Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Studies
http://journals.cambridge.org/MOA
John Young
The Journal of Modern African Studies / Volume 34 / Issue 01 / March 1996, pp 105 - 120
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X00055221, Published online: 11 November 2008
2
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Woyeen, 21 February 1979.
3
See, for example, TPLF, Revolt, First Year (1975?), 7, p. 29, and 8, p. 26.
and beyond. As a result, the EPLF's dependence upon its army and its
conviction that the Derg could be defeated in the Sahel was decisively
rejected. This approach was condemned as relegating the people to the
status of mere ' spectators', while the TPLF military doctrine recognised
the value of their initiatives.7
The guerrilla fighters of the ELF had been trained in Syria, China,
and by Cubans in South Yemen.8 After the collapse of Haile Selassie's
regime in 1974, a number of Eritrean officers from the imperial army
joined the EPLF - as did others later from the ELF - which meant that
its military leaders inherited a tradition of professionalism. As a result,
they emphasised training and relied on technology, an approach
expedited by the EPLF's access to skilled and educated recruits. By way
of contrast, the TPLF's strategy and techniques were acquired through
personal study and practical experience in the countryside.9 Training
methods were not sophisticated, albeit consistent with the Tigrayan
emphasis on self-sufficiency. While those with skills in warfare assumed
key positions in the army, there was never any marked division between
them and their political leaders. It is thus significant that none of the
TPLF's top three surviving military officers, Siye Abraha (Seye),
Mohammed Yanous (Samora), and Hadish Araya (Hayloum), had
either a previous army background or even went abroad for training.
Although it was the EPLF that first introduced the means whereby
the rank-and-file could voice their grievances, my informants suggest
that criticisms were far more likely to be horizontally than hierar-
chically directed. Within the TPLF, however, there seem to have been
genuine opportunities for questioning policies and their implemen-
tation. This emphasis on popular participation and consultation may
well at times have slowed military progress, but it also ensured that the
TPLF did not usually get' too far ahead' of the thinking of its members.
The extent to which they could challenge their leadership was
graphically illustrated in 1989, when those fighting under the banner
of the EPRDF outside of Tigray began deserting the battlefield and
returning home. War-weary, they complained that their objective had
been achieved with the liberation of Tigray, and that it was up to the
other peoples of Ethiopia to free their own territories, a view that had
widespread support in Tigray.
These TPLF fighters were not punished for desertion, but allowed to
7
Interview with Gebru Asrat and Abey Tsheye, Addis Ababa, 9 January 1996.
8
Peter Andreas, 'Politics and Liberation: the Eritrean struggle, 1961-86', Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Aarhus, Denmark, 1987, p. 67.
9
Interview with Yemane Kidane, Ministry of Defence, Addis Ababa, 1 December 1992.
10
Interview with Father Keven Mahoney, Adigrat Catholic Seminary, 4 March 1993.
11
Interview with Colonel Asaminew Bedane, POW camp, Western Tigray, 5 May 1988. He
found the EPLF's strategy and tactics to be superior to those of the TPLF, but the latter more
terrifying in combat because of its ability to launch surprise attacks and the courage of its fighters.
12
EPLF, Adulis, i, 9, March 1985, p. 7. See also, Alex de Waal, Evil Days: 30 years of war and
famine in Ethiopia (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 311.
13
Information based on my visit in May 1988 to the POW camp in western Tigray, where
some 4,000 Derg soldiers were being held by the TPLF.
Derg could not be assured of their loyalty or reliability since they might
well throw down their weapons and surrender at the first opportunity
when next confronting the TPLF on the battlefield, as I personally
witnessed on several occasions.
