PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOG Y BULLETIN
Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE
Incorporating Proximal and Distal
Influences on Prejudice: Testing a
General Model Across Outgroups
Christopher R. Agnew
Purdue University
Vaida D. Thompson
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Stanley O. Gaines, Jr.
Pomona College
The present research integrates various social psychological
approaches to understanding the causes of traditional prejudice.
The authors examined (a) whether conceptually distinct vari-
able sets shown previously to predict prejudice could be modeled
collectively within a proximal-distal framework and (b) whether
different outgroups could be modeled collectively within this
framework. The authors developed and tested a model that
included four sets of explanatory factors derived from past
research: Family Status, Contextual Exposures, Beliefs, and Per-
sonality. It was hypothesized that the influence of these factors
could be represented in a causal sequence such that (a) the distal
factors (i.e., Family Status and Contextual Exposures) would
lead to both proximal factors (i.e., Beliefs and Personality) and
(b) the proximal factors would lead directly to Negative Attitudes
Toward Outgroups. Structural equation analyses of data
obtained from two independent samples generally supported the
model—the impact of distal factors on prejudice was mediated
largely by proximal factors.
W hat causes prejudice? In searching for causal expla-
nations of prejudice toward various outgroups, past
research has addressed and supported a number of
single-factor solutions. The factors explored have been
diverse, including sociodemographic factors (e.g., an
association between urbanism and tolerance for various
outgroups) (Abrahamson & Carter, 1986), family sociali-
zation processes (e.g., prejudice stemming from domi-
neering parents) (Harris, Gough, & Martin, 1950), per-
sonal orientations (e.g., authoritarianism) (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and
cognitive-motivational processes (e.g., social identity)
403
(Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Although these past research
efforts have added to our understanding of intolerant
attitudes, it is generally agreed that no individual factor
or approach provides a comprehensive explanation of
prejudice (Duckitt, 1992a). Moreover, continued pur-
suit of single-factor explanations is unlikely to generate a
useful theoretical framework capable of integrating the
considerable amount of knowledge that currently exists
regarding prejudice.
In this article, we examine the multiple roots of overt,
negative attitudes toward members of one’s outgroups.
In the more recent literature, this type of prejudice is
sometimes labeled “traditional” or “old-fashioned” to
distinguish it from more modern and covert expressions
of outgroup rejection (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991).
Authors’ Note: This research was supported by a summer research
grant to the first and second authors from the Institute for Research in
Social Science (IRSS) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, a National Institute of Child Health and Human Develop-
ment–National Research Science Award (NICHD-NRSA) predoctoral
fellowship from the Carolina Population Center to the first author, and
a postdoctoral fellowship from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and institutional funds from Pomona College to the third
author. We thank David Currey, John Dovidio, Chet Insko, Abigail Pan-
ter, Bev Wiggins, and several anonymous reviewers for thoughtful com-
ments on previous drafts of this article, and we thank Eliot Smith and
Howard Weiss for comments concerning analysis issues. We also thank
the administration and staff of IRSS for assistance with various phases
of this research and Dustin Walling for assistance with Sample 2 data
collection. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to
Christopher R. Agnew, Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue
University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1364; e-mail: agnew@psych.pur-
due.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 26 No. 4, April 2000 403-418
© 2000 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
404 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Recent years have witnessed a decline in research
emphasis on overt prejudice despite strong evidence for
its continued presence in the world (e.g., the ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia) (see Jones, 1997).
We believe it remains important to focus research atten-
tion on the social psychological mechanisms that under-
lie traditional prejudice. Such attention is necessary
(although perhaps not sufficient) for progress to be
made toward eliminating such negativity.
Past social psychological searches for the cause(s) of
traditional prejudice often appear to have been guided
more by changing fashions and historical events than by
empirical data and are decidedly focused in their causal
emphasis (see Duckitt, 1992a; Gaines & Reed, 1995;
Stroebe & Insko, 1989). This is unfortunate given the
caveats offered over the years by leading thinkers in the
area. For example, Pettigrew (1958) argued that the
major psychological and sociological processes routinely
addressed separately by researchers are, in fact, “elabo-
rately intertwined and . . . both are essential to provide an
adequate theoretical framework for this complex phe-
nomenon” (p. 29). More recently, Hamilton and Trolier
(1986) point out that
any particular form of stereotyping or prejudice, such
as racism, is in all likelihood multiply determined by
cognitive, motivational, and social learning processes,
whose effects combine in a given social context to
produce specific judgmental and behavioral manifesta-
tions. Therefore, any attempt to understand such
phenomena as a product of one process alone is proba-
bly misguided. (p. 153)
Although theoretical and empirical pursuit of single
explanations for prejudice may have hampered the
development of more comprehensive models, there are
models that include multiple causal determinants,
including societal, familial, individual, and situational
variables. Notably, early writings by Allport (1954) sug-
gest that prejudice involves a multilevel, multifactor set
of causes, ranging from those that are remote to those
that are immediate. Describing factors varying in prox-
imity to prejudice, Allport cited historical factors as the
most remote influence, with sociocultural, situational,
personality, phenomenological, and stimulus object fac-
tors becoming, in turn, increasingly more immediate.
Others (e.g., Ashmore, 1970; Duckitt, 1992a; Simpson &
Yinger, 1985) have also proposed that similar sets of vari-
ables are influential. Unfortunately, tests providing
empirical support for such multivariate frameworks are
lacking.
A Proximal-Distal Approach
We have previously investigated prejudice toward a
specific outgroup using a multivariate proximal-distal
theoretical model (Agnew, Thompson, Smith,
Gramzow, & Currey, 1993). This research, focusing on
negativity toward homosexuals, followed from the think-
ing of Allport and was heuristically guided by conceptu-
alizations of Fishbein and Ajzen pertaining to predic-
tions of behavioral intentions and behavior. As with
Allport’s (1954) position and the reasoned action model
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), we theorized that a number of
variables, representing varying degrees of proximity to
the attitude, should predict to prejudicial attitudes. We
used the terms “proximal” and “distal” to indicate the
theorized degree of immediate influence of a variable
class on a person’s current attitudes. We used the term
“distal” to denote those factors that are preexisting, con-
ceptualizing those family factors that existed at the time
of birth as being the most remote from current attitudes,
intentions, and behavior. We used the term “proximal”
to denote factors that are more immediate to behavior,
conceptualizing such factors as concomitant percep-
tions as being most proximal to current attitudes, inten-
tions, and behavior. We reasoned that the more theoreti-
cally proximal the variable type, the stronger should be
its prediction of the attitude. The most distal variables
should predict to the attitude but each more proximal
set of variables should yield a stronger prediction.
Why should proximal variables be more predictive
than distal variables of current prejudicial attitudes?
Although preexisting family factors and past experi-
ences are necessary and important precursors of current
behaviors, behavior is primarily determined by the indi-
vidual’s immediate perceptions and situational influ-
ences. For example, whereas early family environment
influences what kind of person one becomes, it is cur-
rent situational pressures and one’s perception of these
forces that influence how one will act at the present time.
As one develops, one’s earliest experiences become
increasingly removed as predictors of present behavior,
whereas one’s immediate psychological state and the
immediate situation become increasingly prominent as
predictors of behavior. Extrapolating from the reasoned
action model, this same logic pertains to the prediction
of current attitudes, themselves a relatively proximal
predictor of behavior. Distal factors such as those exist-
ing in the family of origin should not be as predictive of
current attitudes as are one’s current beliefs and
personality.
The proximal-distal model that we developed for the
investigation of attitudes toward homosexuals (Agnew
et al., 1993) obtained substantial empirical support. The
model contained five broad sets of variables that were
theorized to be increasingly proximal to attitudinal
negativity toward homosexuals: distal family factors
(e.g., parental education), distal individual factors (e.g.,
dogmatism), proximal family factors (e.g., parental atti-
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE
tude toward homosexuality), proximal individual fac-
tors (e.g., current religious beliefs), and proximal
individual-situational factors (e.g., acquaintance with
homosexuals). When entered into separate analyses,
each of these five variable sets was significantly predictive
of attitudes toward homosexuals. We also found that the
more proximal variable sets tended to be increasingly
stronger predictors of such attitudes. Furthermore, we
