CASUAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION The CA however reversed the decision, on the ground that there is a

presumption of negligence by Jabon because his driver’s license was

TISON et al. vs SPS. POMASIN not one that allowed him to drive vehicles of the nature of trailer
trucks.
Facts:
Issue:
This case is regarding a collision between a Jitney and a Trailer-Truck,
the jitney having been the vehicle of the respondents, and the Trailer WON Petitioners are liable for damages for being negligent.
Truck having been driven by petitioner Jabon.
Ruling:
On the 12th of August, 1994, petitioner Jabon, driving his trailer truck,
Petitioners were not negligent.
was met on the road by the respondent’s jitney driven by Laarni
Pomasin. The two vehicles were driving in opposite directions, on in a As between the consistent testimony of Jabon that he was the one
curve going downhill, and the other going uphill. Which vehicle was ascending the hill and that the respondents car zigzagged and cause
going which way is one of the relevant issues in this case. the collision, against the testimony of Gregorio, which was originally
that they were exiting a curve and going downhill, but had changed
The two vehicles collided, causing the death of several of the
during cross-examination to being that they were the one going uphill,
passengers of the jitney and the injuries of both the trailer truck’s
the testimony of Jabon is more credible. It is then improbable that
passenger and driver.
Jabon was the one over-speeding, for a trailer truck could not possibly
Tison, the owner of the trailer truck, extended financial assistance to go at high speeds when ascending a slope.
the aggrieved family in the amount of P1000.00 per person, as well
The presumption of negligence was also disputed by Petitioners when
as P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin, who signed an affidavit of
they proved that it was the LTO who mistakenly labelled Jabon’s
desistance for such financial assistance. It was however proven that
license as one not authorized to drive trailer truck type vehicles.
Cynthia was not completely aware of the nature of the affidavit she
signed. The issue of the affidavit of desistance is no longer relevant because
petitioners have proven that they were not the ones who were
The respondents filed a case against petitioner for indemnification of
negligent.
heirs, as well as damages.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was an OCEAN BUILDERS vs. SPS. CUBACUB
affidavit of desistance, this was however dismissed for lack of merit.
Facts:
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, saying Jabon’s testimony was
Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner
more credible and that he had a better opportunity to see the events
company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. One day, Bladimir was
occurring, being the driver, as against Gregorio Pomansin, being only
afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by Hao, the company’s
a passenger in the Jitney.
manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks
where he lives free of charge. After three (3) days, Bladimir went back
to work and went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the
company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. However,
he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga, to accompany him to his
house so he could rest. Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered
Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest Caybiga hospital
which he did. However, upon the arrival of Bladimir’s parents, he was
transferred to another hospital where he died.
Bladimir’s parents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners on
the ground that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the
deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death. But
petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what
FERNANDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CITY OF DAVAO
the law requires, hence, they are not liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether the Ocean Builders is negligent in not bringing Bladimir to a
better-equipped hospital.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides that it shall be the
duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure
the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and
treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.
In the present case, however, Haos advice for Bladimir to take a 3-
day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital
constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance. Moreover,
Hao may not be expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be
brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital
because chicken pox is commonly known to be self-limiting.
On the other hand, since the present case is one for damages based
on torts, it should be anchored on the following three elements: (1)
duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.
The alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate
cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have
occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case
that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
Doctrine of proximate cause
Facts:
An invitation to bid was issued to for a contract involving the-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao. One of the bidders was Bertulano and
Bascon. But it was Bascon who eventually won the bid and thereafter
signed the purchase order on November 26, 1975. However, before
such date, bidder Bertulano together with four other companions was
suddenly found dead inside the septic tank.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that
the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance and consent
of the market master. The septic tank was found to be almost empty
and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-
emptying. Their cause of death was found out to be because of
"asphyxia" which was caused by the diminution of oxygen in the body
and intake of toxic gas produced from the waste matter inside the
septic tank.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Davao is guilty of negligence and whether such
negligence is the proximate cause of the death of Bertulano et al.
RULING:
No, to be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between
the omission and the damage. He must prove that the defendant's
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred
While it may be true that the City of Davao has been remiss in its duty
to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master
about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao
Public Market, it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid
for such service. It lost no time in taking up remedial measures to
meet the situation.
The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their
own and without authority from the public respondent opened the
septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic
tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily
prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand
in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the
job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. V JOSE CHING AND/OR
LIBERTY FOREST, INC. AND CRESILITO M. LIMBAGA
Facts:
Ortiz, with helper Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Butuan bound to
Surigao City to deliver ice. Cruising towards the opposite lane towards
them was a Joana Paula passenger bus. In between the two vehicles
was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by Liberty Forest, Inc.
represented by Jose Ching, their manager. The prime mover suffered
a tire blowout the night before.
The driver of the Prime Mover, Limbaga, parked it in the portion of
the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. It does not
have reflectorized plates, an early warning device. Limbaga just placed
a banana trunk with leaves and kerosene lighted cans on the front
and back. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover, the Jona Paula
bus swerved to the lane of the van. The van driven by Ortiz also
swerved to avoid the bus. Unfortunately, it hit the front of the
stationary prime mover.
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries, and the van was
inoperable. Dy Teban filed a complaint for damages against Liberty
Forest and Limbaga. However, the Joana Paula bus was not impleaded
as defendant.
RTC:
The trial court ruled in favor of Dy Teban Trading, Inc. on the grounds
that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was the
improper parking of the prime mover along the national highway and
the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle. In other words,
it was the recklessness.
CA:
Partly Modified the ruling of the Trial Court by absolving the
defendants siting that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision
was the failure of the van to give way or yield to the right of way of
the passenger bus.
Issue:
Whether the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the
Nissan Van?
Ruling:
The prime mover is liable for the damages of the van.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code: whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
plaintiff.
Limbaga was negligent in the parking and Liberty is negligent in the
supervision of its employee
Limbaga failed to prevent the risks of incoming motorists. Negligence
is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. The test to determine negligence are as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The test of negligence
is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with
that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation.
Limbaga was negligent in parking on the side of the national
highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national
road on the lane of the bus. The picture shows that there was ample
space on the shoulder. It was pitch dark that whoever travels along
the highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved, it
is because the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked
prime mover and trailer on the bus proper lane because there was no
warning signs.
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by
the improperly parked prime mover. He did not immediately inform
his employer of the two tire blowouts and that he could not have them
fixed because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help,
he simply place banana as warning. Worse, he slept on the prime
mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle.
He admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive
the prime mover. Liberty Forest was utterly negligent in allowing such.
It required highly specialized driving skills. Liberty failed to properly
supervise.
Liberty failed to keep the prime mover in proper condition. The prime
mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire.
The report does not mention lighted tin cans to refer on a
jurisprudential support. This was also the same contention of the
investigating officer. The presence of the cans was only made during
the examination.
The negligent skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate
cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine such. Plaintiff
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission
and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched;
otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a
natural and probable result of the act or omission.
Liberty and Limbaga are liable for all damages that resulted from the
skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other
motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime mover. Ortiz
obviously would not have swerved if not for the passenger bus
abruptly occupying his vans lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would
not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime
mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
The proportionate or contributory liability of the passenger bus cannot
be ruled upon, because it was not a party to the case; joint tortfeasors
are solidarily liable.
Due process dictates that the bus must be given an opportunity to
present its own version of events before it can be held liable. Any
contributory or proportionate liability of the passenger bus must be
litigated in a separate action, barring any defense of prescription or
laches. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the proximate cause of the
collision was the improper parking of the prime mover.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not
necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the
passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private
respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This
means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from
the collision. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code. All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
BATACLAN vs MEDINA
Facts:
On 13 September 1952, the deceased, Juan Bataclan, rode Bus No.
30, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its
way from Cavite to Pasay, one of the tires burst and the vehicle fell
into a canal and turned turtle. Some passengers managed to escape
the bus; others had to be pulled out, while four passengers, including
Bataclan, could not. There was no evidence to show that there was
any attempt to rescue the four (4) passengers still trap inside the bus.
However, calls and shouts were made in the nearby neighborhood.
Few minutes later, came ten (10) men, one (1) of them carrying a
lighted torched. As they approached the bus, immediately a fire
started, burning the bus, including the passengers trapped inside it.
The torched caught fire due to the gasoline leak.
The widow, Salud Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her
five minor children, filed a suit to recover from Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150. The CFI decided in favor of the widow.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the CA, but the latter
referred the case to the SC.
Issue:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other
passengers?
Ruling:
The SC agreed with the trial court that the case involves a breach of
contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination. Our New Civil
Code amply provides for the responsibility of a common carrier to its
passengers and their goods, to wit: Article 17331, 17552, 17563,
17594 and 17635.
The SC also agree that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There was evidence
to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding,
according to one of the passengers.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found
in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
1ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
2 ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
3 ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
The SC in the case did not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus. The reason is that when the vehicle
turned completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and because they are from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available. In other words, the coming
of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
Furthermore, the burning of the bus is also be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its employee. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back
and forth. They should and must have known that in that position,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the tank and soaked the
area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline can
be smelt, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor exercised
4 ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees
may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
5 ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
caution or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V REMOQUILLO
Facts:
Efren Magno went to the house of his stepbrother to repair a media
agua which was located below the third story. Magno received from
his son thru a window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to repair the media
agua. Holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms
length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the
motion of his body, thereby causing electrocution resulting to his
death.
Regulations of the City of Manila required that all wires be kept 3 feet
from the building. There was originally a distance of 7 feet and 2.75
inches between the wires and the side of the house. The owner of the
building was given a permit to construct a media agua of one meter
to preserve the 3 feet required by the ordinance. However, the owner
violated the permit and constructed a meter agua exceeding one
meter which resulted to the violation of the ordinance. The violation
of the permit for the construction of the media agua was not the direct
cause of the accident. Such fact contributed to the accident.
Issue:
Whether the company was negligent and if such negligence was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident.
Ruling:
No. The real cause of the accident was the reckless or negligent act
of Magno himself.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet. For
a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause."
DAVID TAYLOR V. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND
LIGHT COMPANY
Facts:
Defendant a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and electric light system in City of Manila. Its power plant,
situated in a small island called Isla del Provisor, can be reached by
boat or by crossing a footbridge.
David Taylor (15 years old) with Manuel Claparols (12 years old),
crossed the footbridge of Isla del Provisor to visit one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Murphy was not in his
quarters, they spent some time wandering about the company’s
premises.
As they were wandering, they found the area where the company
would throw their garbage. They found a number of brass fulminating
caps (fulminating caps are pipes that have small explosives and a
hammer in them.) The boys took them home. They met Jesse Adrian
and they all went to Manuel’s house where they played with the caps.
They opened that cap and lighted the contents with a match. An
explosion happened causing them injuries with David being required
to have his right eye removed.
David filed an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff?
Ruling:
As to legality of entry of the complainants into defendants property
Entry of the plaintiff upon defendant’s property without the latter’s
express invitation or permission would NOT relieve the defendant from
responsibility for injuries incurred by the plaintiff, without fault on the
latter’s part.
However, under all the circumstances of this case, the negligence of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was NOT
the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. It was the
act of cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents which was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff.
On Contributory Negligence
While there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which
expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this
jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions
by the Supreme Court of Spain and by this court in Rakes v. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific, clearly deny the plaintiff the right to recover
damages, in whole or in part.
In Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific, Court said that fault or negligence
is the source of obligation when between such negligence and the
injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury
produced should not be the result of the acts or omissions of a third
party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such
acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it
is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence
of the injured party himself.
Where the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the
casualty, defendant must be exonerated.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the
injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.
The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident
and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into
it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
In the present case, the immediate cause of the explosion was his
own act, and that having contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. SEBASTIAN M.
BAKING
Facts:
Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical
check-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and
hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that
respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels.
Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions – Diamicron
and Benalize.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation
to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the
prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what
was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine,
respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three consecutive days. On
the third day he took the medicine, he figured in a vehicular accident.
The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta.
Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything
about the collision nor felt its impact.
Thus, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence
was the proximate cause of respondent’s accident
Ruling:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault
or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.3
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree
of care and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of
negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial
court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to
respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death
for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very
cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether
the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by
his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the
superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was
respondent’s negligence in driving his car.
We disagree.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s
employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the
potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that
respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a
collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which
states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for
the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the
law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either
in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after
such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
BPI vs SUAREZ
Facts:
Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and
current account with petitioner BPI in its Ermita branch. Sometime in
1997, respondent Suarez had a client who wanted to buy several
parcels of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly
with the owners of said land.
Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will
be the one to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client
would deposit money in Suarez' BPI account and thereafter, he would
issue the checks for the sellers.
The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has
3-days clearing time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which
confirmed that the said amount had been credited to his account on
that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five (5)
checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000
was also debited from his account. The checks were dishonored
despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount has
been debited from the account of the drawee.
On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against
insufficient fund) and not 'DAUD'' (drawn against uncollected
deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty but denied Suarez
claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence the case filed for
damages.
The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral,
and exemplary damages. BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA ruled that the bank was
negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the latter's
entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the
respondent's account
Ruling:
No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the
checks for lack of sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no
sufficient evidence to prove that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-
day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez account. While BPI
has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy, Suarez failed
to prove his entitlement to such privilege.
The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in
dishonoring the checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit,
hence BPI can rightfully impose the said penalty charges against
Suarez' account.
The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to
prove that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous
marking of the 'DAIF' on the checks.
Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to
exercise the diligence required as the bank's business is deemed to be
affected with public interest. The bank must at all times maintain a
high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury
attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez therefore
has the right to expect a high level of care and diligence from BPI.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
Facts:
Vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned
by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo.
A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries. She
was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the
Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour when
Ford violently rammed against the car's right rear door and fender.
With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards
the direction where it came from.
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence
of Aquilino, C.O.L. Realty's driver, which was the proximate cause of
the accident. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.
C.O.L. Realty filed a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila.
MeTc dismissed the case. RTC affirmed.
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing, as per Certification of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority:
“…the crossing of vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not allowed
since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road
construction at the area.”
Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision,
Ramos' vehicle was moving at high speed in a busy area that was then
the subject of an ongoing construction.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay
petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation?
Ruling:
NO.
Appellate court's mind that Aquilino's violation of the MMDA
prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street was the proximate cause of the accident.
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for
Rodel's contributory negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high
speed along a busy intersection.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened.
Supreme Court find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel's
contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino's
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident.
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., vs JOCELYN CATUBIG
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the
franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla)
is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondents husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr.
(Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in
tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado
(Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While
approaching a curve, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-
wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was
then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla,
headed for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided,
Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Both
Catubig and Emperado died.
Then, Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide. The MCTC issued a Resolution dismissing the
criminal charge because there was no negligence, not even
contributory, on Cabanilla’s part.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages
against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in
the total amount of P484,000.00, for the death of her husband based
on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil
Code. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the
latter’s employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in
driving the bus which collided with Catubig’s motorcycle. Petitioner, in
its Answer, contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was
the sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another
vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of the road.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner that the respondents’ husband is
the reckless and negligent driver and not the driver of the petitioner.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. But, the appellate court
held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving their
respective vehicles. Thus, the CA modified the RTC’s decision ruling
that both petitioner and respondent are equally liable for the accident
in question and hereby award to the heirs of Catubig the amount of
P250,000.00 as full compensation for the death of the latter.
Petitioner denies any vicarious or imputed liability under Article 2180,
in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. According to petitioner,
respondent failed to prove the culpability of Cabanilla, the employee
driver of petitioner. Petitioner additionally argues, without conceding
any fault or liability, that the award by the Court of Appeals in
respondent’s favor of the lump sum amount of P250,000.00 as total
death indemnity lacks factual and legal basis.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for the death of Catubig and Emperado?
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of
the Civil Code imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer
for the fault or negligence of its employee does not apply to petitioner
since the fault or negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla, which
would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, has never been established by respondent. To the
contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that
the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is
attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle,
Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2 Elnas both pointed out that the
motorcycle encroached the lane of the bus when it tried to overtake,
while nearing a curve, a truck ahead of it, consistent with the fact that
the point of impact actually happened within the lane traversed by the
bus. It would be more reasonable to assume then that it was Catubig
who was driving his motorcycle at high speed because to overtake the
truck ahead of him, he necessarily had to drive faster than the
truck. Catubig should have also avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead
of him as the curvature on the road could have obstructed his vision
of the oncoming vehicles from the opposite lane.
The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving
his vehicle along the proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle,
Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he was approaching
a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on
reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee,
Emperado.
The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees. Having
adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision
resulting in Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was no
fault or negligence on Cabanillas part, then such presumption of fault
or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanillas employer, does
not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense
of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
CAEDO VS. YU KHE THAI
Facts:
Around 5:30AM, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car on his way
from home to the airport to send off his son who has a flight bound
to Mindoro. With him in the car were Mrs. Caedo and 3 daughters.
Coming from the opposite direction of the road was the Cadillac car
by Rafael Bernardo taking Yu Khe Thai, his employer, to Wack2x for
his regular round of golf. The 2 cars travelling on opposite sides were
travelling in fair moderate speeds. Ahead of the Cadillac car was a
carretela guided by Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse guided by Pedro’s son.
Bernardo was almost upon the rig when he saw the carretela in front
of him, only eight meters away. The Mercury car was coming on its
own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing
down or stopping altogether behind the carretela, he veered to the
left in order to pass. Caedo saw the Cadillac and so he slackened his
speed. However, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car’s right side
was insufficient and that its rear bumper caught the wheel of the
carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo confronted with the
unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision by going farther right,
but it was unsuccessful. And so, the unfortunate incident happened.
Caedo et al. filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and
Yu Khe Thai. RTC ruled in their favor and held the defendants solidarily
liable for the damages.
Issues:
 1. Who was responsible of the accident?
2. If it be Bernardo, will Yu Khe Thai be solidarily liable?
Ruling:
1. Bernardo is liable for being negligent.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he
saw the carretela in front of him, only eight meters away. The
carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they
should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, the carretela
should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been
careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.
2. No, Yu Khe Thai will not be solidarily liable.
Art. 2184 of CC states that:
"ART. 2184.In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that driver was
negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months."
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. (Relationship of pater familias)
In this case, the car was running at a fairly moderate speed. The road
was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There
was no reason for Yu Khe Thai to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of Bernardo. He became
aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he
did see it at the distance, he could not have anticipated his Bernardo’s
sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the
fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction.
There was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other
persons to drive for them precisely because they do not know how to
drive or not endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of
traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered on the road.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in
the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident.
Therefore, the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai that he is solidarily
liable with Bernardo, is an error.
Add Notes: Damages
Actual damages to be compensable, it must be proven. The actual
damages suffered by Caedo et al., other than expenses for medical
treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Therefore, they can
only be entitled to actual damages that were substantiated with
evidence.
Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation and may
be a ground of granting moral and not actual damages. In this case,
considering the nature and extent of injuries suffered by Caedo et al,
the amounts of moral damages is not excessive.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs CORONADO
-- Gonzaga, Nigel
MENDOZA vs SORIANO
Facts:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue was hit by a
speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was thrown
five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from
the point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Sorianos companions,
asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking
out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to
flee. A school bus brought Soriano to the hospital where he later
died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the
filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
against Macasasa.
Respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Sorianos wife and
daughter, respectively, filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa
and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle.
In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable
since as owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
RTC:
After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against
petitioner. It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth
Avenue by using a small gap in the islands fencing rather than the
pedestrian overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was
not negligent in the selection and supervision of Macasasa since
complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of
petitioners negligence.
CA:
Respondents appealed. While the appellate court agreed that Soriano
was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent for speeding, such that
he was unable to avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Sorianos own
negligence did not preclude recovery of damages
from Macasasas negligence. It further held that since petitioner failed
to present evidence to the contrary, and conformably with Article
2180[8] of the Civil Code, the presumption of negligence of the employer
in the selection and supervision of employees stood.
Issue:
Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
Ruling:
The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a
safe speed to avoid endangering lives. The records show also
that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover,
the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact.
Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven
by Macasasa was overspeeding.
Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident
victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the
hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations.
While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal
case and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as
owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her
failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. The SC
emphasized that this damage suit is for the quasi-delictof petitioner,
as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver
and employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of
the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the
damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly from
petitioner since petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
Lastly, the SC agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the
pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even
note that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the
appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages
it awarded. The reduction of the amount earlier awarded was based on
Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
JONAS AÑONUEVO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
JEROME VILLAGRACIA
Facts:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while
Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s
brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained
serious injuries and had to undergo four operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc.
and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint
against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he
failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
Issue:
1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-
motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively
negligent.
2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic
regulations.
3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence.
Ruling:
1. NO. There is pertinent basis for segregating between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable
of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized
vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of
an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its
relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due
to the use of fuel.

2. No. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what
would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that
Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic
regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding as he made
the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause
of the accident. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to
see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have
acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded
to make the left turn.
3. No. As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts
adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the accident.
The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be
reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not
have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with safety equipment.
FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS.
WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS
SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS AND
CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS
Facts:
Teresa Elena, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos,
performed at the Rizal Theater in Manila as a member of the cast for
the musical play, Woman of the Year.
Santos (Armando), husband of respondent Carmina Vda. de los
Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after her
performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma. Two other
members of the cast of Woman of the Year, namely Annabel Vilches
(Annabel) and Jerome Macuja joined Teresa Elena in the Galant
Sigma.
Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling, the Galant Sigma collided with
the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia
(Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged
about 12 meters from the point of impact, where the Galant Sigma
burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four
occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which was
decided in favor of Mejia. The family of Annabel filed a civil case
against petitioner and Mejia. Wilfredo and Carmina, joined by their
minor children, also filed separate actions for damages against
petitioner and Mejia. The said cases were eventually consolidated.
RTC:
In favor of respondents
CA:
Affirmed RTC
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
CA is incorrect in ruling that Mejia was negligent. This conclusion was
not derived from the evidence during the trial. RTC admitted that De
los Santos made a turn without exercising the necessary care which
would have prevented the accident from happening. The sudden turn
of the vehicle used by the victims should also be considered as
negligence on the part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus,
mitigating, if not absolving petitioner's liability.
Petitioner asserts they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees by presenting
documents showing Mejia's proficiency and physical examinations, as
well as his NBI clearances. The Employee Staff Head of the Human
Resource Division of the petitioner also testified that Mejia was
constantly under supervision and was given daily operational
briefings.
Damages awarded were mainly based on respondents’ assertions as
to the amount of salary being received by the two deceased at the
time of their deaths and not based on evidence on record.
Issues:
Whether CA erred in finding Mejia negligent
Whether petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father of family
in the selection and supervision of its employees
Whether damages awarded was correct
Ruling:
NO. It was well established that Mejia was driving beyond the rate of
speed required by Sec. 35 of RA 4136. Given the circumstances, the
allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour,
while the records show that he was driving at the speed of 70
kilometers per hour.
Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if
at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules
does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the
time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to
speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care
and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the
condition's encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle
under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full
stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.
To suggest that De los Santos was equally negligent based on that
sole statement of the RTC is erroneous. The entire evidence presented
must be considered as a whole. A closer study of the Police Accident
Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident would
reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless
speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased. The excessive
speed employed by Mejia was the proximate cause of the collision that
led to the sudden death of Teresa Elena and Armando.
If the defendants-appellants truly believe that the accident was
caused by the negligence of the driver of the Galant Sigma, they
should have presented Mejia to the witness stand. Being the driver,
Mejia would have been in the best position to establish their thesis
that he was negligent when the mishap happened. Under the RULES
OF EVIDENCE (Section 3[e], Rule 131), such suppression gives rise to
the presumption that his testimony would have been adverse, if
presented. It must be stressed further that Mejia left the scene, not
reporting the fatal accident to the authorities neither did he wait for
the police to arrive. He only resurfaced on the day after the incident.
This is a clear transgression of Section 55 of RA 4136-A which
provides:
SEC. 55. Duty of driver in case of accident. — In the
[event] that any accident should occur as a result of the
operation of a motor vehicle upon a highway, the driver
shall stop immediately, and, if requested by any person
present, shall show his driver's license, give his true
name and address and also the true name and address
of the owner of the motor vehicle. No driver of a motor
vehicle concerned in a vehicular accident shall leave the
scene of the accident without aiding the victim, except
under any of the following circumstances:
If he is in imminent danger of being seriously harmed
by any person or persons by reason of the accident;
 If he reports the accident to the nearest officer of the
law; or
If he has to summon a physician or nurse to aid the
victim.
NO. In the present case, Filsyn merely presented evidence on the
alleged care it took in the selection or hiring of Mejia way back in 1974
or ten years before the fatal accident. Neither did Filsyn present any
proof of the existence of the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of its employees. It is significant to note that in employing
Mejia, who is not a high school graduate, Filsyn waived its
longstanding policy requirement of hiring only high school graduates.
It insufficiently failed to explain the reason for such waiver other than
their allegation of Mejia's maturity and skill for the job.
As revealed by the testimony of another employee, Filsyn admitted
that their shuttle buses were used to ferry Filsyn's employees for three
shifts. It failed to show whether or not Mejia was on duty driving buses
for all three shifts. On the other hand, the trial court found that Mejia,
by the different shifts would have been on the job for more than eight
hours. Filsyn did not even sufficiently prove that it exercised the
required supervision of Mejia by ensuring rest periods, particularly for
its night shift drivers who are working on a time when most of us are
usually taking rest. As correctly argued by the plaintiffs-appellees, this
is significant because the accident happened at 11:30 p.m., when the
shuttle bus was under the control of a driver having no passenger at
all. Despite, the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the
surrounding area, the bus was travelling at a speed of 70 kilometers
per hour.
In view of the absence of sufficient proof of its exercise of due
diligence, Filsyn cannot escape its solidary liability as the owner of the
wayward bus and the employer of the negligent driver of the wayward
bus.
The records show that the CA did not err in awarding the said
amounts, nor was there any mistake in its computation. The
respondents were able to establish their case by a preponderance of
evidence. However, the petitioner is correct when it stated that the
award of P100,000.00 as moral damages is excessive. Jurisprudence
has set the amount to P50,000.00.
Res Ipsa Loquitor
MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. and GUILLERMO
ARANETA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
HERMINIA FAMOSO, respondents.
Facts:
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the
caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the
petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his
companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side,
caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared
dead on the spot.
The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the
petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial
Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but
deducted from the total damages awarded thereof for the decedent's
contributory negligence. The widow appealed, claiming that the
deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that
it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all.
In its own decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the rulings of the
trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased
and disallowed the deductions
Issue:
Whether petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of
due diligence under Article 2176
Ruling:
Res ipsa Loquitor
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the
locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose
because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates.
Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2"
thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to
keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with
special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails
aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the
purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of
the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged
At any rate, the absence of the fish plates — whatever the cause or
reason — is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the
petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently
in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
Due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree.
The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the
necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to
prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour."
Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out
prescribed forms reporting derailments — which reports have not
been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments — is not the kind
of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
Contributory negligence
We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of
contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his
assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a
violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to
his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose
that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car
rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose
to ride in the caboose.
Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury." 5 It has been held that "to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs
of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing
that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place
and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs
of impending danger.
FF CRUZ & CO vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner has a furniture manufacturing shop that was situated
adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Around August
1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached the
petitioner's plant manager to request that a firewall be constructed
between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request
was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early
morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop.
Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause
was never discovered. Subsequently, private respondents collected
P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
Court of First Instance
Private respondents, then plaintiffs, filed an action for damages
against petitioner. The court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents and ordered the petitioner, then defendant, to pay the
amount of P80,000.00 for damages suffered by private respondents
for the loss of their house.
CA:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
but reduced the award of damages P70,000.00 for the house.
Petitioner’s Argument:
Court of Appeals erred (1) in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to the facts of the instant case; (2) in awarding excessive and/or
unproved damages; and (3) in not deducting the sum of P35,000.00,
which private respondents recovered on the insurance on their house,
from the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in applying the common law doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, the issue of damages being merely consequential.
Ruling:
As to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:
The CA had more than adequate basis to find petitioner liable for the
loss sustained by private respondents.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be stated as follows: “Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.”
The facts of the case call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be
found thereon. Moreover, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for
safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
As to the issue of damages:
Both the CFI and the CA, were in agreement as to the value of private
respondents' furniture and fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire.
With regard to the house, the CA reduced the award to P70,000.00
from P80,000.00. The Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages
to private respondents as found by the Court of Appeals. However,
the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code
the amount of P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount
awarded as damages. Under the law, if the amount paid by the
insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the
person causing the loss or injury. Having been indemnified by their
insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency
from petitioner which is P35,000.00.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO
CRAME, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
The accused, Mariano Crame was driving an automobile. At the same
time there were two automobiles on the way, the one driven by Stuart
was a modern Cadillac with high-powered electric lights. The accused
states that this fact, added to the other fact that he was near the
Damas Bridge at the time, induced him to reduce the speed of the
automobile at that point so that he was, at the time of the accident,
going only about 10 miles an hour. He asserts that he suddenly saw
the form of a man, who is George Coombs, in front of his automobile
and that, on seeing him, he altered the course of the machine as much
as possible in order to avoid a collision; but that he was unable to do
so, the right side of the machine hitting the man and knocking him to
the ground. He asserts that, at the time it struck the man, the machine
was almost at a standstill, it coming to a complete stop within about
6 feet of where the injured man lay.
As a result of the blow Coombs was rendered unconscious and has
since remained in a state of great mental debility, with severe pains
in the head, almost complete loss of memory, being unable to
remember anything that occurred during the accident and, at times,
forgetting the names and countenances of his most intimate friends.
He cannot be left alone and requires continual attendance. He is
described by the physician who examined and treated him as an
incurable and hopeless imbecile.
The trial court convicted the accused on the following grounds:
First, in that [before the occurrence] the accused, having seen the
soldier Coombs crossing the street at a certain distance in front of the
automobile, did not reduce the speed of the automobile sufficiently,
nor attempt to stop the machinery entirely, if that was necessary, to
avoid an accident. Second, in that it does not appear that the accused
sounded his horn or whistle or used his voice to call the attention of
the person who was crossing the street or notify him that he should
stop and avoid being struck by the automobile. Third and last, in that
the accused was driving in the center, or rather, a little to the right of
the center of the street instead of on the left side thereof.
Issue:
Whether Crame was negligent in driving, thus liable for the injuries
sustained by Coombs.
Ruling:
We are satisfied from an examination of the record that the
conclusions of the trial court are more than sustained. The accused
did not see the soldier whom he ran down until it was too late,
although the street at that point was brilliantly lighted; he did not
sound his horn or give notice of his approach in any other manner; he
did not apply the brake or make any effort whatever to stop; he was
traveling on the wrong side of the street at the time of the collision.
The fact that the accused did not see the soldier until the machine
was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty. The
street at the place where the accident occurred is wide and
unobstructed. There is no building on either side of the street. Under
such circumstances there is no reason why the accused did not see
the soldier long before he had reached the position in the street where
he was struck down.
There is no evidence in the case which shows negligence on the part
of the injured soldier. The mere fact that he was run down by an
automobile does not signify that he was negligent. At the time he was
struck he was on the right-hand side of the street where he had a
right to be and where the law fully protected him from vehicles
traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving at the time
of the injury.
We regard it as clear from the record that the accused was driving
much faster than he claims he was or else he was negligent in not
watching the street for foot passengers, or in the handling of his
automobile. It is a matter of common knowledge that an automobile
being driven at 10 miles an hour can be stopped, if necessity requires
it, within 10 or 15 feet at the most. That rate of speed is extremely
low for an automobile and, with such a speed, it can be stopped
almost instantly. If, therefore, the accused was going at the rate of
10 miles an hour only and saw the soldier 20 feet ahead of him, he
could, without difficulty, have stopped the automobile and avoided the
accident. As a necessary consequence, the accused was either driving
at a rate of speed much higher than that stated or else he was
negligent in not stopping his car. Furthermore, if he did not see the
soldier until too late to stop, the burden is on him to show why he did,
not. There is something wrong when a chauffeur runs over a man who
is in plain view of the automobile for a long distance before the point
of the accident is reached. No negligence on the part of the injured
person has been shown. Whichever way the case is looked at, whether
from the viewpoint of the failure to see the soldier in time to avoid the
accident or failure to stop or give warning by horn or whistle, it is clear
that the learned trial court was right when it held that the accused
was guilty of negligence.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the Appellant. So ordered.
AFRICA vs CALTEX
-- Mali, Nurbaith
LAYUGAN VS IAC
Facts:
On May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the
Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
which was parked along the right side of the National Highway.
Suddenly, Isidro’s Isuzu truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano
bumped the parked cargo truck. The collision dislodged the jack from
the parked truck and pinned layugan to the ground. As such, layugan
sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. His left leg from
below the knee was later on amputated when gangrene had set in,
thereby rendering him incapacitated for work depriving him of his
income. Thus, Layugan filed an action for damages against Isidro. The
latter in turn filed a third-party complaint against his Insurer,
Traveller’s Multi-Indemnity Corporation (TMIC)
Isidro’s Contention:
The truck allegedly being repaired by Layugan was parked right after
the curve, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya.
The proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of
the parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the
driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by the
truck of Isidro.
As to the Third-Party Complaint, Isidro claims that TMIC is liable to
him for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their
Contract of Insurance, which covers the insurer's liability for damages
arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property.
RTC:
Ruled in favor of Layugan and ordered Isidro to indemnify the former
for the damages sustained. As to the Third-party complaint, the RTC
order TMIC to indemnify Isidro.
IAC:
Reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed both the complaint and
the third-party complaint.
Issue:
Whether Layugan is negligent, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
in not installing a warning device beside the parked cargo truck.
Ruling:
NO, Layugan is not negligent. There was indeed a warning device
installed.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the
rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking
into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven
by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence
of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm
and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee
when gangrene had set in.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of
care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the
invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent
court committed reversible error.
The Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is stated thus: "Where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence…… The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available…… Finally, once the actual cause of
injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or
by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this
case.
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS vs SPS. SARANGAYA
-- Montor, Shericka
OSCAR DEL CARMEN , JR., v. GERONIMO BACOY
Facts:
At dawn on New Year’s Day of 1993, the Monsaluds (Husband, Wife
and daughter) were on their way home from a party when they were
run over by a passenger jeep driven by Allan Maglasang. The jeep was
registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. and was
used as a public utility vehicle.
A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple
Homicide was filed against Allan before the RTC. Allan was declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Geronimo Bacoy (father of the wife who died) filed a civil case in behalf
of the six minor children of the Monsaluds; an independent civil action
for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Parties additionally impleaded
were, the Spouses del Carmen and the registered owner, the son,
Oscar Jr. Geronimo. Bacoy prayed for reimbursement of funeral and
burial expenses, as well as attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary
damages and loss of net income earnings of Emilia (wife) who was
employed as a public school teacher.
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the deaths, the Spouses
Del Carmen averred that there was no cause of action against them.
Oscar, Jr., on the other hand, claimed to be a victim himself. He
alleged that Allan and his friends stole the jeep while it was
parked beside his drivers’ rented house to take it for a joyride. Both
he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be
started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine
shall then run but without any headlights on. Oscar Jr. even filed
before the same trial court a carnapping case against Allan and his
companions. The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was
the latter’s brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed
as the driver. In any event, Allan’s employment as conductor was
already severed before the mishap. Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it
was routinary that after a day’s trip, the jeep would be parked beside
Rodrigo’s rented house.
RTC:
Exculpated the Spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency
of evidence. However, their son Oscar, Jr. was held civilly liable in a
subsidiary capacity. RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle
of res ipsa loquitur: that a presumption of negligence on the part of a
defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury is shown
to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things,
the accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of
care.
Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the
jeep, managed and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in
whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and
Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep could easily be started by a
mere push even without the ignition key, they should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by
unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such
lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence
making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage
caused by the same.
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration contending that the provision on
vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and that the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the
tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his
employee; he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence,
Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove the
jeep. MR was granted, Oscar Jr. was absolved from civil liability. It
cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an
employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee,
the latter should have committed the same in the discharge of his
duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting
in Allan’s case as he was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a
conductor when he drove the jeep. The court also declared the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner
cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his property
by reason of the criminal acts of another.
Geronimo appealed.
CA:
Granted the appeal- the CA first determined the preliminary issue of
whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Oscar
Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident, it ruled in the affirmative.
CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the
operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the
jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against
Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the
circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied
permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the
CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were
both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a day’s work, said
vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigo’s house where Allan also
lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an
ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or secured to
prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key
Oscar Jr., comes to the Supreme Court, arguing that the presumption
of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing
speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant
in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well
secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply to Oscar, Jr,
thereby making him civilly liable for the deaths of the Monsaluds
Ruling:
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of
things, would not happen if those who had management or control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a
sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.
Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence. It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by
jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over
by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle
had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr.
entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct
him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including
who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run
without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely
and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same
precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims
was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a
presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have
overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in
preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to
do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion
that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep.
This is in view of Oscar Jr’s failure to provide solid proof that he
ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had
expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he
entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the
CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo
since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific
and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore
is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the
vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan
to use it.
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject
vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available to a registered
owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from
his jeep’s use.
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
When Gerald was three years old, he was admitted at the Ospital ng
Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion, the
head of the surgical team, was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr.
Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included
Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando
Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks
and regained consciousness only after a month. However, he could no
longer see, hear or move.
Gerald's mother, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the physicians.
The City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum, alleging: –
That the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital
ng Maynila, Malate, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect
to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate
under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly
the levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications, and as a consequence of his said carelessness and
negligence, GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and
consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD
ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or
hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997).
Judgment of the RTC:
The RTC found Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries and was sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH
and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, private
complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Decision of the CA:
The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum stating that the case
appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
Prior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to
undergo a major operation. The accused himself testified that pre-
operation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could
withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was
healthy. There was not a hint that the nature of the operation itself
was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.
The lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except
to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper administration of
anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case.
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from
its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable;
(b) Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling:
(a) Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." It is grounded
in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged.
It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty.
Res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases
presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law,
permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or
that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence.
The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar
with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care.
However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence,
in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted
to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove
a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions,
by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule to be cautiously applied,
depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only
showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was
not accomplished. The real question is whether or not in the process
of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside
of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular
scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if
unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man
as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If
there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain
the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur:
(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution of the person injured.
The application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although the second and third elements were present, considering
that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within
the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then
unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting.
Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians
for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald
was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the
physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation,
causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or
the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing
of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during
the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did
not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians,
including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the
anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the
operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the
vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the
patient.
"The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the
injury was probably caused by someone's negligence." ( Mason v.
Ellsworth)
"Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the
doctrine." (Nelson v. Murphy)
(b) Negligence of Dr. Solidum
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act
from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act.
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure
to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming
the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido affirmed the findings and
conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents
and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted
to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the
anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made
a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the
records it should have been 100% oxygen.
The clinical abstract (record admitted into evidence) show that
approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient
was noted to have bradycardia and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately
administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational
agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen
and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However, the patient
did not respond and the surgeons were immediately told to stop the
operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was
initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while
continuously doing cardiac massage – still with no cardiac rate
appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45
secs, patient’s vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation
lasted approximately 3-5 mins.
There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the
anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the
anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using
a nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent
and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation began, bradycardia
occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the
patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be apparent that
the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100%
halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after something went
amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut
off.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used
before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes
his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance
that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the
operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature
but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and
Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only
a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr.
Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that
she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the
things that happened. She revealed that they were using a machine
that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the
operation.
Dr. Solidum, in his affidavit in the interpretation of the anesthesia
record, mentions – the concentration of halothane as reflected in the
anesthesia record is only one percent (1%) – The numbers indicated
in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1%
halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his
entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which
is only one percent cannot be summated because halothane is
constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the
child as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported
by the results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing
central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness,
decrease in heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor
function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why
would there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1%
halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or
halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the
operation are incontestable, and they can only be led to one
conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was really closely
monitored, the event could not have happened.
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence
beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA
were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of
inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court
of Appealsthat:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science.
In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill
in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least
the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in
this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential
to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also
that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion
of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of
the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient. The negligence must be the proximate
cause (natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred) of the injury complained of.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence
each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient
relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and
causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the
resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical,
witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance
by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict.
As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must
be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case
of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which
the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and
exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The
specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.
In the case at bar, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special
medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial
court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently
be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an
anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the
Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum,
his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted
the investigation. Even then, the report of his Committee was
favorable to Dr. Solidum.
At his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s
operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had
exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. He then
corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been
administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen.
Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other factors
related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not
necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had
caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead,
that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side
effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the
hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt
as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
The acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from
civil liability. However, there was no firm and competent showing how
the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily
the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by
Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be
to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do
so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent
evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that
arising from the offense charged. The lower courts acted capriciously
and whimsically when it rendered their judgment against Ospital ng
Maynila.
Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. No
person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would
enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to
Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be
shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term
industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public
hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely
in charitable and humanitarian work.
Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry
for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital
ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation
on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant
of the hospital.
And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution
against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
Petition is reversed and Dr. Solidum is acquitted.
ROSIT VS DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL
Facts:
Petitoner Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray taken at
Davao Doctors Hospital (DDh) showed that he fractured his jaw. He
was then reffered to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries
who then operated him.
The operation required the smallest titanium screws available only in
Manila but Dr. Gestuvo thinking that Rosit would not be able to afford
the same just cut the screw he had in hand to make them smaller and
attached it to Rosit’s jaws without informing him.
After the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth
and was in pain. 2 days after operation, X-rays shows that the fracture
in his jaw was aligned but the screws used touched his molar. Dr.
Gestuvo referred him to a Dentist and the latter advised him that it is
necessary to undergo another operation and that is to be performed
in Cebu.
Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo for the improperly done operation and
demanded loan to defray the cost of additional operation and
expenses to the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave him P4,500. In cebu,
Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screw and installed smaller ones.
ROsit was able to eat and speak well and normally however the entire
operation costs him P140,000, hence when Rosit came back to Davao
he asked reimbursement from Dr. Gestuvo plus the additional P50,000
that Rosit would have to pay for the removal of the plate and screws
that Dr. Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay. Thus Rosit filed
a civil case for damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC.
RTC Decision:
Held Dr. Gestuvo liable and applied res ipsa loquitor principle and held
that the need for expert, medical testimony may be dispensed with
because injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
CA Decision:
Reversed the decision of RTC on the ground that the elements of res
ipsa loquitor are absent.
Issue:
W/N Res ipsa loquitor applies in the said case?
Ruling:
Yes. The act was tortious. Dr. Gestuvo’s negligence is clearly
demonstrable by the doctrines of res ipsa loquitor and informed
consent. As a general rule, to establish medical negligence, expert
testimony is generally required to define the standard of behavior by
which the court may determine whether the physician has properly
performed the requisite duty toward the patient. However; the same
admits of an exception wherein the court may dispense with such
expert testimony if the application of res ipsa loquitor is warrated.
In the case at hand, all the elements are present:
First element, the accident was of a kind that dies not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent. Rosit proved that one of the screws
struck his molar through the affidavit of Pangan presented by Gestuvo
himself. An average man of common intelligence would know that
striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw would cause
severe pain.
Second element, the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged. It is sufficient
that the operation which resulted to the screw hitting Rosit’s molar
was performed by Dr. Gestuvo.
Third element, the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. It was not
shown that Rosit’s lung disease could have contributed to the pain.
What was clear was the pain was due to screws installed by Dr.
Gestuvo.
Thus, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff,
the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science and not to
matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may
be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Doctrine of common knowledge
CARLOS BORROMEO, Petitioner, vs.
FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, INC. and RAMON S. INSO,
M.D., Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V.
Borromeo (Lilian). Lilian was a patient of the respondent Family Care
Hospital, Inc. (Family Care) under the care of respondent Dr. Ramon
Inso (Dr. Inso).
Petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she
had been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area.
Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian.
Exploratory laparotomy is a surgical procedure involving a large
incision on the abdominal wall that would enable Dr. Inso to examine
the abdominal cavity and identify the cause of Lilian’s symptoms. After
explaining the situation, Dr. Inso obtained the patient’s consent to the
laparotomy.
During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from
acute appendicitis. He proceeded to remove her appendix which was
already infected and congested with pus.
Roughly six hours after the operation, Dr. Inso noticed that her
condition was worsening and requested that Lillian be transferred to
another hospital. But during the transfer, she died.
Petitioner’s arguments:
The petitioner argues: (1) that Dr. Inso and Family Care were
negligent in caring for Lilian before, during, and after her
appendectomy and were responsible for her death; and (2) that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case.
Respondent’s arguments:
Respondents counter: (1) that the issues raised by the petitioner are
not pure questions of law; (2) that they exercised utmost care and
diligence in the treatment of Lilian; (3) that Dr. Inso did not deviate
from the standard of care observed under similar circumstances by
other members of the profession in good standing; (4) that res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable because direct evidence as to the cause of
Lilian’s death and the presence/absence of negligence is available; and
(5) that doctors are not guarantors of care and cannot be held liable
for the death of their patients when they exercised diligence and did
everything to save the patient.
RTC:
The RTC relied on Dr. Avila’s opinion and gave more weight to Dr.
Reyes’ findings regarding the cause of Lilian’s death. It held that Dr.
Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site causing
Lilian’s death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, holding that a patient’s death does not ordinarily occur
during an appendectomy.
CA:
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint.
The CA denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur because the element of causation between the instrumentality
under the control and management of Dr. Inso and the injury that
caused Lilian’s death was absent; the respondents sufficiently
established that the cause of Lilian’s death was DIC.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Inso and Family Care Hospital were negligent.
Whether or not the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable in this
case.
Ruling:
We join and affirm the ruling of the CA.
Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic
legal principle that equally applies to civil and criminal cases. In a
medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its
elements, namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the
defendant’s breach of this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and
(4) proximate causation between the breach and the injury
suffered. In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a
preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner failed to present an expert witness. Dr. Reyes appears
to have inflated his qualifications during his direct testimony. First, his
"extensive training during [his] residency" was neither extensive
actual training, nor part of medical residency. His assignment to the
V. Luna Hospital was not as an on-the-job trainee but as a
mere observer. This assignment was also before he
was actually licensed as a doctor. Petitioner’s counsel even admitted
that Dr. Reyes was not an expert witness even when he was presented
to the court as such.
Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso’s alleged
negligence. His testimony could not have established the standard of
care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso’s
failure to observe this standard.
The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining
whether Dr. Inso was at fault. Dr. Avila testified in his capacity as an
expert in medical jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine, surgery,
or pathology. His testimony fails to shed any light on the actual cause
of Lilian’s death.
To our mind, the testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and
Dr. Ramos carry far greater weight than that of Dr. Reyes.
Dr. Ramos was an associate professor in pathology at the Perpetual
Help Medical School in Biñan, Laguna, and at the De La Salle University
in Dasmariñas, Cavite. He was the head of the Batangas General
Hospital Teaching and Training Hospital where he also headed the
Pathology Department. He also headed the Perpetual Help General
Hospital Pathology department.
Dr. Hernandez at that time was a General Surgeon with 27 years of
experience as a General Practitioner and 20 years of experience as a
General Surgeon. He obtained his medical degree from the University
of Santo Tomas before undergoing five years of residency training as
a surgeon at the Veterans Memorial Center hospital. He was certified
as a surgeon in 1985. He also holds a master’s degree in Hospital
Administration from the Ateneo de Manila University.
Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual
surgical procedure. Both experts agreed that Lilian could not have died
from bleeding of the appendical vessel. They identified Lilian’s cause
of death as massive blood loss resulting from Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation.
The petitioner’s failure to present expert witnesses resulted in his
failure to prove the respondents’ negligence. The preponderance of
evidence clearly tilts in favor of the respondents.
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care
is not immediately apparent to the layman.
The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)
that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution from the injured person. The concurrence of
these elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if
unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff’s burden of proof.
The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the
defendant’s alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately
apparent to a layman. These instances require expert opinion to
establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not
applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been
identified or established.
The petitioner failed to present sufficient convincing evidence to
establish: (1) the standard of care expected of the respondent and (2)
the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected standard. Considering
further that the respondents established that the cause of Lilian’s
uncontrollable bleeding (and, ultimately, her death) was a medical
disorder – Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation – we find no
reversible errors in the CA’s dismissal of the complaint on appeal.
Burden of proof
ALANO V ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO
Facts:
On March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao was brought to East Avenue
Medical Center (EAMC) by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw the
former fall from the overpass. The patient's data sheet identified him
as Angelito Lugmoso. He was conscious and coherent at first, however
his condition progressively deteriorated that admission to the ICU and
mechanical ventilator became necessary. Since there was no available
ventilator units in EAMC, Lugmoso was transferred to NKI.
As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, a Transplant
Coordinator in NKI, tried to locate the patient's family by enlisting
police and media assistance. Certifications were issued by the media
and the policd attesting that the request made by NKI to air its appeal
to locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso was
accommodated.
On March 3, 1988, Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead. Upon
learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI
patients awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue types
compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired whether relatives of
Lugmosos had been located so that consent for organ donation could
be obtained. As the extended search for the relatives of Lugmoso
yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in the success
of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Alano, the Director of
NKI, to authorize removal of specific organs from the body of Lugmoso
for transplantation purposes.
Dr. Alano issued a Memorandum authorizing the removal of specific
organs from the body of Lugmoso provided that all reasonable efforts
to locate the relatives were exerted and that the NBI has been notified.
After securing a Certificate from the NBI, a medical team performed
and completed the transplant operation. Lugmoso's cadaver was then
taken to La Funeraria Oro.
Several days later, NKI issued a press release announcing its
successful organ transplantation. One of Arnelito's relatives heard the
news in television that the donor was an 18 year old boy whose name
sounded like Arnelito Logmao. They went to the La Funeraria Oro
where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
A complaint for damages was filed by Arnelito's mother, Zenaida
Logmao, against Dr. Alano and the medical team who performed the
transplantation.
RTC found Dr. Alano liable for quasi delict and was ordered to pay
damages. CA affirmed.
Issue:
WoN Dr. Alano should be liable for his alleged negligence in
authorizing the removal of Arnelito's internal organs
Ruling:
NO. A careful reading of the Memorandum shows that petitioner
instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable
efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even
enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the
patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that
permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs
of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the
applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased.
Furthermore, from the records of the case, the doctors and NKI
disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media
and sought assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as
March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the Memorandum.
NKI could also not be faulted when the notices did not properly state
the name or identity of the deceased. The NKI could not have obtained
the information about his name from the patient because Arnelito was
already unconscious by the time he was brought to NKI.
In civil cases, the party making the allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely
on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by the opponent
In this case, there is no proof that the period of 24 hours from the
time notices were disseminated cannot be considered reasonable
under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to
prove that given the medical technology and knowledge in the 1980's,
the doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the
internal organs for transplantation.
Petitioner also cannot be liable for damages. It must be emphasized
that the internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he
had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by
respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be
attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record
to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful
state in which she found her son's lifeless body can be categorically
attributed to petitioner's conduct.
BJDC CONSTRUCTION VS. LANUZO
Facts:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a
motorcycle rider Balbino in a nighttime accident (Balbino's Honda
motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in
the right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of his
motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his
instant death).
The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the
construction company did not provide adequate lighting on the site.
The construction company countered that the fatal accident was
caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself (as confirmed
by the police investigation report that stated, among others, that
Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and the accident
occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle) and that
it had installed warning signs and lights along the highway and on the
barricades of the project.
The trial court decided in favor of the construction company, but the
CA reversed the decision and ruled for the plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino?
Ruling:
Negligence of Balbino.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when
a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of
Zamora and SPO1 Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the
Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for doing so, because the greater
probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies
is preferred to that of the appellate court’s because of the trial court’s
unique first–hand opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor as such.
The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer
detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties. The
presumption, although rebuttable, stands because the Lanuzo heirs
did not adduce evidence to show any deficiency or irregularity in the
performance of his official duty as the police investigator of the
accident. They also did not show that he was impelled by any ill motive
or bias to testify falsely.
Thirdly, the CA unreasonably branded the testimonies of Zamora and
SPO1 Corporal as “self–serving.” They were not. Self–serving evidence
refers to out–of–court statements that favor the declarant’s interest; it
is disfavored mainly because the adverse party is given no opportunity
to dispute the statement and their admission would encourage
fabrication of testimony. But court declarations are not self–serving
considering that the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to test
the veracity of the declarations by cross–examination and other
methods.
Fourthly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence
cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown
its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project
site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In
contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and
managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not
take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook
another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not
avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his
motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s
investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This causation
of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal
depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay
opined to be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road
after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown
that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at
the time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect.
Had he worn the protective head gear or helmet, his untimely death
would not have occurred.
The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendant’s. Upon a review of the records,
the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo
heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by
preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the
company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the company
was not negligent in ensuring safety at the project site. All the
established circumstances showed that the proximate and immediate
cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the
Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
DEFENSES
Complete defenses
Plaintiff’s own negligence
PAULAN vs SARABIA
Facts:
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated by Zacarias Sarabia
and driven by Emilio Celeste fell into a creek after it collided with
another truck of the Mary Lim Line. As a result of the collision,
Gaudencio Basco who was one of the passengers of Sarabia’s truck
died.
On April 19, 1955, Basco’s widow and heirs filed a complaint against
Sarabia and Celeste for compensation and damages.
On July 11, 1955, defendants filed a third-party complaint against
Juan Candungon, driver of the Mary Lim Line truck, and one Quintin
Lim as owner and operator which complaint was later amended on
December 30, 1955, stating that the owner of the truck driven by
Candungon was Maria Lim.
Maria Lim filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that there is
not cause of action against her, and (2) that the action, being a quasi-
delict, has already prescribed.
The motion to dismiss was sustained on the ground of prescription
and the complaint against Maria Lim was dismissed.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the action based on quasi-delict has already prescribed
Ruling:
There is no merit in this appeal. The action which appellants desire to
press against appellee is really one based on a quasi-delict which
prescribes in four years, and this period having already expired when
the action was taken, it is obvious that the action has prescribed. But
it is contended that the action of appellants as not yet prescribed if
the period of four years should be counted from the date the main
action was filed against them by the plaintiffs, which is April 19,1955,
because their amended third-party complaint was filed against
appellee only on December 20,1955. This is so, they contend, because
the purpose of their action is only to ask reimbursement.
The law ordinarily provides that the period during which an action may
be brought shall be computed from the time the right of action accrues
(Art. 1144 & 1149) but nothing is provided in this respect with regard
to an action based on a quasi-delict for Art. 1146 simply provides that
the action shall be instituted within four years
There being no provision as to when shall the period of four years
commence to run, the provision of Art. 1150 shall apply, which
provides that it shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Evidently, the day referred to is that of the day of the collision, for an
action based on a quasi-delict can be brought now independently of
the criminal action and even regardless of the outcome of the latter.
There can therefore be no dispute that the action of appellants against
appellee should have been brought within the period of four years
counted from July 25, 1951.
FE CAYAO-LASAM vs. SPOUSES CLARO and EDITHA
RAMOLETE
Facts:
3 months pregnant Respondent EDITHA RAMOLETE was brought to
the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) due to vaginal bleeding. Upon
advice of petitioner DR. LASAM relayed via telephone, EDITHA was
admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then
conducted which revealed the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The
following day, EDITHA’s repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside
from the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding,
petitioner advised EDITHA to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage
Procedure (D&C) or “raspa”.
Subsequently, DR. LASAM performed the said procedure and EDITHA
was discharged from the hospital the following day.
Almost two months after, EDITHA was once again brought at the
LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains.
She was attended by several doctors. DR. MAYO (One of the doctors)
allegedly informed her that there was a dead fetus in her womb.
After, EDITHA underwent laparotomy. She was found to have a
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus,
EDITHA had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and asa result,
she has no more chance to bear a child.
Thereafter, EDITHA and her husband CLARO RAMOLETE filed a
Complaint for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against DR. LASAM
before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC).
Respondents’ (Sps. Ramolete) Arguments:
EDITHA’s hysterectomy was caused by petitioner’s unmitigated
negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C
procedure and her failure to remove the fetus inside EDITHA’s womb.
Allegations of Negligence:
DR. LASAM’s failure to check up, visit or administer medication on
EDITHA during her first day of confinement at the LMC;
She recommended that a D&C procedure instead of closely
monitoring the state of pregnancy of EDITHA.
Petitioner’s (Fe Calao-Lasam) Answer:
She denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the
following explanations:
Upon EDITHA’s confirmation that she would seek admission at the
LMC, she (petitioner) immediately called the hospital to anticipate
the arrival of EDITHA and ordered through telephone the medicines
EDITHA needed to take, which the nurses carried out;
She visited EDITHA on the morning when EDITHA was first admitted
in LMC, during her rounds;
The day before she performed the procedure, she performed an
internal examination on EDITHA and she discovered that her cervix
was already open, thus, she discussed the possible D&C procedure,
should the bleeding become more profuse;
On the day of the procedure, she conduced another internal
examination on EDITHA, which revealed that her cervix was still
open;
EDITHA persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and bowel
movement; thus, she advised her to undergo D&C procedure which
SPS. RAMOLETE consented to;
She (DR. LASAM) was very vocal in the operating room about not
being able to see an abortus;
Taking the words of EDITHA to mean that she was passing out some
meaty mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must
have been expelled in the process of bleeding;
It was EDITHA who insisted that she wanted to be discharged; She
agreed, but she advised EDITHA to return for check-up a few days
after, which she failed to do.
Contentions:
She contended that it was EDITHA’s gross negligence and/or omission
in insisting to be discharged against the doctor’s advice and her
unjustified failure to return for check-up as directed that contributed
to her life-threatening condition;
EDITHA’s hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal
pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare
and very unusal case of abdominal placental implantation;
She argued that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or
any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any
stage of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the
same.
Ruling of the Board of Medicine (of the PRC):
Rendered a decision exonerating DR. LASAM from the charges filed
against her
When EDITHA was admitted at LMC, an ultra-sound was performed
upon her and the result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus
but did not specify where the fetus was located. Obstetricians will
assume that the pregnancy is within the uterus unless so specified by
the Sonologist who conducted the ultrasound.
DR. LASAM cannot be faulted if she was not able to determine that
complainant EDITHA is having an ectopic pregnancy interstitial. The
D&C conducted on EDITHA is necessary considering that her cervix is
already open and so as to stop the profuse bleeding.
Ruling of the PRC (On Appeal by Sps. Ramolete):
Reversed the findings of the Board and revoking DR. LASAM’s
authority or license to practice her profession as a physician
Issue:
Whether DR. LASAM committed gross negligence in performing the
D&C procedure on EDITHA
Ruling:
NO. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which
consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice
of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed
by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like
surrounding circumstances.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Four elements involved in medical negligence:
Duty
Breach
Injury
Proximate causation
Applying the four elements in the present case:
DUTY – Duty is established
A physican-patient relationship was created when EDITHA employed
the services of DR. LASAM. As EDITHA’s physician, DR. LASAM was
duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.
BREACH – No breach of duty
The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient
is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.
In the present case, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted
in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care
that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular
in the way the petitioner dealt with EDITHA.
INJURY – Not the doctor’s fault
In the present case, it is undisputed that EDITHA did not return for a
follow-up evaluation, in defiance of DR. LASAM’s advice. EDITHA
omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could
have avoided the injury.
PROXIMATE CAUSATION – Editha’s omission is the proximate cause
of her own injury
The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a
substantial part in bringing about EDITHA’s own injury. Had EDITHA
returned, DR. LASAM could have conducted the proper medical tests
and procedure necessary to determine EDITHA’s health condition
and applied the corresponding treatment which could have
prevented the rupture of EDITHA’s uterus. The D&C procedure
having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical
practice, it is clear that EDITHA’s omission was the proximate cause
of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her
part.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual
consequences especially so if the patient herself did not exercise the
proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF MEDICINE
EXONERATING THE PETITIONER IS AFFIRMED.
Exception: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs BALANDAN
Facts:
This case is an appeal for cetiorari from the dicision of of CA requiring
Hidalgo Enterprise to pay spouses Balandan damages for the death of
their son Mario.
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice plant factory in the
City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks
full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers.
The edges of the tank were barely a foot high from the surface of the
ground.
Through the wide gate entrance which is continually open for those
who wish to buy, any one could easily enter the said factory, as he
pleased. There was no guard assigned in the gate.
April 16, 1948, plaintiffs' son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years
old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age,
entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one
of said tanks. While thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the
tank, only to be threshed out later, already a cadaver, having died of
'asphyxia secondary to drowning'.
RTC of Laguna and CA applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, took
the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the
tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accident to persons entering its premises
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred on its decision
Ruling:
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who
fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who
is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The reason of the doctrine is that the condition or appliance
in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so
enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children.
However, the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable
to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location. Foreign jurisprudence lucidly explained, Indiana CA;
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Anderson vs. Reith-
Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Assumption of Risk
MARGARITA AFIALDA VS. BASILIO HISOLE AND
FRANCISCO HISOLE
Facts:
Plaintiff's argument:
The deceased, Loreto Afialda, a caretaker of carabaos at a fixed
compensation was gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries. The mishap was due neither to his own
fault nor to force majeure. The plaintiff is his elder sister and heir
depending upon him for support.
Afialda seeks to hold the owners liable under article 1905 of the Civil
Code that the possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same,
is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case,
the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.
Defendants’ argument:
The Hisole spouses as owners of the carabaos moved for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of a cause of action.
RTC:
The lower court granted the motion of the owners. It decided based
on article 1902 of the Civil Code that the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for
damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be
liable only if he had been negligent or at fault.
CA:
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether the owners of the animal are liable when damage is caused
to its caretaker.
Ruling:
NO. The article 1905 of the Civil Code applies only where an animal
caused injury to a stranger or third person. It does not apply in this
case where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. The
distinction is important. The statute names the possessor/user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," for it is
the possessor/user who has the custody and control of the animal and
the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage to anyone,
including himself. The caretaker being injured by the animal was one
of the risks of the occupation he had voluntarily assumed which he
must take the consequences.
Applying the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa
in his Commentaries, this case would not come under the labor laws
due to "a veritable accident of labor" because there was no allegation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act that the owners’ business had
a gross income of P20,000. On the other hand, if the action is to be
based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be
fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage; but the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY (INELCO) V. CA
Facts:
In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, a
strong typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding. When the floodwaters
were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out
of her son-in-law’s house and proceeded towards the direction of the
Five Sisters Emporium to look after her merchandise therein that
might have been damaged.
Wading in a waist-deep flood, the deceased was followed by Aida
Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo, who walked side by side at between
5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased
screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls
attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them because on the spot
where the deceased sank, was an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to the deceased, but eventually
turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
Through the help of the police, defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO was asked to cut off the electric current, which
they did. Thereafter, the deceased’s body was recovered about two
meters from the electric post.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased
against INELCO.
INELCO argues in chief that the deceased could have died simply by
drowning, or if she indeed died by electrocution, the same was due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.
In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without
petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent
by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence
of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current
whenever the switch is on. Petitioner conjectures that the switch to
said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the
deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that fateful
day.
After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed
the complaint. An appeal was filed with the CA which reversed the trial
court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the principle of "assumption of risk" applies.
2. Whether the principle of contributory negligence applies.
Ruling:
No. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds
no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the
surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the
comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The deceased
was on her way to her grocery store to see to it that the goods were
not flooded. As such, shall we punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not.
A person is excused from the force of the rule that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences --- if
an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is
in peril. Clearly, an emergency was at hand, as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred,
was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred
from recovering damages because of the death caused by INELCO's
negligence.
Yes. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of
God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through
the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
In times of calamities such as the one in the case at bar, extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigilance
to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might put life or limb
into peril.
The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area, nor even manning its office. To aggravate matters,
it was found that even before June 28, they were already alerted
about the impending typhoon through radio announcements, and at
that time INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current were
noted because “amperes of the switch volts were moving”. And yet,
despite these danger signals, INELCO did nothing and had to wait for
the request that the switch be cut off.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely
due to a fortuitous event.
"When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission"
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioners V. COURT OF APPEALS,
ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA AND FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Silliman University took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by herein petitioner Calalas. Because the
jeeepney was already full with 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle.
When Sunga gave way to an outgoing passenger, an Isuzu truck
driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She was confined for
almost a month and would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months.
As a result of that incident, Sunga filed a complaint for damages
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage in failing
to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier as
certified by Dr. Oligario, her attending physician.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck.
RTC:
It rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who was responsible for the accident.
CA:
Reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that Sunga’s
cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict,
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required
under the Civil Code. It dismissed the third- party complaint against
Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Petitioner’s argument:
He contends that the negligence of Verana (driver of Isuzu truck) was
the proximate cause of the accident and it negates his liability and to
rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the
safety of its passengers. That the bumping of the jeepney by the truck
owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Issue:
Whether Calalas exercised the diligence required in a contract of
carriage.
Ruling:
No. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove
that he had observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
First, the jeepney was not properly parked. Second, it is undisputed
that petitioner’s driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the
injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
The court found it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s
contention that Sunga’s taking an extension seat amounted to an
implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning
by boarding an overloaded ferry.
For an event to be that of caso fortuito, it is an event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires
that the ff. requirements be present:
The cause of the breach is independent of the debtor’s will;
The event is unforeseeable or unavoidable;
The event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and;
The debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
its body protruding two meters into the highway.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS.
ROBERTO REYES
Facts:
Roberto Reyes alleged that on October 13, 1994, while he was having
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr. Violeta Filart (friend of Reyes),
approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. After a couple of hours, when the
buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to
his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as
Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence
and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the
buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ( huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang). Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his
shame and humiliation. Meanwhile, a Makati policeman approached
and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr. Reyes filed an action for
damages against Ms. Lim and the hotel.
On the other hand, Ms. Ruby Lim narrated that as the Hotel’s
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years, one of her
functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr.
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s
wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller,
the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes. Learning
that Mr. Reyes was not invited, Ms. Lim requested Ms. Fruto (Dr.
Violeta’s sister) to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party. But Mr. Reyes
stayed. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito.
Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo. She then turned
around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave,
but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and
even threatened to dump food on her.
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower
court, averred that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
Trial Court:
Dismissed the complaint. It gave more credence to the testimony of
Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
It held that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the
party as he was uninvited.
Court of Appeals:
The appellate court held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she
needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s
invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Issue:
Whether Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No, Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party
to which he was not invited. She cannot be made liable to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and
social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim
was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19
and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
As applied to herein case, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was
driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each
other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct. A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend but mere
conjectures. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that
indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer
any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk
ruining a formal affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-
examination, had even admitted that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she
was very close—close enough for him to almost kiss her.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of Supervening
Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered Peril; or the
“Humanitarian Doctrine”
PICART vs. SMITH
Facts:
Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the latter neared the bridge, he blew his horn to give
warning of his approach.
The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
signals. However, by reason of the rapid movement of the car, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left as he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. The pony and the car
collided. As a result, the horse died and its rider got injured and
unconscious.
Issue:
Whether Smith is guilty of negligence.

