Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY
INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented
by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional
on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with
attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with
the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during
the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
 (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary
for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. [4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President
is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP
to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question
the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions
of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
EN BANC REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707 REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present: AKLAN,
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, Respondents.
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, x--------------------------------------------------x
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, DECISION
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, REYES, R.T., J.:
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO, AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR., secure titles over their occupied lands.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES, There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial Court
BRION, JJ. (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
- versus - Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and The Antecedents
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated, G.R. No. 167707
Respondents. October 8, 2008
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
x--------------------------------------------------x warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination.The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
THE LANDOWNERS OF approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
BORACAY SIMILARLY Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.[7]
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
Petitioners, No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTACircular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982,
- versus - to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

THE SECRETARY OF THE Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. [10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,[11] as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees
had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago;
and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission
of their respective memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly
Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. [18] The Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as
basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in
public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision
of the lower court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of
the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other
landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public
Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right
over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not
the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC.
4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent
laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of
the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these
grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is
up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership.
The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession
of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. [54] Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed
in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20)
years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.[58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of
agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as
the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December
1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD
No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12,
1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands,
including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence,
the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the
old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified
as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the
courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in
which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary
to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or
mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and
worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves
of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification
was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class
or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land
and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present
or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
 definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in
each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry
or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery
of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts
of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in
1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the
propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the
land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted
by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power
to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution [104] from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have
the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions
of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted
the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles,
and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments
title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term public land referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
 Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem
to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped
of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on
the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation
of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution[112] classifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. [116] At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private
ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural
land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and
disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section
3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that
the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare
areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each,
as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of
the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering
the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name
a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only
the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested
rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part
of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order
No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands
to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations,
shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result.In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land
had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on
this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes
of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are
two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.[128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of
the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
 Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill
of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second
element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants
were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this
Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to
the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with
their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also
notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look
into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead [131] or sales
patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up
the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view
the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to
strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more
urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.[135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 150413. July 1, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an
application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre,
Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the
land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from
Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from
Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open, public, actual,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for
more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified
on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase
of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her
application for registration.Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[3] dated April 19,
1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property,
and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A.
Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted,
open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty
(30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have
been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could well-
discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as technical description and other documents
presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public domain; and
that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.[4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-
007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by
its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name
of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of
Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.[6] Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN
THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.[7]
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION.[8]
B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY
REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.[9]
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE
LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.[10]
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of
evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able
to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the
required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became
effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession remained the
same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940
amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set
forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court
of Appeals,[11] we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since
time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22,
1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession
for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending
C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12] thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by
R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents witnesses did not state the exact period when
respondents predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to
the effect that respondent had been in possession of the property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be
conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have truly been in possession of the
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred
from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of
property was established.Consequently, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina
and her predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it was
owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent
submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However,
the earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required
period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property since he was
ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination, however, he
testified that he based his information on Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet
him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with certainty
whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of the property.[13]
Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of the
land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the
relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was
stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her
possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondents possession can only be
reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land commenced on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our
Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land.[15] All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18]
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19] it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands
of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter
applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent.Respondent merely submitted the survey map and
technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is open for disposition
because no opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims that
in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible
to private ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the property
involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered
is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore,
alienable part of the public domain.[20] Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21] we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the
burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling
in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title.
The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part
of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.[22]
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the government.[23] It cannot be
presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-
D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 17768 September 1, 1922
VICENTE SOTTO, petitioner,
vs.
FILEMON SOTTO, respondent.
Jose P. Fausto for petitioner.
The respondent in his own behalf.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reopen the land registration
proceedings in regard to lot No. 7510 of the Cadaster of Cebu.
The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of said lot No. 7510; that in or about the year 1907 he
absented himself from the city of Cebu, leaving the respondent in charge of the lot; that on or about
the 16th of April, 1921, the petitioner, upon visiting the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, discovered that the respondent had fraudulently obtained the registration of said lot in his
own name and that a certificate of title for said lot had been issued to said respondent on January 24,
1920; that the petitioner, due to his long absence from Cebu, was unable to appear in court in the land
registration proceedings and to defend his rights; and that this action is his only remedy to recover the
property in question. He therefore asks that the decision of the Court of First Instance in regard to said
lot No. 7510 be annulled and that a new trial be had. The case is now before us upon demurrer by the
respondent to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
The respondent maintains that section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to decisions
in land registration proceedings which are covered by a final decree and this is the only question of
importance raised by the demurrer.
A brief statement of the history of the legislation relating to the question at issue may be by some aid
in its determination. The original Land Registration Act (No. 496) which established the Torrens system
of registration in these Islands, went into effect on January 1, 1903, It created a court of land registration
and its section 14 provided for an appeal from that court to the Court o First Instance. Section 38 of the
Act reads:
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant has title as stated in his application, and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration
shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section.
It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included, in
the general description "To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however to the right of any person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration
shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree.
Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall
be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value.
On April 15, 1904, Act No. 1108 was enacted which, by its section 4, amended section 14 of the original
Act so as to read as follows:
SEC. 14. Every order, decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court in the same manner as an order decision, decree or judgment of a Court of First Instance
might be reviewed, and for that purpose sections one hundred and forty-one one hundred and forty-
two, one hundred and forty-three, four hundred and ninety-six, four hundred ninety-seven (except that
portion thereof relating to assessors), four hundred and ninety-nine, five hundred, five hundred and
one, five hundred and two, five hundred and three, five hundred and four, five hundred and five, five
hundred and six, five hundred and seven, five hundred and eight, five hundred and nine, five hundred
and eleven, five hundred and twelve, five hundred and thirteen, five hundred and fourteen, five
hundred and fifteen, five hundred and sixteen, and five hundred and seventeen of Act Numbered One
hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in civil actions and special
proceedings in the Philippine islands," are made applicable to all the proceedings of the Court of Land
Registration and to a review thereof by the Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided in this
section: Provided, however, That no certificates of title shall be issued by the Court of Land Registration
until after the expiration of the period for perfecting a bill of exceptions for filing: And provided further,
That the Court of Land Registration may grant a new trial in any case that has not passed to the Supreme
Court, in the manner and under the circumstances provided in sections one hundred and forty-five, one
hundred and forty-six, and one hundred forty-seven of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety: And
provided also, That the certificates of judgment to be issued by the Supreme Court, in cases passing to
it from the Court of Land Registration, shall be certified to the clerk of the last-named court as well as
the copies of the opinion of the Supreme Court: And provided also, That in the bill of exceptions to be
printed no testimony or exhibits shall be printed except such limited portions thereof as are necessary
to enable the Supreme Court to understand the points of law reversed. The original testimony and
exhibits shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. . . .
Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which reference is made in the foregoing section, reads:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of a First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of First
Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that
court, the party so deprived of hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days
