1. G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005 the amount of US$103,544.
00 with instruction to remit the amount on or
CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner,
vs.
M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA,
and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING,
INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "LokMaheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of
Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India
(SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and
principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by
respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean
company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the
Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent
Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil
products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine
fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2,
1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of
US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another
Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the
Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels
amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to
the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief
Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery
receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the
US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a
check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was
duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice
dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or
Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘LokMaheshwari’" in
before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were
made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner
Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal
fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City,
petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a
sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv
and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the
Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer
for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI,
and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28,
1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s
letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the
attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the
letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the
attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to
maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and
supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or
will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such
single-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-
contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law should be applied.
The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2)
law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance
of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of the original architecture, appearance and specifications of the building,
foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to including the external facade thereof.”
personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ASSOCIATION
arising under maritime law in general
Thereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said violation to
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the application the Board of Directors of the private respondent Galleria de Magallanes
of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a Association, Inc. in a special meeting held on July 8,1989 and the former
maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case sent a letter dated July 12, 1989 to the petitioner demanding the latter to
of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of the forum. All remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at his unit.
other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the Petitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the mandatory injunction against petitioner on February 21, 1990 with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 in Civil Case No. 90-490.
law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D.
on March 23, 1990, instead of an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to
No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind Dismiss with the trial court on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction
the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. over the present case since a complaint for mandatory injunction is within
Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their
laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant *Regional Trial Court - Makati: denied the Motion to Dismiss on account of
lack of jurisdiction, citing Section 21 of BP 129:
interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-
charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the
"Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of original jurisdiction:
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
Canada. warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls."
2.Raymundo v CA G.R. No. 97805, September 02, 1992
*RTC -Makati (Motion for reconsideration): denied.
NILO H. RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
*Court of Appeals: dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and
SIXTEENTH DIVISION, HON. JUDGE, RTC, BR. 133, MAKATI, METRO
prohibition
MANILA AND GALERIA DE MAGALLANES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and
RESPONDENTS.
preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 11, 1991.
D EC I S I O N NOCON, J.:
ISSUE:
FACTS: Which court has jurisdiction over the case considering that private
on July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de Magallanes respondent's sole pecuniary claim of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees in Civil
Condominium discovered that petitioner NiloRaymundo, who was an Case No. 90-490 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
owner/occupant of Unit AB-122 of said condominium, made an unauthorized Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for under Section 33 of B.P. 129?
installation of glasses at the balcony of his unit in violation of Article IV,
Section 3 paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions RULING:
of the Association, which states that: 1. The RTC has jurisdiction since Sec 19 and 21 of BP 129 applies:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
“d. Nothing shall be done or placed in any unit or in the common areas exclusive original jurisdiction:
which is beyond or will impair the structural strength of the buildings or alter
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;”
“Sec. 21.Original Jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions;”
Private respondent's complaint is an action to compel the petitioner to
remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of
the condominium which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
2. ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ONLY INCIDENTAL TO THE PRINCIPAL
CAUSE OF ACTION -- removal of the illegal & unauthorized installation of
the glasses made by the petitioner. the question for resolution is whether or
not the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration
of Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal and
unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium.
Clearly, the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In the instant case, the claim of attorney's fees by the private respondent in
the amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal cause of action
which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized installation of the
glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount is not
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
3. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT MANDATORY INJUNCTION, IT IS MERELY A
PROVISIONAL REMEDY. Note should be taken, however, that the trial
court had erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatory
injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the complaint.
A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional
because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency
of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is
dependent upon the result of the main action.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for certiorari & prohibition dismissed.
NOTE:
“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of first instance [now
regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
[now regional trial courts].”
3.Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Civil Procedures – Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of
heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,
affecting the land executed by and among the respondents whereby
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY
AND PARTITION” against defendants with the RTC claiming that the
document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the
only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been
made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all
the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of
the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC
has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129,
as amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said
court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the Issue # 1:
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
Held: No.Exprop suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP
(now Regional Trial Courts). 129 as amended by RA 7691).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and - The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't
void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the has complied with the requisites for the taking or property.
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the - An exprop suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that value of the land.
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the Issue # 2:
claims asserted therein. Whether the dismissal of the first complaint in the MTC amounts to res
judicata?
4.Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili
Held: NO
Nature: - Requisites for res judicata
Petition for review under Rule 45 1. Former judgment must be final.
2. Court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
Facts: matter and the parties.
- Brgy Masili in Calamba Laguna wanted a lot on which a multi-purpose hall 3. Judgment is on the merits.
will be constructed, so it offered to buy Bardillon's 144 sq. m. lot for Php 4. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in both actions.
200,000. - Since MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata.
- No agreement was reached.
