RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y
PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO
G.R. No. Nos. 119987-88. October 12, 1995. EN BANC. (KAPUNAN, J.)

FACTS:

 The cadaver of a young girl, wrapped in a sack, was seen floating. When untied and removed from its
cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without her panties, with
gaping wounds over her body, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
 On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses and reports, the respondent accused were later charged with
the crime of Rape with Homicide.
 Subsequently, the respondent were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide after already been
charged of the same offense.
 After trial and presentation of the evidence, the respondent judge found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
 The City Prosecutor disagreed; prayed that the Decision be modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed against respondent accused.
 The respondent judge refused to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration and denied the
same for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Is the respondent judge correct in refusing to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No.
7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide?

RULING:

 NO.
 Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the
accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
 When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

 Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion
Perpetua but Death.
 While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows
judges the discretion - depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed - to
impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with
homicide is not one of these three instances.
 The law plainly and unequivocally provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death."
 The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty
under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

Petition is granted. The case is remanded to the RTC for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents.
5. THE UNITED STATES VS. ANTONIO VIZQUERA ET AL.
G.R. No. 1683. April 05, 1905 (WILLARD, J.)

FACTS:

 Pieces of evidence established that appellants, who committed the crime of homicide, were a part of a
band of highway robbers who were pursued by Filipinos and the United States. Several witnesses
testified that the Filipino authorities who were then in control of this part of the Province of Zambales
sent out troops for the purpose of apprehending these appellants and their companions.
 Appellants then argued that since the crime was committed on the 4th day of February, 1899, by reason
of its political character, they are entitled to the benefits of the amnesty granted by the President of the
United States on July 4, 1902. This was however denied by the court.
 The court, after hearing the evidence in regard to the commission of the offense, declared the testimony
closed. Afterwards, not being entirely satisfied on the subject of amnesty, he gave permission to the
parties to summon other witnesses upon that point. This was done, their testimony was taken, and final
judgment afterwards rendered.

ISSUE:
 W/N the action of the court constitutes a new trial and therefore erroneous for being done in the absence
of the defendants motion.

HELD:
 NO.
 Opening of the case before a judgment is rendered was not a new trial of the case, and such action was
clearly within the discretion of the trial court.
 After some evidence had been submitted by the parties the fiscal made a motion that the defendants be
declared entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. It is claimed in this court that that amounted to a
termination of the proceedings and to a withdrawal of the complaint by the fiscal. This point is covered
adversely to the appellants, by the decision of United States vs. Regino Valencia (1 Phil. Rep., 642).

The crime which the appellants committed was homicide, and the judge below imposed the penalty for that
crime. His judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants.
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-1553. October 25, 1949. EN BANC (Paras, J.)

FACTS
 Herein appellant Francisco Concepcion was found guilty of treason on three (3) counts and sentencing
him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 10,000.00 and the costs.
 Counsel for the appellant appealed the judgment of the lower court, alleging, among others (1) that the
lower court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of appellant’s Filipino citizenship after
the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had moved for dismissal, and (2) (3) (4) (5) that the
charges which the appellant was convicted have not been proven in accordance with the two-witness rule
– the there was no corroboration between two prosecution witnesses on some details.

ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the prosecution to present new evidence after the prosecution
had rested its case and the defense had moved for dismissal.

HELD
NO. The matter of reopening a case for the reception of further evidence after either the prosecution
or the defense has rested is within the discretion of the trial court.

Although there may not be corroboration between the two prosecution witnesses on the points they
testified, yet when the witnesses are uniform in their testimony on the overt act of treason charged, the two-
witness rule is complied with

The retraction of witnesses as ground for new trial are not entitled to credit, since their affidavits to that
effect are obviously the result of an afterthought, and if they could have lied during their testimony in court for
some consideration or motive, they can now by the same token commit another falsity.

The appealed judgment, being in conformity with facts and the law, is AFFIRMED. So ordered with
costs.
9. FRANCISCO EVARISTO, PEDRO CARDEÑO AND AGUSTIN MIANO, Petitioner, v. HON.
OLEGARIO LASTRILLA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch IV, and The
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF SAMAR, Respondents.