after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have such judgment set aside. The court shall summarily on notice to both parties hear such
petition, upon oral written testimony as it shall direct, and the judgment shall be set aside and the trial
upon the merits granted, upon such terms as may be just, if the facts set forth in the complaint are
found to be true, otherwise the complaint shall be dismissed with costs.
If a trial on the merits is granted, the order shall forthwith be certified to the Court of First Instance.
Pending such petition, any judge of the Supreme Court for cause shown, may order a suspension of
further proceedings to enforce the judgment complained of, upon taking sufficient security from the
petitioner for all costs and damages that may be awarded against him in case the petition is dismissed.
From the time of passage of Act No. 1108 until the filing of the petition in the recent case of Caballes
vs. Director of Lands (41 Phil., 357) the final decrees in land registration cases were always regarded as
indefeasible and it apparently did not occur to the members of the legal profession that the provision
of section 513, supra, could be applied to such decrees or to the orders or decisions upon which they
were based. Aside from the dictum in the Caballes case, this court has consistently held that final
decrees in land registration cases could not be reopened except under the circumstances, and in the
manner, mentioned in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49;
City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324; Cuyugan and Lim Tuico vs. Sy Quia, 24 Phil., 567; Broce vs. Apurado,
26 Phil., 581; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29, Phil., 31; De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Rodriguez, 29 Phil., 336; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590; Mariano Velasco and Co.
vs. Gochico and Co., 33 Phil., 363; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Sunico and Catli, 36 Phil.,
279; Blas vs. De la Cruz and Melendres, 37 Phil., 1, and Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural,
39 Phil., 996.)
The dominant principle of the Torrens system of land registration is that the titles registered thereunder
are indefeasible or as nearly so as it is possible to make them. (Niblack's Analysis of the Torrens System,
paragraphs 5, 161, and 166; Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 40 and 41; Dumas' Registering Title to
Land, p. 31; Hogg on the Australian Torrens System, pp. 775 et seq.) This principle is recognized to the
fullest extent in our Land Registration Act and gives the Act its principle value. (See land Registration
Act, section 38 and 39.)
An examination of Act No. 1108 shows that it merely provides for the amendment of section 6, 12, 13,
14, 17, 19, 24, 36, and 114 of the original Land Registration Act. Sections 14 and 19 relate to matters of
procedure; all the other section mentioned deal with administrative matters. Nowhere in Act. No 1108
is there any direct indication of any intention or to impair the strength of the registered titles.
The purpose of the amendment of section 14 of land Registration Act was clearly to make the Court of
Land Registration coordinate with the Court of First Instance and to make its judgments appealable to
the Supreme Court instead of to the Courts of First instance. In carrying out this purpose the Legislature
by reference to certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, incorporated into the Land Registration
Act the then existing provisions for bills of exceptions and appeals from the Court of First Instance to
the Supreme Court and made certain original actions in the Supreme Court applicable to land
registration matters. This was all that was done and very evidently all it was intended to do.
As Act No. 1108 only amended certain section of the Land Registration Act and did not purport to amend
the Act as whole, or to introduce any new principle therein, the amended section should be read in
connection with the other sections of the Act as if all had been enacted in the same statute, and, as far
as possible, effect should be given to them all in furtherance of the general design of the Act. Sutherland
on Statutory Construction 2d ed., says in paragraph 368:
The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause, or word means. To answer it one
must proceed as he would with any other composition — construe it with reference to the leading idea
or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts of section and is
animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper
to confine the attention to the one section to be construed. "It is always an unsafe way of construing a
statute or contract to divided it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then
apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definition given by lexicographers, and
then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be
construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be
ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the
parties who executed the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution."
(International Trust Co. vs. Am. L. and I. Co., 62 Minn., 501.) Another court says: "Statutes must receive
a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to all their provisions, force
and effect being given not narrowly to isolated and disjointed clauses, but to their plain spirit, broadly
taking all their provisions together in one rational view. Neither grammatical construction nor the letter
of the statute nor its rhetorical framework should be permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpose
to be gathered from the whole act, comparing part with part. . . . A statute must receive such reasonable
construction as will, if possible, make all its parts harmonize with each other, and render them
consistent with its scope and object." (Adams vs. Yazoo and Miss Val. R.R. Co., 75 Miss., 275.)
Applying the principles stated, we do not think it impossible to so harmonize the various section of the
Land Registration Act as to carry out its general intent.
It must be conceded that section 14, as amended, is repugnant to several other sections of the Land
Registration Act, if we hold that the final "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in
section 38 of the Act is a "judgment" within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But we do not think it necessary to so hold. The Land Registration Act itself distinguishes between a
judgment and the final decree. In section 36 of the Act the decision rendered by the court is styled "a
judgment." The final "decree of confirmation and registration" cannot be entered until at least thirty
days after such judgment has been rendered. The contents of this final decree is thus prescribed by
section 40 of the Act:
Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be
signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name
of husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a
description of the land as finally determined by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the owner,
and also, in such manner as to show their relative priority, all particular estates, mortgages, easements,
liens, attachments, and other incumbrances, including rights of husband and wife, if any, to which the
land or owner's estate is subject, and may contain any other matter properly to be determined in
pursuance of this Act. The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the
certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.
As provided in the last sentence of the section quoted, the decree is transcribed literally upon the
certificates of title. Section 38 of the Act provides that it "shall not be opened by reason of the absence
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment or decrees."
It can readily be seen that such a decree possesses very special characteristics and that it differs not
only in form but also in character from the ordinary judgment.
Its features of finality and indefeasibility constitute the cornerstone of the Land Registration Act; if we
eliminate them we may still have a land registration system but it will not be a Torrens system. To hold
that the Legislature by a mere reference in Act No. 1108 to section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure
intended to include such final decrees in term "judgment" as employed in that section would therefore
equivalent to holding that it proposed in this casual manner to abolish the Torrens system in these
Islands, a system which had given general satisfaction, and to substitute therefor a mongrel system with
all disadvantages of Torrens registration but without its principal advantages.
Such an interpretation of the law would be in conflict with the view of the effect of final decree
expressed in all decisions of this court upon the subject from the time of the enactment of Act No. 1108
until the present time, with the sole exception of the aforementioned dictum in the case of Caballes vs.
Director of Lands, supra. It would lay a final land registration decree open to successive attacks by
persons claiming to have been deprived of their interest in the decreed land by default and would throw
the title back into the realm of oral evidence, which, in land disputes in this country, has always been
found notoriously unreliable
Moreover, an examination of the Land Registration Act shows clearly that its prime object is to give the
greatest possible protection to the bona fide holders of the certificates of title provided for in the Act.
If a final decree of confirmation and registration should be reopened and cancelled, it is, of course,
obvious that all certificates of title issued under the decree would fail whether the holders were guilty
of bad faith or not; as far as the validity of his title might be concerned, the bona fide holder of a transfer
certificate — an innocent third party — would be exactly in the same position as the holder in bad faith
of the first certificate issued under a decree, i. e, neither would have any legal title whatever.
A bona fide holder of title recorded in the old, or Mortgage Law, register would then be in a much better
position inasmuch as he would enjoy the very important benefits of article 34 of the Mortgage Law. In
other words, the old register would offer greater advantages and afford much better protection to bona
fide third parties than would the Torres register if we were to accept the interpretation placed upon
the law by the petitioner. It requires no argument to show that such an interpretation would defeat the
principal object of the Land Registration Act and render the certificate of title an instrument of very
slight value. It is hardly conceivable that the legislators intended to create such a state of affairs.
Another circumstances also plainly indicates that in enactment of Act No. 1108 it was not the purpose
to make such drastic changes in the law. The theory of American adaptation of the Torrens system is
that every transfer of title and every memorandum upon the certificate of title is a judicial act and that
the register of deeds merely acts in a ministerial capacity as an officer of the court.
A transfer certificate of title is both in form and in substance merely a variation of the final decree in
the case; it runs in the name of the judge of the court, contains the same data as the final decree and
transfer and confirms the title just as effectively. If, therefore, we regard the final decree as a judgment
within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we must also so regard a transfer of
certificate of title. Now, if this is so, what can then be the purpose of maintaining the assurance fund?
If both final decrees and transfer certificates of title can be regarded as judgments and reopened or
cancelled by a proceeding under section 513, how can there ever be any demand upon the assurance
fund? Indeed, the fact that in passing Act No. 1108 the Legislature left the provisions for the assurance
fund intact and did not reduce the amount of the premium to be paid into said fund by an applicant for
registration, shows sufficiently that if did not intend to introduce a new proceeding in substitution of
the action against the assurance fund. We cannot assume or believe that the collection of the assurance
premium or fee is only a scheme on the part o of the Government to obtain money under false
pretenses.
If we, on the other hand, hold that in land registration matters section 513 of the Code of the Civil
Procedure applies only to those judgment which are not covered by final decrees of confirmation (of
which the Caballes case offers a good example) all difficulties in reconciling the amended section 14 of
the Land Registration Act within its other section disappear and the registration system established by
the Act will remain intact. In view of the fact that it obviously was not the intention of the Legislature
to introduce any radical changes in the system itself, this seems to be the only rational construction
which can be placed upon the law.
Such an interpretation can in reality impose no material hardship upon the aggrieved party; he still has
his right of action for damages against the person who has unjustly deprived him of his land and if the
title has not been transferred to a third party, an attachment may be levied upon the land. Recourse
may also be had to be assurance fund in proper cases. Furthermore, we have already held in the case
of Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna and Obiñana (40 Phil., 620) that in certain cases a suit in
equity may be maintained to compel the conveyance of registered land to the true owner.
A person who, through no fault of his own, has been deprived of his land through registration
proceedings is thus offered all the remedies which he, in justice and equity, ought to have; to go father
and allow his claims to prevail against the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value from the holder of a
registered title is neither justice nor common sense and is, as we have seen, subversive of the object of
the Land Registration Act. This, as far as we can see, would be the inevitable and logical consequence
of adopting the doctrine that final land registration decrees may be reopened; it is inconceivable that a
certificate of title can stand when the decree upon which it is based fails.
It has been suggested by some of the opponents of the views set forth that as under the final decree in
land registration case the petitioner acquires a legal title a purchaser from him in good faith also
acquires a good title and cannot be disturbed through proceedings under section 513, and that such
proceedings can, therefore, only reach the original holder of the title and his mala fides transferees.
This view is in itself a recognition of the fact that the sweeping language of the section in question is
not, to its full extent, applicable to land registration cases; the only difference between this theory and
ours is that the line of the inapplicability of the section is drawn at a different point. Instead of being
placed at the issuance of the final decree, thus making the section applicable to judgments not covered
by such decrees, the line of demarcation is drawn at the point of where the land passes into the hands
of an innocent purchaser of value.
While this interpretation of the law has an appearance of reasonableness, at first sight, may seem
harmless, its adoption would in reality be only slightly less disastrous than the holding that section 513
is applicable to all land registration matters. The fact that the question of good or bad faith on the part
of a purchaser would often have to be determined by oral evidence, would introduce an element of
uncertainty which would impair the value of Torens titles out of all proportion to the benefits to be
derived from the application of the remedy prescribed by section 513 in the manner suggested. There
might be few successful attacks on such titles, but from a practical point of view the possibility of attacks
and of litigation in regard to which the Statute of Limitation does not apply, would necessarily have a
deterrent effect on possible investors in lands covered by such titles. And, as we have seen, there is not
now, and never has been, any real necessity for such an application of the remedy in land registration
cases; the field is sufficiently covered by other remedies, equally effective and much less harmful to the
public interest. It is, therefore, not at all a question of sanctioning or encouraging fraud by curtailing
the remedies against it.
For the reasons stated, we hold that so called "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in
the Land Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and that such a decree cannot be reopened except for the reasons and in the manner stated
in section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The demurrer must, accordingly, be sustained and it being evident that the petition suffers from defects
not curable by an amendment, an order absolute will be entered dismissing the same with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the
city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October,
1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had
been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the
defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The
lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots.
The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the
defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did
not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall
and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory
should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right
he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for
registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged
to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was
not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then
the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land
under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil.
Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the
world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the
same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very
purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles
only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except
in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even
by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a
bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are
parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or
which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title
once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title
under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented
to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in
his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds
however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to
include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate
who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case
of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and
the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
(of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in
any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may
such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could
be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land
when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code
provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it
shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes
that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case
depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in
the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for
governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more
in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so
decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says,
among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor
of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their
right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and
contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set
up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law
and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder
of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those
dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration
and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the
method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the
plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of
the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage
done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence
of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that
he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration
in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question,
in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and
the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his
own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose
the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth
against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to
successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that
the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his
vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the
vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections
speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the
provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name.
He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is
used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original
certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee?
Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such
purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which
of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected
under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is
recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.
All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever
it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice
sections 710, 710 [a]). resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We
are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present,
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.) the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting
purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if
presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law
of any act of negligence.
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge
of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt
is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens
system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property
all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded
be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.)
alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for
The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory
provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing,
mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should
lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea be protected.
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense
that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked.
notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by
know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error
the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not
be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to
such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the
record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of
notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there
cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that
of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish.
We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once
brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof
is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part
of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had
never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not.
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963 sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant. their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank,
CONCEPCION, J.: the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it
under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental,
favor of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the
the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable
deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take
compensation for the use and occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in
possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital
addition to attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
of Negros Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations
rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however,
with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the
set aside by the Supreme Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
the case remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision was rendered by
said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the year; 1924-
conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once again, before us, this time on appeal by the 1925, through expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the commencement of said
plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusive of interest and proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial
costs. hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely,
notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378,
comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant";
405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of
that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No.
over 502 hectares, originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378
16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing said lot from
has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776
the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital was where it is up to the present,
(Exhibit 4), issued on August 25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter
and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that
sold the aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents as Jose Benares
Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff
Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable installments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21.
corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the support, operation and
On February 8, 1924, said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained,
maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November 8, 1950, defendant alleged, also,
in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921, the
that the aforementioned expropriation case was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in
Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
the sense that the ... Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay to Jose Benares the
for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the
assessed value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to said lot in excess of its assessed
Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by
value which was paid by the Province would be donated and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares
the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the
in favor of the Province purposely for hospital site".
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title,
including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295, covering Lot 378. The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein had acquired Lot
378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. This decision appealed from in effect decided
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the Court
this question in the affirmative and declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in
of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired
view of which it ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated,
the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer
substantially, upon the following premises, namely that case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of
Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151
Negros Occidental for the expropriation of the hospital site of said province, was actually commenced
— which, owing to its subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
on January 26, 1924; that, among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the
1371 — in the name of the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on November
aforementioned cadastral survey, belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to
8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of
the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2)
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title
was issued on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the expropriation of Lot 378
would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this
was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and that defendant's failure to secure
contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the
the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot 378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that
Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute
said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff and its president, for
the former believes that the latter had "manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and
there have been four (4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally
decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified to having been paid
P12,000 by the Government, although, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us
believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters;
(b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days"
after the Government had taken possession of the land, and to have sent the money next day to Pilar
Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received the said sum of P12,000 on November 7,
1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco, former deputy clerk of
court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares asserted that there was a written compromise
agreement between him and the Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely
oral; and (b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378, the assessed
value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government the difference between this sum and
the true value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare, which
he rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government agreed to pay,
although, subsequently, he said that Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept
P1,000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso Coscolluela, the provincial
treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the expropriation, who positively assured the Court that
the expropriation case "was not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise agreement for the
acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and that the expropriation had not been
consummated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing and the publication
in the newspaper of the corresponding notices (Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the Government, followed by
the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title
in the name of the Province, when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of
a transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly suggest that no such
assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12, 1921, and this
mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the
name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not made a party in
the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which would
not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said
lot have been expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation.
What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell the
Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410,
forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had been
expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the expropriation case and
the chances are that the case was dismissed. The Court had to examine carefully and minutely every
single piece of evidence adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the mystery.
The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the corresponding transfer of title to
Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This conclusion was
arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the subdivided lots
were properly identified by lot numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled
with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and that portion
is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building was constructed. This plan was
prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento, embracing lots
covering over 22 hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular portion was not
labelled with the corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to believe that it formed
a part of lot 405-B, which adjoins it, although separated by the creek. This lack of reasonable
explanation why the government failed to secure the corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when
there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of sale in favor of the
government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness and moral courage
that account for the well earned reputation and prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves
unable to concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is no evidence, and defendant has not even
tried to prove, that the expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned.
Hence, the lower court merely speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was
dismissed." By the way, the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for
he testified that the expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial
treasurer, and the record before us suggests that since the Province took possession of the land in 1924
or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no further proceedings in
said case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the authorities had
been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at the lower corner of said plan — which was enclosed,
during the trial, within a circle in red pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 — formed part of Lot 405-B,
which had been expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit X-1,
is not part of the land covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the
boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right hand side
of Exhibit X, the following appears in bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400,
401, 403,405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government of
Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said enumeration and the
explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of
its being mistaken by any body, much less by government engineers, as including the hospital site, and,
hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the defendant herein, specially the assessor's field
sheets and declarations of real property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the
Government had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any
event, said possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant — in the
face of documentary evidence to the contrary — the conclusion that Lot 378 has already been acquired
by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied by him to the
payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at
the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In
this connection, it should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site,
another expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose Benares, appears to
have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have
mistaken the payment for his land included in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was
affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount to a probability when we consider that he
erroneously believed that there had been only one expropriation case, instead of two cases, against
him, and that Lot 378, was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine
National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate recollection of the events or transactions
affecting his properties, and, hence, his testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the defendant
of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's president to
the effect that he did not know until 1949 that the land on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands
is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive knowledge
of defendant's possession of the property at the time it was bought by the plaintiff", because Carlos P.
Benares — whose right to buy the Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff — "is
a part owner of the Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein"; because the hospital
was already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name of the Government"
and "when plaintiff bought the lot in 1935 the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and
improvement"; because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the supposed rights to take
possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that lot No. 378 was erroneously or
inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R) executed by the Philippine National Bank
in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that same lot was occupied by the defendant government for
the provincial hospital for the last 34 years, as owner thereof".
1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was
not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore,
since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the hospital site had begun, said lot was
mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as annotated
on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date,
or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which
acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8,
1935, to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to
plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on
September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that sugar
centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot
be said that plaintiff was not justified in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background
of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were
constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein
is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are of the opinion,
and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested, and is seemingly
conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short,
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time
when possession thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages — including
attorney's fees — from which consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be
deducted, with interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the
date of said actual taking. The case should be remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception
of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from the
defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs against the defendant. It is so ordered..
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not know until 1949
that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence
of evidence that this fact was known to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be
deduced from the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter
appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently
know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings effecting said properties: that the P12,000
received by him from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the
properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.