- Feb. 23, 1998: The first complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Issue # 3:
Calamba MTC by Brgy. Masili against Bardillon. Whether CA erred when it ignored the RTC's issuance of a writ of
- MTC dismissed for Bardillon and counsel's failure to appear at pre-trial. possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint.
MTC denied Masili's Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
- Oct 18, 1999: The second complaint for eminent domain was filed with the Held: NO
Calamba RTC by Masili. - Requisites of immediate entry:
- Bardillon opposed the complaint thru Motion to Dismiss, alleging res 1. filing of a complaint for exprop sufficient in form and substance
judicata. 2. deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the property's fair market value
- RTC denied motion to dismiss, saying that MTC had no jurisdiction over based on its current tax declaration.
the first complaint. - Masili complied with both requisites.
- July 10, 2000: Municipal Ordinance authorizing Masili to initiate exprop - The issue of necessity of the exprop is a matter that should be addressed
proceedings was approved and submitted. by the RTC. If petitioner objects to the necessity, her objection should be
- Aug 16, 2000: RTC issued writ of possession. included in her Answer to the complaint.
- Bardillon appealed to the CA. CA affirned RTC.
- No res judicata. MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint. Issue # 4: Whether or not Masili is guilty of forum shopping?

Held: NO
- Test for determining forum shopping: whether the elements of
litispendentia are present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.
- The earlier case in the MTC had already been dismissed when the second
complaint was filed in the RTC.
- Even if the MTC case was still pending, it will make no difference, because
the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place.
Dispo:
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
5.VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007)
FACTS:Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered
into a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in
Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90 days from
downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. A downpayment was paid.
Another contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and
Villena also paid the downpayment. Villenafaled to install the kitchen
cabinets and deliver the appliances.
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the
amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for
RTCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES, RTC has jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdiction of an
action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are
actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of
money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,
one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it
is actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a
cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.
An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that
Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the
downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver
the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts.
While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts.
Petition DENIED.
6.Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,et al
7.De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 165777 | July 25, 2011
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and
damages, and alternativecauses of action either to declare two documents
as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario'sconjugal share with
damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de
Ungria et al.Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando
Castor, while the rest of the respondentsare their legitimate children. The
documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1) the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly
executed by Fernando in favorof Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and
(2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio infavor of
petitioner.Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising,
among others that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of
plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending resolution of the motion,
respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue prosecuting this case
as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
clarification on whether plaintiffs should beallowed to continue prosecuting
the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was denied. The same wasfiled to
the RTC and to the CA; both were denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari wherepetitioner raises the following assignment of error: that the
Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss despite
respondent’s non-payment of the correct docket fees.
ISSUE:
Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the
plaintiff to file thenecessary docket fees?
RULING:
YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in
court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite
docket and filing fees. It is not simply the filing of thecomplaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests atrial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action.Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 7.
Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
counter-claim or moneyclaim against an estate not based on judgment, or
for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,etc. complaint, or a
complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the
total-sumclaimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in
litigation, is:x x x x(b) For filing:1. Actions where the value of the subject
matter cannot be estimated ........ P400.00
2. xxxIn a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be
the basis in computing the fees.
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not
susceptible of pecuniaryestimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, the docket fees should not be based on theassessed value of the
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be
based onSection 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal
Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00
was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by
the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the
assessed fees, the RTC hasproperly acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continuesuntil the case
is terminated
8.HILARIO vs. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 160384 .April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .
FACTS: Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located
in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon
against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to
possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon
without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite
demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the
property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however,
failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners
were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which
shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion
was denied.
Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him
since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents,
the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property, and that “absent any allegation in the complaint
of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action” (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered
therefiling of the case in the proper court.
ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action
is an accionreivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of
land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not
the market value thereof. […] In the case at bar, the complaint does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of
the complaint. The court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during
the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion,
showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00.
The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax
declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed
their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the
property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC
had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case involved
title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than
Php20,000.00. As the Court of Appeals had held:
“The determining jurisdictional element for the accionreinvindicatoria [sic] is,
as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.
For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed
value exceeds Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or
below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax
declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured
and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark
made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention
that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the
fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration
that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in
Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has
jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court
a quo. 24”
In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accionpubliciana, thus:
“The action of the petitioners was an accionpubliciana, or one for the
recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. It does
not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An
accionreinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other
hand, an accionpubliciana is one for the recovery of pos session of the
right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. […]”
The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC,
including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an
accionreivindicatoria and an accionpubliciana is inappropriate. The issue to
be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the
RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accionreivindicatoria or
accionpubliciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit that
what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-
ownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an
action in ejectment against another co-owner?
Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action
against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset
ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership.
The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession
because as co-owner, he also has the right to possess.
