People vs.

Tan

Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom of Ruiz Saez Co in an Information. On arraignment, appellants
entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

During the trial, the public prosecutor was not allowed by the trial court judge to question the victim although he asked for leave to
ask additional questions after the private prosecutor was done with his questions on direct examination. Instead of granting the
requested leave outright, the trial judge consulted the defense counsel and the private prosecutor who both manifested that
whatever questions the public prosecutor had in mind should be coursed through and asked by the private prosecutor. Thus, the
trial judge directed the private prosecutor to propound whatever questions the public prosecutor would suggest

On 5 April 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of death.[16] The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court
for automatic review. However, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

Appellants argued that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired and actually
participated in the kidnapping of the victim. Furthermore, appellants contended that mere presence at the crime scene cannot be
considered as proof of conspiracy. All told, appellants proffered that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, they must be acquitted.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for its part recommended that appellants be held guilty of serious illegal detention instead
of kidnapping for failure of the prosecution to prove that appellants were the ones who abducted Ruiz. Likewise, the prosecution
failed to prove that demands for ransom had been made by any, some or all of the appellants.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification as to the penalty of the accused-appellants in view of
the passage of RA No. 9346. The appellate court rejected appellants defense of denial and held that it cannot prevail over the ample
amount of circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution which tends to prove their involvement in the crime. The appellate
court likewise sustained the trial courts finding that demands for ransom had been actually made by appellants. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the trial judge in not granting the request of the public prosecutor of asking additional questions
valid
Ruling: No
At this juncture, we find it necessary to remind trial court judges that under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor may turn over
the actual prosecution of the criminal case to the private prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take
over the actual conduct of the trial

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIP PICCIO

Facts:

Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency – the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of
Companies, to which Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is a corporate member – filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Makati City against a group called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting on the
website www.pepcoalition.com an article entitled "Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance with
Coalition. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to indict 16 trustees, officers and/or members of
PEPCI, Upon motion of respondents the RTC, in an Order quashed the criminal information for libel and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the criminal information failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the
offended parties reside. The People of the Philippines (People), through the private prosecutors, and with the conformity of public
prosecutor Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr., filed a Notice of Appeal. Soon after, petitioners filed the Brief for the Private Complainants-
Appellants as directed by the CA.

Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, citing as grounds for dismissal the fact that the Brief for the Private
Complainants-Appellants filed by petitioners did not carry the conforme of the OSG In a Resolution the CA denied the said motion
and directed respondents to file their appellee’s brief. Instead of filing the required appellee’s brief, respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution. In their Comment/ Opposition to the said motion for reconsideration, petitioners
insisted that the trial court’s order of dismissal was a final order from which an appeal was available; that the notice of appeal was
signed by the public prosecutor and therefore valid; and that jurisprudence shows that the conformity of the OSG is not required
when grave errors are committed by the trial court or where there is lack of due process. In its Comment, the OSG concurred in the
propriety of the remedy of an appeal against the assailed order, but nonetheless, asserted that the appeal, without its conformity,
must fail because under the law it is only the OSG that should represent the People in criminal cases. The CA dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the OSG had not given its conformity to the said appeal.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA

Issue: May the petitioners, being mere private complainants, appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a criminal case even
without the OSG’s conformity.

Ruling: The petitioner may not appeal an order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case without the OSG’s conformity.

The CA correctly dismissed the notice of appeal interposed by petitioners against Order of the RTC because they, being mere private
complainants, lacked the legal personality to appeal the dismissal of Criminal Case

To expound, it is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is
vested solely in the OSG which is the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of representing
the Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require. Explicitly, Section 35(1),Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that:

SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation ormatter requiring the services
of lawyers. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

Represent the Governmentin the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof inhis official capacity is a party

Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the
accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor isrooted
in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere
complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the realparties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.

LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, petitioners, vs. SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, respondent. [G.R. No. 189754. October 24, 2012]
(Control of Prosecution)
FACTS
On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2) informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC,
Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel,
committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera.
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication
Bandera, and their co accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were published therein, and subject of the two
informations. According to respondent, in April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about an article dated March 27, 2001, featured on
page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column Usapang Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang
Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, megabrat, megasungit, and brain dead. Moreover, respondent
averred that on April 24, 2001, Ampoloquio wrote two followup articles, one appeared in his column Usapang Censored, entitled Magtigil Ka,
Sharon!, stating that she bad mouthed one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter kulitkulit (annoyingly persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel
(officious or self-important), and other derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the latter bobo (stupid); that she
exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and that she was a dishonest person with questionable credibility. Another article, entitled Magtigil
Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column
Banatan of Ampoloquio, with the headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said issue. Respondent added that
Ampoloquio’s articles impugned her character as a woman and wife, as they depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband.
According to Ampoloquio, respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win (as Senator) because that would mean losing
hold over him, and that she would treat him like a wimp and sampid (hangeron) privately, but she appeared to be a loving wife to him in public.
Respondent denied that Tayag contributed millions to her husband’s campaign fund.
Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each entered a plea of not guilty.
On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence alleging that the prosecution failed
to establish their participation as editor and assoc. editor of the publication Bandera.
RULING OF RTC: On April 25, 2008 the court granted the motion and dismissed the criminal case contending that the prosecution did not submit its
comment to the petitioner’s demurrer, thus the averment therein became unrebutted that the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by
prosecution failed to prove participation of the petitioner as conspirators to the crime; and that during the cross-examination and direct
examination, the herein respondent failed to identify nor mention about their actual participation.
May 29, 2008 prosecution filed a Motion to admit stating that during the pendency of the trial court’s resolution on the petitioners’ Motion for
Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the prosecution intended to file its Comment,
by serving copies thereof, through registered mail, upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however,
said Comment was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the State Prosecutor handling the case. In an
Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions’ Motion to Admit, with the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be
admitted to form part of the court records.
On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted
petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent’s
Comment to form part of the records of the case).
RULING OF CA: Granted respondent’s petition, the court reversed and set aside the ruling of RTC insofar as it pertains to the grant of Demurrer to
Evidence, and thereby ordered the case to be remanded ti the trial court for reception of petitioners’ evidence.
Hence, this present petition
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in not dismissing the case for want of legal standing on the side of the respondent
RULING: Yes. CA should have dismissed the case for want of legal standing.
The respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of
the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General,
acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.
As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil
aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA
was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Respondent lacked the personality or legal standing
to question the trial court’s order because it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in
criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA.
Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to
Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the
accused in double jeopardy.
Final note: Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not
undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse
and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had
it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal
of the Order of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104885, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC024872 and MC024875, which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy
Alcantara, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Just in case itanong
ART. 360. Persons responsible.―Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamation contained therein to
the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner, Tomas, was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration
in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
 The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
  The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch
47, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that
she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds.
First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the
perjury case.
Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed;
and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

RULING OF METC-MAKATI
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury. The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari Makati RTC (Grave Abuse of Discretion) to annul and set aside the above-cited decision of Makati MeTC.
The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false document was presented.

RULING OF RTC-MAKATI

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to
Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of
the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS BEFORE SC: The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling
in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements
was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet
(GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

SOLICITOR GENERAL: Solicitor General shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as
the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or
intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

SUPREME COURT RULING: MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial
courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality
of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the
criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
 (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that
the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for
its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venues of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint
and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information
to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under
oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City. The SC also found out that the third
element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City.

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo
knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, “Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo.”

The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six
(6) inches long. Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When
Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on
the ground.aw virtualaw library

Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to
the place where Mallo was lying flat. At that point, the petitioner uttered, “Johan, patay na,” in a loud voice. The petitioner and her co-
accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away
from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights.alibrary

The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front
of her house. Pelovello conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied having any
knowledge of the incident.

CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES:

The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the
evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report, and the
banging at their door.

Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that
might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance.
The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This
prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.

RULING OF THE RTC:

The RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana
who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left
hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to
find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

RULING OF THE CA:

The CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than
sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.

On further appeal to the SC, the petitioner contended that her right to due process was violated for not being arraigned on the amended
information that convicted him. She contended that a second plea was necessary since not being arraigned on the amended information
deprived her of her right to know the nature and cause of accusations against her.

ISSUE:
W/N the right of the accused to due process have been violated for not being arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court do not see any merit in this claim.