found that the proximal variables not only accounted for
more variance in prejudice but also subsumed the effects
of the most distal variables when both were included in a
hierarchical regression model.
Focusing on Prejudice
Toward Multiple Outgroups
To extend and complement our past research, we
believe it is necessary to direct greater attention to preju-
dice pertaining across outgroups rather than to focus on
the causes of prejudice toward a specific outgroup. This
is particularly important in relation to any theoretical
speculation about the primacy of a specific factor (or fac-
tors) in influencing prejudice because focus on preju-
dice toward a distinct group may not confirm whether
prejudice toward other groups could be explained by
the same factor(s). It seems reasonable to assume that
prejudice toward one group indicates an increased ten-
dency to harbor prejudice toward other groups. Such a
position is consistent with Allport’s (1954) view that
“people who reject one out-group will tend to reject
other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to
be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti- any out-group” (p. 68).
This point also has been made more recently by Ray and
Lovejoy (1986), who hold that “to be ethnocen-
tric . . . implies that one will dislike all out-groups. To dis-
like just one out-group would be incoherent” (p. 563).
However, research exploring the generalizability of
prejudice rarely includes both a full set of predictor vari-
ables and multiple, distinctive outgroup targets suffi-
cient to provide a definitive answer to the generalizabil-
ity question. As a result, research may demonstrate the
presence or absence of generalizability but fail to pro-
vide a full causal picture for either.
Past empirical findings concerning generalizability of
prejudice are mixed but appear to support the notion of
generality. The classic authoritarian personality research
by Adorno and colleagues (Adorno et al., 1950) pro-
vided early evidence that particular individuals are intol-
erant of a wide variety of outgroups. Butler’s (1969) find-
ings also suggest generality of negativity toward racial,
class, and age outgroups. Similarly, in a review of a large
number of studies, Batson and Ventis (1982) found
strong evidence that particular religious orientations
and behaviors were associated with prejudice toward
African Americans as well as with being more punitive
405
toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, the mentally
ill, and drug addicts. Bierly (1985) also reported strong
empirical relations between attitudes toward homosexu-
als, African Americans, women, and old people. Consis-
tent with these findings, Weigel and Howes (1985) stud-
ied a sample of White, New England residents and
showed significant intercorrelations among measures of
prejudice toward African Americans, homosexuals, and
the elderly. Finally, Crandall (1994) recently reported a
significant association between antifat prejudice and
measures of both traditional and modern racism.
In contrast to the above findings, Ray and Lovejoy
(1986) obtained empirical support for generalizability
of outgroup negativity toward Asians, Blacks, Southern
Europeans, and Jews but found that different factors
contributed to rejection of different groups. However, as
in most of the extant research, predictor constructs used
were limited in nature and number, rendering conclu-
sions about the source of specific or generalized rejec-
tion speculative. Similarly, Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford
(1991) found what appeared to be generalizability of
prejudice whereby emotional responses were “a more
consistent and stronger predictor of attitudes and social
distance than were social stereotypes” (p. 359) in rela-
tion to various outgroups. However, affective responses
to different groups were not similar, suggesting some
degree of nongeneralizability. Thus, throughout the lit-
erature there is evidence for both generality and non-
generality of prejudice across outgroups, but predictor
variables employed have been limited in nature.
The Present Research
Given the above observations, there is a need for
empirical research that examines both the multivariate
nature of prejudice and the potential generality of rejec-
tion across outgroups. Such research requires both a
complete set of predictors and a reasonably varied set of
distinctive outgroups toward which negative attitudinal
responses can be explored. As noted earlier, our past
research (Agnew et al., 1993) examined only one out-
group (homosexuals), with no conclusions necessarily
applicable across different outgroups. Moreover, we did
not examine the linkages that may exist between proxi-
mal and distal variable sets.1 In the present research, we
examine these linkages and address two distinct research
questions: (a) Can the multiple antecedents of tradi-
tional prejudice be modeled within a multivariate
explanatory model, one that incorporates simultane-
ously both proximal and distal influences? and (b) Can a
generalizable model of prejudice (that includes multi-
ple outgroup targets) be supported by this single causal
framework? We were interested especially in testing both
an “indirect effects” model, in which the influence of dis-
tal variables on prejudice is mediated by the proximal
406 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
variables, and a “direct effects” model, in which the distal
variables exert a direct influence on prejudice above and
beyond that which would be obtained solely by mediator
(i.e., proximal) variables.
Hypothesized Proximal-Distal
Model of Prejudice Across Outgroups
An adequate multivariate model of prejudice should
be both parsimonious and reflective of the major antece-
dents of prejudice included in earlier frameworks. At a
minimum, four sets of explanatory factors should be
included:2 (a) Family Status, representing historical,
socioeconomic precursors to an individual’s current
social attitudes; (b) Contextual Exposures representing
early social and environmental conditions that affect the
formation of an individual’s outgroup attitudes; (c)
Beliefs reflecting the current general cognitive orienta-
tions of the individual that inform social attitudes; and
(d) Personality, reflecting individual differences in the
propensity to currently possess prejudicial attitudes.
Two of these sets, Family Status and Contextual Expo-
sures, can be considered to be distal, reflecting struc-
tural factors that shape the nature of exposure to out-
groups early in life. The other two sets, Beliefs and
Personality, are proximal, reflecting current defining
aspects of the individual.
We hypothesized that the influence of these four fac-
tors could be represented in a causal sequence such that
the two distal factors would lead to and shape the two
proximal factors and the two proximal factors would
lead directly to Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups.
Note that the effects of the two distal factors on prejudice
are hypothesized to be indirect in that their effect on
prejudice is predicted to be only through the two inter-
vening proximal factors. Our hypothesized theoretical
model (Model 1) is presented in Figure 1 (Paths 1 to 8).
As can be seen in Figure 1, Family Status is posited as
affecting the Contextual Exposures that the individual
confronts early in life as well as influencing the posses-
sion of particular Beliefs and Personality traits in later
life. Consistent with past sociological theorizing and
findings (e.g., Wilson, 1985; Wirth, 1938), it is reasoned
that individuals raised in families of higher status (with
more education and income) are more likely to have
opportunities to experience environments (both physi-
cal and social) that allow for increased contact with a het-
erogeneous population. Increased contact is seen as fos-
tering the formation of a more open belief system and a
more tolerant personality.3 Furthermore, higher status
families are less likely to espouse particular religious ten-
ets in the home or regularly attend religious services,
behaviors that have been shown (paradoxically) to lead
to an increase in prejudice (Batson & Ventis, 1982;
Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). Thus, both Family Status and
Figure 1 Proximal-distal model of prejudice, with Paths 1 to 8 repre-
senting the indirect effects model (Model 1) and the addi-
tion of Paths 9 and 10 representing the direct effects model
(Model 2).
Contextual Exposures are seen as distal factors that tap
early influences hypothesized to relate to later proximal
factors.
Consistent with past research, conservative beliefs
and tolerant personality traits are hypothesized to be the
most proximal and direct predictors of prejudice. Beliefs
have been viewed traditionally as a component of atti-
tude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Insko & Schopler, 1967;
McGuire, 1985), and conservative beliefs in particular
have been found to relate to prejudiced attitudes (for a
review, see Duckitt, 1992b). Personality traits also have
been shown to relate to prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950;
Duckitt, 1992b; Simonton, 1990). In the hypothesized
model shown in Figure 1, note that we suggest that these
two proximal factors are intercorrelated, with neither
factor posited as necessarily causing the other.
To test the generality of the proposed model, it was
necessary to measure attitudes toward several distinct
outgroups simultaneously. Furthermore, we reasoned
that the groups should be conceptually dissimilar from
one’s own in more than one way, for instance, people of a
different race and people of a different sexual orienta-
tion. Several such outgroups were identified and are
included in our model tests.
An Alternative Model:
Direct Effects of Distal Factors
It is possible that one or more alternative models pro-
vide a better theoretical explanation of the underpin-
nings of prejudice than does our hypothesized model
(see MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993).
One such model, which we call a direct effects model,
includes direct causal paths from the two distal factors to
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE
prejudice (i.e., from Contextual Exposures to Negative
Attitudes Toward Outgroups [Path 9 in Figure 1] and
from Family Status to Negative Attitudes Toward Out-
groups [Path 10 in Figure 1]), which were not included
in the hypothesized indirect effects model. The plausi-