9. San Pedro vs. Asdala
10. Maslag vs. Monzon et al
11.Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg
Leasing Corp.
Facts:
Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned
"Damages withprayer for a writ Replevin" against Conpac and Movers. It
was alleged that pursuant toa lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered
one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreementstipulated a monthly rental
of P11,000.00for the use of the equipment. Conpac failedand refused to
pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the operations
ofConpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject
porklift.Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the
equipment and the formaldisclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A
Writ of Replevin was issued.Petitioner was served with a copy of the
summons and the latter filed a motion todismiss the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC sincethe complaint had
asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual
damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injuction againstMTC Judge, COnpac and
Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg'sapplication for
preliminary injunction. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC. Hence
thispetition.
Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held: NO!
MTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the
case.
The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determi
ned by theaverments in the complaints and the character of the relief
sought. The complaint filedby Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return
of the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner orin the alternative for the
payment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid lease andatty's fees.It
would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of
unpaid rentalswere just in incident of the action for the return of the
forklift considering that privaterespondent specifically sought in the
complaint not only seizure of the forklift frompetitioner Movers but also
payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. MTC'sdismissing the
complaint was properly decreed,Petition for review is granted.
12.Mangaliag v. Pastoral
Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the
RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges
that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and
permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the
petitioners’ dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and
imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents
seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to
P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral
damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of
P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his
case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the
amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners
maintain that the court’s jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the
amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as
moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee, etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for
damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be
recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that “in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court” Also, the petitioners’ defense of lack of jurisdiction has already
been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively
taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek
exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to
seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was
denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of
the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses,
excluding moral, nominal damages and attorney’s fees, which
determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO
Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no
judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of
fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged
jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoydoctrine does
 not control the present controversy. What happened in the
Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only
after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis an exceptional
case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is
no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction
of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must
apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of
jurisdiction: The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent
seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but
also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to
permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the
vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the
present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2),
which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of
quasi-delict causing physical injuries.
Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be
considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for
actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an
independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the
physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated,
damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral
damages must be considered as a separate cause of action,
independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in
determining the jurisdictional amount.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi-
delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for
actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award
moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a
situation not intended by the framers of the law.
(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but
was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether
a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the
order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this
Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition.
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.
It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For
this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first
instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations
on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on
disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before
appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the
cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal
questions.
In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving
the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative
Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further
delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners’ invocation of
this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from
the denial of the RTC of the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. There is no
final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)
13. Samson vs. Daway
G.R. No. 160054-55 | July 21, 2004 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioner:
Manolo P. Samson
Respondents:
Hon. Reynaldo Daway (RTC Quezon City), People of the Philippines, and
Caterpillar, Inc.
Summary:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with a
criminal complaint for unfair competition with the Quezon City RTC because
he sells imitations of Caterpillar products, to the damage and prejudice of
respondent Caterpillar Inc. He filed a motion to suspend arraignment
because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
another civil case. This was denied by the trial court. Next, he also filed a
motion to quash information alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
him. The Supreme Court ruled against him. In criminal/civil cases involving
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of
origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the RTC, as
provided under RA 166 or the Old Trademark Law. Note that at this time,
the IPC was already enacted. However, the IPC did not repeal the
provisions involving jurisdiction, hence, RA 166 as regards jurisdiction is still
good law. Further, there can be no prejudicial question involved in this case.
It is important to note that under unfair competition,
fraud
is the common element. Also, an independent civil action may be filed
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code for fraud. Being an independent civil action,
there can be no prejudicial question.
Facts:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with two
informations for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code
(IPC). The following are the pertinent portions of the informations:
Samson is the owner of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing
Corporation.
It is located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA cor. Ortigas Avenue, QC.
Sometime in November 1999, Samson unlawfully distributed/sold Caterpillar
products(footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories) which are closely
identical/colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and
likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the
damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user
and owner of the following internationally: “CATERPILLAR”,
“CAT”,“CATERPILLAR & DESIGN”, “CAT AND DESIGN”, “WALKING
MACHINES” and “TRACK TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”
Samson filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings
because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
another case (Civ Case No. Q-00-41446) involving unfair competition
pending in the same RTC branch, as well as a petition for review with the
Sec. of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution.
RTC denied this.
He then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the offense.
He contended that since under Section 170 of the IPC, the penalty of
imprisonment forunfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court,
per R.A. No. 7691.
RTC also denied this.
Hence, this petition.
Issues/Held:
(IMPT) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation
of intellectual property rights?
RTC. Samson is wrong.
Was there a prejudicial question involved in this case as claimed by the
accused?
– property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly
NO. Judge correctly dismissed the motion to suspend arraignment.
