September 22, 1986 and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of
supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives
have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private
respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned
through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these
terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
BatasangPambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites
of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to
a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these
murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of
fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to
run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's
proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed
winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of
his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the BatasangPambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious
manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which
flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were
above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause
of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the
present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the BatasangPambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between
the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be
a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must
be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard
moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of
the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The
two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the
issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are
also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out
to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during
the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage.
Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other
elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office
of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were
a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all
levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and
referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in
other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the
killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and
implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their
lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in
power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the
petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was
refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its
constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance
could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of
the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent
bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without
recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election
returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that
the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of
ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was
made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San
Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes
but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate until further orders.3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered
the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission.4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the
5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984,
the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter
alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman VictorianoSavellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion
and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former
law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of all member of the BatasangPambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the
BatasangPambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at
opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive
and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all
the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible
viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because
all contests involving the members of the BatasangPambansa come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful
decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part,
argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in
fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction
between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that
the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet
a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission
on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so
was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office
"in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into
the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later
decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed
office, there was no Member of the BatasangPambansa from Antique whose election, returns or
qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election
cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception
was the election contest involving the members of the BatasangPambansa, which had to be
heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a
candidate for the BatasangPambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a
contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily,
subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general
heading of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which
should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over
matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the
exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole
judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the
candidates for the BatasangPambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still
another way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to
do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on
Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the BatasangPambansa, all cases involving elective provincial
and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the
election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in
the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was
made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in
the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting
to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the
Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the BatasangPambansa and elective
provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide
these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising
before the proclamation of the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-
proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced
only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175
thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the
sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or
rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motuproprio or upon written petition, and
after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-
elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving
members of the BatasangPambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to
insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it
might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-
the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the
popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in
nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and
deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.

Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the
came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end
proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the
and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the
protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term
framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the
of his office would have already expired.
past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage
and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative and the second judicial. It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question
upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from
exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was
if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate
incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between
against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election
the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken
contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en
into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included
banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even
the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or
the division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en
ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12
banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in
the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should
Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-
be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as
proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the said
referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after
provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.
proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.
Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same
sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution. Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention
by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of
justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring
Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can
respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14
say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding
of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time,
of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to
the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His
conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they
the Second Division when it rendered its decision.
applied to the members of the defunct BatasangPambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3,
of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided
that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than
"contest" involving members of the BatasangPambansa, which had to be heard and decided en
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall
banc.
give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the
prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process
demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's
wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have
recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so,
he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it
could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17
die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of
Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon
by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the
February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and
repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A
new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the
Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to
express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we
are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with
courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is
finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening
events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted
and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of
the Constitution.

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least
SO ORDERED.
significant of which was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past
regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone,
felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before
enjoyed. Even the BatasangPambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the
previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.
suggested not without reason, to send the rec•rds of this case to the archives and say the case
is finished and the book is closed.

But not yet.

Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor
of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for
fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he
chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did
not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country.
And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell,
he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies
of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of
dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense
Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter
than eagles and stronger than lions."