"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in
and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs.
Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791, February 27,
G.R. No. L-41278 April 15, 1988
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, MARIA O.
GARCIA, and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Filoteo T. Banzon for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
On September 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Maria O. Garcia in
the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Bataan; 1 a copy of the application was forwarded
to the Solicitor General thru the Director of Lands. On February 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed an
opposition to this application, and at the same time the Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearings of the same. Subsequently,
respondent Inperial Development Corporation, with the conformity of respondent Garcia, filed a
Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria O. Garcia to Imperial Development Corporation
without amending the boundaries and the area of the parcels of land stated in the original application,
which motion was granted by the respondent Judge. A Notice of Initial Hearing was sent by the
respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would
be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by
the sheriff as required by law. On January 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner
nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the
same date. After the reception of evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent
Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to
appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision was contrary to the facts and to law.
The motion was, however, denied.
The instant petition is for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the following orders and decision of the
respondent Judge:
a) Order of the respondent Judge dated September 30, 1974, admitting the Amended Application for
Registration;
b) Order of the respondent Judge dated January 23, 1975 declaring, in effect, the Director of Lands in
default;
c) Decision of the respondent Judge dated February 17, 1975, adjudicating the parcels of land in favor
of the respondent corporation; and
d) Order of the respondent Judge dated August 7, 1976, denying the petitioner's Motion for New Trial;
and for mandamus, to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner's Motion for
New Trial; alternatively, the petitioner prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporation's
application for registration. 2
According to Sec. 34 of the Land Registration Act, and as adopted in Sec. 151 of the Public Land Act:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer
on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer
shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing
the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person
in his behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621.)
It is undisputed that on February 19, 1974, or prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, an
opposition was filed by the petitioner Director of Lands to the original application for land registration
of respondent Garcia. 3 That verified opposition was precisely the answer referred to in the above-
quoted section, for, as therein alleged by the Director of Lands, neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcels of land
applied for; neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the present application; that the said parcels of land are a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and that, therefore, the same should
be declared part of the public domain. 4 As a matter of fact, under the Property Registration Decree,
issued on June 11, 1978, which supersedes all other laws relative to registration of property, the word
used is "opposition" and not "answer." 5
Thus, the opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it
was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the
oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The
pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the
court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded ...," 6 cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer
before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of
the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been
so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially
in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged
to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another
date for the reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner
herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government's claim.
True, an amended application was submitted but it is admitted by the respondents themselves that no
significant alterations were made therein, hence, the opposition already filed should have been
considered as the answer to the amended application as well. Parenthetically, since the amendment in
the application consisted merely in the substitution of the name of the applicant, it was not absolutely
necessary to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the amended application, and it sufficed that
the substitution was stated in the Notice of Initial Hearing. 7
The respondent corporation maintains that the appropriate remedy in this instance is appeal, which is
expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and not certiorari. We do not agree. The
declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he
had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer. In Omico Mining and Industrial
Corporation vs. Vallejos we laid down the doctrine that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party
is illegally declared in default. Thus, we stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly, though not
exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a
defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious
remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity. 8
Indeed, for the above reason, we gave due course to this petition. 9
Additionally, the respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner's Motion for New Trial, ignored the
established rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment. "The Court, in the
exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in court and given them an even chance
to face their opponents." 10
Further, we hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent
corporation's application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an
imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Verily, we said in Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court that: "No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth, be little more than formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time;
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested." 11 But
precisely we are not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of
the respondent corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation
purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the
land registration court by Maria Garcia herself which contain the following footnotes: "This survey is
covered by S.A. (x-5) 582" ... "This is covered by S.A. No. (x-5) 583," S.A. being the short form for Sales
Application. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and
that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications
were submitted. 12 Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. We note
that the private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal
this vital fact.
Secondly, if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession
since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968,
and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that
the holder had a claim of title over the property. 13
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of
Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
as the above provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, 14 that the subject lands, with an
approximate area of 56,598 square meters and situated at Sitio Babuyan, Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan,
under Project No. 4-A, were forest lands and only later, declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein,
through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such possession
never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for
sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An
examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24,
1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever clasification belong to the State, courts must
scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly
failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully
analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioner's opposition to the application were so casually ignored.
We no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which would only prolong the litigation
unnecessarily, for as we said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before on the records before it. 15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default, dated
January 23, 1975, as against the petitioner, and the Order dated August 7, 1975 denying the Motion For
New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant
thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation's subject application
for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
PACADA, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her
husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL
ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in
his capacity as Judge of Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et
al., 1ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in
accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only
to the title of the land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same
Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and
personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process therein but had
not appeared nor answered); 2 and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments, 3 since the decree "is to
exist forever." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, 4 "is that a writ of possession can
be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives
and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that neither laches nor
the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et
al. 5 to the following effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a
period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the
execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party
is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted
or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both
of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person
in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some months later and took occasion to
stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to hold that if the writ
of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to
the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that
the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be
ineffective."
The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of these established jurisprudential
precepts to the undisputed facts.
In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a
decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of
Delfina Aquino. 7One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. 8 However,
for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed
by the appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen (14)
years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on
November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina Aquino's
name. 9
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in
Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia Barroga and
Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of
Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants alleged that they, and their mother,
Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and
they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be commanded to
reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their names. 11
It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an
adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court, a complaint in
intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and
declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's
title. 12
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The familiar doctrine
of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery
of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding
affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former's
predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default.
The judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon
the title to the thing." 13 It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of
persons not parties thereto, 14 and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the
proceeding (like the appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened therein as an
oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. 15
The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the Court of appeals by
Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this Court having
thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. Thereafter, at the instance of defendants
Angel Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the judgment on December 6,
1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca - moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973.
They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict was simply one of dismiss of the
complaint; they moreover invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the matter
apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in the record.
What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in
Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as
regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued.
Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They
filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued"
under date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in question, they
could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established axioms set out in
the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be
entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and
vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may
correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta
Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q.
Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of
possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as
against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. 20 The
appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no
longer be allowed to continue doing so.
WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and Saturnina
Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated August 8, 1975,
September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the law.
This decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration will be entertained.
Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras * and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the parties and their counsel stipulated upon
the following facts, to wit:

1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia Albano,
Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and Pedrito Albano are the
children-heirs and successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered
by O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for the petitioners-
claimants;

2. That movants-oppositors Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. de Pacada are the
children-heirs and successors of Ruperta Pascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821, Cad. Case No.
44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and decided on July 31, 1941 as
follows:

Lote No. 9821 — Por incomparecencia injustificada de la opositora Ruperta Pascual, se desestima su
contestacion. Se adjudica este lote No. 9821, con las mejoras en el existentes, en nombre de Delfina Q.
Aquino, filipina, major de edad, viuda y residents del municipio de Lauag de la provincia de Ilocos Norte.

3. That the heirs of Ruperta Pascual, namely, Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. de
Padaca , are in possession of the lot in question since 1941 up to the present time. 18

The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order dated September 22, 1975. The Court
stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time
that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe
pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, 19 It also declared
that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of
Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the
appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and Padaca
moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to this Court.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987 government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which
the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
Petitioner,
Present: - Hernando De Soto[1]
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
CORONA,
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
CARPIO MORALES,
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
TINGA,
confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on
CHICO-NAZARIO,
the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it
VELASCO, JR.,
has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by
NACHURA,
their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land
BRION,
law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.
I.
Promulgated:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and
April 29, 2009
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of
DECISION
the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
TINGA, J.:
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered.
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become
This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many
the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
consequences.
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
xxx
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's
further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.
in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been
Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin
America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as
the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs of which reads:
know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the
 WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known
as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A
and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record
of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who
is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be
factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; [10] hence, it was his heirs
who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic
v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial
Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since
the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners
argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property
as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard
on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? [13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab
initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that
the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains
insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as
of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic [16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as
well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain
so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property
through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG
notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers
to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to
decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year
possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the
concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year
prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision,
reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time,
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. [20] Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural;
(b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and
unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D.
No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands
was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of
the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only
agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court
in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands
of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended
by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been
for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of
the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not
the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed
by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established
the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding
original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits
the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has
been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area
applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this
Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945;
the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be
registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used
in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted
in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application
of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership
to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it
suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto, again
stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage
as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately
granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of
possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even
apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
 Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value
with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the
resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court
on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals[27] since in the latter,
the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The
dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell,
its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which
involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared
alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in
Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated
December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of
imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to
overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land
even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of
them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the
registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was
filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent
seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even
then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property
may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their
registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for
original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not
susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property
through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. [33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith,[34]as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to
the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original
registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are
in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the
concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could
have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are
two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the
Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty
(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession
period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether
the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire
thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b),
which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing
laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code,
in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what
consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
 (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot
be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. [39] Lands of the public domain,
whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so
declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion
into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the
object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by
the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law,
which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act
No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air
Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer
such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) [40] which in turn is authorized to
own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in
whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American
bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national
wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized
under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We
rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive
period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time
that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is
no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is
made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks
of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the
Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section
14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes,
neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch
is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation.
Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the
Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration
procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for
acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons
through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The
first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with
just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the
Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, [45] provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is
just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and
which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This
vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange,
donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that the State, as the
owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required
period of possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article
1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription,
the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed,
two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It
should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a
mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree
in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands
acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership
over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The
gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2)
thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it
is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
 (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites
for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put
on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership SO ORDERED.
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the DANTE O. TINGA
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according Associate Justice
to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every
untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot
be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we
simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-
standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World countries. This
paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so
far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations
imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. [52] Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this
decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on
which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the
State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such
virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property
of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application
of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that
they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence
at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only
on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February
23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject
of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was
a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void
ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of
the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation
of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant
is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This
means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of
the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through
a positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other
natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only
be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested
in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that
the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further
limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land
is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification
of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not
be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that
the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the
lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only
the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12,
1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over
it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result
of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the
property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may
run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of
years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails,
as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of
the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue
of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and
has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of
the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12,
1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986
TOMAS AVERIA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA PADILLO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Lucena
City, 1 which is questioned on a pure questions of law, more specifically whether or not the court has
jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent
contract to sell.
The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings
below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the
said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The respondent
court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for
on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein. 2
In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court
had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the
parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. 3 The petitioner cites Fojas as v.
Grey, 4 where this Court, through Justice Serafin Cuevas, declared:
The aforequoted provision of the Land Registration Act (Sec. 112) was relied upon by appellant Apolinar
Fojas in petitioning the court a quo for the annotation of the Deed of Assignment. However, while he
had the right to have the said Deed annotated in the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-2376, the serious
objection of Saturnina de Grey to the same raises a substantial controversy between the parties.
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions
for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.
The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications
for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."
Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it
to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any
"adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and
decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as
the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below notwithstanding the
manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he
had raised. 6 The trial court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of due
process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after
considering only the evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the
petitioner. 7
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23, 1983, is set aside. Let a new
trial of Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, MC No. 374-
82, be held, at which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity
to be heard. Our temporary restraining order of October 5, 1983, is hereby lifted except as to the
registration of the questioned deed of sale which shall depend on the outcome of the said case.

In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, it SO ORDERED.
has been held that summary relief under Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of
any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs. 5

While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is, however, not applicable to
the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been
superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.

In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:

SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the

registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of
title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO
ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO
ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.
Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed by the Court of
Appeals.1
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of
unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified
as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children,
Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six
children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and
Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970),
and their children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942,
Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon,
and claimed them as owner thereof 5
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. 6
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as
exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the properties in question in favor of all his
grandchildren including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after
Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an application
for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J"
and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro
and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of
them were entitled to one-third thereof. 8
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law
on intestate succession. 9
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court.
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims
of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots
should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive
prescription. 10 They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred the subject lands to
them.
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the
jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the issue of prescription was never
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof.
Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941,
and that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al.
maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days
after the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came earlier, it was notarized, and took
effect, only on November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the donors.
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real question of fact to be
resolved in this case. The important question, so we find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character:
Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under Section
2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested
in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting
merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change
has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petitions.'" 12 At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land
registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or
have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given
full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already
of record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial
issues. 13 By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but
rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the
issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral
court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties
rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered,
in which case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first
decided it.
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four
events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2)
Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue of
since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust him, fact and second, because whatever their true dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of
Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that barring the above Virginia, et al.
exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute the
We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels ' properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J",
had come under the category of a co-ownership, following the death of their grandparents, but in that according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No
case, it has been held that in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) costs.
there is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has made known to
the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property; (3) there is clear IT IS SO ORDERED.
and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15
Melencio-Herrera Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by
lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to
adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not
by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling
either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The
fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive
because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these
circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of
prescription.

We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a
valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".

Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J"
appears to have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and
acceptance. 17 It is true that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of
Jose in making Abdon sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon
"the belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos" 19) but as found
by the Court of Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a 'grain of salt', 20 because, for one
thing, Jose is dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine.
We are bound by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this
question on pure questions of law.

As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death of his wife on September 16, 1942
and does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo." 21

We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to comply with charges
imposed in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof that Abdon when he
executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.

We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and
effect" 26 of exhibit "J".

It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights
were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19, 2004
and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower court’s order to suspend the proceedings on
respondent’s application for land registration.
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in
Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan
Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.
On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey
Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new
owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. 3
Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their
respective oppositions.
On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven
parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26, 1976,
and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29,
1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the
name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the
heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.
Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan, DENR
Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the
petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the
same.4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition 5 for cancellation of the survey plan
sometime in March 2002, alleging the following grounds:
I.
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS CASE
II.
NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER
THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.
III.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF
(PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).6
On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings 7 in the land registration case,
alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan
"as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.
On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant motion and suspends the
proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition
for cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.
SO ORDERED.8
Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the
RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition
for land registration.9
On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of its order. 10 Respondent
thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.
On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings,
the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated
October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.
The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from
an application for registration.12
On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND
RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES-REGION 1.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS
OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE CASE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT THE ONLY
PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ON THE PART OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT.14
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that, since the respondent’s cause of action in the land registration case depends heavily
on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending the resolution
of the petition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR. 15 It, therefore, insists that recourse to a
petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily deprived of her right to
prosecute her application for registration.16
Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants.
But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should
not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every order suspending
proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, 17 or when
the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled.18 Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary exercise of the court’s
discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari.
None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present. In fact, to await the resolution
of the petition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land registration case and undermine
the purpose of land registration.
The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally settle title
to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title – except claims that were noted
on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent
thereto.1avvphi1 Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on
their ownership and possession.19
Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner raised
in its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey plan
should be cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from several
landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates of title.
Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan that
was approved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which
provides that the DENR shall
(15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain
and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in
consultation with appropriate agencies.
court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases,
as well as those involving substantial issues.22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is
deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.23 It may,
therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.
In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. 24 An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, 25 which is not
allowed by law.26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey
plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled
property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the
certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves
to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.27
Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its
determination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. – The court may require facts to be
stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may
require the filing of any additional papers.
The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report on
whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the
court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals.28 In that case, we commended such move by
the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law."29
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 19,
2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is
DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 and to resolve the same with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land registration
court is not by duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the cancellation of the
survey plan.21lawphil.net