Whether the pendency of the petition for review with the SOJ on the finding
of probable cause for unfair competition shall suspend the proceedings
– over violationsof intellectual property rights to the RTC.
NO.
Ratio
Jurisdiction Issue
Under Section 170 of the IPC, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition,
false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand
Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including
criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169
shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction
under existing laws.
The existing law referred to here is Sec. 27 of RA 166 (The OLD
Trademark Law)
It provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court)
Now, Samson is claiming that RA 166 is already repealed by the IPC.
However, this is not so, because:
The repealing clause of the IPC reads that “all acts and parts of Acts
inconsistent herewith, more particularly RA 166 (and goes on to cite other
laws), are hereby repealed).
The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only
means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not
susceptible of harmonization with the IPC.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293.
O
Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
stated so under Section163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail.
In this case, the IPC and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction
It should prevail over RA No 7691 (as cited by Samson) which is a general
law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properlylodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of lessthan 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging
from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving
violations of intellectual property rights under the IPC, the Court issued A.M.
No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002designating certain Regional Trial
Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.
On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating
jurisdiction to hearand decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and
Exchange Commission cases inspecific Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Commercial Courts.
Petitioner also cites the case of Mirpuri in arguing that RA 166 was already
repealed totally by the IPC. However, such argument has no merit because
there is no categorical ruling that violation of IP rights is lodged with the
MTC. Also, the mere passing remark in that case was merely
a backgrounderto the enactment of the IPC and cannot
be construed as a pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual
property rights.
Prejudicial Question Issue
Samson failed to substantiate his allegations of prejudicial question.
In any case, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according tolaw, proceed independently of each other.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section168 of the IPC is fraud
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physicalinjuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action,may be brought by the injured party.
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private
respondent also relateto unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of thecriminal cases at bar.
Petition for Review Issue
According to the Rules, while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension ofthe arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60days reckoned from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office.
Hence, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accusedor to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In this case, Samson failed to substantiate his allegations/failed to discharge
the burden of provingthat he was entitled to a suspension of his
arraignment.
His pleadings and annexes do not show the date of filing of the petition of
review withthe SOJ.
14. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus
15.MADRIÑAN vs. MADRIÑAN
GR No. 159374
July 12, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were
married on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their
conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and
subsequently to Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch
things up between her and petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter
to the LupongTagapamayapa in their Barangay, but this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of
their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that
petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and
to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of
the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her
duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,
it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then
that he went to Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of
1997”) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner
who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and
drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the
fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213
of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two
younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject
to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under
R.A. 8369.
HELD:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA
8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the
SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the
provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129
(the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by
Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.
In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002,
he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial
regions. By giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the
respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack
of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369.
Moreover, under, RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody casesnot in habeas corpus cases. Writs of
habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by the family courts under
said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction
with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
16. TUCP vs. Coscolluela
17. Primero vs. IAC
18.PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG, September 24,1991
Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were
suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola
bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft
against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal
complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the
complaint was dismissed.
Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were
dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result,
they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and decisions mandateed
reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in the Regional Trial
Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for
damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-
employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The
motion was granted .On July 6, 1989, however, the respondent judge, acting
on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was
“distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor
courts.” The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.
Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim for damages
arising from the malicious prosecution of the petitioner company.
Held: It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and
their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so
only if there is a “reasonable causal connection” between the claim asserted
and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of
Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the
regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.
In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, 3 two employees filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a civil complaint for damages against their employer for
slanderous remarks made against them by the company president. On the
order dismissing the case because it came under the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiters, Justice Vicente Abad Santos said for the Court:
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair
labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts
allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing
statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders
under review are based on a wrong premise.
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for
malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte
by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is
a “reasonable causal connection” between the complaint and the relations of
the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from
such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an
employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any
unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the
petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which
the Municipal Trial Court said was intended “to harass the poor employees”
and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor “for
lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the
respondents
herein have committed the crime imputed against them.” This is a matter
which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law
is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the order dated July 6, 1989, is AFFIRMED and the petition
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
19. Tipaitvs Reyes
20. Manliguez vs. CA
21. Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001)
Facts:
Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRCcomplaint for
illegal dismissal against R.A. BroadcastingCorporation represented by it
s Vice President forOperationsVilma J. Barcelona and Station Manager
DeoTrinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Nova and
ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separationpay and full backwages.
NLRC affirmed such decision anddenied the MFR filed by R.A.
Construction on the groundthat it was filed out of time. The NLRC issued
an alias
writ of execution
and the property of Sps. Barcelona wasscheduled in an auction sale.
