CSC v Pobre

Facts:
Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the
government servicethree times. He first retired as commissioner of the Commission on
Audit (COA) on March 31, 1986.
He reentered the government and retired as chairman of the Board of Accountancy. He
was then appointed asassociate commissioner of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) of which he retired eventually aschairman.
The first two times he retired, he received his terminal leave pay both times.
On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed payment of his terminal leave based
on his highest monthlysalary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned from the date he first
entered the government service as budgetexaminer. He invoked Section 13 of
Commonwealth Act 186.
Doubtful of the legality of the claim, PRC chairperson sought the opinion of both COA
and CSC.
CSC said however that all respondent Pobre was entitled to were his terminal leave
benefits based only on hisaccrued leave credits from the date of his assumption to office
as PRC chairman and not his total terminalleave credits, including those earned in other
government agencies from the beginning of his governmentservice.
On appeal, the CA ruled that it is the COA who has jurisdiction and not CSC.
Issue:
W/N CSC has the exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of respondent's claim
for terminal leave?
Held:
No.Ratio:
While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the CSC as the
central personnel agency of thegovernment, the duty to examine accounts and
expenditures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the COA.
Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim
exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave matters are involved.
Thus, even as we recognize CSC’s jurisdiction in this case, its power is notexclusive as it
is shared with the COA.
While the implementation and enforcement of leave benefits are matters within the
functions of the CSC as thecentral personnel agency of the government, the duty to
examine accounts and expenditures relating to leave benefits properly pertains to the
COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSCcannot claim
an exclusive domain simply because leave matters are also involved.
The COA and CSC are equally pre-eminent in their respective spheres. Neither one may
claim dominance over theothers. In case of conflicting rulings, it is the Judiciary which
ascertains which shall prevail.
Here, there is no conflicting ruling to speak of because the COA is yet to render its
opinion on PRC’s queryregarding respondent Pobre’s claim for terminal leave benefits.
The court thus finds it prudent to abstain from any pronouncement on this issue and to
wait for COA to rule on respondent’s claim.

CHREA vs.CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998.
It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution
No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the
body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a
request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the
CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-
Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-
Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal
autonomy.

ISSUE:
Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of
Budget and Management?

HELD:
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in
sanctioning the CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create
positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still
indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously
assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned,
particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein.
The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in
the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the
law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is
tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
Matibag v. Benipayo
380 SCRA 49 Ponente: Justice Carpio Topic: Power of Appointment
Facts :
The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Some
time after, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as Comelec
Chairman and Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the
Commission on Appointments of the respondents for confirmation. However, the
commissions did not act on said appointments. Once more, President Arroyo renewed
the ad interim appointments for the respondents and made them took their oaths for
the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their appointments to the Commission
for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on their
appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad interim appointments of the
respondents to the same positions. The Office submitted their appointments for
confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office anew. In his capacity as
Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner to
be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked for a reconsidered of her
reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition herein questioning the validity of
the appointment of the respondents.
Issue :
(1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary
appointment that is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
(2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of the
ad interim appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution
Held :
(1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution uses the word “effective
only until.”
Villareña v. Commission on Audit
GR Nos. 145383-846 August 2003
Azcuna, J
Facts:
Atty. Rudy Villareña was assigned as Auditor of Marikina by the Commission on Audit
from 1994 to 1997. Ordinances passed by Marikina entitled him to receive special
allowances and benefits, which were later discovered by a Special Audit Team
constituted by COA. It was then declared that these were received in violation of
Section18 of RA 6758, which prohibited payment of additional compensation to COA
personnel by government units to which they were assigned. Atty. Villareña was then
found guilty by the COA for neglect of duty, simple misconduct, and violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations. Atty.Villareña appealed, stating that he was
among the “other national government officials” which were entitled to whatever
additional allowances and benefits the City of Marikina gave to such officials according
to the LGC. He then contended that to discriminate COA personnel from other national
Issue:
W/N Section 18 of RA 6758 violates the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
NO. There are valid reasons to treat COA officials differently from other national
government officials. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able to
properly perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from
unwarranted influences, so that they can act within dependence and integrity. The
prohibition under Section 18 of Act 6758 was designed precisely to serve this purpose.
The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary.
Baytan vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003 CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to
register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain,
Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in
Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.Upon realizing that their residence is situated within
the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-
A of Barangay 28 and registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former
COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to
cancel their previous registration. Petitioners’ Voters Registration Records were
forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation,
who, subsequently, recommended filing an information for double registration against
petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the
prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial
compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration.
HELD:
No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in
different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Since "double
registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ claim of lack of intent to violate the law
is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous
registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and
after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double
registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners’ claims of honest mistake, good
faith and substantial compliance with the Election Code’s requirement of cancellation of
previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather
than at the preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
JOSE L. ATIENZA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010
Facts:
Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced
his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. But Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting
his party. Thereafter, Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare
all positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections.
He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National
Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not
properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party
officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30,
2007. On the other hand,
Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO attended the
assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to "people
power," wherein the LP majority removed Drilon as president by direct action.
Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga
Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified.
Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended. The COMELEC
issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilon’s petition. It annulled the
elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision.
It held that the election of Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing
assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the
amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term
may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover
capacity until new officers were elected. Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to
challenge the COMELEC rulings. A divided Court issued a resolution, granting Drilon’s
petition and denying that of Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the
COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga
Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, Drilon’s term as LP
president was to end only on November 30, 2007
.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilon’s
term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to
vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with Atienza
sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of
the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP
president. Atienza and company filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction before the COMELEC against Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the
party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the
NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the party’s 60th
Anniversary Souvenir
Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier
cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members. Atienza, et al. also complained
that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and
that some members, like Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the
meeting. Atienza’s allies allegedly raised these issues but Drilon arbitrarily thumbed
them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it
to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza’s allies.
On the other hand, Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’ election as LP president faithfully
complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party’s 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the body’s number and composition. Some NECO
members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions
in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007
elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got
elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national
stature also became NECO members upon Drilon’s nom ination, a privilege granted the
LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership
was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances. Roxas, et al. also
claimed that the party deemed Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for
holding the illegal election of LP officers. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006
NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO
members, like Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when
they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections.
They were dropped from the roster of LP members. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued the
assailed resolution denying Atienza, et al.’s petition. As for the validity of Atienza, et al.’s
expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that
related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an
internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. Without filing a motion
for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, Atienza, et al. filed this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO
membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president; 2. Whether or not the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the
validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion
of Atienza, et al. from the party; and 3. Whether or not Roxas, et al. violated Atienza, et
al.’s constitutional right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