Moreover, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was Ruling:
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Without
Yes. Although the defendant, at the outset, had the right to assume
proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs.
that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; the
Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did
control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant
inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did
when he moved toward the center of the bridge. It was his duty either
not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
to bring his car to an immediate stop or take the other lane. But,
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
instead, he ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
As far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which
Furthermore, the test of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the
Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a
alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same
legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
must be his to bear alone.
In this case, the negligence is clearly established. A prudent man,
placed in the position of the defendant would have recognized the risk
of his course, and would have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course. And because the law
imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
Thus, both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent. However,
the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since
the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an interval. Consequently, the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Facts:
A check in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at
Allied Bank's Kawit Branch. The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was
drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner
sent the check for clearing to through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC).
The check was cleared by BPI and Allied Bank credited the account of
MMGI with ₱1,000,000.00. But a just a few days later, MMGI’s account
closed and the amount was withdrawn. Moreover, when Silva
discovered the debit of ₱1,000,000.00, he complained about the
transaction. In response to Silva’s complaint, BPI re-credited his
account with the aforesaid sum.
A controversy between Allied Bank and BPI ensued as to who will
shoulder the amount. Allied Bank argued that despite its antecedent
negligence in accepting the postdated check for deposit, respondent,
by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences had it not negligently cleared the check in
question. Allied Bank underscores BPI’s failure to observe clearing
house rules and its own standard operating procedure which
constituted further negligence so much so that respondent should be
solely liable for the loss.
Issue:
Whether BPI should be made solely liable for the loss.
Ruling:
No. While the doctrine of last clear chance was deemed applicable in
this case, the same did not operate to impose sole liability on BPI only
(as usually is the effect). Stated broadly, the doctrine states that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
negligence. In other words, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance
to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
As such, if the plaintiff’s negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
While BPI’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss, Allied
Bank was not totally free from fault since it is guilty of contributory
negligence in accepting the postdated check in the first place. Thus,
the Court held that both banks should be held liable and apportioned
the damage between BPI and Allied Bank on a 60-40 ratio,
respectively.
 PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. vs. BAESA
Facts:
The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim,
Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico
with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan,
Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and
Marilyn Baesa.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger
jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner
thereof. They were traveling from Ilagan, Isabela to Malalam River,
Ilagan, Isabela. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right
and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While
they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO
bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the
jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and
Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died
while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was
extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO
Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago,
Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been
seen and has apparently remained in hiding.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O.
Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for
damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
Defense of PANTRANCO:
The late David Ico's alleged negligence is the proximate cause of the
accident by applying the doctrine of last clear chance and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver,
Ambrosio Ramirez.
RTC:
The trial court ruled against PANTRANCO.
CA:
The CA partly modified the RTC Ruling with regard to damages
awarded.
Issue:
Whether PANTRANCO’s defenses are tenable?
Ruling:
I. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case.
For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it. In this case, there is nothing to show that
the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he
saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return
the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the
opposite direction.
By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney
to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the
jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision.
Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a
few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid
it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never
apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and
if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered"
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of
petitioner's driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney
and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon
seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole
and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would
not have occurred
II. Re: The issue of liability of petitioner as an employer
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez
gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner
and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in
the selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising their
work rests with the petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's claim, there is
no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety
standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules and regulations
and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without
showing that they are being complied with, are not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its
employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting
and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner
failed to do this. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
evidence presented by the petitioner, which consists mainly of the
uncorroborated testimony of its Training Coordinator, is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of negligence against petitioner.
III. Re: Award of Damages
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased victims. While it is true that private respondents
should have presented documentary evidence to support their claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the
absence thereof does not necessarily bar the recovery of the damages
in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the
earning capacity of David Ico, and the spouses Baesa, respectively,
are sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can make a fair
and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning
capacity of the three deceased victims. Moreover, in fixing the
damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the court
can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment
and the state of his health at the time of death.
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the
time of his death in 1981 and was driving his own passenger jeepney.
The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old
at the time of their death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree
holder and the proprietor of the Cauayan Press, printer of the Cauayan
Valley Newspaper and the Valley Times at Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn
Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and at the time of her death, was
the company nurse, personnel manager, treasurer and cashier of the
Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela. Respondent court duly considered
these factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies of Fe Ico
and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of
earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses Baesa.
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER HARDWARE VS INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
Facts:
Engr. Calibo, Roranes and Patos were on the Jeep with Calibo at the
wheel,, as it approached from the South Lizada bridge going towards
Davao City. At that time, a cargo truck driven by Zacarias came from
the opposite direction. The cargo truck and the jeep collided and as
a consequence, Engr. Calibo died while Patos and Roranes sustained
physical injuries.
A case was filed against the truck driver and the owner by the heirs
of Engr. Calibo. The RTC ruled in favor of the truck driver considering
that the Engr Calibo was negligent in driving the jeep for not reducing
the speed of his jeep (the truck used brake on the other hand). He
was zigzagging at that time and Roranes and Patos refused to be so
investigated by the police officers. Moreover, Roranes’ testimony was
not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias, and was uncertain and
was contradicted by police investigator. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision.
It was established that the jeep was zigzagging before the collision.
Both drivers had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a distance of
one hundred fifty meters. Both also were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. It was also established in
the SC that truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into
it. The truck used the brake still thirty kilometers away.
Issue:
Is Zacarias liable considering that Engr. Calibo had the chance to avoid
the collision?
Ruling:
From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the
jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep
away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while
running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance,
not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court
would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and complete
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied
in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar
state of facts. Of those facts, which should be familiar to every student
of law, it is only necessary to recall the summary made in
the syllabus of this Court's decision that:
(t)he plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile
ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right.
The driver of the automobile, however guided his car toward the
plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away.
He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the
latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing
car xxx
Plaintiff Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered contusions which
required several days of medical attention. He sued the defendant
Smith for the value of his animal, medical expenses and damage to
his apparel and obtained judgment from this Court which, while
finding that there was negligence on the part of both parties, held that
that of the defendant was the immediate and determining cause of
the accident and that of the plaintiff ". . . the more remote factor in
the case":
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant
was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the
law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether
or not the evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer
necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such
evidence in the record which has not been controverted.
 DE ROY vs CA
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death
of Marissa Bernal, daughter of the latter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
RTC: The RTC Br. XXXVIII found petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarded damagest to private respondents.
CA: The RTC’s decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision.
2. Whether the doctrine of "last clear chance" applies in this case.
Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the RTC’s decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
2. The SC said the CA did not commit an error when it rejected
petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the.
warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
PLDT V CA & SPS ESTEBAN
Facts:
Private respondents instituted an action for damages against
petitioner for the injuries they sustained when their jeep ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench allegedly without any
warning lights or signs. The excavation was allegedly undertaken by
PLDT.
The evaluation and assessment of the evidence on record revealed
that (1) private respondents’ jeep was running along the inside lane
of the street then abruptly swerved to the right which caused it to hit
the accident mound, (2) the jeep was running quite fast, (3) that
private respondent was using dim lights despite the drizzle, (4) private
respondent knew of the existence and location of the accident mound,
having seen it many previous times.
Issue:
Whether private respondents can recover from PLDT.
Ruling:
No. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of
his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming
arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of
petitioner.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn
the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep
of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as
the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. 31 It is basic that private respondents
cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to
exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable
degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife
to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence.
ONG VS MCWD
Facts:
Dominador Ong, son of complainant drowned in the pool of the
defendant, a government owned corporation. Now he is seeking
damages. Defendant says the death was caused by unavoidable
accident or negligence of the child. It said it exercised due diligence.
They were equipped with all the needed safety equipment, placed the
needed safety signs, had a chief, a nurse, and 6 lifeguards who all
underwent training with the Philippine red cross. They had a full time
nurse and sanitary inspector on standby.
The child was playing with his brothers. He was 14 at the time. It was
not their first time at the pool because they frequented the place. They
were playing on the small pool. His two older brothers left and
transferred to the bigger pool. The lifeguards on duty were routinely
checking up on the area.
A boy approached one of the lifeguards and told him that one kid was
swimming under the water for a long time already. It was the boy ong
curiously was already in the big swimming pool. They immediately
swam and got the boy and applied artificial resuscitation in an effort
to revive him. The nurse also arrived and took over. They got a doctor
and injected the child with a camphorated oil in order to revive him
but to no avail. The boy was declared dead.
An autopsy was made and these were the findings an abrasion on the
right elbow lateral aspect; contusion on the right forehead; hematoma
on the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion in the brain with
petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face
and on the nails; the lung was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles;
dark fluid blood in the heart; congestion in the visceral organs, and
brownish fluid in the stomach. The death was due to asphyxia by
submersion in water. (TN the autopsy and the injuries are important
in this case)
Issue:
Issue posed in this appeal is whether the death of minor Dominador
Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
Ruling:
As to burden of proof
The present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming
damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed,
or of one of his employees.
This was not proven by the complainant because their 2 witnesses
gave testimony during trial that the lifeguard was reading magazine
and waited 4 minutes before saving the child was destroyed by the 2
witnesses own written statement given to the police who investigated
3 hrs after the incident. There the 2 witnesses emphasized that the
lifeguards IMMEDIATELY dived and tried to save the boy.
As to actions of the employees in trying to save the child
The defendants did everything in their power to prevent the accident
and to save the life of the boy. They had a complete set of safety
equipment and had 6 lifeguards, a fulltime nurse and instituted strict
rules and guidelines. When the accident happened they did everything
possible such as fetching a doctor injecting the victim with the oil,
using up all the oxygen in the resuscitator, in their efforts to save the
child.
Application of the doctrine of last clear chance
The complainants switched to using the theory that even if it be
assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate
incident, still appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save
the victim, it failed to do so.
The last clear chance doctrine simply states:
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident
The court ruled: it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
swimming pool. He went there without any companion in violation of
one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and
the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention
was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at
the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him
back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the
doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee.
Discussion as to the “probable” cause of death and final ruling
The court said that it noted the ruling of the trial court which was
supported by evidence that the expert evidence of both parties
suggested that Ong died at a water with only 5.5 ft depth. He might
have bumped his head or hit himself at the bottom of the pool thus
causing the injury to the head, stunning him thus resulting in the
drowning. As a boy scout (as was noted in the information), the SC
said he should have known that it was dangerous to dive at the pool.
The case was dismissed
ECHEVARA vs RAMOS
Facts:
Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep
with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved in the vehicular accident.
Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator and
as the administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the
Spouses Achevara. The driver, Benigno Valdez, according to the
respo`ndents, was seen driving recklessly and negligently. He tried to
overtake a motorcycle causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the
opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle (owner-type jeep)
driven by Arnulfo Ramos causing the latter’s death. Respondents
alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the
passenger jeep. Respondents sought to recover actual damages for
medical expenses in the sum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in
the sum of P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost
earnings, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In their Answer, petitioners (Achevara) alleged that it was Ramos who
was driving in a zigzag manner with his vehicle wiggling and
encroached on the west lane and to avoid collision, the passenger jeep
drove to the opposite of his lane but Ramos continued to move
towards the passenger jeep and bumped the left side of it. They
further alleged that Ramos knew that the vehicle he drove had a
mechanical defect.
The respondent presented Gamera as witness but his testimony was
controverted by petitioners witnesses (PO3 Peralta and SPO2 Valdez)
saying that passenger jeepney did not overtake a motorcycle because
he (PO3 Peralta) was behind the jeep. It was found out that owner-
type jeep driven by Ramos was indeed defective and he knew it to be
such.
RTC:
It ruled that the statements of the petitioner’s (Achevara) witnesses
were credible but that it ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance
was applicable. The trial court held that the driver of the passenger
jeep, Benigno Valdez, having seen the risk exhibited by the wiggling
of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep, causing it to run in a zigzag
manner, should have parked his vehicle on the right shoulder of the
road so that the mishap could have been prevented. Since he ignored
to take this reasonable precaution, the omission and/or breach of this
duty on his part was the constitutive legal cause of the mishap.
CA: Affirmed
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages
incurred as a result of the vehicular accident
Ruling:
No. The Court notes that respondents version of the vehicular accident
was rebutted by petitioners. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to
act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized
that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected
to a general but definite class of risks.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because
even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last
chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on
the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated
that when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the
passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the
western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type
jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert
in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a
matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the
collision.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would
have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross
negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of
Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident,
respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the
Civil Code.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION ET AL.
V. PURIFICACION VIZCARA, ET AL.
Facts:
Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a jeepney headed towards
Bicol to deliver onion crops, together with Cresencio Vizcara
(Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel),
Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While
crossing the railroad track, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train,
operated by Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and
rammed the jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death
of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel, while Dominador and
Joel sustained serious physical injuries.
The survivors, Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of the
deceased victims, filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas
and Ben Saga, alternate driver of the train, before the RTC.
The respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and
serious physical injuries was petitioners' gross negligence in not
providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and
properties — there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or
bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the
approaching train.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they exercised due
diligence in operating the train. Estranas asserted that he started
blowing the horn to warn the motorists of the approaching train.
However, when the train was 10 meters away from the intersection,
the jeepney suddenly crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately
stepped on the breaks but the momentum was great that the train did
not instantly come to stop.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to pay
the former the damages prayed for in the complaint. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision with modification in the amount of damages awarded
to respondents.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of last clear chance finds application in the
instant case.
Ruling:
No, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
In this case, the proximate cause of the collision was petitioners'
negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely
cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of
the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the
unfortunate incident which befell them. They did not exhibit any overt
act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding
negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied.
GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR.,
Petitioners, v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION AND
NISSIN UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioners: Grepistar is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation, while Sayson is one of its bus
drivers.
Respondents: Universal Robina Corporation (URC) and Nissin
Universal Robina Corporation (NURC) are domestic corporations
engaged in the food business. NURC is a subsidiary of URC. URC is
the registered owner of a Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number WRN
403 (URC van).
At about 6:50 a.m., which was then a declared national holiday,
petitioner's bus, which was then being driven toward the direction of
Manila by Sayson, collided head-on with the URC van, which was then
being driven Quezon province-bound by NURC's Operations Manager,
Bicomong. Bicomong died on the spot, while the colliding vehicles
sustained considerable damage.
Petitioners filed a Complaint against NURC to recover damages
sustained during the collision, premised on negligence. URC and NURC
filed their respective Answers, where they particularly alleged and
claimed lack of negligence on their part and on the part of Bicomong.
RTC RULING: (dismissed the complaint)
Plaintiff has no cause of action and cannot recover from the
defendants even assuming that the direct and proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the defendant's employee Renato
Bicomong.
CA RULING: (affirmed the RTC)
Records bear that the vehicular collision occurred on February 25,
2003 which was declared by former Executive Secretary Alberto G.
Romulo, by order of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as a
special national holiday. Renante Bicomong had no work on that day
and at the time the accident occurred, he was on his way home to
Candelaria, Quezon. There was no showing that on that day, Renante
Bicomong was given by defendants-appellees an assigned task, much
less instructed to go to Quezon. Thus, he was then carrying out a
personal purpose and not performing work for defendants-appellees.
Apropos is Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vicente Vasquez, Jr., wherein
the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that an employee was
using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of
itself sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the operation
of said vehicle unless it appeared that he was operating the vehicle
within the course or scope of bis employment.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in issuing the assailed decision and resolution
that respondents are not liable to petitioners for the damages they
sustained considering that the accident was attributed to the
negligence of Bicomong.
Petitioners' Arguments:
Petitioners insist that respondents should be held liable for Bicomong's
negligence under Articles 2176, 2180, and 2185 of the Civil Code;19
that Bicomong's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the
accident, in that he unduly occupied the opposite lane which the bus
was lawfully traversing, thus resulting in the collision with Greenstar's
bus; that Bicomong's driving on the opposite lane constituted a traffic
violation, therefore giving rise to the presumption of negligence on his
part; that in view of this presumption, it became incumbent upon
respondents to rebut the same by proving that they exercised care
and diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees; that
respondents failed to prove that Bicomong was not in the official
performance of his duties or that the URC van was not officially issued
to him at the time of the accident - and for this reason, the
presumption of negligence was not overturned; and that URC should
be held liable as the registered owner of the van.

Respondents' Arguments:
Pleading affirmance, respondents argue in their Comment: that the
collision occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was using the URC
van for a purely personal purpose, it should be. sufficient to absolve
respondents of liability as evidently, Bicomong was not performing his
official duties on that day; that the totality of the evidence indicates
that it was Sayson who was negligent in the operation of Greenstar's
bus when the collision occurred; that Bicomong was not negligent in
driving the URC van.
SC RULING: (denies the petition)
In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, the Court
made the following relevant pronouncement:
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article
2180's specification that '[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that
registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the
operation of their Vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which
the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180
requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship
between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted
within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand,
applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo,
et al. v. Jepte, where this court explained that the registration of motor
vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 41365
the and Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary 'not to make
said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, ... but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon
any public highway. Its main aim is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner.' x x x x
Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank recognized the seeming
conflict between Article 2180 and the registered-owner rule and
applied the latter.
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas28 stated that the registered owner
of a vehicle can no longer use the defenses found in Article 2180.
Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez29 reiterated this doctrine.
However, it should not be taken to mean that Article 2180 of the Civil
Code should be completely discarded in cases where the registered-
owner rule finds application.
The source of a registered owner's liability is not a distinct statutory
provision, but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code:
While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code does not contain any provision on the liability of registered
owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as
registered owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas' car.
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner
that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules
must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other
rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence.
In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable.
There, this court stated that Article 2180 'should defer to' the
registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be
totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180
have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the
vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that
between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry
the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many
cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to
uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or
any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the
public.
It must be said that when by evidence the ownership of the van and
Bicomong's employment were proved, the presumption of negligence
on respondents' part attached, as the registered owner of the van and
as Bicomong's employer. His burden of proof then shifted to
respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose.
Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of
negligence, having shown that when the collision took place,
Bicomong was not in the performance of his work; that he was in
possession of a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer
NURC, but to URC, and which vehicle was not officially assigned to
him, but to another employee; that his use of the URC van was
unauthorized - even if he had used the same vehicle in furtherance of
a personal undertaking in the past,31 this does not amount to implied
permission; that the accident occurred on a holiday and while
Bicomong was on his way home to his family in Quezon province; and
that Bicomong had no official business whatsoever in his hometown
in Quezon, or in Laguna where the collision occurred, his area of
operations being limited to the Cavite area.
Despite having seen Bicomong drive the URC van in a precarious
manner while the same was still a good 250 meters away from his
bus, Sayson did not take the necessary precautions, as by reducing
speed and adopting a defensive stance to avert any untoward incident
that may occur from Bicomong's manner of driving. This is precisely
his testimony during trial. When the van began to swerve toward his
bus, he did not reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid collision.
Instead, he maintained his current speed and course, and for this
reason., the inevitable took place: An experienced driver who is
presented with the same facts would have adopted an attitude
consistent with a desire to preserve life and property; for common
carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest degree.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons,
corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the
highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring
the safety of its passengers.
However, Sayson took no defensive maneuver whatsoever in spite of
the fact that he saw Bicomong drive his van in a precarious manner,
as far as 250 meters away - or at a point in time and space where
Sayson had all the opportunity to prepare and avert a possible
collision. The collision was certainly foreseen and avoidable but
Sayson took no measures to avoid it. Rather than exhibit concern for
the welfare of his passengers and the driver of the oncoming vehicle,
who might have fallen asleep or suddenly fallen ill at the wheel,
Sayson coldly and uncaringly stood his ground^ closed his eyes, and
left everything to fate, without due regard for the consequences. Such
a suicidal mindset cannot be tolerated, for the grave danger it poses
to the public and passengers availing of petitioners' services. To add
insult to injury, Sayson hastily fled the scene of the collision instead
of rendering assistance to the victims - thus exhibiting a selfish, cold-
blooded attitude and utter lack of concern motivated by the self-
centered desire to escape liability, inconvenience, and possible
detention by the authorities, rather than secure the well-being of the
victims of his own negligent act.
x x x The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties
are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point
of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence, x x x
Emergency rule
Richard Li denied the allegation that he was negligent. He claimed that
Valenzuela’s car was improperly parked and the area was poor lighted.
He also counterclaimed for damages for Valenzuela was negligent for
driving without a license.
A witness testified that Li’s car was approaching the scene very fast.
He stated that Li was under the influence of alcohol since he could
smell it.
The trial court found Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It also held Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer jointly and severally liable for the
damages under Article 2180. The Court of Appeals sustained that Li
was liable for the damages but absolved Alexander Commercial Inc.,
Li’s employer, from any liability against Valenzuela. It dismissed the
defendants’ counterclaims.