The said spouses filed withthe RTC Camarines Norte action for
damages with
prayerof TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting thescheduled public
auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Novaargued that under the Labor
Code, issuance of the TRO orpreliminary injunction in a case arising
from labor disputeis prohibited.
Issue:
Whether the RTC cannot issue injunction against NLRC?
Held:YES
Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear
and decidequestions which arise and are incidental to theenforcement of
decisions, orders or awards rendered inlabor cases by appropriate
officers and tribunals of theDOLE. Corollarily, any controversy in the
execution of the judgment shall be referred to the tribunal which issued
thewrit of execution since it has the inherent power to controlits own
processes in order to enforce its judgments andorders.True, an action
for damages lies within the jurisdiction of aregional trial court. However,
the RTC has no jurisdiction toissue a TRO in labor cases. The SC finds
respondent Judgeguilty of gross ignorance of the law.
22. Tolosavs NLRC (2008)
G.R. 149578
Facts:
Petitioner was the widow of Capt. VirgilioTolosa who was hired by
Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of
the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. His contract officially began on
November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he
assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel
departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of
the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly
shown to be in good health.
During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from
Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was
drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a
slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly
deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992.
When petitioner filed a complaint with the POEA, transferred to the
DOLE, NLRC, the Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. The NLRC, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor commission had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter filed by petitioner.
Hence, this appeal.
Summary of Ruling: The Court affirmed the appealed decision.
Petitioner's action was recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict or
tort, not adjudication of a labor dispute to which jurisdiction of labor
tribunals is limited. Petitioner is actually suing shipmates Garate and
Asis for gross negligence, and the said shipmates have no employer-
employee relations with Capt. Tolosa. While labor arbiters and the NLRC
have jurisdiction to award not only relief provided by labor laws, but also
damages under the Civil Code, these relief must still be based on an
action that has reasonable causal connection with matters.
Issues and Rulings:
1. Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case (whether the
labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner's action).
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi
delict or tort, but on the failure of private respondents — as employers of
her husband (Captain Tolosa) — to provide him with timely, adequate
and competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code:
"ART 161. Assistance of employer. — It shall be the duty of any
employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate
and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an
injured or sick employee in case of emergency."
Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests
labor arbiters and the NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of
damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations.
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule
should be applied in her favor. Citing San Miguel Corporation v.
Etcuban, she insists that a reasonable causal connection between the
claim asserted and the employer-employee relation confers jurisdiction
upon labor tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required
conditions: 1) the dispute arose from an employer-employee relation,
considering that the claim was for damages based on the failure of
private respondents to comply with their obligation under Article 161 of
the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute can be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, because the material issue is whether private respondents
complied with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate and
competent medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's occupational
safety. We disagree.
We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages, because that ruling was
based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; LABOR
TRIBUNALS; ACTION BASED ON QUASI DELICT THAT DOES NOT
INVOLVE LABOR DISPUTE, NOT INCLUDED - Time and time again,
we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature
of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. After
carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are
convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action
based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate
and Mario Asis for gross negligence.
Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses
the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-
employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The labor arbiter himself
classified petitioner's case as "a complaint for damages, blacklisting and
watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in the death
of complainant's husband, Capt. VirgilioTolosa."
We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor
dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The
jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-
employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v.
Isnani:
"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters
that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement."
The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the
relief sought by petitioner. From her paper, it is evident that the primary
reliefs she seeks are as follows:
(a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or
"lost income" and
(b) blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings
of the deceased, but to his earning capacity based on a life expectancy
of 65 years. This amount is recoverable if the action is based on a quasi
delict as provided for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 18 but not in the
Labor Code.
DAMAGES PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE; AWARD PROPER IF
RELIEF SOUGHT HAS CAUSAL RELATIONS WITH LABOR MATTERS
- While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to
award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages
governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an
action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.
The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the
complaint. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, this Court held:"It is the
character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this
connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under
laborlegislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall
within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a
claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim."
The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He
ruled that Captain Tolosa, who died at age 58, could expect to live up to
65 years and to have an earning capacity of US$176,400.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH LABOR
BENEFITS COGNIZED IN LABOR DISPUTES - It must be noted that a
worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated
with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of
earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a
similar cause within the realm of civil law.
Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the
article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such
a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be
considered as arising from employer-employee relations. In the present
case, petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim
under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining
agreements.
Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the
Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This
provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same
Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor
secretary. Thus, claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot
enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for
damages before the labor arbiter.
REGULAR COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ACTION FOR
DAMAGES PREDICATED ON QUASI DELICT AND HAS NO
CONNECTION WITH LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS - It is not the NLRC
but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in
which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which
the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such
as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi
delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective
bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular
courts — not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.
2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by
the labor arbiter (whether the monetary award granted by the labor
arbiter has already reached finality).
