193 Phil.
730 In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was
SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA, COMPLAINANT, VS. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of
lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975) on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit
relationship resulted in the birth on Sep-tember 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino
Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City.
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while
Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts
but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971,
Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They
renewed their relation-ship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding
themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had
gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she
had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual inter-course with him, she jokingly said that
she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man.
Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her
very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his
acquaintances that he and Mag-dalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his
law studies in Davao City. Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and
tele-grams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino
went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were
married although they were not really so. Segundino con-vinced Magdalena's father to
have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and
concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he
would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when
Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community
Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975.
Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped
corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went
to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get
married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage
could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on Novem-ber 25, 1975. She was
broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical inju-ries upon her because she had a
confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the
Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the
father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry
Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She
had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child
before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's
cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not
warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profes-sion. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral con-duct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional be-havior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, dis-barment of
the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in consonance with the canons of the
moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation
from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's
behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or with-out the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as "gross-ly immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding
circums-tances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed,
observed that "the legis-lator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a
man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation
when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is
1
so inducive to sin or crime that the saying 'A fair booty makes many a thief' or 'An open the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint
door may tempt a saint' has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535). whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a Villanueva.
marriage license and despite the birth of a child in conse-quence of their sexual This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor
intercourse; he married another woman, and during Virginia' s pregnancy, Lopez urged her unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montaña vs. Ruado, Administra-tive Case No.
to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547,
abortion, to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667; Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz,
Feb-ruary 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979, 93 SCRA 91).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cab-rera believe that they were married Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for
before Leoncio V. Ag-lubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake mar-riage, they disbarment against the respond-ent is hereby dismissed.
cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256). SO ORDERED.
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his law-ful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313). Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., on leave.
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on
her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities,
while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from
the complain-ant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not
worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando
Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling
her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get
married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative
Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and
making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Jose-fina
Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote
to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you
along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for
worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in
my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen
years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her
eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar
to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villa-nueva
had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954.
They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several
letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
One letter in 1951 contains expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar
nature as to render them un-quotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of
2
692 Phil. 202
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116, August 01, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr.
Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross
misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,[1] complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action
for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional
Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter[2] dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of
attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P40 million. Instead, he was
informed through a letter[3] dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same
after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then
demanded the payment of his commission[4] which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards
required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom
he has two children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four children.
He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business[5] without the required
authorization from the Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent
fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a
forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he
clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and
for the corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales,
for filing a baseless complaint.[6]
In the Resolution[7] dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation[8] dated October 10, 2008, the
Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)
year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No.
XIX-2010-453[9] dated August 28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration[10] which
was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code.[11] Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting
of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the
August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken
the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,[12] Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been
assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws.[13] Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath[14] and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been
sufficiently established. A “business” requires some form of investment and a sufficient
number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. [15] The
lending of money to a single person without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed as indicia that respondent is
engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are
minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and as member of the bar,[16] or the misconduct borders on the
criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance,[17] which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
3
effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member
of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Bersamin,*and Abad, JJ., concur.

4
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 3249, November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUT
ION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D.
Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint
was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission”), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default
for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same
Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16
December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16
December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989.
The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times --- first, for
25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as
complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that
she and her husband had already "reconciled." In an order dated 17 April 1989, the
Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for
confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal
motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party
responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP
Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts,
admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino
Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court. Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and
left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely
G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova
introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova.
Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the
public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the
support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from
a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent
Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home: that
respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had
taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid
Melanie from the complainant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their
children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating
that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also
agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming
the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral
behaviour of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon
him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission
to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,[1] this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession x x x of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of the law x x x and its loss requires suspension or disbarment,
even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment."[2] It is important
to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery at the inviolable social
institution of marriage."[3] In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and
won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and
bore him a son. Because responden't's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally
repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena,[4] the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the
bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have
engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son: and to
have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
5
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the
humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound,
failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform", respondent took up again
with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young
daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and
this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and
that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.

6
43 Phil. 293
, April 07, 1922
IN RE MARCELINO LONTOK.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his
office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands, because of having been convicted of the crime of
bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases
his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor-General Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of
bigamy. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further
attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On
February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:
"By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act of August 29,
1916, the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok, convicted by the Court of First Instance
of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to imprisonment for eight
years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings, which sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme Court,
is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct."
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-General
relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21.) That conviction of the
crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be
doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-
General. On the one hand, it is contended by the Government that while the pardon
removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other
hand, it is contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offense for which, he
was convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a court
to disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination, however, it will be
found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real and arises from
differences in the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based.
Where proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend
alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it
has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted, (In re
Emmons [1915], 29 Cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343.) But where
proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a
transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the
effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not
operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character
and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law. (People vs. Burton
[1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900], 186 111., 122; Nelson vs. Com. [1908], 128
Ky., 779; Case of In re———[1881], 86 N. Y., 563.)
