G.R. No.
L-46930 June 10, 1988 On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance
of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were
performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the
other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer
than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special
services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner
Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the
said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines,3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two
years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the
latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment
had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective
October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute
grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the
U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing
officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private
respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the
hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an
autocratic form of supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the
complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the
rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements
that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs.
Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under
oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
where others not involved in the case could hear."
"B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the
commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of
Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment
status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature
but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of
First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on
November 8, 1976.8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous
imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish
and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their
private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special
appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had
no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in
an order dated March 8, 1977, 9on the main ground that the petitioners had not
presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal
torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted
maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs,
against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave
the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants,
petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated
August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's
failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some
misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion
to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the
respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter
filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the
respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting
officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the
private respondents have sued them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the
protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not
suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled
principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where
the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the
present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima
facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their
precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties.
The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to
substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has
since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the courta quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of
can be determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the
trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial
still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to
the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the
commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued
was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United
States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v.
Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where
we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces
also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The
United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in
United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a
motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and
several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental
rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases
13
the Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had
become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were
covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a
reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information
regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of
such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's
criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services was practicing
"an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval
Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of
employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in
nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department
of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private
about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the
scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will
have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will require that government to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the
government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So
we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the
doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also
to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 16
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our
adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the
previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized
exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do
an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed
of sale; 18or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law
claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of
internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the
purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may
satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist
him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws,
the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing
his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of
state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23
where the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a
personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in
forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the
previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party
defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the
recognized exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its
consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government
itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that
may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been
overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by
such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well
settled .25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under
the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the
fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the
private respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo
Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the
private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper
for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to
treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of
American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The
Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect
upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which
we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people,
particularly since we became independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the
United States but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived
some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning
reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without
which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in
the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even
idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against
the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are
all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even
assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not
decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not
acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977,
August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is
directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of
September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM,
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO,
MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN.
BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE
MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE
LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE
(3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT
AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO
GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE
CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT.
LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO
NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX,
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM,
PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES
AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in
their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY"
PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA,
VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-
two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON
BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL,
RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG,
SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY
CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR
FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS,
ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO
ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO
QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA,
MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO,
REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO
CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA,
FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA,
PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI
UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO
MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM,
PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES
AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in
their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY"
PEREZ, DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM,
ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE
CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two
injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA,
DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN
CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON
MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE,
GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA,
WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE,
MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER,
RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO
ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO
ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR.,
JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO,
JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO
GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS,
MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG
MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA
ROBALE, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.
Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 &
private respondents in 84607.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22,
1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a
grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But
for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter
in our history books. For those however, who have become widows and orphans,
certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives
taken that will never be brought back to life again.
Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group),
instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of
respondent Judge Sandoval,1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the
complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines
in Civil Case No. 88-43351.
Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as
G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31,
1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as
follows:
With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers,
since they are being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding
them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government,
the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and correspondingly be
applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is
hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is
denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within
which to file their respective pleadings.
On the other hand, the Order3 , dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by
both parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge
finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment
by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then
Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco
Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called
"genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free
to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of
land payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15,
1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the
encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet
with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only
meet with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the
MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land
reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only
promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.
Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of
encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from
going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine
flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and
his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land
reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in
the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a
landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between Tadeo and
Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating
panel from each side to meet again the following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacañang to air
their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media.
He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were:
". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero
kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din
namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . . ."4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacañang, from Quezon Memorial
Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral
organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng
Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a
brief program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern
side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden.
Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacañang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached
C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital
Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to
break through the police lines and rush towards Malacañang, CAPCOM Commander
General Ramon E. Montaño inspected the preparations and adequacy of the
government forces to quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the
command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacañang. The
civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier
General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by
CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed
grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar
University would be forcibly occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to
investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that
the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of
three phalanges, in the following manner:
(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6,
7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police
Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District,
was designated as ground commander of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD
CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets
after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The
WPD forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment —
aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD
policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force
stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also
the standard CDC equipment — truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field
Force was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion
composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at
Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16
rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the command of Major Felimon B.
Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards
farther behind the INP Field Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire
width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each
side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The
eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C.
Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams
(MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant
grenadier, a driver and the team leader.
In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacañang stood the
VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP,
General Ramon E. Montaño. At this command post, after General Montaño had
conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the
adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General Alfredo S.
Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado
Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to
the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay
to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter
would negotiate with the marchers.5 (Emphasis supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M.
Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place
between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash
occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke
loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit:
. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles.
Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police
fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police line was breached.
Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged from the government
forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued
from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt. Laonglaan
Goce sped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still
grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs,
together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of
General Montaño to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs
were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white
head bands, who were armed with long firearms. 6 (Emphasis ours)
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although
according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the
name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and
twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and
twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the
like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 11,7(A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which
created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court
Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated
that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an
investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of
Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted
its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the
deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again,
the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it
submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on
February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the
other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a)
Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were
armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited
act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section
14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the
Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police
and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section
10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal
control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e),
Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg.
880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs
with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts
punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e),
Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and
were determined to march to Malacañang, emboldened as they are, by the
inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo — "bubutasin
namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay
gagawa ng sariling butas. . .
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces.
Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began
pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC
contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their
ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is
not clear who started the firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear
gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a)
there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c)
they were out of range of the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the
rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being
carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas equipment
and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and
proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was
given for its absence.8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal
prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in
pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the
Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be
tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually
fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident.
The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the
Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the
incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's
recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly
or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime
Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of
paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a
permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for
inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E.
Montaño; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police
Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for
their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the
dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to
be imposed.
The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the
government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim
for damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was
received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group)
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This
formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House
Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious
payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11
After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were
constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion
on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit
and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and
the International Law on Human Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint
as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by
the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom,
but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988.
Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition
for certiorari.
Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical
issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt
with and resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not
the State has waived its immunity from suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly
waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the
recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the
heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by
then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to
be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is
expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very
essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also
rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the
public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the
instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of
the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of
the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does
not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is
important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the
Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder,
deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11
provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:
1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the
commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be
sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges
arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court. 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only
serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her
claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is
not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind
the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and,
executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done
or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from
suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not
mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the
words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government
with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech
promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this
alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can
it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained
that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party
defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police
and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18
as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself
by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his
acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still
found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by
any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to
ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the
safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as
found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the
latter.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has
given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this
case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on
the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs
to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its
agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position
in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another." 23
The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the
deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named
defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court
of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the
scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954
CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante,
vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.
D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Diaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en
representacion del apelado.
DIOKNO, J.:
Carmen Festejo, dueña de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9
hectareas y media de superfice, demando a "Isaias Fernando Director, Bureau of
public Works, que como tal Director de Obras Publicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas
y proyectos de irrigacion y es el funcionario responsable de la construccion de los
sistemas de irrigacion en el pais," alegando que —
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a
right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against
her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of
land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the
portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the
aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff. ----- R. on A., p. 3.
causando a ella variados daños y perjuicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia
condenando el demandado:
. . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land
unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square
meters and to return the land to its former condition under the expenses of the
defendant. . . .
In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated
can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an area of 24,179
square meters; ---- R. on A., p. 5.
y ademas a pagar P9,756.19 de daños y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las
costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.
El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presento mocion de
sobreseimiento de la demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene
jurisdiccion para dictar sentencia valida contra el, toda vez que judicialmente la
reclamacion es contra la Republica de Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su
consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estimo la mocion y sobreseyo la
demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.
En apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda
como una contra la Republica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.
La mocion contra "Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y
responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas" es una
dirigida personalmente contra el, por actos que asumio ejecutar en su concepto
oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o
haga cometer en el desempeño de sus funciones oficiales. Un caso semejante es el
de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584, NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Alli el
Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la carretera ocupo o se apropio
de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal Supremo del Estado declaro
que espersonalmente responsable al dueño de los daños causados. Declaro ademas
que la ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a una orden
a los mismos. He aqui lo dijo el Tribunal.
We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his
authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's
land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition an dusefulness, he must be
held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There
can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of
way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the
right of way of this trunk highway before construction began. . . .
"Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred
from acquiescence where there is power to restrain." It is unnecessary to consider
other cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or infer that, in so
far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a dumping
place for the rock to be removed from the additional appropriated right of way,
defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was done by his subordinates. —
Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A.L.R., 1472, 1476, 1477.
La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se
resume como sigue:
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor,
and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or
damage results from his tortious act. — 49 Am. Jur. 289.
. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a
public agent. — 43 Am. Jur. 86.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without
authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself
by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not
personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. — 43
Am. Jur. 89-90.
El articulo 32 del Codigo Civil dice a su vez:
ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx
In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The inmdemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648,
Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre 1950.
Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la
demanda conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en
cuanto a las costas. Asi se ordena.
Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that
appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as
an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias
Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of
the complaint, it is alleged:
4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of
irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of
irrigation system in the Philippines;
5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a
right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against
her express objection, unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of
land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the
portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the
aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.)
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were
performed by said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly
shows that the designation of his office was included in the title of the case to
indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered
up by the fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a
judgment
Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the
portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of
24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the
expense of the defendant. (Paragraph a, of the complaint).
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to
in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same
pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau
of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant
to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in
which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works,
the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government. Consequently, in
praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal
involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be
restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its
possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the
Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez (47 Off. Gaz.,
665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in
the case at bar. In other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the
state and may not be maintained without its consent.
Hence I am constrained to dissent.
Bengzon, J., concurs.
G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court,
Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C.
DEL PILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO
BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court
(BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.
G.R. No. 80018 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F.
BOSTICK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 80258 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST
E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS
MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ
AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET
AL., respondents.
Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.
CRUZ, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints
below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against
it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by
the respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S.
Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by
them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting
officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years;
and Tanglao for 50 years.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private
respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The
latter, through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M.
Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to
Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already
operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the
expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31,
1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be
available only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the
private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the
concessions pending litigation. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order
directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a
suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability.
The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also
immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss,
holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court's
attention is called by the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the bidding or
solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as
well as the defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of
concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US Government nor the
herein principal defendants would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs but
that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the
employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of
commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would
become in effect when the Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or
solicitation the questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent, therefore,
indeed a commercial transaction has been entered, and for purposes of the said
solicitation, would necessarily be entered between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement
does not cover such kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as
a barber shop concession. 2
On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order
against further proceedings in the court below. 3
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station
in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of
Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used
in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager,
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators
conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its
employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander
of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction
was to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the
individual petitioners. 4
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force
stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in
his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United
States, which had not given its consent to be sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order which
read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint —
which have been hypothetically admitted by defendants upon the filing of their
motion to dismiss — that although defendants acted initially in their official
capacities, their going beyond what their functions called for brought them out of
the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning.
Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were illegal, done. with extreme
bad faith and with pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the
plaintiff, gains significance. 5
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'
Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye
and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements
made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac.
The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of
the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint
for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of