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that, as an
incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land registration court
may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioner’s properties without
necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious
resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
G.R. No. L-19615 December 24, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE LOS ANGELES,
FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
ISIDORO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, oppositors-appellees.
Antonio G. Ibarra and H. I. Benito for other oppositors-appellees.
Jose W. Diokno for applicants-appellants
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositors-appellees Director of Lands and Province of Rizal.
BENGZON, JP, J.:
Squarely before this Court in this appeal is the important and fundamental question of whether a land
registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of title
thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the
issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.
The court a quo held in effect that it could be, as it dismissed the application to register title to the land
in its order brought here on appeal.
On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San Mateo
Rizal was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants.
Among other things it alleged that "applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid
land."
The required notices were given in which May 27, 1960 was set for the initial hearing. On March 3, 1960
the Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land "is a portion of the public domain". The
Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition on May 24, 1960, asserting "the required 3.00 meters
strips of public easement" on lots along Ampid River and a creek.
At the initial hearing on May 27, 1960 an order of general default was issued except as against the
Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal and eleven private oppositors who appeared therein. On July
10, 1960 the aforesaid private oppositors, Julio Hidalgo among them, filed their written opposition
claiming they "are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead
patents over said lots".
On July 25, 1961 a "Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating:
1. That the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the above-entitled land
registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu-148997, previously patented on June 12,
1961 under Patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and
2. That Case No. N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, was set for hearing on May 27, 1960 but no decision
has as yet been received by this Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to this Honorable Court that Case No. N-2671, LRC Record
No. N-18332, be dismissed with respect to Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857 only, giving due course, however,
to the other lots in the application.
Acting thereon, the court required applicants in its order of July 29, 1961, to show cause why their
application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 (10.6609 hectares). On August 15, 1961 applicants filed
an "opposition to motion to dismiss". But on September 18, 1961 the court issued an order dismissing
the application with respect to Lot 11 "without prejudice on the part of applicants to pursue the
corresponding remedy in any ordinary action". After a motion for reconsideration was filed and denied,
applicants appealed to this Court.
As lone assignment of error it is alleged that "the lower, court grievously erred in dismissing the
application for registration as regards Lot No. 11, over which a homestead patent was issued by the
Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration proceeding". (Emphasis supplied.)
To start with, it is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative supervision and
executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private
ownership. (Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Vital vs. Anore 53 O.G. 3739; Republic vs. Heirs of Carle L-
12485, July 31, 1959; Director of Lands vs. De Luna, L-1441, Nov. 23, 1960.) Accordingly, a homestead
patent issued by him over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against
the owner (Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 416; Vital vs. Anore supra).
Now, in the land registration proceedings applicants contended that as of November 21, 1959 — the
date they applied for registration — they were already "owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land". As a result, if applicants were to successfully prove this averment, and thereby show
their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo's
homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer public. The land
registration court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in applicants' favor and
declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the
real owners (Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 273; Zarate vs. Director of Lands, supra; Lacaste
vs. Director of Lands, 63 Phil. 654).
Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the validity or
nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo's jurisdiction in the
land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance.
Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent
are not (De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480; Philippine National Bank vs. Ortiz Luis, 53 Phil. 649). A
homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as
far as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned (De los Reyes vs. Razon, supra). Applicants should
thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.
WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the orders appealed from and remand the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming
the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case
No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry,
Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion of Lot No.
1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A together with the improvements thereon in the name
of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City,
Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters wide which is
presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road
they being properties of the Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province.
The oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries Commission
are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside
Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the
corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated December 14, 1973
denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is —
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the
Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court depending upon
the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-150727,
containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration
by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land having
bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the
lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on
the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the
lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been
in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of
the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the
ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C.
Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from
Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion
an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the
application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30,
1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land
sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the
Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of
land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which
is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-
way of 15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following
errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF
TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE
UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND
ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the same hence
the present petition with two (2) assigned errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent
court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC
LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES)
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE
REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL.
(pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are
coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain. These are more
particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest,
consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-
A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the
controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista,
Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that
the area in question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the decision of the
Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these
nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
public forest not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit convincing proof classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch
that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of
that these are agricultural lands. Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is
or not a controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be settled by within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for
competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land registration proceeding, it is incumbent forest purposes.
upon the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not
more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription inasmuch
court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in the case at bar, as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part
the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in- of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is
interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
occupants from their holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase." (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
(p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that private respondents
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is
claim the rule of prescription against the government.
hereby rendered, declaring that:
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial area is within
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863 hectares of
a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on
coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain are hereby ordered
February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain
registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided for
which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and
by the Public Land Law; and
there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in
dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of 2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of 19.4080 hectares,
whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared and are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore
certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the inalienable.
original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private respondents themselves in SO ORDERED.
their brief, We held —
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again held,
that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case unless
the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of
private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis)

We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-

... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution
of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.

... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over
the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816
of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly
established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion
of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7,
1958.