ISSUES NOT RAISED IN COURTS A QUO CANNOT BE RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL — Petitioner contends that the labor
arbiter's monetary award has already reached finality, since private
respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not
raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not
raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points
of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court
of Appeals need not — and ordinarily will not — be considered by this
Court. Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its
face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to
due process.
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a
question of fact that cannot be entertained in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review
of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.
23. EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest
FACTS:
Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank
and petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under
which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as
Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with
many proposals which the bank approved and made preparations of. He
was also given privileges like car, renovation of the office, and even a trip to
Singapore at the company’s expense. However, the petitioner abruptly
resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment
and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank
filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for
damages brought about his abrupt resignation.
Though petitioner reimbursed part of the amount demanded by Standard, he
was not able to pay it full.
Standard alleged that assuming arguendo that Eviota had the right to
terminate his employment with the Bank for no reason, the manner in and
circumstances under which he exercised the same are clearly abusive and
contrary to the rules governing human relations, governed by the Civil Code.
Further, Standard alleged that petitioner also violated the Labor Code when
he terminated his employment without one (1) notice in advance. This
stipulation was also provided in the employment contract of Eviota with
Standard, which would also constitute breach of contract.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
action for damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The petitioner averred that the
respondent bank’s claim for damages arose out of or were in connection
with his employer-employee relationship with the respondent bank or some
aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent bank opposed the
motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentally
involved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually
predicated on the petitioner’s acts and omissions which are separately,
specifically and distinctly governed by the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
The SC held that the RTC has jurisdiction. Case law has it that the nature of
an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court has
jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved. Not every
controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-
versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim
by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a “reasonable causal
connection” between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation.
Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of
justice.
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
court. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor
Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their collective bargaining
agreements.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under
paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have
a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that
article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim
for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is
anchored on the petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the private
respondent believe that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment
contract with assiduousness and earnestness. The petitioner volte face
when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he abandoned his office and
rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private respondent to hire a
replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its corporate
plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took
off with the private respondent’s computer diskette, papers and documents
containing confidential information on employee compensation and other
bank matters. On its second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked
away from his employment with the private respondent sans any written
notice, to the prejudice of the private respondent, its banking operations and
the conduct of its business. Anent its third cause of action, the petitioner
made false and derogatory statements that the private respondent reneged
on its obligations under their contract of employment; thus, depicting the
private respondent as unworthy of trust.
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a
contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits
demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such
as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items
claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of
intrinsically a civil dispute. PIL's ready mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the • PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to
petitioner do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.
and other labor laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of • Todaro filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with
action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship between the Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL),
causes of action of the private respondent’s causes of action against the Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings,
petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).
private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an o PIL& – Mother company based in Australia, Cement Aggregate
existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is Business
merely incidental. o PPHI 5 PIL’s operating company (on stocks) in the Philippines
o PCPI 5 Undertakes PIL’s business of ready mix concrete, concrete
Petition is denied. aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines
o McDonald 5 Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL
24. Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. vs. Todaro G.R. oKlepzig 5 President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI
No. 154830 June& 8, 2007 • Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved
AUSTRIA, MARTINEZ, J.: to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is
The Case: within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
A petition for Review on Certiorari seekingtoannulandsetaside theDecisionof • Petitioners contend that since Todaro’s claims for actual, moral and
theCourtofAppealsand its Resolution denying petitioners’Motion exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged breach of
forReconsideration to dismiss the complaint on thegrounds that the employment contract, the present case should be considered as falling
complaint states no cause ofaction, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.
thesubject matter of the complaint, as the same is
within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that The&Issue: Question of jurisdiction.
thecomplaintshouldbedismissedon thebasisof thedoctrineof The&Ruling:
forum+non+conveniens. The complaint was not based on a contract of employment for this was no
employer employee relationship existed between them; it was based on
The Facts: petitioners' unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ
• Antonio D. Todaro (resigned managing director of Todaro. It has been consistently held that where no employer employee
BetonvalReadyconcrete, Inc., a company engaged in pre5mixed relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which
concrete may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes
and concrete aggregate production) was contacted by PIL and asked or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court
him if he was available to join them in connection with that has jurisdiction.
their intention to establish a ready mix concrete plant and other related
operations in the Philippines. 25.LOCSIN v NISSAN LEASE PHILS INC
• PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein PIL consented to
engage the services of Todaro as a consultant for two FACTS: On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President
and Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and
responsibilities included: (1) the management of the finances of the
company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President and/or the Board of
Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of
financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition
of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected
every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and
elected Chairman of NCLPI’s Board of Directors.