their acts that he was removed. 6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro a special counsel
assigned to the International Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of
Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and moved for an
extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was
that the Attorney General of the United States had not yet designated counsel to
represent the defendants, who were being sued for their official acts. Within the
extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority
from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein as
affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the
laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to
represent the defendants, filed with leave of court a motion to withdraw the
answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the defendants
were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that
the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without its
consent.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11,
1987, which held that the claimed immunity under the Military Bases Agreement
covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come
under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer. 7
Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14, 1987, a temporary restraining
order. 8
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents
against the herein petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries
allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There
is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants
beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in
several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants
deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the
dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that
the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical
center for treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the
individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the
United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants were
also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10,
1987, reading in part as follows:
The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are immune from suit.
The allegations, of the complaint which is sought to be dismissed, had to be
hypothetically admitted and whatever ground the defendants may have, had to be
ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. The complaint alleged criminal
acts against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of said acts it
could not be said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity should be invoked.
If the Filipinos themselves are duty bound to respect, obey and submit themselves
to the laws of the country, with more reason, the members of the United States
Armed Forces who are being treated as guests of this country should respect, obey
and submit themselves to its laws. 10
and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer
as required but subsequently filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining order on
October 27, 1987. 11
II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article
XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under
Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to
abide by the rules of the international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state
is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other
states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty"
because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its
citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not
be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is
implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a special law was passed to enable a person
to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver
is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. 17
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the
will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. 19 As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law
on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty.
Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and
authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use,
operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space
adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to
them or appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other
decisions, to support their position that they are not suable in the cases below, the
United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized
that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its
consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is
concerned, the starting point isRaquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a
habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army
authorities, Justice Hilado speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee,
where it was explicitly declared: 'It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to
march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling
in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the
following authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim,
Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification
that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the
treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption being that there
was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign
power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where
plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General of the United States Army in the
Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned
leased to the United States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to
dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge.
The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the
ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the 4 action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor
continued: 'It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer.
The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning
of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen firing an action against a foreign government without
said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of
the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary
and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage
Commission, where respondent, a United States Agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as falling within
the above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually be a charge against or
financial liability of the United States Government because ... , the Commission has
no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.' The Syquia ruling
was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, involving a complaint for
the recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the special defense interposed being
'that the vessel belonged to the United States Government, that the defendants
merely acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States Government
is therefore the real party in interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, where it was held that a suit against Alien Property
Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested property
under the Trading with the Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the United
States. To the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from
the opinion of justice Tuazon clearly shows: 'It is a widely accepted principle of
international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts
of another state or its own courts without its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v.
Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General, Philippine
Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision ordering the return
to plaintiff of the confiscated military payment certificates known as scrip money. In
reversing the lower court decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor,
relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, explaining why it could not be sustained.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the
United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in
the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United
States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in
its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in
United States of America v. Ruiz, 22 where the transaction in question dealt with the
improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a
clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest
the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United kingdom and other states
in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the
discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the
United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United
States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the
judgment.
In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority
whatsoever, appropriated private land and converted it into public irrigation
ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the suit was in effect against the Philippine
government, which had not given its consent to be sued. This Court sustained the
denial of the motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was not
applicable. The director was being sued in his private capacity for a personal tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.
III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named
petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of
preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting
those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting
in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified
against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the
United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v.
Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the
scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts.
The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the
government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is
premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the
United States government should be liable for their torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a
misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the
accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if
he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and,
hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special
counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a
submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in
Republic v. Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier
discussed.
But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were
acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same
conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The
record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in
question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this
case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet
to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the
petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court
determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main
Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess
Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner Lamachia
is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual income of $2
million. Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria,
a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an
administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level
of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of
whom was Genove, with whom the United States government has concluded a
collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such
services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of
membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that
they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known
that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio
City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons
availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in
ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively
low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of
state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove.
Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as
agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For
that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity.
The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the
petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners
are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully
examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough
investigation where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup
stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive
finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously
affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's dismissal.
There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably
nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his
complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the
concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises
operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most
military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure
and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the
concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his
tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less
significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms
of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed
commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being
decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America v.
Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we
have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the paucity of the record in the case at
hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent
court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis
thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case
must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
IV
There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the
question of the immunity of the United States from the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional friendship
between two countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the
so-called "irritants" in their relations will be resolved in a spirit of mutual
accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and asperity of litigation
and always with justice to both parties.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The
temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is
DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made
permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The
temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
All without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.]
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA), Respondents.
Franciso A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
STATE. — The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that,
being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially
in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and
compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the
same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents.
Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE
ACTS, AMONG OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. — A
public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he
acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court
of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
— Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano,
148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public
respondents.
4. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. — The state immunity doctrine rests upon
reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a
different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of
every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152,
19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477).
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15990, entitled "The Chief of Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Unit for Security and
Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) v. Hon. Omar U. Amin and Veterans Manpower
and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)," lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
which the Regional Trial Court had issued to the PC-SUSIA enjoining them from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of the license
of VMPSI to operate as a security agency.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati,
Metro Manila, praying the court to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo,
enjoining the defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s
license;
"B. In due time, issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect;
"C. Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO from
the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an interest in more than one
agency, declaring PADPAO as an illegal organization existing in violation of said
prohibition, without the illegal exemption provided in PD No. 11; declaring null and
void Section 17 of R.A. No. 5487 which provides for the issuance of rules and
regulations in consultation with PADPAO, declaring null and void the February 1,
1982 directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief, requiring
all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO as a
prerequisite to secure/renew their licenses, declaring that VMPSI did not engage in
‘cut-throat competition’ in its contract with MWSS, ordering defendants PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA to renew the license of VMPSI; ordering the defendants to refrain
from further harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or
non-renewal of license, without legal and justifiable cause; ordering the defendants
to pay to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation; and granting such further or other reliefs to VMPSI as may be
deemed lawful, equitable and just." (pp. 55-56, Rollo.)
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487 (otherwise known as
the "Private Security Agency Law"), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its
complaint:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"SECTION 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. — Any
Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital
of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by
Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no
person shall organize or have an interest in, more than one such agency except
those which are already existing at the promulgation of this Decree: . . ." (As
amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
"SECTION 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. — The
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. and subject to the provision of
existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the purpose of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic
because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g)
of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private
Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that
"all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of
any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located . . ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations
in restraint of trade.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the
PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)
hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00
outside of Metro Manila (Annex B, Petition).
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO
accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for
security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided
in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO
Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license (Annex E, Petition).
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to
VMPSI when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or
disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of
its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F,
Petition).
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI’s license was expiring on March 31, 1988,
VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988
against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same date, the court issued a restraining
order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result
in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license" (Annex G, Petition).
The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining
Order," on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given
consent thereto and that VMPSI’s license already expired on March 31, 1988,
hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose
because there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent
VMPSI opposed the motion.
On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSI’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction for being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988
within which to file its application for renewal pursuant to Section 2 (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, Rollo.).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for
its failure to submit its application for renewal of its license and the requirements
therefor within the prescribed period in Section 2(e) of the Revised Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 1919 (Annex M, Petition).
On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a
bond of P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf,
from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSI’s license, until further orders from the
court.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order,
but it was denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition).
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
is hereby GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered to dismiss the
complaint filed by respondent VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471, insofar as petitioners
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are concerned, for lack of jurisdiction. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued on June 10, 1988, is dissolved." (pp. 295-296, Rollo.)
VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
The answer is yes.
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-
SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case
because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act
in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount,
and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action
prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the
State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus did we hold in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded." (Emphasis supplied.)
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if
he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v.
Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may
be had against them in their private capacities.
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
to be sued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC
Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test
for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State
but the legal nature of the act. This was clearly enunciated in the case of United
States of America v. Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.’ (136 SCRA 487,
492.)
"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief
and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a
governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the
purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Emphasis
ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)
Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not
be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano,
148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public
respondents.
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the
inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious
that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the
supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as
cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic v. Purisima (78 SCRA
470, 473) rationalized:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be cause [by] private parties,
the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the
well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could
very well be imagined." (citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, 29
SCRA 598.)cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the
costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the
complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of
P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred:
(a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b)
in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the
collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as
follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding
on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing
along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing
Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said
streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on
the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle
Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the
southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was
taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left
parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while
blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey
matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in
question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so
weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin
in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to
infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that
the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that
made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his
head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to
do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for
mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after
having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had
undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability
that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the
income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his
efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up
ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a
contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer.
Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on
account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up
a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect
that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries,
and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the
plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the
second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services
as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time
to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the
plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the
remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or
employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is
legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by
Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to
determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that
an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the
courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now,
therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages,
if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant
said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it
cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against
the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was
entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the
consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order
to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the
two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in
order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident
was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an
employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look
elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal
and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the
high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No.
2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by
its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does
not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9
Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages
from the state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the
state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the
purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate
information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance
by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those
sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's
liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the
misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
(Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am.
Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State,
73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec.
319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in
36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy
to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915,
the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of
Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in
such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and
determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin,
or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said
George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River,
and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and
relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the
county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on
the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it
would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was
intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with
the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or
courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of
law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of
liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's
immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained
in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not
have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in
express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854;
8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon
and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence
against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby
authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon
against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and
prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply
to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under
different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability
or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but merely gave an
additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had
not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin
vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction
of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an
exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court,
in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new
and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a
judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the
terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in
the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice
Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries
arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive
statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the
substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when
the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall
be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title
15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes
part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on
the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order
that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case
where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which
arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902,
where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons
who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this
persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed
relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the
law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own
fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof,
however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for
acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage,
and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary
manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case,
guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but
not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless
because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of
this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set
forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties
by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the
central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and
as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers,
yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been
occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his
powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by
the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words
are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who
is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid
down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the
claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the
manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
(Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is
only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without
costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable
for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and
by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine.
This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil
Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of
the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060,
which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the
certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in
bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are
now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal
construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the
government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in
his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was
transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later
amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of
the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters
of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment
of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her
land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of
P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative
defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed
first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the
recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already
prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for
moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items
the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it
was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the
construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants
notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's
evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it
had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor
appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the
government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it
have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent
to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government
under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a claim for
payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent. We there said: .
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property
taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character
should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned,
to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were
an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint
they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to
abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole
lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking.2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of
legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that
payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including
attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO,
respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent
Tantoco, Jr.
NARVASA, J.:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago —
together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case
No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly
filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing
their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3,
1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the movants, a reply to the
opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to
expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five
(45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" dated
February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5
Basically, they sought an answer to the
question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion
of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in
the . . case?" 6 The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to
strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird,"
or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper,
impertinent and irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint. 8
As this
expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of
particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out,
for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be
without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out
impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter
alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate
allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged
participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said
Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in
nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined
that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court
is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would
justify . . (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under
date of July 18, 1988. 11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with
Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim " 12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13
On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-
14
TRIAL. The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other
parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16
17
and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended complaint, through
such questions, for instance, as—
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or properties does the plaintiff claim it
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom
has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being ill-gotten?
they are propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . . were committed by
interrogatories;"
defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been
systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
decreed . . as part of the proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"
5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago . . were
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact
committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and
. . which defendants . . sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of
Imelda Marcos?
Particulars;"
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops,
4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is
Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda
prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff
Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation
to first present its evidence."
are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and copying of—
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the Amended Complaint asserted
29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production
that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . . marked as exhibits for the
the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG). 20
plaintiff;" and Hence, this petition for certiorari.