bility of the direct effects model rests on a crucial
assumption from the standpoint of sociologically ori-
ented social psychological theory: Above and beyond
the mediated influence of Family Status and Contextual
Exposures on prejudice, both factors may be expected to
exert direct influences on prejudice (Stryker & Statham,
1985). Given the potential importance and plausibility
of such additional direct causal paths, we evaluated the
goodness of fit of a direct effects model in absolute terms
and in comparison to the hypothesized indirect effects
model.
To test the hypothesized model as well as possible
alternatives, we used data collected from two independ-
ent samples.
SAMPLE 1
Method
Study database and model variables. The first sample was
derived from a unique, extant database, the same data-
base that we used in our earlier research on attitudes
toward homosexuals (Agnew et al., 1993). Specifically,
data were collected by the Institute for Research in Social
Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill (UNC-CH) from randomly selected samples of male
and female undergraduate students over a 5-year period
(1983-1988) as part of the Computer Assisted Panel
Study (CAPS) (Latané, 1989). Over the course of a given
9-month academic year, CAPS participants completed
anonymously a number of different measures each week
via computer. By the end of their participation, most
CAPS participants had completed more than 200 sepa-
rate measures. Thus, the CAPS database contains a wide
variety of variables, including (a) family status variables
(largely demographic information); (b) contextual
exposure variables (including early lifetime social and
environmental conditions); (c) beliefs, attitudes, and
values; (d) measures of personality; and (e) three meas-
ures of prejudiced attitudes (specifically, attitudes
toward homosexuals, other races, and the elderly).
Based on the array of data available and an examination
of the psychometric properties of the measures, we
selected the subset of measures detailed in the appendix
as most conceptually consistent with the factors in the
hypothesized model. The possible scale range, mean,
standard deviation, and brief description of each meas-
ure are provided in the appendix. Individual variables
chosen to measure each model factor are reviewed
briefly below.
407
Family status. Three individual CAPS variables were
used to assess the general socioeconomic status of each
participant’s family while he or she was growing up.
These were father’s education, father’s occupational
status, and social class of the family.
Social and environmental contextual exposures. Four
measures were used to assess the contextual exposures
experienced by each participant early in life. Two of
these represented early exposure to religion (religious
exposure outside the home during high school and
moral/religious emphases in the home while growing
up) and two represented early environmental condi-
tions (development of the community and community
size during high school).
Conservative beliefs. Three standard measures were
selected to assess the current level of conservative
beliefs. These were orthodox religious beliefs, general
conservatism, and traditionality in gender-role beliefs.
Tolerant personality. Three scales from widely used per-
sonality inventories were used to measure current per-
sonality traits associated with prejudice: openness (from
the NEO Personality Inventory) (Costa & McCrae, 1985)
and flexibility and tolerance (from the California Per-
sonality Inventory [CPI]) (Gough, 1956). By proxy,
these measures can be thought to tap tendencies toward
authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950).
Negative attitudes toward outgroups. Three composite
attitude scales were used to assess prejudice toward out-
groups. As the alphas reported in the appendix show,
these scales reliably measured attitude toward homo-
sexuals, toward other races, and toward elderly persons.
Participants. The study included 288 undergraduates at
UNC-CH who participated in CAPS over the 3-year period
from 1986 to 1988. These students, 96 of whom partici-
pated in each of the 3 years, were selected randomly from
admission records to participate. Because only measures
that were collected during each of the 3 years were
employed in our model, we merged the data from the 3
years to create a combined data set for analyses.4
To test the proposed generalized outgroup model, it
was necessar y to exclude those participants who
reported that they were homosexual (n = 7) or bisexual
(n = 3), who declined to state their sexual orientation (n =
8), or who failed to complete all model measures (n =
65). This reduced the sample size to 205, 101 males and
104 females. Mean comparisons between this reduced
sample and the 65 “missing data” participants indicated
no significant differences on those variables for which
data were not missing. Age ranged from 17 to 24 years,
with a mean age of 20. The reported ethnicity of the sam-
ple closely matched that of the university: 85% White,
408 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
10% African American, 3% Asian American, and 2%
other (or unreported) ethnicity.
SAMPLE 2
We collected data from a second sample to extend
and complement the data obtained from the first sam-
ple. There were several notable methodological differ-
ences. First, the extant nature of the Sample 1 data did
not permit us to operationalize all conceptual variables
in the most direct fashion (unfortunately, such problems
are often encountered in research that uses secondary
data) (Dale, Arber, & Procter, 1988). That is, we found it
necessary to adopt measures that fit the model compo-
nents conceptually but that had not been designed spe-
cifically to test the temporal ordering implicit in the
hypothesized model. It would have been preferable to
have distal measures that specified precise temporal
periods (e.g., asking participants to provide answers to
distal items with respect to the period “while you were
growing up”).
In addition, the measurement of Contextual Expo-
sures in the first sample relied heavily on religion-
oriented measures, such as early religious service atten-
dance and family religiosity. Because the measurement
of Conser vative Beliefs also contained a religion-
oriented variable (religious orthodoxy), it is possible
that any latent association between Contextual Expo-
sures and Conservative Beliefs is due to this shared meas-
urement base and not due to an association at the
hypothesized latent level. Accordingly, with Sample 2 we
administered several new variables to operationalize
both Family Status and Contextual Exposures. These
variables more closely capture our intended conceptu-
alization of Contextual Exposures.
Third, to explore the model’s applicability to an even
broader set of outgroups, we included a fourth group
(foreigners) in our measurement of Negative Attitudes
Toward Outgroups. Moreover, with our second sample
we used previously published prejudice scales where pos-
sible, benefiting from the past measurement research on
racism by McConahay (1986); on ageism by Fraboni,
Saltstone, and Hughes (1990); and on antigay prejudice
by Kite and Deaux (1986).
Method
Participants. The study included 225 Purdue Univer-
sity undergraduates who completed self-report question-
naires in partial fulfillment of a psychology course
requirement. To test the proposed generalized out-
group model, it was necessary to exclude those partici-
pants who reported that they were not White (n = 26),
heterosexual (n = 6), or an American citizen (n = 13), or
who failed to complete all model measures (n = 3). This
reduced the sample size to 189, 118 males and 71
females. Age ranged from 18 to 35 years, with a mean age
of 22.
Procedure. Participants sequentially completed five
separate packets of questionnaires, each containing a
number of different self-report measures. As detailed
below, the first four packets contained the measures of
Family Status, Contextual Exposures, Beliefs, and Per-
sonality. The fifth packet contained the outgroup atti-
tude measures. The order of these outgroup attitude
measures was counterbalanced to determine the pres-
ence of possible order effects (subsequent analyses
revealed no such effects).
Model variables. The appendix lists all measures com-
pleted by Sample 2. Notable measurement differences
with the measures completed by Sample 1 will be high-
lighted here. In the measurement of Family Status, par-
ticipants were asked to provide both parents’ education
level and occupational status. An averaged parental
measure of education and occupational status was then
computed and used in analyses. In the measurement of
social and environmental contextual exposures, partici-
pants were asked about the racial composition of the
neighborhood in which they grew up. In addition, the
amount of contact with the four outgroups under investi-
gation was assessed and used as an indicator of early life
exposure to outgroup members. In the measurement of
Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups, we used three
published scales. As the alphas reported in the appendix
show, these scales reliably measured attitudes toward
homosexuals, toward other races, and toward elderly
persons. Because we could find no standard scale assess-
ing prejudice toward foreigners, we created an attitude
toward foreigners scale by adopting McConahay’s
(1986) measure of traditional racism. Alpha analyses
confirmed the internal reliability of this derived attitude
toward foreigners measure (see the appendix).
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
In our analyses, we followed a two-step analytic strat-
egy suggested by Schumacker and Lomax (1996) based
on earlier work by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) as well
as James, Muliak, and Brett (1982). These researchers
emphasize the desirability of analyzing two conceptually
distinct confirmatory models: (a) a measurement model
and (b) a structural model. The measurement model,
tested via confirmatory factor analysis, specifies the asso-
ciations between measured variables underlying
hypothesized latent factors and provides an assessment
of convergent, discriminant, and construct validity.
Assuming an adequate measurement model, one then
proceeds to the structural model. The structural model,
tested via structural equation analysis, specifies the
hypothesized associations among the latent factors and
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE 409

