TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs.

HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749 January

31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was
considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of
California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was
rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law
should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional
rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that
inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts
must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that
finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on
the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed
by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,
ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back
and forth.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of
the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who
was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor
has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of
the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied.
Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines,
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port
of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines
until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until
1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs.
"MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at
the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he
was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in
1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of
the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he
divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to
the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is
used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of
its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified
to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign
law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the
foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of
Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the
internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to
whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary
with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted therenvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the
validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal
law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid
by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last
domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the
so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign
law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp.
523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction,
but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by
the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article
are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating
not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of
the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the
place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would
distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law
would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property.
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal
law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one
for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce
the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it
does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical
with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.
Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward
Bellis
20 SCRA 358 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Nationality Principle
Succession – Nationality of the Decedent – Legitimes
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he
divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria
Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the
other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything.
The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes
to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their
legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE’S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People’s Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was “a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.” By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will
was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including
the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totaling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in
the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor —
pursuant to the “Twelfth” clause of the testator’s Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s seven legitimate children by his first
and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced
by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor’s final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting
the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants’ position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article”
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16
in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
WHEREFORE, the order of the probate court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted
serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen.
Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was
registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or
appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial
granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and
the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because
the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became
an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as “Alicia”), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Lorenzo”) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years
that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March
10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his
wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
“Crisologo Llorente,” with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a
written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as
part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they
would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and
Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary
Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel,
John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of
the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued
an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their twenty-five (25)
year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children, to wit:
“(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
“(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
“(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul
F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of
the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
“(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be
sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
“(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if
of age;
“(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without
bond;
“(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
“(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side
should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children
with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them
by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.”17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for
the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still
alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to
Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper “Bicol Star”. 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
“Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with
Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F.
Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any
share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the
status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
“On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares
the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her
entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should
go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
“Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a
bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three
(3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which
shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from
the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to
perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
“On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
“SO ORDERED.”27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo
since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court
declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia
is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
“SO ORDERED.”32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, 36 the issue is
simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of:
(1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
“Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
“Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign
law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was
“referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that “American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice,
who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice,
and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her right to inherit” from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 43 We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
“Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
“When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.” (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.” 44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s
national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the
estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.