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA V COURT OF APPEALS, Issues:

RICHARD LI AND ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.
1.) Whether or not Li shall be held liable for the damages?
Facts: 2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was also negligent on her part?
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her 3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, shall
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home in Araneta Avenue. She be jointly and severally liable for the damages?
was with a companion. While driving she noticed something was
wrong with her tires. She stopped at a lighted place and verified it to Ruling:
ask help if needed. She was told by the people present that her tire
1. Yes. Negligence is commonly understood as the conduct which
was flat and decided to park her car and turned on the emergency
creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe
lights. She alighted from her car and assisted the man who will be
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which circumstances
fixing her tire when suddenly she was bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The
Lancer driven by Richard Li and registered under Alexander
circumstances established by the evidence showed that Li was grossly
Commercial, Inc. This accident resulted to her confinement for 20 days
negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer. It was emphasized that he
and amputation of her knee. The expenses for the hospital amounted
was driving at a fast speed at 2:00 AM after a heavy downpour which
to Php 120,000 and the cost of the artificial leg was Php 27,000 which
made the street slippery. There was also ample evidence showing that
were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Valenzuela asked for
he was under the influence of liquor.
Php 1M for moral damages, Php 100,000 for exemplary damages and
Php 180,000 for other medical and related expenses.
2. No. Contributory negligence is the conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. Valenzuela did exercise standard reasonably dictated by
emergence. It could not be considered as contributory to the accident
that happened to her. The emergency that led her to park her car on
a sidewalk of Aurora Boulevard was not her fault. It was evident that
she took all the reasonable precautions.
3. Yes. Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of
his employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of
which liability is not respondeat superior but the relationship of pater
familias which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. Alexander Commercial,
Inc. did not demonstrate that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. It was
not shown that the company took the necessary steps in determining
the driving proficiency and history of Li.
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is modified with the effect of reinstating the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court.
ORIX METRO LEASING vs MANGALINAO
Facts:
Anacleto Edurese, Jr. (Edurese) was driving a Pathfinder with plate
number BBG-334. His Isabela-bound passengers were the owners of
said vehicle, spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao (Mangalinao
spouses), their daughter Marriane, housemaid Rufina Andres and
helper Armando Jebueza (Jebueza).
Before them on the outer lane was a Pampanga-bound Fuso 10-
wheeler truck (Fuso), with plate number PAE-160, driven by Loreto
Lucilo (Loreto), who was with truck helper Charlie Palomar (Charlie).
The Fuso was then already moving in an erratic and swerving motion.
Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX's fast
lane and about to overtake the Fuso, the latter suddenly swerved to
the left and cut into the Pathfinder's lane thereby blocking its way.
The impact caused both vehicles to stop in the middle of the
expressway.
Almost instantly, the inevitable pileup happened. Although Antonio
stepped on the brakes, the Isuzu's front crashed 9 into the rear of the
Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck.
In the meantime, the Mangalinao spouses, the driver Edurese, and
the helper Jebueza were declared dead on the spot while 6-month old
Marriane and the housemaid were declared dead on arrival at a nearby
hospital
The children imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on
the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents; while they
hold Sonny andOrix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
respective drivers
Orix in its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual owner
of the Fuso truck. Orix reiterated that the children had no cause of
action against it because on September 9, 1983, it already sold the
Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel Ong (Manuel).
Court a quo issued a Decision on February 9, 2001 finding Sonny,
Antonio, Loreto and Orix liable for damages.
CA rendered its Decision affirming the factual findings of the trial court
of reckless driving.
The CA also ruled that Orix, as the registered owner of the Fuso, is
considered in the eyes of the law and of third persons responsible for
the deaths of the passengers of the Pathfinder, regardless of the lack
of an employer-employee relationship between it and the driver
Loreto.
Issue:
Whether or not the truck drivers are negligent? Whether or not Orix
is solidarily liable as registered owner?
Ruling:
Based on the helper's statement, the Fuso had lost control, skidded to
the left and blocked the way of the Pathfinder, which was about to
overtake. The Pathfinder had absolutely no chance to avoid the truck.
Instead of slowing down and moving towards the shoulder in the
highway if it really needed to stop, it was very negligent of Loreto to
abruptly hit the brake in a major highway wherein vehicles are highly
likely to be at his rear.
Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso
by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for
the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused.
Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the
real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required to pay
as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff.
Prescription
VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G.
CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
and JON ELORDI, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
The case arose from a vehicular collision between a Pepsi-Cola
delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.
The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the
spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Thereafter, Elordi was
charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The
information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages
by the heirs of the three victims.
While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, against
the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of
P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, the parties entered into
a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate
gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement
of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under
the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the
compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was
rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, however, herein appellants commenced a
civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of
the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Appellees filed motion to dismiss said
civil action on the ground that such action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether the action had already prescribed?
Whether the appellees had been released from appellants' claim for
damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of
P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate
from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their
compromise.
Ruling:
In our opinion the question of prescription is decisive.
There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted
within four (4) years. Appellants originally sought to enforce their
claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when
they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The
information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to
include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the
victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. But
appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not
appeal from the Court's order to the effect. And when they
commenced the civil action the criminal case was still pending,
showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by
the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature
and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent
judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it
as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31
and 33 of the Civil Code.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries
causing death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have
been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their
decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and
the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal
action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint
here was filed only on September 26, 1958 or after the lapse of more
than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R.
No. L-10542, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is
governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when
the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from
the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day
the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that
the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the
filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had
neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it
separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having
made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action
even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, as
held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action
cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action
based on a quasi-delict."
Incomplete/Partial defense
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION COMMISSION vs DE JESUS
Facts:
Baby John de Jesus was employed as Lineman II by NTC. He died due
to electrocution while performing a hotspot correction due to the
negligence of his foreman Danilo Manahan. Leslie, Virgilio and Estrella,
all surnamed de Jesus, as heirs filed a complaint for damages based
on quasi-delict against NTC, being the employer of Baby John.
RTC ruled in their favor declaring that NTC failed to prove that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. As reflected on and admitted in the
Accident Investigation Report, it was declared that NTC’s hired
foreman, Danilo Manahan, was assigned to supervise a task wherein
he was not familiar. The report further declares that there was indeed
insufficient coordination of work which was strengthened by the
testimony of NTC’s Senior HR Analyst who narrated that upon request
for a grounding duster to protect Baby John, the latter was merely
ordered by Danilo not to come down anymore and just proceed to
climb which resulted to the accident.
On appeal, CA affirmed with modification. It ruled that actual payment
of damages will be reduced by 20% due to the presence of
contributory negligence on the part of Baby John.
Issues:
Whether CA erred in affirming with modification the ruling of RTC.
Ruling:
No. Failure to controvert the presumption of negligence
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed
to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of his employees. To avoid liability for a quasi
delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.
There was indeed legal basis to declare that NTC failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the supervision of its
employees. Both the RTC and CA based their conclusions on the
Accident Investigation Report prepared and identified by NTC’s own
Regional Safety Engineer/Designated Safety Engineer who noted that
there was indeed "insufficient coordination of work" during the
unfortunate incident, and by the testimony of NTC’s own Senior H.R.
Analyst who narrated that upon request for a grounding cluster to
protect himself, the late Baby John De Jesus was merely ordered by
his foreman not to come down anymore and just proceed and continue
to climb which resulted in the subject incident.
Contributory negligence of Baby John
Failure on the part of the late Baby John to use the required protective
equipment was an act of negligence contributory to that unfortunate
incident which led to his untimely death. He should have insisted for
the said required grounding cluster notwithstanding his foreman's
directive to proceed without it.
If his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. (Mendoza v. Soriano)
Therefore, CA was correct in reducing the amount of damages by
20%.
RAKES vs ATLANTIC GULF
-- Gonzaga, Nigel
BANAL & ENVERSO vs TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & HOUSE
PLANT
Facts:
On 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from
another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the
procession was over, the woman and her daughter, accompanied by
two other persons by the names of Fausto and Elias, passed along a
public street. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of
the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared which
so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she
fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this
gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found
her face downward in the hot water. Her clothes were immediately
removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the
provincial hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician,
Dr. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died.
Dr. Benitez, certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree,
whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of
the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen".
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the
side of the street with the knowledge and consent of the authorities;
that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the
death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.
The trial judge dismiss the case because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case.
Ruling:
The trial court erred.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal
street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child
to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrines announced in the much debated case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence
of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar
to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.
JARCO MARKETING CORP V. CA
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of the Syvel’s Department Store located in
Makati City. On May 9, 1983, the spouses Aguilar together with their
6 year old daughter named Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of the
department store. When the mother, Criselda, was signing her credit
card at the verification counter, they heard a loud thud. They
discovered that their daughter, Zheineth, was pinned down by the
bulk of the store’s gift wrapping counter/structure. Zheineth was
immediately rushed to hospital but later on died after 14 days after
the incident happened. The cause of death was the injury she
sustained as evidenced by the medical certificate. The parents
demanded payment for hospitalization, medical bills, wake and funeral
expenses from the petitioner but petitioner refused. Thus a case was
filed in the court for damages against petitioner.
Trial Court:
The court dismissed the complaint for damages finding that the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter was because of Zheineth
act of clinging to it and that the mother’s negligence contributed to
the accident.
Court of Appeals:
The court reversed the judgment of the lower court finding that the
proximate cause of the death was petitioners negligence in failing to
institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed. The
mother could not be imputed for negligence since it was reasonable
for her to let go of the child since she was signing the credit card slip.
The court declared that a child below seven years of old, at the time
of the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort.
Issue:
1. Whether the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to
negligence
2. In case of finding negligence, whether the same can be attributed
to the petitioner for maintaining a defective counter or to the mother
and daughter for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while
inside the store premises
Ruling:
We rule that the tragedy which befell Zhieneth was no accident and
that Zhieneth’s death could only be attributable to negligence as
evidenced by the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene
of the incident and accompanied the mother and the child to the
hospital. He testified that when they ask the child what she did, it
replied “nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just
fell on me.”. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of
pain and suffering and statements made to physician are generally
considered declarations and admissions. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzale’s testimony on the matter.
Anent the negligence of Zhieneth, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old that they
are incapable of contributory negligence.
The negligence is to be attributed to petitioner. If the claim of
petitioner that the counter was stable and sturdy, a frail six year old
could not have caused the counter to collapse. After scrutiny of the
evidence on record, it revealed that the counter was not durable at
all. The mother should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
The mother momentarily released the child’s hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip, Zhieneth was near her mother
and did not loiter as the child admitted to the doctor who treated her
at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on
her.
NAPOCOR vs CASIONAN
Facts:
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines
of 69 kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon.
Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducing their distance from
the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby
who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991,
the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for
NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users from their high-
tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed
the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles, and they
identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from
its deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble
and his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2
bamboo poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their
shoulder, with Noble carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead
as they passed through the trail underneath the NPC high-tension lines
on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning
left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated that
he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or two, then he saw
Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him, but
Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer
determined the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to
ventricular fibulation, secondary to electrocution. There was a small
burned area in the middle right finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the
wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually
used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that
the trail was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice.
They did not see any danger warning signs installed. After the GM of
NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and
put up warning signs around the area.
Noble’s parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied
being negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that
signs were installed but they were stolen by children, and that
excavations were made to increase the clearance from the ground but
some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses
testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution
since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble
did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.
RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTC observed that NPC
witnesses were biased because all but one were employees of NPC,
and they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC
found NPC negligent since the company has not acted upon the
requests and demands made by the community leaders since 1991.
CA affirmed RTC with modification–award of moral damages was
reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees was disallowed
since the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the
decision.
Issue:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble.
Ruling:
NO; hence, NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause
him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting
to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which,
concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of
the injury.
The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179
provides that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured
party’s contributory negligence.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an
impending danger to health and body. In this case, there were no
warning signs, and the trail was regularly used by people since it was
the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not
be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers
in the area.
NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by
DENR in the area. In Añonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation
of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the
proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened
was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. The
fact that pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for NPC
to leave their transmission lines dangling.
CADIENTE vs MACAS
Facts:
Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at about
4:00 p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in
Davao City, 15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas, herein
respondent, was standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about
two and a half meters away from the respondent when he was
bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca.
Rosalinda and another unidentified person immediately came to the
respondent's rescue and told Cimafranca to take the victim to the
hospital. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical
Center.
Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the
respondent, testified that the respondent suffered severe muscular
and major vessel injuries, as well as open bone fractures in both thighs
and other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon had
to amputate both legs up to the groins. Cimafranca had since
absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was
registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag.
Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident
happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged
that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa on March 28, 1994,
and turned over the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt to
Jalipa, with the understanding that the latter would be the one to
cause the transfer of the registration.
The victim's father, Samuel Macas, filed a complaint for torts and
damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC. Cadiente
later filed a third-party complaint 7 against Jalipa. In answer, Jalipa
claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera at the time
of the accident. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Abraham
Abubakar on June 20, 1994. He thus filed a fourth-party complaint
against Abubakar.
RTC:
Ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente
and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the
plaintiff for their own negligence
CA:
Held that the findings of the trial court were in accordance with the
established facts
Issues:
Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim
Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and
severally liable to the victim.
Petitioner’s arguments:
The victim's negligence contributed to his own mishap. The petitioner
theorizes that if witness Rosalinda Palero, who was only two and a
half meters away from the victim, was not hit by the Ford Fiera, then
the victim must have been so negligent as to be bumped and run over
by the said vehicle. The petitioner further argues that having filed a
third-party complaint against Jalipa, to whom he had sold the Ford
Fiera, the CA should have ordered the latter to reimburse him for any
amount he would be made to pay the victim, instead of ordering him
solidarily liable for damages.
Respondent’s arguments:
The immediate and proximate cause of the injuries he suffered was
the recklessly driven Ford Fiera, which was registered in the
petitioner's name. He insists that when he was hit by the vehicle, he
was standing on the uncemented portion of the highway, which was
exactly where pedestrians were supposed to be. The respondent
stresses that as the registered owner of the Ford Fiera which figured
in the accident, the petitioner is primarily liable for the injury caused
by the said vehicle. He maintains that the alleged sale of the vehicle
to Jalipa was tainted with irregularity, which indicated collusion
between the petitioner and Jalipa.
RULING:
NO. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the
victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented
portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was
intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as
those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running
vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented
portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without
so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped
and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he should
be when the unfortunate event transpired.
Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business driving as
recklessly as she did. The respondent cannot be expected to have
foreseen that the Ford Fiera speeding along the cemented part of the
highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run
him over. Thus, SC cannot accept the petitioner's contention that the
respondent was negligent.
YES. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold
it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause.
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving
who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by
collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury
done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually
without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the
injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to
escape liability by disproving his
The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the
owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or
injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or
prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be
secured.
Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's
name at the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner
cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the
respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to
face life with nary but two remaining limbs.
LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
BY TORTFEASOR
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES vs GLODEL BROKERAGE
Facts:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-
00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132
bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28,
2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey"
from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on
the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery
to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services
of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the
cargoes to Columbia's warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela
City.
The goods were loaded on board 12 trucks owned by Loadmasters,
driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck
helpers. 6 truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to
Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other 6 truckloads were destined for
Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for
Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbia's warehouses there. Of
the 6 trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only 5 reached
the destination. 1 truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of
copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance
a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. R&B
Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against
both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, it sought
reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of
the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right
of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held
legally liable for the loss."
Issue:
Who between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance
for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.
Ruling:
The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly
and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject
cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary."
Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into
by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee,
is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation
with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article
2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody
of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were
instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages
caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercisediligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with
the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated
destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods
to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing
escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel
should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters.
Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B
Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages,
a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that
the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the
damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent tortfeasor.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
By parents
LIBI vs IAC
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong was an 18-year old first year commerce student of
the University of San Carlos. Wendell Libi was also a minor between
18 and 19 years of age. Both were sweethearts for more than two
years before their death. Respondent spouses are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong. Petitioners are the parents of Wendell
Libi.
About a month after Julie broke up with Wendell, Julie Ann and
Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the
crime inside the residence of private respondents.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE:
Private respondents filed a civil case in the then CFI of Cebu against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CFI
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
IAC:
The IAC held the petitioners to be grossly negligent in preventing
Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept
in a safety deposit box and subsidiarily liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT:
Private respondents submitted that Wendell caused Julie Ann’s death
by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT:
Petitioners rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown
third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by
reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then
shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification. They also contend that they had exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly
liable for the crime committed by their minor son.
Issue:
Whether petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on
what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son.
Ruling:
YES, the petitioners should be held primarily liable, and not subsidiarily
liable as decided by the IAC.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son,
despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at
the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was
a CANU agent and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
being drug informers, or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding upright what
clearly appears as a revolver nor on how or why he was in possession
of that firearm.
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it
is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised
on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect
to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under,
or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment;
and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years
of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code,
as so modified.
If the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor
children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense.
CUADRA vs MONFORT
Facts:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. While they were weeding the grass in the school premises
together with three other classmates, as assigned by their teacher,
Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly, she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, the object hit her right eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some
powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and it was then that
the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to
a doctor for treatment. Despite numerous medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. A civil
suit was instituted by Cuadra’s parents in her behalf against Monfort’s
father based on Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
Issue:
Whether the father may be held liable for the act Monfort, his minor
child, which caused damage to Cuadra.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or
that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority
in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her
and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the
care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have
any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180,
in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father
or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of
this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and
may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that
may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
"that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
TAMARGO vs CA
Facts:
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional
Trial Court by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent,
and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed
a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for
adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had
lost their right to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority
is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling:
The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by
a minor child who lives with them.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition
for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air
rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of
any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which states that “… a decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was
filed…”
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be
read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code the adoption shall
“Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent” and urge
that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved
as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the
basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical
and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental
authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the
trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual
custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial
court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By owners and managers of establishment
SPS. VILORIA vs CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Facts:
In 1997, while in the United States, Fernando approached Holiday
Travel, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines (CAI), to
purchase tickets from Newark to San Diego. The travel agent,
Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel by train
because there were no available seats; that they must purchase plane
tickets for CAI; that if they won’t purchase plane tickets; they’ll never
reach their destination in time. As per Mager’s representations, they
purchased two plane tickets worth $800.00.
Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip wasn’t really
fully booked and so they purchased train tickets and went to their
destination by train instead. Then they called up Mager to request for
a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the couple to CAI. As
the couple were now in the Philippines, they filed their request with
CAI’s office in Ayala. The spouses Viloria alleged that Mager
misrepresented which made them into believing that the only way to
travel was by plane and so they were fooled into buying expensive
plane tickets.
CAI refused to refund the amount of the tickets and so the spouses
sued the airline company. In its defense, CAI claimed that the tickets
sold to them by Mager were non-refundable; that, if any, they were
not bound by the misrepresentations of Mager because there’s no
contract of agency existing between CAI and Mager.
TRIAL COURT:
In favor of the spouses.
CA:
Reversed.
Issue:
Whether a Principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and
Holiday Travel; and assuming that an agency relationship exists
between CAI and Holiday Travel, is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday
Travel’s agents and employees such as Mager?
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements of agency are present.
a. there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the
relationship;
b. the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third
person;
c. the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and
d. the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The first and second elements are present as CAI does not deny that
it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel to which Mager is part
of, whereby Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with
third persons on the airlines’ behalf. The third element is also present
as it is undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative
capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the
contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its behalf. The
fourth element is also present considering that CAI has not made any
allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that was granted
to it.
CAI also never questioned the validity of the transaction between
Mager and the spouses. CAI is therefore in estoppel. CAI cannot be
allowed to take an altogether different position and deny that Holiday
Travel is its agent without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever
damage or prejudice that may result from such denial or retraction to
Spouses Viloria, who relied on good faith on CAI’s acts in recognition
of Holiday Travel’s authority. Estoppel is primarily based on the
doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall an
innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in
this case would result in gross travesty of justice.
PHILIPPINE BUS RABBIT vs PHIL-AM FORWARDERS
Facts:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of
the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
CONTENTION OF DEFENDANTS:
Balingit is not Pineda's employer.
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines and Pangalangan have no cause of action
against Balingit as he is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
The CFI dismissed the complaint as against Balingit.
Issue:
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
embrace the manager of a corporation.
Ruling:
NO, Article 2180 does not include the manager of a corporation.
Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a
new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue
that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of
Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200,
Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000
on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo
Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25,
respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be
pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his
wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not
raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of
the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct
from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this
appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within
the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, could
be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505)
CASTILEX INDUSTRIES vs VASQUEZ
Facts:
Benjamin Abad, manager of Castilex, was driving a company owned
car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña
rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. The car collided with
the motorcycle driven by Romeo So Vasquez, who was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling
counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without
any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a 2) Whether Abad was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. The collision caused the latter's
3) Whether Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the death
death Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital, where Abad signed
resulting from the negligent operation by Abad
an acknowledgment of Responsible Party in which he agreed to pay
whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Ruling:
Vasquez may incur.
As to whether the 5th or 4th par of Art 2180 should apply
A criminal case was filed against Abad, which was subsequently
dismissed. YES, 5th par should apply. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180,
whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is
Vasquez's parents then commenced an action for damages against liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his
Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
RTC:
then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense
Ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Abad and Castilex herein to of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
pay jointly and solidarily. Castilex and Abad separately appealed the
Castilex's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
decision.
phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or
CA: industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean
that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business
Affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding Abad and Castilex liable
or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is
but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
solidary" with the former.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine
Hence, Castilex filed the instant petition.
what is applicable:
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Fourth Paragraph Fifth Paragraph
Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not
Both provisions apply to employers
engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business Applies to owners and to employers in
of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by managers of an general, whether or not
said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply. c establishment or engaged in any
enterprise business or industry
Issues:
covers negligent acts of encompasses negligent
1) Whether the fifth or the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 should employees committed acts of employees
apply; either in the service of acting within the scope
the branches or on the of their assigned task.
 occasion of their
functions
an expansion of the 4th
par, in both employer
coverage and acts
included
As to whether Abad was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks
Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties. The mere fact that ABAD was using
a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge Cstilex with liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within
the course or scope of his employment. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the Castilex’s office,
at Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente
Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioner's place of business. At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took
some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was
leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That
same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of
the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then
shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been ABAD's
daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
Hence, Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that Castilex be relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its
vehicle.
As to whether Castilex is vicariously liable
No. To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in personal affairs
not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
By employers
MAMARIL vs BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps. Mamaril) are
jeepney operators since 1971. They would park their six (6) passenger
jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP)
compound for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. All the
jeepneys were parked inside the BSP compound. The following
morning, however, one of the vehicles was missing and was never
recovered. According to the security guards, a male person who
looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound.
Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages against BSP, AIB, Pena
and Gaddi (the guards on duty that night). In support thereof, Sps.
Mamaril averred that the loss of the subject vehicle was due to the
gross negligence of the above-named security guards on duty who
allowed the subject vehicle to be driven out by a stranger despite their
agreement that only authorized drivers duly endorsed by the owners
could do so.
The guards even admitted their negligence during the ensuing
investigation. Notwithstanding, BSP and AIB did not heed Sps.
Mamaril's demands for a conference to settle the matter. In its
Answer, BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps.
Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the manner by which
the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself
expressly stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for
loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein."
Issue:
Whether BSP should be held liable for the loss of their vehicle based
on the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued
Ruling:
Petition lacks merit. In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate
cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of
security guards in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the
subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the
result would not have occurred. Moreover, the guards failed to refute
Sps. Mamaril's contention that they readily admitted being at fault
during the investigation that ensued.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence
on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible error was committed by the
CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle
based on fault or negligence. Neither will the vicarious liability of an
employer under Article 2180 17 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It
is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards
by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly,
therefore, no employer-employee relationship existed
between BSP and the security guards assigned in its
premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be
imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true
employer of Peña and Gaddi.
In the instant case, the owners parked their six (6) passenger
jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee. Hence, a lessor-
lessee relationship indubitably existed between them and BSP. BSP
was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable
parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to
secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss
suffered by Sps. Mamaril. Anent Sps. Mamaril's claim that the
exculpatory clause: "Management shall not be responsible for loss of
vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein" contained in the
BSP issued parking ticket was void for being a contract of adhesion
and against public policy, suffice it to state that contracts of adhesion
are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a
party who enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety.
Wherefore, instant petition is DENIED. CA decision is affirmed.
BALIWAG TRANSIT vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On 10 April 1985 a Complaint for damages arising from breach of
contract of carriage was filed by private respondents, the Spouses
Sotero Cailipan, Jr. and Zenaida Lopez, and their son George, of legal
age, against petitioner Baliwag Transit (Baliwag). George, who was a
paying passenger on a Baliwag bus, suffered multiple serious physical
injuries when he was thrown off said bus driven in a careless and
negligent manner by Leonardo Cruz, the authorized bus driver, along
Barangay Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan. As a result, he was confined in
the hospital for treatment, incurring medical expenses, which were
borne by his parents, the respondent Spouses, in the sum of about
P200,000.00 plus other incidental expenses of about P10,000.00.
An Answer was filed by petitioner alleging that the cause of the injuries
sustained by George was solely attributable to his own voluntary act
in that, without warning and provocation, he suddenly stood up from
his seat and headed for the door of the bus as if in a daze, opened it
and jumped off while said bus was in motion, in spite of the
protestations by the driver and without the knowledge of the
conductor.
Baliwag then filed a Third-Party Complaint against Fortune Insurance
& Surety Company, Inc., on its third-party liability insurance in the
amount of P50,000.00. In its Answer, Fortune Insurance claimed
limited liability, the coverage being subject to a Schedule of
Indemnities forming part of the insurance policy.
Fortune Insurance and Baliwag each filed Motions to Dismiss on the
ground that George, in consideration of the sum of P8,020.50 had
executed a "Release of Claims." These Motions were denied by the
Trial Court in an Order as they were filed beyond the time for pleading
and after the Answer were already filed.
Baliwag filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer, which was granted
by the Trial Court. The Amended Answer incorporated the affirmative
defense in the Motion to Dismiss to the effect that on 16 May 1985,
George bad been paid all his claims for damages arising from the
incident subject matter of the complaint when he executed the
"Release of Claims" releasing, acquitting and forever discharging
Fortune Insurance and/or Baliwag transit, Inc. from any and all liability
accrued in the suit filed, for the consideration of a sum of P8,020.50
During the preliminary hearing on the aforementioned affirmative
defense, Baliwag waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and
instead offered as its Exhibit "1" the "Release of Claims" signed by
George and witnessed by his brother Benjamin L. Cailipan, a licensed
engineer.
By way of opposition to petitioner's affirmative defense, respondent
Sotero Cailipan, Jr. testified that he is the father of George, who at
the time of the incident was a student, living with his parents and
totally dependent on them for their support; that the expenses for his
hospitalization were shouldered by his parents; and that they had not
signed the "Release of Claims."
IThe RTC of Bulacan, Branch 20 dismissed the Complaint and Third-
party Complaint, ruling that since the contract of carriage is between
Baliwag and George L. Cailipan, the latter, who is of legal age, had
the exclusive right to execute the Release of Claims despite the fact
that he is still a student and dependent on his parents for support.
Consequently, the execution by George of the Release of Claims
discharges Baliwag and Fortune Insurance.
COURT OF APPEALS
The Spouses appealed to respondent Court of Appeals and the CA set
aside the appealed Order and held that the "Release of Claims" cannot
operate as a valid ground for the dismissal of the case because it does
not have the conformity of all the parties, particularly George's
parents, who have a substantial interest in the case as they stand to
be prejudiced by the judgment because they spent a sizeable amount
for the medical bills of their son; that the Release of Claims was
secured by Fortune Insurance for the consideration of P8,020.50 as
the full and final settlement of its liability under the insurance policy
and not for the purpose of releasing Baliwag from its liability as a
carrier in this suit for breach of contract. The Appellate Court also
ordered the remand of the case to the lower Court for trial on the
merits and for George to return the amount of P8,020.50 to Fortune
Insurance.
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari by Baliwag assailing the
Appellate Court judgment.
Issue:
Whether the Release of Claims executed by George during the
pendency of the case had the legal effect of discharging Baliwag
Transit from Liability
Ruling:
Yes. Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the
Release of Claims executed by George, as the injured party,
discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability is
valid. He was then of legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural
Engineering, and had the capacity to do acts with legal effect (Article
37 in relation to Article 402, Civil Code). Thus, he could sue and be
sued even without the assistance of his parents.
The contract of carriage was actually between George, as the paying
passenger, and Baliwag, as the common carrier. As such carrier,
Baliwag was bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, and is liable for injuries to them through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees (Articles 1755 and 1759,
Civil Code). George had the right to be safely brought to his
destination and Baliwag had the correlative obligation to do so. Since
a contract may be violated only by the parties, as against each other,
in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as
plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract. A real party-
in-interest -plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party-in-
interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose
act or omission violates the legal right of the former. In the absence
of any contract of carriage between Baliwag and George's parents, the
latter are not real parties-in-interest in an action for breach of that
contract.
The general rule of the common law is that every action must be
brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded
or infringed. "For the immediate wrong and damage the person
injured is the only one who can maintain the action." The person who
sustains an injury is the person to bring an action for the injury against
the wrongdoer."
The release of claims, a duly notarized public document, clearly
stipulates that the consideration of P8,020.50 received by George was
"to release and forever discharge Fortune Insurance and/or Baliwag
from any and all liabilities now accrued or to accrue on account of any
and all claims or causes of action ... for personal injuries, damage to
property, loss of services, medical expenses, losses or damages of any
and every kind or nature whatsoever, sustained by him on 17
December 1984 thru Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Physical
Injuries."
Consequently, the ruling of the CA in holding that the "Release of
Claims" was intended only to release Fortune Insurance from the full
and final settlement of a third-party liability for bodily injury claim and
not for the purpose of releasing Baliwag from its liability, has to be
rejected for being contrary to the very terms thereof. If the terms of
a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control
(Article 1370, Civil Code). The phraseology "any and all claims or
causes of action" is broad enough to include all damages that may
accrue to the injured party arising from the unfortunate accident.
The Release of Claims had the effect of a compromise agreement
since it was entered into for the purpose of making a full and final
compromise adjustment and settlement of the cause of action
involved. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced (Article 2028, Civil Code). The Release of Claims executed
by the injured party himself wrote finish to this litigation.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs CA
Facts:
Ferdinand Castillo a freshman student at St. Francis HS wanted to join
a school pincin but his parents did not allow him because of short
notice however his parents allowed him to bring food to the teachers
for the picnic with a directive to go back home after doing so.
Hpwever, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on
with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students and teachers were in the
water, one of the female teachers was drowning. Some students
including Ferdinand came to recuse, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts
to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna
in Quezon and later to Mt. Carmel General Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Spouses filed a complaint against the
school for damages which respondents incurred from the death of
their 13 year old son.
Respondent’s contention:
The death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to
exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in
preventing their son from drowning.
RTC:
Ruled in favor of respondents and against the petitioner-teachers but
dismissed the case against the School St. Francis High School as it
was found out the principal did not consent thereto. "The students,
young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted
to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the
precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-
teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under the
circumstances”
CA:
Held the School also liable. The school and the principal are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape
liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an 'extra-curricular
activity of the St. Francis High School.' We find from the evidence
that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had
knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even
been invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any
prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any
precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic.
Issue:
Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants
which will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs
Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code is applicable to the case at bar
Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper
under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar.
Ruling:
Under the law, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable
for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused
damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in
the performance of his assigned tasks.
Hence on the first issue, the teachers/petitioners were not in the
actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened
not within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely
private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head
or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
activity.
On the Second issue, The application therefore of Article 2180 has no
basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we
were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers will forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being
hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the
employees even if such act or omission he committed while they are
not in the performance of their duties. Finally, no negligence could be
attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses.
On the third issue, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded
in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under
any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
"Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similarly injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission."
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not
guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be
assessed against them.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN vs CA

Facts:
Funtecha was a working student at petitioner school where he served
as a part-time janitor and scholar. He was, in relation to the school,
an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for
only two hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver of the
school jeepney, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle
while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of
his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the
house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student
of Filamer Christian Institute.
While going through a sharp turn, according to Allan’s testimony, a
fast moving truck nearly hit them and made them swerve to the right
to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they hit the deceased Potenciano
Kapunan. The heirs of Kapunan filed this petition requesting damages.
Issue:
Is petitioner liable for the death of Potenciano?
Ruling:
Yes. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president
where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive
home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning
of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had
knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said
purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also
had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license
and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was
not in his classrooms.
The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer
for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by
arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act
done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer
or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle
derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of
whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of his master's business.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an
official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school
driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption
juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The
petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth
such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees
from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed
sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury
arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the
vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are
paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
YAMBAO vs ZUNIGA
Facts:
A bus owned by petitioner was being driven by Ceferino Venturina.
Thue bus bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a pedestrian, which caused
his death. Private respondents, as heirs of the victim, filed a complaint
for damages against petitioner and the driver. Petitioner alleged that
she is not liable for any damages because as an employer, she
exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection and supervision of the bus driver.
Petitioner was held jointly and severally liable with the bus driver for
damages. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner, as employer, is liable
Ruling: YES.
The law governing petitioner's liability, as the employer of bus driver
Venturina, is Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The "diligence of a good
father" referred to in the last paragraph of the said statute means
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus, when
an employee, while performing his duties causes damage to persons
or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection or
in the supervision of the employee. For the employer to avoid solidary
liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut
the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in
the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the
care and diligence of a good father of a family.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence on her part. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof
that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina's qualifications,
safety record, and driving history. Nor did petitioner show that she
exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. She did
not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training
programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees or required
Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic
efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability
arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
SYKI vs BEGASA
Facts:
On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three
companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Espina and
owned by Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger
jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the
boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Sablayan
and owned by petitioner Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger
jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common
carrier’s contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Pisuena, the
owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Syki, the owner of
the truck;, and Sablayan, the driver of the truck.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Pisuena but ordered
petitioner Syki and Sablayan, to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and
severally, actual and moral damages plus attorney’s fees. The CA
affirmed the decision in toto.
Issue:
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of his employees as to absolve him from
liability.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris familias" in the
selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must
fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased
nature of the testimony.
Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan, he required him to
submit a police clearance in order to determine if he was ever involved
in any vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to undergo a
driving test with conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca.
Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand, testified that
Sablayan passed the driving test and had never figured in any
vehicular accident except the one in question.
Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police clearance
given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of Sablayan’s driving test.
Petitioner also did not present records of the regular inspections that
his mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-
serving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic are, without doubt,
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. Accordingly,
we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for
the injuries suffered by respondent.
AGUILA ET AL vs BALDOVIZO
Facts:
On April 19, 1993, Marlun Lisbos was driving, along EDSA a van
registered under the name of petitioner Danilo Delos Reyes. The van
sideswiped Fausto Baldovizo who was walking along the pedestrian
line. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries and was
brought to the hospital but later died.
Marlon Lisbos was later charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Fausto’s wife and children filed a separate complaint for
damages against Lisbos, Danilo Reyes, Emerlito Aguila, the actual
operator and possessor of the van and Times Surety and Insurance
Company.
Summons were then served except on Lisbon whose whereabouts are
unknown.
The trial court rendered a judgment on March 7, 2000 awarding in
favor of Fausto’s wife and children and against petitioners. Petitioners
Aguila and Reyes filed a petition for relief from judgment which was
also denied by the RTC.
The heirs of Faustino moved for the issuance of a write of execution
after the judgment in their favour attained finality. Petitioners then
filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration.
The trial court denied the two motions and in addition, resolved to
strike off the name of Marlun Lisbos in the dispositive portion.
Accordingly, the trial court issued an Amended Decision which deleted
the name of Marlun Lisbos as a party liable for damages.
Petitioners Aguila and Reyes appealed the amended decision before
the Court of Appeals which the appellate court also denied for being
improper and that they had lost their right to appeal.
Since no appeal of the March 7, 2000 decision was made within the
reglementary period, the decision became final and executory. The
amended decision did not give the parties a fresh period within which
to file an appeal.
The appeallate court sustained the amended decision deleting Lisbos’
name among the parties held liable. It also denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the trial court was correct in rendering an amended decision
excluding Manuel Lisbos among the parties liable.
Ruling:
The ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13, 2001 is null
and void because any amendment or alteration made which
substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. Although the rule that a judgment that
becomes final and executory cannot be disturbed admits of
exceptions, none of those are present in this case.
Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the
petitioners, Marlun Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable.
In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct
and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee. Thus, even if the driver was
included albeit not served with summons, petitioners are directly and
primarily liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and
registered owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively, are
solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 in relation to Articles
2184 and 2194 of the Civil Code.
SPS. JAYME vs APOSTOL
Facts:
Mayor Miguel of Koronadal was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck
driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.
The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol
but in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin Jayme, a minor. The intensity
of the collision sent Marvin 50 m. away from the point of impact, an
indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed. Despite the
medical attention, he expired six days after the accident.
Petitioner’s contention:
Pointed out that the proximate cause of Marvin’s death was Lozano’s
negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle and that all
respondents be held solidarily liable for the loss.
Respondent’s contention:
Mayor Miguel contended that he cannot be solidarily liable for the
negligent act of Lozano as it is the Municipality of Koronadal which is
the driver’s true and lawful employer and denied that he did not
exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano.
Issue:
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts
of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor
pedestrian?
Ruling: NO.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable
for one's own quasi delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or
imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of
their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That
the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That
the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him.
In the present case, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is the
employer of Lozano. The CA correctly held that it was the Municipality
of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of
the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as driver by
the municipality. An E-E relationship still exists even if the employee
was loaned by the employer to another person because control over
the employee subsists. In the absence of an E-E relationship
establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not be
attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant
of the vehicle.
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor
the vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him
accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger
at the time of the accident. ECSHAD
Compare: Subsidiary liability under Art. 103
SPS. FRANCO vs IAC
Facts:
This deals with the nature of an employer’s liability for his employee’s
negligent act.
In the evening of October 18, 1974, MACARIO YURO swerved the
northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a
truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement
of the MacArthur Highway in Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an
incoming Isuzu Mini Bus being driven by one MAGDALENO LUGUE and
making a collision between the 2 vehicles an unavoidable and
disastrous eventuality.
Dragged 15 meters from the point of impact, the mini bus landed right
side down facing south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The
Franco Bus was also damaged but not as severely. The collision
resulted in the deaths of the 2 drivers – MACARIO YURO and
MAGDALENO LUGUE and 2 passengers of the minibus, ROMEO BUE
and FERNANDO CHUAY.
Consequently, ANTONIO REYES (registered owner of the Mini Bus),
MRS. CHUAY (wife of Mr. Chuay) and MRS. LUGUE (wife of Mr. Lugue)
filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence against SPS.
FRANCO, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation
Company.
The complaint alleged the following:
The recklessness and imprudence of the Franco Bus driver caused the
collision which resulted in his own death and that of the mini bus driver
and the 2 passengers;
That as a consequence of the vehicular mishap, the mini bus became
a total wreck resulting in actual damages amounting to P50K and the
loss of an average net income of P120.00 daily or P3,600 monthly
multiplied by a minimum of one more year of serviceability of said mini
bus or P40,200; and
That in view of the death of the three passengers aforementioned, the
heirs of each should be awarded a minimum of P12K and the expected
average income of P6K each of the driver and one of the passengers
and P12K of the Chinese businessman passenger.
Spouses Franco’s defense:
As owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company, they
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their
employees, including the deceased driver, MACARIO YURO.
Trial Court’s decision:
Rejected the spouses’ defense for the reason that the act of the Franco
Bus Driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil
obligation arising from Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not
from Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
“This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises,
and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like
a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of
his truck is no defense to avoid civil liability.”
Appellate Court’s Decision:
Agreeing with the lower court, held that the Franco driver who died
instantly in the vehicular collision was guilty of reckless or criminal
imprudence punishable by law in driving the Franco bus.
Issue:
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by ANTONIO
REYES, ET AL was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict
Ruling:
QUASI-DELICT.
Subsidiary Liability of the Employer under Revised Penal Code: NOT
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
Under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a
delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and
upon whose primary liability his employer’s subsidiary liability is to be
based. Before the employer’s subsidiary liability may be proceeded
against it, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action
whereby the employee’s criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was
instituted, the employer’s liability would not be predicated under Art.
103.
In the case at bar, NO CRIMINAL ACTION was instituted because the
person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to
be primarily liable for damages suffered by ANTONIO REYES, ET AL
as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, SPOUSES
FRANCO’s subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that
their liability is merely secondary to their employee’s primary liability.
Employer’s primary liability under the Civil Code: APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE
Under Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa
aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of
its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employees.
In the present case, it was found that SPOUSES FRANCO were not
able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the
supervision of their bus driver. The evidence presented by the spouses
is purely self-serving. No independent evidence was presented as to
alleged supervision of the Franco bus drivers, especially with regard
to driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. They in fact
admitted that the only kind of supervision given the drivers referred
to the running time between the terminal points of the line.
Moreover, the spouses who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-
Laoag line, have only two inspectors whose duties were only ticket
inspection. There is no evidence that they are really safety inspectors.
BERMUDEZ vs HON. HERRERA
Facts:
This is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Reynaldo, a six-year old son of
plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries, which
caused his death.
Criminal Case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed
against Domingo. Reynaldo filed in the said criminal case "A
Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
Subsequently, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages
with the TRC. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May
10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the RTC stated that plaintiffs had
already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the
criminal case their right to file a separate civil action.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and suspended the hearing of the
case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not the present action based on quasi-delict could proceed
independently of the criminal case filed for homicide thru reckless
imprudence
Ruling: YES
In the case of Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the trial court treated the case as
an action based on a crime and not on tort in view of the
reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case also
pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. The Supreme
Court does not agree saying that the doctrine in the case cited
by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case.
According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime. With respect to obligations arising from
crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code applies. It is now settled
that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites
must be present:
(1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his
duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his
civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry. Hence, without the conviction of the employee, the
employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
However, in cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs
has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime and an action for quasi- delict. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action
for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil
action for quasi-delict. The appellant precisely made a reservation
to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such
a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the
criminal case, which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict.
Petition granted, RTC’s orders reversed.
ALVAREZ vs CA
Facts:
CFI
The employee, Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide with
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence that
resulted from the collision of the sakbayan and the weapon's carrier.
He was guilty of negligence and liable to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The employer engaged in the
business of buying coconuts and copra for re-sale falling under
‘engaged in any kind of industry' was held to be subsidiarily liable and
to pay to the offended persons concerned jointly and severally liable
with employee.
CA
It affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted the subsidiary
payment. Although it is the law that employers are subsidiarily liable
for the civil liability of their employees for felonies committed in the
discharge of the latter's duties if they are engaged in any kind of
industry (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), such subsidiary liability is not
litigated in connection with the criminal prosecution. The employer,
not being a party, is denied the opportunity to present his defense
against such subsidiary liability, such as, his not being engaged in any
kind of industry or that the crime committed by his employee was not
on the occasion of the discharge of the latter's duties.
(Meanwhile, SC promulgated in the Pajarito v. Seneris case the
judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an
indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil
liability but also with regard to its amount, . . . in the action to enforce
the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function than
to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal
case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an
error has been committed in the decision.)
Going back to the CA judgment of employee Ramos, it attained finality
and was remanded to the trial court where the private prosecutor filed
a “Motion for issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Exucution”.
Petitioner’s arguments
He filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA pursuant to the subsidiary
writ of execution. The CA granted the petition saying that its judgment
in the criminal case was first rendered compared to the Pajarito
decision of the SC. Thus, the final judgment in the criminal case, which
expressly declared that a separate action should be instituted to
enforce petitioner's subsidiary civil liability, had long become the "law
of the case" and, therefore, prevails.
Respondent’s arguments
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted, and the
previous decision was set aside on the strength of Pajarito decision.
Issues:
Whether there is a need to file a separate civil action to enforce the
subsidiary liability of the employee.
Whether the principle of “law of the case” is applicable.
Ruling:
No. It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an
employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction, and
subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this light, the application of
Pajarito case is merely the enforcement of a procedural remedy
designed to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of indemnity by
the victims of a judicially-declared criminally negligent act.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have
to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the
criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint
would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for
further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.
No. The principle of "law of the case" as discussed in People vs. Pinuila
is not applicable to a Court of Appeals decision at odds with this
Court's decision, and where the Supreme Court still has the power to
decide on the applicable doctrine to the issue at hand.
The principle is merely a rule of convenience and public policy to
stabilize judicial decisions of tribunals of coordinate jurisdiction, to
prevent re-litigation of questions in the same action, and to obviate
undue prolongation of litigation, purposes which would be negated if
Pajarito were not to be applied in this case simply because of purely
technical reasons not touching on the merits of the case.
CEREZO vs TUAZON
Facts:
A country bus lines passenger crashed into a tricycle. The tricycle
driver Tuazon then filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo,
as owner of the bus line and the bus driver Foronda. The trial court
ruled in favor of Tuazon. Insofar as Foronda’s liability, the court made
no pronouncement because there was no service of summons made.
Thus, the trial court held Cerezo solely liable for the damages
sustained by Tuazon arising from his negligence pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Cerezo insisted that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the case considering that there was no
service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed
was an indispensable party to the said case.
Issue:
Whether Foronda was an indispensable party to the said action so as
to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
The basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict not delict
under the Revised Penal Code. The same negligent act may produce
civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or may
give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the NCC.
An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. Tuazon
chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. Contrary
to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to
the case.
An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct,
while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act
of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly.
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. In contrast, an action based on a
delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the
criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the
RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a
delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established.
If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s
jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is
clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of
Foronda.
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION AND VICTORINO GABOR vs HON.
PHILADELFA PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR
Facts:
On Feb. 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, 7-years old was hit by a Ford
Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven by Ferrer which resulted
to the death of the child.
An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver before MTCC, Bacolod City. Unfortunately,
before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed
suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
In 1999, the Sps. Vallejera, parents of the deceased child filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
It denied liability for the death of Charles Vallereja, claiming
that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION:
Denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant-petitioners for
lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. And it subsequently denied
the order.
CA’s decision:
Denied the petition and upheld the trial court.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for damages.
Ruling:
Victims of negligence or their lives have a choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from the culpa criminal under Article
100 of the RPC and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under
Articles 2176 to 20194 of the CC. If, as here, the action chosen is for
quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent
act of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the
action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer
subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.
The employer is liable for damages cause by his employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.
The reliance on Maniago v. CA by petitioners is misplaced. There, the
civil case was filed while the criminal case against the employee was
still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was
prematurely terminated due to his death.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no
moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed
without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality,
therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first
place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver
as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask
for the impossible.
Cf: Registered owner rule
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL vs ABEJAR
Facts:
Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was hit by a Mitsubishi L-300 van. The
driver of said vehicle was Jimmy Bautista (Bautista). Fortunately for
Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van
was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of
organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee
assigned to drive the van as its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite
medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and
the person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages
against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that
Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the
registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly
negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of
Abejar. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Regional
Trial Court's decision (it modified the amount of damages).
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition.
Caravan argued that Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial
evidence to prove that Bautista, the driver, acted "within the scope of
his assigned tasks" when the accident occurred. According to Caravan,
Bautista's tasks only pertained to the transport of company personnel
or products, and when the accident occurred, he had not been
transporting personnel or delivering products of and for the company.
Issues:
Whether petitioner should be held liable based on the registered
owner rule.
Whether respondent Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring
an action for damages against petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner should be held liable. It was not fatal to the
respondent’s cause that she herself did not adduce proof that Bautista
acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that
respondent Abejar proved that petitioner was the registered owner of
the van that hit Reyes.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article
2180's specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks[.]" Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule
that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the
operation of their vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which
the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180
requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship
between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted
within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand,
applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo,
et al. v. Jepte, where this court explained that the registration of motor
vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 4136, the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary "not to make
said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, . . . but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle
upon any public highway[.]" Its "main aim . . . is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused
by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner."
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas stated that the registered owner
of a vehicle can no longer use the defenses found in Article 2180:
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these
defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle.
Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved
in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the
damages caused to Espinas.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both
the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff
must first establish that the employer is the registered owner
of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that
the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a
consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that
no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the
vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that
between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry
the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many
cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to
uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration
of the van that hit Reyes. The Certificate attests to petitioner's
ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of
the van. Consistent with the rule, a presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do
by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no
employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted
outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Bautista.
Petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the
accident.
Petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. When asked
by the court why Bautista was at the place of the accident when it
occurred, Sally Bellido, petitioner's accountant and
supervisor, testified that she did not "have the personal capacity to
answer [the question]" and that she had no knowledge to answer it.
Sally Bellido's testimony does not affect the presumption that Article
2180's requirements have been satisfied. Mere disavowals are not
proof that suffice to overturn a presumption. To this end, evidence
must be adduced. However, petitioner presented no positive evidence
6 SEC. 24. Use of driver's license and badge. — ...
No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or hire any person to operate such motor
vehicle, unless the person sought to be employed is a duly licensed professional driver.
to show that Bautista was acting in his private capacity at the time of
the incident.
Petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite
diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. In its selection
of Bautista as a service driver, petitioner contented itself with
Bautista's submission of a non-professional driver's license. Employing
a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate
another's motor vehicle violates Section 246 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
To prove that it exercised the required diligence in supervising
Bautista, petitioner presented copies of several memoranda and
company rules. These, however, are insufficient because petitioner
failed to prove actual compliance. In order that the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies
on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in
the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient
to overcome presumption.
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered
actual loss and thus, a real party in interest in this case.
In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her
action for damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority
over Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused by the negligence of
petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her
Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as
service driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.
damage. Respondent properly filed an action based on quasi-delict.
She is a real party in interest.
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based
on two grounds:
Respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes,
it stands to reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the
same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of
one's child. It is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of
a natural parent — that respondent seeks to be indemnified.
Respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would
have been capacitated to do.
Hence, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005
is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) actual damages in the
amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the time it was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. until full
satisfaction; (b) moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the Regional Trial Court Decision until full satisfaction; and (c) civil
indemnity shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of the Court of Appeals Decision until full satisfaction.
Defense: Due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL vs SPS ROMEO AND REGINA
CAPANAZA
Facts:
Regina Capanzana was pregnant with her third child. A week before
her scheduled caesarean section (C-section), she went into active
labor and was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital for an
emergency C-section. She went into a pre-operative examination done
by Dr. Ramos and Dr. Santos. They proceeded with the operation after
having found Regina fit for anesthesia. The operation was successful
and she gave birth to a baby boy.
Thirteen hours after her operation, Regina complained of a headache,
a chilly sensation, restlessness and shortness of breath. She asked for
oxygen and later became cyanotic. After undergoing x-ray, she was
found to be suffering from pulmonary edema. Since her condition
showed no improvement, she was transferred to the Cardinal Santos
Hospital. The doctors in said hospital found that she was suffering
from rheumatic heart disease mitral stenosis with mild pulmonary
hypertension, which contributed to the onset of Fuid in her lung tissue
(pulmonary edema). This development resulted in cardio-pulmonary
arrest and, subsequently, brain damage. Regina lost the use of her
speech, eyesight, hearing and limbs. Due to this, spouses Capanzana
filed a complaint for damages against Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
along with Dr. Ramos, Dr. Santos and the nurses on duty stationed on
the second floor. During the course of the proceedings, Regina died
and was substituted by her heirs.
The RTC found no negligence on the part of Dr. Ramos and Dr. Santos
as they were compliant of the standard practices in attending to a
patient during a C-Section. The court reasoned that the primary cause
of Regina’s vegetative state, amniotic fluid embolism, was not within
the control of the doctor to anticipate. The Court, however, found the
nurses on duty liable for their failure to immediately administer the
oxygen. This failure having contributed to the onset of hypoxic
encephalopathy. The Court held that the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
is free from liability as it was able to discharge the burden of proof
that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC except as to the liability of the midwife (Ballano)
and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. It was found that while there
was evidence to prove that petitioner hospital showed diligence in its
selection and hiring processes, there was no evidence to prove that it
exercised the required diligence in the supervision of its nurses.
Issue:
Whether Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital is liable for damages due to its
failure to exercise due diligence in the supervision of its nurses.
Ruling: YES.
The plaintiff must show the following elements by a preponderance of
evidence: duty of the health professional, breach of that duty, injury
of the patient, and proximate causation between the breach and the
injury.
The Negligence of the Nurses
The SC found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
nurses were negligent. When Regina was gasping for breath and
turning cyanotic, it was the duty of the nurses to intervene
immediately by informing the resident doctor. Had they done so,
proper oxygenation could have been restored and other interventions
performed without wasting valuable time. According to the expert
witness, the occurrence of "hypoxic encephalopathy" could have been
avoided since lack or inadequate supply of oxygen to the brain for 5
minutes will cause damage to it. It was found that the nurses took 10-
15 minutes to respond to the call of Regina’s niece before going to the
room. Also, it took about 20 minutes before the oxygen arrived.
Another instance of negligence was the delay in the removal of
Regina's consumed dextrose which caused Regina discomfort. The
nurses only attended to her after being called twice.
In Ramos, the SC defined “Proximate cause” as that which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case,
that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or
producing cause.
Applying the above definition to the facts in the present case, the
omission of the nurses — their failure to check on Regina and to refer
her to the resident doctor and, thereafter, to immediately provide
oxygen — was clearly the proximate cause that led to the brain
damage suffered by the patient.
The liability of the hospital
The Our Lady of Lourdes hospital is liable under Article 2180 in relation
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an employer may
be held liable for the negligence of its employees based on its
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The liability of
the employer under this provision is "direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee or
a prior showing of the insolvency of that employee." The employer
may only be relieved of responsibility upon a showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
The SC held that the hospital sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of the nurses. The nurses undergo a series of examination,
orientation, training, on the job observation and evaluation before
they are hired as regular employees. However, it failed to prove due
diligence in their supervision. The formulation of a supervisory
hierarchy, company rules and regulations, and disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach, is indispensable. However, to prove
due diligence in the supervision of employees, it is not enough for an
employer such as petitioner to emptily invoke the existence of such a
formulation. What is more important is the actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. In this case, it was
found that there is failure on the part of the hospital to sanction the
tardiness of the nurses which shows an utter lack of actual
implementation and monitoring of compliance with the rules and
ultimately of supervision over its nurses. Also, on the nights subject
of the present controversy, there is failure to show who were the
actual nurses on duty and who was supervising these nurses due to
the conflicting accounts on the documents of the hospital. All these
negate the due diligence on the part of the nurses, their supervisors,
and ultimately, the hospital.
Thus, petitioner was held liable for damages.
Owner of vehicle
DUAVIT vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On July 28, 1971, Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were
aboard a jeep owned by Ruperto Catuar. They were running on
moderate speed at 20-30 kph. While approaching Roosevelt Avenue,
Virgilio Catuar slowed down and was suddenly bumped from behind
by another jeep driven by Oscar Sabiniano. As a result of the impact,
the jeep owned by Catuar fell on its right and skidded by about 30
yards. This resulted in damages to the vehicle as well as physical
injuries to both Virgilio Catuar and Antonio Sarmiento. They filed a suit
for damages against Sabiniano and the owner of the jeep, Gualberto
Duavit. Duavit admitted his ownership of the car but claimed that he
cannot be held liable as Sabiniano is not his employee. On the other
hand, Sabiniano admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of
Duavit without the consent and authority of the latter but interposed
the defense that he was taking precaution while driving.
Issue:
Is Duavit solidarily liable with Sabiniano for damages even if his jeep
was driven by the latter, at the time of the incident, without his
consent.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held
liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven
without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by
him. Duavit does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire
mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano
or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was
virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the
petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano
who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would
be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident
caused by the person who stole such vehicle. Thus, Duavit, cannot be
held solidarily liable with Sabiniano for damages.
JUANIZA vs JOSE
Facts:
A jeepney, owned by Eugenio Jose, collided with a freigh train of
Philippine National Railways. It resulted in the death of seven and
physical injuries to five of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16)
years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. An action for
damages was filed against the owner of the jeepney, Eugenio Jose
and Arroyo, his partner. They were found liable by the RTC for
damages. Arroyo’s liability was based on the provision of Art. 144 of
the Civil Codes which provides that when a man and woman driving
together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Arroyo then
appealed.
Issue:
Whether Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one
of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry;
and whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the
jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the
registered owner of the same.
Ruling:
No. The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is
legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision
of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The
jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.
There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the
passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can
neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. Only the
registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages
that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein.
ANONUEVO vs CA
Facts:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while
Aonuevo traversing the opposite lane was driving his car which was
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc. Aonuevo was in the course of
making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated
his hospitalization and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
A complaint for damages was instituted against Aonuevo & Procter
and Gamble Inc. which were resolved in favor of Villagracia. Aonuevo
brought the matter to the Supreme Court, claiming that Villagracia
violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New
Civil Code which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if
he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, applies
by analogy to bicycles.
Issues:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, should apply by analogy
to non-motorized vehicles; and
Whether Villagracia was negligent for violating a municipal ordinance
requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
devices thereon under the principle of negligence per se.
Ruling:
NO. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on
equal footing with other types of vehicles. There is factual and legal
basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185.
A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a
non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by
man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is capable of greater
speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same
time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury
or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
NO. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance
is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a
contributing cause of the injury. If at all, it is but indicative of
Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal
government, which would then be the proper party to initiate action
on such violation. But such failure alone is not determinative of
Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident in the case at bar.
Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the
bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists
part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as
he proceeded to make the left turn.
FGU INSURANCE CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April
1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising
northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
figured in a traffic accident. One car is owned by Lydia F. Soriano and
driven by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car is owned by FILCAR
Transport, Inc. and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen, as lessee. Upon
approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR
swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that
time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine
driver's license.
Consequently, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation paid Soriano an
amount in accordance with their insurance contract. By way of
subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as
respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as insurer of FILCAR for
quasi-delict.
The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claim of subrogation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the trial court. Petitioner failed to establish its cause of
action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
Petitioner insists that respondents FILCAR and Fortune are liable on
the strength of the ruling in MYC Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda.
De Caldo that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.
Issue:
Whether the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another?
Ruling:
No, in order to sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites
must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second
requisite because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that
the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by
the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the
vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the
negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the
damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability.
Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 of the Civil Code arises by virtue of
a presumption juris tantum of the negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to
prevent them from causing damage. Respondent FILCAR being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased
to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them
as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being
the employer of the latter. The provision of Art. 2184 of the Civil Code
is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.
The reliance in MYC Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a
misapprehension of such ruling. The case made the corporation liable
since it was not persuaded that the vehicle was leased out but it was
nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve
itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer.
CADIENTE vs MACAS
Facts:
Fifteen-year old boy Bithuel Macas who was standing on the shoulder
of the road was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona
Cimafranca. Two witnesses came to the victim’s recue and told
Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital. After that, Cimafranca
was not seen anymore.
Macas suffered severe muscular and major vessel injuries, as well as
open bone fractures. In order to save his life, the surgeon had to
amputate both legs up to his groins. An action for damages was filed
against the registered owner of the vehicle Atty. Medardo Ag.
Cadiente. However, the latter claimed that he was no longer the owner
of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Jalipa who in
turn alleged that he was not the owner of the vehicle anymore at the
time of the accident as he already sold it to a certain Abubakar.
The trial court declared Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally liable.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether Cadiente is liable considering that he is still the registered
owner of the vehicle.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court cited in this case PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. It reiterated that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else,
is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury
the vehicle may cause.
It explained that were a registered owner is allowed to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape
said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to
one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for
the damage or injury done.
Moreover, in the case of Villanueva v Domingo, the policy behind the
vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be
held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury cause by the
vehicle.
Considering that the vehicle in this case is still registered to Cadiente,
he cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the boy
who had stopped schooling and “is now forced to face life with nary
but two remaining limbs.”
Other matters
It was ruled in this case that there was no negligence on the part of
the victim as he was only standing on the part of the uncemented
road which was intended for pedestrian use alone. Running vehicles
are not supposed to pass through the said portion.
By State
REPUBLIC vs PALACIO
Facts:
Private respondent Ortiz filed in the CIF (now RTC) a civil case for
damages and recovery of 958 sqm. lot. He filed the said case after
Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied the said lot, at
the instance of the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU), an agency of DPWH.
The R of P, through the Solicitor General (SolGen), moved to dismiss
the case; however, it was denied because ISU is engaged in the
private business of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials
on installment plan.
Later, in 1962, the SolGen was served with copy of the writ of
execution; and, on February 16, 1962, an order of garnishment
against the deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund, to cover the
sum of P14,874.40. The SolGen a filed motion to lift the order of
garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof are
public funds and exempt from attachment or execution.
The CA sustained decision of the RTC, and said that ISU is engaged
in a private business of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps and
systems. Consequently, by thus engaging in private business, the
Government, through the Irrigation Service Unit, had actually
consented to the suit.
Issue:
Whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the
Philippine National Bank in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit,
may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against the latter.
Ruling:
No, the ISU is not only an office in the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, created to promote a specific economic policy of said
government, but also that its activity (of selling irrigation pumps to
farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit or financial
gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being collected
on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not
convert this economic project of the government into a corporate
activity. The installment payments and interests receivable from the
farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in
furtherance of the operation of the project. The nature of the Pump
Irrigation Trust Fund is a public fund.
The decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous
assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its
property and funds become liable to seizure under the legal process.
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented to be
sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they can not be
enforced by processes of law; and it is for the legislature to provide
for their payment in such manner as it sees fit.
To allow the levying under execution of the ISU funds would amount
to diverting them from the purpose originally contemplated, and would
amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as
required by law.
MERITT vs GPI
Facts:
A chauffer of the General Hospital, due to his negligence, figured in a
collision resulting to the injuries of plaintiff. The state waived its
immunity from suit by promulgating Act No. 2457 authorizing E. Meritt
to bring suit in the CFI against the Government of the Philippine
Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to
determine the amount of the damages.
Issue:
Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands can be made liable
for the damages caused by one of its employees.
Ruling:
NO
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right
to interpose any lawful defense.
The applicable law at the time was Paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code which reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
A special agent as contemplated by Article 1903 refers to a person
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof
he executed the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration
and who in his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations.
Hence, the state is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903. Since the chauffeur of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not such an agent, then the Government of
the Philippine Islands is not liable.
By teachers
EXCONDE vs CAPUNO
Facts:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a
student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the
City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a
jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and
drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far
when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that
Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of
the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
Capuno was was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro and Amado. During the trial,
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against
the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged who was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.
Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his
son Dante Capuno asking for damages. Defendants set up the defense
that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina,
he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of
the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and
custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court
and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the
damages claimed in the complaint.
Issue:
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of
Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Ruling:
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the
damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because
at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in
the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his
father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability
of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court
erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution.
Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante
boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the
accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student
of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them
in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them
the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and
155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that
defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs
of action.
PALISOC vs BRILLANTES
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents of Dominador Palisoc, a student in
automotive at the Manila Technical Institute. The deceased
Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966 they, together
with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess.
Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while
Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a
remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because
of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both
exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was
immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness;
finally he died.
Daffon was found guilty but the other defendants ,the teacher and
head of the school who were absolved from their liability by the trial
court basing their decision on the case of Mercado v. CA stating that:
The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in
Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions
of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass
from the father and mother to the teachers. As per trial court, there
is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon. Plaintiffs therefore appealed on the liability of the
teacher and school head.
Issue:
Whether the school officials are jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors with Daffon.
Ruling:
Yes. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain
in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their
pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law
of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the
school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article
2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows
on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase
used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for
as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board
in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants
but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over
the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light
of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants
failed to prove such exemption from liability.
AMADORA vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally
hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the Alfredo’s death. Daffon
was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s
parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean
of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other
students. Complaints against the students were dropped.
The CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable for damages.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the former’s
decision and completely absolved the defendants. The latter court
found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
and that in any event the defendants had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only
for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
Issue:
Whether Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
Ruling:
No, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos is not liable. The petition was
denied.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of
them was exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed
in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that the confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
Finally, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them
has been found to have been charged with the custody of the
offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
Other Doctrines:
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis
"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads
of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. Although the
distinction no longer applies today, the law has not been amended.
SALVOSA vs IAC
Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is
also an institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged
technical-vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast
and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman
and Automotive Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit.
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its
duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the
BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as ordersfrom
Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University
of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
No.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that
so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
"stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and
[is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so
long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was still in the
protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at
the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was
just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval
is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and
envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity
is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the
school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon
cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his
acts.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs CARPITANOS
Facts:
St. Mary’s Academy (petitioner), conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. They visited schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined one of the
campaigns. Along with the other high school students, they rode a
Mitsubishi Jeep owend by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student
of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless
manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this
accident.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable
for damages.
Ruling:
No, St. Mary’s Academy (petitioner) is not liable.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article
218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher to
accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be
held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the
proximate cause of the injury caused thus; negligence needs to have
a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes.
The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part
of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva, owner of the Jeep admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving
of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor
to drive the Jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event
over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable
for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons
for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Case was remanded to Trial Court for determination of liability of the
defendants excluding herein petitioner.
PROVINCIES, CITIES and MUNICIPALITIES
JIMENEZ vs CITY OF MANILA

