ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

I. Celia S. Vda. De Herrera, Petitioner, vs. Emelita Bernardo as guardian

of Erlyn, Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo, Respondent

Facts:

Alfedo Herrera, husband of Celia, was facing a complaint for

interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a
portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with
an area of 7,993 square meters filed before the Commission on the
Settlements of Land Problems. Crisanto Bernardo, represented by Emelita
Bernardo, claimed that the said parcel of land was originally owned by their
predecessor-in-interest. The COSLAP resolved that the respondents have a
rightful claim over the subject property. Surviving spouse Celia Herrera
sought petition before the Court of Appeals yet it was dismissed. Hence, the
case was elevated to Supreme Court.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the COSLAP had jurisdiction to decide the

question of ownership between the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of respondents’ complaint. Administrative agencies, like
the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of
E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction
if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law,
if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large
number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the
particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law
does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
II. Joaquin Ga, Jr., Judith Ga Gadnanan and Jesusa Ga Esmaña,
Petitioners, vs. Spouses Antonio Tubungan and Rosalinda Tubungan
and Norberto Ga, Respondents

Facts:

Petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property

and Ownership of a parcel of land against respondent Norberto Ga before
the COSLAP. Subsequent complaint was re-filed by Joaquin’s children also
in the COSLAP. The decision of COSLAP declared Joaquin and his children
as lawful owners of the disputed lot. Thus, respondent Norberto Ga moved
for reconsideration but it was denied. Together with the other respondents,
they sought for the reversal of the judgment of COSLAP in the trial court.
Yet, it held that it had no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, as the
same would be an interference with a co-equal and coordinate body. Having
a denied motion for reconsideration, the respondents filed a petition before
the Court of Appeals which was later on granted. According to the appellate
court, respondents should have directly filed the petition with the Court of
Appeals, and not the trial court. Moreover, the appellate court held that
COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed
by petitioners. Hence, herein petitioner sought relief before the Supreme
Court.

Issue/s:

Whether the appellate court erred in relaxing the rules on appeal

considering its findings that respondents failed to avail of the
proper remedy before the appropriate court from the adverse
decision of the COSLAP.

Held:

The Court of Appeals was correct when it said that the proper remedy
from the decision of COSLAP is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
assailing the lack of jurisdiction over the disputed lot. Thus, it should have
been directly filed before the Court of Appeals not the trial court. In other
words, while respondents availed of the correct remedy, they sought the
same from the wrong court. This mistake would have rendered the assailed
COSLAP decision final and executory, were it not for its patent nullity and
invalidity. Administrative agencies like COSLAP are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it
by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, COSLAP has two
options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a)
refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved,
the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over
a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to
the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP
over any land dispute or problem.

Thus, the COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public
lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license
from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession,
or a reservation grant. However, the lot subject of the instant petition was not
shown to fall under any of these categories of land and appears to be a
private unregistered land. Neither is the dispute between petitioners and
respondents critical and explosive in nature nor does it involve a large
number of parties that could result to social tension and unrest. It can also
hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires
immediate action.
III. Davao New Town Development Corporation, Petitioner, vs.
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Public
Respondent, Ariel Onde et. al., Private Respondents.

Facts:

A vast track of land owned by Roman Cuiso, Jr. and a portion of

which is mortgaged to the Philippine Banking Corporation. Through the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform, the government acquired the property and
distributed among its beneficiaries herein private respondents. Certificate of
Land Ownership Awards were individually given following the cancellation
and replacement of certificate of titles in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines favoring the various beneficiaries. Claiming that the disputed
property had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing" and therefore
beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint before
DARAB with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. It was held that the
property is outside the coverage of the CARP as it has been earlier identified
as urban/urbanizing and granting the nullification of the compulsory
acquisition of the property. Herein petitioner Davao New Town
Development Corporation acquired the property and caused the cancellation
of the previous title and the issuance in its name. Respondents in DARAB
appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), where petitioner
intervened as the new owner of the Cuison property. The Bank opposed the
appeal. DARAB decided partially affirming the Provincial Adjudicator's
decision and also ordered the Bank and petitioner to solidarily pay the
disturbance compensation in favor of the beneficiaries. A compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties, however, the DARAB issued a
Resolution denying private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
DARAB decision and considered the case closed and terminated. During the
pendency of the second DARAB case, private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court.

Issue/s:

Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the matter.

Held:

COSLAP was totally without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of

the case. In the instant case, the dispute is between parties claiming to
be agrarian reform beneficiaries and a private property owner over a
parcel of land which does not form part of the public domain. Clearly,
the instant dispute cannot be characterized to be of the same kind as
those enumerated under paragraph 2(a) to (d) of E.O. No. 561.
It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP may
assume jurisdiction over complaints involving "other similar land
problems of grave urgency." Where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind as clear as those specifically mentioned. The grant of
exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the
DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to
resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR. Neither R.A. No.
6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the COSLAP vests the latter and the
DAR concurrent jurisdiction in respect to disputes concerning the
implementation of agrarian reform laws.

Instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have

simply referred private respondents' complaint to the DAR or DARAB,
where another case involving the same parties, the same property and
the same issues was pending on appeal.