AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS

1. HLI v. PARC (G.R. No. 17110: July 5, 2011)

FACTS:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing
public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the
lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in
1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is
owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at
cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the
approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure
its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative
modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the
preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have
extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two
groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA.
In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms
and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits
in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the
promise and rationale of the SDOA.

The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of
the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the
Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2
and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered
by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the
PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws
2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in
lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly
to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec.
4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Administrative Law

Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP

Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve
the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. It may be that
RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC
with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP, but such power or authority is deemed
possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Following this doctrine, the conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock
distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to
revoke or recall the approval of the plan.

Constitutional Law

Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality
of Sec 31 of RA 6657

No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657,
Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21,
1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter.

Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before
the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions
of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-
compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be
resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.

Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of

theexecutive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.

Statutory Construction

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitution’s concept of agrarian
reform

Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the Constitution is unequivocal: the
farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own directly or collectively the lands they
till.

The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR
and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is
the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. Sec. 4
EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the
1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from
being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised.

The word collective is defined as indicating a number of persons or things considered

as constituting one group or aggregate, while collectively is defined as in a collective sense
or manner; in a mass or body. By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for
indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in
recognition of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the
medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.

The stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the
agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the landless appears to be the dominant theme of that
policy, the Court emphasized that Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does
not constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to
and ownership by farmers and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of
unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have worded said section in a manner mandatory in character.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 2. BONIFACIO V. JUDGE DIZON (G.R. No. 79416, Sept. 5, 1989)
FACTS:
Olimpio Bonifacio as the owner of a land which the private respondent, Pastora San
Miguel, was an agricultural lessee. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the
ejectment of private respondent from Bonifacio’s 2-hectare agricultural land. The CAR granted
the ejectment of Pastora San Miguel. On appeal by the private respondent, the CA modified the
judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio to pay her P1,376. Still
dissatisfied, private respondent sought relief to SC.
During the pendency of the case, Olimpio died and was succeeded by his heirs. However,
no notice of such death was given to the Court, hence no order of substitution of his heirs was
made. SC resolved to deny the petition of the private respondent for lack of merit, SC affirmed
the decision of the CA. Subsequently, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision by
RTC of Bulacan. The Deputy Sheriff submitted his report stating in part that except for a portion
thereof occupied by the private respondent which the latter refused to vacate. Private respondent
moved to quash the execution. RTC held the decision of the sheriff to be null and void, and that
the motion for demolition was denied.
Petitioners contended that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. They assert that
the CAR case, being an ejectment case, survives the death of the party. Private respondent, on
the other hand, stress on the fact that the action is not an prdinary ejectment but an agrarian case
for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the
decedent, thereby vesting to the former, all rights conferred by the judgment to the decedent.

RULING:
Petition is granted.
SC reads Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844, which provides, for the continuation in the enjoyment
and possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory. Under such provision, the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the provision, the ejectment of
an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. The right of cultivation
was extended to the landowner’s immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-
lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was and still allowed to cultivate the land with
the aid of his farm household. Whether used in reference to the agricultural, the term “personal
cultivation” cannot be given restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to
either the lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor’s or
lessee’s immediately family. The CAR case not being purely personal right, the same was
transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 3. PAGTALUNAN V. TAMAYO (G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990)

FACTS:
Respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for expropriation of a parcel of
land located in Brgy. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by the Aldabas, as evidenced by a
TCT issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan. The CFI issued a writ of
possession placing the Republic in possession of the land upon its deposit of P7,200 as
provisional value of land.
Petitioners filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with complaint in
intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner has been the bonda fide agricultural tenant
of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Pagtalunan of just
compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance
compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than P15,000 per hectare.
Respondent Judge Tamayo denied the petitioner’s motion.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner has a right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted
by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject property

RULING:
NO. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an
officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee
ownership of the land described therein. Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above
conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested
right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Under these circumstances,
petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a
portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the
landholding.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 4. GONZALES V. LANDBANK (G.R. No. 76759, March 22, 1990)

FACTS:
On August 8, 1981, Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of petitioner Ramon Gonzales. Petitioner filed a case to compel public respondent Land
Bank to issue Land Bank Bonds in the name of petitioner instead of the aforesaid corporation as
the original and registered owner of the property. Defendant corporation was declared in default
for failure to file an answer. Meanwhile, defendant bank filed its answered stating that the
corporation failed to comply with 6 of the requirements. The lower court granted the plaintiff the
issuance of the Land Bank bonds. By an appeal of Land Bank, the CA reversed the decision of
the lower court. Petitioner appealed by certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
WON, respondent Land Bank can be compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the name of
petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.