3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the Chairman The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of

and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar. discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims —

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:

granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), 1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded,

respectively. being addressed only to the PCGG;

On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production 2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants' motion for bill

and inspection of documents). It argued that of particulars) had already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial; and

1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989 3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive

anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are purposeless and unnecessary;" Order No. 14 and related issuances; and

2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described . . (in) plaintiff's b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:

Pre-Trial Brief;" 1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;

3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or its 2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked

Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.: preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made

(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the comments thereon; and

task contemplated by this Order. 3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either —

(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative, or (a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive

administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Order No. 1, or

It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 (b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.
which the Sandiganbayan
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its
treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989
questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
(admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that —
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor General withdrew "as counsel for
plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No.
292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990) 22
to
submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if
called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required
by the Court." 23 This, the Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from which the Solicitor General had
withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay,
Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize." 25
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective positions, the Court now
proceeds to decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties ,
26
and production and inspection of documents and things. 27 Now, it appears to the
Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a
regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and
unreasonable disinclination to resort to them — which is a great pity for the
intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with
pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly
demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. 28 Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all
inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts.
This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material
and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the
parties, and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by
the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled
authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is
occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts,
to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus
the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained;
that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or
distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant
to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention
during the trial. 29
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30
this Court described the nature and object of
litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are
to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.
It is, rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on
the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There
should be no vested right in technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court
the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and
relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing
another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading
and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the
pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate
facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual
basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that
every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts." 31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of
a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to
supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the
court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose
and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make
this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions
has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern
procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to
play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness
of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20,
to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party
is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or
evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible
information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in
Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34
which generally allows the examination of a deponent
—
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of
the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may
be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of
"fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure
can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility, of surprise, . . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a)
depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25,
and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court
intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an
answer to the complaint has been served. 36
It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but
after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the
action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the
reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts
are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in
accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due
application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions
on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment
by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount
of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in
accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated
claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial
intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. 39
And . . .
further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and
not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of course to the particular rules
directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be
sustained.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February
1, 1988 41
— that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories,
because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of
depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to
parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." 42But there was no need for the private
respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"
(dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint,
just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention — that the interrogatories in question are
defective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are
propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the
same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted
Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25
which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as
"a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be
"answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is
absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the
interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to
the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of
no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the
rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent
to testify in its behalf."
That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a
prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint —
and denied for lack of merit — is beside the point. Indeed, as already pointed out
above, a bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary
facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance at them disproves the
argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about
details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories,
on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or
oppress it. 45
But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to
answer subsists.
2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the
PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already
pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed
essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure
of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make
PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order
No. 14 and related issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a
party's making his adversary his witness . 46 This is expressly allowed by Section 6,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may . . . call
an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and
interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be
cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his
examination in chief.
The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing
expedition," apart from the fact that the information sought is immaterial since
they are evidently meant to establish a claim against PCGG officers who are not
parties to the action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are precisely
permitted through the modes of discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who files a
counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons
(therefore strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim.
This may be done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties other than those to
the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be
brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained."
The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action
"for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . .
(Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories.
The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are not self-incriminatory
or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise
from the facts disclosed in light of Executive Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of
defense in the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may
be utilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and
officers. They will be. The private respondents have made no secret that this is in
fact their intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold the proposition that while
the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study
and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued should not be
free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its officers for
gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the
commencement or initiation of such judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that
it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to the parties it
has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within

