ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
SANTOS VS SANTOS
 Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army
 Wedding, lived with Julia’s
parents
 Couple would start quarrelling
over when and where they
should start living
independently from Julia’s
parents and Julia’s sentiment
regarding Leouel’s spending a
few days with his own parents
 Julia went to USA(nurse),
promised to return but she
never did
CHI MING TSOI VS CA
 Refusal to have carnal
knowledge (kay gamayg otin.
hahahahaha)
REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA
 A year after marriage, husband
showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility
 Preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends
 Squandered money
 Depended on his parents for aid
and assistance
 Intense quarrel, Reynaldo left
her and their children
DENIED
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life
GRANTED
Both submitted themselves for medical
examinations:
She is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband.
Plaintiff: husband is impotent and a closet
homosexual, married her to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country
Dr. Alteza Jr: there is no evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection, capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman
DENIED
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted
of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, Psychological Incapacity
should refer to no less than mental(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed by Article 68 of the family code, include
their marital obligations to live together, observe love and respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confide the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
If a spouse, although physically capable, but simply refuses to perform his/her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity. Sesnseless and protracted refusal is equivalent
to Psychological Incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the FC is “to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of his obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
An ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity
(b) Juridical antecedence
(c) incurability
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is

MARCOS VS MARCOS DENIED
 Failure to engage in any gainful The appellee submitted herself to psychologist
employment resulted in Natividad A. Dayan PhD for psychological
quarrelling and as a evaluation, while the appellant on the other
consequence he would hit and hand, did not.
beat her, force to have sex with
him, inflict physical harm on In the case study conducted by Social Worker
children Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them
Testimonies of petitioner, common children,
petitioner’s sister and the social worker
Petitioner: the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to
perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not
taken those tests himself.
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar: (Molina guidelines)
Instant case applied Santos vs CA. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
The Molina guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -
- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
DEDEL VS CA
 Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature
wife and mother, extra-marital
affairs with several men
TENEBRO VS CA
 1st: Hilda Villareyes
2nd: Leticia Ancajas (Bigamy)
3rd: Nilda Villegas
JARILLO VS CA
 Victoria Jarillo and Rafael
Alcocillo (declared null and void
due to Psychological Incapacity)
 Victoria contracted a accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Uy
 Jarillo was charged with bigamy
DENIED
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan,
who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a
perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts
his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse,
even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.
BIGAMY CASE 1
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the
ground of Psychological Incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his
marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared
void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed
BIGAMY CASE 2
In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity
did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records
is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code.
What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.
A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

REPUBLIC VS HAMANO
 She and Toshio started a
common law relationship in
Japan, then got married
 One month after marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return
 After sending money to
respondent for 2 months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support
 She wrote to him several times
but he never responded, visited
Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child
ANTONIO VS REYES
 Pathological liar
DENIED
Petitioner: mere abandonment by Toshio of his
family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated
simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations.
Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of
Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set
in Molina.
Appellate Court:
the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national.
GRANTED
Petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede
(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who
stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of
person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to
petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It
undermined the basic relationship that should
be based on love, trust and respect. They further
asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy
was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained
a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has
after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse,
the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified
that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2)
Respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes
(Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition.
Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant, together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he
himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone,
and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be
insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no
impelling cause to present evidence to that
effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality
of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established
by the petitioner.
such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of
psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties
had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his
wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so
grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able
to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that
the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting
that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did
not testify to such effect
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in
1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
NAJERA VS NAJERA
 Respondent was jobless, while
employed as a seaman, was
away from home from 9-10
months each year, quarreled
with her, was jealous
DENIED
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she
interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who
was abroad.
1. Respondent is afflicted with psychological
hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family
background he has. His mother had an
extramarital affair and separated from
Respondent’s father. This turn of events left an
irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging
from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time,
he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind
where he both deeply loved and resented his
mother.
2. His baseless accusation against his wife and
his violent behavior towards her appears to be
an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and
recurrent thoughts towards his own mother.
Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and
anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for
all his troubles.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based
on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard
to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are
grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner: Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a
Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by
his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-
destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable
impulses. Eduardo Najera’s psychological
impairment as traced to his parents’ separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his
mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage
to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which
mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.

4. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the

chances of curability of respondent’s
psychological disorder were nil. Its curability
depended on whether the established organic
damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain
brought about by habitual drinking and
marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent
with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.
FERRARIS VS FERRARIS
 Amy Perez case
PARAS VS PARAS
 psychological incapacity and
disbarment (suspended from
practice of law)
DENIED
Dr. Dayan:
1. Respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called "schizoid," and he is the "dependent and
avoidant type." He is dependent on others for
decision
2. Such disorder "can be part of his family
upbringing"
3. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their
relationship.
DENIED
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered
documentary and testimonial evidence.
Rosa’s main grounds in seeking the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Justo are
his infidelity, profligacy which includes the
falsification of her signature in one of the loan
documents, failure to support the children,
and abandonment of the family.
Court of Appeals:
Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact,
Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on
others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was
supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She
replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was
a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr.
Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the
part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations.
Filed an MR, denied. Certiorari.
Supreme Court:
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the
family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as
a husband or vice versa. The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the
disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they
may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In
the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question
for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental
incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to
free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following
discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated,
albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.