Tanado vs Tuvera 2) Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required there

was not always imperative

Facts: The petitioners, Tanada et al, invoking due process, demanded the
3) Publication when necessary did not have to be made in the Official
disclosure of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been
Gazette
published as required by law to. On the other hand, government argued
4) The subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
that publication is necessary “unless it is stated otherwise”. The statement
consequently not binding and not 8 members of the court
of such otherwise meant that the publication is not necessary. In April 24,
5) Issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
1985, the Court granted the petition and ordered the respondents “to
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
published
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
6) That publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official
binding force and effect.” Wi th this decision, the petitioners came to the
Gazette
Court again for reconsideration or clarification of the said decision.
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
Issues Whether or not laws of public nature or of general applicability shall
be published in the Official Gazette in full Facts: Cheong Boo, a Chinese native, died in Zamboanga leaving a property
worth nearly PhP 100,000 without a will. His property was being claimed by
Held: Yes. The Court finds that the clause “unless it is stated otherwise” in
Cheong Seng Gee, the respondent, who alleged that he is a legitimate child
Article 2 of the Civil Code applies to the date of effectivity and not to the
of Cheong Boo by Cheong Boo’s marriage to Tan Dit in China in 1895. The
requirement of publication. Thus, publication is compulsory for the law to
petitioner, Maria Adong, was also claiming Cheong Boo’s property on the
take effect and only the period of fifteen days after the publication of the
ground that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896. The
law is under the discretion of the legislature to change. For example, the
Court of First Instance of Zambaonga examined these conflicting claims. The
Civil Code took effect after one year of its publication and not fifteen days
said court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the marriage
after of its publication. Omission of the publication would render the public
of Cheong Boo to Tan Dit but the immigration document of Cheong Seng
unaware of the laws. It cannot be assumed that the public knows the laws
Gee, which showed that he was admitted to the Philippines as Cheong Boo’s
without the publication of the laws. Furthermore, the Court clarified that
son, he has the right in the property as a natural child. As for the side of
the laws which are needed to be published are laws that affect public
Maria Adong, the court ruled that the marriage was sufficiently proven but
interest. Such laws include all statutes, presidential decrees, executive
the marriage was not lawful under the laws of the Philippines on marriage.
orders and administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce
The daughters of Adong with Cheong Boo could also therefore inherit, as
existing law. Regulations and letters of instructions that are internal in
natural children, the property of the deceased. In summary, the order of the
nature and affect only a specific agency need not be published. Lastly, the
court was that the estate left by Cheong Boo should be divided among
Court ruled that the publication of laws should be in full text as its purpose
Cheong Seng Gee and the daughters of Cheong Boo with Adong, namely
is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
Payang and Rosalia, as natural children. Both parties appealed to the
Additional notes decision of the said court and therefore, led to this petition.

Respondents: Issues:

1) Motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefor (1) Whether or not the marriage of Cheong Boo to Tan Dit in China is valid
dismissed
(2) Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage of Cheong Boo to Maria
Adong is valid
Held:
(1) No. The marriage in China is only proven by a letter in Chinese by
Tan Dit’s sister to Cheong Boo’s father that Tan Dit is accepting the
marriage. This proof, however, is not enough to show that the
Chinese marriage is valid. Section IV of the Marriage Law states that
“All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be
valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted,
are valid in these Islands.” Thus, the laws of the foreign country
where the marriage happened should be presented first before
proving the alleged marriage. Since there is no competent
testimony on the marriage laws of China, there is not enough
evidence to show that the marriage of Cheong Boo to Tan Dit is
valid. The court, however, allowed Cheong Seng Gee “testamentary
rights of an acknowledged natural child” because of Cheong Seng
Gee’s immigration document wherein he is recognized as Cheong
Boo’s son.
