Ethics Grossly Immoral

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr.
on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a
widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He
was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia
was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a
civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C
and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one
year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet,
Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located
at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their
housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were
confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family
(25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves
Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five
photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-
Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid
witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could
not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional
obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of
additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof.
She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman
who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno,
a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein
do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules
of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent,
as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were
engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that
they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the
rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant
acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book
as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and
respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to
molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and
respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon
respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her
and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of
complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual
intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel
and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958,
respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had
better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling
that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with
his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant
gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of
marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in
November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met
in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital.
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by
the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November
3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp.
12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old
Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present
evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of
Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re
Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the
law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956
JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,
vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.
Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and eventually
won her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they
could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after
December 31, 1952 upon being assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4.
on January 3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras,
as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras,
although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and respondent continued
cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent,
who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy her.
On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her
complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her
marriage to respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".
Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.
On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son
Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she
knew all the time he was a married man.
On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by
the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.
Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.
However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she
had asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement
with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and
wife, from April to November, 1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she
was on the family way. She also charged the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live
with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living together".
On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the
Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up
his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14,
1953; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having sexual relations with the
spouse of his own son.
On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government
prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he asked
for, and was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and
forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any.
At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a
memorandum--which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation
were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy, and
that the alleged misconduct is not sufficient ground for disbarment.
In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable
doubt the following facts:
In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed
mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the
respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented
himself as single, although he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had
seven children.
A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without
much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was
invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m.,
while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly promising marriage,
succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the benefit of marriage she gave him the
privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in December,
1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to have the marriage celebrated the
following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching until the end of the school term. She
stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.
Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the
first time, she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her
bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of
them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for
marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.
In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to
enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs.
Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her amorous
relations with Attorney Aspiras.
Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before
Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the
ceremony, the two contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife. However,
the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as a result of
which she gave birth to a baby boy on January 24, 1954.
Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is
confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net
. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)
Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the
first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to you.
(Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)
And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953
— Exhibits A-19 and A-21.
Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became
worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover
up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning
him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities.
But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each
other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited with the
wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault — in pari delicto, respondent
suggests -- because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently
ask for dismissal, the matter may not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete defense 4
Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney
may be disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on grounds other
than those enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that
principle in Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.
In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . .
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she
shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to admission to the bar,
and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of
this court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of
this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a showing that he lacked the necessary
qualification, so is its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R.
1361.)
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and on
this we do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of the
latter's honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. 7
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded
five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one
place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968;
that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good
faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina
Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate
and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to
Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of
extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult
breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan
Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred;
by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy
appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating
Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions
to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally
offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear,
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986.
The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present
evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their
respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not
file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation"
to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her,
this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was
married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later
that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she
then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to
exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre
contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over
the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan.
When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was
subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity
of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores
the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by
which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla
being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other),
she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of
this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage
to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other
circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported
by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his
law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a
member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed
by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery
of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil
Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy
of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre
after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the
safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment
of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will
correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent
Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she
would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became
pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the
Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the
latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador
Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino,
Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157,
tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice
her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was
placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as
Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24,
1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel
together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the
school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon
the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would
never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the
College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in
Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to
"K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented
Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every
time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to
14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp.
43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that
respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is
guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense
imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on
respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained
of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While
this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really
felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a
fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA
439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent
should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since
a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a
lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period
and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for
sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem
it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich
man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he
is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of
good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct,
as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S.
959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the
respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person
in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying
all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the
respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left
her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while
she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered
and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the
other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next
undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her
panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual
intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and
all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual
intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27,
t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she
did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran
errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958,
when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt
Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati,
Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January,
1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They
had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second
one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In
all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house
whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot
ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will
object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed
the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not
give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but
the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly
and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have
been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled
because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of
adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not
bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy
and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of
confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without
grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of
her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis,
treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May
22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of
August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942
to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is
still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This
fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year
or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is
submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J.
Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in
his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong,
niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal
business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the
respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not
merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence,
the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence.
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of
seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent
is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äw phï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who
testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16,
1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n.
24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores
registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him
she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's
house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told
him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines)
when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her
sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because
she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left
Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already
reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving
at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived
with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962,
pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also
granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the
latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May
11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-
law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no
intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he
courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February
21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to
Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and
Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he
asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband
(Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a
stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left
Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her
never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months
thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate
from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another
woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court
the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said
fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral
character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he
did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge
of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by
committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross
immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the
present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954
bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise
continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the
complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer
may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of
the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to
the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all
proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that
will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court
[1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the
Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys,
who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the
United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private
and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional
activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that
a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory
grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from
having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he
limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind,
which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As
the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is
the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of
criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this
Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the
case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to
be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his
acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his
paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later
on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the
law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia
Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of
cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order
to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining
sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral
act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free
to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously
maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession.
As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed
therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a
report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the
respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General
finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against
the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality.
Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief
Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character,
or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him,
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the
standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law
is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.]
626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a
good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render
him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or
now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from
the roll of attorneys.
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty.
Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred
the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent and
his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the hearing.
The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent
and upon failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18
August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both
complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988 because
only complainant appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The
hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither complainant nor her
counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only
complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times,
first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to appear
at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and
thereafter submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31
January 1989.
On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:
1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan

Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as

shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan.

Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the child
as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel

Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby

girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital and
for which respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical

Clinic.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy
at said clinic and for which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio

and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the
children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing respondent

either singly or with the rest of the family during happier
times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived
together as husband and wife and begot two children and the respondent
admits these through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at

the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the schooling
of the children as he himself signed the correspondence and was marked as
Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors submitted to
us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became lovers.
Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant bore
respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9)
years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her,
had contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless,
complainant continued living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children
by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she
sought the help of respondent's parents in supporting her children who were then already in school.
Respondent's parents gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP
Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and his having
begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate
children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board
recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having cohabited with
the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in effect until
respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not merely
because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also because for a
prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with
the requirement of good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member
of the Philippine Bar, 2Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic
social institution of marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory
to the Commission and to this Court that respondent is supporting or has made provision for the support of
his illegitimate children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.

Ethics Grossly Immoral

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Ethics Grossly Immoral

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Republic of the Philippines

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,

ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,

ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.

Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

Republic of the Philippines

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

xxx xxx xxx

PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,

Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.

On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:

1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan

Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as

2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan.

3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel

Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby

4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical

5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio

6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing respondent

7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at

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