PROXIMATE CAUSE
Vergara
G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA AND HERMINIA VERGARA, Petitioners, v.
ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
February 24, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated September 2, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357, which reversed and set aside
the Decision4 dated January 4, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
City, Bulacan, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case. No. 900-M-2002 and entered a
new one in its stead.
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara (Sps. Vergara)
and Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Sps.
Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In view
of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties, the property
owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than
that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property).5chanrobleslaw
When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they raised
the height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their house
thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a
portion thereof became part of the wall of the master's bedroom and
bathroom.6chanrobleslaw
Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara
Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level of the
Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a
third of a meter. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water
coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through
the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the
wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps.
build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that
they had dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded.7 Hence, Sps.
Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary
restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps. Rowena Santiago and
Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo, and Rosario Vergara-
Payumo, the other possessors of the Vergara Property.8chanrobleslaw
In defense, Sps. Vergara, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,9
claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall made the same
susceptible to breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to them (Sps.
Vergara). They likewise claimed that when they levelled their own property
by filling it with gravel and soil, they left a distance of one (1) meter from
the partition wall such that the edge of the landfill did not breach it,
asserting further that there was no valid and legal reason why they should
be enjoined from exercising their proprietary rights.10chanrobleslaw
During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony of Engineer Ma.
Victoria Mendoza, considered an expert witness, who categorically declared
that in view of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being lower in
elevation than that of the Vergara Property, the Sps. Vergara were then duty
bound to provide a retaining wall because they were the ones who caused
the landfill, citing Section 120211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096,12
otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines"
(National Building Code). Likewise, citing Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 of
Section 3.2, Rule XV of the original Implementing Rules and Regulations13
of the National Building Code, she explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty
to provide safety requirements for the landfill they made on their property
to prevent any danger to life or property. Moreover, Sps. Vergara failed to
provide a sewerage line to divert the flow of the water into the adjoining
property, in violation of Section 90114 of the National Building
Code.15chanrobleslaw
Finally, the Provincial Engineer of Bulacan, Romeo S. Castro, who was
appointed as Commissioner by the RTC to conduct his own investigation,
likewise found, inter alia, that the introduction of filling materials on the
Vergara Property has "affected" the house of Sps. Sonkin.16chanrobleslaw
1
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision17 dated January 4, 2007, the RTC found Sps. Vergara civilly
liable to Sps. Sonkin for damages and directed them: (a) to scrape the earth
and other filling materials dumped in the adjacent perimeter wall of the
Sonkin Property and erect a retaining wall in accordance with the standards
of the National Building Code; (b) to install and provide an adequate
drainage system in accordance with the same Code; and (c) to jointly and
severally pay Sps. Sonkin P300,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. It dismissed all other claims of the Sps.
Sonkin, as well as the counterclaims of Sps. Vergara, for lack of
merit.18chanrobleslaw
The RTC found that the earth dumped on the Vergara Property pushed back
the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps. Sonkin's bedroom wall and water
to seep through the floor of the house. Moreover, the water seepage could
only have come from the Vergara Property which was higher in elevation, as
Sps. Vergara have failed to provide any drainage to divert the flow of water.
Given the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's act of dumping
earth, soil, and other materials in their property directly caused the damage
to the house of Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they should be held liable for damages
in favor of the latter. Needless to state, Sps. Vergara's co-defendants were
exculpated from liability since they were not shown to have participated in
the former's act.19chanrobleslaw
Aggrieved, Sps. Vergara appealed20 the entire RTC Decision to the CA. They
reiterated that they were merely exercising their proprietary rights over
their property, i.e., the Vergara Property, when they filled the area with soil
and gravel, and that it was Sps. Sonkin who transgressed the National
Building Code when they failed to leave a setback of two (2) meters between
their house and the property line.21chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, Sps. Sonkin filed only a partial appeal,22 assailing the
amount of actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision23 dated February 24, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the
assailed RTC Decision and entered a new one: (a) ordering the Sps. Vergara
to install and provide an adequate drainage system on their property to
prevent the flow of water into the Sonkin Property, and to pay Sps. Sonkin
the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees; (b) setting aside the directive to Sps. Vergara to remove the landfill and
build a retaining wall on their property; (c) deleting the award of actual
damages, as well as exemplary damages; and (d) dismissing the separate
appeal of the Sps. Sonkin for lack of merit.24chanrobleslaw
While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that the cause of the
water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act of Sps. Vergara in
elevating their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, it ascribed error
upon the RTC in not fmding that Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in building their house directly abutting the
perimeter wall.25 The CA explained that despite the fact that under Article
637 of the Civil Code, the Sonkin Property is legally obliged to receive any
water from higher estates such as the Vergara Property, it being the lower
estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their house with parts thereof directly
abutting the perimeter wall and, in the process, violated the two (2)-meter
setback rule under Section 70826 of the National Building Code.27 Thus, the
CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin followed such rule, then their house would
not have sustained any damage from water coming from the Vergara
property.28 Proceeding from such ratiocination, the CA deleted the award
of actual damages in the absence of evidence, i.e., actual receipts, showing
the amount actually spent by Sps. Sonkin in the repairs or renovation of their
property. Similarly, it deleted the award of exemplary damages, as Sps.
Vergara was not proven to have acted with gross negligence in levelling their
property with the landfill and in mitigation of their liability in light of Sps.
Sonkin's contributory negligence. The award of moral damages and
attorney's fees, however, were affirmed.29chanrobleslaw
Finally, the CA found the order directing Sps. Vergara to 6 the landfill on
their property to be unreasonable and an interference on their proprietary
rights. It considered the order to provide an adequate drainage system on
their property to be sufficient under the circumstances. Neither did it find
the need to build a retaining wall on the Vergara Property for the purpose
2
of containing the landfill thereon, opining that if it was Sps. Vergara's
obligation to prevent damage to Sps. Sonkin's house by erecting a retaining
wall, then it was the latter's concomitant obligation to detach their house
from the perimeter wall in order to prevent any future damage or
injury.30chanrobleslaw
Only Sps. Vergara sought reconsideration31 from the CA Decision, which
was denied in a Resolution32 dated September 2, 2010. Hence, this petition
impleading only respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Erlinda), essentially
arguing that Sps. Sonkin: (a) are not entitled to damages; and (b) should be
ordered to demolish the parts of their house directly abutting the perimeter
wall in compliance with Section 708 (a) of the National Building Code.33
Records are bereft of showing that Sps. Sonkin made a further appeal to the
Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The issues for the Court's resolution are (a) whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the award of moral damages and attorney's fees; and (b) whether
or not it should have ordered the demolition of the portion of the Sps.
Sonkin's house that adjoins the partition wall.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.34chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in
elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive
the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil
Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural
drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher
estates water which naturally and without the intervention of man descends
from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the
stones and earth carried by the waters,35viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which
will increase the burden.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and,
accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to
minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so,
they disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against
the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the
National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof
which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and
eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement
on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2
meters from the property line.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping
gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall back
and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is
nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe
the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also
3
for disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such,
Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence, the Court deems it
appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While
moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or
omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 221937 of the Civil Code,38 they are
only given to ease the defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the
wrong done.39chanrobleslaw
Anent the issue on attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same cannot
be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 220840 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may
not be awarded wthere no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected
in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.41 In this case, the Court observes that neither
Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara (thru their compulsory counterclaim) were
shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing their respective claims against
each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the fact that both parties
have valid contentions against each other. Thus, absent cogent reason to
hold otherwise, the Court deems it inappropriate to award attorney's fees
in favor of either party.42chanrobleslaw
Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to observe the two (2)-
meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the
order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate
drainage system within their property, the Court likewise deems it proper,
equitable, and necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as
respondent before the Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the
removal of the portion of her house directly abutting the partition wall. The
underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant
must therefore be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.43chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 24,
2010 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
The awards of moral damages and attorney's fees are DELETED and
respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin is DIRECTED to strictly comply with
Section 708 (a) of the National Building Code by removing or demolishing
the portion of her house that occupies the two-meter easement from the
property line. The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 11-18. Petitioners also filed an amended petition on December
12, 2011 (id. at 160-169) which was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated
January 30, 2012 (id. at 280-281).
2 Id. at 21-34. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate
Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring.
3 Id. at 117-118.
4 Id. at 60-72. Penned by Presiding Judge Renato C. Francisco.
5 Id. at 22.
6 Id.
7 See id. at 22-23.
4
 drainage, pest and vermin control, noise abatement device, and such other
8 See Complaint dated December 9, 2002; id. at 35-41. measures required for the protection and promotion of health of persons
occupying the premises and others living
9 See Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated January 10, 2003; id. at nearby.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
48-52. 15 See rollo, pp. 66-68.