A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice
CalixtoZaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV
and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of MamertaZaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve
ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in
separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82
years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service.
It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust,
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with
such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the
post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found
to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every
public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of
his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of
every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or
employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for
being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and
seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the
decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of
first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to
the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity. For in this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for
employment that a public officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of
office and thereby make it possible thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his position
in the public service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes,
the herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative
Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and
liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of
financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his
financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the
individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and
self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the above requirement
amounts to "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as
it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless
thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition,
income, and expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices
defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as "the income
tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve to determine whether an
officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported
income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then
Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the facts alleged, they
denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth:
"1. That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have
voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the
time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The
private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise
denied that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as
unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot
be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life
and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the
interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate
exercise of the police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all
his material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the
parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was
deemed submitted for decision the lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of
facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the material allegations of the complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional,
null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of
sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the
holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the
matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail." In the present case likewise there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of
this section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court could
be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the
above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental
acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we
expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a
statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional
rights, especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an
event therefore, "there should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be
presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect;
when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual
standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission
of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due
process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there
is an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law. They include persuading, inducing, or influencing
another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself, or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity,
has to intervene under the law; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or
other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the
public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given; accepting or
having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination;
causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of
or discriminating against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into
any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not
the public officer profited or will profit thereby; having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a
material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of
which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against
the same or does not participate in such action; approving or granting knowingly any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled and divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by
his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and
prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets
and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The other
sections of the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the
previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First
Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a
prosecution, 27suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of
small or insignificant value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or
trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier
statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote
morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil
at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then
prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently
detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and
penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof,
to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it
becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their positions to commit
acts of graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the
Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question
raised, is that portion of the statute requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after
an officer or employee had previously done so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity
that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the
aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as
embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice
Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and
public interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public
health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve
public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of
citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent
conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first
used by Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation
usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of
private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well
as now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to
curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the
police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent
in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine
law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments
to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same
power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the
limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote
morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming
to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion
thereof? The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the
protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such
requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not
amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the
proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the
mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held
in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due
process in the form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an
opportunity to defend himself must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be
removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this Court
through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without express provision of
law, "it is established by the great weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension for
cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing."
Such is likewise the import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,
speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement directed in the
decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate administrative action as the behaviour of
petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due process."
To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure
provision to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations entrusted with
governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed:
"That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold their office or employment
during good behavior and would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be determined in
an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by
counsel is afforded them, would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there
made to promoting honesty and efficiency through an assurance of stability in their employment
relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this
Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation
and without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process
guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia
for the Court contained the following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in
view, it cannot be pretended that the constitutional provision of due process of law for the
removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus
compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily
confidential in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed
in them. The inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not
subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and within due process. . .
." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized
"that the vitality of the constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by
sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without
hearing — upon a doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil
Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observation from the same case: "A civil service
employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with
such unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is analogous to property, could
he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to
be an infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in
the affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to freedom the government must respect.
To the extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due
process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the
question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial
Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
"the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In
accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court in the same case,
however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in
the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good, the peace and
order of society and the general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man
must renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is
freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual."
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social
organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that
"to belong to a society is to sacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the
restraints which the society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton however,
should be understood in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or
safety, of general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may
be regulated. The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of
free activity that cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether the command is
specially against him or generally against him and others." 55
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he
had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly
without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the
extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be
denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due
process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That
leads us to an inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness.
It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice'
and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is
not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly
or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach.
There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes
a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional
sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As
Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His
separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the
basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality.
If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a
man no longer master of himself is in any real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of
communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court
or when public safety and order" 60may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and
seizure clause, 61 and the liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory
requirement of further periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
deserves to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been
rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various
American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness
that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of
privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though.
The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.1äwphï1.ñët
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government,
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It
cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective
of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not
to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it
is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets
and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of
personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision
requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it would be violative of
the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was
convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully having in his possession a number
of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized
under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of
Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the
coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the
District Court, there was a finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court
of Appeals did not disturb that finding although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however
under the view that such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the search and
seizure being incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas
emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers or documents, but
with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder but
remained at all times the property of the government and subject to inspection and recall by
it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as suggesting "that officers
seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor
[does it] suggest that the right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general
search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons subject to
inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as indicating that the
officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy
joined, critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation" which in this
particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and expressing the regret
that the Court might be "in danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience with
police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar
qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted
only under judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely
because there may be the duty to make documents available for litigation does not mean that
police officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone
except under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to
express and to safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision
offends against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This
is the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this
Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements
must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to
convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate
provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
has been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial
condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused
immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating
him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills
it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and
the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character.
It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes
from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search
or seizure of his house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-
incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above
inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then,
the protection it affords will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there
is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an
infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of
relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor vehicle,
who knows that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop and give his name,
residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer was sustained
against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as evidence to establish
his connection with the injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in
the opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is invalid, because such information,
although in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the
informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same
ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct
from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right be
involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular
case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the information exacted by the
statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it would
avail, we are not called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized.
As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice
Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As
expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and
keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they,
according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never
inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken
may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be,
the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on
the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null
and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without
costs.
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions
then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statute’s validity must prevail over
mere pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila). While in the
attainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there
must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable that what the Constitution condemns, the statute
allows.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not
amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that
from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection
afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

CASE DIGEST
Morfe v. Mutuc
22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968
J. Fernando

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that “every public officer, ...after his
assumption to office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year...”
Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due process as an oppressive
exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the
ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan.
After the submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts, the CFI found for Morfe, affirming that the
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause – hence, Section 7 of
R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive SecretaryAmelitoMutuc appealed the decision of the CFI before the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the State’s police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is
intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014 Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents. 1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

DECISION 2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

VELASCO, JR., J.: 3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally 4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on
which he lives.
the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. PurisimaPe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high
The Case school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), RoswindaJumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan),
filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al.,
The Facts
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined
from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the exercises.
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray
about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same
(Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Back at the school, MyleneRheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises,
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia,
its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black 1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook party;
friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
 2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only."
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known
of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to
have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this
case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called
"immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies
of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the
Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe
issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and
printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after
trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5,
2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5)
working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return,
laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the
proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant
case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their
right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
x xxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of
the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of
the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus,
the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and
promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in
OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the
end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed
by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements
the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless,
erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and
collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party
and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be
in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"
means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be
done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to
a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to
protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three
strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21(2) informational privacy;
and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays,
not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more
reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and
that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that
given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as
wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy
possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its
Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he
law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or
else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x xx It is imperative that the courts respond
appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the
Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in
effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not
necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in
OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in
mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very
purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have
otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing
of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is
akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of
which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner
can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend
on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since
gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook),
which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to
discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them." 28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can
view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the
link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends
Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue
to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what
extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others,
coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the
spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation
of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world,
of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to
his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless
exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or
her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user
or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user
never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only
strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user
to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook
users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit
the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures
and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their
Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded
with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since
their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not
their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their
knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the
subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not
appear on the records.
41
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior
high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x xx They then said [that]
there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the
computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from
there the various photographs x xx. They even told me that there had been times when these
photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure
to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their
statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce
all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the
less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or
e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are
not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own
Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial
audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends
plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience
who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even
a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be
"very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos
of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s
privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that
they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means that
self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive
in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors,
fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" 56 on the part of teenagers
has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go
too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves
sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in
its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not
only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to
include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in
view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as
well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and
educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions
and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the
process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their
privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they
are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any
kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently
available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and
more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care
in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We
cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in
the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is
notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find
no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners,
vs
 ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of
himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by
Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her
students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist
up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in
the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining
the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right
to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them,
lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational
privacy in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the latter
part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data
as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim
(proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation
of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party
and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be
in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person
or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved
party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information
about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking environment,
privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol
better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is
the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images
(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and
ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an
avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others
in the position of receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the
public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to
the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were
able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy
to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Right to Privacy – Online Privacy (Social
Media)
Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Writ of Habeas Data
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and
by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children
were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in
the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as
“Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall”
(profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most
of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline
their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).