Ruling:
One.
Nothing in the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership
should be pegged to the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have
been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO
membership to be permanent. The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the
amended LP Constitution. Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO
composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders. The explanation is logical and
consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP
president.
Atienza claims that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as
party chairman with a term, like Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and
that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Court’s resolution. But the
Court’s resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining
Atienza under the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or
any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Second.
Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it
ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their
expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim,
categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership
disputes. But, as Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of
the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly
that elected Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELEC’s finding as upheld by this Court
that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot
affect the election of officers that the NECO held.
Consequently, Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts
on the party leadership issue or on the election of Roxas as president so that it was
indispensable for the COMELECt o adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the
validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was purely a membership issue that
had to be settled within the party.
It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
What is more, some of Atienza’s allies raised objections before the NECO assembly
regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the
election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out
those objections.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties
are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The
COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw vs. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
"include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts."
The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC
had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective
positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue
certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the
LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party. The law also grants a
registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of
its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties
that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue
is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the
elections.

Feliciano vs. COA (G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004

Facts:
COA assessed Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) auditing fees. Petitioner
Feliciano, as General Manager of LMWD, contended that the water district could not
pay the said fees on the basis of Sections 6 and 20 of P.D. No. 198 as well as Section 18
of R.A. No. 6758. He primarily claimed that LMWD is a private corporation not covered
by COA's jurisdiction. Petitioner also asked for refund of all auditing fees LMWD
previously paid to COA. COA Chairman denied petitioner’s requests. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which COA denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether a Local Water District (“LWD”) created under PD 198, as amended, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA or
a private corporation which is outside of COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Held:
Petition lacks merit. The Constitution under Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D and existing laws
mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original
charter.
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters. Under existing laws, that general
law is the Corporation Code.
Obviously, LWD’s are not private corporations because they are not created under the
Corporation Code. LWD’s are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that “all corporations organized
under this code shall file with the SEC articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no
articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are
no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all
corporations registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor
appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. The board directors of LWDs
are not co-owners of the LWDs. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are
government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, an LWD
is a public and not a private entity, hence, subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Luciano Veloso, et. al. vs. Commission on Audit (COA)

[GR No. 193677, September 6, 2011]
FACTS:
In 2000, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 authorizing the conferment of
Exemplary Service Award (EPSA) to elective officials of the City who have been elected
for three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Such officials shall be given a
retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the
position for three (3) consecutive terms. In 2006, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-
Local of the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the
Notice of Disallowance on the ground that LGUs have fiscal autonomy and that they
have the power to grant allowances/gratuity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA properly exercised its jurisdiction in disallowing the disbursement
of the City of Manila's funds for the EPSA of its former three-term councilors

RULING:
Yes. COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities,
including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and
to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds. LGUs, though granted local
fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Moreover, COA was
held correct in issuing the Notice of Disallowance because, contrary to the contention of
the petitioners that the award is a form of gratuity, the recomputation of the award
disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for
nine years, that includes basic salary, additional compensation. Undoubtedly, the
computation of the awardees' reward is excessive and tantamount to double and
additional compensation which is prohibited by law.

Cocofed vs Republic
Case Digest GR 177857-58
Jan 24 2012

Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The
copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having the
largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve
the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the
proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-
based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation
of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth
and development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide
readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards
achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF
collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said
bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain
level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to
collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the
general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any
law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of
the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping
Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was
also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or
7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco
claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said
72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to
the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers
equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming
part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining
27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular
relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB,
through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) shares.

Issue 1:
W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid

- No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the
balance thereof should revert back to the general fund.

- Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on
any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was created
has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced
exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore,
the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by
private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is
unconstitutional.

- Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or

policy for which the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities
- No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for
public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for
free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose
and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

- Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute,

for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under
such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional.

- It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to

the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private
interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the
FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
“coconut farmers”, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public
purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.

- Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in
their private capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are
special public funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut levy
funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. RAMIREZ,
[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]

FACTS:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the
position ofGovernor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 16, 1998, the ProvincialBoard of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as
the duly elected Governor, EasternSamar.

ISSUE:
Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the
case (EPCCase No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
We find the petition without merit. The case at bar is an election protest involving the
position ofGovernor, Eastern Samar.
It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division.
Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the division’s resolution or
final decision.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. Under the existing Constitutional
scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division
cannot dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution
or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not
reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed
and resolved by the Division. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration
prior to the filing of a petition.
In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec
en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. “Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on
that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action.”
WHEREFORE the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity

Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section
5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum
Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted
to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative
clause on amendments to the Constitution.