10 See id. at 23 and 50. 16 See id. 63-64.

11 The pertinent portion of Section 1202 of the National Building Code 17 Id. at 60-72.
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1202. Excavation, Foundation and Retaining Walls. 18 Id. at 71-72.

xxxx 19 Id. at 68-71.

(c) Footings, Foundations, and Retaining Walls 20 See Notice of Appeal dated February 7, 2007; id. at 73-74.

xxxx 21 See id. at 25.

(2) 22 See Notice of Partial Appeal dated February 15, 2007; id. at 75-76.
Whenever or wherever there exists in the site of the construction an abrupt
change in the ground levels or level of the foundation such that instability 23 Id. at 21-34.
of the soil could result, retaining walls shall be provided and such shall be of
adequate design and type of construction as prescribed by the Secretary. 24 Id. at 32-33.
12 Entitled "ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
THEREBY REVISING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-FIVE HUNDRED FORTY- 25 Id. at 26-27.
ONE" (February 19, 1977).
26 Section 708 (a) of the National Building Code
13 The original IRR have been revised in October 29, 2004. provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.
14 Section 901 of the National Building Code
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
Section 901. General.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and
Subject to the provisions of Book II of the Civil Code of the Philippines on eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement
Property, Ownership, and its Modification, all buildings hereafter erected, on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2
altered, remodeled, relocated or repaired for human habitation shall be meters from the property line.
provided with adequate and potable water supply, plumbing installation,
and suitable wastewater treatment or disposal system, storm water xxxx

5
27 See id. at 27-28.
28 Id. at 27.
29 See id. at 30-33.
30 Id. at 31-32.
31 See motion for reconsideration dated March 18, 2010; id at 110-114.
32 Id. at 117-118.
33 See id. at 15-17. See also amended petition dated December 6, 2011; id.
at 166-168.
34Allied Banking Corporation v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No.
188363, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 186, 201, citing Philippine National
Bank v. Cheah Chee Chong, G.R. Nos. 170865 & 170892, April 25, 2012, 671
SCRA 49, 64.
35 See Paras, Edgardo L., CIVIL CODE OR THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, Vol.
II, Sixteenth Edition (2008), pp. 686-687.
36 See also Article 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1067, entitled "A DECREE
INSTITUTING A WATER CODE, THEREBY REVISING AND CONSOLIDATING THE
LAWS GOVERNING THE OWNERSHIP, APPROPRIATION, UTILIZATION,
EXPLOITATION, DEVELOPMENT, CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF
WATER RESOURCES" (December 31, 1976), which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate can not construct works which will impede
this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
this natural flow.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
37 Article 2219 of the Civil Code reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
instances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to
in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
38California Clothing, Inc. v. Quiñones, G.R. No. 175822, October 23, 2013,
708 SCRA 420, 431, citing Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil. 352, 364 (2004).
39 Id., citing Villanueva v. Rosqueta, 624 Phil. 330, 337 (2010).
40 Article 2208 of the Civil Code reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's
liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable
G.R. No. 204866 January 21, 2015
RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner,
vs.
ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING CORPORATION* and TRANSWORLD
MEDIA ADS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
November 16, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated December 10, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94693 which affirmed the Decision4
dated August 25, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 03-1452 holding, inter alia, petitioner Ruks Konsult
and Construction (Ruks) and respondent Transworld Media Ads, Inc.
(Transworld) jointly and severally liable to respondent Adworld Sign and
Advertising Corporation (Adworld) for damages.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a complaint for damages filed by Adworld
against Transworld and Comark International Corporation (Comark) before
the RTC.5 In the complaint, Adworld alleged that it is the owner of a 75 ft. x
60 ft. billboard structure located at EDSA Tulay, Guadalupe, Barangka
Mandaluyong, which was misaligned and its foundation impaired when, on
August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure owned by Transworld and
used by Comark collapsed and crashed against it. Resultantly, on August 19,
2003, Adworld sent Transworld and Comark a letter demanding payment for
the repairs of its billboard as well asloss of rental income. On August 29,
2003, Transworld sent its reply, admitting the damage caused by its
billboard structure on Adworld’s billboard, but nevertheless, refused and
failed to pay the amounts demanded by Adworld. As Adworld’s final
demand letter also went unheeded, it was constrained to file the instant
complaint, praying for damages in the aggregate amount of ₱474,204.00,
comprised of ₱281,204.00 for materials, ₱72,000.00 for labor, and
₱121,000.00 for indemnity for loss of income.6
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its
billboard structure was due to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred
instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused to
Adworld’s billboard structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the
collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor.1âwphi1 It was alleged
7
therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor
foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such,
Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages caused to Adworld’s
billboard structure.7
For its part, Comark denied liability for the damages caused to Adworld’s
billboard structure, maintaining that it does not have any interest on
Transworld’s collapsed billboard structure as it only contracted the use of
the same. In this relation, Comark prayed for exemplary damages from
Transworld for unreasonably includingit as a party-defendant in the
complaint.8
Lastly, Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the
construction of the latter’s billboard structure, but denied liability for the
damages caused by its collapse. It contended that when Transworld hired
its services, there was already an existing foundation for the billboard and
that it merely finished the structure according to the terms and conditions
of its contract with the latter.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 25, 2009, the RTC ultimately ruled in Adworld’s
favor, and accordingly, declared, inter alia, Transworld and Ruks jointly and
severally liable to Adworld in the amount of ₱474,204.00 as actual damages,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until full
payment thereof, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00.11 The
RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the construction of the
collapsed billboard as they knew that the foundation supporting the same
was weak and would pose danger to the safety of the motorists and the
other adjacent properties, such as Adworld’s billboard, and yet, they did not
do anything to remedy the situation.12 In particular, the RTC explained that
Transworld was made aware by Ruks that the initial construction of the
lower structure of its billboard did not have the proper foundation and
would require additional columns and pedestals to support the structure.
Notwithstanding, however, Ruks proceeded with the construction of the
billboard’s upper structure and merely assumed that Transworld would
reinforce its lower structure.13 The RTC then concluded that these negligent
acts were the direct and proximate cause of the damages suffered by
Adworld’s billboard.14
Aggrieved, both Transworld and Ruks appealed to the CA. In a Resolution
dated February 3, 2011, the CA dismissed Transworld’s appeal for its failure
to file an appellant’s brief on time.15 Transworld elevated its case before
the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 197601.16 However, in a Resolution17
dated November 23, 2011, the Court declared the case closed and
terminated for failure of Transworld to file the intended petition for review
on certiorariwithin the extended reglementary period. Subsequently, the
Court issued an Entry of Judgment18 dated February 22, 2012 in G.R. No.
197601 declaring the Court’s November 23, 2011 Resolution final and
executory.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated November 16, 2011, the CA denied Ruks’s appeal and
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It adhered to the RTC’s finding of negligence
on the part of Transworld and Ruks which brought about the damage to
Adworld’s billboard. It found that Transworld failed to ensure that Ruks will
comply with the approved plans and specifications of the structure, and that
Ruks continued to install and finish the billboard structure despite the
knowledge that there were no adequate columns to support the same.20
Dissatisfied, Ruks moved for reconsideration,21 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution22 dated December 10, 2012,hence, this petition.
On the other hand, Transworld filed another appeal before the Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 205120.23 However, the Court denied outright
Transworld’s petition in a Resolution24 dated April 15, 2013, holding that
the same was already bound by the dismissal of its petition filed in G.R. No.
197601.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks jointly and severally
liable with Transworld for damages sustained by Adworld.
8

