors
imized their material utility.Later, similarlysituated and explanatoryvariablessuch as actors'preferences
actorsindeed preferredsuch a policyover alternatives withinthe model in orderto allow for change (cf., e.g.,
and employedvariousstrategiesto achieve the adop- JacksonandNexon 1999,302ff).At the sametime,such
tion of Keynesianpoliciesby governments.Thisfinding endogenizationof explanatoryvariablesto capturedy-
does not suggest that, at the earlierpoint in time, the namicchange(and explainstasiswhereit occurs)does
actorswere less instrumentallyrationalin rankingthe not requirea fundamentallydifferentapproachto the-
outcomes and selecting their strategiesaccordingly- orizing.Some recent work in economics,for instance,
the "outcome"of Keynesianismjust had not been for- relies on only minor modificationsof rationalchoice
mulatedyet (Hall 1989). assumptionsto develop dynamicmodels of preference
Second, ideas and especially norms, being social formation(e.g., Becker 1996),which could be used as
constructs,can change (Ball, Farr,and Hanson 1989; a buildingblock of a largermodel of an historicalpro-
Ruggie1983;Wendt1999,esp. 113ff).An examplefrom cess. Evolutionarymodels developed in biology seem
the literatureon regimechangeillustratesthe resulting to be well suitedto being adaptedto explainthe socio-
changein preferencesnicely:Assume that policies are political processes of persistence and change in the
at least in part a functionof regime type, and assume knowledge,values,andhabitsto whichwe customarily
furtherthat regime type has no effects on the citizens refer as "culture"(Boyd and Richerson1985).In sum,
otherthanthroughpolicy(thereareno normativecom- endogenizingexplanatoryvariablesdoes not require
mitments to a particularregime type). Social actors a fundamentallynew approachbut can be achieved
(individualsor groups) may, under these conditions, throughbuildingon, or adapting,variousexistingtypes
be expectedto have preferencesover (i.e., rank-order) of models.
the regime types based on which regime type affords Endogenizing explanatory variables, however,
them the greatestimpacton policy(e.g.,Bracher[1955] comes at the expense of parsimonyor worse:Scholars
1971;Hallgarten1952;Lepsius1978;Przeworski1991, who seek causalexplanationsusuallyfrownuponendo-
passim, esp. 51ff). If actors now develop over time a genization because when the dependent variable is
normativecommitmentto a democraticform of gov- not only explained by, but also (partly) explains the
ernment, they will probablyrank-orderthe possible independentvariables,we run the risk of circularrea-
outcomes of a regime change differentlybecause the soning.Canwe avoidthisproblem?Sequenceprovides
utilitythatthey assignto the outcome"democracy"has the answer.
increasedrelativeto all other outcomes (e.g., Bermeo
1992;Di Palma 1990;Weingast1997). The actorsmay
stillrank-ordertheirstrategiesas beforeandmaythere- Sequence
fore choose the same action(for instance,acquiescence Sequenceallowsus to endogenizethe explanatoryvari-
to the rule of the currentnondemocraticregimeif the ables without havingto abandonmodelingand scien-
perceived risks and costs associated with doing any- tific aspirationsbecauseit enables us to avoid circular
thingelse renderotherpossiblestrategiesprohibitive), reasoning.Endogenizationinvolvesincorporatinginto
but theirpreferenceshave changed.1" the modelsomevariationof causalfeedbackloops from
The dynamic quality of temporality suggests that the explanandumto the explanatoryvariables.In a
models based on assumptionsof stable institutional static model, such feedbackloops make the argument
contexts, stable preferences, and constant units for circular.Determiningcausalitythen becomesimpossi-
which we record variable, independent attributes at ble. The sequential element of temporality, however,
any given point in time would be unsuited if we are gets us around this problem, because it allows us to
concerned with explaining history, understood as a have causal feedback loops from the explanandum at
macroprocess. Yet taking temporality seriously does one point in time to the explanatory variables at a later
not require abandoning modeling as such. In fact, stan- point in time only.'12
dard game theoretic models can incorporate dynamic The enabling effect of sequence is nicely illustrated
elements (for an introduction, see Brams 1994, and by an example of a causal feedback loop in the chapter
on education in Abram de Swaan's (1988) In Care of
11 Higher-level preferences surely remain the same (in this case,
the State, where the author seeks to explain the histor-
for instance, the preference for longer life or safer possessions,
which may be threatened by the current regime's sanctions against
ical process by which elementary education, once seen
prodemocracy activists). But-and this is the key to the differentia-
tion between preferences and strategies used here-those unchang-
12 Note that
ing higher-level preferences are insufficient by themselves to explain anticipated reactions can undermine the assumption that
the rank-ordering of outcomes in the situation at hand. events at time t are independent of events at time t + 1.