TABLE 1: Correlations Among Measured Variables for Each Hypothesized Latent Factor and Standardized Loadings on Latent Factors,
Samples 1 and 2

Loadings
Measured Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 S1 S2

Family status
1. Father’s/parents’ education 1.00 .46*** .48*** — — — .38 1.00
2. Father’s/parents’ occupational status .39*** 1.00 .44*** — — — .42 .60
3. Social class of family .32*** .31*** 1.00 — — — 1.00 .69
Social and environmental contextual exposures
1. Religious exposure outside the home 1.00 — — — — — .75 —
2. Moral/religious emphases in home .61*** 1.00 — — — — 1.00 —
3. Early outgroup contact — — 1.00 .39*** .22** .25*** — .41
4. Early neighborhood racial mix — — — 1.00 .21** .37*** — .47
5. Development of community .16* .22** — — 1.00 .51*** .27 .60
6. Size of community .29*** .25** — — .37*** 1.00 .41 1.00
Conservative beliefs
1. Orthodox religious beliefs 1.00 .43** .45*** — — — .84 .51
2. General conservatism .50*** 1.00 .44*** — — — 1.00 .66
3. Traditionality in gender-role beliefs .14* .33*** 1.00 — — — .44 1.00
Tolerant personality
1. Openness 1.00 .52*** .29*** — — — 1.00 .72
2. Flexibility .44*** 1.00 .38*** — — — .63 1.00
3. Tolerance .35*** .40*** 1.00 — — — .75 .54
Negative attitudes toward outgroups
1. Attitude toward homosexuals 1.00 .37*** .32*** .48*** — — 1.00 .68
2. Attitude toward other races/Blacks .51*** 1.00 .37*** .62*** — — .91 .72
3. Attitude toward elderly persons .18** .22** 1.00 .36*** — — .31 .47
4. Attitude toward foreigners — — — 1.00 — — — 1.00

NOTE: Sample 1 (S1) correlations are displayed below the diagonal. Sample 2 (S2) correlations are displayed above the diagonal.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

can be thought of as providing an assessment of
nomological validity.
Following this two-step approach, we began by assess-
ing the measurement model, determining whether each
set of measured variables hypothesized to measure a
given second-order factor (shown in Figure 1) actually
measured that latent factor in a valid and reliable man-
ner within each sample (see Bernstein, Garbin, & Teng,
1988; Nunnally, 1967). To accomplish this, we used
LISREL to conduct two separate confirmatory factor
analyses, one for each sample, in which we tested
whether each measure loaded significantly on the
hypothesized latent factor. As part of the confirmatory
factor analyses, we tested whether an orthogonal or
oblique solution provided a significantly better model fit
to the sample data. This type of model comparison indi-
cates whether the latent factors postulated to underlie a
set of measured variables are or are not intercorrelated
with another given the data (Schumacker & Lomax,
1996). Support for an orthogonal model would argue
against our hypothesized model in that such a model
would hold that there are no relationships between
latent factors. Support for an oblique model would be
consistent with our hypothesized model in that such a
model would indicate that there is at least some relation-
ship between the latent factors but not necessarily in the
precise manner specified in our hypothesized model.
Next, to test our hypothesized structural model and
potential alternative structural models, we analyzed the
data from both samples simultaneously by conducting
two-group (also referred to as multiple group) analyses
using LISREL. Two-group analyses test whether the
obtained pattern of associations observed between
latent factors differs significantly between groups (or
samples). Besides providing a parsimonious manner of
model testing, two-group structural analyses are particu-
larly useful in cases in which the groups have an unequal
number of measured variables. Given that Sample 1 had
a total of 16 measured variables and Sample 2 had 17
measured variables (including the additional foreigner
measure), two-group analyses provides an excellent
method for testing the equality of factor structure across
the two samples.
RESULTS
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Table 1 presents the simple correlations between vari-
ables hypothesized to comprise each latent factor for
Samples 1 and 2. As can be seen in the table, the variables
410 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
postulated to measure each construct were significantly
intercorrelated. In addition, the loadings derived from
the separate confirmatory factor analyses of the meas-
ured variables are displayed in Table 1. In conducting
these confirmatory analyses, note that (a) maximum
likelihood estimation methods were employed, a
method preferred due to its desirable psychometric
properties (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989); (b) one variable
in each measured set was set to 1 (often referred to as the
reference variable) (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993) and the
others in the set allowed to vary; and (c) LISREL’s ridge
option was employed, allowing estimations in the pres-
ence of multicollinearity. For both samples, the obtained
factor loadings indicate that the measured variables
hypothesized to load on a given latent factor did so gen-
erally at a moderate to high level.
In addition, model comparisons of orthogonal versus
oblique solutions suggest support for an oblique solu-
tion. For Sample 1, the obtained chi-square value was
175.23 (df = 109) for an orthogonal solution and 77.44
(df = 99) for an oblique solution. The chi-square differ-
ence test for significance indicated that the oblique solu-
tion provided a significantly better fit to the data than
did the orthogonal solution, χ2 difference (10) = 97.79,
p < .01. Similarly, for Sample 2, the obtained chi-square
value was 101.64 (df = 124) for an orthogonal solution
and 61.65 (df = 114) for an oblique solution, with the
oblique solution providing a significantly better fit, χ2
difference (10) = 39.99, p < .01. On the basis of the corre-
lational findings, the confirmatory factor analyses, and
the oblique versus orthogonal model comparisons, we
concluded that our measurement models were adequate
in both samples.
Structural Equation Analyses
Next, to assess the structural model, we performed
two-group structural equation analyses in which the
goodness of fit of Model 1 (shown in Figure 1, Paths 1 to
8) was assessed. All parameters were estimated using the
maximum likelihood method, with ridge option. With
the exception of the correlation between Conservative
Beliefs and Tolerant Personality (which was predicted to
be negative), all off-diagonal elements of the variance-
covariance matrix were fixed at 0. Moreover, all elements
in the beta weight matrix corresponding to paths in Fig-
ure 1 were freed. All measurement error terms were esti-
mated by LISREL but were constrained to be equal
across factors and across samples. Obtained latent factor-
pooled, within-group correlations ranged from .23 to .67
(all ps < .001). The resulting standardized beta weights,
correlation, and residuals associated with the elements
of the hypothesized structural model are shown in Table 2.
Test of the indirect effects model (Model 1, Paths 1 to 8). As
Table 2 reveals, seven of the eight paths hypothesized to
be significant were significant, with the valences for
those paths in the expected directions. The exception
involves the direct path between Family Status and Con-
servative Beliefs. Essentially, no linear relation was found
between these two latent factors (standardized beta =
–.04). As for overall model fit, results of the structural
equation analysis indicated that the indirect effects
model provided a satisfactory fit to the data, χ2(17) =
24.03, ns, Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) = .98, standard-
ized Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = .07, with the
chi-square/degrees-of-freedom ratio (i.e., 1.41) well
within the range of values commonly viewed as accept-
able (i.e., 1.0 to 2.0) (Loehlin, 1992). The total amount
of variance in the criterion variable (i.e., Negative Atti-
tudes Toward Outgroups) accounted for by the model
was 57%.
Test of the direct effects model (Model 2, Paths 1 to 10).
Although the a priori hypothesized indirect effects
model could not be rejected in terms of goodness-of-fit
criteria, it is possible that an alternative direct effects
model would provide an even better fit to the data. Such
a model, as described in the Introduction, adds direct
causal paths (a) from Contextual Exposures to Negative
Attitudes Toward Outgroups (Path 9 in Figure 1) and (b)
from Family Status to Negative Attitudes Toward Out-
groups (Path 10 in Figure 1). The results for the direct
effects model (Model 2) are shown in Table 2. In and of
itself, the direct effects model provided a marginal fit to
the data, χ2(15) = 23.90, p <.07, GFI = .98, standardized
RMR = .07. Of importance, as shown in Table 2, neither
added direct path approached statistical significance.
Comparing Model 2 with Model 1. We then compared the
overall fit of Model 2 with Model 1 by computing the dif-
ferences between the chi-squares and degrees-of-
freedom associated with each model (Loehlin, 1992). To
support Model 2 (the direct effects model) the loss in
degrees of freedom corresponding to the inclusion of
the two additional paths in that model would have to be
offset by a significant reduction of chi-square value from
Model 1 (the indirect effects model). Otherwise, adop-
tion of Model 2 would amount to sacrificing theoretical
and statistical parsimony for the sake of a negligible
change in chi-square (Loehlin, 1992; see also MacCal-
lum et al., 1993). The chi-square test for significance
indicated that Model 2 did not provide a significantly
better fit than Model 1, χ2 difference (2) = .13, ns. There-
fore, we concluded that the direct effects model fit the
correlational data no better than the hypothesized indi-
rect effects model and was less parsimonious in its
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE 411