The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the RTC, when
affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight by the Court and are
deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.25
Absent any exceptions to this rule – such as when it is established that the
trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances that, if considered, would change the outcome of
the case26 – such findings must stand.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court sees no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA and their uniform conclusion
that both Transworld and Ruks committed acts resulting in the collapse of
the former’s billboard, which in turn, caused damage to the adjacent
billboard of Adworld.
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.27 It is the failure to observe for
the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.28
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s
initial construction of its billboard’s lower structure without the proper
foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its upper structure and just merely
assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two
(2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the
damages sustained by Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully
aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was weak; yet, neither
of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on
each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none
was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both
Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction of the
former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and
the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint tortfeasors,
therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors
are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as
those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent
of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 219429 of the
Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In
other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves."30 The Court’s pronouncement in People v. Velasco31 is
instructive on this matter, to wit:32
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because
it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.1âwphi1 Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. x x x. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In conclusion, the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks
jointly and severally liable with Transworld for damages sustained by
Adworld.
9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2011
and the Resolution dated December 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94693 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199886 December 3, 2014
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., represented by its General
Manager and Chief Executive Officer, GABRIEL A. TORDESILLAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE TANGONAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the December 8, 2011 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV No. 77659. The appellate court
granted the appeal of respondents Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan
and held petitioner Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc. liable for quasi-
delict resulting in the death of Camilo Tangonan and physical injuries of
Rapanan, and ordering it to pay respondents damages and attorney's fees.
The antecedents of the case follow:
On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers
figured in a mishap along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey,
Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from the
accident, while his companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin
Coloma suffered injuries.
On March 29, 2000, Rapanan and Camilo’s common law wife, respondent
Mary Gine Tangonan, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan a complaint2 for damages against petitioner. They alleged that
while the victims were traversing the national highway, they were struck
and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned
by petitioner. They contended that the mishap was due to petitioner’s
negligence when it failed to fix and change said live tension wire despite
being immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an
immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along the
national highway.
Mary Gine prayed that she beawarded ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱25,000
burial expenses, ₱1,584,000 indemnity for loss of earning capacity and
₱100,000 moral and exemplary damages. Rapanan, on the other hand,
prayed for ₱10,000 for his medical treatment and ₱50,000 moral and
exemplary damages. Both Mary Gine and Rapanan prayed for 30% of the
total award representing attorney’s fees.
In its Answer,3 petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck its areas of
responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall and high tension wires
to snap or cut-off which caused brownouts in said areas. It claimed that they
cannot be faulted for negligence if there were electric wires dangling along
the national road since they were caused by typhoons which are fortuitous
events. It also alleged that it was able to clear the said areas of fallen electric
poles and dangling or hanging high tension wires immediately after the
typhoons, to secure the safety of persons and vehicles traveling in said
areas. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of the mishap was the
victims’ negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle
they were riding on.
During the trial, respondents testified and also presented Dr. Triffany C.
Hasim as witness. Mary Gine testified4 that she is not married to Camilo but
they are living together and that they have one child. She also testified that
she spent ₱20,776 for the funeral expenses of Camilo. She herself prepared
an itemized list and computation of said expenses. She also claimed that
Camilo worked as a jeepney driver earning ₱150 per day and that as a result
of Camilo’s death, she suffered sleepless nights and lost weight.
Rapanan testified5 that he, Camilo and one Erwin Coloma were riding a
motorcycle along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan on
October 31, 1998, around 9:00 in the evening. He claimed that they saw a
wire dangling from an electric post and because of a strong wind that blew,
10
they got wound by said dangling wire. He suffered physical injuries and
electric burns and was hospitalized for seven days. He claimed to have spent
around ₱10,000 for his medicines, and also complained of sleepless nights
because of the mishap.
Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, the physician who attended to the victims when they
were rushed to the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital, also
testified6 for the respondents. According to Dr. Hasim, the abrasions of
Rapanan were caused by pressure when the body was hit by a hard object
or by friction but she is uncertain as towhether a live electric wire could have
caused them. She further said that she did not find any electrical burns on
Rapanan. As with Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on his body
and that the cause of death was due to "cardio respiratory arrest secondary
to strangulation." She also opined that the strangulation could have been
caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilo’s neck.
Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom were SPO2
Pedro Tactac, Tranquilino Rasosand Rodolfo Adviento.
SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified7 that there was a skid
mark on the cemented portion of the road caused by the motorycle’s foot
rest which was about 30 meters long. According to him, it appears that the
motorcycle was overspeeding because of said skid mark.
Rasos and Adviento, employees of petitioner, both testified8 that as a result
of the onslaught of typhoons Iliang and Loleng in Buguey and Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, the power lines were cut off because the electric wires snapped
and the electric poles were destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioner’s
employees inspected the affected areas. The dangling wires were then
removed from the electric poles and were placed at the foot of the poles
which were located four to five meters from the road.
On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision9 in favor of petitioner
and dismissed the complaint for damages of respondents. It held that the
proximate cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo
in driving the motorcycle. It further held that respondent Mary Gine has no
legal personality to institute the action since such right is only given to the
legal heir of the deceased. Mary Gine is not a legal heir of Camilo since she
is only his common law wife.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-
delict. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of
Appari, Cagayan, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. 10-305 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE ENTERED holding the defendant-appellee
CAGEL[C]O II liable for quasi-delict which resulted in the death of Camilo
Tangonan and the physical injuries of Allan Rapanan, and ordering the
payment of 50% of the following damages, except the attorney’s fees which
should be borne by the defendant-appellant: To the plaintiff-appellant Allan
Rapanan:
1. temperate damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and
2. moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
To the legal heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan:
1. indemnity for death in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
2. indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱1,062,000.00;
3. temperate damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00; and
[4.] moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
To both the plaintiff-appellant Allan Rapanan and the legal heirs of the
deceased Camilo Tangonan:
1. exemplary damages in the amount [of] ₱50,000.00; and
2. attorney’s fees amounting to 20% of the total amount adjudged.
SO ORDERED.10
11

In ruling against petitioner, the CA found that despite the different versions
of how the incident occurred, one fact was consistent – the protruding or
dangling CAGELCO wire to which the victims were strangled or trapped. It
likewise ruled that the police blotter and medical certificates together with
the testimony of one of the passengers of the motorcycle, respondent
Rapanan, was able to establish the truth of the allegations of respondents –
all of which were not controverted by petitioner. The appellate court held
that clearly, the cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Camilo and
injured Rapanan was the dangling wire which struck them. Without the
dangling wire which struck the victims, the CA held that they would not have
fallen down and sustained injuries. The CA found that if petitioner had not
been negligent in maintaining its facilities, and making sure that every
facility needing repairs had been repaired, the mishap could have been
prevented.
The appellate court nevertheless ruled that the victims were partly
responsible for the injuries they sustained. At the time of the mishap, they
were over-speeding and were not wearing protective helmets. Moreover,
the single motorcycle being driven carried three persons. While said
circumstances were not the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and
Rapanan’s injuries, they contributed to the occurrence of the unfortunate
event.
Hence this petition raising the following arguments for this Court’s
consideration:
1. THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PETITIONER WAS
NEGLIGENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS POWER LINES IS MANIFESTLY
ABSURD AND PREMISED ON A SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND
COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND GRAVE ABUSE
OFDISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP
WAS A DANGLING ELECTRIC WIRE THAT STRUCK AND WOUND UPON THE
VICTIMS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF CAMILO
TANGONAN NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NEVER
IMPLEADED AS PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
4. ASSUMING, FOR ARGUMENT’S SAKE, THAT THE PETITIONER CAN BE HELD
LIABLE FOR THE MISHAP, DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES COULD NOT BE
AWARDED TO THE HEIRS OFCAMILO TANGONAN; AND THE AWARD OF
MORAL, TEMPERATE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S
FEES, TO ALLAN RAPANAN IS WITHOUT BASIS.11
Thus, there are two main issues that need to be resolved by this Court: (1)
Was petitioner’s negligence in maintenance of its facilities the proximate
cause of the death of Camilo and the injuries of Rapanan? and (2) In the
event that petitioner’s negligence is found to be the proximate cause of the
accident, should damages be awarded in favor of Camilo’s heirs even if they
were not impleaded?
Petitioner contends that it cannot be accused of negligence as its crew
cleared the roads of fallen electric poles and snapped wires to ensure the
safety of motorists and pedestrians. They rolled the snapped wires and
placed them behind nearby electric polesaway from the roads as temporary
remedy considering that the snapped wires could not be collected all at
once. It cites the report of SPO2 Pedro Tactac and testimony of Tranquilino
Rasos stating that the electric wire was placedat the shoulder of the road.
The photograph of the wire also shows that it was placed among banana
plants which petitioner submits to be a clear indication that it was safely
tucked away from the road. Petitioner contends that the trial court correctly
observed that Camilo drove the motorcycle at a high speed causing it to
careen to the shoulder of the road where the electric wire was and had
Camilo driven the motorcycle at an average speed, that would not have
happened. Thus, petitioner submits, as found by the trial court, the
proximate cause of the mishap was dueto recklessness and imprudence of
Camilo and not of petitioner.
Respondents, for their part, insist that the appellate court erred in ruling
that it was petitioner’s negligence that caused the mishap resulting to the
death of Camilo and injuries of Rapanan. They argued that had petitioner
12
properly maintained its facilities by making sure that every facility needing
restoration is repaired, the mishap could have been prevented.
The petition is meritorious.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.12 Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case
are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond,
was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.13
The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate
incident brought about the death of Camilo and physical injuries to Rapanan.
This Court, however, finds that the second and third elements are lacking
thus precluding the award of damages in favor of respondents. Adviento,
petitioner’s employee testified that their electric poles along the highways,
including the one where the mishap took place, were erected about four to
five meters from the shoulder of the road. Another employee of petitioner,
Rasos, testified that after the typhoons hit Cagayan, he together with his co-
employees, after checking the damage to the electric lines, rolled the fallen
electric wires and placed them at the foot of the electric poles so as to
prevent mishaps to pedestrians and vehicles passing by. Their testimonies
were corroborated by whatwas recorded in the Police Blotter of the Buguey
Police Station, Buguey, Cagayan after SPO2 Tactac investigated on the
incident. The pertinent excerpt from the blotter is quoted verbatim:
xxxx
TEAM LED BY SPO2 PEDRO R TACTAC JUMPED OFF AND PROCEEDED TO
BRGY MADDALERO, BUGUEY, CAGAYAN TO CONDUCT INVEST AT THE SAID
VEHICULAR ACCIDENT AT THE SAME PLACE AND RET STN WITH THE REPT
THAT ON OR ABOUT 8:45 PM 31 OCTOBER 98 ONE MOTORCYCLE SUZUKI X4
WITH TEMPORARY PLATE NUMBER 14592 DRIVEN BY ONE CAMILO
TANGONAN y ROSETE 21 years old, MARRIED, DRIVER AND A RESIDENT OF
BRGY MASI, STA TERESITA, CAGAYAN (DEAD ON THE SPOT) AND TWO
COMPANIONS EDWIN COLOMA y MABANAG, 23 YEARS OLD, MARRIED,
DRIVER AND A RESIDENT OF MASI AND ALLAN RAFANAN y GUILLERMO, 19
YEARS OLD, SINGLE, CONDUCTORAND A RESIDENT OF BRGY BUYUN STA
TERESITA CAGAYAN WAS ACCIDENTALLY TRAPPED BY A PROTRUDING
CAGELCO WIRE AT THE SHOULDER OF THE ROAD WHILE THEY WERE BOUND
TO STA TERESITA FROM APARRITHIS PROVINCE DUE TO THE OVER SPEED OF
MOTOR VEHICLE THE WIRE STRANGLED THE NECK OF THE VICTIMS WHICH
CAUSED THE INSTANTANEOUS DEATH OF THE DRIVER, CAMILOTANGONAN
AND ABRASIONS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY OF THE TWO OTHER
VICTIMS THE SAID TWO OTHER VICTIMS WERE BROUGHT TO ALFONSO
ENRILE HOSPITAL, GONZAGA, CAGAYAN FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.14
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, there is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was allegedly the
proximate cause of Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries.1a\^/phi1 From
the testimonies of petitioner’s employees and the excerpt from the police
blotter, this Court can reasonably conclude that, at the time of that fatal
mishap, said wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far
enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing
motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the victims of the mishap
were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle
careened towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found
the motorcycle not on the shoulder butstill on the road, that the three
passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road
and caught up with the wires. As to how that happened cannot be blamed
on petitioner but should be attributed to Camilo’s over speeding as
concluded by the police after it investigated the mishap. SPO2 Tactac, in his
testimony, explained how theymade such conclusion:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: x x x My question is, you said that the motor vehicle was overspeeding,
when you went to the place, what made you conclude that the motor
13
vehicle where the three rode which caused the death of Camilo Tangonan, Q: And did you try to investigate what was the cause [of death] of the victim?
was overspeeding? Please explain that before this court[.]
ATTY. RAPANAN:
ATTY. RAPANAN:
Incompetent, your honor.
Incompetent, you honor.
ATTY. TUMARU:
COURT:
Q: Per your investigation, did you find out the cause of death of the victim
Answer. and the others (sic)?