FACTS:
 The petitioners together with six others were charged with murder for the death of Pastor Muyot.
 The Court rendered judgment dated 11 March 1958, finding the petitioners guilty as charged in the
information and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua, the accessories of the law
 Their six co- defendants were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
 Upon being notified of the judgment, on the same day, 29 March 1958, the petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and served a copy thereof upon the Provincial Fiscal.
 On 10 April 1958 the petitioners moved for new trial upon the ground of the newly discovered evidence.
 On 28 July 1958, the petitioners asked to leave to amend their motion previously filed, attaching thereto
an amended motion for new trial of even date.

HELD:
1. In criminal proceedings, an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court in which the
judgment or order was rendered, and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party or his attorney
within fifteen days from the rendition of the judgment or order appealed from. And within five days after
the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk or judge of the Court with whom it is filed must transmit to the
Clerk of the Court to which the appeal is taken, the complete record of the case together with the notice
of appeal.
2. The filing of a notice of appeal in the trial court and serving a copy thereof upon the provincial fiscal,
perfected appellant’s appeal. Upon perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case to
pass upon a motion of new trial. Even in cases involving automatic review by the Supreme Court, if the
defendant perfects an appeal, although he is not in duty bound to do so, the Court of First Instance loses
jurisdiction of the case and can no longer pass upon or resolve a motion for new trial after the taking of
appeal by the defendant..
3. After perfection of appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case, except to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal
10. PEOPLE VS. COLMENARES

Supreme Court En Banc,

G.R. No. L-13284. February 29, 1960
Ponente: Labrador, J.

FACTS:

 This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
presiding, holding that the judgment of the Justice of the Peace court from which the appeal was made to the Court
of First Instance in Criminal Case No. 4567 of said court, had already become final, by failure of the defendants to
file their notice of appeal on time, and remanding the record to the Justice of the Peace for the execution of the
latter’s judgment.
 Defendants-appellants were charged in the Justice of the Peace court of La Castellana, for the crime of theft of 15
cavans of palay, belonging to the complainant Pedro Monsale. The attorney for the accused filed a motion to
reconsider the judgment, on the ground that in accordance with the documentary evidence presented during the trial
it appears that the case involved the question of ownership of the land from which the palay allegedly stolen was
raised.
 The above motion for reconsideration was set for hearing on May 27. The private prosecutor filed an opposition
thereto and a petition to strike the same, on the ground that it was pro forma.
 Upon the docketing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and on April 10, 1956, the assistant provincial fiscal
immediately presented a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the decision of the justice of the peace
court sentencing the accused, having been received by the latter on April 29 and the motion for reconsideration
having been denied on May 28, 1955, a period of more than 15 days had elapsed when the appeal was perfected,
for the reason that the motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period to perfect an appeal, it being a pro
forma motion and, therefore, the decision of the Justice of the Peace court had become final when the appeal was
entered.
 The Court of First Instance sustained this motion to dismiss the appeal. From this order an appeal was prosecuted
to the Court of Appeals, which endorsed the case to Us as involving exclusively questions of law.

ISSUE:
WON the motion filed in the Justice of the Peace court was a pro forma motion

RULING:

 It is argued on behalf of appellants that the motion filed in the Justice of the Peace court was not a pro forma motion,
and secondly, that said court had already ruled that the judgment had not become final when it forwarded the record
to the Court of First Instance after appellants filed their notice of appeal.
 Both the first motion for reconsideration and the subsequent one cannot be said to be pro forma; they raise valid
questions of law and fact. Said motions point to an error of law in the judgment prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the accused. It cannot therefore be said to be merely pro forma; it satisfied provisions Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court that a new trial should be granted when errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant;"

DISPOSITIVE:

Wherefore, the order of dismissal of the appeal must be reversed and the case remanded to the Court of First Instance
of origin for trial on the merits. Without costs.
11. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. AGUSTIN ALQUISAR, ET. AL., AGUSTIN
ALQUIZAR and MARCELO LOZANO
G.R. No. L-32080 May 22, 1975

Facts:
Pursuant to the appeal interposed by defendants Agustin Alquizar and Marcelo Lozano from the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Criminal Circuit Court of Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-16-2
DS (3433), the record of said case was transmitted to this Court.