There is almost certainly another factor that must figure in any
explanation of the differing attitudes to POWs. The EPLF was engaged
in a struggle for independence and took the view that Derg soldiers were
illegal and foreign occupiers of Eritrean sovereign territory, whereas
the TPLF looked upon them as forcefully conscripted peasants and
fellow Ethiopians. In other words, the situation in Tigray made it easier
to adopt a more humane approach to the captives than in Eritrea,
where militant nationalism coloured all contacts with Ethiopians. Even
so, Alex de Waal's conclusion that prisoners held by both the EPLF
and TPLF were well treated is correct,14 not to say remarkable in view
of the terror tactics employed by the Derg's army in Tigray and Eritrea.
14
De Waal, op. cit. p. 309.
15
'EPLF Political Report and NDP', adopted at the Second and Unity Congress of the EPLF
16
and the ELF—Central Leadership, 16 March 1987, p. 152. Andreas, op. cit. p. 93.
17
'On Our Differences with the EPLF', in People's Voice, Special Issue, 1986, p. 7.
18
'A Great Leap Forward', in ibid. p. 6.
19 20
Adulis, May 1985, p. 5. Ibid. pp. 6-7.
21
'A Great Leap Forward', loc. cit. p. 7.
22
J o h n Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa ( C a m b r i d g e , 1987), p . 255.
By defining its relationship with the EPLF as ' tactical', the TPLF was
indicating that the only thing the two Fronts had in common was a
shared commitment to overthrowing the Derg. The fact that they did
not have similar positions on political or ideological concerns cast the
long-term viability of their alliance in doubt. Moreover, if the EPLF
was not regarded by Eritreans as being 'democratic', at least as
understood by Tigrayans, the TPLF had the right to enter into tactical
alliances with others who were. This was the EPLF's fear, which was
not misplaced, as in the mid-1980s the Democratic Movement for the
Liberation of Eritrea (DMLE), which opposed EPLF hegemony, was
organised in Tigray with TPLF support.30
The EPLF's decision to break with the TPLF was also due to the
existence, as already noted, of a number of areas of disagreement. But
having learnt to live with these differences for ten years in return for the
obvious benefits derived from their relationship, questions arise as to
why the EPLF ended ties with the TPLF, and why it did so in 1985.
The explanation given by the Tigrayans is that after being the senior
partner in the alliance for so long, the EPLF could not accept them as
equals. No longer the fledgling guerrilla band dependent on the EPLF,
by the mid-1980s the TPLF's growing military capacity was rapidly
approaching that of the Eritreans.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, the impact of the EPLF's
decision in 1985 to sever relations with the TPLF was immediate and
severe. Military collaboration ended, political contacts were termin-
ated, and the TPLF's radio station in Eritrea was closed down. Most
significantly, at the height of the 1984-5 famine the EPLF even refused
to allow the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) to use the main supply
link which ran from Kassala in the Sudan through Eritrea. Some
100,000 peasants were quickly mobilised by the TPLF and REST to
construct a link road from western Tigray to Gederef in the Sudan.
Following a route previously surveyed as a means to reduce dependency
on the EPLF, the TPLF was able to construct a rough track that
allowed aid convoys to resume the transport of grains, as well as
providing refugees with a more direct route to the UNHCR camps in
the Sudan. Because of this quick response probably few lives were
actually lost as a result of the EPLF's actions. However, the new road
30
At a conference in early 1990 a DMLE delegation led by its vice-chairman, Salah Ayay, met
with a delegation from the TPLF led by two Politburo members, Seyum Musa and Awalom
Wolde, and reached agreement on a set of principles. DMLE and TPLF Joint Statement, 24-31
January 1990.
repeatedly crossed the perennial flowing Tekezze River, and could only
be used when the waters were low.
Ultimately, however, neither the EPLF nor the TPLF would have
survived and prospered without being led by pragmatic leaders, which
the quick resolution of their conflict in April 1988 demonstrated.