A: I stated in the police blotter over speeding when we went to investigate. A: There was abrasion at the neck of the victim, sir.
We reflected in the report/police blotter that there was over speeding
because of the skid mark that lasted up to 30 meters from the start to the COURT:
place where the motorcycle fell, sir.
Q: Who among the victims?
Q: In this skid mark that you have seen, at the point of the start of the skid
mark to the place where you found the motor vehicle, where was the motor A: The driver Camilo Tangonan, sir.
vehicle that time?
Q: What about the two others?
A: It was at the road, sir.
A: When we arrived at the scene, the two companions of the victim were
Q: What road? brought to the Gonzaga Alfonso Ponce Enrile hospital by the PNP of Sta.
Teresitapolice station, sir.
A: At the edge of the cemented pavement, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where was the victim found?
ATTY. RAPANAN:
ATTY. RAPANAN:
Q: Do you know that a motorcycle is provided with the speedometer?
Immaterial, your honor.
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: When you arrived at the scene, you no longer bother yourself to see the
Sustained. speedometer of the motorcycle, is that correct?

ATTY. TUMARU: ATTY. TUMARU:

14
Incompetent, your honor. A: There was an accident, sir.

COURT:
Answer.
A: I did not bother to see the speedometer, sir.
Q: You only conclude in saying that the driver of the motorcycle was running
his motorcycle in a very speed[y] manner because of the skid mark
measuring 30 meters, you did not include that in your report?
Q: Do you know that when a vehicle even if running with slow speed if a
driver suddenly applied a break, there was always a skid mark on the road?
A: It is the footrest of the motorcycle that caused the skid mark, sir.
COURT:
Q: Which is which now, you found a skid mark of the tire and footrest or
only the skid mark of the footrest?

ATTY. TUMARU: A: The footrest, sir.

The document is the best evidence, your honor. Q: How do you know that the skid mark was caused by the footrest?

ATTY. RAPANAN: A: Because the skid mark was caused by the footrest because the place
where the motorcycle fell (sic),the footrest was still pointing [to] the skid
This is a new matter, your honor. mark [on] the cemented road, sir.15

COURT: The foregoing shows that the motorcycle was probably running too fast that
it lost control and started tilting and sliding eventually which made its foot
Answer. rest cause the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the mishap already
occurred even while they were on the road and away from petitioner's
A: We saw the skid mark so we concluded that there was an over speeding electric wires and was not caused by the latter as alleged by respondents. It
due to the skid mark, sir. just so happened that after the motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers
were thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires were. This Court
Q: Do you know that a skid on the surface of a cemented road shows that hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate cause of the mishap
something happened to the motorcycle o[r] its [d]river? was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an
average speed, the three passengers would not have been thrown off from
ATTY. TUMARU: the vehicle towards the shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric
wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of Camilo to have
That calls for an opinion, your honor. allowed two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them
when the maximum number of passengers of a motorcycle is two including
COURT: the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the
motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to drive and control.
Answer. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages.16

15
As to the second issue, assuming arguendo that petitioner was indeed
negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding damages in favor of Camilo' PANGANIBAN, J.:
s legal heirs since they were not imp leaded in the case. It should be noted
that it was Mary Gine, the common law wife of Camilo, who is the
complainant in the case. As a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not T
considered a legal heir of the latter, and hence, has no legal personality to he review of cases under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of
institute the action for damages due to Camilo' s death. law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The December 8, 2011 weigh evidence all over again. Under the circumstance, the factual findings
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 77659 is hereby and
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 2002 Decision of the Regional conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial courts will be
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. 10-305 dismissing conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Furthermore, well-entrenched is the
the complaint for damages of respondents Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
Tangonan is REINSTATED. attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or
certiorari. Finally, this Court reiterates the principle that moral damages are
No pronouncement as to costs. designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Hence, absent any definite finding as
SO ORDERED. to what they consist of, the alleged moral damages suffered would become
a penalty rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice The Case
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT G.R. No. 150304
and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON, Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Petitioners, Present: assailing the February 21, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 9, 2001
Panganiban, J., Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29392. The
Chairman, challenged Decision disposed as follows:
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 29, 1990 in Civil
Carpio Morales, and Case No. Q-88-233 should be AFFIRMED, with costs against the
Garcia, JJ appellants.[4]
Promulgated:
FULGENCIO DACARA,*
Respondent. June 15, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
DECISION

