TOYOTA PASIG, INC. V. VILMA S. DE PERALTA
27
G.R. No. 213488, November 07, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Doctrine: While commissions are, indeed, incentives or forms of encouragement to inspire
employees to put a little more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these
commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a complaint5 for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, unpaid
commission, annual profit sharing, damages, and attorney's fees filed by respondent against
petitioner and/or Severino C. Lim, Jnalyn P. Lim, Jason Ian Yap, Jorge Tuason, Marissa
Operaña, and Arturo P. Lopez (Lim, et al.) before the NLRC.
Essentially, respondent alleged that petitioner initially hired her as a cashier in March 1997.
She worked her way up to the position of Insurance Sales Executive (ISE). However, things
turned sour when her husband, Romulo "Romper" De Peralta, also petitioner's employee and
the President of the Toyota Shaw-Pasig Workers Union - Automotive Industry Workers
Alliance (TSPWU-AIWA), organized a collective bargaining unit through a certification
election.10
According to respondent, petitioner suddenly dismissed from service the officials/directors of
TSPWU-AIWA, including her husband. She was accused of "having committed various acts"
relative to the processing of insurance of three (3) units as "outside transactions" and
claiming commissions therefor, instead of considering the said transactions as "new business
accounts" under the dealership's marketing department.12 Accordingly, she was preventively
suspended because of such charge. On February 3, 2012, respondent received a Notice of
Termination.
In their defense, petitioner and Lim, et al. maintained that respondent was dismissed from
service for just cause and with due process. They explained that respondent was charged and
proven to have committed acts of dishonesty and falsification. They further averred that
respondent's claims for commissions, tax rebates, and other benefits were unfounded and
without documentation and validation.
The LA Ruling - dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
It found that respondent herself admitted through her letter explanation to the Notice to
Explain that she indeed processed the insurance of units from petitioner's own dealership,
and as a result, received commissions which were rightly attributable to the dealership's
marketing department not being "outside transactions.”
The NLRC Ruling - affirmed the LA ruling with modification finding petitioner liable to
respondent. The NLRC agreed with the LA's finding that respondent's act justified her
termination from employment.25 As such, respondent is not entitled to backwages,
separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.26
in directing petitioner's affairs.
The CA Ruling - dismissed the consolidated petitions and, accordingly, affirmed the NLRC
ruling in toto.
ISSUE: whether or not they are entitled to unpaid commissions, tax rebate for achieved
monthly targets, salary deductions, salary for the month of January 2012, and success
share/profit sharing - YES
HELD:
ART. 97. Definitions. - As used in this Title:
xxxx
(f) "Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration of earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on
a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and
includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to
the employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer, or to
any person affiliated with the employer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This definition explicitly includes commissions as part of wages. While commissions are,
indeed, incentives or forms of encouragement to inspire employees to put a little more
industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these commissions are direct
remunerations for services rendered. In fact, commissions have been defined as the
recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver,
factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his
transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the
reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that
commissions are part of a salesman's wage or salary.
Thus, respondent's allegation of nonpayment of such monetary benefits places the burden
on the employer, i.e., petitioner, to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty that it paid
said benefits and that the employee, i.e., respondent, actually received such payment or that
the employee was not entitled thereto. It is well-settled that the failure of employers to
submit the necessary documents that are in their possession gives rise to the presumption
that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its cause.
Indubitably, petitioner failed to discharge its afore-described burden. Hence, it is bound to
pay the monetary benefits claimed by respondent. As aptly pointed out by the NLRC, since
respondent already earned these monetary benefits, she must promptly receive the same,
notwithstanding the fact that she was legally terminated from employment.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (AKELCO) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (Fourth Division), RODOLFO M. RETISO and 165 OTHERS
[G.R. No. 121439. January 25, 2000]
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Doctrine: The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management
and employee of a "fair days wage for a fair days labor" remains as the basic factor in
determining employees wages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be
no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was
illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed,[23] or otherwise illegally prevented from
working,[24] a situation which we find is not present in the instant case.
FACTS:
"These are consolidated cases/claims for non-payment of salaries and wages, 13th month
pay, ECOLA and other fringe benefits as rice, medical and clothing allowances. Complainants
alleged that prior to the temporary transfer of the office of AKELCO from Lezo Aklan to Amon
Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, complainants were continuously performing their task and were duly
paid of their salaries at their main office located at Lezo, Aklan.
On January 22, the Board of AKELCO allowed the temporary transfer holding of office at
Kalibo, Aklan. Nevertheless, majority of the employees continued to work at Lezo Aklan and
were paid of their salaries. An unnumbered resolution was passed by AKELCO withdrawing
the temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan and that daily operation be held again at
the main office of Lezo, Aklan. From June 1992 to March 1993, complainants who reported at
Lezo were not paid their salaries. From March up to the present, complainants were allowed
to draw their salaries, with the exception of a few who were not paid their salaries for April
and May 1993. The respondents allege that the complainants voluntarily abandoned their
work assignments and that they defied the lawful orders by the General manager and thus
the Board of Directors passed a resolution resisting and denying the claims of these
complainants under the principle of “no work, no pay.”
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS
 That these complainants voluntarily abandoned their respective work/job