1. ON THE ISSUE OF THE AMENDMENT

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of
court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
tua1aw 1ibrary

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state
its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an
amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.

It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the
offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.

2. ON THE ISSUE OF ARRAIGNMENT ON AMENDED INFORMATION

Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. Procedural due process requires that the
accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity
to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of
his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime.

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to
substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the
original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do
not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.

We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since
the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably
come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

SUM UP OF THE RULING:

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was
from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments that the change
in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the
essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.

PACOY VS CAJIGAL

FACTS: Petitioner SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal. On July 4, 2002, an
information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner for shooting and killing his commanding officer, 2 Lt.
Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. However, on the same day and after
the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information
to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which Judge Cajigal
registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.

The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in
the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for
Homicide. Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash: Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As
petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.

ACTION ON MOTION FILED/CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The respondent judge denied the Motion to
Quash. He ruled that there must be a judgment rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that
petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before
trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid
proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, the crime
of Homicide is qualified to Murder.

PETITIONER:

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit:
He alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment
of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. Petitioner also argued that
the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double
jeopardy.

RULING IN RTC:

The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is
merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.

ISSUE ON SC: (Via petition for certiorari, dumeretso sya sa SC)

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED
HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO
MURDER

HELD:

NO, the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in such ordering the amendment of the information.

Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --

 SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a
substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof:

The rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows
that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with
the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was
not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance.
Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is
necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the
original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of frustrated murder

That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro
Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen
Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which prevented her death.

After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to file an amended information
and to admit said amended information. The amended information reads:
 That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information. At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991,
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information.

Contention of Petitioner : Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, constitutes a substantial
amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. He
argues that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different offense,
involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary
investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.

Issues: (1) Was the petitioner correct in saying that the amended information changes an entirely different offense so as to require
another preliminary investigation

(2) Was the amendment of information which initially charged frustrated murder to consummated murder a substantial amendment

Ruling: (1) No, the petitioner was not correct in saying that the amended information charges an entirely different offense
so as to require another preliminary investigation.

In determining whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is
in order.

Going to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former
is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances
such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby
meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is
because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential
ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder. Therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in
both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged,
but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. Consequent thereto, the
filing of the amended information for murder is proper. Hence, the amended information did not charge an entirely different
offense so as to require another preliminary investigation.

(2) No, the amendment of information which initially charged frustrated murder to consummated murder was not a substantial
amendment. The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been said
to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made,
and whether or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. Now, an objective appraisal of the
amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged
was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with
intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may
adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form
which is allowed even during the trial of the case.

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 179962.
June 11, 2014

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint¬ affidavit with the Department of Justice against the petitioner. The BIR
alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing business and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to
2003. Based on these operations, the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable years 2001 to 2003 and,
consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the government.

In his defense, the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati,
Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he countered that he did not file his income tax returns in these places because his business
establishments were registered only in 2003 at the earliest; thus, these business establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his
alleged failure to file his income tax return.

After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against petitioner for nonfiling of income tax
returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003,
in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (Sec 255 of RA 8424). Thus, an information was filed before CTA.The petitioner plead
not guilty. Subsequently, on 4 May 2007, prosecution filed a motion to amend information with leave of court. The amendment reads:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named accused,
doing business under the name and style of “Weigh Less Center”/“Mendez Medical Group,” with several branches in Quezon City,
Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income
tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring and
boldfacing in the original).

CTA: CTA granted the motion. It ruled that amendment was only in form as it “merely states with additional precision something already
contained in the original information.” Thus, both the original and the amended information charges the petitioner with the same offense. It
observed that the change in the name of his business to include the phrase “Mendez Medical Group” does not alter the fact the [petitioner] is
being charged with failure to file his Income Tax Return... The change in the branches of his business, likewise did not relieve [the petitioner]
of his duty to file an ITR. In addition, the places where the accused conducts business does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction... nor ... change
the nature of the offense charged, as only one [ITR] is demanded of every taxpayer.

