Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
This petition for prohibition, which was led on January 21, 1975, seeks the
nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366- A, calling a referendum
for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating
funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the
referendum questions, as well as other presidential decrees, orders and
instructions relative to the said referendum. This is on the ground that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any
lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution
and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations,
decrees and orders.
Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos has the capacity to pass the foregoing
presidential decrees.
Ruling:
Yes, since under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can
continue in office beyond 1973. In addition to that, the sovereign people
expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 in order to
finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and this was the decision
of the people, in whom "sovereignty resides and all government authority
emanates.”
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
During a house hearing, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval of the Conference Committee report on the bill that became R.A.
8240. This led the Chair, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, to ask if there was any
objection to the motion. Representative Joker Arroyo asked, "What is that,
Mr. Speaker?" The Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the
report approved. Petitioners in this petition for rehearing and
reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing their petition for certiorari
and prohibition claim that the question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a
privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules of the House,
has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to adjourn.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8240 should still be subjected in rehearing and
reconsideration since the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion in enacting the law.
Ruling:
It doesn’t matter since, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard
of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the
rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well
settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance
with internal rules.
4. Republic Flour Mills Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs (G.R. No. 28463m
31 May 1971, 39 SCRA 268)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law.
Ruling:
Yes. The language of Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code appears to
be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines .
. . exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton
as a fee for wharfage . . . " Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite
obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall
within the terms of the above section. It does take a certain amount of
hairsplitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner "waste" resulting
from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's
our mills in the Philippines.
Facts:
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Sur; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued
under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates
of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the
carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable
animals; one from the livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for
replevin for the recovery of the carabaos and damages. The sheriff could not
execute the replevin order. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo
Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to
Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It appears that
the Executive Order was published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982.
Issue:
Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos and the dismissal of the
petition by Judge Angeles were proper.
Ruling:
No they were not proper since the Executive Order became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. The livestock inspector and the
provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No.
626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an
executive order.
6. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 115455,
August 25, 1994)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Art. VI, § 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also
adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the
exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure.
Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent
and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it
was passed by the Senate, implying that there is something substantially
different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No.
11197.
7. Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals (351 SCRA 44, G.R. No. 128448, February 1,
2001)
Facts:
Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop
loan-financing schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with
respondent PNB. The latter was authorized to negotiate and sell sugar
produced and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations.
Respondent PHILEX, under P.D. No. 579 (Rationalizing and Stabilizing The
Export of Sugar and For Other Purposes) was authorized to purchase sugar
allotted for export with PNB. Meanwhile, the petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the
request. Petitioners conveyed several properties to PNB as dacion en pago
when asked to settle their accounts. Petitioners reiterated their request for
accounting, but PNB again failed to heed the same. Thus, the filing of Civil
Case No. 14725 for accounting, specific performance and damages against
PNB. PHILEX was impleaded as party defendant.
During the trial, petitioners alleged that the loans granted them by PNB had
been fully paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated amounts
owed to them by PNB. The trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General,
rendered judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional, ordering private
respondents to pay petitioners the whole amount corresponding to the
residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported and to pay
moral damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared
the dacion en pago valid and ordered PNB to render an accounting.
Issue:
Ruling:
On the first issue, it is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, or executive order.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never noti ed about Civil Case No.
14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a
representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the
constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not
err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial
court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential
decrees.
And for the second issue, Jurisprudence has laid down the following
requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court
an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question
of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and speci c
performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to
render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without having to
rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No.
579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an
accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being
undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite
that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the
case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.
8. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (267 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156, February
3, 1997)
Facts:
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of
the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel, which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul, a
place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country.
The Court cannot extract rhyme or reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark to a total stranger. For, indeed,
the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands, a
veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so
we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a quali ed
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it stands
for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand,
how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This
is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
9. Astorga vs. Villegas (56 SCRA 714, G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974)
Facts:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in
the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for
its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The
committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment,
suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-
Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on
May 20, 1964, Senator Arturo Tolentino introduced substantial amendments
to Section 1. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal
of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on
May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification
of the amendment, which was the one, recommended by Senator Roxas and
not the Tolentino amendments, which were the ones, actually approved by
the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of
House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be
printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary
of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation
mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator
Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the
Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
on the Senate floor.
Issue:
Whether or not a R.A. No. 4065 should remain a law since it already signed
into law by the President of the Philippines.
Ruling:
10. Victoria’s Milling v. SSC (114 Phil 555, G.R. No. L-16704, March 17,
1962)
Facts:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No.
22 of the following tenor:
Issue:
It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not
demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the
employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is
demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer
does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be
considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been
received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular
law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for
it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning
for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the
case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what
"compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act
1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the
original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology
of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been
given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the
new law.
Facts:
'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.'
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase 'has served as offcer
in the Armed Forces' was inserted so as to make the provision read:
'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or
who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank
of captain and/or higher.'
Issue:
Whether or not the enrolled bill stands when there is no record in the
Journal, which results to the changes.
Ruling:
This is based on theory that if there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive, on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.
12. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 669, G.R. No. L-14078,
March 7, 1919)
Facts:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the provincial
officials of that province are illegally depriving the Maguianes of their liberty.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under
the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.
Issue:
Ruling:
No, the Philippine Legislature here has conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.