TABLE 2: Two-Group Structural Results for Indirect- and Direct-Effects Models, Across Outgroups and by Outgroup

Overall Model Fit Indices Standardized Loadings by Path

2
c df GFI RMR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Across outgroups
Indirect Effects Model (Model 1) 24.03 17 .98 .07 –.04 .44** .28* –.43** .20* –.36** .46** –.40** — —
Direct Effects Model (Model 2) 23.90 15 .98 .07 –.03 .44** .27* –.44** .21* –.36** .48** –.39** .04 –.04
Residuals (ε) for Model 1/Model 2: Contextual Exposures = .81/.81, Conservative Beliefs = .80/.80,
Tolerant Personality = .84/.84, Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups = .44/.43

Homosexuals
Indirect Effects Model (Model 1) 15.93 17 .98 .12 –.03 .42** .25* –.40** .17 –.33** .40** –.29* — —
Direct Effects Model (Model 2) 15.10 15 .98 .11 –.02 .43** .25* –.43** .19 –.32** .47** –.29* .13 –.03
Residuals (ε) for Model 1/Model 2: Contextual Exposures = .82/.81, Conservative Beliefs = .83/.80,
Tolerant Personality = .87/.86, Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups = .66/.62

Other races/Blacks
Indirect Effects Model (Model 1) 28.28 17 .97 .16 –.02 .44** .25* –.44** .20 –.32** .41** –.30* — —
Direct Effects Model (Model 2) 28.11 15 .97 .16 –.03 .43** .25* –.42** .20 –.32** .38* –.29** –.06 .01
Residuals (ε) for Model 1/Model 2: Contextual Exposures = .81/.81, Conservative Beliefs = .80/.81,
Tolerant Personality = .85/.86, Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups = .63/.65

The elderly
Indirect Effects Model (Model 1) 17.95 17 .98 .11 –.03 .43** .25* –.43** .18 –.32** –.00 –.28* — —
Direct Effects Model (Model 2) 17.17 15 .98 .11 –.03 .43** .25* –.43** .18 –.31** .06 –.29* .12 –.01
Residuals (ε) for Model 1/Model 2: Contextual Exposures = .82/.81, Conservative Beliefs = .81/.80,
Tolerant Personality = .87/.86, Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups = .92/.91

NOTE: GFI = Goodness-of-Fit index, RMR = standardized Root Mean Square Residual.
*z > 1.96, p < .05. **z > 2.58, p < .01.