16
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:
Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.,
son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan
with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr.
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p. 22), which
however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara
(hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son,
Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for damages against the Quezon City and
Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than
P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages,
P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of
the suit be awarded to him.
In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p. 11),
defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the
subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with
reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was
visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short,
defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of
the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason
why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the
latters negligence and failure to exercise due care.[5]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101, Quezon
City, rendered its Decision[6] dated June 29, 1990. The evidence proffered
by the complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of
the negligence of herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,[7]
the latter were held liable as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of
evidence presented by the plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating the
negligent acts of the city government together with its employees when
considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees
and other costs of suit.[8]
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due
diligence and care in installing preventive warning devices, and that it was
in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast
to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only to liability for
the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.[9] Noting the
failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their contention that
precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:
x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they
placed sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to
minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb under the circumstances.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely
Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there were
signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the
wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the
sufficiency and adequacy of said contention.[10]
17
Further upholding the trial courts finding of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners, the CA gave this opinion:
x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear
based on the investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the
effect that the subject vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep
excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e whatsoever and as a
consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car and finally
turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same. As a defense against
liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the
instant case.[11]
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death
or physical injury, the CA ruled in the affirmative:
x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or
personal injury only as argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the
foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts and
mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing
something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment. Injury is the most
comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or
destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of
value.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance
contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of
moral damage suit (sic) the amount of P10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance
contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of
exemplary damage sin (sic) the amount of P5,000.00 and attorneys fee in
the [a]mount of P10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic) had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction
when it refused to hold that respondents son in the person of Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr. was negligent at the time of incident.[14]
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and
exemplary damages presuppose that their negligence caused the vehicular
accident, we first resolve the question of negligence or the proximate cause
of the incident.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed
all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside
construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of
18
respondents car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was
therefore the sole cause of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise.[15] Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[16]
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that
this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any
basis for their conclusions.[17] The unanimity of the CA and the trial court
in their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and
substituting these with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the
review of the appellate courts alleged errors of law. It is not required to
weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.[18] Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to
an exception to this rule.[19] They have not sufficiently demonstrated any
special circumstances to justify a factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident
was aptly discussed in the lower courts finding, which we quote:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28,
1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his
car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done
relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were
signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the
wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik
Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is
quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
xxxxxxxxx
Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of
events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the
danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care
required to be observed.
xxxxxxxxx
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof
but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of
60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was
allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets
with light traffic, when not designated through streets, as provided under
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus,
petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation,
should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185[21] of the Civil
Code.[22]
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during
the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time
the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration[23]
19
of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them
to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories or
arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered
on review or appeal.[24] To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this
stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.[25]
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents
car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances
specified in Article 2219[26] of the Civil Code. Although the instant case is
an action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that moral damages are not
recoverable, because no evidence of physical injury were presented before
the trial court.[27]
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the
following requisites: (1) an injury -- whether physical, mental, or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219.[28]
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-
delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can
be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical
injury.[29] This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang[30] as follows:
x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages may be allowed,
thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries
are excluded, excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309
(par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents son Fulgencio
Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he suffered a deep cut
on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had
been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts,
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of
medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an
award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim
of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of
petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the testimony
of respondents four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement
regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate
and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person.[31]
Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo
ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional
injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral
injury, competent and substantial proof of the
suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation
are definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered
20
consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty rather than
a compensation for actual injury suffered.[32]
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be
awarded -- whether in a civil[33] or a criminal case[34] -- in the absence of
proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
or similar injury.[35] The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored
on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof.[36]
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages
Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorneys fees are not
recoverable. Allegedly, the RTC and the CA did not find that petitioners were
guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duty and
responsibilities.[37]
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right.[38] While
granting them is subject to the discretion of the court, they can be awarded
only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.[39] In the case before us, respondent sufficiently
proved before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or
compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim
for the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is
whether exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory
damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.[40] Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise
a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the
probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have
nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the
person or property of others.[41] The negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains
in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both
the CA and the trial court. We quote from the RTC Decision:
Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have
(sic) failed to show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected
of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable that
it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in
the so-called premier city.[42]
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners negligence
was clear, considering that there was no warning device whatsoever[43] at
the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any
adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device
at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly
lit,[44] the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By
carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners
demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28,
1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear
that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of
gross negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of
these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.[45]
Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an
offender.[46] It must be emphasized that local governments and their
employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure
construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.
21

Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very
existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local governments have
the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost
in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the
present petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the
public through such a rash and reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is DELETED. No costs.
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision1 dated 29
September 2003 of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71877, which affirmed with modification the Decision2
dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172,
Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 5352-V-97, and which effectively allowed
the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondent Spouses Leonora and
Gabriel Gomez (respondents).
Antecedent Facts
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW
582,3 owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora)4 and driven by
Antenojenes Perez (Perez),5 was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus
(Mayamy bus) with temporary plate number 1376-1280,6 registered under
the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C.
Mendoza (Mendoza).8
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
Mendoza.9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a
separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual
damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.10 This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 5352-V-97.
According to PO1 Melchor F. Rosales (PO1 Rosales), investigating officer of
the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan Road
and heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along the
downward portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner
of Riviera Street, fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion was hit by
the Mayamy bus.11 According to PO1 Rosales, the Mayamy bus, while
traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu
truck.12
PO1 Rosales also reported that Mendoza tried to escape by speeding away,
but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road corner C. P. Garcia Avenue by
one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.13
As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu
truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca (Banca), and Jimmy
Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment
amounting to ₱11,267.35,which amount was shouldered by respondents.
Moreover, the Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis,
lights and steering wheel, amounting to ₱142,757.40.14
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily
income of ₱1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and
delivering them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck
was vital in the furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in
question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim,
the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had
the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy
22
Transport) under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded
both Lim and Enriquez.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented Teresita Gutierrez (Gutierrez),
whose testimony was offered to prove that Mayamy Bus or Mayamy
Transport is a business name registered under her name, and that such
business is a sole proprietorship. Such was presented by petitioners to rebut
the allegation of respondents that Mayamy Transport is a corporation;15
and to show, moreover, that although Gutierrez is the sole proprietor of
Mayamy Transport, she was not impleaded by respondents in the case at
bar.16
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct
personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found
Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code.
As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of Registration issued by
the Land Transportation Office on 9 December 199617 in concluding that
she is the registered owner of the bus in question. Although actually owned
by Enriquez, following the established principle in transportation law, Lim,
as the registered owner, is the one who can be held liable.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and
against the [petitioners]:
1. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay [respondents], jointly
and severally, the costs of repair of the damaged vehicle in the amount of
₱142,757.40;
2. Ordering the defendants except Enriquez to pay [respondents], jointly
and severally, the amount of ₱1,000.00 per day from March 7, 1997 up to
November 1997 representing the unrealized income of the [respondents]
when the incident transpired up to the time the damaged Isuzu truck was
repaired;
3. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay [respondents], jointly
and severally, the amount of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, plus a separate
amount of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay [respondents], jointly
and severally, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; 5. Ordering the
[petitioners] except Enriquez to pay [respondents] the costs of suit.18
Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA, which appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 71877. After evaluating the damages awarded by the RTC,
such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of unrealized
income which the CA ordered deleted, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 dated
January 31, 2001, is MODIFIED, in that the award of ₱1,000.00 per day from
March 1997 up to November 1997 representing unrealized income is
DELETED. The award of ₱142,757.40 for the cost of repair of the damaged
vehicle, the award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, the award of
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, the award of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit are hereby MAINTAINED.19
The Present Petition
Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari
before the Court, raising the following issues:20
1. The court a quo has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court when it
awarded:
a. Moral damages in spite of the fact that the [respondents’] cause of action
is clearly based on quasi-delict and [respondents] did not sustain physical
injuries to be entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2219 (2) of the New Civil
Code and pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. The court
a quo erroneously concluded that the driver acted in bad faith and
erroneously applied the provision of Article 21 of the same code to justify
23
the award for bad faith is not consistent with quasi-delict which is founded
on fault or negligence.
b. Exemplary damages in spite of the fact that there is no finding that the
vehicular accident was due to petitioner-driver’s gross negligence to be
entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2231 of the New Civil Code and
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. The factual basis of
the court a quo that "the act of the driver of the bus in attempting to escape
after causing the accident in wanton disregard of the consequences of his
negligent act is such gross negligence that justifies an award of exemplary
damages" is an act after the fact which is not within the contemplation of
Article 2231 of the New Civil Code.
c. Attorney’s fees in spite of the fact that the assailed decisions of the trial
court and the court a quo are bereft with jurisdictions for the award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court on
the matter and provision Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. The court a quo
erroneously applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Bañas, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partially meritorious.
Respondents anchor their claim for damages on Mendoza’s negligence,
banking on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the latter’s
vicarious liability as espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business of industry.
The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendoza’s negligence
was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.21
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in
driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the
time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu
truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in
violation of traffic laws. Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was
the proximate cause of the harm.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.22
24
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was
in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a
security guard of St. Ignatius Village.23 The mishap occurred when the
Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the
collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck,
encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused
the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and
considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
Having settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next question
that confronts us is who may beheld liable. According to Manresa, liability
for personal acts and omissions is founded on that indisputable principle of
justice recognized by all legislations that when a person by his act or
omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation is
created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be
indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this is found in
the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the precepts of
prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to another, he
must repair the damage.24 His negligence having caused the damage,
Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said damage.
Additionally, Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the
doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a
person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage
or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either
directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25 In our jurisdiction,
vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said article is the
direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or
supervision, or both, of his employee.26
In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez,
the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas,27 we held that the registered owner
is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Citing
Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom,28 the Court ruled that in so far as
third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is
the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered
merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether there is an employer-
employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is
irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death
caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.29
As early as Erezo v. Jepte,30 the Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
Labrador summarized the justification for holding the registered owner
directly liable, to wit:
x x x The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicle running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.
"‘One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification
of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that
the knowledge that means of detection are always available may act as a
deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative
and safe operation. Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is
subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of rendering it certain that
the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of
lack of means to discover him." The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and
the displayed number becomes a "snare and delusion," if courts will
entertain such defenses as that put forward by appellee in this case. No
responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most
outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to place a
25
"middleman" between them and the public, and escape liability by the
manner in which they recompense their servants.31
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him
after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted.
Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability.32 However, with the
enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the
scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage – are no longer available to the
registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.33
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable
with Mendoza.
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against
Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by
the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code,
whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the
claim.
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what may be
awarded.
Actual or Compensatory Damages. Actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
wrong.34
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the
limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or
compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage
sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and,
moreover, the claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
In the case at bar, the RTC, basing on the receipts submitted by respondents
and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to examine, found that
the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to ₱142,757.40, and that the
full hospitalization and medical expenses of Perez, Anla, Banca, and
Repisada amounted to ₱11,267.35. As such, these are the amounts that
respondents are entitled to as actual and compensatory damages.
Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the damage to their
Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of ₱1,000.00, such claim
was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus cannot be
awarded in their favor.
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.35
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception
rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are
designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a
person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily
prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung
from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
26
Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis
of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.36
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence
of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; 2)a culpable act or omission factually established;
3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the
act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.37
A review of the complaint and the transcript of stenographic notes yields
the pronouncement that respondents neither alleged nor offered any
evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering incurred by them. All that Leonora and her counsel had to say on
the matter of damages other than actual or compensatory damages is
this:38
Q: Did you ever spend covering attorney’s fees?
A: Yes, sir. ₱50,000.00.
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned x x x, how much
more would you like this Court to award you by way of moral damages?
A: ₱100,000.00, sir.
Q: How about exemplary damages?
A: ₱50,000.00, sir.
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the defendants failed to
immediately repair your vehicle that was damaged Madam Witness?
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a loan, sir.
In Kierulf v. CA,39 we observed that this Court cannot remind the bench and
the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded,
there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright
and the like. Citing Francisco v. GSIS,40 the Court held that there must be
clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if
the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be
awarded.
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim properly falls
under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Respondents cannot rely on
Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries because in physical injuries, moral damages
are recoverable only by the injured party,41 and in the case at bar, herein
respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al.,42 the Court, in a claim for
damages based on quasi-delict causing physical injuries, similarly disallowed
an award of moral damages to the owners of the damaged vehicle, when
neither of them figured in the accident and sustained injuries.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC
erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is
done with intent to injure.43 In the present case, it can hardly be said that
Mendoza’s negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts.
Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al.
Thus, Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar. All in all, we find that
the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages to respondents.
Exemplary Damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Article 2231 of the same Code further states that in quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
27
Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be
awarded: First, they may be imposed by way of example or correction only
in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Third, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty
party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.44
In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be awarded where
the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple negligence
and be tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive
or negative misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive misconduct
which will support a claim for punitive damages, the courts have used such
descriptive terms as willful, wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, or malicious,
either alone or in combination.45
Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.46
In the case at bar, having established respondents’ right to compensatory
damages, exemplary damages are also in order, given the fact that Mendoza
was grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus. His act of intruding or
encroaching on the lane rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck shows his
reckless disregard for safety.
In Baño v. Bachelor Express, Inc., et al.,47 where an erring bus, in the process
of overtaking a jeepney, also encroached on the opposite lane, and
consequently collided with a dump truck, the Court held the driver of the
bus grossly negligent and affirmed the award of exemplary damages.
Attorney’s Fees. Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
when attorney’s fees may be recovered:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff’s valid and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s
liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered;
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
From the very opening sentence of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, it is clearly
intended to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the exception in our law,
as the general rule remains that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in the
28
absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy
to set a premium on the right to litigate.48
As such, in Spouses Agustin v. CA,49 we held that, the award of attorney’s
fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award. Thus, the reason for the
award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision;
otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the
same must be disallowed on appeal.
In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the propriety of
attorney’s fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA
Decision, on the other hand, merely stated that the award of attorney’s fees
is merited as such is allowed when exemplary damages are awarded.50
Following established jurisprudence,51 however, the CA should have
disallowed on appeal said award of attorney’s fees as the RTC failed to
substantiate said award. Costs of suit. The Rules of Court provide that,
generally, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of
course, thus:52
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit.- Unless otherwise provided
in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of
course, but the court shall have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that
either party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, as
may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the
Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
In the present case, the award of costs of suit to respondents, as the
prevailing party, is in order. Interests.1âwphi1 Interest by way of damages
has been defined as interest allowed in actions for breach of contractor tort
for the unlawful detention of money already due. This type of interest is
frequently called "moratory interest." Interest as a part of damage, is
allowed, not by application of arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of
the individual case and as compensation to the injured party.53
The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is Article 2211 of the Civil
Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the
damage, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated
claims when due.54 For unliquidated claims, however, Article 2213 of the
Civil Code provides that interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.
In the case at bar, although the award of exemplary damages is unliquidated
in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before judgment, the
exact amount that they are required to pay to respondents, the award of
actual or compensatory damages, however, such as the truck repairs and
medical expenses, is arguably liquidated in that they can be measured
against a reasonably certain standard.55 Moreover, justice would seem to
require that the delay in paying for past losses which can be made
reasonably certain should be compensated through an award of interest.56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to PARTIALLY GRANT
the appeal by certiorari, as follows:
1) DECLARE Mariano Mendoza and Elvira Lim solidarily liable to respondent
Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez;
2) MAINTAIN the award of actual or compensatory damages in the amount
of ₱142,757.40 for the repair of the Isuzu Elf truck, with legal interest
beginning 31 January 2001 until fully paid;
3) GRANT additional actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
₱11,267.35 for the medical expenses shouldered by respondent Spouses
Leonora and Gabriel Gomez, with legal interest beginning 31 January 2001
until fully paid;
4) DELETE the award of moral damages;
5) MAINTAIN the award of exemplary damages at ₱50,000.00;
29
6) DELETE the award of attorney's fees; and
7) MAINTAIN the award of costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
REMOTE CAUSE
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and
VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the
death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in
Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos,
spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City
rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of
money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of
Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by
plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and
to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and
Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of
damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission
of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St.
Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same
being adjudged against defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His
counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is
hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-
appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
30
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with
other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in
a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the
accident.[2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing
the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a
quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral
damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and
in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
31
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and
Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of
the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II
but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin
Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment
of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was
an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and
which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for
moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[14] In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity
to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of
attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule.[15]
The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.[16] Thus, the
grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle
was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.
We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on
the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who
shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
32

The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case
to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding
petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
CONCURRENT CAUSES
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners,
vs.
CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Sabido, Sabido and Associates for petitioners.
Ernesto S. Tengco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the review by certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, sentencing the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., Nicasio Mudales, and
herein petitioners. Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, to jointly and
severally indemnify Belen Makabuhay Custodio and her son, Agripino
Custodio Jr., in the sum of P6,000 and to pay the costs of the suit.
The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals from which we
quote:
Upon a careful study and judicious examining of the evidence on record, we
are inclined to concur in the findings made by the trial court. Here is how
the Court a quo analyzed the facts of this case:
"In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks,
one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus
Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero
Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino
Custodia a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck
was full of passengers was sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda.
As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died (Exhibit A).
"It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was hanging on
the left side of the LTB bus. Otherwise, were he sitting inside the truck, he
could not have been struck by the six by six truck driven by Aser Lagunda.
This fact alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side of the
truck, makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for
damages. For certainly its employees, who are the driver and conductor
were negligent. They should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride
their truck in that manner.
"To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all the
blame on Nicasio Mudales. From the testimony, however, of Belen
Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can deduce that Aser Lagunda
was equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck
was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and
opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and
cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply
swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided
hitting Agripino Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was running on the
middle of the road when passing a curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so.
We are rather of the belief that both trucks did not keep close to the right
side of the road so they sideswiped each other and thus Agripino Custodio
was injured and died. In other words, both drivers must have drive in their
trucks not in the proper lane and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent.
"We might state by way of additional observations that the sideswiping of
the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at
about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load
to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no
cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and
33
driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). Under the above-stated condition,
there exists strong persuasion to accept what Belen Makabuhay and Sofia
Mesina, LTB passengers, had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck
was running at a fast rate of speed (tsn. 15, 74, 175 Mendoza). From the lips
of no less than driver Lagunda himself come the testimonial admission that
the presence of three hanging passengers located at the left side of the bus
was noted when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the
bus, and yet despite the existence of a shallow canal on the right side of the
road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise
prudence to avert the accident simply because to use his own language the
canal "is not a passage of trucks."
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court
of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter
referred to as the carrier — and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom
has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable in the manner above
indicated.
Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due
exclusively to the negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners
were not guilty of negligence in connection with the matter under
consideration; (3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with the
carrier and its driver; and (4) that the complaint against petitioners herein
should be dismissed.
With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is urged
that the carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having
allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus, in
violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the
proximate cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the
lower court had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory
negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the
carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at a considerable
speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of
being close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle
portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite direction
as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.1äwphï1.ñët
The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location
at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we
cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar.
At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very
testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers
riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five (5) or
seven (7) meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance
between the two (2) vehicles was such that he could have avoided
sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In
fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result
without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running
board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the
opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.
Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the
carrier and its driver, because the latter's liability arises from a breach of
contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict. The rule is,
however, that
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although
acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor ... . (38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)
34
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., is on leave.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CASES
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Jose G. Gatchalian for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-
appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey,
semi-concrete edifice (Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and "4") located at the
corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said
second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in
width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-
escape ladders (Exh. "4"), and the presence of each of said fire-exits was
indicated on the wall (Exh. "5").
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out
in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the
institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing
the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!'
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the
registrar, tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the
time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not
get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across
the street. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of
the instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students
the above admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three
students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar,
whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and tried with outstretched
arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their way to the stairs.
The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the
exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was
over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede.
xxx xxx xxx
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both
eyes and on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the body,
internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The
cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to
traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations
of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court
of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case.
The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a
divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been
constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant
to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00, plus interest at
the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.
35