Hence, petitioner filed this present petition alleging among others:

• The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect
the form of his defense.
• Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• He claims that to change the allegation on the locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to Muntinlupa and
Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he would have to assume.
• The petitioner adds that the change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002 would also alter his defense considering
that the difference in taxable years would mean requiring a different set of defense evidence.
• The same is true with the new allegation of “Mendez Medical Group” since it deprived him of the right, during the preliminary
investigation, to present evidence against the alleged operation and or existence of this entity.
The respondent in its comment, stating among others:
• The amended information could not have caused surprise to the petitioner since the amendments do not change the nature and cause of
accusation against him. The acts or omissions involved remain the same under the original and the amended information, i.e., his failure to
file his ITR in 2002 for income earned in 2001 from the operation of his businesses.
• Neither would the change in the date of the commission of the crime nor the inclusion of the phrase “Mendez Medical Group” cause
surprise to the petitioner since he was fully apprised of these facts during the preliminary investigation.
• the original information already alleged that the petitioner’s failure to file an ITR refers to “taxable year 2001.”

ISSUE: W/N the amendment was substantial

RULING: No. It is merely a formal amendment.

There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint
or information consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.

Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as
the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.

Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment,
particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the charge
against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the
recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to
(i) the alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002;
(ii) the addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group”;
(iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and
(iv) the addition of the phrase “for income earned.”

The “change” in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase “for income earned”

The prosecution mistakenly stated that the information it originally filed alleged the commission of the offense as “on or about the 15th day
of April, 2001” — even if the record is clear that that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002. The petitioner makes a similar erroneous
allegation in its petition before the Court. The actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with
the allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year 2001. Since the information alleges that petitioner
failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be committed when petitioner failed to file
his income tax return before the due date of filing, which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002.

Accordingly, the addition of the phrase “for the income earned” before the phrase “for the taxable year 2001” cannot but be a mere formal
amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that is already contained in the original information,
i.e., the income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable year.

The addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group and the change and/or addition of the
branches of petitioner’s operation

Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should have filed a consolidated return in his
principal place of business, regardless of the number and location of his other branches. Consequently, the change and/or addition of the
branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the
prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.

The Court reiterated that prejudice exists when a defense under the original information would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as amended. To be sure, the jurisprudential
test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence
that the accused previously had under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the characteristic thread of
formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the essence of the offense charged.

In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and
consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.

In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is “doing business under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less
Center’/Mendez Medical Group.” Given the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and
style” is merely descriptive of the nature of the business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his
profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the “entity” “Mendez Medical Group”
because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its business owner — petitioner himself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

(Just in case itanong)

Section 255. Failure to File Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax Withhold and Remit Tax and Refund Excess Taxes
Withheld on Compensation.—Any person required under this Code or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make
a return, keep any record, or supply any correct and accurate information, who wilfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such
record, or supply correct and accurate information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund excess taxes withheld on compensation, at
the time or times required by law or rules and regulations shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) and suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than ten
(10) years.

People of the Philippines v. Democrito Paras

G.R. No. 192912, October 22, 2014
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Democrito Paras was charged with rape against a 17 year old minor. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused.
Hence, he appealed to the SC. On June 4, 2014, the SC promulgated its Decision,7 affirming the judgment of conviction against the
accused-appellant

Police Superintendent Roberto Rabo sent a letter to the Court stating that the accused-appellant had died due to pulmonary
tuberculosis at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on January 24, 2013. The Court received the letter only on August 27, 2014.
ISSUE:
Is the Court’s Decision date June 4, 2014 still valid in line with the accused-appellant’s death?

HELD:
NO, the Court’s Decision date June 4, 2014 had been rendered ineffectual and therefore set aside. Under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex
delicto.

Thus, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished since there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.

In this case, when the accused-appellant died on January 24, 2013, his appeal to this Court was still pending. The Decision dated June
4, 2014 was thereafter promulgated as the Court was not immediately informed of the accused-appellant's death. The death of the
accused-appellant herein, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
crime committed.

PEOPLE VS SORIA

On November 14, 2012, The supreme court rendered its Decision1 in this case finding accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

Supposedly the decision should become final and executory on December 20, 2012. However, the Court received a letter from the
Bureau of Corrections informing the court of the death of accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. Also, The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections submitted on November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate4 of accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Is the Court’s Decision still valid in line with the accused-appellant’s death?