its official cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself
initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the
exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation
and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties
under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded,
that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge
all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be
subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of
its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of
an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 48
The suggestion 49
that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except
when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. On the contrary —
The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff
may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the
private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the
state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899)" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in
expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an
action for payment by the owner. 52
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for
the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been
presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered
objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No
serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in
order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the corresponding question in the
interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The PCGG is however at
liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the
documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53
Some of the documents are, according to the
verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material
allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the
rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial
and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation
to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature,
purposes and operation of the modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of
said modes is a complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could
be farther from the truth. For example, as will already have been noted from the
preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of
discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is simply
the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with
the request that they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of such a
communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
answering the questions "separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a
copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15)
days after service of the interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make
discovery have already been mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is
begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other
written communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth
and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has
the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party requesting
admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the
matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking
of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written
interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as
complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The
temporary restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.
Romero, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.
YAP, J.:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of
respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land on the ground of non-suability of the State.
The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as follows:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares,
situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by
virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute
Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase
from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was
evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements
therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by
the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes,
under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac
and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the
Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that
the property in question, while located within the reservation established under
Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be
excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true
owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of
ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be
declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
nullify all awards to the settlers.
The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way
of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a
decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private
property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title in the
name of his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the
NARRA settlement reservation. The court declared the rest of the property claimed
by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by
eighty-six (86) settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among
other things that intervenors had been in possession of the land in question for
more than twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.
On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case
and directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their
evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well as the
Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The
plaintiff presented additional evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for
hearing for the reception of intervenors' evidence on August 30 and August 31,
1971.
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for
intervenors, the latter did not appear but submitted a motion for postponement
and resetting of the hearing on the next day, August 31, 1971. The trial court denied
the motion for postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence "en
ausencia," after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the
following day, August 31, 1971, Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his
decision of August 29, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before
this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for execution, dated November
18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time through Judge Miguel
Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the
order denying intervenors' motion for postponement. The case was reopened to
allow intervenors to present their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of
Judge Navarro's order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a
petition for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163,
which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings.
On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground
that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence
the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the
questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for
reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper
on the ground of non-suability of the State and also on the ground that the
existence and/or authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the
respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any
rate, the same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by
prescription and laches.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the
Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the
respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge Lising
and remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Hence this
petition.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has
proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed
to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an
action in rem, but an action in personam.1 It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The
complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against
the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 2 There is no
such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the
existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3and on this basis alone, the
complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the
case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any
stage of the proceedings." 4
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation " subject to private rights, if
any there be. " We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language
of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the
immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission, which the respondent appellate
court sustained, on the basis of our decision in the Begosa case, 6 that the present
action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from suit,
because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its
funds. It is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but
private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested
of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since the
character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the
plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to
litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff
is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally,
on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of
ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.
The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the
Spanish Mortgage Law was a means provided by the law then in force in the
Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of
America, to record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of land, established
through an ex parte proceeding conducted in accordance with prescribed rules. 7
Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at
the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under
a claim of right as set forth in his application. 8 The possessory information could
ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10
years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the
respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory
information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem.
However, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at
this time. Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact
admitted by him and stated in the decision of the Court a quo that settlers have
been occupying and cultivating the land in question since even before the outbreak
of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession.
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the
informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines
Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was
"reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr.
Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was
authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made
only in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to
the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by
respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," 11 whereas the land
claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to
701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information
documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged
ownership of lands.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming
the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed
by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS
and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and
ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent
judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to
shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company
alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a
price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United
States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not been
tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins,
Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest
Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners
herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. In the
abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of
America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order
the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties
for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which
included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the
writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant
petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary
to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp.
207-209 [1984].)
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when
he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A
distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p.
20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion
that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a
governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly
pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons,
Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a
private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the
level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be
sued under the contract. ...
xxx xxx xxx
We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States
government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant
for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S.
Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any
contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract. The
trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following
reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of
a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the
subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a)
it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit;
and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the
contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure
laid down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against
the United States Government, or, stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its
administrative remedies against said Government, the lower court acted properly in
dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity
from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an
imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84
Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the
United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to
recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court
of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance,
the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this
Court said:
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that
the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of
America; that any judgment for back or Increased rentals or damages will have to
be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by
the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar
already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the courts of the
Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the
present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not ,
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not
in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against
a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it
unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its
consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were forjure imperii and not
for jure gestionis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent
judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991
denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
 I the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three
parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of
petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the
price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the
condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and
that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same;
(3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup
assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers
of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr.
Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters;
however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to
vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the
eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent
counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the
purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per
square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and
wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the
original purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back
to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC,
without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by
two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D;
and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled,
transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced
petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of
private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to
Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent
is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually
made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers'
breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale
between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2)
to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was
filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30,
1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing
Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to
facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed
that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the
said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the
motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the
motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to
file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of
the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by
reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they
refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p.
87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of
Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of
to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is
that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts,
the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing
before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is
when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to
dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992];
Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be
a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a
trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or
legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf
of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office
of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where
the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court
requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled
to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only
the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit
of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088
[1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v.
Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter
directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the
Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval
Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as
amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner.
The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of
petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the
local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford,
75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948];
United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In
cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into
the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over
petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand,
private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore
absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free
will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located
in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its
status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the
monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law.
With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy
See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law
became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over
the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign
diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties
according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International
Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of
assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to
it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I
International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even
suggested that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy See and
Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in
which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz,
International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City
represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an
independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions,
and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and
activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international
state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has
significant implication — that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects
essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international
personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American
Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international
person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p.
87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation,
such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of
the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial
determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial
activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the
"commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to
Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial
activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of
conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems
involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal
treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have
difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private
party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into
purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist
states which took control of nationalized business activities and international
trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment
buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the
conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status
of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign
state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the
recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and
a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to
American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark
Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering
into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary
function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come
out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in
its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course
of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner
to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of
a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized
in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty
was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines
on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this
case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private
respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was
sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of
Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines'
foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the
Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially
certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to
the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the
rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country
(Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a
state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political
question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World
Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to
conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view
of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly
circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645,
July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office,
to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
rights — its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court
Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case
No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and
THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for
petitioner.
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor,
then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and
executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of
law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic
of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to
have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be
nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of
facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special
Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of
Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On
the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969,
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment
dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds
duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the
AFP Controller,..."2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then
alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of
garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." 3 In the answer filed by
respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts
set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was
in the amount of P2,372,331.40.4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this
certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was
indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of
the Philippines,6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court,
at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective
obstacle, could very well be imagined."7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit
in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued
without its consent."8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego,9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.
Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice
Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never
been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization
by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be
garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of
the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the
Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and
setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of