The case came up to this Court on a petition for review filed by the
defendant below.
The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter
to be referred to as the petitioner, was negligent and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of
negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491
Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with
in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where
the petitioner's vocational school was housed. This provision reads as
follows:
Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. — ... All buildings
and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as
accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more persons
domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all public or quasi-
public buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium,
schools, reformatories, places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs,
restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two
unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters
in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall
likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department, said
stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact
that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5
meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time
of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under
construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of
negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on a number of authorities in the
American jurisdiction, thus: .
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference
that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained.
However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will
be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury. (65 C.J.S. 1156).
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the
state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect
to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise
expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to
such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself,
in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial,
where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting
such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of
any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any
reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. .... (65 C.J.S.
pp. 623-628).
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes
an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, do not inquire
whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety
is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to
avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to
prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such
circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which
obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it
is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court
has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
manner of driving. (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
... However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward
an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the
36
injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be
maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events
or agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection
between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to Prevent. (38 Am
Jur 841).
The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The first is that Section 491 of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers to public buildings and
hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership.
It will be noted from the text of the ordinance, however, that it is not
ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its
requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular
building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is
devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance — for
instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely was — then the
building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement
that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only
one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but
does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is
devoted.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply with the ordinance
devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not
the petitioner herein, who is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the
violation. The contention ignores the fact that it was the use of the building
for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the
ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners who was
responsible for such use.
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by the petitioner is whether or
not the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. The case of Villanueva
Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, G. R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is
cited in support of the contention that such failure was not the proximate
cause. It is there stated by this Court:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of
events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1)
violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!,
Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury
complained of. A statement of the doctrine relied upon is found in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L-8328, May 18, 1956, wherein this Court, citing
Corpus Juris said:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
37
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were
independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of
the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury.
It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question
was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that
it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was
a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of
the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably
foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was
only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would
have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a
fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush
headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such
contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for
under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants
of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841:
"The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate
cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it
would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was
the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended
to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of
proximate cause applies to such violation.
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not
specifically allege that the ordinance in question had been violated. The
violation, however, as an act of negligence which gave rise to liability, was
sufficiently comprehended within paragraph 7 of the complaint, which
reads: .
Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross
negligence of the defendant who failed to exercise due care and diligence
for the safety of its students in not providing the building with adequate fire
exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to avoid the stampede, aside
from the fact that the defendant did not have a permit to use the building
as a school-house.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them
who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches
wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was
used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
38
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier
on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe
Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went
to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend
to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because
Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to
Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla
issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981)
which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years
of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This
wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was
already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by
Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit
A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis
and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to
each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore
and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3,
1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The
medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
39

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with
the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The
motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position
in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon
that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San
Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were
regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to
the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in
said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with
my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
40
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who
used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the
incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and
that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was
the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was
declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which
covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that
the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his
death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus.
And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the
proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected
with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is
liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that
the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death
of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at
the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the
following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
41
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region
of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to
some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the
major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction
of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then
lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and
an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia
is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe
tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus
is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition,
pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's
body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
42
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote
cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident,
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano
defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses
is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and
remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case.
It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may
still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria,
et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter
is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate
and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
43
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense
also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the
right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will
close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on
the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by
the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based
solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case,
the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect
of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
[G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.]
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA,
thru her personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO and
SHARON ICO, Respondents.
Efren N. Ambrosio & Associates for petitioner PNEI.
Emiliano S. Micu for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE; WHEN
APPLICABLE. — The doctrine of last clear chance applies only in a situation
where the defendant, having the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so, becomes liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION TO MAKE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE. — In
order that the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied, it must be shown
that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril or with exercise of due care should
have been aware of it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO PERSON ACTING
INSTANTANEOUSLY OR BY AVAILABLE MEANS. — This doctrine of last
chance has no application to a case where a person is to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by using all means available after the
peril is or should have been discovered.
4. ID.; ID.; PROVISION OF R.A. NO. 4136 RE VEHICLE ENTERING A
THROUGH HIGHWAY OR A STOP INTERSECTION. — Section 43 (c), Article III,
Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 1436 cannot apply to case a bar where at the
time of the accident, the jeepney had already crossed the intersection.
5. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE EMPLOYER.
— A finding of negligence on the part of the driver establishes a presumption
that the employer has been negligent and the latter has the burden of proof
that it has exercised due negligence not only in the selection of its
employees but also in adequately supervising their work.
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES. — Plaintiff’s failure to present documentary evidence to support
their claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim
44
does not bar recovery of the damages, if such loss may be based sufficiently
on their testimonies.
7. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY FIXED AT P30,000. — The indemnity for the
death of a person was fixed by this Court at (P30,000.00).
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
In this Petition, Pantranco North Express Inc. (PANTRANCO), asks the Court
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05494-95 which
affirmed the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Rosales, Pangasinan
in Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil Case No. 589-R wherein PANTRANCO was
ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees to herein private
respondents.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The pertinent fact are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and
seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a
picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney
driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner thereof. From Ilagan,
Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to one
Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to
Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and
proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were
proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from
Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane
while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn
Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the
rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively
damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time
on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently
remained in hiding.
All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private respondents
settled the case amicably under the "No Fault" insurance coverage of
PANTRANCO.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for
herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as Civil Case
No. 561-R and 589-R of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s
alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver,
Ambrosio Ramirez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision against
PANTRANCO awarding the total amount of Two Million Three Hundred Four
Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven (P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10%
thereof as attorney’s fees and costs to Maricar Baesa in Civil Case No. 561-
R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Six Hundred
Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees and costs to Fe Ico and her children in Civil Case No. 589-R.
On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals modified
the decision of the trial court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay the total
amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred
Twenty Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Maricar Baesa, and the total
amount of Three Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Pesos (P344,000.00) plus
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Fe Ico and her
45
children, and to pay the costs in both cases. The dispositive portion of the B) For loss of earning capacity of David Ico — P252,000.00;
assailed decision reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
C) As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the injury of Fe
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by ordering the Ico — P30,000.00
defendant PANTRANCO North Express, Inc. to pay:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library D) As payment for the jeepney — P20,000.00;

I. The plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos Baesa, the E) For the hospitalization of Fe Ico — P12,000.000;
following damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
F) And for attorney’s fees — P10,000.00;
A) As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa —
P30,000.00; and to pay the costs in both cases.

B) As compensatory damages for the death of Marilyn Baesa — The amount of P25,000 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in Civil Case
P30,000.00; No. 561-R, and the medical expenses in the sum of P3,273.55, should be
deducted from the award in her favor.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
C) As compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and
Marcelino Baesa — P30,000.00; All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs shall earn
interest at the legal rate from date of this decision until fully paid. [CA
D) For the loss of earnings of Ceasar Baesa — P630,000.00; Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 57-58.]

E) For the loss of earnings of Marilyn Bascos Baesa — P375,000.00; PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal’s
decision, but on June 26, 1987, it denied the same for lack of merit.
F) For the burial expenses of the deceased Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for review.
— P41,200.00;
I
G) For hospitalization expenses of Maricar Baesa — P3,727.00;

H) As moral damages — P50,000.00;
I) As attorney’s fees — P20,000.00;
II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case
damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the
"last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that under
the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney
who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore
No. 589-R, the following negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then
existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

A) As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico — The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of
P30,000.00; Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

46

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s Lumber and
Hardware, Et. Al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de
Calibo, Et Al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of
the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff
becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the
plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,
supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver, petitioner claims that the
original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident
and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident. It is petitioner’s
position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the
lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney
towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to himself or
his passengers.
The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance"
finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity
to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid
an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance
that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane
upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As held
by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his
own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching
vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane
of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not
return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane
by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate
driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver Ramirez at the
time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the
steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney’s lane because there
was a steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However,
this is belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was
enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger
[CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50].
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the
time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila [CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. By the time David Ico must have realized that
the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve
the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the
jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus,
even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has
held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
47
have been discovered" [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District,
supra].chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe
Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136 * which
provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop
intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either
direction on such through highway.
Petitioner’s misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in
this case. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering
a through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the
jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam
River. Petitioner itself cited Fe Ico’s testimony that the accident occurred
after the jeepney had travelled a distance of about two (2) meters from the
point of intersection [Petition p. 10; Rollo, p. 27]. In fact, even the witness
for the petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both vehicles were coming
from opposite directions [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50], clearly indicating
that the jeepney had already crossed the intersection.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of petitioner’s
driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to
return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming
from the opposite direction was the sole and proximate cause of the
accident without which the collision would not have occurred. There was no
supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver
which would have made the prior negligence of petitioner’s driver a mere
remote cause of the accident.
II
On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims that it had
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage,
conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner adduced evidence to show that in hiring its drivers, the latter are
required to have professional driver’s license and police clearance. The
drivers must also pass written examinations, interviews and practical driving
tests, and are required to undergo a six-month training period. Rodrigo San
Pedro, petitioner’s Training Coordinator, testified on petitioner’s policy of
conducting regular and continuing training programs and safety seminars
for its drivers, conductors, inspectors and supervisors at a frequency rate of
at least two (2) seminars a month.
On this point, the Court quotes with approval the following findings of the
trial court which was adopted by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the
selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although
this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome
by proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is far
from sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced. The professional
driver’s license of Ramirez has not been produced. There is no proof that he
is between 25 to 38 years old. There is also no proof as to his educational
attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not. Neither
are the result of the written test, psychological and physical test, among
other tests, have been submitted in evidence [sic]. His NBI or police
clearances and clearances from previous employment were not marked in
evidence. No evidence was presented that Ramirez actually and really
attended the seminars. Vital evidence should have been the certificate of
attendance or certificate of participation or evidence of such participation
like a logbook signed by the trainees when they attended the seminars. If
such records are not available, the testimony of the classmates that Ramirez
was their classmate in said seminar (should have been presented) [CA
Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 51-52].chanrobles law library
Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez was employed and
remained as its driver only means that he underwent the same rigid
selection process and was subjected to the same strict supervision imposed
by petitioner on all applicants and employees. It is argued by the petitioner
that unless proven otherwise, it is presumed that petitioner observed its
48
usual recruitment procedure and company polices on safety and efficiency
[Petition, p. 20; Rollo, p. 37].
The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious.
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner and the
burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of
its employees but also in adequately supervising their work rests with the
petitioner [Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934); Umali v.
Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623]. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, there is no presumption that the usual recruitment
procedures and safety standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules
and regulations and the formulation of various company policies on safety,
without showing that they are being complied with, are not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver, the recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by the petitioner,
which consists mainly of the uncorroborated testimony of its Training
Coordinator, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence
against petitioner.cralawnad
III
On the question of damages, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
victims. Petitioner assails respondent court’s findings because no
documentary evidence in support thereof, such as income tax returns, pay-
rolls, pay slips or invoices obtained in the usual course of business, were
presented [Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 39]. Petitioner argues that the "bare and
self-serving testimonies of the wife of the deceased David Ico and the
mother of the deceased Marilyn Baesa . . . have no probative value to sustain
in law the Court of Appeals’ conclusion on the respective earnings of the
deceased victims." [Petition, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 38-39.] It is petitioner’s
contention that the evidence presented by the private respondent does not
meet the requirements of clear and satisfactory evidence to prove actual
and compensatory damages.
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased victims. While it is true that private respondents should have
presented documentary evidence to support their claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof does
not necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question. The testimony
of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico, and
the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from
which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for
the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victims. Moreover, in
fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the
court can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment
and the state of his health at the time of death.
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the time of his
death in 1981 and was driving his own passenger jeepney. The spouses
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at the time of their
death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and the proprietor of
the Cauayan Press, printer of the Cauayan Valley Newspaper and the Valley
Times at Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and
at the time of her death, was the company nurse, personnel manager,
treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela. Respondent court
duly considered these factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies
of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of damages for the loss
of earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses
Baesa.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
However, it should be pointed out that the Court of Appeals committed
error in fixing the compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa
and Marcelino Baesa. Respondent court awarded to plaintiff (private
respondent) Maricar Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
"compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino
Baesa." [CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, 57]. In other words, the Court of Appeals
awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as indemnity for the
49
death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
for the death of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In the case of
People v. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA
518, the indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by this Court at Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be
awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of
her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death of each brother.
The other items of damages awarded by respondent court which were not
challenged by the petitioner are hereby affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that the amount of compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim
Baesa and Marcelino Baesa are increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) each.chanrobles law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003]
ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former
Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision[1] dated May 31,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358, which affirmed with
modification the judgment[2] dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting
in physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer
imprisonment for one month and one day of arresto mayor, (b) pay private
complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount of fifty one thousand pesos
(P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw jeepney, and one
hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000) for her hospital and medical
expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the prison term
imposed on petitioner to four months of arresto mayor.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was
driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was
Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the
road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers
allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven
by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly
gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the
Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it
swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed
towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid
the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right.
Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right
front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the
Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw
and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center
of the road.
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital.[3] Seyan
was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock with her
eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was
transferred to St. Pauls Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her
medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur,
lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt
abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right
kidney.[4] She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000.
A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence
with serious physical injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran.[5]
50
Probable cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint against
Iran was dismissed.[6]
Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him with
serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence, thus:
That on or about November 29, 1989, in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up
with Plate No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless imprudence drive said pick-
up in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner with disregard of traffic
laws and regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless driving
the Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota Tamaraw jeep
with Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan and driven by
Edwin Iran thereby causing damage to the Toyota Tamaraw in the amount
of P80,000.00 and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was
riding said vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal in more than
30 days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Simple Imprudence resulting [in] physical injuries and damage to property
defined and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused
Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY
of arresto mayor.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the
amount of P51,000.00 for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw
Jeepney and P110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical
expenses, and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial courts
decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty
imposed upon the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the
instant petition, wherein petitioner raises the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN INFERENCE SPECIFICALLY ON
WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE ACT
WAS IT.[10]
Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this
case we should relax the rule that only legal questions can be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him,
the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion
as to the proximate cause of the collision. He insists that the Court of
Appeals erred when it found him negligent for occupying the lane of the
Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to return to his original lane at the safest
and earliest opportunity.
Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already
relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-ups right
signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw,
had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left,
according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran
who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his act of
51
occupying the Tamaraws lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Irans
swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted
a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual
injuries and damages to private complainant.
Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the
pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this was
not borne by the evidence on record.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that
the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner
herein. Petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident,
according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no
justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong
lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his
own lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw,
with no opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Irans
swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioners wrongful act, which
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale
of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency
might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based
largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same
standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect, even though
it later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly, under the
emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the
OSG.
As to petitioners claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up
was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony
of Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a
fast speed when it encroached on their lane immediately before the
collision.
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio
Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision? This is the crux of the
present petition.
In our view, petitioners attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver
of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the
left only to avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head to head
position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the
vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the evidence on record.
No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the
Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision.
We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of
the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of those who
went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he
arrived at the place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up
positioned diagonally at the center of the road.[12] Its head was towards
the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches
beyond the center of the lane.[13] Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo,
at two arms length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12
inches long and located at the left side of the center line going to the right
side.[14]
The above circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran
that, immediately before the collision, the pick-up was not on its proper lane
but on the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision
course with the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance
between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to return to its
proper lane.
It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to
it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in
safety.[15] This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136
as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking
or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
52

In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the
Tamaraw jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved
to the left of the center line.[16] In addition, petitioner was running at a fast
clip while traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran,
unrebutted by petitioner. The resulting damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at
the point where the head and chassis were separated from the body,
bolsters this conclusion that petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner
was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the
opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe
passage. Further, after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did
not slow down, contrary to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
v. IAC,[17] thus:
[O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds
that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed
so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary.
negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences of the accident.[19] But as already stated on this point,
no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation
of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence
of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule.
Petitioners act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters
from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the
Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all.
There was no clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the
resulting damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and
the total loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on
petitioner the sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of
vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.

Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioners acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in
a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.[18]

Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of

last clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the

53