explanation of the pattern of correlations. This conclu-
sion is particularly warranted when one considers the
lack of significance obtained for the two additional
direct paths.
Test of a revised indirect effects model (Model 3, Paths 2, 4, 5,
6, 7, and 8). Given the lack of relationship between Fam-
ily Status and Conservative Beliefs, we also tested a
revised version of our indirect effects model, which pos-
ited no direct association between Family Status and
either of the proximal factors. In this revised indirect
effects model, Family Status is seen as affecting Beliefs
and Personality only through its relationship to Contex-
tual Exposures. The revised indirect effects model pro-
vided a marginally satisfactory fit to the data, c2(19) =
28.93, p < .10, GFI = .97, standardized RMR = .08. All six
paths remain significant at the .01 level. We then com-
pared the overall fit of Model 3 with Model 1 by comput-
ing the differences between the chi-squares and degrees
of freedom associated with each model. The chi-square
test for significance indicated that Model 3 provided a
marginally worse fit than Model 1, χ2 difference (2) =
4.90, p < .10. Therefore, we concluded that the revised
indirect effects model fit the data less well than did the
hypothesized indirect effects model in its explanation of
the observed pattern of correlations.5
Exploring Mediation
We also examined the degree to which the effects of
the two distal factors (Family Status and Contextual
Exposures) on Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups
were mediated by the two proximal factors (Conserva-
tive Beliefs and Tolerant Personality). To that end, we
conducted two separate analyses. First, consistent with
an approach suggested by Schumacker and Lomax
(1996), we computed the total effect size obtained from
Model 1 (which includes no direct effect paths for the
two distal factors) and compared it with the total effect
size obtained from Model 2 (which includes the two
direct effects paths) using GPOWER (Erdfelder, Faul, &
Buchner, 1996; Faul & Erdfelder, 1992). Results indi-
cated no difference in effect size between the two models
(effect size = 1.44 in both models), indicating that the
distal factors do not account for additional variance in
prejudice beyond that provided by proximal factors. Sec-
ond, we conducted stepwise regression analyses using
the obtained latent factor scores and found that the two
distal factors did not contribute significantly to a model
412 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
that contained the two proximal factors (R 2 = .57 in both
models). In contrast, the two proximal factors did con-
tribute significantly to a model containing only the two
proximal factors. Thus, the two proximal factors can be
said to meaningfully mediate the association of the two
distal factors on Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups.
In addition, we explored the manner in which the two
distal factors exert their indirect effects on Negative Atti-
tudes Toward Outgroups via the two proximal factors. To
that end, we calculated the total indirect effects of each
distal factor on Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups via
each proximal factor. Family Status was found to have an
indirect effect size of .147 via Tolerant Personality and
.105 via Conservative Beliefs. Contextual Exposures was
found to have an indirect effect size of .080 via Tolerant
Personality and .198 via Conservative Beliefs. Although
descriptive in nature, the differences in the relative sizes
of these indirect effects suggest that the two distal factors
influence general prejudice via slightly different proxi-
mal routes, with Family Status exerting its effect through
both Personality and Beliefs and Contextual Exposures
exerting its effect mainly through Beliefs.
Testing Single Outgroup Models
Although we were primarily interested in determin-
ing whether there was general support for an indirect
effects versus a direct effects model across outgroups, we
also recognize that it may be of interest to know how the
models fare for each of the separate outgroups. To that
end, we conducted ancillary analyses (a) to determine
whether there was general support for the indirect
effects model over the direct effects model for each of
the separate outgroups, (b) to examine the path load-
ings obtained for each outgroup in each model, and (c)
to explore the degree to which the effects of the two dis-
tal factors on Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups were
mediated by the two proximal factors for each outgroup.
Table 2 contains the two-group structural results for
both indirect and direct effects models computed sepa-
rately for each of the outgroups (note that two-group
analyses were not possible for attitude toward foreigners
because this attitude was measured only in Sample 2). As
can be seen in Table 2, all of the separate indirect effects
models provided a satisfactory fit to the data; for attitude
toward homosexuals, χ2(17) = 15.93, ns, GFI = .98, stan-
dardized RMR = .12; for attitude toward other races,
χ2(17) = 28.28, ns, GFI = .97, standardized RMR = .16;
and for attitude toward elderly persons, χ2(17) = 17.95,
ns, GFI = .98, standardized RMR = .11. Of principal inter-
est, however, is the comparison of each of these indirect
effect models with their respective direct effect counter-
parts. In no case did the corresponding direct effects
model provide a superior fit to the data; for attitude
toward homosexuals, χ2 difference (2) = 0.83, ns; for atti-
tude toward other races, χ2 difference (2) = 0.17, ns; and
for attitude toward elderly persons, χ2 difference (2) =
0.78, ns. Although there were some differences in magni-
tude or significance for individual path loadings (e.g.,
Path 5 was only marginally significant when considered
within each of the separate outgroups; Path 7 was not sig-
nificant for attitude toward the elderly), the overall ade-
quacy and superiority of the indirect effects model was
not influenced significantly by the particular outgroup
in question.
To more fully examine mediation, we also conducted
two additional analyses for each outgroup. First, using
the procedure outlined above, we computed the total
effect size obtained from Model 1 and compared it with
the total effect size obtained from Model 2 for each out-
group. Results indicated no difference in effect size
between the two models for attitude toward other
races/Blacks (effect size = .61 in both models) and small
differences in effect size for attitude toward the elderly
(effect size = .09 and .10 for Models 1 and 2, respec-
tively), attitude toward homosexuals (effect size = .56
and .64 for Models 1 and 2, respectively), and attitude
toward foreigners (effect size = .18 and .23 for Models 1
and 2, respectively). By convention, the magnitude of
such effect size differences is considered to be small
(Lipsey, 1990). Second, we conducted stepwise regres-
sion analyses for each outgroup using the single out-
group prejudice measure and the obtained latent factor
scores derived from the proximal-distal measures. We
found that the two distal factors did not contribute sig-
nificantly to a model that contained the two proximal
factors for attitude toward other races/Blacks (R2 = .38 in
both models), did contribute minimally for attitude
toward the elderly (R2 = .08 for Model 1 and .09 for
Model 2), and did contribute significantly for attitude
toward homosexuals (R2 = .36 for Model 1 and .39 for
Model 2) and attitude toward foreigners (R 2 = .15 for
Model 1 and .19 for Model 2). In contrast, the two proxi-
mal factors did contribute significantly to a model con-
taining only the two proximal factors for each outgroup.
Thus, with some exception, the two proximal factors can
be said to largely mediate the association of the two distal
factors on prejudice.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We began this article by asking a deceptively simple
question: “What causes prejudice?” Results from the cur-
rent investigation lead us to answer “both proximal and
distal factors, themselves causally linked.” Such a
response echoes the sentiment of Allport (1954) and
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE
others who have suggested that prejudice involves a mul-
tilevel, multifactor set of causes, ranging from those
causes that are remote to those that are immediate.
Unfortunately, these past theoretical pronouncements
have not been paralleled by systematic empirical valida-
tion. Data from two independent samples provide con-
verging evidence of the viability of a general model of
prejudice, one that incorporates both proximal and dis-
tal causes of traditional prejudice.
Specifically, the results from structural equation
analyses suggest that an indirect effects proximal-distal
model, in which the impact of distal factors (i.e., Family
Status and Contextual Exposures) on prejudice is medi-
ated by proximal factors (i.e., Conservative Beliefs and
Tolerant Personality traits), provides a significant and
parsimonious fit to the data. The proximal-distal model
explains substantial variance in individuals’ prejudicial
attitudes in absolute terms, and with the exception of the
hypothesized direct path from Family Status to Conser-
vative Beliefs, every path and correlation hypothesized
in the model proved to be statistically significant. More-
over, the addition of direct paths from Family Status and
Contextual Exposures to prejudice failed to improve the
fit of the original model significantly, and both of these
direct paths failed to reach statistical significance.
Additional mediation analyses suggest that the two
distal factors influence general prejudice via slightly dif-
ferent proximal routes, with Family Status exerting its
effect through both Personality and Beliefs and Contex-
tual Exposures exerting its effect mainly through Beliefs.
Descriptive in nature, these finding are probably best
interpreted at face value. That is, these subtle differ-
ences are best not overemphasized or interpreted as