485
486
487
for making choices about where to begin and end a Third, what is the status of any narrative'struth
narrative. claim?As Mink ([1978]1987, 199) put this "dilemma
De Swaan(1988),whose use of historicalnarratives of the historicalnarrative":
is exemplary,achievessucha delineationof a temporal
... As historicalit claims to represent,throughits form,
sequence by defininghis explanandumas the process part of the real complexityof the past, but as narrative
bywhichelementaryeducationwastransformedfroma it is a productof imaginativeconstruction,whichcannot
privateandlocal affairinto a responsibilityof the state, defend its claim to truth by any accepted procedureof
providedat a basiclevel throughoutthe territorywithin argumentor authentication.
its reach,accordingto certainstandards(e.g.,a uniform
language)andfinancedthroughcompulsorymeasures. The problem here, as Andrew Norman (1991, 131)
This definitionof the explanandumsuggests that the pointsout, is not that"adiscursiverepresentationhas a
narrativemust startwith the initial moves (ideational structurethatthatwhichit representsdoes not."There
or practical)awayfrom the previouslocal and private is no necessarylink between discursivestructureand
systemof schoolingbutneed not be concernedwiththat misrepresentation.Moreover,some objectivecriteria
system'spriorhistory.And the narrativecan end when for assessinga narrative'struthclaimexist, suchas the
uniform,state-financedelementaryeducationhasbeen extent to which an authoris able to providefrom the
establishedin the countryin question,withoutneeding historicalrecordevidence that, afterhavingbeen sub-
to concernitself with the subsequentevolution of the jectedto standardhistoriographicprocedures,supports
educationalsystemor otherrelatedaspectsof the wel- the author's"story."It is therefore hardlynecessary
fare state. The specificationof the explanandumthus to equate historianswith novelists or fiction writers
provides the criteriafor choosing the beginningand (Gaddis 1992/93,56). Rather,the problemis that, be-
end of the narrative. cause facts never speakfor themselves(Lustick1996),
The second problem concerns the need to thereis an interpretativeelementthatcannotbe evalu-
"conclude"the narrativewhile the processmay be on- ated fromwithinthe narrativewithoutcircularreason-
going, which restrictsthe "generality"of our conclu- ing. To assess this aspect of the narrative,the reader
sions (King,Keohane,and Verba1994,137). If we use will have to drawon knowledgefrom sourcesexternal
feedbackloops in our models,throughwhicha change to the narrativeat hand;i.e., the reader will need to
in the value of the dependentvariableis hypothesized know somethingabout the historicalperiod in ques-
to change the value of some or all of the explanatory tion from other sources-sources that themselvesare
variablesat a later point in time, time itself acquires bound to have narrativequalities.Consequently,it is
an explanatoryrole (in interactionwith the original more meaningfulto endorse good narrativework as
explanatoryvariables).As long as only the explanatory "plausible,""persuasive,"or "compelling"-as seems
variables,and not the explanandumitself, are affected to be the practiceamonghistorians-ratherthan"true"
by time in this way,truncatingtime by setting an end or "right,"thoughwe certainlymayfindsome narrative
point for the narrativedoes not introducethe selec- workthatis poor andeven plain"wrong,"suchas when
tion bias that is caused by truncatingthe range of the its interpretationis marredby logical inconsistencies
dependentvariable(King, Keohane,and Verba 1994, or makesincorrectassertionsabout the chronologyof
128ff).But more than with conventionalindependent events.