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly in point. The
petitioner in this case applied for & license to practice law in the United States courts,
without first taking an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given aid to any
government hostile to the United States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems,
had been a member of the Confederate Congress, during the secession of the South, but
had been pardoned by the President of the United States. It was held, by a divided court,
that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense named would be to
enforce a punishment for the offense, notwithstanding the pardon, which the court had no
right to do; and the petition was granted. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the
court, in part, said:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innqcent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, if
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new flian, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
"There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or
property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment."
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the
Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under
obligation to follow the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher court. We do
this with the more grace when we recall that according to article 130 of the Penal Code,
one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon. We must
also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of
conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language
of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole.
It may be mentioned, however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be
guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then
become subject to disbarment.
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and that
the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section 24 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
7
115 Phil. 647
Adm. Case No. 363, July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on
October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of
Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death.
Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G. R.
No. L-7101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of
the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19,
1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the
roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due
time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding his previous conviction but
pleading the conditional pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In
re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or
to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man. State ex rel. Conklin vs. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is
placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of
bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for
his disbarment on the ground of such conviction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike on attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend
alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it
has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to
support it, namely, In re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
"We are of the opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the
felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in
article 226. This record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon,
and could not therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony."
Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon
falling short of this would not be pardon, according to the judicial construction which that
act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote vs. U.S. 95 U.S.
149, and cases there cited; Young vs. Young, 61 Tex, 191."
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case
is as follows:
"'A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.'"
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that
in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him
committed in connection with the rebellion (civil war) against the government of the
United States."
The foregoing considerations render In re Lontok in applicable here. Respondent Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he
invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal
mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez,
supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the
Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk
of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556;
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recrency
to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."
Wherefore, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and
his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C. J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.
8
202 Phil. 322
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and
the inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys.
The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision
promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an
indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
of the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member
of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus.
Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the
genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix,
and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality
thereof, petitioner commenced service of the sentence.
Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this
Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment
on April 12, 1961.[1]
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and
unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights."[2]
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner, had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of
law, the first of which was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30,
1968.
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was
deferred "until after the integration of the bar has been effected."[3]
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others,
of the following documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association
signed by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for reinstatement[4]; the certificate of the
mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where petitioner has been residing,
to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral character, a peace-loving and
law-abiding citizen"[5]; a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros Oriental,
attesting to the fact that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has
comported himself as a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active
and has cooperated in civic and social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead
a decent and dignified life"[6]; the certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of
Law, Siliman University, vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life x x x and
because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the community and
regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates"[7]; the statement of Atty.
Alexander G. Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces x x x is a person of good moral
character, whose integrity is beyond question"[8]; and the clearance certificates issued by
Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete Provincial Fiscal Andrew S.
Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the
effect that petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his release from
the national penitentiary he "has never been accused or convicted of any crime involving
moral turpetude."[9]
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president,
Atty. Marcelo B. Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for reinstatement.
On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment
proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed
by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental,
addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and referred to this Court,
opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-reformation, immoral
conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer."
Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made
the following observations:
"By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have
been referred to the Integrated Bar for comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to respondent's petition and
supplementary petition for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of
Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos,
requesting the Office of the President to oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
"It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above
stated petition for reinstatement.
"Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the
Integrated Bar received a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the
Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the
reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978 the President of
the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned
petitions and telegram.
"This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated November 3, 1978, which is
being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent
papers.
"It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse
allegations and charges which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality
(publicly maintaining a querida) and gambling are general statements devoid of particular
allegations of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops the list of persons who have
signed the February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr.
Vailoces, appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a
Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is personally known to me as a person of
exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in
9
all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our respectable citizens in our Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor
community.' That this official should now sign a petition containing statements exactly x x x that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself
opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will
difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces' imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay. endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer's oath.
"As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of
the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and attorneys.
hostility, etc. are matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and charges SO ORDERED.
in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant that Mr. Vailoces in his 
Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Vasquez,
comment states: 'If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Aquino, and Melencio-
considering really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for Herrera, JJ., no part.
her satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a
modest amount because I am only a small farmer with still three college students to
support.'
"Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as
grounds for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces' petition for reinstatement the alleged
'grounds of non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer
by soliciting cases,' there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in such statement of
grounds that one is at a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces
could properly defend himself against such charges."
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's
"reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys."
This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras
and Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and
on August 4, 1982, the latter, after conducting an investigation, submitted his report,
recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the roll of attorneys upon
taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently
proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon
extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to
the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
evidence" [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]
"The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good
moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an
attorney x x x" [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the
respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community.
The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros
Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of
Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his
active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral
reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has
reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a
period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.
10