(2) Yes. There are many evidences that prove the marriage of Cheong
Boo to Mara Adong. Such evidences include eyewitnesses of the
wedding ceremony, Mohammedan Iman who solemnized the
marriage and different documents where Cheong Boo established
Mara Adong as his lawful wife. Moreover, the court affirms the
validity of Mohammedan marriages such as the marriage of Cheong
Boo and Adong in the Philippines by taking into consideration three
sections of the Marriage Law. First, Mohammedan marriages satisfy
Section V of the Marriage Law which suggests that marriage be
solemnized by a “minister of the Gospel of any denomination.” In
the case of Cheong Boo and Adong’s marriage, this is Mohammedan
Iman. Second, Section VI of the Marriage Law suggests that “No
particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.” This
section affirms that there is no prescribed form for the ceremony
but capacity and consent of the parties should be present. The court
rules that both essentials were present in Mohammedan marriage
in the case at bar. Third, Section IX of the Marriage Law is “in the
nature of a curative position intended to safeguard society by
legalizing marriages.” In this regard, the court would like to turn to
public policy to come up with a decision. By invalidating the
marriage of Adong and Cheong Boo, it would also invalidate other
Mohammedan marriages. This would be disastrous and would make
children out of these marriages illegitimate. As such, to promote
public policy, Section IX of the Marriage Law validates
Mohammedan marriages such that of Maria Adong and Cheong
Boo.
Additional Notes
Question:
1) Case was in 1922 while the Civil Code was enacted in 1950. If the
Civil Code is enacted before this case, then, given that Article 16
states that “intestate and testamentary successions shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration”. One of the facts is that Cheong Boo is a
Chinese native. Therefore, the laws of China should apply.
2) Mohammedan marriage as custom that is not contrary to public
policy (Article 11)
People of the Philippines vs Patalin
Facts: Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin Jr were charge with the crime of
robbery in which they were alleged to take, steal and carry away monetary
and material properties of Aliman household during the evening of August
11, 1984. On the same night, information suggests that after stealing from
the Aliman household, they, together with Nestor Ras, went to the Carcillar
household. In the Carcillar household, they did not only steal monetary and
material properties but also raped the Carcillar sisters. Thus, Alex Mijaque,
Alfonso Patalin Jr, and Nestor Ras were charged with the crime of robbery
with multiple rape. A trial on the merits suggested that there were enough
evidence that the accused in these cases were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. As such, in the crime of robbery, Mijaque and Patalin were
sentenced the penalty of imprisonment and pay back to the Aliman the
amount of the stolen properties. In the crime of robbery of multiple rape,
Mijaque, Patalin and Ras were sentenced to a death penalty and assure the
Carcillar family the amount of the stolen properties. With the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, death penalty was abolished and previously imposed
death penalties were reduced to reclusion perpetua. However, the Congress
restored the death penalty which took effect on January 1, 1994. Appellants
argued that they are not covered by the restoration of death penalty.
Issues: Whether or not the restoration of death penalty on January 1, 1994
is applicable to the accused
Held: No. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws
shall have no retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
felony, who is not a habitual criminal … although at the time of publication
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.” The court pointed out that for penal provisions may be
given retroactive effect during three possible stages of crime prosecution:
(a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began, (b)
when sentence has been passed but the services has not begun; and (c)
when the sentence is being carried out. With the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the appellants receive the benefit of the abolishment of death
penalty. They have accrued a right to life. Retroactive effect on statutes may
only be applied when it is favorable to the accused and should not be
applied if it provides more damage because it will impair the accrued right.
Therefore, the restoration of death penalty is not applicable to the accused.
Cui vs Arellano University
Facts: The plaintiff, Emeterio Cui, took up his prelaw in the defendant school
which is the Arellano University. After which, he entered the College of Law
of the said school until the first semester of his fourth year. He enrolled
again in the defendant school for his last semester in law but he could not
pay the tuition because his uncle, Francisco R. Capistrano who is the former
dean of the defendant’s College of Law, accepted the deanship and
chancellorship in College of Law of Abad Santos University. He, then,
transferred to Abad Santos University for his last semester. During his stay
in the defendant school, the tuition he paid was always reimbursed at the
end of the semester because he was awarded scholarship grants for
scholastic merits. In total, the scholarship grants amounted to P1,033.87.
When he was about to take the bar, he needed his transcript from the
defendant school but the defendant would not give the said transcript
unless the plaintiff pays back the amount of P1033.87. To be able to take
the bar, the plaintiff paid the said amount and was asked to sign a contract
that stated, “I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the University the equivalent of my scholarship cash.”
Having read Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools
about Scholarship which stated, “…scholarships should not be subsequently
charged to the recipient student when they decide to quit school or transfer
to another institution,” filed a petition against the defendant. The lower
denied the petition on the ground that said memorandum is not a law and
therefore, not mandatory in nature but is advisory.
