Particulars objects and things may agree in attribute in various ways.

They may agree in their

being black, white, wise, ignorant etc. It is in virtue of these agreements that metaphysicians seek to

identify what underwrites this attribute agreement. Metaphysical realism asserts that different objects

agree in attribute in virtue of standing in a particular relation of exemplification or instantiation toward

a common essence or universal. This universal is an abstract entity which stands over and above the

particulars which instantiate it. The realist holds that the existence of universals is indispensable in

understanding what makes subject-predicate statements true. For the realist, we must suppose that

there are universals, and that those entities are the referent of predicate terms. Consider the sentence

“Hawking is wise.” What makes this statement true? It appears that when we decompose the phrase, it

is true just in case the particular Hawking stands in a certain relation to the property of wisdom. To be

true, the property of wisdom must exist so that Hawking may be related to it in such a way that can

insure the truth of the statement. Furthermore, “wisdom” may be instantiated by more than one

particular. We may say that “Einstein is wise.” The predicate term “wise” can be applied in exactly the

same sense to different particulars. What we say about Hawking we say about Einstein, and so the term

“wise” must refer to the same entity in both statements. This universal entity must stand over and

above the particulars which instantiate it for this to be possible. This explains how we can then

meaningfully combine the two phrases into “Hawking and Einstein are wise.”