assignments, without any justifiable reason and without notifying the management
of the Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO), hence the cooperative suffered
damages and systems loss; That the complainants herein defied the lawful orders
and other issuances by the General Manager and the Board of Directors of the
AKELCO.
 These complainants were requested to report to work at the Kalibo office x x x but
despite these lawful orders of the General Manager, the complainants did not
follow and wilfully and maliciously defied said orders and issuance of the General
Manager; that the Board of Directors passed a Resolution resisting and denying the
claims of these complainants, x x x under the principle of "no work no pay" which is
legally justified;
 That these complainants have "mass leave" from their customary work on June
1992 up to March 18, 1993 and had a "sit-down" stance for these periods of time in
their alleged protest of the appointment of respondent Atty. Leovigildo Mationg as
the new General Manager of the Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO)
 That they engaged in " . . . slowdown mass leaves, sit downs, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities of the Aklan Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO)."
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s decision and
RULING that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages.
NLRC based its conclusion on the following: (a) the letter of Leyson, Office Manager of
AKELCO addressed to AKELCO’s General Manager, Atty. Mationg, requesting for the payment
of private respondents’ unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March18, 1993; (b) the
memorandum of said Atty. Mationg in answer to the letter request of Leyson where he made
an assurance that he will recommend such request; (c) the private respondents’ own
computation of their unpaid wages.
Petitioner AKELCO claims – compensable service is best shown by timecards, payslips and
other similar documents and it was an error for public respondent to consider the
computation of the claims for wages and benefits submitted merely by private respondents
as substantial evidence
ISSUE: WON the refusal of private respondents to work under the lawful orders of AKELCO
management are covered by the “no work, no pay” principle (thus not entitled to the claim
for unpaid wages)
HELD: Yes.
The above bases of the NLRC does not constitute substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that private respondents are entitled to the payment of wages from June 16, 1992
to March18, 1993. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. These evidences relied
upon by public respondent did not establish the fact that private respondents actually
rendered services in the Kalibo office during the stated period.
It has been established that the petitioner’s business office was transferred to Kalibo and all
its equipments, records and facilities were transferred thereat and that it conducted its
official business in Kalibo during the period in question. It was incumbent upon private
respondents to prove that they indeed rendered services for petitioner, which they failed to
do. It would neither be fair nor just to allow private respondents to recover something they
have not earned and could not have earned because they did not render services at the
Kalibo office during the stated period.
It would neither be fair nor just to allow private respondents to recover something they have
not earned and could not have earned because they did not render services at the Kalibo
office during the stated period.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION &
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 88168. August 30, 1990.]
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Doctrine: The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be
forced upon the employer "who may not be obliged to assume the onerous burden of
granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the employee’s basic salaries or wages
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify or set aside the decision dated September 2, 1988
of the National Labor Relations Commission, which found the petitioner, Traders Royal Bank
(or TRB), guilty of diminution of benefits due the private respondents and ordered it to pay
the said employees’ claims for differentials in their holiday, mid-year, and year-end bonuses.
On November 18, 1986, the Union, through its president, filed a letter-complaint against TRB
with the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations claiming that:
1. "First, the management of TRB per memo dated October 10, 1986 paid the
employees their HOLIDAY PAY, but has withheld from the Union the basis of their
computation.
2. "Second, the computation in question, has allegedly decreased the daily salary rate
of the employees. This diminution of existing benefits has decreased our overtime
rate and has affected the employees’ take home pay.
3. "Third, the diminution of benefits being enjoyed by the employees since time
immemorial, e.g. mid-year bonus, from two (2) months gross pay to two (2) months
basic and year-end bonus from three (3) months gross to only two (2) months.
4. "Fourth, the refusal by management to recall active union members from the
branches which were being transferred without prior notice, solely at the instance
of the branch manager." (p. 26, Rollo.).
demand as a matter of right" (Aragon v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 61 O.G. 4597). "It is
something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient."
It is clear from the above-cited rulings that the petitioner may not be obliged to pay bonuses
to its employees. The matter of giving them bonuses over and above their lawful salaries and
allowances is entirely dependent on the profits, if any, realized by the Bank from its
operations during the past year.
From 1979-1985, the bonuses were less because the income of the Bank had decreased. In
1986, the income of the Bank was only 20.2 million pesos, but the Bank still gave out the
usual two (2) months basic mid-year and two months gross year-end bonuses. The petitioner
pointed out, however, that the Bank weakened considerably after 1986 on account of
political developments in the country. Suspected to be a Marcos-owned or controlled bank, it
was placed under sequestration by the present administration and is now managed by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
In the light of these submissions of the petitioner, the contention of the Union that the
granting of bonuses to the employees had ripened into a company practice that may not be
adjusted to the prevailing financial condition of the Bank has no legal and moral bases. Its
fiscal condition having declined, the Bank may not be forced to distribute bonuses which it
can no longer afford to pay and, in effect, be penalized for its past generosity to its
employees.
Private respondent’s contention, that the decrease in the mid-year and year-end bonuses
constituted a diminution of the employees’ salaries, is not correct, for bonuses are not part
of labor standards in the same class as salaries, cost of living allowances, holiday pay, and
leave benefits, which are provided by the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted.