On June 18, 1970, the following resolution was adopted —

Considering the letter of transmittal of record of the Deputy Clerk Lazaro N. Baarde of the Criminal Circuit Court
of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, stating that stenographer Melquiades Asuncion died in a sea accident on
February 6, 1969 and that he had with him in that accident the untranscribed stenographic notes he had taken in
the trial of this case, THE COURT RESOLVED to require the parties herein to move in the premises, within 10
days from notice hereof.

The Solicitor General, in his comment dated July 21, 1970, stated that it is necessary to remand the case to the
lower court for the reconstitution of the testimonies of the witnesses enumerated in the letter of transmittal of
Deputy Clerk Lazaro N. Baarde.

Thus, in accordance with the resolution of this Court dated July 8, 1970, the original record of aforesaid criminal
case was remanded to the court of origin on July 13, 1970, "for the reconstitution of the testimonies of the 10
witnesses involved or for the retaking of their testimonies."

Issue:
Whether or not a trial should ensue

Ruling:
This Court in the case ofPeople vs. Castelo, et al. (1 SCRA 461-462)had occasion to resolve a similar situation,
stating that —

The remedy, in case the transcript of the stenographic notes, containing the testimony of some prosecution
witnesses has been lost, is reconstitution of the missing evidence, not a new trial. It is only when the decision
itself has been lost and no authentic copy-thereof obtainable that the case should be decided anew as if it had
never been decided.

So that —
In the exercise of the court's inherent power to supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings and of its
discretion to adopt, in the absence of any specific procedure, any suitable process or mode of proceedings, which
appears most conformable to the spirit of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court decided to remand an appealed
case to the court solely for the purpose of reconstructing the testimony of the witnesses, the stenographic notes of
whose testimony had been lost, by retaking their testimony and, if deemed necessary, of some other witness who
had personal knowledge of the facts testified to by the witness who is dead.
17. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. MARIANO CU UNJIENG, JOHN DOE and
MANUEL CARLOS
G.R. No. L-41200. December 17, 1935. EN BANC (Diaz, J.)

Facts

 Manuel Carlos, an expert forger, was ordered by Rafael Fernandez to forge sugar warehouse receipts and
contracts of loan on future crops. The purpose of Fernandez in ordering him to commit said falsifications was
to negotiate the forged documents with the Cu Unjiengs, the banks and other persons.

 All the forged warehouse receipts by pledging which Rafael Fernandez succeeded in obtaining several sums
of money in the form of overdrafts from the National City Bank of New York and the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, were supposed to be of the Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc.

 The CFI of Manila convicted the appellants of the crime of (hindi nasabi dito sa case )

 Several motions (a total of four), one after another, have been filed by the appellant Mariano Cu Unjieng to
ask for a new trial on the ground that new evidence of such nature that, if admitted, would result in the
modification or revocation of the sentence imposed upon the appellant, has been discovered.
Ruling

 It should be noted at the outset that the second, third and fourth motions have been presented in open violation
of Rule 39 of the Rules of this court. Said rule does not permit the filing of more than one motion for
reconsideration or for new trial without express leave of the court which must precisely be secured beforehand;
much less, when, as it happens in this case, the special period of more than two and a half months, which had
been granted for the presentation of a motion of that nature, has already elapsed. And this rule holds true,
notwithstanding the fact that section 42 of General Orders No. 58 permits the filing of a motion for new trial
at any time before the final entry of a judgment of conviction, because the granting or not granting of such
motions is purely discretionary act (U.S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416), and the denial and even the striking
out of such motions does not constitute an abuse of discretion when, as the ones here under consideration,
they are without merit and, besides, have been presented without due permission and outside the authorized
period of time.

 The appellant took part in the commission of the complex crime of which he was convicted with the same
malice and to the same degree or extent as the said witness and Rafael Fernandez. Even granting for the sake
of argument that it was not the appellant who instructed Manuel Carlos to falsify the documents referred to in
the case, his responsibility as co-author of the said crime is the same because before pledging the warehouse
receipts, certificates of stock and the other documents mentioned in the decision of the trial court, he was
aware of the nullity thereof on account of their falsify.