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as
Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the
Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new
set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor
reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and
attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who
was then President of NCLPI.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson
filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have
jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsin’s removal as
EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, holding that her office acquired “jurisdiction to arbitrate
and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case an employer-
employee relationship.”
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NCLPI raised the issue on
whether the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had jurisdiction over the
dispute.
On August 28, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate
officer. The CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether
elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC
has no jurisdiction. Instead, according to the CA, Locsin’s complaint for
“illegal dismissal” should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
pursuant to Rule 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the
present petition.
ISSUE:WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction?
HELD: We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists
between Locsin and Nissan. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and
President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board pursuant
to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The
CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on
Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as “those
officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the
Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.” Likewise, Section 25 of
the Corporation Code provides that corporate officers are the president,
secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the
by-laws. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted
as a corporate officer because the position of Executive Vice-
President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissan’s By-Laws. Article IV, Section
4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this position.
An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee”
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the
directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who
also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the
Amended By-Laws of the corporation. Locsin, therefore, at the time of his
severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s corporate officer.
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter
or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his
relationship with Nissan. The RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on the
following:
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of PD 902-A provided that intra-
corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC. However, after
RA8799 took effect, Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of the said law transferred
said jurisdiction to the RTC.
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to
dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65. We cannot
close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established by
evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose
termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule
upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the
case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to
hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before
any quasi-judicial officer can act. In the context of the present case, the
Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin
brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the
absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the
law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial
delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the
merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of
an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
The petition is dismissed and the CA decision is affirmed.
26.Mangaliang vs. Catubig-Pastoral-SAME Pg. 8
27. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
LUCIABAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
bondingcompany and defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses
Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal
interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the
defendants’ properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had
become final and executor, the court issued a writ of execution against
the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of the writ of execution against
the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on
the ground that the
same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the
RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA, which was denied. This time, the
surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion for
reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it
filed a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of which placed
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
action where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00.
The Court of First Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case.
The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from
the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE
LACK OF JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law
and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done
in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny
it to escape a
penalty.
28. CALIMLIMvsHON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
FACTS:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court
to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the
name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title
not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of
the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted
Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare
TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said
petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No.
68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of
land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as
a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the
court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation
of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then
resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the
conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property,
covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have
bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the
property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated
on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco
Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by
prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the
respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment.
Issue: W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by
prior judgment
HELD: No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the
herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil
case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been
rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was
an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a
land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
29. SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA
vs.
CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private
respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of
240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19
under a TCT and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan.
Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19
but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as
Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed petitioners
of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen
their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house.
However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from
SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
SSS.
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from
Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of
sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house
was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No.
19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the
swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering that Sps.
Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would
be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore, the RTC
ruled:
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the
defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is
Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly
indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The
contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the
parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake,
hence the same need no longer be reformed.”
A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said
writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in
theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga
filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for annulment of
judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
ISSUE:
WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case
HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in
numerous cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction
by estoppel, the Court quoted its decision in said case, to wit:
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x xxx [T]he
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated–– obviously for reasons of public policy."
Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked
the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue
of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two
years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ
of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to
them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Petition for review is denied.
30. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. V. Eddy Ng Kok Wei
G.R. No. 139791, 12 December 2003, Third Division, (Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.)
 Yet while it may be true that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear
the case, the petitioner company’s active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held that it is an
undesirable practice for a party participating in proceedings and submitting
its case for decision and then accepting judgment if acceptable, only to
attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if adverse.
FACTS: Eddy Kok Wei purchased from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Co.
a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Kok Wei and Manila Bankers
Life president Antonio Puyat executed a contract to sell where it was
stipulated that the condo unit shall be substantially completed and
delivered to Kok Wei within 15 months from February 8, 1989 or May 8,
1990. The turnover date was moved to May 31, 1990 due to uncontrollable
forces (typhoons, coup d’etat attempts, steel and cement shortage).
The trial court found Manila Bankers Life liable for damages due to delay in
the performance of its obligation. On appeal, the CA affirmed the award of
damages, prompting Manila Bankers Life to elevate the case to the SC.
Petitioner company argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case as it is properly cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to decide Kok Wei’s
complaint?
HELD:
Complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium
unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB.
Yet while it may be true that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear
the case, the petitioner company’s active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held that it is an
undesirable practice for a party participating in proceedings and submitting
its case for decision and then accepting judgment if acceptable, only to
attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if adverse.
31. G.R. No. 151821 April 14, 2004
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI
Investment Corporation, petitioner,
vs.
ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Regulatory
Board (HLURB) over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344 is
exclusive. It has sole jurisdiction in:
a. A complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate
of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot;
b. For claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or
not; and
c. For determining whether there is a perfected sale of contract.
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the decision of the CA.