RULING: No, under ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

The rule is that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex
delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

In this case, accused-appellant’s death on August 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November
14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Hence, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still
pending resolution.

PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, [September 13, 2010]

DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide.

FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito
Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of
a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Hence, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the
RTC Quezon City.

RTC RULING: The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

CA: On appeal to CA, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it
would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD: No. The action for annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in this case.

RATIO: The rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In the case at bar, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.

ON PJQ ISSUE: The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall
kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the
issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s
will.

FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO, respondents

FACTS:
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of
an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against
petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.

ETO YUNG INFORMATION PERO DI NAMAN SYA MAHALAGA ATA SA CASE FYI LANG
xxx

The said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss, falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-
173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate, to which said
Francisco M. Magestrado signed and swore on its verification, the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit
and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for
a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant
by virtue of said loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M.
Librojo.
xxx
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that a case for
recovery of a sum of money, and a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon
City, must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the
issues raised in the criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, the MeTC (where the criminal case was assigned) issued an Order denying petitioners motion for suspension of
proceedings, finding the aforesaid motion without merit, appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The MeTC also denied the MR filed by the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC on the ground that the
MeTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the
proceedings in criminal case. The RTC denied the petition as well as the MR, finding no prejudicial question involved in the 3 cases.
The petitioner again filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was immediately dismissed for being the wrong remedy, that instead he
could have appealed the dismissal of his petition for certiorari in the RTC. CA also denied his MR.

ISSUE: W/N the criminal case filed before the MeTC can proceed independently of the outcome of the 2 civil cases pending in the RTC
RULING:
Yes, the criminal case filed before the MeTC can proceed independently of the outcome of the 2 civil cases pending in the RTC.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that the 2 civil cases pending before RTC, are principally for the determination of
whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the
property covered by the said Transfer Certificate Title. On the other hand, the criminal case before MeTC involves the determination of
whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of
the TCT involved.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil
cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his
execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false
affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

Facts : Respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking
the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to
suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the
second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
Article 40 of the Family Code.

Issue : whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.

Ruling: No, the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to
a criminal case for bigamy. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. In the case at bar, it was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential
prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of
the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City

Facts:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married. After twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner
filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to the
said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain
woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinagebagainst petitioner and his paramour.
The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The Judge denied the foregoing motion contenting that the pendency of a civil
action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the said Order of denial was likewise denied

Petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders issued by Judge and praying for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In an Order the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court
subsequently issued another Order, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his
wife. Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of
marriage and the criminal case for concubinage.

Issue : Whether the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.

Ruling : No, the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
For purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for
concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence
in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void,
suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. It must be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.

7. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC vs. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, G.R. No. 166836
September 4, 2013

Background: The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully
paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571
on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges
based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased from B.F. Homes,
Inc., then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque. The transactions were embodied in three
separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel
Properties, but the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price were not delivered
to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39,
both of Presidential Decree No. 957.

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-
11183), praying to compel BF Homes to release the land in its favor. In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’
claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the lots due to his having been replaced as
BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and
unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases,
it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers
free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved
were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to
proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, citing the pendency of BF
Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27,
2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership.

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had
appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of
the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the
liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual
signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000,
holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No.
957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes
did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary
denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding: After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor
concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use
Resulatory Board a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the
sales transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

Until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty.
Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the
subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have
ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration.

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008),
contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors
and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not
HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 957.

CA: In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’
petition, holding and ruling as follows: From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question
generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an
administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the
suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings. In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the
Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation
should the demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial
question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.In fact, in
Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the
instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely
intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their
failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private
respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to
delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private
respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15
October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.

Issue: Whether or not the HLURB case does not present a "prejudicial question" to the subject criminal case since the former involves
an issue separate and distinct from the issue involved in the latter, consequently, the HLURB case has no correlation, tie nor linkage to
the present criminal case which can proceed independently thereof.

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’
posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that
there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action
for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for
the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance
was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original.

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of
guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was
made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
which reads: Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191
speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the
term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a
tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance
of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the
increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of
alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957
authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines
and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not
BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because
Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC,
the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the
need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is
enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information
on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the
criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal
action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the
party who filed or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.