 Summarizing all that has heretofore been said, the recantation of Manuel Carlos, the revelation of Amalia
Francisco, and the other facts alleged by the defense as ground for its motion for new trial do not constitute
and cannot constitute newly discovered evidence sufficient in law to warrant the reopening of the case or the
holding of a new trial.

 Before closing, it should be stated that on October 7, 1935, the defense again filed an extensive memorandum
in writing. This is contrary to rule 39 of the Rules of this court. If such practice were tolerated, suits and
proceedings would become interminable and unnecessarily voluminous, and in order not to establish a bad
precedent, said memorandum should be ordered stricken out from the record.
For all the foregoing, the court resolves to deny, as it hereby denies, the above-stated four motions for new trial
of the appellant; and orders that said motions, that is, that of June 15, 1935, and the first, second and third
supplemental motions of July 13th, August 14th, and September 14th, respectively, of said year, together with all
the annexa thereto, be turned over to the Solicitor General so that, after due investigation, the person concerned
may bring the corresponding criminal action for perjury against those persons found to be responsible for said
crime; and orders, finally, that the memorandum of the defense filed on October 7, 1935, be stricken out from the
record. So ordered.
18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. POLICARPIO TIONGSON Y GARCIA
G.R. Nos. L-15201 and L-15202 October 31, 1962 EN BANC

FACTS:

On October 19, 1958, the body of William Co Chi Chay was discovered by his brother, Jacinto Velasco Co, lying
on an army cot inside the Champion Watch and Jewelry Store at Rizal Avenue Sta. Cruz, Manila. The cot and the
floor of the store were covered with blood, and empty watch-boxes found scattered all around. Three policemen
arrived at the scene of the crime about twenty minutes later. A postmortem examination of the cadaver showed
the victim died of extensive traumatic comminuted fractures of the skull, with contusions and hemorrhages the
brain caused by a blow from a hard, blunt object with an elevated edge like monkey wrench.

Two days after the discovery of the crime, the Cavite Police arrested Policarpio Tiongson and Rufino Galang
while trying, through the latter's sister, to sell men's and ladies' wrist watches to one Amado Rustia. After being
questioned at police headquarters, they were taken for further investigation to Manila where Tiongson, in the
evening of October 22, 1958, executed a sworn statement admitting his participation in the commission the
robbery in question and pointing to his co-defend Navarro as the one who killed the deceased. Galang also
executed a sworn statement admitting that he was in the house of Tiongson in the morning of October 19, 1958
and that in the morning of 21st of the same month, they agreed to sell the stolen watches in Cavite thru his sister.
He also implicated Navarro and Salvador Villaveles having participated in the commission of the crime.

On November 3, 1958, Navarro was apprehended in Cabanatuan City and executed a written statement confessing
his participation in the commission of the crime but pointing to Tiongson the slayer of William Co Chi Chay

The trial court further found that defendants planned to rob the Champion Watch and Jewelry Store and that to
facilitate their getaway after the robbery and to carry their loot to the provinces, Navarro hired a car driven by
Salvador Villaveles whom he took to Tiongson's house in the early morning of October 19 that Navarro and
Villaveles then proceeded to Avenida Rizal, followed by Tiongson; that to gain entrance into the store, Tiongson,
who was acquainted with the deceased, brought along a watchclock which the latter had sent him for repairs days
before; that once inside, Tiongson hit the deceased on the head with a monkey wrench while the latter was sitting
on an army cot, causing a fracture in the cranium and other mortal wounds which led to his death; that meanwhile,
Navarro ransacked the showcases, taking 67 watches therefrom and scattering the empty boxes on the floor; that
thereafter, defendants left the store and were joined by Galang and Villaveles who were on guard outside.

Tiongson claims that his extrajudicial confession, and those of Navarro and Galang were obtained through force
and intimidation; that the lower court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated testimony of accomplice
Salvador Villaveles and in not giving credit to his defense of alibi.

ISSUE: W/N the motion for a new trial filed by Tiongson should be granted based on the ground that the
confessions were obtained by force and intimidation and on the ground of newly discovered e idence?

HELD:

The claim that the confessions mentioned above were obtained through force and intimidation is unfounded.