Facts:
1. "On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a
complaint for a Sum of Money against ALS Management and
Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on July 22, 1983,
[petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila a
Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin
Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment
Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A
comprising of 271 squares [sic] meters more or less, together with
parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
2. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of
Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the execution of
the said Deed of Sale.
3. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in
causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium
Certificate of Title.
4. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated
that the VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the
preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale and such other
documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the
corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title.
5. After the [petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said
Deed of Sale, [respondent], notwithstanding demands made by
[petitioner], failed and refused to pay [petitioner] its legitimate
advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid,
legal or justifiable reason.
6. [Respondent] averred among others that it has just and valid
reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal claims.
a. In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee
except those required for the registration of the deed of sale
in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance
of such title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the
amount of its alleged advances for the issuance and
registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title in the
name of the [respondent], by including therein charges
which should not be collected from buyers of condominium
units.
b. "[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented
to the [respondent] that the condominium unit will be
delivered completed and ready for occupancy not later than
December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the
descriptions and warranties contained in the
aforementioned brochures and other sales propaganda
materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the
Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00
considering that the Twin Towers was then yet to be built. In
contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and of good
engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by
[respondent] suffered from the following defects and/or
deficiencies:
7. Trial court ruled:
1. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of
P26,300.45, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint up
to full payment thereof, representing the amount spent for the
registration of the title to the condominium unit in [respondent’s]
name;
2. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at
[petitioner’s] exclusive expense/cost or appoint a licensed
qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf, the following
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the
[respondent.
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
a. The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for
expenses incurred for the materials/labor in installing
walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar counter cabinet.
b. The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned
income
c. The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of
twenty-one (21) months (from May 1985 to January
1987), representing unearned income
8. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that "while
[petitioner] succeeded in proving its claim against the [respondent]
for expenses incurred in the registration of [the latter’s] title to the
condominium unit purchased, x xx for its part [respondent] in turn
succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim under its
counterclaim."11
9. Hence, this Petition.12
Issues:
Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and
not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaim--being one
for specific performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the
condominium unit) and damages? YES!
And, whether or not petitioner could still deny the trial court’s jurisdiction
after prceeding with the trial? NO!
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Held:
Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) -- not the RTC -- that had jurisdiction over respondent’s
counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the award of the trial court.
As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is
encompassing. Hence, we said in Estate Developers and Investors
Corporation v. Sarte:15
"x xx. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot
buyers from the fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision
owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA
is broad and general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’ in
accordance with the provisions of said law."
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in
Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board
has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific performance for the delivery of
a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot; 16 for claims of refund
regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;17 and for determining
whether there is a perfected contract of sale.18
Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim -- being one for specific
performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit)
and damages -- falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by
Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a
judgment unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may
no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing so.
This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner has
adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it has
voluntarily submitted.24
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for
decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction if it is not.25
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the
question of jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed its
counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the former could have raised such
issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s
brief26 with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction for
Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant
therein failed to raise the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after an
adverse decision had been rendered.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:
Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver
storage facilities on the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned
income for the five-month period that the lease contract was allegedly
suspended; (3) correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay
P40,000.00 as reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5)
pay P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one months for the alleged
unearned income during the period when the condominium unit remained
vacant. Petitioner, however, is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as temperate
damages for the termination of the lease contract because of the defects in
the condominium unit. All other awards are AFFIRMED.
33. [G.R. NO. 154295. July 29, 2005]
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-
PE, Petitioners, v. Johnny Pastorin, Respondent.
FACTS:
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times
Corporation (Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field
Representative/Collector. His task entailed the periodic collection of
receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers.
Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the
petitioner company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the
dismissal was not effected.
However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a
magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped
collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him
to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no
definitive explanation for the same.
Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to
do field work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion
of his suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter
communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a complaint
for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other money
claims with the labor arbiter.
The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an
appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not
raised by petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no
jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by
the voluntary arbitrator. However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA.
The CA held that the active participation of the party against whom the
action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
LA during appeal.
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the LA during appeal.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but
rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has no bearing thereon.
Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction,
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.
Decision of the CA is set aside.
34. Lourdes Eristngcolvs CA, G.R. No.167702. March 20, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City
started constructing a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations, respondent UVAI, an association of
homeowners at Urdaneta Village, imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00
and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and
working on her property. This prompted petitioner to file the subject
complaint before the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues
that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular
courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.
ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?
HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that
in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of
an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments
of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.
Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration of
nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on
more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations
contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question
subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s
Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper
interpretation and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction
rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol,
admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the
application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction
Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the
HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions
over homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC as well as
controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.
Thereafter, with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’
associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)