Facts:
Petitioner herein shows that in the morning of August 15, 1974 he,
together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy
"bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle
deep rainwater.
After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but
he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because
of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four inch nail, stuck
inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-
petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches.
He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita
Mascardo.
He was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had
to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever and severe pain.
Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with
crutches for fifteen (15) days.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana
Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and
Operating Contract.
Lower court dismissed the complaint.
Intermediate Appellate Court held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
liable for damages but absolved respondent City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable
with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered?
Ruling:
YES.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for
the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the
Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third
persons for any cause attributable to it.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision."
It is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that
the defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that
the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision"
over the public building in question.
In fact, the City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana
Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and
control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the safety
of the place for the public.
CITY OF MANILA vs TEOTICO
Facts:
Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole
on P. Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was trying to board a jeepney,
causing injuries which required him to incur medical expenses.
Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and
dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA,
except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced
to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal
for certiorari by the City of Manila.
Issue
WON the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident happened
on a NATIONAL highway
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
YES
The question to be determined is if present case is governed by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila)
reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons
or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively
for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It
is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic
Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;
but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted,
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or injury to persons or
property … Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.”
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets,” in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged
defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
xxxxx
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were due to the defective
condition of a street which is “under the supervision and control” of
the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that “the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the
storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
and the officers concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties
as imposed upon them by law.“ Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national
highway was made, for the first time, in its MR of the decision of the
CA . Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had
not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the
first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of
the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that
the province, city or municipality have either “control or
supervision” over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its “control or supervision” by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying
out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and
other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of
streets and public places; . . . … the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same
…to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, .
. … and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; …
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are
not subject to our review.
GUILATCO vs CITY OF DAGUPAN
Facts:
While she was about to board a motorized tricycle, herein plaintiff, a
Court Interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole located on a
sidewalk, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan,
thereby causing her right leg to be fractured.
As a result, she incurred hospitalization, medication and other
expenses for a total of P 10,000.00 in all; during the period of her
confinement, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain also on all
parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her discharge to
the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is
presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed
that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap up
to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs
of her office. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her
monthly salary and other means of income, but she has been deprived
of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the
government service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the
accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been
unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole
is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision
of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It
submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has
control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere
coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
Issue:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City
of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
Liability of the City of Dagupan:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to
the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The
same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and
sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the
Municipal Board . 7 Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for
damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the
failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter,
cannot be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the
city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability
arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public
works."
Award of damages:
The actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P
10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65
only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In
determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof
of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without
proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination of the amount
is discretionary on the court. However, in awarding moral damages,
the following should be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of
the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered
by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place
of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being
jovial to depressed. She refrained from attending social and civic
activities.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly
pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to
their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction
work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which
are uncovered
PROPRIETORS OF BUILDING, ARCHITECT, CONTRACTOR
DE ROY vs CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned out building owned by de Roy and
Ramos (de Roy) collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied
by the family of Bernal, resulting in injuries and the death of their
daughter Marissa. Bernal had been warned by de Roy to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but Bernal failed to
do so.
RTC rendered judgment finding de Roy guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to Bernal.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, de Roy filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
however, it was denied. Thereafter, de Roy filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
De Roy filed a special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null
and void two (2) resolutions denying his motions.
Issue: Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion?
Held: No, CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied de Roy’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion
for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court could have denied the petition outright for not
being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from such defect,
on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
In Habaluyas case, the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration before the lower courts cannot be
extended. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. There is one-
month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June
30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since de Roy filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it
is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and
may still be allowed. However, the motion for extension of time was
filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of
the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period.
De Roy cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period.
De Roy contends that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the CA was promulgated. However, there is no law
requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It
is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the SC.
Further, CA didn’t commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
RTC’s decision holding de Roy liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse,
if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs." Nor was there
error in rejecting de Roy’s argument that Bernal had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, de Roy’s prior negligence
should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable
to this case.
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES
UNION vs MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION

Facts:
Mitsubishi and its Employee’s Union, MMPSEU, entered into a CBA.
Included therein were the hospitalization insurance benefits which
required the employees to pay P100 per month. When the CBA was
renewed for another three years, the same provisions of the CBA was
included. This time, employees paid P375 monthly. Three of the
members of the union; Calida, Oabel and Martin filed claims for
reimbursements. All of them had expenses for hospitalization that was
partially paid by MEDICard and Prosper. Only the remaining hospital
bill was paid by MMPC. The employees claimed for the entire hospital
bill whether or not it was paid for already by a separate entity.
The employees complained through their president. The dispute was
submitted before the NCMB. Separately, the parties sought the
opinion of the Insurance Commission of whether the claims for
reimbursement will tantamount to double insurance. The Insurance
Commission through Atty. David Funk opined that the recovery from
a HMO does not bar recovery of the same reimbursement of medical
expenses from another health contract or medical insurance. It can
be claimed simultaneously.
By virtue of this opinion, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the
MMPSEU.
CA, on the other hand, reversed the decision of VA. Hence, he petition
of MMPSEU.
MMPSEU:
The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator must be respected since it
was based on the opinion of the Insurance Commission, an agency
equipped with vast knowledge about insurance contracts.
Issue:
WON MMPSEU’S CLAIM WILL PROSPER UNDER COLLATERAL SOURCE
RULE?
Ruling:
No. The Voluntary Arbitrator’s ruling was based on the opinion of Atty.
Funk which was wrong. He based his opinion under collateral source
rule. However, he misapplied it.
As part of American personal inquiry law, the collateral source rule
was originally applied to tort cases wherein the defendant is prevented
from benefitting from the plaintiff’s receipt of money from other
sources. Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation
for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the
payment should not be deducted from the damages which he would
otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. Collateral rule applies in order
to place the responsibility for losses on the party causing them. Thus,
it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under
which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies,
regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the losses.
Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be
obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its
employees which has already been paid by separate health insurance
providers of said employees.
STRICT LIABILITY
POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
VESTIL vs CA
Facts:
Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of
Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the
Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated
wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by
Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following
day, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-
pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the
Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that
bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any
case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
After trial, the judge sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint.
The CA found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the
dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code
for the injuries caused by the dog.
- Upon appeal, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been
partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. She claims, even
her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of
the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitioners were in the possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question (regardless
of the ownership of the dog or of the house).
2. Whether there was clear showing that child died as a result of
the dog bite.
Ruling:
1. Petitioners are in the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's
house is hardly credible. There is contrary evidence that the occupants
of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders than relatives) who
paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid,
Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house
for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita
herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining
boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another
witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that
the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And
although Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private
respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for
water connection with the Cebu Water District, which strongly
suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the
time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property,
which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there
is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the
house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and
used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter
was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten
by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after
the death of Vicente Miranda, when the incident in question
occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist
the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually.
2. The child died as a consequence of the dog bite.
The SC found out that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia (fear of
water), a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second,
that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death,
was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water
after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr.
Tautjo. On the strength of the testimony of Dr. Tautjo, the Court finds
that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
has been satisfactorily established.
The SC reiterated its ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the
cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence
of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she
died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death
certificate stated a different cause of death.
The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of
the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
"escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does
not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was
tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame
ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation,
the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183
of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and
on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the
damage which such animal may cause. 21
MANUFACTURERS AND PROCESSORS OF FOODSTUFF
PASCUAL vs FORD MOTOR
Facts:
Pasual purchased a second-hand Ford vehicle. On November 2008,
Pascual and the other passenger of the Ford vehicle got into an
accident because the vehicle’s right axle broke causing its wheel to be
detached. Pascual demanded damages against Ford Motor Company
Philippines, Inc. (FMCI), a Ford manufacturer, and Ford Group
Philippines, Inc. (FGPI), a ford distributing company. Pascual claims
that FMCI and FGPI are strictly liable for the defective vehicle citing
the case of California Supreme Court of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products Inc. in which it held “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human being. Respondents on the other hand claims that
Pascual cannot claim any damages since the vehicle was bought
second hand and that the vehicle’s warranty had expired.
RTC:
The trial court ruled in favor of Pascual.
CA:
CA reversed the decision of the lower court finding that respondents
cannot be attributed with negligence since the vehicle was altered
which affected its performance and in violation of the vehicle’s
maximum capacity.
Issue:
Whether the strict liability in tort is applicable against FMCI and FGPI
Ruling:
No. The Greenman case is only persuasive. The facts are different in
this case since the Greenman case talks about first hand products
while this case involves second-hand vehicles. Even assuming that the
Greenman is applicable, Respondents are not liable because their
representation as to the vehicle’s weight capacity is limited. The
vehicle will safely do the job for which it was built subject to the
vehicle’s weight capacity. The alteration of the vehicle’s rear axle to
carry more weight beyond the vehicle’s capacity is outside of the
respondent’s representation of its product.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC vs HON. OMELIO
Facts:
On August 31, 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers from
over 14 countries instituted class suits for damages in the United
States against 11 foreign corporations, namely: (1) Shell Oil Company;
(2) Dow Chemical Company; (3) Occidental Chemical Corporation; (4)
Standard Fruit Company; (5) Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.; (6)
Dole Food Company, Inc.; (7) Dole Fresh Fruit Company; (8) Chiquita
Brands, Inc.; (9) Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; (10) Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A.; and (11) Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) in the 1970s up to the 1990s while
working in plantations that utilized it. As a result, these workers
suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems.
DBCP is a pesticide used against roundworms and threadworms that
thrive on and damage tropical fruits such as bananas and pineapples.
It was first introduced in 1955 as a soil fumigant. Early studies have
shown that prolonged exposure to DBCP causes sterility. DBCP was
also found to have mutagenic properties.
The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum
non conveniens and directed the claimants to file actions in their
respective home countries.
On May 3, 1996, 1,843 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages
against the same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court
in Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Philippines.
Before pre-trial, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International,
Inc. (collectively, Chiquita), Dow Chemical Company (Dow),
Occidental Chemical Corporation (Occidental), Shell Oil Company
(Shell), Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., and Del Monte Tropical Fruit
Co. (collectively, Del Monte) entered into a worldwide settlement in
the United States with all the banana plantation workers. The parties
executed a document denominated as the "Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement" (Compromise Agreement).
The Filipino claimants were represented by their counsel, Atty. Renato
Ma. Callanta (Atty. Callanta).
The Compromise Agreement provided, among others, that the
settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account, which
should be administered by a mediator. After the claimants execute
individual releases, the mediator shall give the checks representing
the settlement amounts to the claimants' counsel, who shall then
distribute the checks to each claimant.
The Regional Trial Court, Panabo City approved the Compromise
Agreement by way of judgment on compromise. Accordingly, it
dismissed Civil Case No. 95-45. Shortly after the dismissal, several
claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on compromise.
However, Chiquita, Dow, Occidental, Shell, and Del Monte opposed
the execution on the ground of mootness. They argued that they had
already complied with their obligation under the Compromise
Agreement by depositing the settlement amounts into an escrow
account. Hence, there was nothing left for the court to execute.
Chiquita pointed out that the claimants' execution of individual
quitclaims, denominated as "Release in Full," was an
acknowledgement that they had received their respective share in the
settlement amount. The quitclaims proved that the claimants entered
into a compromise agreement and that petitioners complied with its
terms.
Issue:
Whether or not Chiquita is still liable for damages despite the
execution of individual quitclaims of the claimants.
Ruling:
A compromise is defined under the Civil Code as "a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put
an end to one already commenced.” It may either be judicial or
extrajudicial depending on its object or the purpose of the parties. A
compromise is judicial if the parties' purpose is to terminate a suit
already commenced. On the other hand, a compromise is extrajudicial
if its object is to avoid litigation.
In any case, a compromise validly entered into has the authority and
effect of res judicata as between the parties. To this extent, a judicial
compromise and an extrajudicial compromise are no different from
each other.
However, unlike an extrajudicial compromise, a compromise that has
received judicial imprimatur "becomes more than a mere contract." A
judicial compromise is regarded as a "determination of the
controversy" between the parties and "has the force and effect of [a
final] judgment." In other words, it is both a contract and "a judgment
on the merits." It may neither be disturbed nor set aside except in
cases where there is forgery or when either of the parties' consent has
been vitiated.
The doctrine on immutability of judgments applies to compromise
agreements approved by the courts in the same manner that it applies
to judgments that have been rendered on the basis of a full-blown
trial. Thus, a judgment on compromise that has attained finality
cannot be "modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land."
A judgment on compromise may be executed just like any other final
judgment in the manner provided in the Rules of Court. The writ of
execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce
and must essentially conform to the judgment's terms. It can neither
be wider in scope nor exceed the judgment that gives it life.
Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus, in issuing writs of execution, courts
must look at the terms of the judgment sought to be enforced.
Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement, petitioners are
obliged to deposit the settlement amount in escrow within 10 business
days after they receive a signed Compromise Agreement from the
counsel of the claimants.
There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required
petitioners to ensure the distribution of the settlement amount to each
claimant. Petitioners' obligation under the Compromise Agreement
was limited to depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the
other hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts was
delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr. Mills. To require proof that the
settlement amounts have been withdrawn and delivered to each
claimant would enlarge the obligation of petitioners under the
Compromise Agreement.
Consequently, the Omnibus Order dated December 14, 2006, which
directed the implementation of the Writ of Execution, is likewise void.
HEAD OF FAMILY
DINGCONG vs KANAAN
Facts:
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain
Francisco Echevarria rented a room in the upper floor of the hotel.
The room he rented was immediately above the store occupied by the
Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night,
Echevarria carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room
and it caused water to drip from his room to the store below. Because
of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan were damaged. Apparently
also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from Echevarria’s
room was defective hence the flooding and the dripping.
Issue:
Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by
Echevarria.
Ruling:
Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest
of his hotel (Echevarria). It was not shown that Dingcong exercised
the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage caused. The
pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been
provided with a container to catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is
liable to pay for damages by reason of his negligence.
NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY
NO DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR SAME ACT OR OMISSION
COCA COLA vs SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Facts:
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in
the manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages. Co-petitioner Eric
Montinola was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod
City. Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer physician
at the company's plant in Bacolod City.
In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer
Agreement for one year, with a monthly compensation of
P3,800.00, where he "may charge professional fees for hospital
services rendered in line with his specialization." The agreement
further provided that "either party may terminate the contract upon
giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the other." In consideration of
the retainer's fee, Dr. Climaco "agrees to perform the duties and
obligations" enumerated in the Comprehensive Medical Plan, which
was attached and made an integral part of the agreement.
Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employee-
employer relationship shall exist between the company and Dr.
Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case of its termination, Dr.
Climaco "shall be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due him
at the time of termination”.
Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of Labor and
Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of the
company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative. As a result, Dr.
Climaco filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. In his complaint, he sought
recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits.
During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its
Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company before the NLRC
Bacolod City. He asked that he be reinstated to his former position as
company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights,
with full payment of backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for
payment of damages.
The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of
petitioner company. The first complaint was dismissed after Labor
Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. found that the company did not have
the power of control over Dr. Climaco's performance of his duties and
responsibilities. The validity of the Retainer Agreement was also
recognized. Labor Arbiter Benjamin Pelaez likewise dismissed the
second complaint in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, but the CA
reversed the ruling of NLRC. The appellate court ruled that using the
four-fold test, an employer-employee relationship existed between the
company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a
petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
Meantime, on November 9, 1994, while the NLRC cases were pending,
Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bacolod City, a petition praying,
among others, that petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be
ordered to report him for compulsory social security coverage.
On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:
Whether the case poses a prejudicial question
Whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping
Whether the case is barred by litis pendentia
Ruling:
No prejudicial question exists.
Petitioners allege that Dr. Climaco previously filed separate complaints
before the NLRC seeking recognition as a regular employee.
Necessarily then, a just resolution of these cases hinge on a
determination of whether or not Dr. Climaco is an employee of the
company. The issue of whether Dr. Climaco is entitled to employee
benefits, as prayed for in the NLRC cases, is closely intertwined with
the issue of whether Dr. Climaco is an employee of the company who
is subject to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. Hence, they
argue, said regularization/illegal dismissal case is a prejudicial
question.
The argument is untenable. The rule is that there is prejudicial
question when (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Here, no prejudicial
question exists because there is no pending criminal case. The
consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as "previously
instituted civil action".
There is no forum shopping.
Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since the issues before
the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make a ruling on
the issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect
on the issue before the NLRC. It was patently erroneous, if not
malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC through
a separate petition. Thus, petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty
of forum shopping.
Again, We turn down the contention. There is forum shopping when
one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely, by some other court. In short, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other. Dr. Climaco is not guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that
the parties are identical in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs sought
and the causes of action are different.
Admittedly, Dr. Climaco's basis in filing the cases before the NLRC and
the SSC is his Retainer Agreement with the company. This does not
mean, however, that his causes of action are the same. As the SSC
and the CA correctly observed, different laws are applicable to the
cases before the two tribunals. The Labor Code and pertinent social
legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC, while the Social
Security Law would govern the case before the SSC. Clearly, as the
issues pending before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse, a ruling on
the NLRC cases would not amount to res judicata in the case before
the SSC.
3. Lastly, petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Climaco before
the SSC is defective because there were pending actions between the
same parties and involving the same issues in different fora.
For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or
at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.
In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As
previously explained, although the parties in the cases before the
NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each tribunal, are different.
Evidently, there is no "another action" pending between petitioners
and Dr. Climaco at the time when the latter filed a petition before the
SSC.
SPECIAL TORTS
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT vs DACARA
Facts:
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of respondent Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr.,
drove and rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the
Quezon City government. As a result, Dacara Jr. allegedly sustained
bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned
turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara for and in behalf of his minor son,
Jr., filed a complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court.
RTC:
The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was
found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners.
CA:
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent, noting
the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their
contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT:
Petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence and care
in installing preventive warning devices, and that it was in fact the
plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast to
avoid the diggings. They also argue that moral damages are
recoverable only in the instances specified in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict,
petitioners contend that moral damages are not recoverable, because
no evidence of physical injury were presented before the trial court.
Issue:
Whether moral damages should be awarded.
Ruling:
NO.
Both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners'
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by
respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this
factual conclusion.
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the
following requisites: (1) an injury — whether physical, mental, or
psychological — clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act
or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219.
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for
quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical
injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-
delict resulted in physical injury.
This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang as follows:
". . . Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries,' as an instance when moral damages may be
allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in
physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the special torts
referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219)."
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son
Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he
suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after
hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any
warning device whatsoever. It is apparent from the Decisions of the
trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such
as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented
to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there
was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages
based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
DBP vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Spouses Gotangco are the owners of 7 parcels of land. They
mortgaged the land to support a loan from DBP. The spouses were
considering a poultry venture. Thereafter, the spouses sold the
mortgaged parcels to Elpidio Cucio. In the contract, they agreed that
Cucio will pay P50,000, the purchase price for the land, to DBP, to be
applied to the mortgage indebtedness of the spouses. After paying the
purchase price, DBP is to release the owners copy of the certificates
of title to Cucio. DBP was notified of the arrangement. Cucio was able
to pay the full amount of the purchase price, but the spouses were
not able to pay the whole debt to DBP. Cucio asked DBP to release
the titles to the land but the latter refused on the ground that the
spouses have not yet fully paid them.
Thereafter the obligation of the spouses became due. DBP applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure but the spouses filed a petition for injunction
with claim for moral damages against the foreclosure. Such order was
issued. DBP in this present petition assails the injunction filed against
it.
Issue:
WON the award for moral damages proper.
Ruling:
No. Under Art. 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of
a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith
is at the core of said provision. Good faith is presumed and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-
will that partakes of the nature of fraud
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the
petitioner. The bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, notwithstanding some
disagreements, cannot thereby give rise to the conclusion that the
petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses Gotangco. The
records show that, time and again, the petitioner had sent notices to
the spouses and demanded the updating of their account and the
payment of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses failed
to comply. Under the terms of the real estate mortgage and its
charter, the petitioner had the right to foreclose the said mortgage
extrajudicially. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file its
application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for the
Spouses Gotangcos past due obligation.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS vs ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC filed in the
Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages in behalf of the Muslim
members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC arising from
an article published issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the
God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but
with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims
and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public
policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines
but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-
Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their
defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as
the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages;
and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and
was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,
prejudice or injury to Muslims.2
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed
by the article were not specifically identified
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It opined
that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was
directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith
Issue:
Whether respondents have a cause of action.
Ruling:
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was
allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly
defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no
individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class
allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action
in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case
to prosper.
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by
petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to
any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the
alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having
been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case
is an intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an action
for libel.
We do not agree to the contrary view. Primarily, an "emotional
distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed
by an individual24 to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility
due to personal attacks on his character. Moreover, under the Second
Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the
defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b)
The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and
severe.26
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must
have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten
the plaintiff.27
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock,
fright, horror, and chagrin.29 "Severe emotional distress," in some
jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed
by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress
disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.30 The
plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has
suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the
cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.31
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than
mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability
does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort
of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and
required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough
language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the
other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt,
is not enough.32
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not
extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress allegedly
suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it. There is no evidence on record that points
to that result.
LAGON vs CA
Facts:
Jose Lagon purchased commercial buildings from the estate of Sepi
two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Said buildings
were constructed by Lapuz pursuant to a contract of lease between
him and the late Sepi wherein it was stipulated that the Lapuz would
put up a commercial building which would be leased to new tenants.
The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent that
Lapuz was obligated to pay Sepi for the lease of the land. It was
alleged by Lapuz that the lease contract ended in 1974, but it was
renewed since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to
be completed.
When Sepi died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the administrator
of the deceased’s estate until he was advised to stop collecting rentals
from the tenants because the property had been sold to Jose Lagon,
and the latter had been collecting the same.
Lapuz filed a complaint against Lagon, accusing Lagon of inducing the
heirs of Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
rights over it. Lagon denied that he induced the heirs to sell him the
property, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay
off the obligations of the deceased and this was what led the heirs to
sell him the property. Lagon also maintained that he didn’t interfere
with Lapuz’ leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering
the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and
inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
Lagon alleged that he even consulted the lawyer who allegedly
notarizes the renewed leased contract but the contract shown to him
was unsigned.
Issue:
WON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the
supposed existence of the private respondent’s lease contract with the
late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon
should be held liable for damages.
Ruling:
No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in
furtherance of a personal financial interest) and without bad faith.
Elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relations:
Existence of a valid contract
Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract
Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse
Existence of a valid contract: The Court declared that absent a clear,
strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to
be a prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution
and delivery. This brought the Court to rule that the notarized copy of
lease contract presented in court appeared to be an incontestable
proof that Bai Tonin Sepi and private respondent renewed their
contract.
Knowledge on the part of the interfere that the contract exists: The
Court ruled that Lagon had no knowledge of the lease contract as he
even conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a
cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim
over the property; that an examination of the entire property title bore
no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent and that
even the registry of property had no record of the same.
Interference without legal justification or excuse: To sustain a case
for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice
or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff.
Even assuming that Lapuz was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to
prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the
property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.
U-BIX vs MILLIKAN
Facts:
Milliken & Company (M&C) designated petitioner U-Bix Corporation as
its authorized dealer of Milliken carpets in the Philippines. Under the
dealership agreement, petitioner undertook to market Milliken carpets.
M&C, on the other hand, bound itself to support petitioners marketing
efforts and projects. Thus, once petitioner had specified a project
(i.e., submitted an accomplished dealer project registration form),
M&C was to exclusively designate the said project as petitioners.
Then, M&C informed U-Bix that Chase Manhattan Bank (CMB) was
furnishing its Manila office. U-Bix immediately formed a team and
conducted presentations and submitted product samples to CMB.
Unfortunately, it failed to impress CMB.
CMB awarded the supply contract to respondent Projexx Creator, Inc.
(Projexx) which had in the meantime become a dealer of Milliken
carpets. =Eser resigned from petitioner and joined Projexx.
On April 3, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract,
torts and damages claiming that respondents were guilty of malicious
interference.
After U-Bix presented its pieces of evidence, respondents filed a
demurrer to evidence, which the RTC granted. U-Bix appealed to the
CA, the but the Appellate Court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:
M&C violated the dealership agreement when it designated Projexx as
an authorized dealer of Milliken carpets; thus it was guilty of breach
of contract.
Projexx, with the help of Sylvan and Batara, poached the CMB project
from it. Moreover, Projexx allegedly hired Eser because he had worked
on the CMB project while in the employ of petitioner.
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:
Since U-Bix was unacceptable to CMB, M&C designated Projexx as
authorized dealer.
U-Bix neither submitted an accomplished dealer project registration
form nor complied with the rules for project registration. It never
specified the CMB project. Therefore, petitioner never earned a right
over it.
Since there was no contract was perfected between U-Bix and CMB,
the former never acquired any proprietary interest in the project.
Issue:
Whether respondents are guilty of malicious interference.
Ruling:
NO, respondents are not guilty of malicious interference. To prove that
respondents were guilty of malicious interference, petitioner had to
show the following: the existence of a valid contract, knowledge by
respondents that such a contract existed and acts (done in bad faith
and without legal basis) by respondents which interfered in the due
performance by the contracting parties of their respective obligations
under the contract. Apart from the fact that these matters were factual
(and therefore beyond our mandate to review), petitioner failed to
prove entitlement to the relief it was seeking.
Only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition because the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to passing upon errors of
law. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are
generally binding on this Court.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that respondents were
not guilty of malicious interference because no contract was ever
perfected between petitioner and CMB. Because all petitioner
presented to us were reiterations of its arguments in the courts a quo,
we find no reason to disturb the decision of the CA.
KINDRED TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REYES ET AL vs SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL
Facts:
Leah Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners,
namely, were their children. Five days before his death, Jorge had
been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. He decided to see
the doctor. He was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic. He was
attended to by Dr. Marlyn Rico, who gave Jorge a physical examination
and took his medical history. Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard
test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. After about an hour,
Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. As her
shift has ended, she indorsed Jorge to Dr. Marvie Blanes. She attended
to Jorge and took Jorge's history and gave him a physical examination.
Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she
ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be
done on Jorge. She did not observe any adverse reaction by the
patient to chloromycetin. At around 1:00 a.m. Jorge's temperature
rose to 41°C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited
respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put
him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patient's convulsions. When he
regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether
he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in
the past. Jorge replied he did not. After about 15 minutes, however,
Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions
returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before
and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not
respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or
purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to
deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died.
He was forty years old. The cause of his death was "Ventricular
Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever."
Reyeses filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint
for damages against respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio,
Dr. Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn Rico, and nurse Josephine Pagente.
Their principal contention was that Jorge’s death was due to the
wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had
respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not
have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test,
hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and
administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on
the patient's compatibility with said drug. They charged respondent
clinic and its directress, Sister Rose Palacio, with negligence in failing
to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent doctors and
nurses. Respondents denied the charges.
RTC and CA required expert opinion on the alleged breach by
respondents of the standard of care required under the circumstances.
Expert witnesses, however, testified that due care had been exercised
and the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure
of those skilled in that particular practice.
Reyeses claimed that expert testimony was not necessary, rather the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been applied in determining
the doctors' failure to observe due care which is immediately apparent
to a layman. Jorge Reyes was brought to the hospital merely
experiencing fever and chills for five days, but he was fully conscious,
coherent and ambulant, when he went to the hospital. Due to their
acts of negligence in their treatment of Jorge Reyes, the latter died
after only ten hours from the time of his admission.
Issues:
1) Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
2) Whether there was medical malpractice
Ruling:
As to whether res ipsa loquitur applies
No. The requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution of the person injured.
When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to
matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may
be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
While it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional
medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or
extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient
already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This
shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and
professional medical help came too late for him.
Doctors’ alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur.
The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by
respondents of the standard of care required by the circumstances.
Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no
presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves
the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or
surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment
did not produce the desired result.
As to whether there was medical malpractice
There was none. The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in
only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned through years of
education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state
through professional board examinations. Such license may, at any
time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to
state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the
Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which
doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and acceptance
of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there
is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of
"extraordinary" diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is
already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we
have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply
the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians. That
is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called
it, the reasonable "skill and competence . . . that a physician in the
same or similar locality . . . should apply."
Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard
recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care
required under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not
conclusive, it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and,
in the present case, greater accuracy through repeated testing was
rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The results
of the Widal test and the patient's history of fever with chills for five
days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as
indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20
typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of
reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.
JARCIA vs PEOPLE
Facts:
Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the petitioners, Dr. Jarcia and
Dr. Bastan, for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused
her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago (Roy, Jr.), to suffer serious physical
injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy, Jr. was hit by a
taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an
emergency medical treatment; that an X-ray of the victim's ankle was
ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as read by Dr.
Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room (ER) and, after
conducting her own examination of the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago
that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there was no need to
examine the upper leg; that eleven (11) days later, Roy, Jr. developed
fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that
Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and that the X-ray
revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the
shaft of the bone.
The NBI indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila for preliminary investigation. Probable cause was found and a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries was filed against Dr. Jarcia, Dr. Bastan before the RTC. RTC
found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Simple Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for criminal negligence
Ruling:
The CA is correct in finding that there was negligence on the part of
the petitioners. After a perusal of the records, however, the Court is
not convinced that the petitioners are guilty of criminal negligence
complained of.
The totality of the evidence on record clearly points to the negligence
of the petitioners Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason
of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. The elements of simple
negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
In this case, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the
petitioners are guilty of reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
elements thereof were not proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimony of Dr. Cirilo R. Tacata (Dr. Tacata),
a specialist in pediatric orthopedic, although pointing to some medical
procedures that could have been done by Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan,
as physicians on duty, was not clear as to whether the injuries suffered
by patient Roy, Jr. were indeed aggravated by the petitioners'
judgment call and their diagnosis or appreciation of the condition of
the victim at the time they assessed him.
It can be gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Tacata that a thorough
examination was not performed on Roy, Jr. As residents on duty at
the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were expected to know
the medical protocol in treating leg fractures and in attending to
victims of car accidents. There was, however, no precise evidence and
scientific explanation pointing to the fact that the delay in the
application of the cast to the patient's fractured leg because of failure
to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the patient prolonged
the pain of the child or aggravated his condition or even caused further
complications. Any person may opine that had patient Roy, Jr. been
treated properly and given the extensive X-ray examination, the
extent and severity of the injury, spiral fracture of the mid-tibial part
or the bigger bone of the leg, could have been detected early on and
the prolonged pain and suffering of Roy, Jr. could have been
prevented. But still, that opinion, even how logical it may seem would
not, and could not, be enough basis to hold one criminally liable; thus,
a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners' guilt.
The Court, nevertheless, finds the petitioners civilly liable for their
failure to sufficiently attend to Roy, Jr.'s medical needs when the latter
was rushed to the ER, for while a criminal conviction requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required to establish civil liability. Taken into account also was the fact
that there was no bad faith on their part.
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan cannot pass on the liability to the taxi driver
who hit the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct, immediate,
and proximate cause of the injury (fracture of the leg bone or tibia) of
Roy, Jr. was the vehicular accident when he was hit by a taxi. The
petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such fact alone to excuse
themselves from any liability. If this would be so, doctors would have
a ready defense should they fail to do their job in attending to victims
of hit-and-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which
the actual, direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury is
indubitably the act of the perpetrator/s.
In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine
the extent of Roy, Jr.'s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss
of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for
the sake of argument that they did not have the capacity to make
such thorough evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the
patient to another doctor with sufficient training and experience
instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right
To repeat for clarity and emphasis, if these doctors knew from the
start that they were not in the position to attend to Roy, Jr., a vehicular
accident victim, with the degree of diligence and commitment
expected of every doctor in a case like this, they should have not made
a baseless assurance that everything was all right. By doing so, they
deprived Roy, Jr. of adequate medical attention that placed him in a
more dangerous situation than he was already in. What petitioners
should have done, and could have done, was to refer Roy, Jr. to
another doctor who could competently and thoroughly examine his
injuries.
CRUZ vs AGAS
Facts:
Petitioner, Dr. Jaime T. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) filed a complaint for Serious
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical
Malpractice against Dr. Agas.
Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May 2003, he
engaged the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC)for a medical
check-up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003, he
underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted
by the employees and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29,
2003, he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a
scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the specialist
assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave
the colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist for
the information and consideration of the assigned specialist; that,
thereafter, he was sedated and the endoscopic examination was
carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt that
something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy,
had cold clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty;
that he could not stand or sit upright because he felt so exhausted
and so much pain in his abdomen; that when he was about to urinate
in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the
specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be
found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to
observe his critical condition and immediately referred him to the
surgical department which suspected that he had hemorrhage in his
abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical
operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon
waking up at the ICU on May 30, 2003, he learned that the doctors
cut a portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches because
it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused the internal
bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was under tremendous pain
in the incision area during his recovery period in the ICU and had
fever; and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms,
subclavian artery on the left part of his chest and a nasogastric tube
through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who
performed the colonoscopy procedure but the latter insisted that
nothing went wrong. Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard
time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two hours
because he easily got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time
he moved his bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had gastric
acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was in good physical
condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Defense of Dr. Agas
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove
the basic elements of reckless imprudence or negligence. He averred
that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not know that he
would perform the procedure. He explained that before the start of
the colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and
review his medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow
gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the gastroscopy and
colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely
successful considering that the latter did not manifest any significant
adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that
his vital signs were normal throughout the procedure.
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements attesting to
the fact that the intraperitonial bleeding which developed after the
colonoscopy procedure, was immediately recognized, evaluated,
carefully managed, and corrected; that he provided an adequate and
reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz; that the endoscopist followed
all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done
properly; that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the
colonoscopy procedure; that he did not deviate from any standard
medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he exercised
competence and diligence in rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.
ANTECEDENTS AT THE PROSECUTION LEVEL
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing
the complaint for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice. Dr. Cruz filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) but was dismissed. Dr.
Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
COURT OF APPEALS
Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the
unfavorable DOJ resolutions. The CA affirmed the DOJ resolutions.
The CA explained that, as a matter of sound judicial policy, courts
would not interfere with the public prosecutor’s wide discretion of
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation unless such
executive determination was tainted with manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion. It stated that the public prosecutor’s finding of
lack of probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance with law
and that his alleged negligence was not adequately established by Dr.
Cruz.
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his Complaint-
Affidavit the specific procedures that Dr. Agas failed to do which a
reasonable prudent doctor would have done, or specific norms he
failed to observe which a reasonably prudent doctor would have
complied with. The CA pointed out that Dr. Agas was able to
satisfactorily explain in his Counter-Affidavit that the complications
suffered by Dr. Cruz was not caused by his negligence or was the
result of medical malpractice.
Dr. Agas explained that the complication was due to the abnormal
condition and configuration of the digestive system, colon in
particular, of the complainant and not from any negligent act in
connection with the conduct of colonoscopy.
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in affirming the decision of the DOJ that
no probable cause exists for filing an information against the
respondent, that the respondent was not negligent and that there was
no denial of due process
Ruling:
Non-interference with Executive Determination of Probable Cause in
Preliminary Investigations
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to
directly decide on matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to
substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled
policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
Information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.
Medical Negligence and Malpractice Not Established
Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in
finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the
complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through
Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid
proof that the doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and
such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply
put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of
Dr. Agas. Dr. Cruz failed to show that the internal hemorrhage was
caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the
colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and
explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed
by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that
there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine Not Applicable Against Respondent
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
are:
(1) the occurrence of an injury;
(2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those who had control or management
used proper care; and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing
requisites, the most instrumental is the control and management of
the thing which caused the injury.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by
Dr. Cruz was due to the abnormal condition and configuration of his
sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering that the said
condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr.
Agas adequately explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests,
or diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed
tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have detected this
condition prior to an endoscopic procedure.
Petition is DENIED.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC vs AGANA
Facts:
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her
to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed
an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy
spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband,
Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After
the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who
examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave
the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure
when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were
missing). A “diligent search” was conducted but they could not be
found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the
surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the
operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US,
she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back,
her daughter found a piece of 1.5 inches gauze protruding from her
vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that
the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought
treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found
in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are
liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana
also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and
malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the
case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad).
Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by
her children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence
and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA
dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence
and malpractice.
Whether or not the CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.
WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence.
Ruling:
No. Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and malpractice. Leaving foreign
substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has
been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his
patient’s abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still,
it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek
relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her
condition might permit. What’s worse in this case is that he misled her
by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must
only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something or
did something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
No. Dr. Fuentes is not liable. The res ipsa loquitur argument of the
Aganas’ does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application
of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged
such role is evident from the acts that he called Dr. Fuentes to perform
a hysterectomy; he examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order;
he granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and he ordered the
closure of the incision.
Yes. Hospital owner PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil, and directly
liable to Sps. Aganas. Previously, employers cannot be held liable for
the fault or negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has
weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are
taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to
its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others.
Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule
of respondeat superior.
In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable
care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for
medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter
reported in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part
in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the
report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was
carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff
It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the
negligence committed. PSI also liable under NCC 2180 AS It failed to
adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil.
GARCIA-RUEDA vs PASCASIO
Facts:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda,
underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a
stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio,
Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died
of complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST
Hospital.
Petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI
ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending
physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the
NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-
Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before
the Office of the City Prosecutor.
TN: Taas au ni na part where the case was being passed from one
prosecutor to another for various reasons. So ako lang g shorten kay
makasabot rapud si dean ana ui.
During the preliminary investigation and for various reasons, the case
was being passed from different prosecutors. Finally, the case was
transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who
resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes and Dr. Antonio from any
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor
Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed graft charges under section 3 of RA
3019 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for
manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Can the Supreme Court review the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman?
Ruling:
TN: layo ra kaau ang case pero naa jud cya discussion on medical
malpractice and res ipsa loquitor, mao ako e discuss later on. But for
the purpose of answering the issue, unahon lang sa ni ang review of
the findings of the Ombudsman.
No. In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the
Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in dismissing the
complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with
the same.
The City Prosecutors were charged with violating Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which requires the following facts:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or
official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public
position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any
private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.
Why did the complainant, petitioner in instant case, elect to charge
respondents under the above law?
While a party who feels himself aggrieved is at liberty to choose the
appropriate "weapon from the armory," it is with no little surprise that
this Court views the choice made by the complainant widow.
To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the
circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the City
Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of
Justice under the Department of Justice's Order No. 223.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty,
breach, injury and proximate causation. In order to successfully
pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider,
in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not
have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and
Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was created. They have a
duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and
care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby
the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable
malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the
patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the
surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the
administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert
testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa
loquitur to the plaintiff; have been applied in actions against
anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or
injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. .
Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to
the recognized standards of the medical community in the
particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in
question negligently departed from this standard in his
treatment.
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is
divided into two inquiries: whether the doctor's actions in fact caused
the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause
of the patient's injury. Indeed here, a causal connection is
discernible from the occurrence of the victim's death after the
negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia,
a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate
criminal case.
To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless.
Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not
conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation.
It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been
averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms
of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an
antidote was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious
effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these precautionary
measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
Hence, the case was dismissed but without prejudice to the filing of
the proper remedy.
RAMOS vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos after seeking professional medical help was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall
bladder. She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon. Since neither
petitioner nor her husband knew of any anaesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka,
recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
Upon the request of the petitioner, Herminda Cruz, her sister-in-law
and then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center
was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room.
On the scheduled day of operation, Dr. Hosaka came late.
While inside the operating room, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to
intubate the patient. She then noticed a bluish discoloration of
Erlinda’s nailbeds and then was placed in a trendelenburg position.
After the operation, Erlinda was wheeled to ICU and remained in
comatose condition until she died.
Petitioner’s contention:
Filed an action for damages for the negligence of the respondents in
the performance of their duties to Erlinda.
Respondent’s contention:
Dr. Gutierrez- she maintains that the court erred in finding her
negligent and in holding that it was the faulty intubation which was
the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose.
Dr. Hosaka- he cannot be held negligent as a surgeon by applying the
Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine by pointing out that anesthesiology and
surgery are two distinct and specialized fields of medicine and as a
surgeon, he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr.
Gutierrez. Also, the trend in American jurisprudence is to do away with
that doctrine.
DLSMC- no E-E relationship exists between DLSMC and Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka so as to make them solidarily liable.
Issue:
Who among the respondents are liable to the death of the petitioner?
Ruling:
As to Dr. Gutierrez, it has been sufficiently established that she failed
to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia
on a patient. The conduct of a preanesthetic/ preoperative evaluation
prior to the operation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of
anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned. As she
herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation itself, one hour before the scheduled operation.
She auscultated the patient's heart and lungs and checked the latter's
blood pressure to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation.
However, she did not proceed to examine the patient's airway. Had
she been able to check petitioner Erlinda's airway prior to the
operation, Dr. Gutierrez would most probably not have experienced
difficulty in intubating the former, and thus the resultant injury could
have been avoided. There is no question that Erlinda became
comatose after Dr. Gutierrez performed a medical procedure on her.
Also, there is no evidence on record to support the theory that Erlinda
developed an allergic reaction resulting in the patient’s comatose
condition.
Moreover, the standard practice in anesthesia is that every single act
that the anesthesiologist performs must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez’
case, she could not account for at least 10 minutes of what happened
during the administration of anesthesia.
As to Dr. Hosaka, due to the peculiar factual circumstances justifies
that application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. First, it was Dr.
Hosaka who recommended to petitioner the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
In effect, he represented that the latter possessed the necessary
competence and skills. Next point is both of them worked as a team.
Their worked cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments
because their duties intersect with each other. It is quite apparent that
they have common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the
condition of the patient while the other physician is performing the
necessary medical procedures.
As to DLSMC, the court finds that no E-E relationship exists between
the hospital and Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez.
SPS. FLORES vs SPS. PINEDA
Facts:
Teresita Pineda was a 51-year old unmarried woman. She consulted
on April 17, 1987 her townmate, Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her
medical condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of
appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal
bleeding. Dr. Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for
the history of her monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the
vaginal bleeding. He advised her to return the following week or to go
to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a
general check-up. As for her other symptoms, he suspected that
Teresita might be suffering from diabetes and told her to continue her
medications.
Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when her
condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC
clinic on April 28, 1987 with her sister, Lucena Pineda. Lucena later
testified that her sister was then so weak that she had to lie down on
the couch of the clinic while they waited for the doctor. When Dr.
Fredelicto arrived, he did a routine check-up and ordered Teresita's
admission to the hospital. In the admission slip, he directed the
hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call" D&C operation to
be performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores. The hospital staff
forthwith took her blood and urine samples for the laboratory tests
which Dr. Fredelicto ordered.
Based on these preparations, Dr. Felicisima proceeded with the D&C
operation with Dr. Fredelicto administering the general anesthesia.
Teresita's complete laboratory examination results came and her
urinalysis showed a three plus sign (+++) indicating that the sugar in
her urine was very high. She was then placed under the care of Dr.
Amado Jorge, an internist.
By April 30, 1987, Teresita's condition had worsened. She experienced
difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care unit.
Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus
Type II. Insulin was administered on the patient, but the medication
might have arrived too late. Due to complications induced by diabetes,
Teresita died in the morning of May 6, 1987.
Believing that Teresita's death resulted from the negligent handling of
her medical needs, her family (respondents) instituted an action for
damages against petitioner spouses.
Issue:
W/N sps Dr. Fredelicto and Dr. Felicisima were guilty of medical
malpractice.
Ruling:
YES.
The respondents' claim for damages is predicated on their allegation
that the decision of the petitioner spouses to proceed with the D&C
operation, notwithstanding Teresita's condition and the laboratory test
results, amounted to negligence. On the other hand, the petitioner
spouses contend that a D&C operation is the proper and accepted
procedure to address vaginal bleeding - the medical problem
presented to them. Given that the patient died after the D&C, the core
issue is whether the decision to proceed with the D&C operation was
an honest mistake of judgment or one amounting to negligence.
Elements of a Medical Negligence Case
A medical negligence caseis a type of claim to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to
or the death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a
medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on
one's conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of
competence associated with the proper discharge of the profession. A
physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to
comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the
patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for
negligence.
We find that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes
and its complications were foreseeable harm that should have been
taken into consideration by the petitioner spouses. If a patient suffers
from some disability that increases the magnitude of risk to him, that
disability must be taken into account so long as it is or should have
been known to the physician. And when the patient is exposed to an
increased risk, it is incumbent upon the physician to take
commensurate and adequate precautions.
Taking into account Teresita's high blood sugar, Dr. Mendoza opined
that the attending physician should have postponed the D&C
operation in order to conduct a confirmatory test to make a conclusive
diagnosis of diabetes and to refer the case to an internist or
diabetologist. This was corroborated by Dr. Delfin Tan ( Dr. Tan), an
obstetrician and gynecologist, who stated that the patient's diabetes
should have been managed by an internist prior to, during, and after
the operation.
That the D&C operation was conducted principally to diagnose the
cause of the vaginal bleeding further leads us to conclude that it was
merely an elective procedure, not an emergency case. In an elective
procedure, the physician must conduct a thorough pre-operative
evaluation of the patient in order to adequately prepare her for the
operation and minimize possible risks and complications. The internist
is responsible for generating a comprehensive evaluation of all medical
problems during the pre-operative evaluation.
Significantly, the evidence strongly suggests that the pre-operative
evaluation was less than complete as the laboratory results were fully
reported only on the day following the D&C operation. Dr. Felicisima
only secured a telephone report of the preliminary laboratory result
prior to the D&C. This preliminary report did not include the 3+ status
of sugar in the patient's urine - a result highly confirmatory of
diabetes.
Because the D&C was merely an elective procedure, the patient's
uncontrolled hyperglycemia presented a far greater risk than her on-
and-off vaginal bleeding. The presence of hyperglycemia in a surgical
patient is associated with poor clinical outcomes, and aggressive
glycemic control positively impacts on morbidity and mortality.
Elective surgery in people with uncontrolled diabetes should preferably
be scheduled after acceptable glycemic control has been achieved.
According to Dr. Mercado, this is done by administering insulin on the
patient.
The prudent move is to address the patient's hyperglycemic state
immediately and promptly before any other procedure is undertaken.
In this case, there was no evidence that insulin was administered on
Teresita prior to or during the D&C operation. Insulin was only
administered two days after the operation.
The above facts, point only to one conclusion - that the petitioner
spouses failed, as medical professionals, to comply with their duty to
observe the standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic
patients undergoing surgery. Whether this breach of duty was the
proximate cause of Teresita's death is a matter we shall next
determine.
Related Law: RA No. 9439
DR. RUBI LI vs SPOUSES REYNALDO AND LINA SOLIMAN
Facts:
Angelica Soliman, 11 years old, was suffering from osteosarcoma,
osteoblastic type, a high-grade cancer of the bone which usually
afflicts teenage children. Her right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. Chemotherapy was then
suggested by Dr. Tamayo to eliminate remaining cancer cells and
prevent the disease from spreading to other part s of the body. Dr.
Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SMLC, herein petitioner
Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she
died on
September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous)
administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen.
Respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella,
Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents
charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelica's safety,
health and welfare by their careless administration of the
chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions
in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and
stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to
hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's untimely demise.
Respondents averred that the only side effects resulting from the
chemotherapy which were communicated to them were slight
vomiting, hair loss and weakness. They claim that they would not have
given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assure
them of its side effects.
Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the
chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that she had fully
explained to respondents how thechemotherapy will affect not only
the cancer cells but also the patient's normal body parts, including the
lowering of white and red blood cells and platelets.
She claimed that what happened to Angelica can be attributed to
malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioner was not
liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
died.
Using the standard of negligence laid down in Picart v. Smith, the trial
court declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution
against the adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding
that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence. Respondents were
ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill in the amount of P139,064.43.
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals found that while there was no
negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as her
attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the
known side effects of chemotherapy. The appellate court stressed
that since the respondents have been told of only three side effects of
chemotherapy, they readily consented thereto.
Had petitioner made known to respondents those other side effects
which gravely affected their child — such as carpopedal spasm, sepsis,
decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual
death — respondents could have decided differently or adopted a
different course of action which could have delayed or prevented the
early death of their child. there was no negligence committed by the
petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to
Angelica, found that petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully
explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy.
The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have been
told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily consented
thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents those other side
effects which gravely affected their child — such as carpopedal spasm,
sepsis, decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and
eventual death — respondents could have decided differently or
adopted a different course of action which could have delayed or
prevented the early death of their child.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The type of lawsuit which has been called
medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is
that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress
a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily
harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best
proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding
that the alleged negligence of petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs to respondents' child was not proven considering
that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer
specialists, were not qualified to give expert opinion as to whether
petitioner's lack of skill, knowledge and professional competence in
failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was the
proximate cause of the patient's death.
There are four essential elements that must be proven in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician
had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or
inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result
of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured
by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent
case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it.
There was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s
parents. They could not have been unaware in the course of initial
treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity, that her
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor
in her knee. When Dr Li informed them beforehand of the side effects
of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red
blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the
part of the doctor that the parents understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients
undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the
disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with
pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the
physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the
treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime
after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot
be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
MENDOZA vs CASUMPANG
Facts:
JOSEPHINE (CASUMPANG) underwent hysterectomy and
myomectomy that DR. MENDOZA performed on her at the Hospital.
After her operation, JOSEPHINE experienced recurring fever, nausea,
and vomiting. 3 months after the operation, she noticed while taking
a bath something protruding from her genital. She tried calling DR.
MENDOZA to report it but she was unavailable. JOSEPHINE instead
went to see another physician, DR. EDNA JAMANDRE-GUMBAN, who
extracted a foul-smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her
cervix.
The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through prompted
JOSEPHINE to file a damage suit against DR. MENDOZA. Because
JOSEPHINE died before the trial could end, her husband and their
children substituted her in the case. She was a housewife and 40 years
old when she died.
RTC’s Decision:
Rendered judgment finding DR. MENDOZA guilty of neglect that
caused JOSEPHINE’s illness and eventual death and ordering her to
pay JOSEPHINE’s heirs:
Actual damages – P50K;
Moral damages – P200K; and
Attorney’s fees – P20K
Costs of suit
CA’s Decision:
Affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that DR. MENDOZA
committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze remained
in her patient’s body after surgery.
Issue:
Whether DR. MENDOZA committed a breach of her duty as a physician
Dr. Mendoza’s argument:
Claims that no gauze or surgical material was left in JOSEPHINE’s body
after her surgery as evidenced by the surgical sponge court in the
hospital record
Ruling:
JOSEPHINE did not undergo any other surgical operation. And it would
be much unlikely for her or for any woman to inject a roll of gauze
into her cervix.
The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded
exemplary damages against DR. MENDOZA when, under Art. 2229 of
the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded in cases of gross
negligence.
A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it.
He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and
materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up
have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical
profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending
to a patient’s health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is
in order.
Further, in view of JOSEPHINE’s death resulting from DR. MENDOZA’s
negligence, civil indemnity under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code should be
given to respondents as heirs. The amount of P50K is fixed by
prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.
LI vs SPS. SOLIMAN
Facts:
Angelica Soliman, 11 years old, was suffering from osteosarcoma,
osteoblastic type, a high-grade cancer of the bone which usually
afflicts teenage children. Her right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. Chemotherapy was then
suggested by Dr. Tamayo to eliminate remaining cancer cells and
prevent the disease from spreading to other part s of the body. Dr.
Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SMLC, herein petitioner
Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she
died on
September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous)
administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen.
Respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella,
Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents
charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelica's safety,
health and welfare by their careless administration of the
chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions
in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and
stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to
hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's untimely demise.
Respondents averred that the only side effects resulting from the
chemotherapy which were communicated to them were slight
vomiting, hair loss and weakness. They claim that they would not have
given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assure
them of its side effects.
Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the
chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that she had fully
explained to respondents how thechemotherapy will affect not only
the cancer cells but also the patient's normal body parts, including the
lowering of white and red blood cells and platelets.
She claimed that what happened to Angelica can be attributed to
malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioner was not
liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
died.
Using the standard of negligence laid down in Picart v. Smith, the trial
court declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution
against the adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding
that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence. Respondents were
ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill in the amount of P139,064.43.
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals found that while there was no
negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as her
attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the
known side effects of chemotherapy.
The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have been
told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily consented
thereto.
Had petitioner made known to respondents those other side effects
which gravely affected their child — such as carpopedal spasm, sepsis,
decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual
death — respondents could have decided differently or adopted a
different course of action which could have delayed or prevented the
early death of their child. there was no negligence committed by the
petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to
Angelica, found that petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully
explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy.
The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have been
told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily consented
thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents those other side
effects which gravely affected their child — such as carpopedal spasm,
sepsis, decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and
eventual death — respondents could have decided differently or
adopted a different course of action which could have delayed or
prevented the early death of their child.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The type of lawsuit which has been called
medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is
that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress
a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily
harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best
proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding
that the alleged negligence of petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs to respondents' child was not proven considering
that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer
specialists, were not qualified to give expert opinion as to whether
petitioner's lack of skill, knowledge and professional competence in
failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was the
proximate cause of the patient's death.
There are four essential elements that must be proven in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician
had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or
inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result
of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured
by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent
case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it.
There was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s
parents. They could not have been unaware in the course of initial
treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity, that her
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor
in her knee. When Dr Li informed them beforehand of the side effects
of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red
blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the
part of the doctor that the parents understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients
undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the
disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with
pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the
physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the
treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime
after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot
be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
CASUMPANG vs CORTEJO
Facts:
On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo
brought her 11-year old son, Edmer to the Emergency Room of the
San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing,
chest pain, stomach pain, and fever.
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined
Edmer. In her testimony, Mrs. Cortejo narrated that in the morning of
April 20, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted for one
day; a few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family
doctor; and two hours after administering medications, Edmer's fever
had subsided.
After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs,
body temperature, and blood pressure. Based on these initial
examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo
diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia." Edmer's blood was also
taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics.
Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen
his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
The mother was suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again
called Dr. Casumpang's (a pediatrician) attention and stated that
Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain.
Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in
Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr.
Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and
reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.
Dr. Miranda came in due to request and conducted a physical check-
up covering Edmer's head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and
abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing
fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever.
Upon seeing Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood
specimen, and reported that Edmer had complained of severe
stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg. Dr. Miranda called
up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer's condition.
Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures
done including: hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood
transfusion and tourniquet tests. She advised Edmer's parents that the
blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at
Edmer's room and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care
Unit (ICU), to which the respondent consented. Since the ICU was
then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire
a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his
son to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's
clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the
attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was
already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action
for damages against SJDH, and it’s attending physicians:
Dr.Casumpang and Dr. Miranda (collectively referred to as the
"petitioners") before the RTC of Makati City.
Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment
and care to the best of his abilities, and within the proper standard of
care required from physicians under similar circumstances. He claims
that his initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia was supported by the
chest x-ray result.
Dr. Miranda faults the CA for holding her responsible for Edmer's
wrong diagnosis, stressing that the function of making the diagnosis
and undertaking the medical treatment devolved upon Dr.
Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer, and who confirmed
"bronchopneumonia."
SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by asserting that Dr.
Casumpang and Dr. Miranda are mere independent contractors and
"consultants" (not employees) of the hospital. SJDH alleges that since
it did not exercise control or supervision over the consultants' exercise
of medical profession, there is no employer-employee relationship
between them, and consequently, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
not apply
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded actual and moral
damages. Ruled the petitioning doctors were negligent, and found
untenable the petitioning doctors' contention that Edmer's initial
symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily
relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the other
manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed.
CA affirmed en toto the RTC's ruling, finding that SJDH and its
attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical care,
attention, and treatment expected of an ordinary doctor under like
circumstances.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable
lack of precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient;
2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarily liable with the
petitioning doctors;
3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners'
negligent act/omission and the patient's resulting death.
Ruling:
1. YES for Dr. Casumpang, but Dr. Miranda is not liable
The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' negligence
in diagnosing and treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the
respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to
victims to redress a wrong committed by medical professionals who
caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient.33 As the term is
used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health
care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession,
or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient.
A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the
required standard of care involves a question of mixed fact and law;
it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly technical in nature,
requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to
the court on matters clearly falling within the domain of medical
science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert
testimonies, and guided by medical literature, learned treatises, and
its fund of common knowledge, ultimately determines whether breach
of duty took place.
In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining first,
the standard medical examinations, tests, and procedures that the
attending physicians should have undertaken in the diagnosis and
treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs and
symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed and
considered.
Furthermore, the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian is to
administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose.
If the patient had twice vomited fresh blood and thrombocytopenia
has already occurred, the doctor should order blood transfusion,
monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop
bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming
the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively
appreciated some and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed
to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In
sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which
failure, especially when reasonable prudence would have shown that
indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes
negligence.
We find that Dr. Miranda as resident doctor was not independently
negligent. Although she had greater patient exposure, and was'
subject to the same standard of care applicable to attending
physicians, we believe that a finding of negligence should also depend
on several competing factors, among them, her authority to make her
own diagnosis, the degree of supervision of the attending physician
over her, and the shared responsibility between her and the attending
physicians.
2. YES
The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held vicariously
liable for the petitioning doctors' negligence but also for its own
negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of providing its
patients with the necessary facilities and equipment.
The hospital's liability is not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency
by estoppel. There is No Employer-Employee Relationship between
SJDH and the Petitioning Doctors.
Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised
any degree of control over the means, methods of procedure and
manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted and performed
their medical profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis and
treatment. Likewise, no evidence was presented to show that SJDH
monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning doctors in the
treatment and management of Edmer's case. In these lights, the
petitioning doctors were not employees of SJDH, but were mere
independent contractors.
SJDH is Solidarity Liable Based on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine
of Apparent Authority. Despite the absence of employer-employee
relationship between SJDH and the petitioning doctors, SJDH is not
free from liability.
The hospital may be found liable if the physician or independent
contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception
is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority.”
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a
manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance
of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in
reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with
ordinary care and prudence.
3. YES
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the
causal relation between the negligence and the injury. This connection
must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening
efficient causes.
IOW, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. The
injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician's
negligence when it appears, based on the evidence and the
expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part
in causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of
the physician's negligence.
As the respondent had pointed out, dengue fever, if left untreated,
could be a life threatening disease. As in any fatal diseases, it requires
immediate medical attention. With the correct and timely diagnosis,
coupled with the proper medical management, dengue fever is not a
life-threatening disease and could easily be cured.
To reiterate, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with
dengue fever despite the presence of its characteristic symptoms; and
as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to promptly
manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately conducted confirmatory
tests, (i.e., tourniquet tests and series of blood tests) and promptly
administered the proper care and management needed for dengue
fever, the risk of complications or even death, could have been
substantially reduced.
ALANO vs MAGUD-LOGMAO
Facts:
An 18-year old boy went missing after seeing a movie and his brother
reported it to the police station 2 days after the incident. Unknown to
the family, the boy was brought to a medical center in Quezon City by
2 sidewalk vendors who saw him fall from the overpass. The patient’s
data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso of Mandaluyong, while
the surgical resident on-duty at the Emergency Room stated that his
name is Angelito Logmao. The resident doctor reported that Logmao
was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that
the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that he developed generalized
seizures and was transferred to National Kidney Institute (NKI) since
there was no vacancy in the ICU and all ventilator units were being
used.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
At the NKI, Logmao was recorded as Lugmoso relying on the data
sheet. No relative could be found after the extensive search through
the police and media assistance. Lugmoso died of craniocerebral
injury. The time being of the essence in the success of organ
transplantation, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano as Executive Director of NKI
authorize the removal of heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen
from the body of Lugmoso for double organ transplantation in
accordance with R.A. No. 349, as amended by P.D. 856, i.e., giving
his subordinates instructions to make certain and to exert all
reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's
son.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The mother of the boy heard of the incident and saw his son in a
cheap casket. She filed with the court a complaint for damages that
the authorities conspired to remove the organs while the boy was still
alive and that they concealed his true identity.
RTC
In a judgement, it rendered the Director of NKI liable for quasi-delict
to pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner appealed to the CA.
CA
It affirmed with modification by deleting the actual damages and by
reducing the other awards.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for negligence.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner could not have been faulted for having full confidence
in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to
comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting
only in accordance with the requirements of the law.
It was the medical center, who had the opportunity to ascertain the
name but recorded the wrong identity to NKI. The NKI could not have
obtained the information as the patient was already unconscious by
the time he was brought to the NKI.
As stated in Otero v. Tan, "in civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.” Here, there is no proof that the period
of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot
be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to
present any expert witness to prove the doctors could or should have
waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for
transplantation.
It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were
removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the
emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son
cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court
find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering
at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless
body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
DAMAGES
DEFINITION
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs ROBLES
Facts:
This case is a continuation of Yu vs. The Orchard Gold & Country Club,
Inc. The relevant facts are as follows:
Yu and Yuhico went to Orchard Golf to play golf w/ another member
of the club. At the last minute, they were informed that the other
member could not play with them. Due to the “no twosome” policy of
Orchard contained in their handbook prohibiting less than 3 players
from playing on weekends a public holiday before 1pm. Yu decided to
convince Orchard’s assistant golf director to allow them to play. The
latter refused. Yu then shouted invectives at the assistant golf
director. Thus w/o the latter’s permission, they were able to play. The
lower court ruled by saying that the Orchard’s decision suspending Yu
and Yuhico is declared void. Orchard is likewise directed to pay moral,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation
Issue:
W/N the damages claimed could be awarded?
Ruling:
No.
Yu and Yuhico acknowledged that there was an offense committed.
Similarly, Yuhico admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge
of Orchard’s policy against twosomes, contained in their handbook.
However, they asserted that such policy was relaxed by the
management when a member would not be prejudiced. However, the
court ruled that such claim is based not on concrete examples. No
specific instance as to when and under what circumstance the
supposed relaxation took place was cited.
As to the purported damages, Yuhico stated that he became the butt
of jokes of another group of member-golfers in the club. Also, Yu said
that his friends in business started to evade him. Respondents could
not however present any testimonial/documentary evidence to bolster
their claims.
Thus, contrary to the findings of the trial courrt’s findings, there is no
factual/legal basis to grant moral/exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of suit in favor of respondents. The damages suffered, if
there are any, partake of the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo
utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in
order to oblige them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a
result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in
the Club is a privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the
facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and regulations.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish
respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon
them by themselves for deliberately and consciously violating the rules
and regulations of the Club. Considering that respondents were validly
suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them.
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
COMPONENTS OF ACTUAL DAMAGES
Loss of earning capacity
Formula in determining loss of earning capacity
PEOPLE vs MUYCO
Facts:
Jesus and Arnulfo Muyco, cousins, were charged with murder for the
death of Romeo Boteja Jr. Only Jesus Muyco was apprehended while
Arnulfo remains at large.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION:
Found Jesus guilty as charged and correspondingly sentenced him to
reclusion and to pay the heirs of Boteja, Jr. P30,000.00 as death
indemnity and P27,000.00 as funeral expenses.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
The lower court erred:
In giving credence to the testimony of Boteja, which he (Jesus) claims
to be improbable and incredible; in finding him guilty despite failure
of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of his innocence; in
disregarding his alibi; and in appreciating the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
Whether the heirs of Boteja, Jr. entitled to claim damages for loss of
earning capacity.
Ruling:
Yes. SC noted that the trial court failed to award damages for loss of
earning capacity despite testimony of Leticia Boteja to this effect. In
People v. Dizon, where Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the
time of his death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a
construction worker. In the instant case, the victim was 19 years old
at the time of his death and earning P1,600 monthly as a farm laborer.
Thus, his heirs are entitled to receive an award for lost earnings.
VICTORY LINER vs GAMMAD
Facts:
Respondent Rosalito Gammad testified that on March 14, 1996, his
wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad, was on board an air-
conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan from
Manila. At about 3:00 a.m., the bus while running at a high speed fell
on a ravine somewhere in Barangay Baliling, Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya,
which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries to
other passengers.
On May 14, 1996, respondent heirs of the deceased filed a complaint
for damages arising from culpa contractual against petitioner.
On November 6, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification as to the amount of damages. For instance,
the trial court awarded 1,500,000.00 as compensatory damages, while
the Court of Appeals lowered it to P1,135,536,10.
In this petition for review, petitioner argues that the trial court’s award
of damages was without basis and should be deleted.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages was proper.
Held:
Respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemnity for the
death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence is fixed at
P50,000.00.
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s
earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate
the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased
is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In People v. Oco, the evidence presented by the prosecution to
recover damages for loss of earning capacity was the bare testimony
of the deceased’s wife that her husband was earning P8,000.00
monthly as a legal researcher of a private corporation. Finding that
the deceased was neither self-employed nor employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under the labor laws
existing at the time of his death, the Court held that testimonial
evidence alone is insufficient to justify an award for loss of earning
capacity.
Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals computed the award of
compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis
of the testimony of respondent Rosalito that the deceased was 39
years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum
when she died. No other evidence was presented. The award is
clearly erroneous because the deceased’s earnings does not
fall within the exceptions.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to
respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Respondents in the instant case should be awarded moral damages
to compensate for the grief caused by the death of the deceased
resulting from the petitioner’s breach of contract of carriage.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with
exemplary damages because they are based on different jural
foundations. These damages are different in nature and require
separate determination. In culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of contractual obligations and, as in this case, when
the act of breach of contract itself constitutes the tort that results in
physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in relation to Article P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Marie Grace Pagulayan-
2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case Gammad; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P100,000.00 as
the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. exemplary damages; (4) P78,160.00 as actual damages; (5)
P500,000.00 as temperate damages; (6) 10% of the total amount as
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the
attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit. Furthermore, the total amount
extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed
adjudged against petitioner shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per
to have acted recklessly. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is
annum computed from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
proper.
PHIL. HAWK vs VIVIAN TAN LEE
Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good may be recovered in contractual
**Repeated case; this is now a discussion on the computation for the
obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. Under the circumstances, the
loss of earning capacity
Court finds it reasonable to award respondents the amount of Facts:
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. These amounts are not excessive. On March 27, 1991, Vivian Tan Lee (respondent) was riding on their
motorcycle with her husband, Silvino Tan, in Barangay Buensoceso,
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the Court Gumaca, Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon. They were about to
of Appeals should be further reduced. make a turn when a bus owned by Philippine Hawk Corporation and
driven by Margarito Avila hit them and a jeepney parked on the left
In People v. Duban, it was held that only substantiated and proven
side of the road. This caused the respondent physical injuries as well
expenses or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in
as the death of her husband. Respondent sued Philippine Hawk
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be
Corporation and Avila for damages based on quasi-delict. During the
recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit J), and the contract/receipt for
trial of the case, respondent testified that her husband was leasing
the construction of the tomb (Exhibit F) in this case cannot be
and operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that
considered competent proof and cannot replace the official receipts
yielded one million pesos a year in revenue. She also testified that
necessary to justify the award. Hence, actual damages should be
they had a copra business, which gave them an income of P3,000 a
further reduced to P78,160.00, which was the amount supported by
month or P36,000 a year.
official receipts.
The trial court awarded damages based on loss of earning capacity,
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may also be
among others. The petitioner corporation appealed stating that the
recovered in the case at bar where exemplary damages are awarded.
award was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not the
The Court finds the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the
admissions made by respondent during the trial. The CA sustained the
total amount adjudged against petitioner reasonable.
award of the trial court for loss of earning capacity of Silvino Tan,
Hence, the petition is partially granted. The April 11, 2003 decision of moral damages for his death, and actual damages.
the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner Victory
Issue:
Liner, Inc., is ordered to pay respondents the following: (1)
Whether the CA’s award for loss of earning capacity is proper. The computation of the SC for the loss of earning capacity of Silvino
Tan is as follows:
Ruling:

YES. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is

provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. This compensation is
awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money. In order to for such award to be given, it must be backed by
documentary evidence. Documentary evidence may however be
dispensed with under the following instances: (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; Hence, petitioner is liable for actual damages based on loss of
or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less earning capacity in the amount of P1,000,000.
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
PEOPLE vs JOSEPH ASILAN
As proof of her husband’s income while operating a Caltex gasoline
station, respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable
Facts:
Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that
respondent's husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. On the evening of March 27, 2006, Binosa while chatting with his
It is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondent's testimony as friends at the El-Nino Bakery along Teresa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million heard a gunshot nearby. He went to the place where the sound came
pesos before respondent's husband died on March 17, 1999. However, from and saw a uniformed policeman (Randy Adovas) seemingly
no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income arresting someone. However, when he was about to handcuff such
derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent person, herein accused, Joseph Asilan stabbed Adovas with a fan knife
as regards such income cannot be considered. on his back several times. The man who was being arrested, took the
Adovas’ gun and shot the latter with it. This resulted in the death of
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not
Adovas. Asilan was then charged with the complex crime of Direct
gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings
Assault with Murder. The RTC convicted Asilan of murder and ordered
less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income,
him to pay the heirs of Adovas the sum of P84,000 as actual damages,
less living and other incidental expenses. In the absence of
P25,000 for moral damages and P50,000 civil indemnity. The RTC
documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for
acquitted him of the charge of Direct Assault as the prosecution failed
the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the
to establish that Adovas was in the performance of his duty when he
gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income
was assaulted by Asilan. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s ruling.
(gross income less necessary expenses).
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in failing to consider loss of earning capacity of
Adovas in the award for actual damages.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Asilan. As regards
his civil liability, the Supreme Court held that aside from the actual
damages, on hospital, and funeral expenses in the total amount of
P80,224, Asilan is also liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
Adovas under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, and such indemnity
should be paid to his heirs. The provision states that:
“Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;”
Irene Adovas testified on the amount her husband received as police
officer and presented documentary evidence to show that Adovas,
who was only 29 years old when he died, earned ₱8,605.00 a month
at the time of his death.
In computing the amount of damages recoverable for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, the following factors are to be
considered:
1) The number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed. This is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 - age of the
deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy), which is adopted
from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and
2) The rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased
should be fixed.
Net income is arrived at by deducting the amount of the victim’s living
expenses from the amount of his gross income. The loss of earning
capacity of Asilan is thus computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income - living
expenses]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual
income - 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-29] x [₱103,260.00 - ₱51,630.00]
= 34 x ₱51,630.00
= ₱1,755,420.00
Attorney’s fees and interest
QUIRANTE vs IAC
Facts:
Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a
building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine
American General Insurance Co. Inc. acted as bondsman for
GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his
counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and
PHILAMGEN for damages, with PHILAMGEN. 4
RTC:
In favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering
GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the
amount of P129,430.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and attorney's fees
in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering Guerrero alone to pay
liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July
16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of
the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. 5 A motion for
reconsideration filed by PHILAMGEN was denied by the trial court on
November 4, 1982. 6
IAC:
Filed with this court for the quashal of the writ of execution and to
compel the trial court to give due course to the appea but was
dismissed.
Quirante filed a motion for the confirmation of his attorney's fees as,
according to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the
late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement
was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de
Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether Petitioner Quirante is entitled to the attorneys fees.
Ruling:
No. The action is premature. Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may
be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question
have been rendered, or in a separate action. What is being claimed
here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from
attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208
of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant,
not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment
creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged
contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the
private respondents as the debtors.
However, the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. The
petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court may
or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola family of the
total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. Since the main
case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has
not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees
and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for
recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client.
“An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation
has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of
the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something
has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.”
PNB vs CA
Facts:
A check was issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture payable
to F. Abante Marketing and drawn against PNB. F. Abante Marketing,
deposited it with Capitol City Development Bank (Capitol), the latter
in turn deposited the same in its account with the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) which, in turn, sent the check to PNB for
clearing. However, PNB returned the check to PBCom and debited
PBCom’s account for the amount covered by the check, the reason
being that there was a material alteration of the check number.
Issue:
Whether the award of attorney’s fees plus interest was proper.
Ruling:
NO, while the award of attorney’s fees lies within the discretion of the
court and depends upon the circumstances of each case, such exercise
of discretion under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
demands factual, legal and equitable basis, without which the award
is unjustified. The reason for the award must be stated in the text of
the court’s decision. If it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the
decision, the same shall be disallowed. The award of attorney’s fees
being an exception rather than the rule (since it puts a premium on
the right to litigate), it is necessary for the court to make findings of requisites for res judicata as a bar by prior judgment are present in
fact and law that would bring the case within the exception to justify the case. However, Civil Case No. 9114 was erroneously suspended,
its grant. not terminated. Civil Case No. 9114 was erroneously suspended, not
terminated. Civil Case No. 9114 was erroneously suspended, not
In their respective decisions, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
terminated.
failed to explicitly state the rationale for the said award. Thus, the
amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees was deleted.
With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the exception
PADILLO vs COURT OF APPEALS rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every
time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees as part of
Facts:
damages are not the same as attorney's fees in the concept of the
In 1983, Padillo initiated Civil Case No. 9114, a petition for declaratory
amount paid to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
relief and damages, against Averia and Casilang for unlawfully
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
refusing to vacate the subject lot Padillo purchased from the de Vera
for the legal services he has rendered to the latter, while in its
alleging that she is the absolute owner of the parcel of land.
extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
Prior to Civil Case No. 9114, however, there was another case, M.C.
party.
No. 374-82, instituted also by Padillo in 1982, to compel the Register
of Deeds to register the Deed of Sale on the subject lot between de
In this case, the trial court’s award is too unreasonable. It must be
Vera and Padillo. Pending the resolution of both cases, Civil Case No.
reduced from P 107,000 to P 25, 000. Attorney’s fees as damages is
9114 was suspended.
awarded only in the instances specific in Article 2208 and it is not
meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant,
Long after Case M.C. No. 374-82 has been finally settled in favor of
therefore it should be reasonably reduced.
Padillo, the latter still pursued her claim under Civil Case 9114. She
now instituted the current suit to award her damages but the CA
denied the damages due to res judicata.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES vs COURT OF APPEALS

Issue: Facts:
Whether res judicata bars her from getting damages with the current Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan for
case? delivery vessel “SS EASTERN COMET” owned by Eastern Shipping
Lines (EASTERN). Upon arrival of the shipment, it was discharged unto
Held: the custody of defendant Metro Port Services (METRO). The latter
No, res judicata does not bar her. excepted to one drum because it was bad order. Then, Allied
Brokerage Services (ALLIED) received the shipment in which also one
Under ordinary circumstances, case M.C. No. 374-82 should have drum was also excepted due to spillage.
barred Padillo's claim for damages in Civil Case No. 9114 since all the
Plaintiff (Mercantile) contended that due to the losses incurred by the
drum, the consignee suffered losses totaling 19,032 Pesos due to the
fault of Eastern, Metro, and Allied.
The RTC ruled that the three defendants (Eastern, Metro, and Allied)
should pay damages jointly and severally to plaintiff with a legal
interest of 12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of the filing
of the complaint until fully paid. The RTC also ordered defendants to
pay P3,000 worth of attorneys’ fees. Considering that the two drums
were shipped in good order and condition, as clearly shown by the Bill
of Lading and Commercial Invoice which do not indicate any damages,
it follows that the damage happened within the respective or
successive custody and possession of Eastern, Metro, and Allied.
The Court of the Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
It was contended by the defendant that the reckoning period of the
interest rate should not be at the time of the filing of the complaint
instead from the date of the decision of the trial court. It also
contended that the rate should be 6%.
Issue:
When is the reckoning period of the computation of the interest on an
award for damages? And what is the applicable interest rate?
Ruling:
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When a obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date of the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
ESTORES vs SPS. SUPANGAN
Facts:
Petitioner Hermojina Estores (Estores) and respondent-spouses Arturo
and Laura Supangan (Spouses) entered into a Conditional Deed of
Sale a parcel of land for four million Seven Hundred Thousand pesos
(Php 4,700,000). They also agreed that the vendor shall complete all
necessary approved documents for registration of the title.
After seven (7) years from the time of the execution, and despite
payment of P3.5 million by Spouses, petitioner Estores still failed to
comply with her obligation, expressly provided in paragraphs 4, 6, 7,
9 and 10 of the contract. Hence, the Spouses wrote a letter dated
9/27/2000 to Estores demanding the return of the of P3.5 million. In
reply, she acknowledged receipt of the P3.5 million and promised to
return the same within 120 days. She still failed to return the amount
despite demand, Spouses were constrained to file a Complaint for sum
of money.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
She insists that she is not bound to pay interest on the P3.5 million
because the Conditional Deed of Sale only provided for the return of
the downpayment in case of failure to comply with her obligations.
SPOUSES ARGUMENTS:
Spouses aver that it is only fair that interest be imposed considering
that petitioner failed to return the amount upon demand and had been
using the P3.5 million for her benefit.
RTC:
It rendered its Decision finding Spouses entitled to interest but only
at the rate of 6% per annum and not 12% as prayed by them.
CA:
It rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC
finding the imposition of 6% interest proper. However, the same shall
start to run only from September 27, 2000 when Spouses formally
demanded the return and not from October 1993 when the contract
was executed.
Issue:
Whether it is proper to impose interest for an obligation that does not
involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation
of the parties.
Ruling:
The SC sustained the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it is
proper to impose interest notwithstanding the absence of stipulation
in the contract.
Article 2210 of the Civil Code provided that interest may, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach
of contract. In this case, petitioner is legally obligated to return
the P3.5 million because of her failure to fulfill the obligation, despite
demand. She enjoyed the use of the money from the time it was given
to her until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation from
the date of demand.
Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable rate of
interest shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties. Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be
12% per annum when the obligation arises out of a loan or a
forbearance of money, goods or credits.
The contract involved in this case is not a loan but a
Conditional Deed of Sale. However, the SC believed that the
stipulation governing the return of the money be considered
as a forbearance of money which required payment of
interest at the rate of 12%.
In Crismina Garments, Inc. v. CA, forbearance was defined as a
contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain during a given
period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan
or debt then due and payable. This definition describes a loan where
a debtor is given a period within which to pay a loan or debt. In such
case, forbearance of money, goods or credits will have no distinct
definition from a loan. The Court believes however, that the phrase
forbearance of money, goods or credits is meant to have a separate
meaning from a loan, otherwise there would have been no need to
add that phrase as a loan is already sufficiently defined in the Civil
Code. Forbearance of money, goods or credits should
therefore refer to arrangements other than loan agreements,
where a person acquiesces to the temporary use of his
money, goods or credits pending happening of certain events
or fulfillment of certain conditions. In this case, the Spouses
parted with their money even before the conditions were fulfilled.
They have therefore allowed or granted forbearance to the Estores to
use their money pending fulfillment of the conditions. They were
deprived of the use of their money for the period pending fulfillment
of the conditions and when those conditions were breached, they are
entitled not only to the return of the principal amount paid, but also
to compensation for the use of their money. And the compensation
for the use of their money, absent any stipulation, should be the same
rate of legal interest applicable to a loan since the use or deprivation
of funds is similar to a loan.
SUNGA-CHAN vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership but was registered as a
sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto Sunga albeit their
agreement for equal sharing of the net profit. When Jacinto died, his
heirs continued the partnership business without Chua’s consent.
Chua demanded for the accounting and winding up of partnership
affairs.
The RTC’s judgment included an award of legal interest on Chua’s
share over the partnership assets which accrued from June 1, 1992 to
October 15, 2002; before the computation of claim was approved by
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the grant of interest, on Chua’s share over partnership
assets, accruing before the computation of claim was approved by the
trial court proper.
Ruling:
No. Chua’s share and interest over the partnership assets, before the
approval of the computation of claims, partake the nature of an
unliquidated claim and shall not earn interest until reasonably
determined and not merely determinable by mathematical
computation.
The Court has certainly not lost sight of the fact that the October 7,
1997 RTC decision clearly directed petitioners to render an accounting,
inventory, and appraisal of the partnership assets and then to wind
up the partnership affairs by restituting and delivering to Chua his
one-half share of the accounted partnership assets. The directive itself
is a recognition that the exact share and interest of Chua over the
partnership cannot be determined with reasonable precision without
going through with the inventory and accounting process. In fine, a
liquidated claim cannot validly be asserted without accounting.
In net effect, Chua's interest and share over the partnership asset,
exclusive of the goodwill, assumed the nature of a liquidated claim
only after the trial court, through its November 6, 2002 resolution,
approved the assets inventory and accounting report on such assets.
AIR FRANCE vs DE CASTRO
Facts:
Camilisi was on a pilgrimage to selected countries in Europe with Air
France(AF). According to respondent: (1) AF’s agent in Paris failed to
inform him of the need to secure a transit visa for Moscow, as a result
of which he was denied entry to Moscow and was subjected to
humiliating interrogation by the police; (2) another AF agent (a certain
Ms. Soeyesol) rudely denied his request to contact his travel
companions to inform them that he was being sent back to Paris from
Moscow with a police escort; Ms. Soeyesol even reported him as a
security threat which resulted in his being subjected to further
interrogation by the police in Paris and Rome, and worse, also lifted
his flight coupons for the rest of his trip; (3) AF agents in Rome
refused to honor his confirmed flight to Paris; (4) upon reaching Paris
for his connecting flight to Manila, he found out that the AF agents did
not check in his baggage and since he had to retrieve his bags at the
baggage area, he missed his connecting flight; (5) he had to shoulder
his extended stay in Paris for AF’s failure to make good its
representation that he would be given a complimentary motel pass
and (6) he was given a computer print-out of his flight reservation for
Manila but when he went to the airport, he was told that the flight
was overbooked. It was only when he made a scene that the AF agent
boarded him on an AF flight to Hongkong and placed him on a
connecting Philippine Airlines flight to Manila.
RTC decision
The RTC found that AF breached its contract of carriage and that it
was liable to pay P200,000 actual damages, P1 million moral damages,
P1 million exemplary damages and P300,000 attorney’s fees to
respondent.
CA decision
The CA ruled that it was respondent (as passenger), and not AF, who
was responsible for having the correct travel documents. However,
the appellate court stated that this fact did not absolve AF from liability
for damages.
The CA agreed with the findings of fact of the RTC that AF’s agents
and representatives repeatedly subjected respondent to very poor
service, verbal abuse and abject lack of respect and consideration. As
such, AF was guilty of bad faith for which respondent ought to be
compensated.
The appellate court affirmed the award of P1 million moral damages
and P300,000 attorney’s fees. However, it reduced the actual
damages to US$906 (or its peso equivalent). According to the CA, this
amount represented the expenses respondent incurred from the time
he was unable to join his group in Rome (due to the unfounded
"communiqué" of Ms. Soeyesol that he was a security threat) up to
the time his flight reservation from Paris to Manila was dishonored for
which he was forced to stay in Paris for two additional days. The
appellate court pointed out that, on the other hand, respondent’s
expenses for the Moscow leg of the trip must be borne by him as AF
could not be faulted when he was refused entry to Moscow for lack of
a transit visa.
The CA also decreased the exemplary damages from P1 million to
P300,000. The CA further imposed interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from
the date of extrajudicial demand until full satisfaction, but before
judgment becomes final. From the date of finality of the judgment
until the obligation is totally paid, 12% interest p.a. shall be imposed.
Issue:
AF assails the CA’s award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent as the alleged injury sustained was not
clearly established. AF added that, even if respondent was entitled to
the same, the amounts awarded were exorbitant. Lastly, it argued that
the interest rate should run not from the time of respondent’s
extrajudicial demand but from the time of judgment of the RTC.
Ruling:
On issue of whether or not respondent was entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees
Both the RTC and the CA have competently ruled on the issue of
respondent’s entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees as they
properly laid down both the factual and legal bases for their respective
decisions. We see no reason to disturb their findings.
The above liabilities of AF shall earn legal interest pursuant to the
Court’s ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Estrella
Pursuant to this ruling, the legal interest is 6% p.a. and it shall be
reckoned from April 25, 2007 when the RTC rendered its judgment,
not from the time of respondent’s extrajudicial demand. This must be
so as it was at the time the RTC rendered its judgment that the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained. Then, from the time this decision becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% p.a. until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90151 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered
to PAY legal interest of 6% p.a. from the date of promulgation of the
decision dated April 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City and 12% p.a. from the time the decision of this Court
attains finality, on all sums awarded until their full satisfaction.
EXTENT OF RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
In contracts and quasi-contracts where there is
GOOD FAITH ON OBLIGOR
BATONG BUHAY vs CA
Facts:
Batong Buhay issued Stock Certificate No. 16807 covering 62,495
shares with a par value of P0.01 per share to Francisco Aguac who
was then legally married to Paula G. Aguac, but the said spouses had
lived separately for more than fourteen (14) years prior to the said
date. Francisco Aguac sold his 62,495 shares covered by Stock
Certificate No. 16807 in favor of Inc. Mining Corporation without the
knowledge and consent of Paula. Upon learning of such sale, Paula
wrote Batong Buhay a letter asking that such sale be withheld as it is
part of their conjugal property.
Batong Buhay refused to effect the transfer to Inc. Mining,
notwithstanding the letter, on the apprehension that they might be
held liable in a criminal case filed against Francisco Aguac. Hence, an
action was filed against Batong Buhay and the ruling was against the
latter.
Inc. Mining however appealed the decision because there was no
award for damages for the in Batong Buhay’s wrongful refusal of the
transfer of the stocks; to which the CA ordered so. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
May the Court of Appeals award damages by way of unrealized profits
despite the absence of supporting evidence, or merely on the basis of
pure assumption, speculation or conjecture; or can the respondent
recover damages by way of unrealized profits when it has not shown
that it was damaged in any manner by the act of petitioner?
Ruling:
NO. The stipulation of facts of the parties does not at all show that
private respondent intended to sell, or would sell or would have sold
the stocks in question on specified dates. While it is true that shares
of stock may go up or down in value (as in fact the concerned shares
here really rose from fifteen (15) centavos to twenty three or twenty
four (23/24) centavos per share and then fell to about two (2)
centavos per share, still whatever profits could have been made are
purely SPECULATIVE, for it was difficult to predict with any decree of
certainty the rise and fall in the value of the shares. Thus this Court
has ruled that speculative damages cannot be recovered.
It is easy to say now that had private respondent gained legal title to
the shares, it could have sold the same and reaped a profit of
P5,624.95 but it could not do so because of petitioner's refusal to
transfer the stocks in the former's name at the time demand was
made, but then it is also true that human nature, being what it is,
private respondent's officials could also have refused to sell and
instead wait for expected further increases in value.