variables,of whichwe may restrictthe range,we have Moreover,that the truthclaimof a narrativecannot
to be verycarefulaboutassumingconsistentcontinuity be assessed from within the narrativeitself also has
of the relationshipbetween the explanatoryvariables importantimplicationsfor the utility of narrativesas
and the explanandumbeyond the investigatedperiod. data on whichto test hypothesesderivedfrommodels.
When time itself becomes a factor in the model, as Presumably,no one will consciouslypublisha model
discussed above, we have to consider carefully how with empiricalinformationthat directlycontradictsit.
each explanatoryfactor is affectedby the progression Except for discardedalternativeexplanations(see be-
of the processthat we are tryingto explain.The extent low) and possibleoversights,then, the vulnerabilityof
to which we can expect the effect of time on the ex- the model to empiricaldisconfirmationis ultimately
planandum(throughthe other independentvariables) also externalto the narrative.
to continue as observed during the time period covered However, the use of multiple narratives may increase
by the narrative depends on the tenability, beyond this our confidence that the model indeed captures the key
time period, of the assumptions that we had to make dynamics of the process. Using multiple narratives is
to model the effect of time. This limitation of historical appropriate because models should be applicable to
narratives affects the confidence we can have in the more than a single instance if they have the benefits
generalizability of the insights we gain from them. The
solution, however, lies not in modestly claiming that our
([1906] 1975), for instance, long ago provided a fascinatingly simple
conclusions cannot be generalized but, rather, in pay- example of what we would today call a "second image reversed"
ing careful attention to temporality in both the model (Gourevitch 1978) model of state formation, capturing an essen-
and the narratives and specifying the implications for tial element of a causal mechanism that might explain not only the
various transformations of the "organization of the state" over the
generalization accordingly.17
thousand-year stretch of European history to which he applies it, but
also phenomena that occurred many decades after the formulation
17 The applicability of a historical model by no means needs to end of his model, such as European integration and the later parts of the
with the time period on which it was empirically tested. Otto Hintze "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991, esp. 85ff).
488
489
(2) I have soughtto make the case for narratives,iden- studyof historydoes notrequirea fundamentallydiffer-
tify four overlookedproblemswith theiruse as datato ent approach.Notwithstandingsome remaininglimita-
test modelsabouthistoricalprocesses,andofferat least tions, historicalnarrativescan providestrongsupport
partialsolutionsto these problems. for the plausibilityof a historicalmodel,maintaininga
I have arguedthat modelingis renderedmore dif- basic commitmentto a scientificapproachwhile over-
ficult when dealing with "history"due to the impor- coming several of the problemsof the compatibility
tance of the dynamicand sequentialaspects of tem- of historicalnarrativeand social science identifiedby
porality for processes that can be methodologically critics of the "protoscientific"ambitionsof historical
meaningfullydistinguishedas "historical."But social analyses.And it may be that at the level of broadhis-
scientistsinterestedin the studyof such"history"need torical phenomena,where the temporaldimensionis
not returnto narrativesthat, detached from any ex- cruciallyimportantto any explanation,providingsuch
plicit causal model of the historicalprocess they seek supportfor the plausibilityof the argumentis the best
to capture,implicitlymake-often sweeping--causal we can hope for, at least fromany one scholar.Science
claims based on hidden assumptionsand unspecified is, afterall, a collectiveenterprise(Weber[1919]1946).
causalmechanisms.Thereis no inherentincompatibil-
ity betweenthe deductivemodelingof causalrelation-
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