July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J, took no part.
G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-
suability of the state.
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the
Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional
Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2
of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on
petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract3 on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the
latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of
the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another
contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of
the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages,4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City,
docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket
number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein
petitioner and jointly and severallyliable with Sultan Security Agency for the
payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the
City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota
Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown.6 These units were put under the
custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their
sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come
first.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was
effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void
and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal,
effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property
would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice
of the public good.
On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:
1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in
NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are
temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months, more or less, but not
extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to
source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it;
2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within
the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the
aggregate amount. it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with
respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan
de Oro City within the same period for proper dispositions;
3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise
directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at
least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case
of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims;
4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of
petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the posting of
sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile,
petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff,
if any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases
upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city
Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the
conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs;
5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against
each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the
judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle Security
case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the Executive Labor
Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties
conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision
after due notice and hearings;
7. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a
Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not
extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the
posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from
notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the
complaint in intervention is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the
petition filed by Duty Sheriff is Noted
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC
for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on
the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not
be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be
given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law 13
or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government
"consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when
the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim16 or
when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private
respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into
by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18
In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt
with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have
assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into
the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of
wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract
for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the
consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act
("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money
claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs.
Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under
Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general
law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment
rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the
conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the
Government must be strictly observed."
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of
C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State.
The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State
liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity,
all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that
the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the
issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained,
thus —
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the
property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents
are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all
writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter
against said petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La
Union, AGOO TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA
TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union,
respondents.
Conrado E. Medina, Edgardo M. Magtalas & Walfrido Climaco for petitioner.
Felimon A. Aspirin fit respondent Agoo 'Tobacco Planters Association, Inc.
Virgilio C. Abejo for respondent Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution,
1
followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 2 deposited with it, is on the
fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being alleged
that such funds are public in character. This is not the first time petitioner raised
that issue. It did so before in Philippine National Bank v. Court of industrial
Relations, 3decided only last January. It did not meet with success, this Court ruling
in accordance with the two previous cases of National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation 4 and Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 5
that funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a
public corporation possessed of the same attributes,6 a similar outcome is
indicated. This petition must be dismissed.
It is undisputed that the judgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration had reached the stage of finality. A writ of execution was, therefore,
in order. It was accordingly issued on December 17, 1970. 7There was a notice of
garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of execution in the sum of
P12,724,66. 8 In view of the objection, however, by petitioner Philippine National
Bank on the above ground, coupled with an inquiry as to whether or not
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds deposited with
petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until January 25, 1971 that the order sought
to be set aside in this certiorari proceeding was issued by respondent Judge. 9 Its
dispositive portion reads as follows: Conformably with the foregoing, it is now
ordered, in accordance with law, that sufficient funds of the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration now deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union
Branch, shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the
Writ of Execution for one-half of the amount awarded in the decision of November
16, 1970." 10 Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
As noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National Bank would invoke the
doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution,
what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been
set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 11 If the
funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government,
then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case
here. Garnishment would lie. Only last January, as noted in the opening paragraph
of this decision, this Court, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely
invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of public corporations could
properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. Accordingly, this petition
must fail.
1. The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of this certiorari
proceeding, was sought to be justified on the failure of respondent Judge to set
aside the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration. This excerpt from the aforecited decision of
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations makes manifest why such
an argument is far from persuasive. "The premise that the funds could be spoken as
public character may be accepted in the sense that the People Homesite and
Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though
that they were exempt. from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation
v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the
opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the
effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that,
as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for,
as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality
of its own. distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has — pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ... , pursuant to which
The NASSCO has been established — all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law ... ." Accordingly, it may be sue and be sued and may be subjected
to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as
amended.)" ... To repeat, the ruling was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing
party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or
controlled by the government." 12
2. The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the first of
its kind. The ruling therein could be inferred from the judgment announced in
Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, decided as far back
as 1941. 13 In the language of its ponente Justice Ozaeta "On the other hand, it is
well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
(Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation
subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." 14It is worth mentioning
that Justice Ozaeta could find support for such a pronouncement from the leading
American Supreme Court case of united States v. Planters' Bank, 15 with the opinion
coming from the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall. It was handed down more than
one hundred fifty years ago, 1824 to be exact. It is apparent, therefore, that
petitioner Bank could it legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of
garnishment the doctrine of non-suability.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Santos, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981
GAUDENCIO RAYO, BIENVINIDO PASCUAL, TOMAS MANUEL, MARIANO CRUZ,
PEDRO BARTOLOME, BERNARDINO CRUZ JOSE PALAD , LUCIO FAJARDO,
FRANCISCO RAYOS, ANGEL TORRES, NORBERTO TORRES, RODELIO JOAQUIN,
PEDRO AQUINO, APOLINARIO BARTOLOME, MAMERTO BERNARDO, CIRIACO
CASTILLO, GREGORIO CRUZ, SIMEON ESTRELLA, EPIFANIO MARCELO,
HERMOGENES SAN PEDRO, JUAN SANTOS, ELIZABETH ABAN, MARCELINA
BERNABE, BUENAVENTURA CRUZ, ANTONIO MENESES, ROMAN SAN PEDRO,
LOPEZ ESPINOSA, GODOFREDO PUNZAL, JULIANA GARCIA, LEBERATO
SARMIENTO, INOCENCIO DE LEON, CARLOS CORREA, REYNALDO CASIMIRO,
ANTONIO GENER, GAUDENCIO CASTILLO, MATIAS PEREZ, CRISPINIANO TORRES,
CRESENCIO CRUZ, PROTACIO BERNABE, MARIANO ANDRES, CRISOSTOMO CRUZ,
MARCOS EUSTAQUIO, PABLO LEGASPI, VICENTE PASCUAL, ALEJANDRA SISON,
EUFRACIO TORRES, ROGELIO BARTOLOME, RODOLFO BERNARDO, APOLONIO
CASTILLO, MARCELINO DALMACIO, EUTIQUIO LEGASPI, LORENZO LUCIANO and
GREGORIO PALAD, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA, and NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The relevant antecedents of this case are narrated in the petition and have not
been controverted, namely:
3. At about midnight on October 26, 1978, during the height of that infamous
typhoon "KADING" the respondent corporation, acting through its plant
superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or caused to be opened simultaneously
all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam. And as a direct and immediate result of
the sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns
in Bulacan were inundated. Hardest-hit was Norzagaray. About a hundred of its
residents died or were reported to have died and properties worth million of pesos
destroyed or washed away. This flood was unprecedented in Norzagaray.
4. Petitioners, who were among the many unfortunate victims of that man-
caused flood, filed with the respondent Court eleven complaints for damages
against the respondent corporation and the plant superintendent of Angat Dam,
Benjamin Chavez, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. SM-950 951, 953, 958, 959, 964, 965,
966, 981, 982 and 983. These complaints though separately filed have a
common/similar cause of action. ...
5. Respondent corporation filed separate answers to each of these eleven
complaints. Apart from traversing the material averments in the complaints and
setting forth counterclaims for damages respondent corporation invoked in each
answer a special and affirmative defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam,"
it is "performing a purely governmental function", hence it "can not be sued
without the express consent of the State." ...
6. On motion of the respondent corporation a preliminary hearing was held
on its affirmative defense as though a motion to dismiss were filed. Petitioners
opposed the prayer for dismissal and contended that respondent corporation is
performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its
own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in
any court. ...
7. On July 29, 1980 petitioners received a copy of the questioned order of the
respondent Court dated December 21, 1979 dismissing all their complaints as
against the respondent corporation thereby leaving the superintendent of the
Angat Dam, Benjamin Chavez, as the sole party-defendant. ...
8. On August 7, 1980 petitioners filed with the respondent Court a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. ...
9. The respondent Court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its
order dated October 3, 1980. ... Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
under Republic Act No. 5440. (Rollo, pp. 3-6.)
The Order of dismissal dated December 12, 1979, reads as follows:
Under consideration is a motion to dismiss embodied as a special affirmative
defense in the answer filed by defendant NPC on the grounds that said defendant
performs a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat Dam and
cannot therefore be sued for damages in the instant cases in connection therewith.
Plaintiffs' opposition to said motion to discuss, relying on Sec. 3 (d) of Republic Act
6396 which imposes on the NPC the power and liability to sue and be sued in any
court, is not tenable since the same refer to such matters only as are within the
scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in
the instant cases. It being an agency performing a purely governmental function in
the operation of the Angat Dam, said defendant was not given any right to commit
wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for tort may require the express
consent of the State.
WHEREFORE, the cases against defendant NPC are hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 60.)
The Order dated October 3, 1980, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
the plaintiffs is pro forma; the motion was simply denied for lack of merit. (Rollo, p.
74.)
The petition to review the two orders of the public respondent was filed on October
16, 1980, and on October 27, 1980, We required the respondents to comment. It
was only on April 13, 1981, after a number of extensions, that the Solicitor General
filed the required comment. (Rollo, pp. 107-114.)
On May 27, 1980, We required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within
twenty (20) days from notice. (Rollo, p. 115.) Petitioners filed their memorandum
on July 22, 1981. (Rollo, pp. 118-125.) The Solicitor General filed a number of
motions for extension of time to file his memorandum. We granted the seventh
extension with a warning that there would be no further extension. Despite the
warning the Solicitor General moved for an eighth extension which We denied on
November 9, 1981. A motion for a ninth extension was similarly denied on
November 18, 1981. The decision in this case is therefore, without the
memorandum of the Solicitor General.
The parties are agreed that the Order dated December 21, 1979, raises the
following issues:
1. Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat
Dam; and
2. Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and
be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC
performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation
of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court
under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August
31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and
be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly
it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the Orders of the respondent court
dated December 12, 1979 and October 3, 1980, are set aside; and said court is
ordered to reinstate the complaints of the petitioners. Costs against the NPC.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO
ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN,
respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul
Certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it
from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court
ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing
Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court
against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary
of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the
Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano
Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or
coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization
an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the
and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for
breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing
has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard,
petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the
trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional
question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial
Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on
the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary
in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of
this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the
case to this Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including
work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such
other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See.
1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are
provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing
needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev.
Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may
be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending
upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional
work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request,
as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government
work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the
Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As
shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works
consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and
for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the
Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is
embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the
reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of
private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per
cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does
not include profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau
of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that
it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for
private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees
performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed
in its general governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did
not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid
of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long
line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not
organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization.
This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial
employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry
and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of
the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of
Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion
College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule
is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation
System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44,
December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of
administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing
Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said
administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts
prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of
Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials.
Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute
and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the
Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect
a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of
government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of
such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is
granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor
practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other
than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T. Cuison for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville"
sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.,
Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was
discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of
Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service
later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other
damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau
of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants'
suability under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of
Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties.—Only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical
person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs
nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are
merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau
under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as
stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under
Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion
to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein
cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or
juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in
arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly authorizes it to be sued as arrastre
operator, for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is
proprietary, not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned,
appellant would put defendants under the third category of "entities authorized by
law" to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly
authorizing the Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is
implied from its very power to render arrastre service at the Port of Manila, which it
is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act
1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it states:
SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.—The
Bureau of Customs shall have exclusive supervision and control over the receiving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all ports of
entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take
over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and
comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage; as well as to acquire fire
protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, That whenever in his judgment
the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried on by private
parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public bidding and
subject to the approval of the department head, contract with any private party for
the service of receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and in such
event, the contract may include the sale or lease of government-owned equipment
and facilities used in such service.
In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution
of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the foregoing statutory provisions
authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said
arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be
proprietary or non-governmental function." The issue in said case, however, was
whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in
the Government employed in governmental functions for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the
Government . . . shall not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which
does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government . .
..
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be
sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the
issue on the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued
does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the
case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the
inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair
labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function,
there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity. This is the doctrine recognized in Bureau of Printing, et al. vs.
Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including
work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such
other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . . ." (Sec.
1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are
provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing
needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing
jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The
additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function,
and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.)
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule
is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation
System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December
28, 1957.)
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is
part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of
its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported
articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties
(Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For
practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and
collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's
declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the
Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies
with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre
operations.1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is
a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end,
should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which appellant would rely. For
there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its prime reason for
existence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was
not a mere incidental function:
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concessions rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to
aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any
property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion,
the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what
is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. . . .
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of
public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its
present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which
money claims against the Government may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit
are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of
sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and
Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S.
275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785). From the provision authorizing the Bureau of
Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue
the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation
itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national
government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative
mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune
from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
G.R. No. L-51806 November 8, 1988
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Ledesma, Guytingco, Veleasco & Associates for respondent Ernest E. Simke.
CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial court decision which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
amount of P15,589.55 as full reimbursement of his actual medical and hospital
expenses, with interest at the legal rate from the commencement of the suit; the
amount of P20,200.00 as consequential damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages; the amount of P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; the further
amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs [Rollo, p. 24].
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the incident
was the Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the Philippines.
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other
persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In
order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded
to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent
slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. As
a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about
three hours.
Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner Civil Aeronautics
Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage,
control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport ... ." [Sec. 32 (24),
R.A. 776].
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills,
consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in
private respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions and for the
publication of notices announcing the postponement of private respondent's
daughter's wedding which had to be cancelled because of his accident [Record on
Appeal, p. 5].
Judgment was rendered in private respondent's favor prompting petitioner to
appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's decision.
Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for, Reconsideration but this was
denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present the CAA
is really a suit against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without
its consent, which was not given in this case.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of
respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to petitioner's negligence — although there
was no substantial evidence to support such finding; and that the inference that the
hump or elevation the surface of the floor area of the terrace of the fold) MIA
building is dangerous just because said respondent tripped over it is manifestly
mistaken — circumstances that justify a review by this Honorable Court of the said
finding of fact of respondent appellate court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA
622; Ramos v. CA, 63 SCRA 331.)
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees to
respondent Simke — although there was no substantial and competent proof to
support said awards I Rollo, pp. 93-94 1.
I
Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent, petitioner
contends that being an agency of the government, it cannot be made a party-
defendant in this case.
This Court has already held otherwise in the case of National Airports Corporation v.
Teodoro, Sr. [91 Phil. 203 (1952)]. Petitioner contends that the said ruling does not
apply in this case because: First, in the Teodoro case, the CAA was sued only in a
substituted capacity, the National Airports Corporation being the original party.
Second, in the Teodoro case, the cause of action was contractual in nature while
here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict. Third, there is no specific
provision in Republic Act No. 776, the law governing the CAA, which would justify
the conclusion that petitioner was organized for business and not for governmental
purposes. [Rollo, pp. 94-97].
Such arguments are untenable.
First, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the point that the CAA was only
substituted for the National Airports Corporation, in fact treated the CAA as the real
party in interest when it stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
... To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is
dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative,
acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice there should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the
third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. [National
Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 208.]
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as to whether
or not the CAA's power to sue and be sued applies only to contractual obligations.
The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that Sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order 365
confer upon the CAA, without any qualification, the power to sue and be sued,
albeit only by implication. Accordingly, this Court's pronouncement that where such
power to sue and be sued has been granted without any qualification, it can include
a claim based on tort or quasi-delict [Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, G.R.
Nos. 55273-83, December 19,1981, 1 1 0 SCRA 4561 finds relevance and
applicability to the present case.
Third, it has already been settled in the Teodoro case that the CAA as an agency is
not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what
is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an
enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National
Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]
xxx xxx xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec.
Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the
National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the
Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter the character of
the CAA's objectives under Exec, Order 365. The pertinent provisions cited in the
Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to
consider the CAA in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in
Republic Act 776, Sec. 32 (24) and (25).<äre||anº•1àw> Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general — control
and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have among
others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila
International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes except those
controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such
powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip, expand, improve, repair
or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities; (b)
to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or
public or private corporation or entity; ... .
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking space
fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of
aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools,
other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its
management and control.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-
governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on
State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Tedoro case states:
xxx xxx xxx
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity functions suits is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to
act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain
corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself
so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the
corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airport Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-
207; Emphasis supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine
National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 631, where it was
held that the Philippine National Railways, although owned and operated by the
government, was not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely
proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to
undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve
proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to
government agencies performing strictly governmental functions.
II
Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis for a finding
of negligence. There can be no negligence on its part, it alleged, because the
elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was
never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other
purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace" [Rollo, P. 99].
To determine whether or not the construction of the elevation was done in a
negligent manner, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
... This Court after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in Exhs. A or 6-A
where plaintiff slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step, and the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injury...
xxx xxx xxx
This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective
condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. It
has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of
many government buildings and offices. Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate
in the terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and
unattented. The several elevations shown in the exhibits presented were verified by
this Court during the ocular inspection it undertook. Among these elevations is the
one (Exh. A) where plaintiff slipped. This Court also observed the other hazard, the
slanting or sliding step (Exh. B) as one passes the entrance door leading to the
terrace [Record on Appeal, U.S., pp. 56 and 59; Emphasis supplied.]
The Court of Appeals further noted that:
The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it
is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will
prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. But if, it is a step then it will not serve
its purpose, for pedestrian purposes. (tsn, p. 35, Id.) [rollo, p. 29.]
These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence, the CAA
cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the elevation since
under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of planning, designing,
constructing, equipping, expanding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or
such structures, improvements or air navigation facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A.
776]. In the discharge of this obligation, the CAA is duty-bound to exercise due
diligence in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the viewing deck or
terrace of the airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault
or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the person, of the time and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in
maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure
the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to the viewing deck to
watch the planes and passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or
pavement of the viewing deck. The CAA should have thus made sure that no
dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any
undue harm to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done... As
the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though,
was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building
for proper drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57;
Rollo, p. 391, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the
existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based
on quasi-delict upon CAA.
The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty
of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover,
unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code
contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which
although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care.
In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private
respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot
be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They
are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813; Emphasis supplied.]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court,
could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the
attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking
where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its
construction. As the trial court found:
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a section of
the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals two pavements
adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and one-fourth inches than the
other. From the architectural standpoint the higher, pavement is a step. However,
unlike a step commonly seen around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted
outward as one walks to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination
between the edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had
stepped on the inclination because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he
would not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements
including the inclined portion are tiled in red cement, and as shown by the
photograph Exhibit A, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be
difficult for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of
persons in the terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no
warning sign to direct one's attention to the change in the elevation of the
floorings. [Rollo, pp. 2829.]
III
Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private
respondent. The liability of CAA to answer for damages, whether actual, moral or
exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of one conferment of the power to
sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the case of Rayo v. Court of First Instance,
supra, includes liability on a claim for quasi-dilict. In the aforestated case, the
liability of the National Power Corporation to answer for damages resulting from its
act of sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which
caused the death of several residents of the area and the destruction of properties,
was upheld since the o,rant of the power to sue and be sued upon it necessarily
implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for
that matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that the same
be proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one are entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual on compensatory damages
[New Civil Code].
Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical and hospitalization
bills. This Court finds the same to have been duly proven through the testimony of
Dr. Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private respondent (Rollo, p.
26) and who Identified Exh. "H" which was his bill for professional services [Rollo, p.
31].
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other expenses such as
the transportation of the two lawyers who had to represent private respondent
abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the wedding, the Court
holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately
shown the existence of such losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies
before the trial court [CA decision, p. 81. At any rate, the findings of the Court of
Appeals with respect to this are findings of facts [One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 5379053972, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 4161 which, as
had been held time and again, are, as a general rule, conclusive before this Court
[Sese v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31, 1987,152 SCRA 585].
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court holds private WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is
respondent entitled thereto because of the physical suffering and physical injuries DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is
caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217 and 2219 (2), New Civil Code]. AFFIRMED.
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code explicitly, states: SO ORDERED.
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages, are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, liquidated or
compensatory AIR TRANSPORTATION G.R. No. 159402
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the OFFICE,
defendant acted with gross negligence. Petitioner, Present:
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the term "notorious
negligence" and consists in the failure to exercise even slight care [Caunan v. BRION, Acting
Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542 (1932)] can be attributed to the CAA for Chairperson,**
its failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to - versus - BERSAMIN,
even post a warning sign directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the ABAD,***
elevation of the floorings notwithstanding its knowledge of the hazard posed by VILLARAMA, JR., and
such elevation [Rollo, pp. 28-29; Record oil Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard by SERENO, JJ.
the CAA of the safety of the people using the viewing deck, who are charged an SPOUSES DAVID* and
admission fee, including the petitioner who paid the entrance fees to get inside the ELISEA RAMOS, Promulgated:
vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are, therefore, entitled to expect Respondents. February 23, 2011
a facility that is properly and safely maintained — justifies the award of exemplary
damages against the CAA, as a deterrent and by way of example or correction for
the public good. The award of P40,000.00 by the trial court as exemplary damages
appropriately underscores the point that as an entity changed with providing x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
service to the public, the CAA. like all other entities serving the public. has the
obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe service. RESOLUTION
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art. 2208
(1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are BERSAMIN, J.:
awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the
discretion to grant the same when it is just and equitable.
The States immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an
However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has taken over
the management and operations of the Manila International Airport [renamed agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the States
Ninoy Aquino International Airport under Republic Act No. 6639] pursuant to exclusive prerogative.
Executive Order No. 778 as amended by executive Orders Nos. 903 (1983), 909
(1983) and 298 (1987) and under Section 24 of the said Exec. Order 778, the MIAA
has assumed all the debts, liabilities and obligations of the now defunct Civil Under challenge is the decision promulgated on May 14, 2003, [1] by which the Court
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the liabilities of the CAA have now been
of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on February 21,
transferred to the MIAA.
2001 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 (RTC), in Baguio City in favor of the
respondents.[2]
Antecedents
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their
land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City
land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents
agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO
in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the
ATO and some of its officials in the RTC (docketed as Civil Case No. 4017-R and
entitled Spouses David and Elisea Ramos v. Air Transportation Office, Capt. Panfilo
Villaruel, Gen. Carlos Tanega, and Mr. Cesar de Jesus).
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved
certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the
Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATOs motion for a preliminary hearing
of the affirmative defense.
After the RTC likewise denied the ATOs motion for reconsideration on December
10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail
the RTCs orders. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its
finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. [3]
Subsequently, February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision on the merits, [4]
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment is rendered ORDERING the defendant Air
Transportation Office to pay the plaintiffs DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS the following:
(1) The amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated
by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of
12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The
amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
In due course, the ATO appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs decision on
May 14, 2003,[5] viz:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION that the awarded cost therein is deleted, while that of moral
and exemplary damages is reduced to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is
lowered to P10,000.00.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
 Issue
The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without
the States consent.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong. Moreover, as the eminent Justice Holmes said in
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:[6]
The territory [of Hawaii], of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178
US 436, 44 L ed 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the
proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. xxx But in the case at bar it
did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield.
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign
power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public
property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Car on peut bien
recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy. Bodin,
Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3.
Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed.
1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.[7]
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor
of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other
individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety
endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against.[8]
Several justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in
the Philippines, but that offered in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic
of the Philippines[9] is the most acceptable explanation, according to Father Bernas,
a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law,[10] to wit:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the
well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could
very well be imagined.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of
its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. [11] However, the need to
distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The
immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function;[12] it has not been upheld in favor of
the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business.[13]
Should the doctrine of sovereignty immunity or non-suability of the State be
extended to the ATO?
In its challenged decision,[14] the CA answered in the negative, holding:
On the first assignment of error, appellants seek to impress upon Us that the
subject contract of sale partook of a governmental character. Apropos, the lower
court erred in applying the High Courts ruling in National Airports Corporation vs.
Teodoro (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), arguing that in Teodoro, the matter involved the
collection of landing and parking fees which is a proprietary function, while the case
at bar involves the maintenance and operation of aircraft and air navigational
facilities and services which are governmental functions.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to appellants conclusions, it was not merely the collection of
landing and parking fees which was declared as proprietary in nature by the High
Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport operations as a
whole, as well. Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs.
Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the
pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO)
is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a
private entity. It went on to explain in this wise:
xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the
category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a
business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It
is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive
prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp.
v. Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]
xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was
promulgated was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the National Airports
Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the
Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter
the character of the CAAs objectives under Exec. Order 365. The
pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3
and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA
in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in
Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25). Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the
general control and supervision of the Department Head, the
Administrator shall have among others, the following powers and
duties:
xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and
develop the Manila International Airport and all government-owned
aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including such powers and duties as: (a) to
plan, design, construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or alter
aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation
facilities; (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind
with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity;
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing
fees, parking space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or
indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and
lubricants, spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools, other
 royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its
management and control.
In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO

xxx as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked
with private or non-governmental functions which operate to
remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit.
For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states:
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its
sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

xxx
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-
corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first
organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
resorted to of the plaintiffs property.[16] Thus, in De los Santos v. Intermediate
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to Appellate Court,[17] the trial courts dismissal based on the doctrine of non-suability
act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain
of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of
corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a property where a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The area of 1,165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the
so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners knowledge
corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp.
and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The
206-207; Italics supplied.]
Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of
instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of
Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7,
1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the Philippine National eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as
Railways, although owned and operated by the government, was distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area,
not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely
proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation
created to undertake the management of airport operations which being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the
against an action for payment by the owners.
immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing
strictly governmental functions.[15]
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States
consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497,
otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO, to wit:
Section 4. Creation of the Authority. There is hereby created an independent
regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing
corporate attributes to be known as the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP), herein after referred to as the Authority attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination.
For this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 776, as amended is hereby abolished.
xxx
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the
ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and
revenues, viz:
CHAPTER XII
TRANSITORTY PROVISIONS
Section 85. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office. The Air Transportation
Office (ATO) created under Republic Act No. 776, a sectoral office of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), is hereby abolished.
All powers, duties and rights vested by law and exercised by the ATO is
hereby transferred to the Authority.
All assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues owned by or
vested in the different offices of the ATO are transferred to the Authority. All
contracts, records and documents relating to the operations of the abolished
agency and its offices and branches are likewise transferred to the Authority. Any
real property owned by the national government or government-owned
corporation or authority which is being used and utilized as office or facility by the
ATO shall be transferred and titled in favor of the Authority.
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP,
including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind
and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and
lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions
most advantageous to it, any claim by or against it.[18]
With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the
obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos
spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA,
JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.
Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.
Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings
and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana
Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4, 1975; July
13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979;
September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision
dated October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral
expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation
existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La
Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor
Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the
deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the
aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained
and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in
the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However,
the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and
the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by
respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By
virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were
impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised
affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following
questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against
Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on the
affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds for
the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed
out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for
decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective
memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is
hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the
plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig
are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Baniña, Mrs.
Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano,
Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B. Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral
expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña
Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against
said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to
another motion which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued
another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing
that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter
disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court
in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in
rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the
decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner
and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is
indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition,
the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court,
including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p.
43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve
the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a
motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of
non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said
respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and
thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the
exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability
of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of
his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the
municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its
consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except
when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied
consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v.
Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby
descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files
a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and
be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
(United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-
29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts
of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In
one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the
performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public
service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other
capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising
from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in
their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
(112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
(Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair
of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at
the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may
be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's
dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave
abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the
issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is
hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61744 June 25, 1984
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch
IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE
IMPERIO, ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO,
ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and
SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.
Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein petitioner
municipality liable to private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,
represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the
deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated
October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan
Psd-20831 are concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters,
which lots are among those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San
Miguel Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of
Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the
proportion of the undivided one-half (½) share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D.
Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and
Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-half (½) share in favor
of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the
proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of
P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for
their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in
question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned;
5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for
attomey's fees; and to pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence
presented to substantiate the same.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was
dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was
affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this Court in
G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ
of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent judge, on July 27,
1982, issued an order, to wit:
Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in
G. R. No. L-59938 and;
Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution
dated July 23, 1983;
Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. (p. 10,
Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the
ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from
execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge
in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force
and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:
It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough
funds to meet its judgment obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San
Miguel, Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are
therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge
Agustin C. Bagasao against said municipality. In like manner, the municipal
authorities of San Miguel, Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs'
legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias
writ of execution.
Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within
which to submit their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of
September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that
they will be release only upon compliance thereof.
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of
San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of
Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from
execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The
reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86
Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and
that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially
impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco
vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine
of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues
of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of
such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution
unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner
municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as
those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds
and as such they are exempt from execution.
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal
Administration", Section 2 (a), provides:
SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. — Local government financial affairs, transactions,
and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth
hereunder:
(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the
municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the
Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect.
Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure
for the enforcement of money judgment:
(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not
otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient
property for the purpose;
(b) By selling the property levied upon;
(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and accruing costs; and
(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise,
directed by judgment or order of the court.
The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated
July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution,
dated July 27, 1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982,
directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San
Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and
respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as
Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM,
INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA, respondents.
Defante & Elegado for petitioner.
Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors' Consortium, Inc.
RESOLUTION
CORTÉS, J.:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings
initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and
one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at
Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo
under TCT No. S-5499.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed
as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a
bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB
Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made
pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the
parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the
property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the
appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay
this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier
released to private respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge.
After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14,
1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the
PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code"
was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result of this, private respondent filed
a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued directing the bank
to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due
under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of
payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the
respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its
opposition to the motion.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a
"Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true
and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the property had
been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) Respondent RTC
judge issued an order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to
its transactions over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to reveal
the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In
compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had
consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB
and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they
agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation
proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988
which: (1) approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch
to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the
balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision
dated June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB
and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the
subject property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment
was denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private
respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia
Branch to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed
two succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court. During the hearings conducted for the above
motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista,
informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB
head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its
part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither
be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the
law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated
in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account
No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the expropriation
proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent
RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his
inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus ordered
his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate
petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually
consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent
RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3,
and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from
enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ
of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment
to the petition, while petitioner filed its reply.
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the
Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts
with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively for the expropriation of the
subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory obligations and other
purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of
July 12, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.]
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two
bank accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was opened only
for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent
RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance
on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as
enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any rate, the Court will give petitioner
the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented
based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for
expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner
poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds
deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main
contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved
the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without
the proper appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account
No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan
Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel,
Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing
rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less
the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no
legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of
municipal funds therefor [SeeViuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo,
supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247
(1960)].
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed
by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has
enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has
benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of
Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not
condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized
that, within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988,
164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de
Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291].
The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair
play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been
taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession
and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds
that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to
immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount
of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of
its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60)
DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution.
The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered
in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107271. September 10, 2003]
CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T.
ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.
CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA
HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision[1] dated August 31, 1992, of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 27423, ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 123, to implement an alias writ of execution dated January
16, 1992. The dispositive portion read as follows:
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby granted ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Kaloocan City, Branch 123, to immediately effect the alias writ of execution dated
January 16, 1992 without further delay.
Counsel for the respondents are warned that a repetition of their contemptuous act
to delay the execution of a final and executory judgment will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.[2]
It is important to state at the outset that the dispute between petitioner and
private respondent has been litigated thrice before this Court: first, in G.R. No. L-
39288-89, entitled Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al.,
decided on January 31, 1985; second, in G.R. No. 98366, entitled City Government
of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., resolved on May 16, 1991, and third, in G.R.
No. 102625, entitled Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al., decided on August 1, 1995. This
is not to mention the numerous concurrent efforts by the City Government of
Caloocan to seek relief from other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The present