As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is
G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974
ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Flores Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz
and Solicitor Concepcion T. Agapinan for respondents-appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1969 in
its CA-G.R. 27655-R which reverses the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of
petitioners-appellants against the Secretary and Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications in
the case instituted to annul the order of November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works
& Communications directing the removal by the petitioners of the dikes they had constructed on Lot
No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, which order was issued pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056. The dispositive portion of the judgment of reversal of the Court of Appeals reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed, and another entered: [1] upholding the validity of the decision
reached by the respondent officials in the administrative case; [2] dissolving the
injunction issued by the Court below; and [3] cancelling the registration of Lot No.
2, the disputed area, and ordering its reconveyance to the public domain. No costs
in this instance.
The background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are
the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao, Pampanga,
covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said
province. Both parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant
case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who
secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino
Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria
Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first
parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of
Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from restoring the dikes constructed on the contested
property, the former, on June 22, 1914, filed Civil Case No. 1407 with the Court of
First Instance against the said Pedro Beltran to restrain the latter in his official
capacity from molesting him in the possession of said second parcel, and on even
date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued against said
municipal president. The Court, by decision promulgated June 12, 1916, declared
permanent the preliminary injunction, which, decision, on appeal, was affirmed by
the Supreme Court on August 21, 1918. From June 22, 1914, the dikes around the
property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just
before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of
land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land
registration court, granted the registration over and against the opposition of the
Attorney-General and the Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's decision,
original certificate of title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the
spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose
name transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they
were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of transfer
certificate of title No. 15856.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the
Committee on Rivers and Streams, by then composed of the Honorable Pedro
Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as chairman, and the Honorable Salvador
Araneta and Vicente Orosa, Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, respectively, as members. This
committee thereafter appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the case and to
conduct an ocular inspection of the contested property, and on March 11, 1954,
said Sub-Committee submitted its report to the Committee on Rivers and Streams
to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer certificate of title No. 15856 was not a
public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
On July 7, 1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo
Martinez and Leonor Suarez should be restored to the exclusive
possession, use and enjoyment of the creek in question which
forms part of their registered property and the decision of the
courts on the matter be given full force and effect."
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad, apparently
refused to recognize the above decision, because on September 1, 1954, the
spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez instituted Civil Case No. 751 before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against said Mayor Zagad, praying that the
latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of their property and in
the construction of the dikes therein. The writ of preliminary injunction applied for
was issued against the respondent municipal Mayor, who immediately elevated the
injunction suit for review to the Supreme Court, which dismissed Mayor Zagad's
petition on September 7, 1953. With this dismissal order herein appellee spouses
proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.
Some four (4) years later, and while Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the
Honorable Florencio Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the appellees
herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the strength of the authority
vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An
Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any
Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing
Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal
Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes.
1 The said order which gave rise to the instant proceedings, embodied a threat that
the dikes would be demolished should the herein appellees fail to comply therewith
within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January 2, 1959 the
present case, which was decided in their favor by the lower Court in a decision
dated August 10, 1959, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby declares the decision, Exhibit S, rendered by the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications null and
void; declares the preliminary injunction, hereto for issued,
permanent, and forever enjoining both respondents from
molesting the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez in
their possession, use and enjoyment of their property
described in Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their petition."
"Without pronouncement as to costs."
"SO ORDERED."
As against this judgment respondent officials of the Department of Public Works
and Communications took the instant appeal, contending that the lower Court
erred:
1. In holding that then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, complainant in the administrative
case, is not an interested party and his letter-complaint dated August 15, 1958 did
not confer jurisdiction upon the respondent Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to investigate the said administrative case;
2. In holding that the duty to investigate encroachments upon public rivers
conferred upon the respondent Secretary under Republic Act No. 7056 cannot be
lawfully delegated by him to his subordinates;
3. In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this case
is illegal on the ground that the said respondent Secretary has arrogated unto
himself the power, which he does not possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and
setting aside the two lawful decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I, and even
annulling thereby, the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the land;
4. In not sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no cause of action
because the property in dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim
has no basis in fact and in law;
5. In not passing upon and disposing of respondent's counterclaim;
6. In not sustaining respondent's claim that the petition should not have been
entertained on the ground that the petitioners have not exhausted administrative
remedies; and
7. In holding that the decision of the respondents is illegal on the ground that it
violates the principles that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary
is provided and in holding that the said Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional
on the ground that respondents' threat of prosecuting petitioners under Section 3
thereof for acts done four years before its enactment renders the said law ex post
facto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of errors committed by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and, as previously stated, reversed the judgment of the latter court. From
this reversal this appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this Court, petitioners-appellants assigned
the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT CASE THAT
PARCEL NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER
AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF ITS REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS TITLE IN VIOLATION OF THE
LAW AND THE WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REOPENING AND RE-LITIGATING THE ISSUE AS
TO WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, IS A PUBLIC RIVER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG RESOLVED AND SETTLED BY THE LAND
 REGISTRATION COURT OF PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING NO.
692 AND IS NOW RES JUDICATA.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS TITLE COVERING IT HAS BEEN
VESTED IN THE PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE SUCCESSIVE
INNOCENT PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED
ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PERSONS DEALING WITH REGISTERED LAND NEED
NOT GO BEHIND THE REGISTER TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY.
The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related, will be taken up together.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of
the petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the
indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants'
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that
as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition
for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack
under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established
by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree
of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the exemption
stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under
the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the
Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry."
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or existing under the law is that
provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and
bridges constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character. (Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside
the commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. ( 3 Manresa, 6th ed. 101-
104.)
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein.
If a person obtains title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not
by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also said:
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title
No. 329 in her favor because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right
to the creek in question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public domain, is
included among the various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to
which the said certificate is subject by express provision of the law.
The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil.
644, as regards public plaza.
In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA
704, it was held that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does
not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and
incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the
public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence,
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title
No. 15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968,
23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos, G.R. No.
L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works &
Communications under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a
public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open
to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary
of Public Works & Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of
Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the
public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of
Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically
on all sides by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 1247 for
injunction filed by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and
decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with water
since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been affirmed by
the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856
of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
(Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 647).
Consequently, appellants' title does not include said river.
II
principle that rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private
appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from is in accordance with
law, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioners-appellants.

As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in the appellants' argument that, being a Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
purchaser for value and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary
to the law and to the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the Makasiar, J., is on leave.
title which is the core of the system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value
and in good faith as in the deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor, the following appears:

6. Que la segunda parcela arriba descrita y mencionada esta actualmente abierta,

sin malecones y excluida de la primera parcela en virtud de la Orden Administrative
No. 103, tal como fue enmendada, del pasado regimen o Gobierno.

7. Que los citados compradores Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez se encargan de

gestionar de las autoridades correspondientes para que la citada segunda parcela
pueda ser convertida de nuevo en pesqueria, corriendo a cuenta y cargo de los
mismos todos los gastos.

8. Que en el caso de que dichos compradores no pudiesen conseguir sus propositos

de convertir de nuevo en pesquera la citada segunda parcela, los aqui vendedores
no devolveran ninguna cantidad de dinero a los referidos compradores; este es, no
se disminuiriat el precio de esta venta. (Exh. 13-a, p. 52, respondents record of
exhibits)

These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the same conveyance in the following
terms:

Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y residentes en al

Barrio de Julo Municipio de Malabon, Provincia de Rizal, por la presente, declaran
que estan enterados del contenido de este documento y lo aceptan en los precisos
terminos en que arriba uedan consignados. (Exh. 13-a, ibid)

Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the appellants who were the vendees
did not know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions
thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of converting Lot No. 2
in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to
the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor
cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37 Phil. 664).