Navarro signed his statement before Fiscal Cabrera who, according to the evidence, explained its contents to him
before he signed it. While Navarro, on the witness stand, pointed out the portions of his confession that, according
to him, were his true answers and those that were supplied by his investigators, he did not tell Fiscal Cabrera
anything about this before he signed his confession. He was also physically examined by the NBI after signing
his statement, but he told the examining physician nothing about the alleged duress he was previously subjected
to. Indeed, that no such unlawful means was employed is demonstrated by his own admission that he was allowed
to make deletions and corrections in the confession.
As far as the confession of Galang is concerned, the record shows that the contents thereof were translated and
explained to him before he affixed his signature thereto. Similarly, he was subjected to a physical examination
after making the statement, but no evidence of maltreatment was found in his person.

Tiongson's claim of maltreatment, on the other hand, is supported only by his testimony, and there is suffice
evidence showing that whatever injuries he had sustained during his confinement were not inflicted by the police
authorities but by a brother of the deceased.

Lastly, it should be observed first, that the confessions contain details that the police could not have possibly
supplied or invented, and second, that the declarants tried blame one another for the killing. These circumstance
lead us to believe that the confessions were freely made.

Tiongson's claim that the lower court should not have failed on the uncorroborated testimony of Salvador
Villaveles is likewise untenable. Villaveles testimony in open court was merely confirmatory of the statements
contained in his confession in which he described how Tiongson and Navarro conspired to commit the crime and
how the crime was actually committed. While testimony coming from the mouth of a co-conspirator must be
accepted with caution, we believe that in this case, the trial court was justified in giving credit to that of Villaveles,
no part of said testimony having been shown by appellants to be false.

To support his alibi, Tiongson testified that on the morning of October 19, 1958 he had several visitors in his
house located at 2316 Misericordia, Manila, one of whom was a certain Rufino Galang who asked him to sell an
outboard motor; that another visitor named Adelaida Viray arrived between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock and still
another named Esperanza Guhit arrived at about 10 o'clock, both having left the house only before lunch time;
that his co-accused Navarro and Villaveles were among his visitors at about 11 o'clock that morning, and they
offered to sell him 65 brand new watches, according to them, were smuggled goods; that he was able to pay them
only P750 and agreed to pay the balance in two or three days; that Viray and Guhit saw him pay for the watches
and even offered some to them but they refused to buy.

Tiongson's alibi was correctly disregarded by the trial court. While his testimony is somewhat incoherent, it
sufficiently establishes the fact that among his alleged visitors about 11 o'clock in the morning of October 19,
1958 were Navarro and Villaveles who brought with them a bag full of watches. As the crime was committed at
an earlier hour that same morning, it would seem reasonable to assume that Tiongson and his confederates had
repaired to his house with their loot after committing the crime.

Appellant Navarro, for his part, testified that in the morning of October 17, 1958, he went to Novaliches to visit
his friend, Simeon de Jesus; that he and the latter went to witness a basketball game in Novaliches at about 8
o'clock a.m., having left the game only at 12 o'clock noon when they went to de Jesus' house in Barrio Gulod;
that at 2 o'clock that afternoon he witnessed another basketball game at the public plaza of Novaliches, and spent
the night in the house of de Jesus; that on the following day he went to the Forest Hills with some friends; that it
was only on November 1, 1958 that he learned from his sister in the house of de Jesus that he was being charged
with murder.

It is obvious that Navarro's testimony is hard to believe. In the first place, why he stayed for so many days in the
house of de Jesus in Novaliches has not been satisfactorily explained. In the second place, while he claims that
his purpose in going to Novaliches was to witness basketball games, he admitted that, in reality, he did not know
that such games were to be played until he arrived in said municipality. On the other hand, Navarro's witnesses
do not seem to be reliable ones. His intimate friend, Simeon de Jesus, could not even tell how many players there
are in a basketball team; while he and Navarro testified that they were present at the start of the games 8 o'clock
in the morning, Navarro's other witness a friend, Manuel Austria, said that Navarro invited him to the games only
at 8:30 a.m. and that they arrived at the place where the basketball games were being played at 8:40 a.m. To this
we must add the circumstance that, according to appellant Tiongson, Navarro went to his house at Misericordia
St., Manila at on October 19. This precludes the possibility of Navarro being in Novaliches that same morning.
Indeed, that Navarro was in Manila that morning is admitted in his sworn statement given to the police after his
arrest in Cabanatuan City

Lastly, Navarro's contention that the alleged conspirator to commit the crime had not been established by evidence
other than the confessions mentioned heretofore is without merit. After going over the testimony of Salvador
Villaveles, we are satisfied that the same is quite sufficient to establish the conspiracy.