RULING:
The determination of the issue was guided by Resolution No. 75-68 entitled PROPER
PARTIES TO RECEIVE LAND TRANSFER PAYMENT. Thereunder the Land Bank can only
issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. It is only after the issuance of bonds in the
landowner's name that he shall be required to make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his
assignee. Thereunder the Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-
landowner. It is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be
required to make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 5. TALAVERA V. LAXAMANA (G.R. No. 77830 February 27, 1990)

FACTS:
Jose Laxamana instituted an action for recovery of possession on July 10, 1984 against
petitioners over a parcel of land located in Brgy. Sto. Domingo 11, Sition Tambo, Capas, Tarlac.
Private respondent alleged that he had been in continuous possession of the said land until the
petitioners took possession of it and planted palay without private respondent’s knowledge and
through force and intimidation. The private respondent suffered damages amounting to P500.00
and the price equivalent to sixty-five cavans of palay per agricultural year. In the petitioner’s
defense, they stated that the taking of the private respondent’s possession was in accordance with
their “Kasunduan” executed on March 30, 1973 and that he was not actually a tenant of the
petitioners. The document states that private respondent sold his rights and interests over the
property for a consideration of P1,000.00. The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent to
which the petitioners appealed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision that the Kasunduan did not constitute valid surrender of the land contemplated
under the law.

ISSUE:
WON the surrender of the land by the private respondent constitutes “valid surrender”
contemplated by law.

RULING:
No. The surrender did not constitute a valid surrender as contemplated by the law. The
Decision of the RTC and the CA is affirmed. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines, Sec. 8, agricultural leasehold shall only be extinguished based on the following
grounds:
1. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or
3. Absence of the person under Sec. 9 to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or
permanent incapacity of the lessee.

Voluntary surrender does not require any court organization since it involves the tenant’s
own volition however, it must be shown that the surrender was voluntary through convincing and
sufficiently proved evidence. It cannot be presumed nor implied, otherwise the right of the tenant
to security of tenure becomes illusory one. It was shown that the Kasunduan was prepared by
petitioner Visitacion Talavera and that Jose Laxamana, at the time the Kasunduan was made,
needed money for his wife’s illness which later caused her death. Laxamana could also hardly
sign his own name. Laxamana also continued working on the land until 1984 even after the
Kasunduan was made while the Talaveras claimed that they cultivated the land themselves.
Exhbibits presented as evidence showed that the Talaveras did not cultivate the land and actually
resides in another baranggay. The circumstances showed that Laxamana was forced to sign the
Kasunduan without fully understanding it and continued cultivating the land after.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 6. BERNAS V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 85041 August 5, 1993)

FACTS:
Natividad Bito-on Deita gratuitously entrusted farm lots by way of “dugo” to her brother
Benigno Bito-on so he could support the schooling of his children in Manila. Benigno then
engaged Graciano Bernas in a production sharing agreement; the former shouldered the expenses
while the latter provided labor. Natividad knew nothing of this arrangement. When Benigno
returned the lots to his sister, Bernas contested their possession, claiming he was an agricultural
leashold lessee. In the RTC, the issue was whether or not Bernas was a leasehold lessee. RTC
ruled in his favor using RA 1199 and 3844.In her appeal to the CA, the issue was whether or not
the Benigno-Bernas arrangement was binding upon her. Natividad argued that since their
agreement was one of commodatum, Benigno cannot lend nor lease the properties contested. CA
agreed with her since she knew nothing of the Benigno-Bernas arrangement.

ISSUES:
Is the Benigno-Bernas arrangement binding upon Natividad?

RULING:
Yes it is. RA 3844 made Benigno the LEGAL POSSESSOR, granting him the authority
and capacity to institute agricultural leasehold lessees. Natividad did not raise the issue of
terminating the leasehold so this court cannot decide on that. Natividad changed the theory of her
case from court to court, this is not allowed. Even if there was lack of authorization,
no evidence established the specifics of Natividad’s “dugo” with her brother.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 7. NISNISAN V. CA (G.R. No. 126425 August 12, 1998)

FACTS:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare land
in Davao del Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of said
land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract which
stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino sold two (2)
ha of the land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of
the sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed an action for reinstatement of
tenancy against the Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered that spouses
Nisnisan have no cause of action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

ISSUE:
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?