petition for certiorari is the fourth time we are called upon to resolve the dispute.
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through Ordinance
No. 1749, abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City
Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected employees of the
City Government assailed the legality of the abolition before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33.
In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all
the dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other
emoluments. The City Government of Caloocan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Santiago and her co-parties moved for the dismissal of the appeal for
being dilatory and frivolous but the appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they
elevated the case on certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-39288-89,
Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al. In our Resolution
dated January 31, 1985, we held that the appellate court erred in not dismissing the
appeal, and that the appeal of the City Government of Caloocan was frivolous and
dilatory. In due time, the resolution lapsed into finality and entry of judgment was
made on February 27, 1985.
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in
partial payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530,761.91. Her
co-parties were paid in full.[3] In 1987, the City of Caloocan appropriated funds for
her unpaid back salaries. This was included in Supplemental Budget No. 3 for the
fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release the money
to respondent Santiago.
Respondent Santiago exerted effort for the execution of the remainder of the
money judgment but she met stiff opposition from the City Government of
Caloocan. On February 12, 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan City,
Branch 123, issued a writ of execution for the payment of the remainder of
respondent Santiagos back salaries and other emoluments. [4]
For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan went up to the Court of
Appeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to stop the trial
court from enforcing the writ of execution. The CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the order of issuance of the writ of execution.[5] One of the issues raised
and resolved therein was the extent to which back salaries and emoluments were
due to respondent Santiago. The appellate court held that she was entitled to her
salaries from October, 1983 to December, 1986.
And for the second time, the City Government of Caloocan appealed to this Court in
G.R. No. 98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al. The
petition was dismissed, through our Resolution of May 16, 1991, for having been
filed late and for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The resolution subsequently attained finality and the corresponding entry
of judgment was made on July 29, 1991.
On motion of private respondent Santiago, Judge Mauro T. Allarde ordered the
issuance of an alias writ of execution on March 3, 1992. The City Government of
Caloocan moved to reconsider the order, insisting in the main that respondent
Santiago was not entitled to backwages from 1983 to 1986. The court a quo denied
the motion and forthwith issued the alias writ of execution. Unfazed, the City
Government of Caloocan filed a motion to quash the writ, maintaining that the
money judgment sought to be enforced should not have included salaries and
allowances for the years 1983-1986. The trial court likewise denied the motion.
On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of
the motor vehicles of the City Government of Caloocan, with plate no. SBH-165, for
P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were turned over to respondent Santiago in
partial satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a balance of P439,377.14, inclusive
of interest. Petitioners filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction sale of
the vehicle with plate no. SBH-165, and a supplemental motion maintaining that the
properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. In his Order dated
October 1, 1992, Judge Allarde denied both motions and directed the sheriff to levy
and schedule at public auction three more vehicles of the City of Caloocan - [6]
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Station Wagon); Motor No. C-240-199629;
Chassis No. MBB-910369C;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel); Engine No. 4FB1-174328,
Chassis No. MBB-910345C; Plate No. SDL-653;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel); Engine No. 4FB-165196;
Chassis No. MBB 910349C.
All the vehicles, including that previously sold in the auction sale, were owned by
the City and assigned for the use of herein petitioner Norma Abracia, Division
Superintendent of Caloocan City, and other officials of the Division of City Schools.
Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan sought clarification from the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) on whether respondent Santiago was considered to have
rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to backwages for that period. In
its Resolution No. 91-1124, the CSC ruled in the negative.
On November 22, 1991, private respondent Santiago challenged the CSC resolution
before this Court in G.R. No. 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al. On July 8, 1993,
we initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit; however, we reconsidered the
dismissal of the petition in our Resolution dated August 1, 1995, this time ruling in
favor of respondent Santiago:
The issue of petitioner Santiagos right to back salaries for the period from October
1983 to December 1986 having been resolved in G.R. No. 98366 on 16 May 1991,
CSC Resolution No. 91-1124 promulgated later on 24 September 1991 in particular,
its ruling on the extent of backwages due petitioner Santiago was in fact moot and
academic at the time of its promulgation. CSC Resolution No. 91-1124 could not, of
course, set aside what had been judicially decided with finality x x x x the court
considers that resort by the City Government of Caloocan to respondent CSC was
but another attempt to deprive petitioner Santiago of her claim to back salaries x x
x and a continuation of the Citys abuse and misuse of the rules of judicial
procedure. The Citys acts have resulted in wasting the precious time and resources
of the courts and respondent CSC. (Underscoring supplied).
On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series
of 1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent
Santiago as back salaries, plus interest.[7] Pursuant to the subject ordinance, Judge
Allarde issued an order dated November 10, 1992, decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto Azarcon is hereby ordered
to deliver to this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof, (a) managers check
covering the amount of P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of petitioner
Delfina H. Santiago in accordance with Ordinance No. 0134 S. 1992 and pursuant to
the final and executory decision in these cases.
Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check
intended as payment for respondent Santiagos claims. This, despite the fact that he
was one of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment. On April 29,
1993, Judge Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City Mayor of
Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the check which had been pending before
the Office of the Mayor since December 11, 1992. Acting City Mayor Malonzo
informed the trial court that he could not comply with the order since the subject
check was not formally turned over to him by the City Mayor who went on official
leave of absence on April 15, 1993, and that he doubted whether he had authority
to sign the same.[8]
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A.
Castillo to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
corresponding to the claim of respondent Santiago. [9] On the same day, Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan City. When PNB immediately
notified the City of Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a
letter-advice informing PNB that the order of garnishment was illegal, with a
warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the
withholding of the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge
Allarde and released to the Sheriff a managers check amounting to P439,378. After
21 long years, the claim of private respondent Santiago was finally settled in full.
On June 4, 1993, however, while the instant petition was pending, the City
Government of Caloocan filed yet another motion with this Court, a Motion to
Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and Administrative
Complaint against Judge Allarde, respondent Santiago and PNB. Subsequently, the
City Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental Petition formally impleading PNB
as a party-respondent in this case.
The instant petition for certiorari is directed this time against the validity of the
garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan, as well as the validity of the levy
and sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City of Caloocan. More specifically,
petitioners insist that Judge Allarde gravely abused his discretion in:
(a) ordering the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan deposited with the
PNB, since it is settled that public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment and
even with the appropriation passed by the City Council, the authority of the Mayor
is still needed for the release of the appropriation;
(b) ordering the levy and sale at public auction of three (3) motor vehicles owned by
the City of Caloocan, which vehicles are necessary for public use and cannot be
attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the City
of Caloocan;
(c) peremptorily denying petitioner City of Caloocans urgent motions to vacate and
set aside the auction sale of the motor vehicle with PLATE NO. SBH-165,
notwithstanding that the auction sale by the Sheriff was tainted with serious
irregularities, more particularly:
i. non-compliance with the mandatory posting of the notice of sale;
ii. non-observance of the procedure that a sale through public auction has to be
made and consummated at the time of the auction, at the designated place and
upon actual payment of the purchase price by the winning bidder;
iii. violation of Sec. 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the effect that sale of
personal property capable of manual delivery must be sold within the view of those
attending the sale; and,
iv. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale contained false narration of facts respecting the
actual time of the public auction;
(d) the enforcement of the levy made by the Sheriff covering the three (3) motor
vehicles based on an alias writ that has long expired.
The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in implementing the alias writ of execution to settle the claim of
respondent Santiago, the satisfaction of which petitioner had been maliciously
evading for 21 years.
Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch as
these were public funds and thus exempt from execution. Garnishment is
considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject
to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money
owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. [10]
The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or
any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds
and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
appropriation as required by law:[11]
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the
courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has
been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to
pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will
recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. [12]
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law.[13]
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is,
when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated,
the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not
apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by
law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes.
Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X, et
al.,[14] where petitioners challenged the trial courts order garnishing its funds in
payment of the contract price for the construction of the City Hall, we ruled that,
while government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or
garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for
the payment of the Citys obligations
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-appellants moved for its
quashal alleging among other things the exemption of the government from
execution. This move on the part of petitioner-appellants is at first glance laudable
for all government funds deposited with the Philippine National Bank by any agency
or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy. But
inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the
amount of P613,096.00 as payment to the respondent-appellee, then the herein
case is covered by the exception to the general rule x x x x
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for
respondent Santiagos back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within
the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum indicated in the
ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other
budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys
monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly
enforced against such funds.
Indeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by the Certification issued on
December 23, 1992 by Norberto C. Azarcon, City Treasurer of Caloocan:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that according to the records available in this Office the claim for
backwages of the HON. JUDGE DELFINA H. SANTIAGO has been properly obligated
and can be collected in accordance with existing accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.
This is to certify further that in case the claim is not collected within the present
fiscal year, such claim shall be entered in the books of Accounts Payable and can still
be collected in the next fiscal year x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners reliance on Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] and
Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego,[16] does not help their cause.[17]
Both cases implicitly affirmed that public funds may be garnished if there is a
statute which appropriated the amount so garnished. Thus, in Municipality of
Makati, citing San Diego, we unequivocally held that:
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided by statute x x x x
Similarly, we cannot agree with petitioners argument that the appropriation
ordinance of the City Council did not authorize PNB to release the funds because
only the City Mayor could authorize the release thereof. A valid appropriation of
public funds lifts its exemption from execution. Here, the appropriation passed by
the City Council of Caloocan providing for the payment of backwages to respondent
was duly approved and signed by both the council and then Mayor Macario Asistio,
Jr. The mayors signature approving the budget ordinance was his assent to the
appropriation of funds for respondent Santiagos backwages. If he did not agree
with such allocation, he could have vetoed the item pursuant to Section 55 of the
Local Government Code.[18] There was no such veto.
In view of the foregoing discourse, we dismiss petitioners unfounded assertion,
probably made more out of sheer ignorance of prevailing jurisprudence than a
deliberate attempt to mislead us, that the rule that public funds (are) beyond the
reach of levy and garnishment is not qualified by any condition.[19]
We now come to the issue of the legality of the levy on the three motor vehicles
belonging to the City of Caloocan which petitioners claimed to be exempt from
execution, and which levy was based on an alias writ that had purportedly expired.
Suffice it to say that Judge Allarde, in his Order dated November 10, 1992, [20]
already lifted the levy on the three vehicles, thereby formally discharging them
from the jurisdiction of the court and turning them over to the City Government of
Caloocan:
x x x x the levy of the three (3) vehicles made by Sheriff Alberto Castillo pursuant to
the Orders of this Court dated October 1 and 8, 1992 is hereby lifted and the said
Sheriff is hereby ordered to return the same to the City Government in view of the
satisfaction of the decision in these cases x x x x
It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot issue.
We turn to the third issue raised by petitioners that the auction sale by Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo of the motor vehicle with plate no. SBH-165 was tainted with
serious irregularities. We need not emphasize that the sheriff enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. This
presumption prevails in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and
cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving allegations. The petitioners failed to
convince us that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff indeed suffered from
fatal flaws. No evidence was adduced to prove that the sheriff had been remiss in
the performance of his duties during the public auction sale. Indeed it would be
injudicious for us to assume, as petitioners want us to do, that the sheriff failed to
follow the established procedures governing public auctions.
On the contrary, a review of the records shows that the sheriff complied with the
rules on public auction. The sale of the Citys vehicle was made publicly in front of
the Caloocan City Hall on the date fixed in the notice July 27, 1992. In fact,
petitioners in their Motion to Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the
Garnishment and Administrative Complaint admitted as much:
On July 27, 1992, by virtue of an alias writ of execution issued by the respondent
court, a vehicle owned by the petitioner xxx was levied and sold at public auction
for the amount of P100,000.00 and which amount was immediately delivered to the
private respondent x x x x[21]
Hence, petitioners cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale.
Petitioners, in desperation, likewise make much of the proceedings before the trial
court on October 8, 1992, wherein petitioner Norma Abracia, Superintendent of the
Division of City Schools of Caloocan, was commanded to appear and show cause
why she should not be cited in contempt for delaying the execution of judgment.
This was in connection with her failure (or refusal) to surrender the three motor
vehicles assigned to the Division of City Schools to the custody of the sheriff.
Petitioner Abracia, assisted by Mr. Ricardo Nagpacan of the Division of City Schools,
appeared during the hearing but requested a ten-day period within which to refer
the matter of contempt to a counsel of her choice. The request was denied by
Judge Allarde in his assailed order dated October 8, 1992. Thus petitioner Abracia
claimed, inter alia, that: (a) she was denied due process; (b) the silence of the order
of Judge Allarde on her request for time violated an orderly and faithful recording
of the proceedings, and (c) she was coerced into agreeing to surrender the vehicles.
We do not think so. What violates due process is the absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard. That opportunity, the Court is convinced, was sufficiently accorded to
petitioner Abracia. She was notified of the contempt charge against her; she was
effectively assisted by counsel when she appeared during the hearing on October 8,
1992; and she was afforded ample opportunity to answer and refute the charge
against her. The circumstance that she opted not to avail of her chance to be heard
on that occasion by asking for an extension of time within which to hire a counsel of
her choice, a request denied by the trial court, did not transgress nor deprive her of
her right to due process.
Significantly, during the hearing on October 8, 1992, Mr. Nagpacan manifested in
open court that, after conferring with petitioner Abracia, the latter was willing to
surrender these vehicles into the custody of the sheriff on the condition that the Petitioners and their counsels are hereby warned against filing any more pleadings
standing motion (for contempt) be withdrawn.[22] Her decision was made freely and in connection with the issues already resolved with finality herein and in related
voluntarily, and after conferring with her counsel. Moreover, it was petitioner cases.
Abracia herself who imposed the condition that respondent Santiago should Costs against petitioners.
withdraw her motion for contempt in exchange for her promise to surrender the SO ORDERED.
subject vehicles. Thus, petitioner Abracias claim that she was coerced into Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
surrendering the vehicles had no basis. concur.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there indeed existed certain legal Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
infirmities in connection with the assailed orders of Judge Allarde, still, considering
the totality of circumstances of this case, the nullification of the contested orders
would be way out of line. For 21 long years, starting 1972 when this controversy
started up to 1993 when her claim was fully paid out of the garnished funds of the
City of Caloocan, respondent Santiago was cruelly and unjustly deprived of what
was due her. It would be, at the very least, merciless and unchristian to make
private respondent refund the City of Caloocan the amount already paid to her,
only to force her to go through the same nightmare all over again.
At any rate, of paramount importance to us is that justice has been served. No right
of the public was violated and public interest was preserved.
Finally, we cannot simply pass over in silence the deplorable act of the former
Mayor of Caloocan City in refusing to sign the check in payment of the Citys
obligation to private respondent. It was an open defiance of judicial processes,
smacking of political arrogance, and a direct violation of the very ordinance he
himself approved. Our Resolution in G.R. No. 98366, City Government of Caloocan
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., dated May 16, 1991, dismissing the petition of the City
of Caloocan assailing the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court, already
resolved with finality all impediments to the execution of judgment in this case. Yet,
the City Government of Caloocan, in a blatant display of malice and bad faith,
refused to comply with the decision. Now, it has the temerity to come to this Court
once more and continue inflicting injustice on a hapless citizen, as if all the harm
and prejudice it has already heaped upon respondent Santiago are still not enough.
This Court will not condone the repudiation of just obligations contracted by
municipal corporations. On the contrary, we will extend our aid and every judicial
facility to any citizen in the enforcement of just and valid claims against abusive
local government units.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The assailed
orders of the trial court dated October 1, 1992, October 8, 1992 and May 7, 1993,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.