Reconciliation was facilitated by the TPLF's unstinting support of the
right of Eritrea to independence even in the midst of a highly polemical
and public debate. But a rapprochement was actually achieved,
according to Meles Zenawi, because of the string of TPLF military
victories over the Derg in the towns of Tigray in early 1988.31 Indeed,
although denied by the TPLF, it is believed that one of the reasons why
these attacks were launched was to draw the EPLF's attention to its
power, and of the need to overcome their differences and form a
military alliance that would move quickly to defeat the Derg.
Three other factors also encouraged reconciliation at this time. First,
the two Fronts were mindful of the agreement recently reached
between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden. According to Sebhat
Nega, who was then the TPLF's secretary-general, this freed up to
15,000-20,000 Derg troops for deployment in the rebellious northern
provinces.32 Second, Tigray was again facing drought and would have
to import grains from the Sudan over its road link to Gederef, which
would be closed with the onset of the main season of rains that normally
began in late June. Agreement with the EPLF would provide access to
the all-weather route through Eritrea to Kassala. Lastly, although
denied in 1988, TPLF officials in 1993 acknowledged their fears that if
secret negotiations being conducted at the time between Eritreans and
Ethiopians were successful, they might have to face the full force of the
Derg virtually alone.
In April 1988 the politburos of the EPLF and the TPLF decided to
co-ordinate their struggle on the basis of common views and aims.33
These included (i) the commitment to work co-operatively to destroy
the Derg, (ii) the condemnation of the intervention of both superpowers
in the region, (iii) the recognition of the legitimacy of the Eritrean
people's struggle for independence, as well as (iv) the right of Ethiopia's
nationalities to self-determination, and (v) the need for national
and multinational opposition groups to unite in their struggle.34 The
agreement thus reflected considerable compromise on the part of both
liberation movements, as well as a considerable amount left unsaid.
31 32
Meles Zenawi, op. cit. Interview with Sebhat Nega, Wolkait, 27 April 1988.
33
People's Voice, M a y 1988, p . 8.
34
'EPLF and TPLF Joint Statement', in ibid. pp. 16-17.
The decision by the EPLF to form a common front gave the TPLF
the equal recognition it wanted. Condemnation of both superpowers in
the region amounted to a retreat by the TPLF, which had focused its
wrath on the Soviet Union, as well as by the EPLF, which had directed
its ire against the West.35 The statement on self-determination was
constructed in a deliberately unclear manner, but on balance the
TPLF would appear to have ' backed down' somewhat from its earlier
stand, since no reference was made to the right of Eritrea's nationalities
to self-determination and independence. There was no explicit
recognition of the right of Ethiopia's nationalities to independence
which the TPLF had repeatedly called for, and instead the statement
gave greater weight to the place of multinational opposition forces in
the united front than the TPLF had previously been prepared to
accept.
What complicates any assessment of the agreement is that the
positions of the two Fronts have changed somewhat over time. For
example, the EPLF was less ready to defend the Soviet Union in 1988
when its days as a superpower appeared to be numbered, while the
TPLF was less insistent about the right of Ethiopian nationalities to
independence when it anticipated having enough power in the new
regime in Addis Ababa to arbitrate the outcome of demands for
national self-determination. As a journalist in Tigray at the time, it was
clear that a considerable residue of suspicion and bitterness remained.
Indeed, REST officials were only guardedly optimistic that EPLF
promises of access to their all-weather road to Kassala would be
fulfilled. Ultimately, however, the agreement demonstrated the
pragmatism of both the Eritrean and the Tigray leaders, and a
recognition of their need of each other if victory was to be achieved.
CONCLUSION
Growing peasant support for the TPLF translated into a greater role
in the war against the Derg, and this in turn led to an increasingly
critical appraisal of its former benefactor, the EPLF. Combined with
the latter's slowness in accepting the TPLF's changing status, and an
historical sense of inferiority on the part of many Tigrayans in their
relations with Eritreans, the stage was set for the break that came in
35
In the aforementioned DMLE-TPLF Joint Statement 17 months later, the two parties
agreed in January 1990 to condemn the Soviet Union, but pointedly omitted any reference to the
United States.