e.
Declaratory relief interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
Sec 1, Rule 63 - Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule.
Carmen Danao Malana v Benigno Tappa (Chico-Nazario, 2009)
65 to SC
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages[2] against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937[3] situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
(subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao
(Anastacio), who died intestate.[4] During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo
Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern
portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the
said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members,[6] continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over
the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that
respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.
Pet referred land dispute to Lupong TAgapamayapa. Respondents asserted ownership and
presented documents. Pet: documents were dubious, falsified. Pet went to RTC to remove
cloud and prayed for 50k for actual damages (baseless claim that prop did not belong to them
Art 19 of NCC), exemplary and attorney’s fees. 50k each
RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Referred to BP 129. Prop was worth only 410. RTC
must exceed 20k.
Pet filed MR: quieting of title! Accion reinvidicatoria was merely included. DENIED. RTC:
action to quiet title is still real action. Pet filed another pleading designated as a Motion and
said that the 2 actions can be joined pursuant to Rumarate v Hernandez. Misjoinder daw not a
ground for dismissal. RTC dismissed motion yet again coz no jurisdiction. Dissected Sec 1
Rule 63 and said first paragraph refers to declaratory relief (RTC dapat) and the 2 nd different
remedies w/c must be read in conjunction with RA 7691 (20k/50k)
WON RTC erred in dismissing complaint for lack of jurisdiction – NO
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a
petition for declaratory relief
he second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the
Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code;
and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale
with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief
because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the
need of execution to carry the judgment into effect
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may
that an action for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory
relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
Should be read along with RA 7691
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.[24] Since the purpose of an action
for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.[25]
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words,
a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already
been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.
Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court
over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence,
or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an
action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio (Laresma v Abellana)
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for
the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from
the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that
has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