RULING:
NO. Other than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present any
evidence to show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after the
private respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against private respondents before
the CAR militates against the private respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily
surrendered their landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary surrender, as a
mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding
cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
The leasehold relation is not terminated by death or permanent incapacity of the
landholder-lessor. It binds his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9).
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that the mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding does not extinguish leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the lessor.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 8. CECILLEVILLE REALTY VS. CA (G.R. No. 120363 September 5, 1997)

FACTS:
Cecilleville Realty and Services Corporation (Petitioner) is an owner of a parcel of land
in Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Ana Pascual (Pascual) is a tenent of the said land and thus lives
within a parcel of land therein. Her son, Herminigildo Pascual (Private Respondent), assists her
in her duties as a tenant since she is already of old age and infirm. The respondent does not live
in the home of Pascual, but instead has his own home in the same portion of land. Despite the
repeated demands of the petitioner for the private respondent to vacate the land, the respondent
refuses to do so since he helps his mother to tend the land which she is entitled to.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is a tenant of the said land which entitles him to create
an abode of his own.

RULING:
Petition is granted.

According to Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by RA 2263:

Sec. 5
(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another, with thelatter1s consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
(b) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of
the tenant, and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm
enterprise.

It cannot be argued that the private respondent is entitled to help his mother in cultivating
his land since he is an immediate member of Ana Pascual’s family.
What is of concern is that only a tenant may construct and maintain his/her house in the
said portion of land. Said home must be no more than 3% of the total land area of his land
holding and provided that it does not exceed 1000 sqm.
The purpose of the act is to “afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and
landholders”. It would be unfair to the land owners if the courts would sustain the arguments of
the private respondent. The land would no longer be for efficient agricultural production but
instead will become a residential area filled with colonies of houses.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato
 9. QUINO V. CA (G.R. No. 118599 January 26, 1998)

FACTS:
Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agridculttural land in Basak, Compostela, Cebu.
More than a decade later, petitioner Quinto filed a complaint for redemption of the
property against the vendes claiming that he had been instituted as tenant thereon by the Galans
since 1951, consequently, he has the right to be notified in writing of the owners’ intention
to sell the property to enable him to exercise his right to preemption but that notwithstanding
the Galans had not informed him of the sale. He learned of the transaction only when he
found out that the Leonardos were already the new owners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint after finding that majority of the essential
requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties did not exist.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that all the essential requisites for tenancy
relationship were present, and being a tenant petitioner was entitled to the rights of
preemption and redemption. Nevertheless it noted a stumbling block to petitioner's complete
victory thus be that as it may, since the land in question had already pass(ed) on to
defendant-appellee Jose Bitoon, and plaintiff-appellant's quest against defendant-appellees
spouses Antonio Leonardo and Josefa Galan may be considered moot and academic under
RA 3844, Section 10, defendant-appelle Jose Bitoon having been subrogated to the rights and
obligations of his predecessors-in-interest, his obligation under the law to the tenant-plaintiff
continues and subsists, that if he decides to sell the land, then plaintiff-appellant can still
exercise his rights under the law

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner could
not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it on the
strength of the ruling in Velasques v. Nery.

RULING:
Respondent appellate court must have taken out of context our statement therein
when the former ruled that "if respondent Bitoon decides to sell the land then petitioner
can still exercise his rights under the law." The phrase in the Velasquez case that "if and
when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future" logically refers
to "its subsequent transferees" only, and not as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
right of redemption as what respondent court perceived it to be. The plain import of the obiter
dictum in the Velasquez case is that the Velasquez spouses may redeem the property from
the PNB as new owner, or should PNB decide to sell the property they may redeem the same
from its transferee. Thus, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, Velasquez is applicable
but not as so applied by respondent court; instead, it should have based its main ruling lack of
interest to redeem the property at the acquisition price paid by respondent Bitoon.

DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C. Social Legislation and Agrarian Laws

2A – 2011026685 Labor Arbiter Benedict Kato