The union insisted on pursuing the case, arguing that the CBA would apply prospectively only
to claims arising after its effectivity. Petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that it had paid
the employees holiday pay. The practice of giving them bonuses at year’s end, would depend
on how profitable the operation of the bank had been. Generally, the bonus given was two
(2) months basic mid-year and two (2) months gross end-year.

On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the employees

ISSUE:

Whether or not bonuses are part of labor standards. - YES

HELD:
A bonus is "a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver which the recipient has no right to
ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC., vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NAPOLEON
C. MAMON, ARSENIO GAZZINGAN, ROMEO C. VELASCO, ARMANDO L. BALLON, VICTOR E.
ALDEZA, JOSE L. CABRERA, VETERANS PHILIPPINE SCOUT SECURITY AGENCY, and/or ENGR.
SERGIO JAMILA IV, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 116476-84 May 21, 1998
Doctrine: The indirect employers liability to the contractors employees extends only to the
period during which they were working for the petitioner, and the fact that they were
reassigned to another principal necessarily ends such responsibility. The principal is made
liable to his indirect employees, because it can protect itself from irresponsible contractors
by withholding such sums and paying them directly to the employees or by requiring a bond
from the contractor or subcontractor for this purpose.
Similarly, the solidary liability for payment of back wages and separation pay is limited, under
Article 106, to the extent of the work performed under the contract; under Article 107, to the
performance of any work, task, job or project; and under Article 109, to the extent of their
civil liability under this Chapter [on payment of wages].
FACTS:
All the complainants were employed by the Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency as
security guards: Napoleon Mamon on October 7, 1989; Arsenio Gazzingan on September 25,
1988; Rodolfo C. Velasco on January 5, 1987; Armando Ballon on June 28, 1990; Victor Aldeza
on March 21, 1990; and Jose L. Cabrera in January 1988.
Some were assigned to other companies and to Rosewood, while others are re-assigned to
other companies from Rosewood, and still others were put on “floating” status without
assignment. Most were underpaid or their wages were never paid. All these circumstances
led to the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and for
nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day,
thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages was filed against
Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila IV (collectively referred to as
the "security agency," for brevity). Thereafter, petitioner Rosewood Processing, Inc. was
impleaded as a third-party respondent by the security agency. In due course, Labor Arbiter
Ricardo C. Nora rendered a consolidated Decision dated March 26, 1993 finding the security
agency and Rosewood as solidarily liable to pay the monetary benefits due the security
guards.
Labor Arbiters Ruling - The labor arbiter noted the failure of the security agency to present
evidence to refute the complainants allegation. Instead, it impleaded the petitioner as third-
party respondent, contending that its actions were primarily caused by petitioners
noncompliance with its obligations under the contract for security services, and the
subsequent cancellation of the said contract. The labor arbiter held petitioner jointly and
severally liable with the security agency as the complainants indirect employer under Articles
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. The labor arbiter ordered the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Ruling of Respondent Commission - dismissed petitioners appeal, because it was allegedly
not perfected within the reglementary ten-day period. Thus, it ruled that the labor arbiters
Decision became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Rosewood was solidarily liable with the security agency for
the non-payment of wages, as provided in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
HELD: YES
Notwithstanding the service contract between the petitioner and the security agency, the
former is still solidarily liable to the employees, who were not privy to said contract, pursuant
to the aforecited provisions of the Code. Labor standard legislations are enacted to alleviate
the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs.
They are considered written in every contract, and stipulations in violation thereof are
considered not written. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the
contract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their or their
contractors or subcontractors liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.
The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance
with the provisions of the Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The
contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct employer,
and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractors employees. This liability
facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers compensation, thus, giving the workers
ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to
the employer. Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover
whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between
itself and the contractor.
Withal, fairness likewise dictates that the petitioner should not, however, be held liable for
wage differentials incurred while the complainants were assigned to other companies. Under
these cited provisions of the Labor Code, should the contractor fail to pay the wages of its
employees in accordance with law, the indirect employer (the petitioner in this case), is
jointly and severally liable with the contractor, but such responsibility should be understood
to be limited to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner
and extent that he is liable to the employees directly employed by him. This liability of
petitioner covers the payment of the workers performance of any work, task, job or project.
So long as the work, task, job or project has been performed for petitioners benefit or on its
behalf, the liability accrues for such period even if, later on, the employees are eventually
transferred or reassigned elsewhere.