 DISMISSED
Bank of Commerce v Spouses Prudencio and Natividad San Pablo (Chico-Nazario, 2007)
Rule 45 to reverse and set aside CA decision which reversed RTC decision which affirmed
MTC Mandaue City decision w/c dismissed complaint against Melencio Santos and Bank of
Commerce for lack of merit.
Santos obtained 1million loan from Direct Funders. As security, Natividad executed a SPA in
favor of Santos authorizing him to mortgage to Direct Funders a paraphernal real property
under her name. Natividad and her husband Prudencio signed as co-mortgagors. Spouses
received a letter than Santos failed to pay for his obligations. He settled his obligation.
Spouses wanted the TCT to be turned over to them. Santos refused despite repeated demands.
Spouses then inquired status of property with the Register of Deeds in Mandaue City and they
discovered Santos used the property as a collateral in another loan he secured from Bank of
Commerce.
Spouses filed complaint seeking for Quieting of Title and Nullification of SPA and the deed
of real state mortgage with prayer for damages against Santos and BoC w/ MTC Mandaue
City
During pendency of case, BoC initiated foreclosure proceedings for non-payment of
loan. Spouses prayed for annulment of the foreclosure sale.
Santos: loan was w/ their consent! Boc: denied allegation that SPA and Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were spurious
MTC: dismissed complaint for lack of merit. Forged but BoC was in good faith. Appealed to
RTC. Denied. Mr denied. CA granted. Bank of Commerce went before SC
WON MTC had jurisdiction over the case – YES. Besides BoC raises issue of jurisdiction 10
years after??? nung nasa SC na???
Upon cursory reading of the records, we gathered that the case filed by the spouses San Pablo
before the MTC was an action for quieting of title, and nullification of the SPA, Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings. While the body of the complaint consists
mainly of allegations of forgery, however, the primary object of the spouses San Pablo in
filing the same was to effectively free the title from any unauthorized lien imposed upon it.
Clearly, the crux of the controversy before the MTC chiefly hinges on the question of who has
the better title over the subject property. Is it the spouses San Pablo who claim that their
signatures on the loan document were forged? Or is it the Bank of Commerce which maintains
that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were duly executed and, therefore, a valid
source of its right to foreclose the subject property for non-payment of loan?
An action for quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. As clarified by this Court in
Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals21 :
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "… an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that
the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger
or hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "… not only to place things in
their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best (citation
omitted).
The mortgage of the subject property to the Bank of Commerce, annotated on the Spouses San
Pablo’s TCT, constitutes a cloud on their title to the subject property, which may, at first,
appear valid and effective, but is allegedly invalid or voidable for having been made without
their knowledge and authority as registered owners. We thus have established that the case
filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC is actually an action for quieting of title, a real
action, the jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of the property.22 The
assessed value of the subject property located in Mandaue City, as alleged in the complaint, is
₱4,900.00, which aptly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. (BP 129 again)
In Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., we thus ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel
has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief.
Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when
the adverse judgment is rendered.24
Participation in all stages before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking
for affirmative relief, effectively bars the party by estoppel from challenging the court’s
jurisdiction.25 The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.26
Spouses Clemencio and Ma. Rosario Sabitsana v Juanito Muertegui (Del Castillo, 2013)
Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of Muertegui over a parcel of
unregistered land in Dalutan Island, Biliran Leyte. Juanito’s father tok possession of the land,
planted trees and paid real property taxes from 1980-1998.
Garcia then sold the land to the Muertegui family lawyer, Sabitsana through a notarized deed
of absolute sale. Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. When Domingo Sr (Juanito’s
father) passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the PLA. Atty Sabitsana
wrote a letter to the DENR, opposed the application, and said he was the true owner of the lot.
Juanito then filed for quieting of title and preliminary injunction against petitioners. Complaint
prayed among others that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale be declared null and void.
RTC ruled in favor of Muertegui. MR denied. CA affirmed the RTC decisions. Rule 45
WON RTC has jurisdiction – YES
The Petition must be denied.
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title
may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute.
Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August
24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to
prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case
No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
> DENIED
2. Shari’a courts
Vivencio B. Villagracia v 5th Shari’a District Court and Roldan E. Mala (Leonen, 2014)
Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300sqm land in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao from some
Canete person. TCT was in Mala’s name. At the time of purchase, petitioner occupied the
land. Petitioner secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo issued by the Land Registration
Authority. Mala had the land surveyed and found that petitioner occupied the land. He then
initiated a barangay conciliation. It went to no avail so he filed an action to recover the
possession of the parcel of land with the 5th Shari’a District Court.
In the petitioner, Mala alleged that he was a Filipino Muslim and was the registered owner of
the lot in question. Respondent court took cognizance of the case and summoned petitioner
who did not respond. Mala moved to present evidence ex parte and such motion was granted.
Respondent court ruled in Mala’s favor and issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner then filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions
and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
Lower court said: he intentionally waived his right to defend himself. According to respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph
(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari’a
Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.
Sharia court denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner then filed a 65 w/ prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order.
WON a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines – NO
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District
Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not
arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. –
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based
on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits
non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim
Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a
marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under
Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified
from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and regardless of
Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be
entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification."56
In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case
involves an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a
District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims."
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may
assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action."
Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a
Muslim against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons. - NO
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action."79 A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the
initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her
person either by his or her voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of
summons.82

Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s
personal liability.84 Since actions in personam "are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded
and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or
she must have been duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded;
otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and
decide actions in rem.88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of
a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in
rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation,
to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant but only
to satisfy due process requirements.91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
"defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived."
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings
before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are
void.
> GRANTED
3. Municipal Trial Court
Secs 32-35, 38(2), BP 129
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of
the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial
Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications
for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
Sec 2, SC Admin Circular 09-94 - Sec 2, SC Admin Circular 09-94 - 2. The exclusion of the
term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19
(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
Oscar C. and Nenita Fernandez v The International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank
of the Philippines) and Premiere Insurance and Surety Co (Panganiban, 1999)
Petitioner purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of International
Corporate Bank and a Chattel Mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution.
Bank filed an “unfounded” complaint for a sum of money with replevin before MTC of Pasay
City (Branch 44). Petitioner filed an Answer mentioning in the special and affirmative
defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction. The same was denied. Mr was also
denied.
CA ruled that MTC had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did
not exceed P 200k. Impropriety of venue should have been raised in a motion to dismiss
before the filing of a responsive pleading. It was raised only for the first time in the Answer.
CA affirmed MTC decision.
Rule 45 before SC
WON the Writ of Replevin may be enforced anywhere in the Philippines – YES
Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for
the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin
like the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically,
the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes. ---
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial
court.[10]
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item a
of the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners
confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the
other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.
Applying the said Rule, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[11] reiterated the foregoing distinction
between the jurisdiction of the trial court and the administrative area in which it could enforce
its orders and processes pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it:
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in
unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly
provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary,
expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit [to] its area of
enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly
authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes
specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in paragraph (b).
Plus, too late na to question venue.
Petitioners object to the filing of the Complaint in Pasay City, pointing out that their residence
is in Quezon City, while private respondents principal place of business is in Makati. Again,
we are not persuaded. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,[12] an objection
to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
deemed waived. In Diaz v. Adiong,[13] the Court explained such requirement in this wise:
xxx. Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial
and not to jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a
motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those
which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which,
although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue
must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
WON MTC had jurisdiction over complaint – YES
Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess of P200,000 and thus
outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. This argument has no legal and factual
basis. The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent
banks Complaint, is the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within
the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of
Replevin may have exceeded P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage
that had been used to secure petitioners loan. In any case, private respondents are entitled only
to the amount owed them. Under Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the proceeds of the
sale of the mortgaged property shall be used primarily to pay the costs of the sale, the
obligation that has been secured and other subsequent obligations; and the balance will be
turned over to the mortgagors, herein petitioners.
> DENIED
Marietta Barrido v Leonardo Nonato (Peralta, 2014)
While they were married, Barrido and Nonato acquired a property consisting of a house and
lot in Eroreco, Bacolod City. Their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Nonato then asked Barrido for a partition. The latter refused. Nonato then filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 3.
Bacolod MTCC adjudicated the property to Barrido. Nonato appealed to the RTC which
reversed the MTCC’s ruling by ruling that there be an equal partition, that the sons should be
reimbursed and that the presumptive legitimes must be delivered. CA affirmed RTC decision.
WON the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case – YES
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions
or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall
within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of
the instant case.
B. Appellate (exclusive/concurrent)
1. Supreme Court
Sec 5(2) Article VIII, Const - Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Sec 1, 9, Rule 45
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Sec. 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases.
The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be applicable to both civil and criminal cases,
except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
Sec 2(c), Rule 41 - Modes of appeal. (c) Appeal by certiorari.- In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Sec 30, Art VI - No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Sec 3, Rule 56 - Mode of appeal.
An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari,
except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
Sec 3(c), Rule 122 - Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:
(a) To the Regional Trial Court, in cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
(c) To the Supreme Court, in cases decided by the Court of Appeals.
Teresita G. Fabian v Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, ombudsman and Nestor V. Agustin
(Regalado, 1998)
Petitioner was major stockholder and president of PROMATConstruction Development
Corporation which is engaged in the construction business. Private resp was incumbent
District Engineering District. Proat participated in the bidding for government construction
project and private respondent took advantage of his position and inveigled her and they
entered into an amorous relationship. They had an affair for sometime. During the course of
the affair, private respondent gifted petitioner with public works contracts. They broke up. PR
refused and resisted attempts to end their relationship to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats.
Petitioner filed letter complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Sec 19 RA 6770 and Sec
36 of PD 807 with an ancillary prayer for preventive suspension.
Graft Investigator found PR guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from service
with forfeiture of all benefits as provided by law. Resolution was approved by the Director and
Assistant Ombudsman.
Respondent Ombusdman approved the same with modifications. He found PR guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. PR moved for
reconsideration. Deputy Ombusdman exonerated PR from the admin charge =.=
WON the final order of the Ombusdman is appealable to the SC - NO
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the
charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable.
She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to
restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic
Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited
provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the
availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman
is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure.
Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of
the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on
law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own
rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and
duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due
process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest
of justice may require.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770,
with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that
constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this
case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of
the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty
to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a
statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to
declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised
in the pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not
preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that
it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends
is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.[14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where
the fact is developed.[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be
further heard on this constitutional question.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules
of Civil Procedure[19] preclude appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of
the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals
from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the
scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we
have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at
that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari
but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .[21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-
judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional
body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by
the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that
as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service,
Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to
resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it
now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65
since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellatejurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented
to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First
Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act
and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of
the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force
and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a
petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem
necessary and proper.
2. Court of Appeals
Sec 2(a)(b), Rule 41 - Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
Sec 9(3), 22, BP 129 - Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Sec 1, Rule 43 - Scope.
This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Sec 1, Rule 42 - How appeal taken; time for filing.
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful
fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and
the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review.
No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.

3. RTC

Sec 1, Rule 40 - Where to appeal.

An appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court may be taken to the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the area to which the former pertains. The
title of the case shall remain as it was in the court of origin, but the party appealing the case
shall be further referred to as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee.

Sec 2, BP 129 - Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of
Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Courts.