GARCIA VS DRILON
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before
the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against
her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim
of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply
with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer
for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the
theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral
attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that
RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal
protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA
9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to
the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited
authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of
the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262
is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court
shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is
so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and
administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
Sharica Mari Go-Tan vs. Spouses Perfecto and
Juanita Tan
Facts:
Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her
husband,Steven, and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C.
Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004."
Respondents contend that they cannot be included in the charge
since they are not among the personalities liable as enumerated
under the said law by virtue of “expresio unius est exclusion
alterius.”
Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner with regard to the inclusion
of the respondent spouses.
A provision of the said law expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC (Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262), which
allowed legal principles developed in the RPC may be applied
in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special
laws, such as R.A. 9262.
Citing jurisprudence, the court held that the “principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision
of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.
Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the
principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators”.
Furthermore, Section 5 of R.A. 9262 recognizes the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by
an offender through another
The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application in the case at bar since it is only an "ancillary rule of
statutory construction” and not of universal application nor is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent when not plainly indicated.
However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be
best decided after fullblown trial on the merits.
RUSTAN ANG v. CA
FACTS:
Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts
until Irish decided to break up with Rustan after learning that he
had taken a live‐in partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Before
Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish toelope with him.
Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed
her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get
hold of it and sent her text messages. He used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text
messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face
superimposed on the figure. The sender'scellphone
number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got
the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan.
He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the
picture through the internet. Irish sought the help of the police in
apprehending Rustan. Under police supervision, she contacted
Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort.
When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested
him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka
kasi!"
Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him
to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious
text messages. Rustan got the sender's number and, pretending
to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back
obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to
Irish from his cellphone. According to him, this explained why
the obscene messages appeared to have originated from
his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself
who sent the obscene picture to him.
The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner. The trial court found Rustan
guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR. Rustan filed
a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between
Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262; and
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of
the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD:
1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h)
indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act
or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship"
includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. The law did not use in its
provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual
act. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's
relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself distinguishes a
sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e)
defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual
relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or
may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between
those involved. An "away‐bati" or a fight‐and‐kiss thing between
two lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between the
two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding.
2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of
acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that
a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would
be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones. What is obscene and injurious to
an offended woman can of course only be determined based on
the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it
in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to
the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his
minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead
and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To
give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the
foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child
to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262)
because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines and
committed the offense here.
Dinamling v People (2015)
Facts:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal
information for violation of R.A. No. 9262. It is alleged in the
information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence
upon a woman with whom he has two children, resulting to
mental and emotional anguish and public humiliation by
repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad
and insulting utterance directed against the victim. Dinamling
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No.
9262.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime are;
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender,
or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has
a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may
be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family
abode.
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or
emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar acts or omissions.
In this case, the elements have been proven and duly
established. It is undisputed that thevictim is a woman who has
then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had
two common children. The woman is often in fear of petitioner
due to latter’s physical and verbal abuse.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5
(RA No. 9262) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. It is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as the element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present a
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the
actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary
to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in
Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at
bar, when the physical violence done, petitioner Dinamling's
acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping her pants and
underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also
instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and
proven that they resulted in the victim’s public ridicule. Accused
is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in
which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In
this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to
actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to
psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's
mental or emotional well-being.