Issue: Whether or not the contract where the petitioner waived his right to
transfer to another school without refunding to the defendant the amount
of P1,033.87 which is the monetary amount of the scholarship grant is valid
Held: No. The Court finds the contract to be null and void because it is
contrary to the issued memorandum which is identified by the court
incorporating “sound principle of public policy.” Thus, Memorandum No. 38
is a sound policy. A contract is void against public policy if it is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals. By awarding scholarship only to attract
students and keep them is not good customs and do not receive social and
practical confirmation. It is more of a business scheme. By demanding for a
refund from the plaintiff, the defendant is “inconsistent with sound policy
and good morals” and therefore, void against public policy.
United States vs Soliman
Facts: Gabino Soliman, the defendant, was charged with estafa and
testifying on his behalf, gave a false testimony imputing other person. In his
case of estafa, he was acquitted on the ground that there was room for
reasonable doubt. However, his false testimony suggests that he is guilty of
the crime perjury which is defined and penalized under section 3 of Act No.
1697 where the penalty is imprisonment and payment of a fine.The
judgment was entered in November 23, 1915. On July 1, 1916, section 3 of
Act No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of an
Administrative code that suggested that the judgment convicting and
sentencing the accused under the former provision should not be sustained
and that the criminal responsibility of the accused is remitted and
extinguished.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative Code had relieved Soliman of his
penalties
Held:
(1) No. Before Section 3 of Act No. 1697 is repealed expressly by the
Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), Section 3 of Act No. 1 repealed
by implication the provisions of the Penal Code on the crime of
perjury. The court pointed out that when a law repeals a prior law
by implication, “the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior
law.” In the case at bar, since section 3 of act no 1697 repeals the
Penal Code by implication, it, being repealed expressly by the
Administrative Code, revives the provisions of the Penal Code on
the crime of Perjury. Furthermore, in case a statute is repealed, Act
No. 2142 prescribes that the penalty that should be given to the
accused is the one favorable to accused whether be it the penalty of
the repealed statute or the new statute. By comparing the penalties
of the provions of the Penal Code on perjury and Section 3 of Act
no. 1697, the Penal Code has lighted penalty of 4 months and 1 day
of aresto mayor and a fine of 75 pesos. Thus, Soliman’s penalties
have not been relieved but rather, reduced.
United States vs Palacio
Facts: The defendant, Mateo P. Palacio, was accused by violating section 87
of Act No. 82 or the Municipal code. Palacio was a deputy to the provincial
assessor of Leyte and had the task of assessing real property. He allegedly
omit from the tax list some properties and improvements of Francisco
Madlonito with the knowledge that such properties were fully taxable. The
defendant’s counsel argued that the alleged facts do not apply to the crime
provided for and punished by section 87 of Act. No. 82 because of the
enactment of Act no. 2238 that allowed the creation of the position of
provincial assessor and his clerks and deputies. Hence, the position of the
defendant is subjected to later act and not with the former act. On January
15, 1915, the Court of First Instance decided that the defendant is guilty of
the crime and thus sentenced of imprisonment and pay a fine of P10. The
defendant had appealed and hence, the following issues.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the evidence
adducted at trail proves defendant’s guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt
(2) Whether or not the penal provision contained in section 87 of Act
No. 82 is applicable to the accused
Held:
(1) No. Palacio argued that he relied on the information on the
property and the improvments provided by Madlonito and the two
labors who measured the properties of Madlonito. The court ruled
that Palacio should have verified the information given to him.
Furthermore, with the circumstance that he had passed by the
house of Madlonito, he, therefore, had the opportunity to check if
the information given to him were correct. Thus, he willfully
omitted from his report the correct measurements of Malonito’s
property which are all fully taxable.
(2) Yes. “When there two laws on the same subject enacted different
dates, and it appears evident by the form and essence of the later
law that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the
whole of the subject and that it is a complete and perfect system, or
is in itself a provision, the latest law should be considered as a legal
declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force
and that all that is not shall be rejected and repealed. An
examination of Act 2238 will suggest that Act 2238 is a
complementary of Act 82 and thus, it does not cover the whole
subject of Act 82. As such, all that is in Act 82 and not in Act 2238
shall not be repealed. The penal provisions applicable to the
violation of the defendant still stand.