The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as
to the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is
no lien or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted
[G.R. No. 126316. June 25, 2004]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA AND
ANGEL T. YU, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for annulment of judgment filed before it by the petitioner.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 22, 1994, respondent Angel T. Yu filed a petition[2] for registration of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 524, Cad. 633-D, Estancia Cadastre, Ap-063019-005139, with an area of 1,194 square
meters, more or less, situated at the Poblacion, Zone 1, Municipality of Estancia, Province of Iloilo. The
case was docketed as LRC Case No.1000, LRA Rec. No. N-64463 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, Branch 37.[3] The petition was later amended to include the adjoining
lots and the corresponding owners name.
Initial hearing was scheduled on February 9, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. For the purpose, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance on January 18, 1995 and at the same time deputized the
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear for and in behalf of the Solicitor General under the latters
supervision and control. Except for the opposition filed by the Solicitor General, no one else appeared
to oppose the application/petition. The case was then set for reception of applicants evidence on
February 16, 1995[4] which was again set to another day.[5]
On February 22, 1995, the RTC received a letter from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
requesting the court to require the Land Management Bureau, Manila and the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) at Barotac Viejo, Iloilo to report on the status of the subject land
considering that a discrepancy was noted after plotting the land.[6]
Thus, on March 6, 1995, the RTC issued an Order to the effect.[7]
On March 31, 1995, the RTC received a certification from the Land Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Manila stating that according to the
verification of our records, this Office (formerly Bureau of Lands) has no record of any kind of public
land application/land patent covering the parcel of land situated in Estancia, Iloilo, identified as Lot No.
524, Cad. 633-D, Ap-063019-005139, [8]
Based on this certification and after reception of evidence, the RTC rendered judgment on May
3, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, ratifying the Order of general default previously entered in this case, and after considering
the evidence adduced and finding that petitioner Angel T. Yu had sufficient title proper for the
registration in his name of the land subject of the application, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
confirming the title of the applicant/petitioner ANGEL T. YU, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident
of Estancia, Iloilo, over a parcel of land (Lot 524, Cad. 633-D, Estancia Cadastre, AP-063019-005139)
situated in the Poblacion Zone 1, Municipality of Estancia, Province of Iloilo, Island of Panay, identified
in the Plan, Exhibit E and technically described in Exhibit F.
As soon as this Decision becomes final, let an order for the issuance of the permanent decree and the
corresponding certificate of title be issued in accordance with law.[9]
No motion for reconsideration was filed by the City Prosecutor on behalf of the Solicitor General.
Hence, the said decision became final and executory on June 14, 1995, and entry of judgment was duly
made on July 7, 1995. An order was consequently issued by the RTC directing the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title to respondent Angel T. Yu.[10]
On May 29, 1995,[11] the OSG received a copy of the supplementary report and findings of Land
Management Officer Myra B. Rosal dated April 12, 1995 (Rosal Report), which was submitted to the
trial court in compliance with the courts Order dated March 6, 1995. The report was worded, thus:
The Honorable Judge
JOSE AZARRAGA
Regional Trial Court
Sixth Judicial Region
Branch 37, Iloilo City
April 12, 1995
SUBJECT: LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.
N-1000 LOT NO. 524, CAD,
CAD-633-D, ESTANCIA CADASTRE
ANGEL TILOS YU APPLICANT
___________________________________
In compliance with the Order of March 6, 1995, received by this Office on March 15, 1995, attached for
your ready reference is the amended report in three (3) pages of Land Management Officer III Fabio O.
Catalan, Jr., of this Office, which was sent to Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Bureau, DENR Masonic Temple, Iloilo City, in a cover memorandum dated September 24,
1994, duly endorsed by the CENR Officer of CENRO, Sara, Iloilo, Edgardo J. Himatay.
This supplementary report of the undersigned is prepared with the request that the additional findings
be made on record when the undersigned repaired on the premises of the land on April 7, 1995, in the
morning to conduct an ocular inspection. The following facts were ascertained and found;
1. [That] the Cadastral lot in question and subject of a Land Registration Case at bar,
is Lot 524, Cad 633-D, Estancia Cadastre, containing an area of 1,194 square
meters, approved on October 21, 1980, located at Zone 1, Poblacion Estancia,
Iloilo. Again, Engr. Rogelio Santome, adopting the cadastral survey of the then
 Bureau of Lands, prepared an Advance Plan and subsequently approved as Ap-
063019-005139 on May 25, 1994.
2. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is covered by a Foreshore Lease Application (FLA No.
(VI-I)78) applied for by Angel Tilos Yu on July 1, 1977, with the then Bureau of
Lands, MNR, Ministry of Natural Resources, NRD (VI-7) Barotac Viejo, duly
ratified by Land Investigator Antonio L. Luis. An amount of P775.00 each had
been paid in the year 1982 and the year 1983, (please see certification hereto
attached) dated February 6, 1995, of CENR Officer Edgardo J. Himatay.
3. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is declared public land and is Alienable and Disposable
per L.C. Map 1020, Project 44 dated July 26, 1933.
4. That the improvements found on the land are as follows:
a) A commercial complex built of strong materials (concrete steel and
galvanized iron with 18-20 feet structure in depth, as foundation of
the building, occupying around 600 square meters of the whole area
of Lot 524. The building itself houses 14 commercial concrete stalls
of 14 x 5 meters which is offered for rent as boutiques and dry goods
stalls.
b) On the second floor now undergoing are bowling lanes (6 alleys) for
recreational purposes which will soon open to the public in 3 months
time.
5. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is not an agricultural land. That out of the total area of
1,194 square meters, only around 850 square meters is dry land and that an
area of 334 sq. meters which used to be covered and uncovered by water
during high tide is now a reclaimed area, since way back 1977 when applicant
Angel Tilos Yu applied for a Foreshore Lease Application with [the] then
Bureau of Lands.
Respectfully
submitted,
(signed
) which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides.[22] It is part of the alienable land
MYRA B.
ROSAL[12]
On June 22, 1995, the OSG received a letter from Regional Executive Director Jose P. Catus of the
DENR, stating that an investigation was conducted on the instant case, and it was found that there were
grounds for opposition to the respondents land application. Land Investigator Fabio O. Catalan, Jr., who
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject land, found the same to be a reclaimed foreshore
area. Attached therein was the Amended Report of Land Investigator Catalan, Jr.(Catalan
Report);[13] the 1977 Foreshore Lease Application of Angel T. Yu;[14] the November 16, 1983 Visitation
and Examination Report of Land Investigator Antonio L. Luis over Lot No. 524;[15] and a blueprint plan
of Lot 524 (formerly Lot 2) of the Estancia Cadastre.[16]
After discovering the actual status of Lot 524, the Republic filed a petition for the annulment of
judgment with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals on July 20, 1995. [17]
On February 5, 1996, respondent Angel T. Yu filed a motion with the CA, praying that he be
allowed to submit to the Land Registration Authority the corrected technical description and the
republication in the Official Gazette of the corrected technical description of Plan Ap-063019, Lot 524,
Cad. 633-D dated January 15, 1996.[18] The OSG filed its objection thereto.[19]
On September 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment. It also ruled that since the RTC decision had already become final and executory, the
technical description could no longer be modified to include the increased area as prayed for by the
private respondent. The CA held as follows:
Lot 524 is not a foreshore land..
The CENRO report is proof that Lot 524, Cad-633-D, is an agricultural land. Out of the total area of 1,194
square meters, around 850 square meters is dry land. That an area of 334 sq. meters which used to be
covered and uncovered by water during high tide is now a reclaimed area, since way back
1977.(underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition for annulment of judgment is hereby DISMISSED. The motion of private
respondent dated January 15, 1996 is DENIED.[20]
Finding no relief from the CA, the Republic filed the instant petition, raising the issue that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE REPUBLICS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
ON THE MERE SUPPOSITION THAT LOT 524 IS NOT FORESHORE LAND, BUT AGRICULTURAL LAND. [21]
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, there is a need to take a closer look at the true nature of the land in question.
The petitioner asserts that Lot 524 is foreshore land.
Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea,
of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.[23]Foreshore land remains
part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private
appropriation.[24]
It is for this reason that the petitioner persists in its action to revert the subject land to the
State. Thus, even if the decision of the RTC has become final and executory, we find that the respondent
court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed before it which is
impressed with public interest. There are valid and meritorious grounds to justify such action. The State
has to protect its interests and can not be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts
of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof. As held in Republic vs. Alagad:[25]
[T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of the
most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition, SO ORDERED.
especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew after almost fifty years.Such primordial
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescence of public officials, is the Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
controlling norm Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

The Catalan Report, which states that the subject land is foreshore land, was received by the OSG
only on June 22, 1995, long after the RTC rendered its judgment on May 3, 1995. Angel T. Yu had, in
fact, filed a foreshore lease application in 1977 and paid the corresponding fees thereon. There is,
therefore, doubt to the respondents claim that he had been in actual, open, notorious, continuous
possession , in the concept of an owner.

Moreover, the Rosal Report dated April 12, 1995 was received by the OSG only on May 29,
1995. Although the report states that Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is declared public land and is alienable
and disposable per L.C. Map 1020, Project 44 dated July 26, 1933, the same report buttresses the
contention that the subject land is foreshore land and covered by a foreshore lease application filed by
Angel T. Yu. Finding the reports to be revealing and significant as to the real status of the land being
foreshore, the petitioner lost no time in filing the petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals.

We can not fault the trial court for not having considered in its decision the Rosal Report dated
April 12, 1995 which was apparently submitted to it. On March 15, 1995, the trial court issued an order
where it considered the case submitted for decision upon the submission to this court by the Land
Management Bureau, Manila and CENRO, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo of the report as directed in the Order of
this Court dated March 6, 1995, and after the Land Management Sector, Region 6, Iloilo City had duly
verified the discrepancy of plan Ap-063019-005139 of the subject land applied for.[26] In compliance
with the order, the trial court received a certification from the Land Management Bureau that the office
has no record of any kind of public land application/land patent covering the parcel of land[27] and
thereby approved the registration of the land in favor of respondent. The records reveal that the Rosal
Report, through a 1stIndorsement dated April 24, 1995, was received by the RTC only on May 5,
1995,[28] after the court had already rendered its decision on May 3, 1995. No motion for
reconsideration was filed to controvert the said decision based on the report. The OSGs receipt of the
Rosal and Catalan Reports on the status of the land were also belated through no fault of theirs.

Finally, we can not uphold the respondent courts finding regarding the character of the land. The
Rosal Report clearly states that the subject land is not an agricultural land. Despite such declaration,
the respondent court continued to rule that the subject land is agricultural on the basis that out of the
total area of 1,194 square meters, 850 square meters is dry land and that 334 square meters is now a
reclaimed area.[29]

Clearly, there is a need to determine once and for all whether the subject land is really foreshore
land and/or whether the respondent has registerable title thereto. The classification of public lands is
a function of the executive branch of government, specifically, the director of lands (now the director
of the Land Management Bureau).[30] This Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, for a proper and conclusive
classification of the land involved, the instant case has to be remanded to the trial court for that
determination.[31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,
Branch 37 for further proceedings.