meaning that either Family Status or Contextual Expo-
sures are more or less important in understanding tradi-
tional prejudice. Rather, the dual mediating roles of
Conservative Beliefs and Tolerant Personality under-
score the subtle manner in which both Family Status and
Social and Environmental Contextual Exposures are
manifested in Negative Attitudes Toward Outgroups. We
believe these results demonstrate that there is a multi-
variate causal nexus underlying prejudice. Whereas vari-
ables that are more proximal to the outgroup attitude
should predict better than variables that are further
removed (Agnew et al., 1993), these proximal variables
are themselves largely derived from (or influenced by)
more distal antecedent variables. In this sense, the find-
ings are consistent with those found for other proximal-
distal social psychological models, such as the reasoned
action model (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Just as one’s
behavior is best predicted by factors that are most proxi-
mal and specific to the behavior (e.g., behavioral inten-
tions), one’s attitude toward outgroups is best predicted
by current beliefs and personality traits, not by tempo-
413
rally distal factors such as family education. Viewing tra-
ditional prejudice in this proximal-distal manner per-
mits us to align prejudice research with central tenets in
attitude theory and, ultimately, to explore in finer detail
the role that social-cultural, family, and individual vari-
ables play in the formation of current attitudes.
Such a model permits one to examine some of the
complex contributions of distal factors. For example,
Family Status was not manifested directly in Conserva-
tive Beliefs, as was hypothesized and as might have been
expected given previous research (e.g., Hyman &
Wright, 1979). Rather, Family Status exerted its effects
on Conservative Beliefs via Contextual Exposures (Paths
2 and 4). It is possible that the locus of socioeconomic
status in the current investigation may be partially
responsible for the lack of direct effect. Previous find-
ings are based on the examination of a given individual’s
own socioeconomic circumstances and his or her own
conservative beliefs. In contrast, the socioeconomic
status of our college student participants may be quite
different from that of their parent(s) (note the educa-
tional attainment means of parents in the appendix).
The direct association between Family Status and Con-
servative Beliefs is diminished as Family Status deviates
increasingly from a participant’s own current socioeco-
nomic circumstances. It should be stressed, however,
that this explanation is speculative.
Can a generalizable model of prejudice (one that
includes multiple outgroup targets) be supported by a
single causal framework? The results suggest an affirma-
tive response to this question. In both samples, we found
a significant amount of shared variance among the sin-
gle outgroup measures of prejudice (see Table 1).
Moreover, the latent prejudice factor was found to be sig-
nificantly associated with both proximal and distal fac-
tors, in both bivariate (or bifactorial) correlations and
within the structural models (see Table 2). These find-
ing are consistent with past research that showed interre-
lations among measures of prejudice toward different
target outgroups (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Crandall,
1994; Weigel & Howes, 1985).
Although we found much commonality in overall pat-
terns of association, analyses of specific outgroups
revealed some differences in overall variance accounted
for and in the magnitude or significance of individual
path loadings (see Table 2). The most prominent of
these differences emerged for attitude toward the eld-
erly. The overall amount of variance in this attitude
accounted for by model factors was markedly lower than
that for the other outgroups. Furthermore, the path
between Conservative Beliefs and negative attitude
toward the elderly was found to be essentially 0 (see Path
7 in Table 2 under “the elderly”), whereas for the other
outgroups this path was found to be strongly and posi-
414 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
tively significant. This lack of association is consistent
with recent theorizing concerning the unique nature of
the elderly as an outgroup. As Lambert and Chasteen
(1997) note, although it is tempting to view the elderly as
“ ‘just another outgroup,’ this group differs from other
social categories in that for most people, what was once
an out-group inevitably becomes an in-group” (p. 470).
In their article, Lambert and Chasteen offer a concep-
tual framework that differentiates conservatism from lib-
eralism. Conservatism is held to be associated “with
respect for conventional, old fashioned values,” whereas
liberalism is viewed as associated “with the desire to assist
disadvantaged groups” (p. 469). Because the elderly are
seen as both highly disadvantaged and highly conven-
tional, the authors hypothesized and obtained evidence
that conservatism was negatively correlated with atti-
tudes toward Blacks but positively correlated with atti-
tudes toward the elderly. Although the proximal-distal
model highlights important similarities in predictors of
negativity toward outgroups, the observed differences
for the elderly on this dimension underscore the impor-
tance of considering perceived differences in an out-
group’s conventionality versus disadvantaged status.
Because of the cross-sectional nature of the present
data, it is useful to note the logical temporal order of the
factors contained in the theorized proximal-distal
model. The model begins with distal social factors exis-
tent early in life and proceeds to the current beliefs and
personality traits of the individual. It is not plausible,
theoretically, for the causal sequence to go from the
proximal to the distal. An individual who currently pos-
sesses conservative beliefs or has a tolerant personality
would not be capable of affecting his or her family’s
socioeconomic status when the individual was growing
up. The logic of this temporal ordering strengthens the
validity of the model (see Heise, 1975). It should, of
course, be noted that only longitudinal data can estab-
lish causality. Furthermore, because we do not directly
measure distal factors but rather contemporaneous
memories, recollections, and reports of these factors, it
is possible that such reports may be distorted by current
beliefs and personality factors.
Limitations regarding the samples used in this study
also should be noted. First, it might be argued that col-
lege student samples are not representative of the gen-
eral public and may not be an appropriate population
with which to test the model (Sears, 1986). Indeed, vari-
ance on such critical distal variables as education and
age is severely restricted in a college sample. Consider-
ing the multiplicity of measures administered, it would
not be easy to collect the requisite data from a more rep-
resentative general population survey. This difficulty
might account for why multivariate, integrative models
of prejudice have not been subject to widespread empiri-
cal testing in the past. However, it is also true that the cur-
rent climate of political correctness on college campuses
nationwide might be expected to reduce the level of
expressed negativity toward outgroups (Jones, 1997).
Therefore, one might reasonably expect stronger effects
from a noncollege sample than those reported here.
In addition, it would be preferable to test the model
with a more racially and ethnically diverse sample. Such
testing might not only demonstrate the generalizability
of the overall model but also suggest any important dif-
ferences in the predictive value of specific measures for
specific groups of respondents. Although it would
clearly be instructive to have data from additional seg-
ments of the general population, the present study
remains a useful demonstration of our major point: a
multivariate, proximal-distal framework is capable of
integrating a number of conceptually distinct social psy-
chological approaches to prejudice.
Despite noted limitations, this study has a number of
strengths. Although the bivariate findings within the
model are largely consistent with past research, the
empirical combination of distal and proximal variable
sets tested within a single model employing a latent out-
group factor is unique. In addition, the data collection
procedure employed in the CAPS project (Sample 1)
provided desirable temporal separation of the instru-
ments used to measure the model components (e.g., the
measure of ageism was collected during the 3rd week of
the study, whereas the racism measure was administered
during the 10th week). This measurement separation
reduced the possibility that participants’ data were
affected by transitory factors (e.g., temperature or
mood).
This study represents one step toward the establish-
ment of a broad framework that consolidates existing
knowledge about traditional prejudice. The proximal-
distal framework allows for the simultaneous test of the
effects of numerous predictor variables that have
received past support. In so doing, the framework dem-
onstrates that it facilitates not only the organization of
predictive factors but also their meaningful consolida-
tion. Past research suggests that the factors in the
proximal-distal model correlate with traditional preju-
dice in a bivariate sense. However, knowledge regarding
the interconnectivity of these factors adds appreciably to
our understanding of the mechanism through which
particular variable sets exert their effects.
Traditional prejudice remains a real-world phenome-
non with profound implications for victims and perpe-
trators alike. Although the atrocities of World War II
served as the impetus for contemporary social psycho-
logical inquiry on prejudice (see Snyder & Ickes, 1985),
current events such as the rise of neo-Nazi hate groups in
the United States and Europe, the recent ethnic cleans-
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE 415