Appellant Tiongson filed in this Court a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence consisting of
affidavit of Villaveles in which the latter recants his previous testimony implicating Tiongson. Petitions of this
nature have heretofore been denied by us because of the untrustworthiness of similar evidence coming from the
mouth of convicts or ex-convicts who have nothing or not much to lose by recanting previous testimony given
under oath. For this same reason Tiongson's motion should be, as it is hereby, denied.
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO MORALES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-37107 April 27, 1982, ERICTA, J.

FACTS:
Notwithstanding appellant’s defense of alibi, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on the basis of the positive identification made by the only eyewitness for the
prosecution, the father of the deceased who testified that while he and his son were walking together with appellant
and the latter’s brother Ludovico, appellant suddenly and without warning fired at the deceased who fell to the
ground, after which Ludovico stabbed the latter with his butcher’s knife and then, appellant fired another shot at
the victim who not aware of the impending assault had no chance to defend himself and died. After the trial,
appellant moved for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of the retraction of the only
eyewitness for the procession, but was denied. Hence, this appeal both from the judgment of conviction and the
order denying the motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for new trial may be granted based on an affidavit.

HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that the commission of murder was clearly established by the positive identification of
the appellant by an eyewitness without any improper motive against which the weight of alibi as a defense is nil
and the motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation of a witness whose purpose
is to free the Appellant.
The motion for new trial will not be granted if the motion is based on an affidavit of recantation of a witness
whose effect is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the crime. It would be a dangerous
rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. It is not improbable that such a retraction was made
for a consideration, usually monetary.
21. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch XVI, Court of First Instance of Manila, and CESAR URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION
CLAUDIO,

G.R. No. L-27935 August 16, 1985| MAKASIAR, C.J.:| SECOND DIVISION

Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio was charged w/ the crime of theft. The informantion
states that the accussed steal Six pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at -P7,104.62 all
valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one Juan B. Bañez, Jr.

July 7, 1967, Respondent Court of First Instance of Manila orders the case dismissed. On the ground that
it is in the opinion that the same is more civil than criminal. The issue is who is the owner of the logs. Both parties
claim ownership and both claim that they can prove ownership. During the summary investigation the accused
acknowledged to have taken the logs from the compound in the pier in good faith, without any intention to steal
them from anybody.

Private prosecutors filed a "motion for reconsideration" . CFI denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the order dated July 7, 1967.

HELD: YES

It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were not placed under
oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge, Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered
into the records of the case before respondent Court. respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order
was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.

Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its
evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due
process.

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction

PS. Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same
does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Mas nadiscussed dito yung double jeopardy
kesa sa reconsidation)
23. LEODEGARIO PAYO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. [G.R. No. L-36809. February 24, 1984.]
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the review by certiorari of the decision of the now defunct Court of Appeals which affirmed his
conviction by the likewise defunct Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I of the crime of estafa on an
information which charged that petitioner "having received in trust One (1) unit Blackstone, heavy duty diesel
engine for repair and overhauling from Generoso Acero valued at P10,000.00, under the express obligation of
repairing the same and turning it over to the owner upon payment of the proper fees for repair, but instead of
complying with the said aforesaid obligation, said accused inspite of repeated demands, with grave abuse of
discretion, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed and still fails to return the said engine, having sold the
same to one Romana Rubia and misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to his personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Generoso Acero in the aforesaid amount of P10,000.00."
The charges were denied by petitioner and as a defense, he alleged that the engine in question was bartered to him
by complainant Generoso Asero when, after he made an estimate that the cost of the repair would amount to
P3,000.00, complainant agreed to his proposal that the engine be exchanged with his corn degerminator and
several equipments, plus the amount of P1,000.00.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court convicting petitioner of the offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner filed a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was supported by an affidavit executed by
complainant Acero admitting in a sworn statement that his transaction with petitioner was really one of barter.
The appellate court denied the motion for new trial declaring that the alleged newly discovered evidence was
only for "impeachment" purposes, "since complainant had declared in the trial (and) subjected to cross-
examination" and rendered its decision affirming petitioner's conviction, as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review, wherein petitioner prays that the appealed decision be set aside
and that he be acquitted or at least that the case be remanded to the court a quo for new trial.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial.