BAD FAITH ON OBLIGOR
GEN. ENTERPRISES vs LIANGA BAY
Facts:
Lianga Bay Logging Company and General Enterprises, Inc entered
into a contract, whereby the former, a producer of logs from a timber
concession, designated the latter as distributor of a portion of its log
production on condition that it would pay the distributor a commission
of the logs exported.
Sometime in October 1959, Lianga Bay sent a notice to the General
Enterprises stating that after the November shipment there will be no
longer logs available for “unless the price of such logs become
comparable to what we may expect to receive in the way of returns
from lumber and veneer of barterable and export grades.” Lianga Bay
thereafter stopped supplying logs for export, whereupon General
Enterprises reminded the former that it had a contract to fulfill relative
to its log production as otherwise it would be held responsible for the
consequences of the breach that may ensue. Lianga Bay did not heed
this reminder adducing reasons which in its opinion justify the action
it had taken, such as the restriction by the government. Hence,
General Enterprises initiated the herein action alleging breach of
contract and praying for damages.
The CFI of Rizal rendered decision in favor of the General Enterprises
ordering the Lianga Bay to pay damages. This is an appeal from said
decision.
Issue:
Whether Lianga Bay acted in bad faith in the performance of its
obligation.
Ruling:
No.
Even assuming that the restrictions imposed by the government on
barter, the breakdown of machineries and the inability to secure spare
parts, replacements and wire ropes, as well as the passage of the
Margin Law, have the nature of fortuitous events, yet it cannot be said
that they had caused such a reduction in appellant's [Lianga Bay]
production of logs that made it impossible for it to comply wholly, or
even partly, with its commitment with appellee [General Enterprises].
The rule is that even the happening of a fortuitous event in itself does
not necessarily extinguish an obligation for, as this Court has said, the
fortuitous event must be of such a character as to render it impossible
for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
One of the causes for the suspension of the agreement alleged by
appellant was the demand for the renegotiation of prices. Another
reason advanced is the establishment of a veneer plant for the
purpose of increasing the log production. But these two matters are
not among the various causes of suspension enumerated in the
agreement. The suspension, therefore, of the contract on these
causes is not justified.
However, the SC ruled that exemplary damages awarded to General
Enterprises is excessive it appearing that Lianga Bay in suspending
the operation of the contract has not acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner. The most that can be said is that Lianga Bay, to
suit its purpose, has availed to certain misstatements or half-truths as
reflected in the declarations of Mr. Dempsey, one of its high officials,
in an attempt to justify its desistance from the contract. While this is
reprehensible, it is not a wanton or malevolent perversion of the truth.
In crimes and quasi-delict
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs PEOPLE
Facts:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment.
The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-
operator of a passenger bus. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as
the regular driver of the bus.
Suelto was driving the passenger bus. The bus suddenly swerved to
the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned
by Valdello.
Valdellon filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus
company for damages. She prayed that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the
defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and after trial on
the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the expenses for
the repair of the damaged apartment of plaintiff, with
interests to be charged thereon at the legal rate from the date
of the formal demand until the whole obligation is fully paid;
b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as compensatory
and exemplary damages;
c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum
of P1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiffs counsel; and
costs of suit;
During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the
terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in evidence
a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator for carpentry, masonry, welding job
and electrical [work].
RTC:
Found Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to
pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual
and compensatory damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of
suit.
CA:
Affirmed the decision of the trial court, but the award for actual
damages was reduced to P100,000.00
Issue:
Whether the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that
respondent suffered actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00
Ruling:
Petitioners insist that private respondent was able to prove only the
amount of P35,000.00 by way of actual damages; hence, the award
of P100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.
We agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to
prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the
incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent
were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent
for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry,
welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to
testify on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court
awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but
failed to state the factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court
merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the sum
of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for
her damaged apartment. The appellate court, for its part, failed to
explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page
decision.
 Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive,
as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him ( lucro cesante).
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish
ones case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the
evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the
other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove
the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed
out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises,
speculations or conjectures. As the Court declared:
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual
or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount
of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented
on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot
be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific
facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
or actual damages are borne.
The Court further declared that where goods are destroyed by the
wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he
would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar
goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during
the period before replacement.
While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims
for damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same
should be admitted with extreme caution. Their testimonies should be
viewed in light of claimants self-interest, hence, should not be taken
as gospel truth. Such assertion should be buttressed by independent
evidence.
An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice.
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their
view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent
would amount to P55,000.00. Accordingly, private respondent is
entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages.
SUBROGATORY RIGHT OF INSURER
RCJ BUS LINES vs STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY
Facts:
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (STANDARD) filed a complaint against
petitioners FLor Bola Mangoba and RCJ Bus Lines. The complaint was
predicated upon an accident which involves the Mitsubishi Lancer and
the RCJ Bus Lines. Upon seeing a pile of gravel and sand on the road,
the Toyota Corolla, which is ahead of the Mitsubishi Lancer, stopped
on its tracks. The Mitsubishi Lancer followed suit and also halted. At
this point, the bus hit and bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi
Lancer causing it to move forward and hit the Toyota Corolla in front
of it. As a result of the incident, the Mitsubishi Lancer sustained
damages amounting to PhP162,151.22, representing the cost of its
repairs. Under the comprehensive insurance policy secured by
Rodelene Valentino, owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer, STANDARD
reimbursed to the former the amount she expended for the repairs of
her vehicle. Rodelene then executed a Release of Claim and
Subrogation Receipt, subrogating STANDARD to all rights, claims and
actions she may have against RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Flor
Bola Mangoba.
In its answer, RCJ Bus Lines, Inc maintained, among others, that the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the driver of the Mitsubishi Lancer when, for no reason
at all, it made a sudden stop along the National Highway, as if to
initiate and/or create an accident.
The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Standard. The RTC affirmed
with modification the MeTC’s Decision deleting the award for
exemplary damages. The appellate court found that the RTC
committed no reversible error in affirming RCJ’s liability as registered
owner of the bus and employer of Mangoba.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Court of Appeals erroneously disregarded the
point that petitioner RCJ’s defense of extraordinary diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver was made as an alternative
defense;
Ruling:
No. The petition has no merit. RCJ, by presenting witnesses to testify
on its exercise of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its bus drivers, admitted that Mangoba is its
employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2176,
makes the employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees.
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent - rebuttable only by proof of observance
of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such
legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of
employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the
basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the
employer’s own negligence. Mangoba, per testimony of his conductor,
was ten meters away from the Mitsubishi Lancer before the collision
and was driving 60 to 75 kilometers per hour when the speed limit
was 50 kilometers per hour. The presumption under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code was thus proven true: Mangoba, as driver of the bus
which collided with the Mitsubishi Lancer, was negligent since he
violated a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap. We see no
reason to depart from the findings of the MeTC, RTc and appellate
court that Mangoba was negligent.
MORAL DAMAGES
PURPOSE
SIMEX INTERNATIONAL vs CA
Facts:
The petitioner was a depositor of the respondent bank and maintained
a checking account in its branch. Petitioner deposited to its account in
the said bank the amount of P100,000.00, thus increasing its balance
as of that date to P190,380.74.
Petitioner issued several checks against its deposit but was surprised
to learn later that they had been dishonored for insufficient funds.
California Manufacturing Corporation sent on June 9, 1981, a letter of
demand to the petitioner, threatening prosecution if the dishonored
check issued to it was not made good.
The error was rectified on June 17, 1981, and the dishonored checks
were paid after they were re-deposited.
The petitioner demanded reparation from the respondent bank for its
"gross and wanton negligence."
CFI ordered the defendant to pay nominal damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. This decision
was affirmed in toto by the respondent court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Moral and Exemplary damages?
Ruling:
As the Court sees it, the initial carelessness of the respondent bank,
aggravated by the lack of promptitude in repairing its error, justifies
the grant of moral damages.
This rather lackadaisical attitude toward the complaining depositor
constituted the gross negligence, if not wanton bad faith, that the
respondent court said had not been established by the petitioner.
The fact is that the petitioner's credit line was canceled and its orders
were not acted upon pending receipt of actual payment by the
suppliers. Its business declined.
Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory
damages may be received "(2) for injury to the plaintiff's business
standing or commercial credit."
We agree that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have
suffered.
However, from every viewpoint except that of the petitioner's, its claim
of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is nothing short of
preposterous. Its business certainly is not that big, or its name that
prestigious, to sustain such an extravagant pretense.
Moreover, a corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages
because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and moral shock.
The only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a good
reputation that is debased, resulting in its social humiliation.
Now for the exemplary damages. After deliberating on this particular
matter, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby imposes
upon the respondent bank exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, "by way of example or correction for the public good," in
the words of the law.
MAKABALI vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Georgina Makabali had just graduated from the College of
Medicine, and as a graduation gift from her father, was given a trip to
Hongkong. She was accompanied by her sister and co-petitioner
Lourdes Cynthia Makabali.
An offer of package tour to Hongkong by Baron Travel Corporation
caught the attention of petitioners. They were promised that they
would be going with a group of travelers to be led by a tour guide,
that a representative of travel corp would see them off at the Airport
to give them final instructions, and that they would be lodged at the
President Hotel in Hongkong. These promises convinced petitioners to
purchase the Hongkong package tour.
On the departure day, petitioners were dismayed knowing that none
of those promises have actually been fulfilled. In Hong Kong,
petitioners simply tagged along with the Abaya Tour Group provided
they pay all their expenses in Hong Kong. Petitioners claimed public
humiliation due to the fact that they had to pay for their lunch while
the rest of the group had prepaid meals. They could not go shopping
with the Abaya group for fear that their limited funds would not be
sufficient to pay for their hotel bills. There were times when breakfast
consisted of hot dogs bought along the sidewalk while lunch and
supper consisted of apples and oranges.
It was only in the morning of May 13, 1969 or on the fourth day of
the supposed five-day tour that petitioners were notified that the
travel corp had finally made arrangements for the payment of their
bills. By that time, the supposed tour was practically over.
An action for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs
was filed by the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to more than the P5,000.00
moral and exemplary damages, P1,000.00 attorney's fees and costs
awarded to them by the Court of Appeals in the light of the
circumstances of the case.
Ruling:
Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, 5they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
While moral damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee,
such as physical suffering and the like, exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. It is
essential however, in the award of damages that the claimant must
have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual
basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.
As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of appeals was in
agreement with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered
anguish, embarrassment and mental sufferings due to failure of
private respondent to perform its obligation to the petitioners.
It must be emphasized that moral damages are not intended to enrich
the complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the
injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable
action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. 15 The amount of P5,000.00 is minimal compared to the
sufferings and embarrassment of petitioners who left Manila with high
spirits and excitement hoping to enjoy their first trip to a foreign land
only to be met with uncertainties and humiliations.
We note however that petitioners limited their claim for moral and
exemplary damages in their complaint filed with the Court of First
Instance to a total of P35,000.00 plus attorney's fees and costs. We
feel that Our award should not exceed the said amount.
BURDEN OF PROOF
PNB vs CA
DECS (drawer) PNB (drawee)  F. Abante Marketing
(payee)  Capitol Bank  PBCom  PNB for clearing
Facts:
A check with serial number 7-3666-223-3, dated August 7, 1981 in the
amount of P97,650.00 was issued by the Ministry of Education and
Culture (now Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS])
payable to F. Abante Marketing. This check was drawn against
Philippine National Bank (PNB).
F. Abante Marketing, a client of Capitol City Development Bank
(Capitol), deposited the check in its savings account with said bank.
In turn, Capitol deposited the same in its account with the Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCom) which, in turn, sent the check to
PNB for clearing.
PNB cleared the check as good and, thereafter, PBCom credited
Capitol's account for the amount stated in the check. However, PNB
returned the check to PBCom and debited PBCom's account for the
amount covered by the check, the reason being that there was a
"material alteration" of the check number. PBCom then proceeded to
debit Capitol’s account for the same amount. However, Capitol could
not debit F. Abante Marketing's account since the latter had already
withdrawn the amount of the check.
Capitol sought clarification from PBCom and demanded the re-
crediting of the amount. PBCom followed suit by requesting an
explanation and re-crediting from PNB. Since the demands of Capitol
were not heeded, it filed a civil suit against PBCom which, in turn, filed
a third-party complaint against PNB for reimbursement with respect
to the claims of Capitol. PNB filed a fourth-party complaint against F.
Abante Marketing.
RTC ruled in favor Capitol including payment of attorney’s fees.
CA modified by exempting PBCom from liability to Capitol for
attorney's fees and ordering PNB to honor the check for P97,650.00,
with interest as declared by the trial court, and pay Capitol attorney's
fees of P10,000.00.
Issue:
(in relation to the topic, go to issue #4)
1. Whether alternation of the serial number of a check is a
material alteration under the NIL.
2. Whether a certification issued by DECS can be given weight
in evidence.
3. Whether in the absence of malice or ill PNB may be held liable
for attorney’s fees.
Ruling:
1. No, the alteration is not a material alteration.
A material alteration is one which changes the items which are
required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL. An alteration in the
serial number of the check is an item which it can readily be observed
and is not an essential requisite for its negotiability. In this case, the
alteration did not change the relations between the parties. The sum
of money due to the payee remained the same.
The check's serial number is not the sole indication of its origin. As
found by the CA, the name of DECS which issued the subject check
was prominently printed therein. If the purpose of the serial number
is merely to identify the issuing government agency, its alteration in
this case had no material effect whatsoever on the integrity of the
check. The identity of DECS was not changed thereby and the amount
of the check was not charged against the account of another
government agency which had no liability under the check. Therefore,
the ownership of the check is established without the necessity of
recourse to the serial number.
2. No, the certification issued by Minrado C.
Batonghinog, Cashier III of the DECS showing that the
check was altered cannot be given weight in evidence.
Batonghinog was not presented before the trial court to prove that
the said document was really the document he prepared and that the
signature below the said document is his own signature. Neither did
PNB present an eyewitness to the execution of the questioned
document who could possibly identify it. Absent this proof, SC cannot
rule on the authenticity of the contents of the certification.
3. No, in the absence of malice or ill PNB cannot be held
liable for attorney’s fees.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. However, the
discretion of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines demands without a premise and
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It becomes a violation
of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to
litigate.
The reason for the award must be stated in the text of the
court's decision. If it is stated only in the dispositive portion
of the decision, the same shall be disallowed.
As to the award of attorney's fees being an exception rather than
the rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and
law that would bring the case within exception and justify the grant
of the award.
In this case, both RTC and CA failed to explicitly state the rationale of
the attorney’s fees. Therefore, PNB should honor the check however
it cannot be held liable to pay attorney’s fees.
RAAGAS vs RAYA
*repeated case
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC vs MAGNO
Facts:
The Municipal Board of Butuan City passed Ordinance No. 11
amending Ordinance No. 7 of said City, imposing a tax of two per cent
(2%) on the gross sales or receipts of those engaged in the sale,
trading in, or disposal of all alcoholic or malt beverages, wines and
mixed or fermented liquors, including tuba, basi and tapuy.
The same Municipal Board passed Ordinance No. 110 amending
Ordinance No. 11, fixing instead a tax on the sale of beer at the rate
of P.25 per case of twenty-four bottles, and on the sales of soft drinks
at the rate of P.10 per case of twenty-four bottles of Coca-Cola, Pepsi-
Cola, Tru-Orange, Seven-Up, Bireley, Soda Water, and any other kind
of soft drinks or carbonated drinks.
The San Miguel Brewery, Inc.(SMB), was engaged in the sale of beer
and soft drinks in said City. Although it appears to have paid the
required taxes under Ordinance No. 11, however the company
stopped paying the taxes thereafter and thereby incurred in back
taxes.
Verbal demands were made by the City Treasurer of Butuan on SMB
with warnings that a warrant of distraint and levy will be issued against
its properties unless it settles its tax liability under the ordinance
aforesaid.
The counsel for the company wrote a letter to the City Treasurer of
Butuan questioning the power of the city government of Butuan to
levy upon its properties.
To this, the City Treasurer of Butuan, promptly answered and
explained that he may issue warrants of distraint and levy upon
properties of delinquent taxpayers under Ordinance No. 26 of the City
of Butuan.
Several other written demands were thereafter made by the City
Treasurer of Butuan to officials of plaintiff's branch office in said city,
but to no avail.
Accordingly, the city treasurer, with the approval of the Mayor of
Butuan City issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the
properties of the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. at its branch office in that
city to enforce the collection of the taxes assessed against it, i.e.,
under Ordinance Nos. 11 and 110, amounting to P9,129.42, including
penalties.
A notice of seizure by virtue of the warrant of distraint and levy was
served on the company's Branch Manager at Butuan City who,
voluntarily surrendered the two (2) delivery trucks of the company
seized under the warrant to the said City Treasurer of the same day.
SMB instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying for an order directing the defendant Francisco Magno
to release the delivery trucks seized and impounded by the City
Government of Butuan allegedly "without authority and for reasons
unknown to the company", and to order the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff damages plus the costs of the suit.
Note: the action was brought against the defendant Francisco Magno
in his individual capacity, as disclosed in the allegations in the
complaint, and as expressly admitted in the appellant's brief.
Francisco Marco interposed, the defense that in seizing the delivery
trucks of the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., he was acting, and was in the
performance of his official duty, as Treasurer of Butuan City, and, can
not be hold liable to pay to the company any damages. He set up a
counterclaim of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
During the pendency of the action, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. paid
under protest the taxes assessed against it by the City Treasurer and
forthwith the impounded trucks were released.
The parties submitted no testimonial evidence. Instead, they
submitted a stipulation of facts along with documentary evidence on
the basis of which the court a quo, rendered the decision appealed
from. A motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied,
the plaintiff interposed the instant appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether trial court erred in not ordering Magno to pay to SMB
in damages the amount of P2,160.00, notwithstanding the
admission of the defendant in the stipulation of facts that the
SMB incurred damages in that amount, representing the hire
of two (2) trucks.
2. Whether the trial court erred in ordering SMB to pay damages
in favor of Magno under the counterclaim of the latter.
Ruling:
1. The trial court did not err.
It erroneously assumes that the defendant is personally liable for
damages to the appellant, disregarding the established fact that the
defendant had issued the warrant of distraint and levy against
plaintiff's properties in his capacity as City Treasurer of Butuan who,
under the law, is empowered to issue the warrant under Ordinance
No. 26 of the City of Butuan.
- By not having been shown that the defendant Magno, either as a
private citizen or as City Treasurer of Butuan, had acted in bad faith,
there can be no question that appellee Francisco Magno, who was
merely performing a duty enjoined by law to be performed when he
issued the warrant of distraint and levy, cannot be made to
answer personally for damages to the appellant.
2. In respect of the Magno’s counterclaim for moral and exemplary
damages, the trial court said:
With respect to the counterclaim of defendant, it appears that
defendant introduced no evidence to support his claim for P40,000.00
moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages and P2,000.00
attorney's fees.
Nevertheless, the trial court sentenced the plaintiff to pay to the
defendant, damages in the sum of P2,000.00, and costs.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading
and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like
(Darang vs. Belizar, L-19487, January 31, 1967). While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court (Article 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant
should satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the
damages (Article 2217) and its causal connection to defendant's acts.
This is so, because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award, designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrong-doer.
Neither may we consider the award as exemplary damages, because
the mere findings that certain allegations in the complaint are not true,
and the plaintiff committed a mistake in instituting the action against
the wrong party, do not justify the award of this kind of damages. It
infringes upon the right of a citizen to have access to the courts. The
portals of the courts of justice should not be closed to litigants who
ask for the protection of their rights. Penalty in the concept of
damages should not be imposed simply because a complaint is found
unmeritorious by the courts.
The amount of attorney's fees, on the other hand, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. It may be awarded along with expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, in cases where the court deems
it just and equitable under the circumstances of the case. And when
as in this case, the defendant public officer was sued in his private
capacity for acts done in the performance of official duty required by
law, and was forced to employ the services of private counsel to
defend his rights, it is but proper that attorney's fees be charged
against the plaintiff. Nominal damages may also be adjudicated. The
SC believed that the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees and P100.00
nominal damages, is just and equitable in the premises.
Order:
P2,000 as damages in favor to Magno was set aside.
Increased the attorney's fees to P2,000.00, and
Ordered the SMB to pay to the Magno P100.00 as nominal damages.
WHEN AWARDABLE
TULFO vs PEOPLE
Facts:
Atty Ding So filed a criminal case of libel against Erwin Tulfo, as
author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing director, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay,
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc. of the daily tabloid
“Remate”, with the crime of libel in connected with the publication of
the articles in the column “Direct Hit” in which Tulfo accused Atty So,
an employee of the Bureau of Customs in NAIA as an extortionist, a
corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth.
RTC:
The trial court ruled in favor of the Atty So, awarding him of 800k as
actual damages, 1M as moral damages and 500k as exemplary
damages
CA:
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court
Issue:
Whether the award of damages is proper
Ruling:
Only for moral damages.
Actual damages
The award must be modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides,
“Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages. There was no showing of any pecuniary loss
suffered by the complainant Atty So. Without proof of actual loss that
can be measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.
Moral damages
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty So, and for that
Atty So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification for the
award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219 (7) of the Civil Code,
which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation. The fact the no actual or
compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does not
adversely affect the offended party’s right to recover damages.
Exemplary damages
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified.
Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, “In criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a party of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances”.
No aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of the
libelous act; thus, no exemplary damages can be awarded.
GUILATCO vs CITY OF DAGUPAN
Facts:
GUILATCO was a Court Interpreter of CFI-Dagupan. While she was
about to board a motorized tricycle at the sidewalk of Perez Blvd., she
accidentally fell into a manhole, thus causing her right leg to be
fractured. She was confined in 2 hospitals for a period of more than
16 days. She suffered excruciating pain; incurred hospitalization and
medication expenses; had difficulty in locomotion; has not been able
to report for duty as court interpreter, hence deprived of income.
The manhole on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd was partially covered
by a concrete flower pot and left a wide open hole about 2 ft. long by
1.5 feet wide.
Defendant government official TANGCO, who took on the DUAL role
of being (1) City Engineer of Dagupan City (LOCAL govt capacity) and
(2) Ex-officio Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public Works (NATIONAL
govt capacity), admitted the existence of said manhole.
CITY ’S CONTENTION:
That Perez Boulevard is a national road that is not under the control
or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach
to the city. It is the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or
supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere
coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
Issue:
WON the City of Dagupan exercises control or supervision over a
national road in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with article 2189? YES. City of Dagupan is liable.
Ruling:
Article 2189 of the Civil Code requires only that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. It is not even
necessary for the defective road or street to belong to (or be owned
by) the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach.
The charter of Dagupan clearly indicates that the city indeed has
supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage
hole is located.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The
same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and
sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the
Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed
has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control
or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability
of the city to the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil Code is clear.
FILINVEST vs MENDEZ
Facts:
Ivan Mendez purchased a car from Davao Motor Sales Company
(DMSC) and to secure his balance, he executed and delivered a
promissory note and chattel mortgage in favor of DMSC. DMSC
assigned it to Filinvest Credit Corp.. According to the terms of the
promissory note, the installments would be paid monthly.
Ivan Mendez failed to pay for Febraury, March and April installments.
Thus, the financing company sent written demands to him to update
his account. Ivan Mendez paid the financing company through Phil.
Veterans Bank (PVB) which was credited for the unpaid installments.
However, the check was returned on the ground of insufficient funds
by PVB.
The financing company filed an action for recovery of personal
property and/or sum of money against Ivan Mendez. Subsequently,
the check was finally cleared and considered payment for the
installments. However, the Court issued an Order of Seizure for failing
to comply with the terms and conditions.
Meanwhile, Ivan Mendez used the car to fetch Col. Coronel at the
airport. Ivan Mendez, brought Col. Coronel to a hotel where a
conference was being held. After which, Mendez instructed his driver
to take the car home. Shortly, personnel of the financing company
and a deputy sheriff arrived at the house of Mendez and seized the
car pursuant to the Order. The car was driven back to where
Ivan Mendez was called and he pleaded with the FILINVEST people to
release his car in the meantime. Refused, Mendez then went to the
office of the financing company and reiterated his plea. He was told
by the collection and credit manager of the financing company that he
had to pay the whole amount due in order to get back the car. After
further negotiations, Mendez was permitted to pay his April, May and
June installments plus repossession expenses as a condition to the
release of the car.
After payments, the financing company finally released the car to
Ivan Mendez. Subsequently, Mendez filed a complaint for Solutio
Indebiti and damages against the petitioner. He alleged, among
others, that the seizure order was illegal, as the unpaid installments
for the months of February, March, April, 1976 had previously been
updated by the clearing of the PVB check, and that petitioner was
therefore without any right to claim from him the repossession
expenses and that due to the alleged unjustified repossession of the
car and the factual circumstances attendant thereto, he is entitled to
moral damages.
The petitioner countered that the subsequent updating of
respondent's account did not invalidate the seizure order, as the basis
was the failure of respondent to pay the installments when they fell
due, and not the failure to pay the February, March and April
installments in particular.
Issue:
WON Mendez is entitled to moral damages
Ruling:
NO. The award for moral damages has no factual and legal basis.
Mendez bases his claim to moral damages on the alleged failure of the
petitioner, to act with caution and to observe honesty and good faith
with due regard to the his rights under the installment sales law as
well as on the act of the petitioner in deliberately repossessing the car
in violation of law.
The respondent claims that it was while he was attending a seminar
for home defense in Davao City that the car was repossessed. When
he pleaded with the petitioner not to seize the car at that very moment
because he was using it for his visitor from Manila, the petitioner chose
to brandish the seizure order as its weapon to enforce collection of his
whole account. The respondent claims that he was humiliated and
embarrassed most especially before his visitor and among those
attending the seminar as well as among his friends and business
associates. The shock and humiliation he suffered resulted to his
hospitalization immediately, thereafter, for about a week.
The testimony, however, of the driver of the respondent shows that
the car was seized at the residence of the respondent while the said
driver was cleaning the same. It is, therefore, not true that the
respondent was humiliated and embarrassed before his visitor and
among those attending the seminar.
The rule is settled that moral damages cannot be awarded in the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud or bad faith. When the
action is filed in good faith there should be no penalty on the right to
litigate. The petitioner may have erred but error alone is not a ground
for moral damages.
The willingness of the petitioner to allow the respondent to pay only
the unpaid installments for April, May, and June instead of the total
outstanding balance and to release the car as well as its voluntary
motion to dismiss the case indicates lack of fraud or bad faith on the
part of the petitioner. The private respondent was not without fault.
He was three months behind in his payments and he issued a bouncing
check. The dismissal of the civil case rendered moot and academic the
issues of whether or not the acceleration clause in the promissory note
is illegal and unenforceable as well as the other issue of whether or
not the petitioner acted cumulatively in pursuing its various remedies
to effect collection.
LOPEZ vs PAN-AM
Facts:
Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No. 2 of Pan
American World Airways — hereinafter otherwise called PAN AM —
from Tokyo to San Francisco on May 24, 1960 were made with PAN
AM on March 29, 1960, by "Your Travel Guide" agency, specifically,
by Delfin Faustino, for then Senator Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J.
Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter Mrs.
Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. (Milagros Lopez Montelibano). PAN AM's San
Francisco head office confirmed the reservations on March 31, 1960.
First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently
issued by PAN AM on May 21 and 23, 1960, in favor of Senator Lopez
and his party.
As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest
Airlines on May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo at 5:30 P.M. of that day.
As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of
the Philippine Embassy to contact PAN AM's Tokyo office regarding
their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. For the given
reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up, however,
PAN AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PAN AM could
not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class
passengers. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to
Minister Busuego for him to show the same to PAN AM's Tokyo office,
but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for
them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight
unless they took the tourist class therein.
Senator Lopez and party were constrained to take PAN AM's flight
from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers. Senator Lopez
however made it clear, as indicated in his letter to PAN AM's Tokyo
office on that date, that they did so "under protest" and without
prejudice to further action against the airline.
Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party
against PAN AM on June 2, 1960 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant, plaintiffs asked
for P500,000 actual and moral damages, P100,000 exemplary
damages P25,000 attorney's fees, plus costs. PAN AM filed its answer
on June 22, 1960, asserting that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees.
It also interposed a counterclaim for attorney's fees of P25,000.
The CFI ruled in favor of plaintiff and awarded the following (a)
P100,000.00 as moral damages: (b) P20,000.00 as exemplary
damage; (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of this
action.
Plaintiffs however, on November 21, 1963, moved for reconsideration
of said judgment, asking that moral damages be increased to
P400,000 and that six per cent (6%) interest per annum on the
amount of the award be granted. And defendant opposed the same.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff is entitled to moral damages and when is it
awardable.
Ruling:
Yes, moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil
Code).
As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its
contracts with plaintiff's the latter suffered social humiliation,
wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs
were travelling with first class tickets issued-by defendant and yet they
were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected
to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome
them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be
humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International
carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the
Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but
the nation's treaty-ratifying body. It may also be mentioned that in his
aforesaid Office Senator Lopez was in a position to preside in
impeachment cases should the Senate sit as impeachment Tribunal.
And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez
was going to the United States to attend a private business conference
of the Binalbangan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid rank
and position were by no means left behind, and in fact he had a
second engagement awaiting him in the United States; a banquet
tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro
Tempore. For the moral damages sustained by him, therefore, an
award of P100,000,000 is appropriate.
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and
therefore his humiliation. In addition, she suffered physical discomfort
during the 13-hour trip (5 hours from Tokyo to Honolulu and 8 hours
from Honolulu to San Francisco). Accordingly, considering the totality
of her suffering and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of
P50,000.00 for moral damages will be reasonable.
Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were traveling as immediate
members of the family of Senator Lopez. They formed part of the
Senator's party as shown also by the reservation cards of PAN AM. As
such they likewise shared his prestige and humiliation for by that time
they had already been made to pay for first class seats and therefore
to expect first class accommodations. As stated, it is one thing to take
the tourist class by free choice; a far different thing to be compelled
to take it notwithstanding having paid for first class seats.
LAO vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner Dennis Lao was an employee of the New St. Joseph Lumber
& Hardware Supply, hereinafter called St. Joseph Lumber, owned by
the private respondent, Chan Tong. St. Joseph Lumber filed a
collection suit against a customer, the private respondent, Benjamin
Espiritu, for unpaid purchases of construction materials from St.
Joseph Lumber.
St. Joseph Lumber also filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
Espiritu, based on the same transaction. Since the petitioner was the
employee who transacted business with Espiritu, he was directed by
his employer Chan Tong to sign the affidavit or complaint prepared by
the firm's lawyer. Finding probable cause after conducting a
preliminary investigation of the charge, the investigating fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Espiritu. The case was dismissed
because the court believed that Espiritu's liability was only civil, not
criminal.
Espiritu filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against the
petitioner and St. Joseph Lumber. The Trial Court ordered Lao and St.
Joseph Lumber to pay damages jointly and severally to Espiritu.
Petitioner’s argument:
Petitioner alleged that he acted only as or employee of St. Joseph
Lumber when he executed the affidavit which his employer submitted
to the investigating fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation
of his employer's estafa charge against Espiritu.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Lao has a valid defense to the action for malicious
prosecution.
Ruling:
Yes.
To maintain an action for damages based on malicious prosecution,
three elements must be present: First, the fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and
that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; second, that
in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and third, the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
First: Lao was only a witness, not the prosecutor in the estafa case.
The prosecutor was his employer, Chan Tong or the St. Joseph
Lumber. Second: there was probable cause for the charge of estafa
against Espiritu, as found and certified by the investigating fiscal
himself. And third: Lao was not motivated by malice in making the
affidavit upon which the fiscal based the filing of the information
against Espiritu. He executed it as an employee, a salesman of the St.
Joseph Lumber from whom Espiritu made his purchases of
construction materials and who, therefore, had personal knowledge of
the transaction. Although the prosecution of Espiritu for estafa did not
prosper, the unsuccessful prosecution may not be labelled as
malicious.
GUTIERREZ vs VILLEGAS
Facts:
The plaintiff (Gutierrez) and defendants (Villegas and Rivera) are the
only legal heirs of the late Irene Santos. On, January 12 1955, plaintiff
signs a document entitled “Kasulatan ng Bilinan at Salinan” which is a
sale of her rights to the inheritance. At the same time, plaintiff signed
a manifestation purporting to inform, the probate court that she had
sold all her rights.
However, a few months later, the plaintiff then files an annulment of
a deed of sale against Rizalina Santos Rivera on the ground of fraud
and mistake. According to Adela Santos Gutierrez, she was made to
sign through fraud of Rivera. She contends that one day, she was
accompanied by the defendants to their lawyer. She was not able to
bring her reading glasses, and she could not recognize the paper that
she was made to sign. She states that she did not finish grade three,
and she is just a simpleton which led her to sign those documents.
Additionally, she invokes the ground of lesion to rescind the sale. The
defendants argue that the petitioner really did sell her right to the
inheritance to them.
Issue:
WON the plaintiff was made to sign by fraud
WON the plaintiff can rescind the sale by account of lesion
Ruling:
No. The alleged indicia of fraud upon which she rests her case are
backed only by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is
contradicted by that of defendants and their witnesses. Plaintiff's lack
of formal education was no handicap to her ability to read and write
the Tagalog dialect, in which Exhibit "A" was couched, and, as the
lower court stated, "she is a woman of average intelligence capable
of understanding the consequences of a signature affixed to a
document". Her alleged poor eye-sight has not been shown with
convincing evidence, but, on the contrary, during the trial, she readily
identified a letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, even without
eyeglasses.
While fraud may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence, it is
not to be lightly inferred. The evidence for appellant does not suffice
to overcome the presumption of good faith and regularity in human
affairs.
No. Granting, arguendo, that the assignment of her hereditary share
in favor of her sister, Rizalina, should be deemed a partition under
Article 1082 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (notwithstanding the
fact that it did not totally terminate the indivision among the co-heirs
of Irene Santos, since the undivided share of the widower Villegas
remained unchanged), still the lesion, if any, suffered by plaintiff from
her sale of P50,000.00 of an individed heredity interest worth
P54,000.00 is certainly less than the one-fourth (1/4) required by
Article 1098 of the Code.
RAMOS vs RAMOS
Facts:
When the spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died, they were
survived by their three legitimate children named Jose, Agustin and
Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his seven natural
children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria
and Federico. A special proceeding was then instituted for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the said spouses.
A project of partition was submitted and was eventually approved by
the court. It was agreed in the project of partition that Jose Ramos
would pay the cash adjudications to Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel,
while Agustin Ramos would pay the cash adjudications to Modesto,
Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was further agreed that Jose Ramos
and Agustin Ramos would pay their sister, Granada. The sum of
P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural child, was the amount
which was indicated in the project of partition and which was to be
satisfied in cash. According to the natural children however, they did
not know that intestate proceedings were instituted for the distribution
of the estate of their father. They never received any sum of money
in cash. They only discovered later on that the property administered
by their elder brother Jose had a Torrens Title in the name of his
widow, Gregoria, and daughter, Candida, when plaintiff Modesto's
children insisted and inquired from the Register of Deeds sometime in
1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not intervene in the intestate proceedings
for (the) settlement of the estate of their brother Jose as they did not
know of it.
Plaintiffs, who are the natural children, were thus constrained to bring
the present suit seeking for the reconveyance in their favor by
defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose Bayor
of their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in
accordance with article 840 of the old Civil Code and attorney's fees
in the sum of P10,000 plus costs and expenses of this litigation.
The CFI dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and held that the intestate
estate of Martin Ramos was settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was
terminated on March 4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res
judicata and bars any litigation regarding the same estate. Defendants
Granada Ramos, Gregoria T. Ramos, Candida Ramos, Jose Bayor and
Agustin Ramos appealed from the lower court's decision insofar as it
ignored their counterclaim for P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000
as attorney's fees. The defendants argue that plaintiffs' action was
baseless and was filed in gross and evident bad faith. It is alleged that
the action caused defendants mental anguish, wounded feelings,
moral shock and serious anxiety and compelled them to hire the
service of counsel and incur litigation expenses.
Issue:
Whether the defendants entitled to an award of moral damages.
Ruling:
Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code indicate
the cases where moral damages may be recovered. The instant
litigation does not fall within any of the enumerated cases. Nor can it
be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those
articles. Hence, defendants' claim for moral damages cannot be
sustained. The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that
was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages
contemplated in the law.
The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right
is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who
may exercise it erroneously.
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been awarded in this
case, defendants' claim for exemplary damages, which was ventilated
for the first time in their appellants' brief, may be as an afterthought,
cannot be granted (Art. 2229, Civil Code).
GALANG vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but
Rodrigo’s parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. They lived
as husband and wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo
left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts is
however conflicting. Galang tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were
engaged despite the opposition of the latter’s mother and that the
father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and defray the expenses of
the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Dagawan for
them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not
able to secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he
went back to his hometown to get such certificate but never returned.
On the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that he and
Galang were engaged but his parents were opposed to the marriage.
Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the Galang after his graduation but
the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take place
sooner. Because of continued relationships with Galang, Rodrigo’s
parents told him to leave the parental home. He later told this to
Galang. The Galang convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where
she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal
to marry the Galang, the latter’s relatives, accompanied by policemen
and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. He was allowed to go home
and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his
parents. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which
was provided by Dagawan for him to sign, when he did not appear
before a notary public.
Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit
to recover damages for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to
marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff,
which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise
to marry.
Ruling:
It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding
moral damages to her. She insists that moral damages for breach of
promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has
already been settled adversely to plaintiff’s pretense in Hemosisima
vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry
are not collectible.
MERCADO vs LIRA
Facts:
Gonzalo Mercado and others were the owners and operators of the
Laguna Transportation Company. On April 21, 1951, the left front tire
of its passenger bus No. 39 blew out and sent it swerving gradually
toward the left side of the road, over the shoulder and into a ravine
some 270 meters away. From the wreckage, the bodies of the
passengers, several dead, others injured, were recovered, and among
the fatalities was Ramon Lira, Jr. (24), son of Mr. and Mrs. Ramon
Lira, Sr. and injured Nita Lira. Two cases for recovery of damages
were commenced against the owners and operators in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas: No. 104 (now G.R. Nos. L-13326-29, in
this Court) by the parents of deceased Ramon Lira, Jr. and No. 107
(now G.R. No. L-13358, in this Court) by Nita Lira. After a joint-trial,
defendants, the court awarded damages to the petitioners in both
cases.
Defendants appealed in both cases and plaintiff Nita Lira appealed in
No. 107 (being cases CA-G.R. No. 15422 and CA-G.R. No. 15423-R).
As such, the CA reduced the amount of damages.
On December 19, 1957, and in pursuance of a motion for
reconsideration, the CA again modified the award of damages by
eliminating the P5,000.00 moral damages to plaintiff Nita Lira in case
CA-G.R. No. 15422-R, maintaining said judgment in all other respects.
In other words, in the case CA-G.R. No. 15422-R, involving the death
of Ramon Lira, Jr., the Court of Appeals granted moral damages, and
in the case of CA-G.R. No. 15422-R, involving physical injuries caused
upon Nita Lira, moral damages of P5,000.00 awarded her, were
eliminated.
Hence, a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals was filed by Gonzalo Mercado, et al., petitioners, against
Ramon Lira, et al., (G.R. No. L-13328-29), and another similar petition
was filed by Nita Lira, petitioner vs. Gonzalo Mercado, et al.,
respondents (G.R. No. L-13358).
CONTENTION OF MERCADO ET AL:
We respectfully submit, therefore, that, even if granting that the
respondents are entitled to moral damages, yet the same should not
be fixed in such an amount as to kill the entire business of the
respondents who are public service operators, by the enormous
amounts they have to pay on account of the negligence of one driver.
In this case, we respectfully submit that the amount of P500.00 is a
reasonable moral damage considering that the other damages already
awarded are excessive. In the same way that the attorney's fees
should also be reduced to only P1,500.00.
Issues:
Whether the award of moral damages in G.R No. L-13328-29
(involving the death of Ramon Lira Jr.) is proper.
Whether the elimination of moral damages in G.R No. L-13358
(involving physical injuries caused upon Nita Lira) is proper.
Ruling:
YES. The pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code state: —
Art. 1764 — Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2206 — The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: . . .
(3) The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
It is thus seen that Article 2206 of the new Civil Code, expressly
provides that the amount of damages for death shall be "at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances." In other words, the amount of damages to be
awarded for the death of a passenger may be more than P3,000.00.
It is argued that the award for moral damages for mental anguish
caused by the death of a passenger is not obligatory, and that the
amount should only be nominal if the heirs have already been
compensated substantially for the death of the deceased. Article 2206
states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00
to be awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages as a consequence of the death of their
deceased kin, which simply means that once the above-mentioned
heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral damages and are
able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty
of the court to award moral damages to the claimant in an amount
commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by them. In the Civil
Code, nominal damages are treated separately from moral damages.
Petitioners' claim that as the other damages awarded to said
respondents are already excessive, the award for moral damages
should be reduced to P500.00. But the Court of Appeals found
the other damages not to be excessive, and as far as this factual
finding is concerned, we are not authorized to rule otherwise.
Considering the mental anguish and sorrow that must accompany and
overwhelm the parents upon the tragic death of a son, and considering
the nature and extent of the services rendered by counsel for
respondents and other circumstances of the case, we believe the
awards given by the Court of Appeals to respondents in the sum of
P4,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Ramon Lira, Jr. and the
amount of P4,000.00 for attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation, fair and reasonable.
YES.
We gleaned, therefore, from previous decisions that (1) that the case
of a passenger of a carrier who suffered physical injuries "because of
the carrier's negligence (culpa contractual), cannot be considered in
the descriptive expression 'analogous cases', used in Art. 2219"; and
(2) that in cases of breach of contract (including one of transportation)
proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus) i.e., wanton or deliberate injurious
conduct is essential to justify an award of moral damages. There being
no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith, contemplated by law, on the
part of the respondents, because the cause of the accident was merely
the bursting of a tire while the bus was overspeeding, the cause of
petitioner Nita Lira should fail, as far as moral damages is concerned.
Moral damages was, therefore, correctly eliminated by the Court of
Appeals.
PERMEX vs NLRC
Facts:
Permex initially hired Emmanuel Filoteo as a mechanic. Eventually,
Filoteo was promoted to water treatment operator, a position he held
until his termination. As water treatment operator, Filoteo did not
have a fixed working schedule. His hours of work were dependent
upon the company's shifting production schedules.
One time, Filoteo logged in at the main gate and entered his time-in
at 8:45 p.m., and since he was scheduled to work until 7:00 a.m. the
next day, he wrote 7:00 a.m. in his scheduled time-out. This practice
of indicating the time out at the moment they time in was customarily
done by most workers for convenience and practicality, and the
company had tolerated the practice. On the evening the same day at
around 9:20 p.m., Filoteo went to see the Assistant Production
Manager to inquire if "butchering" of fish would be done that evening
so they could start operating the boiler. They were advised to wait
from 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. for confirmation. At or about 10:00 p.m.,
Filoteo and Pelayo went back to the Assistant Production Manager's
office. There they were informed that there would be no "butchering"
of tuna that night. Filoteo then sought permission to go home, which
was granted. Filoteo then hurriedly got his things and dashed off to
the exit gate to catch the service jeep provided by Permex. Filoteo
and his co-workers were granted permission to go home at 10:00 p.m.
Filoteo retimed his DTR the next day.
The next day, August 1, 1994, Filoteo reported for work as usual. He
then remembered that he had to make a re-entry in his daily time
record for the previous day. He proceeded to the Office of the
Personnel Manager to retime his DTR entry. Later, he received a
memorandum from the Assistant Personnel Officer asking him to
explain, in writing, the entry he made in his DTR. Filoteo complied.
But later, Filoteo was dismissed from employment for entering in his
DTR that he had worked from 8:45 p.m. of July 31, 1994 to 7:00 a.m.
of August 1, 1994, when in fact he had worked only up to 10:00 p.m.
LABOR ARBITER:
There was no illegal dismissal, finding that there was no merit.
NLRC:
Reversed the same; the two-fold requirements for a valid dismissal
were not satisfied by the petitioners. Moreover, it ordered Permex,Inc.
to pay Filoteo moral and exemplary damages in the sum of P10,000.00
and P5,000.00, respectively.
Issues:
WON NLRC erred when it awarded Filoteo damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the
employee was tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it constituted an
act oppressive to labor, and done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
In this case, we are persuaded that Filoteo, in his rush to catch the
service vehicle, merely forgot to correct his initial time-out entry.
Nothing is shown to prove he deliberately falsified his daily time record
to deceive the company. The NLRC found that even management's
own evidence reflected that a certain Felix Pelayo, a co-worker of
private respondent, was also allowed to go home that night and like
Filoteo, logged in advance 7:00 a.m. as his time-out. Moreover, as
early as Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Victory Employees and
Laborers' Association, we ruled that, where a violation of company
policy or breach of company rules and regulations was found to have
been tolerated by management, then the same could not serve as a
basis for termination.
These notwithstanding, none of the grounds which would warrant an
award for moral and exemplary damages exist in the present case.
GUTIERREZ vs VILLEGAS
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendants are the only legal heirs of the late Irene
Santos who died intestate. Villegas is the surviving spouse while
Gutierrez and Rivera are the nieces of the said decedent. A few says
after the death of Irene Santos, a petition for the administration of
her estate was filed. The probate court granted the petition and
thereafter Villegas was qualified as the administrator of the estate.
Gutierrez signed a 4-page document written in Tagalog entitled
“Kasulatan Ng Bilihan at Salinan”, purporting to be a sale of her share
and participation in the estate in favor of Rivera in consideration of
P50,000.00 payable in installments. This deed was notarized.
Gutierrez also signed a “Manifestation” purporting to inform the
probate court that the she had sold all her rights, interests, and
participation in the estate to Rivera.
Gutierrez filed the present case to annul the aforesaid deed of sale on
grounds of fraud and mistake. Gutierrez, testified that she asked
Villegas for a loan of P2,000.00 by way of advance payment on her
share in the estate of her deceased aunt, but Villegas answered her
that as his lawyer advised him that he had no authority to give such
an advance he would ask Rivera if she could lend him the money,
which, in turn, he would give to the plaintiff; that at about Christmas
time, Villegas counter-offered to give the plaintiff a loan of
P10,000.00, to be evidenced in writing, instead of the P2,000.00
originally asked, to which proposition Gutierrez agreed because she
was planning a business venture; that the defendants invited the
plaintiff to go with them to Manila; they went to the law office of Atty.
Flores; that while they were waiting for the lawyer, the plaintiff and
Rivera were given copies of a document which the former was not
able to read on account of her poor eye-sight and her failure to bring
her eyeglasses with her; that when she was asked to sign the
document on the space indicated to her, she simply obeyed; that she
was again asked to sign another document, a manifestation, which
attorney Flores translated to her in Tagalog this second document,
which turned out to be a manifestation for the court, and what she
signed the day before was a sale of her share in the inheritance.
The plaintiff claims, furthermore, that in signing the deed of sale, her
consent was vitiated by gross mistake because the defendants misled
and deceived her as to the actual and real value of the estate of Irene
Santos because the inventory failed to include certain properties, or
which, if at all listed, were either undervalued or stated to be conjugal
when, in fact, they are paraphernal properties.
The defendants answered denying the charges, and counterclaimed
for P200,000.00 moral and exemplary damages and P50,000.00
attorney's fees, because of the allegedly malicious charges and filing
of the suit. The trial court rejected the pretensions of both parties,
dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. Whereupon,
plaintiffs and defendants regularly appealed to this Court directly
Issue:
Whether defendants are entitled to the award of moral damages
Ruling:
Court first discussed how Gutierrez was not deceived by the
defendants. The plaintiff depicts herself as an unschooled simpleton
that attained only the third grade, while picturing the defendants as
intelligent and clever persons; that she has poor eye-sight, low degree
of intelligence, and that there was no impelling need for her to sell the
property. These circumstances, the plaintiff reasons out, coupled with
the inadequacy of consideration, are badges of fraud that contributed
to her being an easy victim of her opponents' deceit. However, the
alleged indicia of fraud upon which she rests her case are backed only
by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is contradicted by that
of defendants and their witnesses. Plaintiff's lack of formal education
was no handicap to her ability to read and write the Tagalog dialect,
in which Exhibit "A" was couched, and, as the lower court stated, "she
is a woman of average intelligence capable of understanding the
consequences of a signature affixed to a document".
The alleged existence of a relationship of trust and confidence which
was supposedly taken advantage of by the defendants is belied by the
plaintiff's own assertion that her defendant uncle-in-law and her
deceased aunt had treated her as the underdog since childhood, and
her sister, Rizalina, as the favorite; With the unfavorable treatment
that the plaintiff claims to have received at the hands of the
defendants Villegas since childhood, it cannot be expected that the
plaintiff would be unwary of whatever he would ask her to do, let
alone her signing a four-page document. Hence, there was no vitiated
consent.
Turning now to the defendant's appeal, Court was disposed
not to vary the lower court's refusal to award them damages
and attorney's fees. Such awards are primarily in the discretion of
the trial court, and it has found no facts upon which such award can
be made. As to moral damages, the record shows no proof of mental
suffering on the part of defendants upon which the award can be
based. In addition, the absence of actual damages, moral, temperate,
or compensatory, blocks the grant of exemplary damages (Civil Code,
Article 2234).
YASONA vs DE RAMOS
Facts:
In November 1971, Aurea Yasoña and her son, Saturnino, went to the
house of Jovencio de Ramos to ask for financial assistance in paying
their loans to Philippine National Bank (PNB), otherwise their
residential house and lot, would be foreclosed. Jovencio acceded to
his aunt's request. They agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of
the loan to PNB, half of Yasoñas’ subject property would be sold to
him.
Jovencio paid Aurea’s bank loan and Aurea executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Jovencio over half of the lot consisting of 123
square meters. Thereafter, the lot was surveyed and separate titles
were issued by the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in the
names of Aurea and Jovencio.
Twenty-two years later, in August 1993, Aurea filed an estafa
complaint against brothers Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the
ground that she was deceived by them when she asked for their
assistance in 1971 concerning her mortgaged property. Aurea alleged
that Rodencio asked her to sign a blank paper on the pretext that it
would be used in the redemption of the mortgaged property. Aurea
signed the blank paper without further inquiry because she trusted
her nephew, Rodencio. Thereafter, they heard nothing from Rodencio
and this prompted Nimpha Yasoña Bondoc to confront Rodencio but
she was told that the title was still with the Register of Deeds.
However, when Nimpha inquired from the Register of Deeds, she was
shocked to find out that the lot had been divided into two, pursuant
to a deed of sale apparently executed by Aurea in favor of Jovencio.
Aurea averred that she never sold any portion of her property to
Jovencio and never executed a deed of sale. Aurea was thus forced to
seek the advice of Judge Enrique Almario, another relative, who
suggested filing a complaint for estafa.
On February 21, 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B.
Zayenis dismissed the criminal complaint for estafa for lack of
evidence. On account of this dismissal, Jovencio and Rodencio filed a
complaint for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution with
the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 91. They alleged
that the filing of the estafa complaint against them was done with
malice and it caused irreparable injury to their reputation, as Aurea
knew fully well that she had already sold half of the property to
Jovencio.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Jovencio and Rodencio.
Petitioner Violeta Yasoña, personally and on behalf of her brothers
and sisters and mother Aurea, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same on June 14,