ing in the former Yugoslavia, and the increasing outcry (Jones, 1997). A genuine understanding of the nature of
against immigrants in the more developed countries of such prejudice requires a thorough exploration of these
the world suggest that the ultimate causes of traditional causal precursors and of the chain of causality underly-
prejudice are just as firmly rooted today as ever before ing outgroup rejection.

APPENDIX
Description of Measured Model Variables, Samples 1 and 2

Variablea Scale Range Mean (SD) Description

Family status
1a. Father’s education
1b. Parents’ education
2a. Father’s occupational
status
2b. Parents’ occupational
status
3a. Social class of family
3b. Social class of family
1 (8th grade) to 7 (Ph.D.)
1 (8th grade) to 7 (Ph.D.)
0 to 100 (e.g., 20 = waiter, 73.58 (17.10) “If you had to rank the occupation that your father had most
60 = bookkeeper, 98 = doctor)
0 to 99 (e.g., 88 = garbage
collector, 02 = physician)
1 (lower) to 5 (upper)
4.77 (1.38)
“What is the highest grade in school completed . . . by your
father or man who raised you?”
4.38 (1.07) Two items similar to the question above, one for each parent;
responses averaged
of the time that you were growing up, where would you put
it on the above scale?”
64.24 (15.52) Two items similar to the question above, one for each parent;
responses averaged and reverse coded.
3.47 (.66) “Generally speaking, what would you say was the social class
of your family while you were growing up?”
3.14 (.86)

Contextual exposures
4a. Religious exposure
outside the home
4b. Early outgroup contact
5a. Moral/religious
emphases in home
5b. Early neighborhood
racial mix
6a. Development of
community
6b. Development of
community
7a. Size of community
7b. Size of community
1 (at least once a week) to 4
(almost never)
1 (absolutely no contact) to 5
(very frequent contact)
29 to 71: lower = more moral/ 45.47 (10.66)
religious emphases at home
1 (all White), 2 (mostly White), 3
(about half White, half non-White),
4 (mostly non-White),
5 (all non-White)
1 (rural farm), 2 (rural
nonfarm), 3 (suburb), or
4 (city/town)
1 (rural farm) to 5 (large
city or town)
1 (less than 5,000 people) to 3
(greater than 100,000 people)
1 (less than 5,000 people) to 5
(greater than 1,000,000 people)
2.13 (1.14) “While in high school, how often would you say you attended
religious services?”
1.80 (.64) “How much contact would you say you had with Black
people [old people, foreigners, homosexuals] in the
neighborhood where you grew up?” (separate responses
averaged)
9-item standardized scale. Measures emphasize ethical and
religious issues and values in the family (from the Family
Environment Scale) (Moos & Moos, 1981).
1.56 (.58) “What was the racial mixture (the ratio of Whites and non-
Whites) in the neighborhood where you grew up?”
3.27 (.95) “In which of the following was your home (during high
school) located?”
3.19 (1.24) “In which of the following was your home located while
growing up?”
1.99 (.70) “What would you say was the size of the community in which
you lived during high school?”
2.56 (1.13) “What would you say was the size of the community in which
you lived while you were growing up?”

Conservative beliefs
8a. Orthodox religious beliefs
8b. Orthodox religious beliefs
9a. General conservatism
9b. General conservatism
10a. Traditionality in gender- 0 to 75: lower = more
role beliefs
10b. Traditionality in
gender-role beliefs
12 to 108: higher = more
religious orthodox beliefs
13 to 78: higher = more
conservative
traditional role beliefs
(reversed in analyses)
79.60 (26.72) 12-item scale measures belief in traditional religious
doctrines (e.g., American Protestantism) (Batson & Ventis,
1982)
80.04 (26.84)
44.21 (7.12) 13-item scale assesses general conservatism as a separate
factor from liberalism (Kerlinger, 1984)
42.20 (8.78)
16.73 (10.01) 25-item scale measures beliefs about the rights and roles of
women in major activities that could be the same for men
and women (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973)
25.80 (11.34)

(continued)
416 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

APPENDIX Continued

Variablea Scale Range Mean (SD) Description

Tolerant personality
11a. Openness 0 to 192: higher = more 117.73 (17.39) 48-item subscale from the NEO Personality Inventory
openness (Costa & McCrae, 1985)
11b. Openness 122.37(18.52)
12a. Flexibility 1 to 28: higher = more 14.40 (4.00) 28-item subscale from the California Personality Inventory
flexibility (Gough, 1956)
12b. Flexibility 16.36 (4.87)
13a. Tolerance 1 to 32: higher = more 19.89 (4.50) 32-item subscale from the California Personality Inventory
tolerance (Gough, 1956)
13b. Tolerance 20.75 (4.31)

Negative attitudes toward outgroups

14a. Attitude toward
homosexuals
14b. Attitude toward
homosexuals
15a. Attitude toward other
races
15b. Attitude toward Blacks
16a. Attitude toward
elderly persons
16b. Attitude toward
elderly people
17b. Attitude toward foreigners 5-point Likert scales, ranging
5-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
14 to 70 (higher = more
negative attitude).
5-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
21 to 105 (higher = more
negative attitude).
5-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
9 to 45 (higher = more
negative attitude).
5-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
7 to 35 (higher = more
negative attitude).
4-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
10 to 40 (higher = more
negative attitude).
5-point Likert scales, ranging
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
29 to 145 (higher = more
negative attitude).
from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. Scores ranged from
7 to 35 (higher = more
negative attitude).
43.68 (13.25) 14-item composite measure (α = .95). For example, “Homo-
sexuality is something unhealthy and abnormal that should
be cured.”
62.06 (18.48) 21-item Homosexual Attitude Scale (α = .92) (Kite & Deaux,
1986). For example, “Homosexuals should be forced to have
psychological treatment.”
22.80 (7.13) 9-item composite measure (α = .87). For example, “The
races should be considered equal in all matters public and
private.”
15.03 (5.00) 7-item composite measure of “old-fashioned racism” (α =
.82) (McConahay, 1986). For example, “Black people are
generally not as smart as Whites.”
16.22 (4.56) 10-item composite measure (α = .83). For example, “If old
people want to be liked they should get rid of their irritating
faults” (adapted from Kogan, 1961).
70.40 (13.70) 29-item Fraboni Scale of Ageism (α = .83) (Fraboni,
Saltstone, & Hughes, 1990). For example, “Old people
complain more than other people do.”
16.40 (4.89) 7-item composite measure adopted from McConahay’s
(1986) “old fashioned racism” items (a = .83). For example,
“It is a bad idea for Americans and foreigners to marry one
another.”

a. Sample 1 variables are marked “a” (e.g., 1a, 2a, etc.) and Sample 2 variables are marked “b” (e.g., 1b, 2b, etc.).

NOTES
1. In Agnew, Thompson, Smith, Gramzow, and Currey (1993), per-
sonality variables were classified as “distal individual factors,” whereas
in the current article, they are considered to be proximal. The differ-
ence in classification is necessitated by the different goals of these arti-
cles. The Agnew et al. (1993) article examined how classes of individual
and family factors independently predict prejudice toward a specific
outgroup (i.e., homosexuals). Accordingly, personality constructs
were considered a more distal individual factor than either personal
beliefs or relevant attitudes and experiences with respect to homosexu-
als. In addition, no attempt was made in the earlier article to examine
the interrelationships between variables’ classes or to examine the
manner in which variables’ classes might mediate the effect of other
classes on prejudice. In examining such interrelationship and media-
tional issues, we see personality variables to be more proximal in the
chain of causality hypothesized to underlie prejudice toward out-
groups.
2. Note that we are not suggesting that these are the only sets that
could be conceptualized to underlie generalized prejudice; rather,
these factors represent clear examples of past single-factor distal and
proximal approaches to prejudice.
 Agnew et al. / PROXIMAL AND DISTAL INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE
3. Of course, a number of conditions must be met for the “contact
hypothesis” to be supported. See Duckitt (1992b) for a review of these
conditions.
4. Data were merged only after preliminary analyses indicated no
significant differences on study measures between participants from
the three Computer Assisted Panel Study (CAPS) cohorts.
5. Although not of central interest, we also tested three equivalent
alternatives to Model 1 (i.e., alternative models in which the degrees of
freedom were held constant while certain paths and/or correlations
were altered) (see MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993),
each of which focused on the link between Conservative Beliefs and
Tolerant Personality. Model 4 tested the possibility that Conservative
Beliefs cause Tolerant Personality traits, Model 5 tested the hypothesis
that Tolerant Personality traits cause Conservative Beliefs, and Model 6
tested the supposition that Conservative Beliefs and Tolerant Personal-
ity traits are reciprocally causal. All three of these equivalent models
provided a fit to the data that was equivalent to that of Model 1, χ (17) =
2
24.03, ns, GFI = .98. Therefore, the hypothesized correlation between
Conservative Beliefs and Tolerant Personality appears to be repre-
sented just as well by a causal path from Conservative Beliefs to Toler-
ant Personality, or vice versa.
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