Ang Ping vs Regional Trial Court of Manila
Facts: On November 13, 1895, in GR No 70581, the Supreme Court affirmed
the October 25, 1983 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court and the
partial grant of the Regional Trial Court of motion for reconsideration in July
5, 1984 wherein the penalties provided by the MTC in October 25, 1983
were reduced. The case was an ejectment case. The petitioners went back
to the MTC where they filed for execution of the judgment but the
respondents opposed the motion because they filed a complainant
annulment of sale in the RTC and was ruled on their favor on ground of
equity under Article 19 of the Civil Code wherein the petitioners were
ordered to sell a portion of the property to the respondents. This is the
second case between the petitioners and the respondents. The first case as
mentioned earlier was an ejectment case while this second case was for an
annulment of sale. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
denied and thus, the matter was raised to the Court of Appeals where the
case of annulment of sale is still pending. On the other hand, the MTC
denied the respondent’s opposition and granted the motion for execution.
The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO or
preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ of execution
in the ejectment case which was granted by the RTC. The petitioners came
to the Supreme Court again to petition that both the respondents and the
respondents court in the annulment of sale case gravely abused its
discretion by filing and granting the TRO.
Issue: Whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment
case which has gone all the way to the Supreme Court may be stayed by a
trial court in favor of the petitioners even though there is a pending
judgment by the regional court of nullification of sale and title that may
favor the respondents
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court provided that the case, which is an ejectment
case, filed in the MTC is different to the case filed in the RTC that is on the
matters of nullification of sale and reconveyance of property. The ejectment
case is about the possession of the property while the nullification case is
about the ownership of the property. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also
pointed out that it still proceeded in making a judgment on November 13,
1985 knowing that there is a pending case on the nullification of sale. In that
judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the MTC. Being a
higher court, the Supreme Court has the final say. Therefore, as a lower
court, it is the MTC’s duty to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Given that the Supreme Court already made a judgment in the ejectment
case by affirming the decision of the MTC with modification, when the
petitioners came back to MTC where they filed a motion for execution of
the judgment, the MTC can execute the final judgment by following the
judgment of the Supreme Court.
Nactor vs Intermediate Appelate Court
Facts: In 1962, the Melchor spouses, who are the plaintiff-respondents in
this case, as they were intending to go abroad allowed Guillermo Nactor,
who is one of the defendants-petitioner, to build a shanty in their property.
This is under the agreement that Nactor would be the caretaker of the said
property and would not allow squatter to trespass. However, Nactor let his
relatives to build houses in the property without the knowledge of the
spouses. When the spouses returned to the Philippines, they had discovered
that there were squatters in their property and therefore, asked Nactor and
his relatives to vacate the property. Nactor and his relatives refused which
prompted the spouses to file a complaint with the barangay and the
barangay elevated the case in Metropolitan Trial Court. The trial court was
in favor of the spouses on September 5, 1984. The Nactor family filed an
appeal in the RTC but the RTC affirmed the decision of the trial court on
June 4, 1985. They filed for a reconsideration on June 24, 1985 but the
Judge denied and it became final and executory on October 22, 1985. The
spouses were awarded writ of execution on the other hand. The Nactor
family moved to the Court of Appeals and filed for a review on certiorari on
January 30, 1986. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the RTC. They filed a motion for reconsideration on February 22, 19856 but
again denied by the Court of Appeals on March 21, 1986. The Nactor family
did not stop their and filed a review on certiorari seeking to set aside or
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, Nactor
family, argued that the lack of cause of action by the complainants based on
the ground that the other family members except Guillermo Nactor should
be charged with forcible entry instead of unlawful detainer. The
complainants therefore should make a written demand to the petitioners to
vacate the property with compliance with the Rules of Forcible Entry case
which the spouses failed to do and that the court has no jurisdiction over
the case.
Issues:
 (1) Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed on June 24,
1985 is already late by one day
(2) Whether or not the complainants lack cause of action and the court
a quo lack jurisdiction

Held:

(1) No. The last day of the submission of the motion for reconsideration
falls on a Sunday. In the computation of periods, the first day should
be excluded while the last day is included. However, if the last day
falls on a Sunday or a legal holiday, the period will be extended on
the next day which should neither be a Sunday nor a legal holiday.
(2) No. The caption of the case is not controlling for it does not
materially alter the situation. The allegations are the ones
controlling for they “determine the nature of the action and even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by court if the facts alleged in complainant
and the evidence introduced so warrant.” Furthermore, the
unlawful detainer case can still hold against the petitioners since the
relatives of Nactor are in the property under the “apparent
protection” of Guillermo. Therefore, the court affirms the decision
of the Court of Appeals.