2002 on the ground that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy.
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
December 12, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the filing of the criminal complaint for estafa by petitioners
against respondents constituted malicious prosecution
Ruling:
In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined
as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein."
To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act
of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
In this case, there is reason to believe that a malicious intent was
behind the filing of the complaint for estafa against respondents. The
records show that the sale of the property was evidenced by a deed
of sale duly notarized and registered with the local Register of Deeds.
After the execution of the deed of sale, the property was surveyed
and divided into two portions. Separate titles were then issued in the
names of Aurea Yasoña and Jovencio de Ramos. Since 1973, Jovencio
had been paying the realty taxes of the portion registered in his name.
In 1974, Aurea even requested Jovencio to use his portion as bond
for the temporary release of her son who was charged with malicious
mischief. Also, when Aurea borrowed money from the Rural Bank of
Lumban in 1973 and the PNB in 1979, only her portion covered by
TCT No. 73252 was mortgaged.
All these pieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long
acknowledged Jovencio’s ownership of half of the property.
Furthermore, it was only in 1993 when petitioners decided to file the
estafa complaint against respondents. If petitioners honestly believed
that they still owned the entire property, it would not have taken them
22 years to question Jovencio’s ownership of half of the property. The
only conclusion that can be drawn from the circumstances is that
Aurea knew all along that she was no longer the owner of Jovencio’s
portion after having sold it to him way back in 1971.
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the
elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These two
elements are present in the present controversy. Petitioners were
completely aware that Jovencio was the rightful owner of the lot,
clearly signifying that they were impelled by malice and avarice in
bringing the unfounded action. That there was no probable cause at
all for the filing of the estafa case against respondents led to the
dismissal of the charges filed by petitioners.
Petitioners’ reliance on Drilon vs. Court of Appeals is misplaced. It
must be noted that in Drilon, the investigating panel found that there
was probable cause to hold private respondent Homobono Adaza for
trial for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder.
Thus, petitioner, Franklin Drilon could not be held liable for malicious
prosecution as there existed probable cause for the criminal case.
Here, the complaint for estafa was dismissed outright as the
prosecutor did not find any probable cause against respondents. A suit
for malicious prosecution will prosper where legal prosecution is
carried out without probable cause.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORP vs CALDERON
Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business
activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or
Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition thereto, he is a
stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among
others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a
year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the defendant-
appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for
brevity), is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the
Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.
Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card
which can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and
outside the Philippines. In its dollar transactions, respondent is
required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of
$3,000.00, the balance shall serve as credit limit. In one of his trips to
Hongkong, together with a friend, he went to a Gucci Department
store where he tried to purchase several Gucci items which amounted
to $523.00 using his Visa card The saleslady informed him in front of
his friend and other shoppers that the transaction failed because of
his Visa card was blacklisted and so he felt deep embarrassment.
Upon his return to the Philippines, Calderon filed a complaint for
damages claiming he suffered much torment and embarrassment on
account of EBC’s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his Visa card
while at the Gucci store in Hongkong.
Trial Court:
Ruled favor of Calderon.
CA:
Affirmed the ruling of the lower court but reducing the moral damages
awarded by the latter and justified that EBC was negligent in not
informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even
before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioner’s right to
automatically suspend a cardholder’s privileges without notice should
not have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because
the latter has already paid his past obligations and has an existing
dollar deposit in an amount more than the required minimum for credit
card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in holding that the respondent is entitled to moral
damages notwithstanding its finding that petitoner’s actions have not
been attended with any malice or bad faith?
Ruling:
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. However, to be
entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently
or in bad faith or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad
faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive
or abusive[
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended
petitioners dishonor of respondents credit card. For, as found no less
by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the
provisions of its Credit Card Agreemen with respondent, paragraph 3
of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit
limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred
through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit
limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges shall
be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in
accordance with Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding
of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of the petitioner, the CA
nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA
justified the award on its assessment that EBC was negligent in not
informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even
before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioners right to
automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice should
not have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because
the latter has already paid his past obligations and has an existing
dollar deposit in an amount more than the required minimum for credit
card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong.
Calderon’s card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended
because of his past due and demandable obligations. He made a
deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to
request the petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card
privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under
suspension. On account of this, and with the express provision on
automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3 of the parties’
Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding petitioner
negligent for not notifying respondent of the suspended status of his
credit card privileges. And, certainly, respondent could not have
justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by
reason alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he
left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to
decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card
previously suspended on considerations which the petitioner deemed
proper, not the least of which are the cardholder’s payment record,
capacity to pay and compliance with any additional requirements
imposed by it.
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have
been properly adjudged liable for moral damages. Unquestionably,
respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card.
There is, however, a material distinction between damages and injury.
To quote from the decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury. In the situation in which
respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
On a final note, “moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.”
SAVELLANO ET AL vs NORTHWEST AIRLINES
Facts:
The Savellanos were traveling with their son. They booked a flight
from San Francisco, USA back to Manila with Respondent Northwest
Airlines. During the flight, one of the engines caught fire and they
were forced to make an emergency landing in Seattle. They stayed
overnight in a hotel at Respondent’s expense. The next day, they went
to Seattle International Airport. When petitioners reached the Seattle
Airport, respondent's ground stewardess belatedly advised them that
instead of flying to Manila they would have to board NW Flight 94, a
DC-10 plane, bound for a 3-hour flight to Los Angeles for a connecting
flight to Manila. When Petitioner Savellano insisted theirs was a direct
flight to Manila, the female ground stewardess just told them to hurry
up as they were the last passengers to board.
When they finally landed in NAIA, they also noticed that the would-
have-been handcarried items which were not allowed to be placed
inside the passengers' baggage compartment had been ransacked and
the contents thereof stolen. Virginia was later to claim having lost her
diamond earrings costing P300,000.00, two (2) Perry Gan shoes worth
US$250.00, four (4) watches costing US$40.00 each, two (2) pieces
of Tag Heuer watch and three (3) boxes of Elizabeth Arden
[perfumes]. Deogracias, on the other hand, claimed to have lost two
(2) pairs of Cole Haan shoes which he bought for his wife, and the
clothes, camera, personal computer, and jeans he bought for his
children.
They filed an action for damages against Northwest Airlines.
RTC found bad faith on the part of respondent and ruled in favor of
petitioners.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC finding no bad faith.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Is respondent liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages —
including attorney's fees — as a consequence?
Ruling:
Partly meritorious. A contract is the law between the parties. The basis
of the Complaint was the way respondent allegedly treated petitioners
like puppets that could be shuttled to Manila via Los Angeles and Seoul
without their consent.
After an examination of the conditions printed on the airline ticket, we
find nothing there authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally, after
the distressed flight landed in Seattle, what other stopping places
petitioners should take and when they should fly. True, Condition 9
on the ticket allowed respondent to substitute alternate carriers or
aircraft without notice. However, nothing there permits shuttling
passengers — without so much as a by your-leave — to stopping
places that they have not been previously notified of, much less
agreed to or been prepared for. Substituting aircrafts or carriers
without notice is entirely different from changing stopping places or
connecting cities without notice.
The ambiguities in the contract, being one of adhesion, should be
construed against the party that caused its preparation — in this case,
respondent. Since the conditions enumerated on the ticket do not
specifically allow it to change stopping places or to fly the passengers
to alternate connecting cities without consulting them, then it must be
construed to mean that such unilateral change was not permitted.
Furthermore, the change in petitioners' flight itinerary does not fall
under the situation covered by the phrase "may alter or omit stopping
places shown on the ticket in case of necessity." A case of necessity
must first be proven. The burden of proving it necessarily fell on
respondent. This responsibility it failed to discharge.
Northwest failed to show a "case of necessity" for changing the
stopping place from Tokyo to Los Angeles and Seoul. It is a fact that
some of the passengers on the distressed flight continued on to the
Tokyo (Narita) connecting place. No explanation whatsoever was
given to petitioners as to why they were not similarly allowed to do
so.
In the absence of evidence as to the actual situation, the Court is hard
pressed to determine if there was a "case of necessity" sanctioning
the alteration of the Tokyo stopping place in the case of petitioners.
Thus, we hold that in the absence of a demonstrated necessity thereof
and their rerouting to Los Angeles and Seoul as stopping places
without their consent, respondent committed a breach of the contract
of carriage.
As for damages, The records show that respondent was impelled by
sincere motives to get petitioners to their final destination by whatever
was the most expeditious course — in its judgment, if not in theirs.
Though they claim that they were not accommodated on Flight 27
from Seattle to Tokyo because respondent had taken on Japanese
passengers, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to back
this allegation. In the absence of convincing evidence, we cannot find
respondent guilty of bad faith.
As for the claim of lost luggage, this cannot prosper because they
failed to give timely notice of the loss to respondent. After allegedly
finding that their luggage had been ransacked, petitioners never
lodged a complaint with any Northwest airport personnel. Neither did
they mention the alleged loss of their valuables in their November 22,
1991 demand letter.
However, petitioners were awarded Nominal Damages taking into
consideration that petitioners suffered the inconvenience of having to
wake up early after a bad night and having to miss breakfast; as well
as the fact that they were business class passengers. They paid more
for better service; thus, rushing them and making them miss their
small comforts was not a trivial thing. We also consider their social
and official status.
Hence, it will be proper to grant one hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000) as nominal damages to each of them, in order to vindicate
and recognize their right to be notified and consulted before their
contracted stopping place was changed.
CHINA AIRLINES vs CHIOK
Facts:
Petitioner China Airlines (CAL) issued tickets to respondent for his
Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila tour. Said ticket was exclusively
endorseable to Philippine Airlines, Ltd. (PAL). In Taipei, petitioner CAL
confirmed respondent's Hongkong to Manila trip on board PAL Flight
No. PR 311. In Hongkong, the PAL office likewise confirmed
respondent's return trip to Manila on board Flight No. PR 311. On
November 24, 1981, the day of the departure, PAL was unable to
transport respondent on Flight PR 311 due to typhoon. However, PAL
informed that all the confirmed passengers of PR311 were
automatically booked to the next available flight, PR 307, on the
following day. However, on November 25, respondent was harangued
and prevented from boarding PR 307 because his name did not appear
from the computerized passenger list despite his confirmed flight
tickets. Thus, PAL's refusal to accommodate the respondent in Flight
No. 307 resulted in the loss of the business option which respondent
has to execute on that day. Consequently, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner CAL and PAL before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The RTC, after due trial, ruled in
favor of the respondent and found petitioner and PAL jointly and
severally liable to respondent for the payment of actual, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC but with modification deleting the award of actual
damages.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for moral damages
Ruling:
YES. The business of common carriers is imbued with public interest
and duty; therefore, the law governing them imposes an exacting
standard. In Singson v. Court of Appeals, the Court held: ". . . [T]he
carrier's utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and
wanton disregard of the rights of the latter, [are] acts evidently
indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As
the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the
defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with malice or
in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition
to actual damages, is proper."
The acts of PAL's employees particularly Chan, clearly fell short of the
extraordinary standard of care that the law requires of common
carriers. As narrated in Chan's oral deposition, the manner in which
the airline discharged its responsibility to respondent and its other
passengers manifested a lack of the requisite diligence and due regard
for their welfare. . . .. We stress that respondent had repeatedly
secured confirmations of his PR 311 flight on November 24, 1981 —
initially from CAL and subsequently from the PAL office in Hong Kong.
The status of this flight was marked "OK" on a validating sticker placed
on his ticket. That sticker also contained the entry "RMN6V."
Ms. Chan explicitly acknowledged that such entry was a computer
reference that meant that respondent's name had been entered in
PAL's computer. Since the status of respondent on Flight PR 311 was
"OK," as a matter of right testified to by PAL's witness, he should have
been automatically transferred to and allowed to board Flight 307 the
following day. Clearly resulting from negligence on the part of PAL was
its claim that his name was not included in its list of passengers for
the November 24, 1981 PR 311 flight and, consequently, in the list of
the replacement flight PR 307. Since he had secured confirmation of
his flight — not only once, but twice — by personally going to the
carrier's offices where he was consistently assured of a seat thereon
— PAL's negligence was so gross and reckless that it amounted to bad
faith. In view of the foregoing, we rule that moral and exemplary
damages were properly awarded by the lower courts.
LATEST RULE ON CORPORATION
MAMBULAO LUMBER vs PNB
FACTS:
Plaintiff applied for a P155,000 industrial loan with PNB, to which only
P100,000 was approved. To secure the payment of the loan, the
plaintiff mortgaged to PNB a parcel of land, together with the buildings
and improvements existing thereon, situated in Camarines Norte, as
well as various sawmill equipment, rolling unit and other fixed assets
of the plaintiff, all situated in its compound in the aforementioned
municipality. When plaintiff failed to pay the amortization on the
amounts received to and received by it, PNB made repeated demands
to pay its obligation but such demands went unheeded. Upon
inspection and verification made by employees of the PNB, it was
found that the plaintiff had already stopped operation.
PNB then sent a letter to Anacleto Heraldo, the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff, requesting him to take possession of the parcel of land,
together with the improvements existing thereon, and to sell it at
public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid obligation of the
plaintiff. Anacleto Heraldo then took possession of the chattels
mortgaged by the plaintiff and made an inventory thereof. Upon
plaintiff’s request, the foreclosure sale of mortgaged chattels was
extended. However, the foreclosure sale of the parcel of land was held
and sold to PNB.
The trial court rendered the decision appealed from which sentenced
the Mambulao Lumber Company to pay to the defendant PNB the sum
of P3,582.52 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum.
Plaintiff appealed.
Issue:
Is the appellant entitled to an award of moral damages?
Ruling:
No.
Herein appellant's claim for moral damages, however, seems to have
no legal or factual basis. Obviously, an artificial person like herein
appellant corporation cannot experience physical sufferings, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or
social humiliation which are basis of moral damages. A corporation
may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a
ground for the award of moral damages. The same cannot be
considered under the facts of this case, however, not only because it
is admitted that herein appellant had already ceased in its business
operation at the time of the foreclosure sale of the chattels, but also
for the reason that whatever adverse effects of the foreclosure sale of
the chattels could have upon its reputation or business standing would
undoubtedly be the same whether the sale was conducted at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, or in Manila which is the place agreed
upon by the parties in the mortgage contract.
But for the wrongful acts of herein appellee bank and the deputy
sheriff of Camarines Norte in proceeding with the sale in utter
disregard of the agreement to have the chattels sold in Manila as
provided for in the mortgage contract, to which their attentions were
timely called by herein appellant, and in disposing of the chattels in
gross for the miserable amount of P4,200.00, herein appellant should
be awarded exemplary damages in the sum of P10,000.00. The
circumstances of the case also warrant the award of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees for herein appellant.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs CA
Facts:
ABS-CBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby the
latter gave the former an exclusive right to exhibit 24 VIVA Films for
TV telecast. Later, VIVA, through respondent Vincent del Rosario,
offered ABS-CBN a list of 3 film packages (36 titles) from which the
latter may exercise its right of first refusal under their agreement. ABS-
CBN ticked off 10 titles therefrom. Thereafter, Del Rosario offered
ABS-CBN airing rights over a package of 104 movies for P60 million.
Del Rosario, and Eugenio Lopez of ABS-CBN, met at a restaurant to
discuss the package proposal. According to Lopez, however, what
they agreed upon was ABS-CBN's exclusive film rights to 14 films for
P36 million. Del Rosario denied the same. He insisted that the
discussion was on VIVA's offer of 104 films for P60 million, to which
ABS-CBN later made a counter proposal but rejected by VIVA's Board
of Directors. Hence, VIVA later granted RBS the exclusive right to air
the 104 VIVA films, including the 14 films supposedly granted to ABS-
CBN.
ABS-CBN then filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer
for injunction. The RTC granted the prayer and required ABS-CBN
post a P35 million bond, But while ABS-CBN was moving for reduction
of the bond, RBS offered to put up a counterbond and was allowed to
post P30 million. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and
VIVA, ordering ABS-CBN to pay RBS the amount it paid for the print
advertisement and premium on the counterbond, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fee. According to the RTC, there
was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. The
alleged agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to
the approval of the VIVA Board of Directors, and said agreement was
disapproved during the meeting of the Board on 7 April 1992.ABS-CBN
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Viva and Del Rosario also appealed
seeking moral and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and sustained the
monetary awards, VIVA's and Del Rosario's appeals were denied. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the contract between ABS-
CBN and VIVA had not been perfected, absent the approval by the
VIVA Board of Directors of whatever Del Rosario, it's agent, might
have agreed with Lopez III.
The appellate court did not even believe ABS-CBN's evidence that
Lopez III actually wrote down such an agreement on a "napkin," as
the same was never produced in court. As to the award of moral
damages, the Court of Appeals found reasonable basis therefor,
holding that RBS's reputation was debased by the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309 and by the non-showing of the
film "Maging Sino Ka Man."
On the other hand, respondent Court of Appeals denied VIVA and Del
Rosario's appeal because it was RBS and not VIVA which was actually
prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN.
Issue:
Whether RBS is entitled to moral damages
Ruling:
No.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Trial courts must then guard against the award of exorbitant
damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured
objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or
corruption on the part of the trial court.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses.
It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish
which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The
statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB
that a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good
reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter
dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside,
since RBS is a corporation.
NAPOCOR vs PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC
Facts:
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for
the supply and delivery of 120, 000 metric tons of imported coal for
its Batangas- Coal Fired Thermal Power Plant. The Philipp Brothers
Oceanic, Inc.’s (PHIBRO) bid was accepted. However, it wasn’t able
to meet the Bidding Terms and Specifications in which it shall arrange
and provide gearless bulk carrier for the shipment of coal to arrive at
discharging port on or before 30 calendar days after receipt of the
Letter of Credit because of industrial disputes in Australia, the point of
origin, which hamper to supply the needed coal.
NAPOCOR then once more advertised for the delivery of coal. PHIBRO
participated anew in this subsequent bidding but NAPOCOR
disapproved its application. PHIBRO found out that the real reason for
the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR’s
demand for damages due to the delay in the delivery of its coal
shipment.
PHIBRO’s contention:
NAPOCOR’s act of disqualifying it in the bidding was tainted with
malice and bad faith thus asked for moral, exemplary and actual
damages.
NAPOCOR’s contention:
Averred that the strikes in Australia cannot be invoked as reason for
the delay in the delivery of coal. And even assuming that the strikes
were still ongoing, it should have shouldered the burden of a “strike-
free clause”.
RTC:
Rendered a decision in favor of PHIBRO.
CA:
Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether NAPOCOR acted in bad faith and is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
NO. Even it was established that what prevented PHIBRO from
performing its previous obligation was due to force majeure, it does
not necessarily that NAPOCOR acted unjustly in disapproving its
application. First, it must be stressed that NAPOCOR was not bound
under any contract to approve PHIBRO’s pre-qualification
requirements.
Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case,
the propriety of NAPOCOR's act should therefore be judged on the
basis of the general principles regulating human relations, the
forefront provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which
provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
We went over the record of the case with painstaking solicitude and
we are convinced that NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent to injure
or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR
acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a "seriously-impaired"
track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.
In determining the existence of good faith, the yardstick is the frame
of mind of the actor at the time he committed the act, disregarding
actualities or facts outside his knowledge. We cannot fault NAPOCOR
if it mistook PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere attempt on the latter's
part to undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's inconsistency. The
circumstances warrant such contemplation.
The circumstances under which NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's pre-
qualification to bid do not show an intention to cause damage to the
latter. The measure it adopted was one of self-protection.
Consequently, we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action
it took. NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To reiterate,
NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moral damages are not,
as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that
besmirched reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause
mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural person,
for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual has,
and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer
mental anguish.
FILIPINO BROADCASTING NETWORK vs AGO MEDICAL AND
EDUCATIONAL CENTER
Facts:
‘Expose’ is a radio documentary program hosted by RIMA and
ALEGRE. It aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK (FBNI).
RIMA and ALEGRE exposed various alleged complaints from students,
teachers and parents against AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL
CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (AMEC) and its
adminstrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC
and AGO, as Dean of AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for
damages against FBNI, RIMA and ALEGRE.
Allegations in the Complaint:
AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposes,
FBNI, Rima and Alegre “transmitted malicious imputations, and as
such, destroyed AMEC and AGO’s reputation”. AMEC and AGO
included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
RIMA and ALEGRE.
Defendants’ Answer:
Claimed that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI,
RIMA and ALEGRE claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense
of public duty to report the “going-on in AMEC, which is an institution
imbued with public interest”.
FBNI’s Separate Answer:
It claimed that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of RIMA and ALEGRE. FBNI claimed that before hiring a
broadcaster, the broadcaster should:
File an application;
Be interviewed; and
Undergo an apprenticeship and training program after passing the
interview
It claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to “observe truth,
fairness and objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using
libelous and indecent language”. Moreover, FBNI requires all
broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas
(KBP) accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit.
Trial Court’s Decision:
In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to
exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Court of Appeals’ Decision:
It held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees for allowing RIMA and ALEGRE to make
the radio broadcasts without the proper KBP accreditation.
Issue:
Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with RIMA and ALEGRE for payment
of moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit
Ruling:
YES. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which
they commit. Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid
or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit.
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of RIMA and ALEGRE, FBNI is
solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous
broadcasts. As stated by the Court of Appeals, “recovery for
defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had
from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station
or a person who procures or participates in, the making of the
defamatory statements”.
As employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory
statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her
employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation. In this case, RIMA and ALEGREE were clearly performing
their official duties as hosts of FBNI’s radio program Expose when they
aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that RIMA and
ALEGRE went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was
likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the
defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly RIMA and ALEGRE. FBNI merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the SELECTION of its broadcasters without introducing
any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the
SUPERVISION of RIMA and ALEGRE.
FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its
broadcasters. FBNI’s alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to
“observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using
libelous and indecent language” is not enough to prove due diligence
in the supervision of its broadcasters.
REPUBLIC vs TUVERA
Facts:
The instant action originated from a civil complaint for restitution and
damages filed by the Republic against Marcos and his longtime aide
Juan Tuvera, as well as Tuvera's son Victor and a corporation the
younger Tuvera had controlled, Twin Peaks Development Corporation.
Juan Tuvera, was then the Presidential Executive Assistant of
President Marcos.
Upon motion by respondents, the Sandiganbayan granted them a
separate pre-trial/trial from President Marcos, who was then already
in exile. After the Republic had presented its evidence, the Tuveras
successfully moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence.
Twin Peaks Development Corporation (Twin Peaks) was organized on
5 March 1984 as a corporation with a principal purpose of engaging in
the real estate business. President Marcos granted the award of a
Timber License Agreement (TLA), more specifically TLA No. 356, in
favor of Twin Peaks to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land with
an annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters of timber and to export
10,000 cubic meters of mahogany of the narra species. As a result,
Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging operations.
On Feb. 25,1986, when President Marcos was ousted, President
Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency. Among her first acts as
President was to establish the PCGG, tasked with tracking down the
ill-gotten wealth procured by Marcos, his family, and associates during
his 20-year rule. On June 13, 1988, PCGG issued a Writ of
Sequestration on all assets, properties, records, documents, and
shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the ground that all the assets of the
corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired directly or
indirectly through fraudulent and illegal means.
On Dec. 9, 1988, PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, filed the complaint
which is now the subject of this petition. Through the Complaint, the
Republic sought to recover funds allegedly acquired by said parties in
flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary obligations with grave abuse of
right and power in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. This was allegedly accomplished on his
part by securing TLA No. 356 on behalf of Twin Peaks despite existing
laws expressly prohibiting the exportation of mahogany of the narra
species and Twin Peaks' lack of qualification to be a grantee thereof
for lack of sufficient logging equipment to engage in the logging
business. The Articles of Incorporation of Twin Peaks does not even
stipulate that logging was either a principal or secondary purpose of
the corporation. It was alleged that, as Presidential Executive Assistant
of President Marcos, took advantage of his relationship to influence
upon and connection with the President by engaging in a scheme to
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of the Republic and of the
Filipino people
The complaint prayed for moral, temperate and exemplary
damages, litigation expenses, and treble judicial costs. It cited
as grounds for relief, gross abuse of official position and authority,
breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right
and power, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Constitution.
Respondents Victor Tuvera and Twin Peaks claimed that Twin Peaks
was awarded TLA No. 356 only after its articles of incorporation had
been amended enabling it to engage in logging operations, that the
Republic's reference to Chinese operations and revenue of
approximately P45 million were merely imagined,16 and that the
PCGG has no statutory authority to institute the action
Sandiganbayan held that the validity of TLA No. 356 was already
fully adjudicated in a Resolution/Order issued by the Office of the
President on 14 August 1987, which had become final and executory
with the failure of the aggrieved party to seek a review thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic is entitled to temperate or moderate
damages.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held, there is sufficient basis for an award of
temperate damages, sought by the Republic notwithstanding the fact
that a claim for both actual and temperate damages is internally
inconsistent. Temperate or moderate damages avail when "the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."
The textual language might betray an intent that temperate damages
do not avail when the case, by its nature, is susceptible to proof of
pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have proved
pecuniary loss herein. Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear
that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances where
pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty.
In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, a civil action for
damages involving a vehicular collision, temperate damages were
awarded for the resulting damage sustained by a cargo truck, after
the plaintiff had failed to submit competent proof of actual damages.
We cannot discount the heavy influence of common law, and its
reliance on judicial precedents, in our law on tort and damages.
Notwithstanding the language of Article 2224, a line of jurisprudence
has emerged authorizing the award of temperate damages even in
cases where the amount of pecuniary loss could have been proven
with certainty, if no such adequate proof was presented.
The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages
were not adequately proven is ultimately a rule drawn from
equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely
injured who are unable to prove how definite the injury.
There is no impediment to apply this doctrine to the case at bar, which
involves one of the most daunting and noble undertakings of our
young democracy–the recovery of ill-gotten wealth salted away during
the Marcos years. If the doctrine can be justified to answer for the
unlawful damage to a cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it
cannot answer for the unlawful exploitation of our forests, to the injury
of the Filipino people. The amount of P1,000,000.00 as temperate
damages is proper.
FLT PRIME INSURANCE vs CHEVRON
Facts:
Chevron sued First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance (FLT) for the payment
of unpaid oil and petroleum purchases made by its distributor
Fumitechniks Corp. Fumitechniks had applied for and was issued
Surety Bond by FLT for the amount of P15.7M for the grant of a credit
line with Chevron. Fumitechniks defaulted on its obligation when the
check was dishonored for reason of “Account Closed.”
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
FLT asked for the written agreement secured by the bond but
Fumitechniks cannot submit since no such agreement was executed
between Fumitechniks and Chevron. Chevron notified FLT of
Fumitechniks’ unpaid purchases. FLT explained that being an
accessory contract, the bond cannot exist without a principal
agreement as it is essential that the copy of the basic contract be
submitted to the proposed surety for the appreciation of the extent of
the obligation to be covered by the bond applied for.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Chevron formally demanded payment but FLT reiterated its position
that without the basic contract subject of the bond, it cannot act on
Chevron’s claim. Chevron argued that because FLT still issued the
bond and accepted premium payment even without the written
agreement being attached, this shows that the agreement was for
evidentiary purposes only. Chevron prayed for judgment ordering FLT
to pay the sum of P15M, plus interest, costs and atty’s fees.
RTC
It dismissed the complaint and FLT’s counterclaim. It found that the
terms and conditions of the oral credit line agreement between
Chevron and Fumitechniks have not been relayed to FLT. Since the
surety bond is a mere accessory contract, the bond cannot stand in
the absence of the written agreement secured thereby. The RTC noted
the practice of FLT to attach a copy of the written agreement (principal
contract) whenever it issues a surety bond, or to be submitted later if
not yet in the possession of the assured, and in case of failure to
submit the said written agreement, the surety contract will not be
binding despite payment of the premium.
CA
It ruled in favor of Chevron, ordering FLT to pay Chevron. FLT is
estopped from assailing the oral credit line agreement, having
consented to the same upon presentation by Fumitechniks of the
surety bond it issued.
Issue:
Whether a surety is liable to the creditor in the absence of a written
contract with the principal.
Whether the award of moral damages to a corporation is proper.
(related to torts)
Ruling:
No. A surety contract is merely a collateral one, its basis is the principal
contract or undertaking which it secures. Necessarily, the stipulations
in such principal agreement must at least be communicated or made
known to the surety particularly in this case where the bond expressly
guarantees the payment of Chevron’s fuel products withdrawn by
Fumitechniks in accordance with the terms and conditions of their
agreement.
A reading of Surety Bond shows that it secures the payment of
purchases on credit by Fumitechniks in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the “agreement” it entered into with Chevron. However,
it turned out that Chevron has executed written agreements only with
its direct customers but not distributors like Fumitechniks and it also
never relayed the terms and conditions of its distributorship
agreement to FLT after the delivery of the bond.
No. The filing alone of a civil action should not be a ground for an
award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded
civil action is not among the grounds for moral damages. Besides, a
juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock. Although in some recent cases we have held that the
Court may allow the grant of moral damages to corporations, it is not
automatically granted; there must still be proof of the existence of the
factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the defendant’s
acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer. There is no evidence presented to
establish the factual basis of petitioners claim for moral damages.
Petitioner is likewise not entitled to atty’s fees. The settled rule is that
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not every
winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of atty’s fees. In
pursuing its claim on the surety bond, respondent was acting on the
belief that it can collect on the obligation of Fumitechniks
notwithstanding the non-submission of the written principal contract.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
GO vs IAC
Facts:
Floverto Jazmin, a visitor residing at Maravilla St. Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, is an American citizen and a retiree of the United States
Federal Government. Being a pensionado of the US Government, he
received annuity checks through Mangatarem Post Office and used to
encash it at the Prudential Bank Branch at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
However, there was a time that he was not able to receive the checks
on time, thus prompted him to write a complaint due to the delay.
Thereafter he received a substitute check and encashed it at the
Prudential Bank. Meanwhile, Agustin Go in his capacity as the
manager of the Solidbank (now Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation), allowed a person, in the name of Floverto
Jasmin, to open a savings account thereby depositing two US Treasury
Checks. Deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank (First
National City Bank). Having no reply from the drawee bank, the
Solidbank allowed the depositor to withdraw the amount indicated in
the checks.
A year later, the two-dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with
the notation that there was an alteration. With that, Jazmin received
radio messages requiring him to appear before the Philippine
Constabulary regarding the complaint filed by Go against him for
estafa. It was then found out that the depositor who withdrew the
amount from Solidbank was an impostor. Thus, Jazmin filed a case
against Go at the CFI Pangasinan for moral and exemplary damages.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants appealed to
the IAC. Like the lower court, IAC ruled in favor of the plaintiff but
awarded nominal damages instead of moral and exemplary damages.
Thus, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Go and the Solidbank are liable for nominal damages.
Ruling:
Yes, Go and the Solidbank are solidarily liable for nominal damages.
Petitioner Go's negligence in fact led to the swindling of his employer.
Had Go exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank officer and
employee, he would have noticed the glaring disparity between the
payee's name and address on the treasury checks involved and the
name and address of the depositor appearing in the bank's records.
While at that stage of events private respondent was still out of the
picture, it definitely was the start of his consequent involvement as
his name was illegally used in the illicit transaction. Again, knowing
that its viability depended on the confidence reposed upon it by the
public, the bank through its employees should have exercised the
caution expected of it.
Under the law, quasi-delict cases are one of the sources of obligation.
In this case, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Go has the obligation to pay nominal damages because of the Jazmin’s
right being violated and invaded in the case of estafa instituted at the
Philippine Constabulary. Nominal damages are awarded instead of
moral and exemplary damages.
MEDINA vs CRESENCIA
Facts:
On May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque,
smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga Street, resulting in the
death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. A criminal case for
homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Avorque to
which he pleaded guilty.
The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right to file a
separate action for damages and brought suit against the driver
Avorque and appellant Cresencia, the registered owner and operator
of the jeepney in question.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
Cresencia disclaiming liability on the ground that he had already sold
the jeepney in question to one Maria A. Cudiamat and it had been
repeatedly sold by one buyer to another, until it was purchased by
Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner at the time of the accident.
During trial, plaintiffs had presented evidence that Cresencia was still
the registered operator of the jeepney in question in the records of
the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public Service Commission during
the accident.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION:
It held that as far as the public is concerned, defendant Cresencia, in
the eyes of the law, continued to be the legal owner of the jeepney in
question; and rendered judgment against him, jointly and severally
with driver Brigido Avorque for P6,000 compensatory damages,
P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages, P10, 000
nominal damages, P5,000 attorney’s fees, and costs.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in holding Cresencia liable.
Ruling:
No. As already decided in the case of Montoya v. Ignacio which cited
that the law requires the approval of the Public Service Commission
(PSC) in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto,
may be sold or leased without infringing transferred or leased without
this requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the public
or the Service Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee
of record continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation
to the Commission and to the public.
As the sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without
the approval of the PSC, Cresencia, who is the registered owner and
operator thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and the
public for the consequences incident to its operation. Wherefore, the
lower court did not err in holding him responsible for the damages
sustained by plaintiff by reason of the death of Medina resulting from
the reckless negligence of the jeepney’s driver, Avorque.
VENTENILLA vs CENTINO
Facts:
In an action for recovery of a sum of money with damages (civil case
No. 18833), plaintiff Ventanilla retained the service of Atty. Gregorio
Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case. Decision
unfavorable to the plaintiff was received by Atty. Centeno on July 21,
1955, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25,
1955. Plaintiff Ventanilla after receiving the letter (from Atty. Centeno)
and copy of the decision went to see Atty. Centeno in his office in
Manila about August 5, 1955.
Plaintiff, however, did not leave with Atty. Centeno at that time the
amount for the appeal bond. But it was alleged that Plaintiff at a later
date, issued the check (Exhibit 1) for P60.00 as appeal bond and
delivered the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the
same to Atty. Centeno. The Court does not believe plaintiff's testimony
that Sanchez had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and that he
issued the cheek upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. On August 17,
Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal, Exhibit D, which was filed only on August 20, 1955.
Atty. Centeno cash the check, Exhibit 1, and then went to the office
of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond. According to Atty.
Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already
expired, and that it was only at that time he came to know that the
period of appeal had expired. The court does not likewise believe the
testimony of Atty. Centeno. As a result, the record on appeal was
disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had
been filed by the plaintiff.
Ventanilla claims that the trial court erred in not ordering Atty.
Centeno to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or
moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the
appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000
as nominal damages; and in not ordering the appellee to pay the
appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee.
Issues:
Whether P200.00 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to
Ventanilla was sufficient. (issue based on the syllabus)
Whether the trial court erred in not ordering Atty. Centeno to pay
Ventanilla actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and
exemplary or corrective damages.
Ruling:
The amount awarded to Ventanilla for nominal damages should not
be disturbed. P200.00 was sufficient amount as nominal damages.
Article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of the
case. Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and
the degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal
within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about
the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount
of P200 awarded by the trial court to Ventanilla as nominal damages
may seem inadequate. Nevertheless, considering that nominal
damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even
if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was
not an assurance that the plaintiff would succeed in recovering the
amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
plaintiff seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.
The trial court is correct in not ordering Atty. Centeno to pay Ventanilla
actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and
exemplary or corrective damages.
He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and
prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss. Ventanilla’s bare
allegation that by reason of the appellee's indifference, negligence and
failure to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an
adverse judgment, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory
damages is highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such
damages.
Since Ventanilla’s cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not
predicated upon Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code, the trial
court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him.
Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the plaintiff,
considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages
but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award
precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages, and so
the trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate
damages to the appellant.
As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the
plaintiff, since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court
will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, the trial court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised
its discretion in not awarding them to the plaintiff.
As regards attorney's fees, since Ventanilla’s claim does not fall under
any of those enumerated in Article 2208, Atty. Centeno may not be
compelled to satisfy it.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
TEMPERATE OR MODERATE
SULPICIO LINES vs SESANTE ET AL
Facts:
On September 18, 1988, M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger
vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (plantiff), sank near
Fortune Island in Batangas. One of the passengers of such vessel was
Napoleon Sesante. He was a member of the Philippine National Police
and a lawyer. On the day of the incident, Sesante already noticed that
Metro Manila is having a stormy weather. At around 11 pm, the vessel
was already pounded by strong winds and big waves. He had
managed to stay afloat after the vessel had sunk. He had been carried
by the waves to the coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had been
rescued.
Sesante sued Sulpicio Lines, Inc. for actual and moral damages in the
amount of P500,000 and P1,000,000, respectively. He alleged that he
had suffered tremendous hunger, thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious
anxiety and mental anguish; that he had sustained injuries, and had
lost money, jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and the
.45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP and that petitioner had
committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail despite the storm
signal.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. interposed the defense that it could not be held
liable for damages as the M/V Princess of the Orient, at the time of
the incident, was seaworthy and that the sinking had been due to a
fortuitous event.
The RTC held plaintiff liable for temperate damages in the amount of
P400,000, moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000, and costs of
suit. The trial court lowered the amount of temperate damages upon
motion for reconsideration to P300,000. The CA, on appeal, modified
the temperate damages to P120,000, which approximated the cost of
Sesante’s lost personal belongings.
Issue:
Whether it was proper for the CA to hold Sulpicio Lines, Inc. liable for
damages.
Ruling:
YES.
THERE WAS BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
The presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier applies so
long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a contract exists between
the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the injury or death
took place during the existence of such contract. In such event, the
burden shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of
extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen event or force
majeure had caused the injury.
In order to exculpate the carrier based on force majeure, the common
carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of
the
incident due to its own or its employees' negligence. In this case,
according to the findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry, the sinking
was caused by the “erroneous maneuvers” of the captain of the
vessel. It also found that the vessel, which had a volume of 13.734
gross tons, would have been capable of withstanding a Storm Signal
No. 1.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES IS PROPER
In an action upon breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may
be awarded only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death
does not result. However, moral damages may be awarded if the
contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately injurious,
or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
In this case, the SC found that the negligent acts of the officers and
crew of M/V Princess of the Orient as well as the indifference of the
petitioner to render assistances to Sesante, warranted the award of
moral damages.
The Court also recognized the mental anguish, agony and pain
suffered by Sesante who fought to survive in the midst of the raging
waves of the sea while facing the immediate prospect of losing his life.
His claim for moral and economic vindication is a bitter remnant of
that most infamous tragedy that left hundreds of families broken in its
wake. The anguish and moral sufferings he sustained after surviving
the tragedy would always include the memory of facing the prospect
of his death from drowning, or dehydration, or being preyed upon by
sharks. Based on the established circumstances,
his survival could only have been a miracle wrought by God's grace,
by which he was guided in his desperate swim for the safety of the
shore. But even with the glory of survival, he still had to grapple with
not just the memory of having come face to face with almost certain
death, but also with having to answer to the instinctive guilt for the
rest of his days of being chosen to live among the many who perished
in the tragedy.
Hence, the award of P1,000,000 as moral damages was affirmed.
THE AWARD OF TEMPERATE DAMAGES CORRESPONDING
SESANTE’S PERSONAL BELONGINGS IS PROPER
The rule that the common carrier is always responsible for the
passenger's baggage during the voyage needs to be emphasized.
Article 1754 of the Civil Code does not exempt the common carrier
from liability in case of loss, but only highlights the degree of care
required of it depending on who has the custody of the belongings.
Hence, the law requires the common carrier to observe the same
diligence as the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with the
passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be exercised.
Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proven with certainty. Article 2224 of the
Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate
damages despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages.
Indubitably, Sesante suffered some pecuniary loss from the sinking of
the vessel, but the value of the loss could not be established with
certainty. The CA, which can try facts and appreciate evidence,
pegged the value of the lost belongings as itemized in the police report
at P120,000.00. The valuation approximated the costs of the lost
belongings. In that context, the valuation of P120,000.00 is correct,
but to be regarded as temperate damages.
THE PLAINTIFF IS ALSO LIABLE FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the discretion to award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, and it is left to the court to
decide whether or not to award them. These damages need not be
pleaded or proved because it is at the discretion of courts to award
them. Also, exemplary damages are designed to "permit the courts to
reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by
creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior."
Clearly, the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted wantonly and
recklessly.
The defendant must have acted wantonly and recklessly for the award
to prosper. Wanton and reckless are virtually synonymous in meaning
as respects liability for conduct towards others. Wanton means
characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard
for the rights of others; or marked by or manifesting arrogant
recklessness of justice or of rights or feelings of others. Conduct is
reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care,
in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent. It
must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience,
excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
inadvertence, or simple inattention.
The SC held that the actuations of the petitioner and its agents during
the incident attending the unfortunate sinking of the M/V Princess of
the Orient were far below the standard of care and circumspection
that the law on common carriers demanded.
Thus, the SC held plaintiff liable for P1,000,000 as exemplary
damages.
PLENO vs CA
Facts:
On December 21, 1971, Petitioner was driving his Volkswagen Kombi
on the South Super Highway in Taguig, Rizal when the delivery truck
of private respondent PPPI, driven by private respondent De Luna
crashed into the left rear portion of the Kombi causing it to swerve to
the right and bump the parked vehicle of one Ruben Rivera. This was
a three-way car accident. The truck continued on its way as if no
accident had occurred and it took some investigation to find that it
belonged to private respondents.
Due to the collision, petitioner, the driver of the kombi was severely
injured and was hospitalized for around 5 months. He brought the
action to the RTC for actual damages and attorneys fees. The RTC
awarded petitioner damages, believing that it was indeed private
respondent De Luna’s negligence that caused the accident because he
was driving at such high speeds as to cause the severity of the damage
to the kombi.
The CA, however, reversed the decision of the RTC, believing private
respondents version of the incident that petitioner, while driving the
kombi, attempted to overtake the vehicle of Ruben Rivera, causing
him to swerve hard right and crash into it when he noticed, too late,
that the truck was already passing them on the left. They claim that
they did not collide witht the kombi at all. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC, hence the current petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT
Petitioner argues that it was very unlikely that the version of the
incident of the respondents was what truly happened and that the
factual finding of the RTC and CA that the car of Ruban Rivera was
parked along the side of the road, out of the way from the passing
vehicles, should have been considered by the CA to disprove the
allegations of private respondents.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT
Respondents claim that the CA was correct in believing their
allegations and that, if in any case that private respondent De Luna
was actually negligent, private respondent PPPI should not be held
solidarily liable. PPPI gave evidence to prove that it exerted diligence
in the choosing of De Luna as a driver and that he had no past record
of accidents before they hired him.
Issue:
WON private respondents are truly liable for the damages to
petitioner?
WON private respondent PPPI should be held liable alongside De
Luna?
Ruling:
The factual antecedents of the case being uncontroverted, it is highly
improbable that private respondent’s version of the facts was the
actual truth. The damage to the kombi would clearly show that there
was a collision that occurred between the truck and the kombi.
Respondent’s argument that they did not collide with the kombi is
inconsistent with the damage to both the left rear of the kombi and
the front bumper of private respondent’s truck.
Respondents are liable for the accident and damages are awarded to
petitioner.
As for the issue on whether PPPI is liable, the evidence given by PPPI
to prove it exerted due diligence in choosing De Luna as a driver is of
no significance. The fact remains that De Luna was negligent in driving
the truck and that lead to the accident in question. As the employer
of De Luna, who at the time was driving PPPI’s truck and going about
PPPI’s usual business, PPPI is solidarily liable for damages.
BPI INVESTMENT vs DG CARREON
Facts:
D. G. Carreon placed with BPI Investments P318,981.59 in money
market placement with a maturity term of thirty two days, or up to
December 17, 1979, at a maturity value of P323,518.22. BPI
Investments issued the corresponding sales order slip for straight sale
and confirmation slip.
On December 12, 1979, D. G. Carreon did not make any money
placement maturing on December 12, 1979, the BPI Investments
ledger shows that D. G. Carreon had an amount of P323,518.22, which
is the exact amount to mature on December 17, 1979. An officer of
BPI Investments called up Aurora Carreon about the money market
placement supposedly maturing on December 12, 1979. Carreon, in
turn, instructed Abrantes to roll over the amount of P323,518.22, for
another thirty days at 19% interest to mature on January 11, 1980. A
sales order slip and a confirmation slip were executed on same date.
On December 17, 1979, BPI Investments credited D. G. Carreon
with another P323,518.22 via roll over of P300,000.00, for a term of
one hundred twenty days at 19% interest maturing on April 15, 1980,
and P23,518.22, paid out in cash. A sales order slip for straight sale
and a confirmation slip were executed.
BPI Investments paid D. G. Carreon twice in interest of the amount
of P323,518.22, representing a single money market placement, the
first on December 12, 1979, and the second on December 17,
1979. According to petitioner, their bookkeeper made an error in
posting 12-17 on the sales order slip for 12-12. BPI Investments
claimed that the same placement was also booked as maturing on
December 12, 1979. Aurora Carreon instructed BPI Investments to roll
over the whole amount of P323,518.22 for another thirty days, or up
to January 11, 1980, at 19% interest. BPI Investments had made over
payments at a total amount of P410,937.09.
BPI demanded the return of overpayment from Daniel and Aurora
Carreon. However, the latter sent a memorandum instead which
provides that “because of the age and retrieval difficulty of the
transactions on this placement, the Company has a five-year option
to determine if the said placement referred to as funded, and if so, to
submit to BPI documents to this effect. And if such documents support
the funding of side placement, BPI shall pay the company the stated
amount being temporarily reimbursed by the Company with a 12%
p.a. interest. In the spirit of goodwill the company hereby agrees to
temporarily reimburse BPI the amount of FOUR HUNDRED TEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN and 9/100 PESOS
(P410,937.09) representing the full amount of the claim of BPI.”
BPI Investments did not respond to the memorandum but instead filed
a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against D. G. Carreon
with preliminary attachment. The preliminary attachment was
granted.
RTC: Ruled in favor of D.G Carreon for failure to establish
overpayment. It ordered BPI to pay the following 1M moral damages
to late Daniel G. Carreon; 1M and 500k to Aurora Carreon and Josefa
Jeceil, respectively; compensatory damages to D.G Carreon;
exemplary damages; and attorneys fees.
Issue: whether the Court awarded excessive moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees to respondents
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious. As ruled by the lower Court, BPI
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that D. G. Carreon
indeed received money in excess of what was due them. The alleged
payments in the complaint were admitted by plaintiff itself to be
withdrawals from validly issued commercial papers, duly verified and
signed by at least two authorized high-ranking officers of BPI
Investments.
On the damages, exemplary damages is imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-
delicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
In this case, BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, when it asked for
preliminary attachment. It was just exercising a legal option. The
sheriff of the issuing court did the execution and the
attachment. Hence, BPI Investments is not to be blamed for the
excessive and wrongful attachment.
The award of moral damages and attorneys fees is also not in keeping
with existing jurisprudence. Moral damages may be awarded in a
breach of contract when the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligation. Finally, with the elimination of award of
moral damages, so must the award of attorneys fees be deleted
The damages sustained by respondents were due to petitioners fault
or negligence, short of gross negligence. Temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.The Court deems it prudent to award
reasonable temperate damages to respondents under the
circumstances.
GSIS vs DAENG
Facts:
The Spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS in the
amount of eight thousand five hundred pesos (P8,500.00) which was
to mature on December 23, 1979. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage constituted over the spouses’ property. Eleven (11)
months before the maturity of the loan, the spouses Deang settled
their debt with the GSIS and requested for the release of the owners
duplicate copy of the title since they intended to secure a loan from a
private lender and use the land covered by it as collateral security for
the loan. However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the
owner’s duplicate of the title as it could not be found despite diligent
search.
The Spouses Deang filed a complaint against GSIS for damages,
claiming that as result of the delay in releasing the duplicate copy of
the owners title, they were unable to secure the loan, the proceeds of
which could have been used in defraying the estimated cost of the
renovation of their residential house and which could have been
invested in some profitable business undertaking.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Deang are entitled to damages despite there
being no proof of pecuniary loss.
Ruling:
YES, temperate damages may be granted. Proof of pecuniary loss is
not needed. The rationale behind temperate damages is precisely that
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered. When the court is convinced that there has been such loss,
the judge is empowered to calculate moderate damages, rather than
let the complainant suffer without redress from the defendant’s
wrongful act. As to the funeral expenses of P20,000. It should likewise be deleted
in the absence of evidence to prove the same. To justify a grant of
Thus, the award of only twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in
actual damages, it is necessary to show the amount of actual loss with
temperate damages is reasonable considering that GSIS already spent
the best evidence obtainable. The testimony of Julia Aca-ac that she
for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of the title.
spent P20,000 for the wake and burial of her husband, without
PEOPLE vs YRAT presenting any receipts, is not sufficient to support the claim for
funeral expenses. We have consistently ruled that only expenses
supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually incurred
Facts:
shall be allowed. It is a settled rule that there must be proof that
Yrat and Jimena (appellants) were charged and convicted with murder
actual or compensatory damages have been suffered, and evidence
for the death of Benjamin Aca-ac.
of its actual amount. In the present case, since no receipt was
presented to support the claim for funeral expenses, the same cannot
Evidence showed that the victim was suddenly shot frontally by Yrat
be allowed.
after being hit by Yrat with the butt of his gun from behind while
Jimena boxed the victim on the face. The trial court awarded damages
In lieu of the aforesaid damages, the heirs of the deceased Benjamin
P50,000 for loss of earning capacity, P20,000 for funeral expenses on
Aca-ac should be awarded the amount of P15,000 as temperate
the lone testimony of the deceased's wife, civil indemnity in the
damages pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides
amount of P50,000 and P60,000 for moral damages and to pay the
that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
costs.
some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Issue:

As to the civil indemnity of P50,000, the court sustained such finding

Whether the damages awarded were proper?
which requires no proof other than the fact of death of the victim and
assailant's responsibility therefor. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
provides that when death occurs as a result of the crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim
As to the loss of earning capacity, it is not in order. It bears stressing
without need of any evidence or proof thereof. The award of moral
that compensation for loss of income is in the nature of damages and
damages in the amount of P60,000 should also be sustained taking
as such requires due proof of the damages suffered. The prosecution
into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim's family.
failed to present evidence to show the deceased's monthly earnings.
What was presented in evidence was only the testimony of the wife
that the deceased was earning P50,000. We have held that "for lost
PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK vs CA
income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's
average income. Self-serving, hence, unreliable statement is not Facts:
enough."
Panacor acquired an exclusive distributorship of products
manufactured by Colgate. To meet the capital requirement, Panacor
applied for a loan of 4.1 Million Pesos with Premier Development Bank.
The latter suggested that Panacor’s affiliate company Arizona be the
one who applies the loan credit. Eventually, Premier granted the loan
credit to Arizona, 2.7 Million of the 6.1 Milllion loan grant to Panacor.
A real estate mortgage was executed.
Since only 2.7 Million was granted to Panacor, the latter negotiated
for a take-out loan with Iba-Finance in the sum of 10 Million Pesos,
7.5 Mil of which will be released outright in order to take out the loan
from Premier Bank and the balance of 2.5 Mil to complete the needed
capital of 4.1 Million with Colgate. Iba-Finance requested for the
release of the property subject of the real estate mortgage but Premier
bank refused. Because of this, the release of the 2.5 Mil was
conditioned on the cancellation of the mortgage and the submission
of the TCT. Panacor failed to generate the required capital to meet its
distribution and sales target. Consequently, Colgate terminated its
agreement with Panacor to the latter’s prejudice.
An action for damages was filed against Premier Bank.
It was contended by Panacor that it incurred actual damages
amounting to 4.2 Million Pesos because of the terminated agreement
with Colgate.
Issue:
Whether Panacor should be entitled with 4.2 Million Pesos of actual
damages? What are the requirements in able for a party to
successfully acquire actual damages?
Ruling:
To justify an award for actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to
claims, which are duly supported by receipts. The burden of proof is
on the party who will be defeated if no evidence is presented on either
side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which
means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior
to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed
and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that can
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages
are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty.
In the instant case, the actual damages were proven through the sole
testimony of Themistocles Ruguero, the vice president for
administration of Panacor. In his testimony, the witness affirmed that
The documentary evidence marked as exhibit W, which was an
ordinary private writing allegedly itemizing the capital expenditures
and losses from the failed operation of Panacor, was not testified to
by any witness to ascertain the veracity of its contents. Although the
lower court fixed the sum of P4,520,000.00 as the total expenditures
incurred by Panacor, it failed to show how and in what manner the
same were substantiated by the claimant with reasonable certainty.
Hence, the claim for actual damages should be admitted with extreme
caution since it is only based on bare assertion without support from
independent evidence. Premieres failure to prove actual expenditure
consequently conduces to a failure of its claim. In determining actual
damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and
on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.
Even if not recoverable as compensatory damages, Panacor may still
be awarded damages in the concept of temperate or moderate
damages. When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered.
Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature
of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss.
It is obvious that the wrongful acts of Premiere Bank adversely
affected, in one way or another, the commercial credit of Panacor,
greatly contributed to, if not, decisively caused the premature
stoppage of its business operations and the consequent loss of
business opportunity. Since these losses are not susceptible to
pecuniary estimation, temperate damages may be awarded.
The Supreme Court awarded Panacor with 200,000 worth of
temperate damages.
RAMOS ET AL vs CA
REPUBLIC vs TUVERA
PT & T vs CA
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
for the delay in the delivery of the remittance sent to her by her sister-
in-law through petitioner corporation. The address given by the
sender was vaguely stated to be “UP Diliman Quezon” and private
respondent provided the wrong address where the money transfers
originated from.
The RTC awarded actual/compensatory damages, moral damages and
exemplary damages. The CA sustained the award of moral and
exemplary damages but deleted the award of actual damages because
the evidence was inadequate to prove pecuniary loss. Petitioner
appealed and argued that the award for moral and exemplary
damages be reversed because of private respondent’s failure to
present evidence that the latter had suffered wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, and mental anguish or that the act she had ascribed
to petitioners was done in bad faith, or in wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
Issue:
Whether the grant of moral and exemplary damages was proper.
Ruling:
No, the appellate court itself did not see any clear indication of bad
faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith on the part of
petitioners to justify the grant of moral damages nor was the delay
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or oppressive in character to justify the
grant of exemplary damages.
In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the
claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal
tie with the acts of the defendant. In order that an award of moral
damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to
satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages, that the injury
causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and
2220 of the Civil Code, and that the damages must be shown to be
the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. In culpa
contractual or breach of contract, particularly, moral damages may be
recovered when the defendant has acted in bad faith or is found to be
guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith or in wanton
disregard of his obligation.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right.
Although such damages need not be proved, plaintiff must first show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages
before a court can favorably consider an award of exemplary
damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts, specifically, exemplary
damages may be justified if the defendant is shown to have acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The Court is left with two alternative possibilities — an award of
temperate or moderate damages or an award of nominal damages.
Temperate or moderate damages may only be given if the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but that its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The
factual findings of the appellate court that respondent has failed to
establish such pecuniary loss or, if proved, cannot from their nature
be precisely quantified precludes the application of the rule on
temperate or moderate damages.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The court may award nominal
damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in
article 1157 of the Civil Code or, generally, in every case where
property right is invaded.
Nominal damages were awarded.
PHIL HAWK CORP vs VIVIAN TAN LEE
* repeated case
TAN vs OMC CARRIERS
BUT SEE:
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES vs CHUA
Facts:
The twenty-foot container van loaded with the personal effects of
[respondent] Celeste M. Chua arrived at the North Harbor, Manila,
from Oakland, California. It was unloaded from the vessel and was
placed in the depot belonging to ICTS [petitioner] for safekeeping
pending the customs inspection. On April 6, 1997, the container van
was stripped and partially inspected by custom authorities. Further
inspection thereof was scheduled on May 8, 1997. However, on the
date scheduled, [petitioner’s] depot was gutted by fire and
[respondent’s] container van, together with forty–four (44) others,
were burned. In the survey conducted thereafter, seventy percent
(70%) of the contents of the van was found to be totally burnt while
thirty percent (30%) thereof was wet, dirty, and unusable.
[Respondent] demanded reimbursement for the value of the goods.
However, her demands fell on deaf ears. She also claims that, while
the value of the goods destroyed is (US$87,667.00), she has in her
possession only the machine–copies of receipts showing an aggregate
value of only (US$67,535.61) because, pursuant to [petitioner’s]
request, she gave to the latter’s representative the original receipts.
On August 23, 1999, [respondent] filed the suit below alleging, in
essence, that the proximate cause of the fire that engulfed
[petitioner’s] depot was the combustible chemicals stored threreat;
and, that [petitioner], in storing the said flammable chemicals in its
depot, failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees and/or of their work.
In its Answer, [petitioner] admits that it accepted, in good order,
[respondent’s] container van for storage and safekeeping at its depot
but denies that there was negligence on its part or that of its
employees. It asserts that the fire that gutted its depot was due to a
fortuitous event because it exercised the due diligence required by
law. It maintains that [respondent] is not entitled to her claim because
she did not declare the true and correct value of the goods, as the Bill
of Lading indicates that the contents of the van have no commercial
value.
RTC:
Ruled in favor of Chua.
CA:
Affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the damaged goods
Whether the award of damages was proper
Ruling:
1. Yes. Absent any justifiable explanation on the part of petitioner on
the cause of the fire as would absolve it from liability, the presumption
that there was negligence on its part comes into play. The situation in
this case, therefore, calls for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine, however, “can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.” Here, there was no evidence as to how or why the
fire in the container yard of petitioner started; hence, it was up to
petitioner to satisfactorily prove that it exercised the diligence required
to prevent the fire from happening. This it failed to do. Thus, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals acted appropriately in applying the
principle of res ipsa loquitur to the case at bar.
2. NO. The Court is at a loss as to how the lower courts arrived at
their award of actual damages of US$67,535.61 when on the contrary,
all the foregoing actually prove that the submitted receipts do not
accurately reflect the items in the container van and, therefore, cannot
be the basis for a grant of actual damages. Furthermore, the award
of the trial court failed to take into consideration that since most of
the contents of respondent’s container van are electronics or electrical
items, the same are subject to depreciation.
In the case before us, respondent failed to adduce evidence adequate
enough to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damages claimed.
The receipts she submitted cannot be considered competent proof
since she failed to prove that the items listed therein are indeed the
items that were in her container van and vice versa. As pointed out,
there are discrepancies between the items listed in the submitted
receipts and those contained in the respective inspection reports of
the marine surveyors. Hence, the said receipts cannot be made the
basis for the grant of actual damages.
In the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages
suffered, a party is entitled to receive temperate damages.
Certainly, an award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear
showing that the party claiming the same actually experienced mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
or similar injury. In the case herein under consideration, the records
are bereft of any proof that respondent in fact suffered moral damages
as contemplated in the afore–quoted provision of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No.
78315 dated 14 September 2010 is MODIFIED in that the award of
actual damages, moral damages and attorney’s fees are DELETED.
However, petitioner is ordered to pay respondent TEMPERATE
DAMAGES in the amount of P350,000.00.
SPS. DIONISIO ESTRADA vs PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES
Facts:
An accident happened between the passenger bus owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines driven by respondent Eduardo R. Saylan
and an Isuzu truck. Petitioner Dionisio Estrada was one of the
passengers of the bus. Due to the accident, Dionisio’s right arm was
amputated.
Dionisio argued that pursuant to the contract of carriage, respondents
were duty-bound to carry him safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, with utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
and with due regard for all the circumstances from the point of his
origin to his destination. However, respondents failed to transport him
safely, which resulted in the amputation of Dionisio's right arm.
Dionisio filed the said complaint wherein he prayed for the following
awards: moral damages of P500,000.00, actual damages of
P60,000.00, and attorney's fees of P25,000.00.
Denying any liability, Philippine argued that the cause thereof was an
extraordinary circumstance independent of its driver's action or a
fortuitous event. Philippine Rabbit averred that it was the Isuzu truck
coming from the opposite direction which had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap. Instead of slowing down upon seeing the bus, the
said truck continued its speed such that it bumped into the right side
of the bus. The proximate cause of the accident was the wrongful and
negligent manner in which the Isuzu truck was operated by its driver.
The trial court treated petitioners’ complaint for damages as one
predicated on breach of contract of carriage and concluded that
Eduardo was negligent in driving the bus. It also found that Philippine
Rabbit failed to show that it had taken all the necessary and actual
steps to thoroughly examine the qualifications of Eduardo as a driver
worthy of employment, and no proof relative to the existence of
company rules and regulations, instructions, and policies affecting its
drivers, as well as to their actual implementation and observance,
were presented. Hence, Philippine Rabbit was held jointly and
severally liable with Eduardo for the awards made in favor of Dionisio.
The RTC awarded five hundred thousand pesos as moral damages,
fifty-seven thousand seven hundred sixty pesos and twenty-five
centavos as actual damages, and twenty-five thousand pesos as
attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Philippine Rabbit argued that moral damages are not
recoverable in an action for damages predicated on breach of contract
except when death results or when the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith. The appellate court partially granted the appeal. It ratiocinated
that there was no evidence on record indicative of fraud or bad faith
on [Philippine Rabbit's] part. The settled rule is that the law always
presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded
damages due to the acts of another has the burden of proving that
the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. Moreover, the driver
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of
breach of the contract of carriage. The contract of carriage is between
the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability,
the carrier is exclusively responsible [therefor] to the passenger, even
if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. The carrier can
neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with
him for his driver's negligence is his. Thus, the CA modified the RTC
decision: 1) Philippine Rabbit is solely and exclusively liable for the
actual damages; 2) deleted the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether moral damages may be awarded in the instant case.
Ruling:
No.
Petitioners argue that while in a strict sense, Dionisio incurred actual
damages through the amputation of his right arm, such loss may
rightly be considered as falling under moral damages. This is because
a right arm is beyond the commerce of man and loss thereof
necessarily brings physical suffering, mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and similar injury to a person.
Respondents, on the other hand, reiterate the rule that moral
damages are not recoverable in an action for damages predicated on
a breach of contract, since breach of contract is not one of the items
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Since Dionisio did not
die in the mishap nor was Philippine Rabbit found guilty of fraud or
bad faith, respondents argue that an award for moral damages is
improper for having no basis in fact and in law.
The SC modified the CA’s ruling.
Moral damages not recoverable in this case
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on breach of contract. As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: 1) in cases in which the mishap results in
the death of the passenger; and 2) in cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith.
In this case however, moral damages are not recoverable. While
petitioners predicated their claim under the second exception, there is
no showing here that Philippine Rabbit induced Dionisio to enter into
a contract of carriage with the former through insidious machination.
Neither is there any indication or even an allegation of deceit or
concealment or omission of material facts by reason of which Dionisio
boarded the bus owned by Philippine Rabbit. Likewise, it was not
shown that Philippine Rabbit's breach of its known duty, which was to
transport Dionisio, was attended by motive, interest, or ill will.
Actual damages for loss of earning capacity are also not
recoverable
In lieu thereof, temperate damages are awarded
While petitioners denominated their claim for five hundred thousand
pesos as moral damages, their computation was actually based on the
supposed loss/impairment of Dionisio’s earning capacity. The same
however is in the nature of actual damages. Thus, as a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss [or impairment] of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased
[or the injured] was self-employed and earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was employed as a daily
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
However, there is no competent proof substantiating his actual income
and because of this, an award for damages for loss of earning capacity
cannot be made.
Nonetheless, temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded. Under Article 2224, “[t]emperate
or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.” Thus, it is
reasonable to award Dionisio temperate damages of five hundred
thousand pesos in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity.
Actual damages by way of medical expenses must be
supported by official receipts.
Actual proof of expenses incurred for medicines and other medical
supplies necessary for treatment and rehabilitation must be presented
by the claimant, in the form of official receipts, to show the exact cost
of his medication and to prove that he indeed went through
medication and rehabilitation. In the absence of the same, such claim
must be negated.
Legal interest imposed on the amounts awarded.
The amounts awarded are subject to legal interest of 6% per annum
from finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.
SC awarded petitioners temperate damages in the amount of
P500,000.00; actual damages in the amount of P57,658.25; and these
are subject to 6% legal interest.
LIQUIDATED
LAMBERT vs FAX
Facts:
Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the
retail book and stationery business, found itself in such condition
financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant,
together with many others, agreed to take over the business,
incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective
credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the
two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar
& Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed
plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement:
xxxx
Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of
one thousand (P1, 000) pesos as liquidated damages, unless previous
consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be
obtained. xxx
Notwithstanding this contract, the defendant, Fox, sold his stock in
the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C.
McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R.
Edgar & Co., Inc.
RTC:
Decided the case in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the
intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract in question
was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue
only until the corporation reached a sound financial basis, and that
that event having occurred some time before the expiration of the
year mentioned in the contract, the purpose for which the contract
was made and had been fulfilled and the defendant accordingly
discharged of his obligation thereunder.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff can recover
Ruling:
In this jurisdiction penalties provided in contracts of this character are
enforced. It is the rule that parties who are competent to contract may
make such agreements within the limitations of the law and public
policy as they desire, and that the courts will enforce them according
to their terms. (Civil Code, articles 1152, 1153, 1154, and 1155;
Fornow vs. Hoffmeister, 6 Phil. Rep., 33; Palacios vs. Municipality of
Cavite, 12 Phil. Rep., 140; Gsell vs. Koch, 16 Phil. Rep., 1.) The only
case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is authorized to
intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty stipulated in the
contract is when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
fulfilled and the court can see that the person demanding the penalty
has received the benefit of such or irregular performance. In such case
the court is authorized to reduce the penalty to the extent of the
benefits received by the party enforcing the penalty.
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and
liquidated damages, so far as legal results are concerned. Whatever
differences exists between them as a matter of language, they are
treated the same legally. In either case the party to whom payment is
to be made is entitled to recover the sum stipulated without the
necessity of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary purposes in
fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid such necessity.
The judgment is reversed, the case remanded with instructions to
enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
for P1, 000, with interest; without costs in this instance.
HL CARLOS CONSTRUCTION vs MARINA PROPERTIES CORP
Facts:
Marina Properties Corporation (MPC) entered into a contract with H.L.
Carlos Construction, Inc. (HLC) to construct a condominium complex
for a total consideration of PhP35.58 million within a period of 365
days from receipt of notice to proceed. The original completion date
of the project was May 16, 1989, but was extended to October 31,
1989 with a grace period until November 30, 1989. On December 15,
1989, HLC instituted a case for sum of money, among others, for cost
of labor escalation, change orders and material price escalation. The
Construction Contract contains the provision that no cost escalation
shall be allowed except on the labor component of the work. HLC
argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both labor and material
because MPC was delayed for paying its obligations. MPC, on the other
hand, avers that HLC was delayed in finishing its project; hence, it is
not entitled to price increase.
Issue:
Whether or Not MPC is liable for price escalation.
Ruling:
MPC is liable for price escalation, but only for the labor component.
The Construction Contract contains the provision that no cost
escalation shall be allowed except on the labor component of the
work. Since the contract allows escalation only of the labor
component, the implication is that material cost escalations are
barred. There appears to be no provision, either in the original or in
the amended contract that would justify billing of increased cost of
material. HLC attempts to pass off material cost escalation as a form
of damages suffered by it as a natural consequence of the delay in
the payments of billings. However, the contentious billing itself
contains no claim for material cost escalation.
SCOTT CONSULTANTS & RESOURCE DEVT CORP. vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner, was registered with the Office of the Mining Recorder of
the DENR, to develop, operate, mine and market the products
therefrom, and otherwise exploit properties with respect to their
alluvial precious metals.
Petitioner and Juana Santos, a duly authorized representative of San
Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc., (SMMEI, for short), an entity that has
the "possession and beneficial use of the mining claim" situated at San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, entered into an agreement, granting the
plaintiff "the exclusive and irrevocable right and privilege, to do all or
any of the acts" mentioned in the Agreement.
Respondent used to hold an operating agreement with the San Mateo
Mines Exploration, Inc.
On February 9, 1990, SMMEI notified the defendant of the termination
of their operating agreement for the reasons stated in the letter.
Respondent has prevented petitioner from gaining access, occupying,
exploring and developing the existing mining claims and despite a
cease and desist order and a letter from the Bureau of Mines to the
respondent.
Respondent avers that the land is privately owned, that with the
acquisition of easement rights from the owners of the land in favor of
the respondent. The contract granting easement rights to defendant
which is recognized under P.D. No. 463 carries with it the stipulation
that such grant shall be exclusive.
San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc. entered into a contract with
defendant Philrock on November 18, 1987 for the latter to operate
San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc.'s Industrial Permit No. 40 for a
period of five (5) years.
Subsequently, on February 9, 1990, San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc.
notified the defendant that it is unilaterally terminating the contract
for being "one-sided."
Five days thereafter, or on February 14, 1990, San Mateo Mines
Exploration, Inc. entered into a mining exploration contract with the
plaintiff, which includes the operation of Industrial Permit No. 40.
Trial Court dismissed. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to conduct exploration and
similar activities within the mining claims?
Ruling:
This Court is of the view that a party cannot unilaterally terminate a
contract it entered into with another without justifiable cause. In fact,
a party's unilateral termination of a contract without legal justification
makes it liable for damages suffered pursuant to Article 1170 of the
New Civil Code.
The Court was made to understand that plaintiff does not pretend to
conduct mining exploration/operation on the access routes. These
areas, i.e., access routes, are to be utilized only as a means to go to
and come from on the plaintiff's legitimate area of activity.
Plaintiff's intention, in effect, is to ask this Court that it grant plaintiff
similar easement rights already obtained by defendant from the
landowners.
In the instant case, the petitioner was not prevented by the surface
owners or occupants of the land covered by its mining claims. As to
the private respondent's access routes, the petitioner was unable to
prove its right to use it.
EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE MEASURES
WHEN AWARDABLE
SULPICIO LINES vs SESANTE ET AL.
*repeated case
DE LEON vs CA
Facts:
Spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo first mortgaged a
fishpond to Hermogenes Tantoco for P20,000. Apart from this first
mortgage, the spouses Briones likewise executed a deed of second
mortgage for P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum in favor of
Cornelio S. Tantoco. Both mortgages were duly registered and duly
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title of the Briones.
While these two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses
sold the fishpond to plaintiff spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F.
Gonzales de Leon in the amount of P120,000.00. Of the amount of
P120,000.00, the Briones spouses actually received only the amount
of P31,000.00, as the amount of P89,000.00 was withheld by the
plaintiff de Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage indebtedness
of the Briones to the Tantocos.
After the sale plaintiffs de Leon satisfied the first mortgage obligation
to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly executed a deed of
discharge of mortgage. For the second mortgage, plaintiffs wrote a
letter to private respondent Cornelio Tantoco making it clear that he
was tendering the sum of P29,382.50 in full discharge of the legitimate
obligation of his clients, the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena
Bernardo. However, the latter denied having hired plaintiff as their
counsel.
Thus, the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. de Leon filed a
complaint against defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco for discharge of
mortgage. The defendant Cornelio Tantoco filed his answer with
counterclaim and third party complaint against the Briones spouses
alleging that the true and real amount of obligation of the Briones
spouses is the sum of P68,824.00, with 10% interest secured by a
second mortgage in favor of defendant; that the amount of
P29,382.50 sent by plaintiff was accepted as part payment or partial
extinguishment of the mortgage loan of P68,824.00 with 10%
interest; and, that defendant did not accede to the demand of the
plaintiff to have the mortgage lien on the property in question
cancelled or discharged because the full amount of the mortgage debt
of P68,824.00 plus the 10% interest has not yet been fully paid.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled in favor of the defendant Dr.
Cornelio Tantoco.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of P60,000.00 in the concept of moral and
exemplary damages is proper.
Ruling:
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission. On the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain
conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded, to wit: (1)
They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in
addition, among others, to compensatory damages and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and (3) the
wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would
be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolant manner.
Respondent Court found malice in petitioners' refusal to satisfy
respondent Tantocos lawful claim and in their subsequent filing of the
present case against respondent, and took into consideration the
worries and mental anxiety of respondent as a result thereof.
As a lawyer in the practice of law since his admission to the Bar in
1929, petitioner Fortunato de Leon could not have missed the import
of the annotation at the back of TCT regarding the second mortgage
for the sum of (P68,824.00) of the property he was buying.
Furthermore, petitioners cannot deny having assumed the mortgage
debts of the Briones spouses amounting to P89,000.00 in favor of the
Tantocos. The "Patunay" executed by the Briones spouses gives the
information that their property, and fishpond, was sold by them to the
spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales for the amount of
(Pl20,000.00). At the bottom of the "Patunay" in the handwriting of
petitioner Fortunato de Leon is a statement signed by him signifying
that he was assuming the spouses' debt of P89,000.00 to respondent
Tantoco.
The filing of the case against respondent being unfounded and
maliciously prosecuted satisfactorily proves the existence of the
factual basis for moral damages and the causal relation to petitioners'
acts. Private respondent has a good name to protect. He is a surgeon
by profession, had been Chief of the Bulacan Provincial Hospital since
1946 until he put up a hospital of his own, the Rosary General Hospital.
He is a member of the Knights of Columbus, a Cursillista, a member
of the Lions, a fellow of the Philippine College of Surgeons in good
standing from 1946 up to the present, a member of the Philippine
Medical Association and of the Bulacan Medical Association. He has
been humiliated, embarrassed, maligned and has been charged in bad
faith as a money lender in petitioner's complaint accusing him of
defrauding the Briones spouses.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award
of exemplary damages is proper. In the case of Miranda Ribaya v.
Bautista, this Court considered 25% of the principal amount as
reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found on February
21, 1970 that the outstanding balance of the disputed loan was
P64,921.69. Twenty five percent thereof is P16,230.00 but considering
the depreciation of the Philippine peso today, it is believed that the
award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
is reasonable.
OCTOT vs YBANEZ
Facts: Diosdado Octot sought in this action of mandamus his
reinstatement in the government service as Security Guard in Regional
Health Office No. VII, Cebu City from which he was summarily
dismissed "for being notoriously undesirable."
Octot was employed as Security Guard since 1970, however, on
October 1, 1975, he was summarily dismissed pursuant to P.D. No. 6
and LOI Nos. 14 and 14-A directing heads of departments and
agencies of the government to weed out undesirable government
officials and employees, specifically those who were facing charges or
were notoriously undesirable on ground of dishonesty, incompetence
or other kinds of misconduct defined in the Civil Service Law.
Octot had been convicted by the RTC of the crime of libel, but his
appeal therefrom was pending in the CA.
Believing that his dismissal was illegal, he continued reporting for work
the whole month of October, 1975 but Regional Director Ybanez
refused to order the release of his salary for the period and instead
ordered that his name be deleted from the office payroll.
In due time, Octot was acquitted of the libel case by the CA.
On March 10, 1977, one Mr. Alfredo Imbong wrote to the
Undersecretary of Justice seeking assistance to reinstate Octot to his
former position which letter was forwarded by the Undersecretary of
Justice to the Secretary of Health. When the letter request was
referred by the Secretary of Health to the Regional Health Office for
comment, Dr. Felicito Aniceto, Officer-in-Charge of the same regional
office favorably recommended Octot’s reinstatement, not only
because of his acquittal in the criminal case but also because of his
satisfactory performance rating. Octot’s papers were likewise
favorably acted upon by the Presidential Executive Assistant but in
returning the papers to the Secretary of Health, attention was invited
to the provision of LOI No. 647 which does not allow payment of
backwages.
The papers were then forwarded to Octot informing him that his
request for reinstatement may now be given due course. When Octot
failed to appear, he was personally furnished by Personnel Officer
Ramon R. Encarnacion with the necessary papers to be filled up to
support his new appointment. However, he again sent a letter to
Secretary of Health, reiterating his request for reinstatement and
demanding back salaries from the date of his dismissal from the
service, furnishing the Regional Health Director a copy thereof, who
upon receipt of his copy, contacted him instructing him to come so
that the necessary papers for his new appointment could be prepared.
Again, he did not appear, and instead filed the instant petition for
mandamus wherein he prays that respondents be ordered to:
1. reinstate him to his former position
2. to pay his back salary, as well as the cost of living allowance
of P50.00 a month from the date of his alleged dismissal
3. grant him compensatory, exemplary and moral damages
4. to pay his attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
Issues:
1. Whether Octot is entitled to his claim for backwages from the
date of his dismissal in 1975 up to the date of reinstatement
and damages.
2. Whether Octot is entitled to moral damages.
Ruling:
1. No, in the absence of proof that Regional Director Ybanez
acted in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion, Octot is
not entitled to backwages and consequently cannot claim for
damages.
In the case at bar, respondents officials were not motivated by ill will
or personal malice in dismissing petitioner but only by their desire to
comply with the mandates of Presidential Decree No. 6. Accordingly,
when Octot was acquitted by the CA, and made a request for his
reinstatement, respondents readily showed their willingness to take
him back and recommended to the authorities concerned his
reinstatement. Moreover, the Office of the President, in approving the
reinstatement of Octot, specifically invited attention to the provisions
of LOI No. 647 which does not authorize payment of backwages of
reinstated employees.
2. No, Octot is not entitled to claim moral damages.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if there was any delay in his
reinstatement, it was attributed to his own fault and negligence. After
his reinstatement was authorized by the Office of the President,
respondents had promptly communicated with him, directing him to
report to the Regional Office and accomplish the necessary papers for
his reinstatement, but he delayed doing so.
It is clear that since the separation of Octot from the government
service had not been shown to be in bad faith, an award for damages
under the circumstances would not be just and proper. Neither is it
among the cases mentioned in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code wherein moral damages may be recovered.
Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in a special civil
action for mandamus unless the defendant patently acted with
vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest
judgment. The claim for exemplary damages must presuppose the
existence of the circumstances enumerated in Articles 2231 and 2232
of the Civil Code.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Such damages are required by
public policy, for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an
antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the
body politic.
Jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may
be awarded and these are as follows:
1. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only
in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
2. The claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidate or compensatory damages.
3. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
Therefore, since Octot had been reinstated to his former position, the
petition for mandamus for his reinstatement is now moot. His claim
for backwages and damages is hereby denied.
BPI INVESTMENT vs DG CARREON
*repeated case
BANO vs BACHELOR EXPRESS
Facts:
Salvana was driving the bus owned by Bachelor Express along the
national highway at Magdum, Tagum City bound for Davao City. He
overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while negotiating a blind curve in a
descending road at Km. 60, causing him to intrude into the opposite
lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of Bano running uphill
from the opposite direction. This caused damage to property and
death of Amancio, the driver of the truck.
Bano and heirs of Amancio filed a case against Respondent. RTC
awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of Amancio that was deleted
by CA.
Issue:
WON THE HEIRS OF AMANCIO IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES?
Ruling:
YES. The exemplary damages is granted by law to serve as warning
to the public and a deterrent against repetition of similar deleterious
actions. In the present case, records show that when bus driver
Salvana overtook the jeepney, he was rounding a blind curve along
the descending road. Having thus encroached on the opposite lane in
the process of overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was
clear of oncoming traffic that resulted in the collision with the
approaching dump truck driven by deceased Ambrocio, Salvana was
grossly negligent in driving the bus. However, the award it tempered
not to enrich one party and impoverish the other. Hence, P50,000
rendered by RTC is reinstated.
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
INHELDER CORPORATION vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
What commenced the instant proceedings is a damage case instituted
by private respondents (PANGANIBANS), against petitioner
(INHELDER) before a Mindoro Court.
The Complaint alleged that INHELDER had filed a collection case
against the PANGANIBANS before the Municipal Court in
Mandaluyong, which was subsequently dismiss; that the COLLECTION
CASE (Civil Case No. 5582), was clearly unfounded,- and that the
PANGANIBANS were entitled, as against INHELDER, to quantified
damages totalling P169,550.00.
The complaint of the PANGANIBANS was essentially for actual and
compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages,
based on the alleged clearly unfounded COLLECTION CASE.
After declaring INHELDER in default in the DAMAGE CASE, the
MINDORO COURT rendered judgment in favor of the PANGANIBANS.
It will be noted that the P5,000.00 claim for attorney's fees
corresponding to the COLLECTION CASE was reduced from P5,000.00
to P3,000.00, and attorney's fees corresponding to the DAMAGE CASE
was reduced from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. But the prayed for
P50,000.00 "as moral and/or compensatory damages due to the
nervous break-down suffered by plaintiff Dra. Paula R. Panganiban"
was increased to P100,000.00, that is, P50,000.00 compensatory and
P50,000.00 moral.
On appeal by INHELDER, the Appellate Court reduced the total
damages awarded to the PANGANIBANS from P212,650.00 to
P41,550.00 by modifying the judgment of the MINDORO COURT.
The background facts and circumstances of the COLLECTION CASE
can be stated as follows:
INHELDER is engaged in the manufacture and sale of medicines and
drug. Its principal office is at No. 41 Pioneer Street, Mandaluyong,
Rizal (now Metro Manila).
The PANGANIBANS, physicians, are the owners of the DOCTOR's
CLINIC in Calapan.
DOCTOR's CLINIC purchased medicines and drugs from INHELDER in
the amount of P1,385.10, payable in installments. The PANGANIBANS
were able to pay the amount of P824.10 for that purchase, leaving a
balance of P561.00 which had remained unpaid for approximately two
years.
On December 2, 1974, Atty. Fajardo sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS
requesting settlement of the said amount of P561.00. In their reply,
the PANGANIBANS requested a statement of account which was sent
to them on January 17, 1975 with a follow-up letter, again, requesting
remittance of the outstanding balance of P561.00.
On January 28, 1975, the PANGANIBANS, as stated by them, "sent
PNB Check No. 32058 to (INHELDER) in the amount of P561.00, dated
January 28, 1975, and said check was received by (INHELDER) on or
before February 5. 1975".
On February 8, 1975, Atty. Fajardo prepared the complaint in the
COLLECTION CASE, which was filed with the MANDALUYONG COURT
on February 12, 1975.
On February 19, 1975, INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS
"acknowledging the receipt of the PNB Check No. 32058
For the payment made by the PANGANIBANS to be effective, the PNB
Check must first be cleared with the PNB Branch in Calapan, which
could have been completed only on February 19, 1975.
Issue:
1. Whether the Municipal court erred in dismissing the
COLLECTION CASE for being unfounded.
2. Whether the Collection suit was maliciously instituted.
Ruling:
1. The municipal court erred in dismissing the collection suit. It is not
clear that the account of the PANGANIBANS had already been paid as
of February 12, 1975.
Under Article 1249 of the Civil Code, payment should be held effective
only when PNB Check No. 32058 was actually cashed by, or credited
to the account of, INHELDER. If that did not eventuate on or before
February 12, 1975, and there is no proof that it did, the account would
still be unpaid, and the complaint in the COLLECTION CASE,
technically, could not be considered as substantially unfounded.
It is true that when the check of the PANGANIBANS was received on
February 5, 1975, the better procedure would have been to withhold
a complaint pending determination of whether or not the check was
good. If dishonored, that would be the time to file the complaint. That
procedure was not followed because of the failure of the
corresponding advice which could have been given to Atty. Fajardo.
But the lack of that advice should not justify qualifying the
COLLECTION CASE as clearly unfounded. If the check had bounced,
the COLLECTION CASE would have been tried and acted upon by the
MANDALUYONG COURT on the merits.
2. The the COLLECTION CASE was not malicious. Malicious
prosecution, to be the basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice
and want of probable cause. 5 There must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge
was false and groundless. 6
In the present case, there is no evidence on record, clearly
establishing these two elements. Although there may be want of
probable cause, there is no proof that petitioner deliberately initiated
the COLLECTION CASE knowing that the same was false and
groundless.
Nor can malice be inferred from want of probable cause. It should also
be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does 'not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. 9 Sound principles of justice and public policy demand that
persons shall have free resort to Courts of law for redress of wrongs
and vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing trial for
damages should their actions lose ground.
Trial Courts must be reminded to guard against the award of
exhorbitant damages that are way out of proportion to the
environmental circumstances of a case and which, time and again, this
Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the
Courts in the assessment of damages must always be ex with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity.
RAAGAS vs TRAYA
Facts:
Sps. Raagas filed a case agains Octavio Traya for “recklessly” driving
a truck along the public highway in MacArthur, Leyte, and that the
said vehicle ran over a 3 year old child of the spouses causing the
instantaneous death. The Spouses claim for actual damages, moral,
nominal, corrective damages, attorney’s fees and expenses for
litigation. Octavio raised the defense that the truck drove slowly and
that it was the child who rushed from an unseen position causing his
death, the parent’s negligence and exercise of due diligence in the
supervision and selection of the driver. The case was set for hearing
on June 18 however the previous day of the hearing the counsel for
the defense requested the case to be postponed for July 2. The lower
court denied the request and consequently made a judgment on the
pleadings and awarded the damages requested by the plaintiffs.
CA:
Upon appeal, the CA certified the case to Supreme court because the
issues raised are purely of law.
Issue:
Whether it was wrong for the trial court to award the damages?
Ruling:
Yes. As we held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of
damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer,
such damages are not deemed admitted. We remand the case back
to the trail court for a full-blown trial.
PEOPLE vs JUGUETA
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant Ireneo Jugueta was charged
with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace
Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years
of age. That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party
who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.”
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores
and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder,
allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of
June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified
by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the
family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the
crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts
of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause
or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused,
that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and
children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils
and who are minors, were not hit.”
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case
against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his
sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with
a certain “Hapon” and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was
only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no
participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that
Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the
sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima
facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon
motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial
proceeded only as to appellant.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case
No. 7698-G reads:
“WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double
Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the
death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount
of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the
death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition,
he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in
the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.”
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment
in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
“WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple
Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation
to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto
Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further,
accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.”
Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the
CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.
Issue:
The main issue advanced in the Appellant’s Brief deals with the
inconsistencies in Norberto’s testimony, such as his failure to state
from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to
categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill
Norberto’s children.
Ruling:
The supposed inconsistencies in Norberto’s testimony, i.e., that he
failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants were
carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm
that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a
dent on said witness’s credibility. An examination of Norberto’s
testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak
of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan, “[m]inor inconsistencies and
discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility
of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime.”
The Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards
criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three
kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity,
moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be
awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our
criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages,
which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, “Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In our
jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind
of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage
or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money
as restitution.
Second, moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature and
may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages
must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the
injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed
in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. It is discretionary
upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed
the award of civil indemnity.
Third, also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,
therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the
case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender.
imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum
penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs
shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than
qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants
in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers
before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their
other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to
determine the stage in which the crime was committed and proven
during the trial.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single

act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those
were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and
moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims.
For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated.

If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance

but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty