Cosunji notes

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died
in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for
benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10
days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf
on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to
her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
1. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy
than that of which she already had.

Bernabe v. alejo

A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a

record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes
of voluntary recognition of natural children.

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition

of the spurious child, then his filiation may be
established by means of the circumstances or grounds for
compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned
articles 283 and 284.

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have

superior successional rights over spurious ones. However, Rovira treats them
[23]

as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted
by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority
are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code)
for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right
was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
 Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors
who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative
parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum, the State [24]

as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only
seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his
alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate

children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be
impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.

Pp v. casacao

The trial courts appreciation of the complainants testimonies deserves the

highest respect since it was in a better position to asses their credibility.
Even assuming that appellant was a mere employee, such fact is not a shield
against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. In the case of People v.
Cabais,[11]we have held that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in
illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it
is shown that he actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.
We further stated that:

In this case, evidence showed that accused-appellant was the one who informed
complainant of job prospects in Korea and the requirements for deployment. She
also received money from them as placement fees. All of the complainants testified
that they personally met the accused-appellant and transacted with her regarding
the overseas job placement offers. Complainants parted with their money,
evidenced by receipts signed by accused Cabais and accused Forneas. Thus,
accused-appellant actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants.[12]
 Clearly, the acts of appellant vis--vis the private complainants, either as the
crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. or as a mere employee of
the same, constitute acts of large scale illegal recruitment which should not be
countenanced.
We find as flimsy and self serving appellants assertion that he was unaware
of the prohibition against the collection of bonds or cash deposits from applicants. It
is an established dictum that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.[14] The defense of good faith is neither available.

It is also undisputed that appellant failed to deploy the private complainants

without any valid reason, this notwithstanding his promise to them that those who
can pay the cash bond will be deployed within three months from payment of the
same. Such failure to deploy constitutes a violation of Section 6 (l) of RA No. 8042.
Worse, when it became clear that appellant cannot deploy the private complainants
without their fault, he failed to return the amount of the cash bond paid by them.

Wong woo yiu v.vivo

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19
of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative
to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the
absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and
a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.

Decision appealed from reversed.

Yao kee v. ca

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
 Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
(1922).]

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten
foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is

admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness
to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686,
700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom
of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on
the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the
Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]

This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
[Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
the same as ours
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the
laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their
conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See
Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who
are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with
Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of
marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise
agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on
February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance,

Del socoro v. wilsem

the doctrine of processual presumption

nedloys vs glowlask

On or about 14 September 1987, respondent loaded on board M/S Scandutch at the Port of Manila a
total 343 cartoons of garments, complete and in good order for pre-carriage tothe Port of Hong
Kong. The goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-34 arrived in good
condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to M/S Amethyst for final carriage to Colon, Free Zone,
Panama. Both vessels, M/S Scandutch and M/S Amethyst, are owned by Nedlloyd represented in
the Phlippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods which were valued at US$53,640.00 was agreed
to be released to the consignee, Pierre Kasem, International, S.A., upon presentation of the original
copies of the covering bills of lading.5 Upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Colon on 23 October
1987, petitioners purportedly notified the consignee of the arrival of the shipments, and its custody
was turned over tothe National Ports Authority in accordance with the laws, customs regulations and
practice of trade in Panama. By an unfortunate turn ofevents, however, unauthorized persons
managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the basis of the falsified documents, the ports
authority released the goods.