Held: Such sworn statement of complainant in the language of Lao Wan Sing, supra, "constitutes an evidence
that was discovered by the appellant after the lower court had tried and decided the case, and while this case was
pending appeal. The statements made by the [complainant] after the trial in the Court below was evidence which
the appellant could not have secured during the trial, such that, they can be considered as a newly discovered
evidence that may be properly be presented in a new trial. More so, because those statements appear to be a
material evidence that may change the judgment, that had been rendered." Granted, then that complainant's sworn
statement constituted impeachment evidence, as held by the appellate court, it nevertheless partook of the nature
of material newly discovered evidence that should properly be presented in a new trial. The Court in said case
went on to cite the precedent of U.S. vs. Dacir, 26 Phil. 204, that ". . . The practice of this Court has been to grant
new trials in such cases only in very exceptional instances, as for example, in cases wherein it is made to appear
that there was no evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction other than the testimony of a witness who is
shown to have made contradictory statements as to material facts, and where it appears further that under all the
circumstances of the case proof that the witness had varied or modified his testimony out of court and after the
trial would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion."
Indeed the Solicitor General cites the jurisprudential test for granting a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, as follows:
 "Settled is the rule that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must
be shown:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching and of such a weight that it would
probably change a judgment if admitted. Evidence which merely seeks to impeach the evidence upon which the
conviction was based, or retractions of witnesses, will not constitute grounds for new trial, unless it is shown that
there is no evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except the testimony of the retracting witness. The
reason for this rule is that, if new trial will be granted at every instance where any interested party succeeds in
inducing some of the witnesses to vary their testimony outside of court after trial, there will be no end to litigation.
Indeed, the case at bar clearly appears to fall within the recognized exception that the evidence in the form of
complainant's "recanting" or "clarificatory" statement after the trial and on appeal that "he was in fact acceptable
(sic) to the proposed exchange" although later because of some disagreement he "was not anymore agreeable to
continue with the agreed barter" was material and vital evidence which could not be produced at the trial. For it
was testimonial evidence on the part of complainant which could not be elicited from him at the trial and to which
he alone held the key, answerable only to his own conscience. It is in the compelling interest of justice that such
statement of complainant be allowed to be submitted in a new trial, which if admitted, is of such weight that it
could probably change the judgment as there would then be no evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to SET ASIDE the appellate court's decision and to remand the records of
the case to the trial court below for a new trial.
24. GAUDENCIO C. HIQUIANA, ET AL., v. ISMAEL L. VELOSO, ETC.
G.R. No. 47864. May 12, 1942. EN BANC. (OZAETA, J.)

FACTS:

 Four persons were accused of theft in the Justice of the Peace court. Two of them were convicted and two
acquitted.
 The two accused who were convicted presented a motion for new trial, which was submitted to respondent
Justice of the Peace Ismael Veloso.
 Without expressly setting aside the decision, the Justice of the Peace granted a new trial, saying that the
court is convinced that a review of the case is necessary, and announcing its intention to make an ocular
inspection of the place of the crime.
 A motion for reconsideration was presented by the offended party, but it was denied.
 The prosecutor instituted the present certiorari proceedings in the trial court to annul the order of the
Justice of the Peace granting the motion for new trial.
 The trial court granted the writ and ordered the Justice of the Peace to abstain from holding a new trial in
said criminal case, instructing him to elevate the case to the trial court as if it had been appealed by the
accused.
 Justice of the Peace appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace has authority to grant a new trial in a criminal case.

RULING:

 NO.
 There is no statutory provision granting the Justice of the Peace authority to consider a motion for a new
trial, but held nevertheless that it does not require statutory authority for a court to correct its errors or
mistakes during the time which it has control over its decisions.
 The authority to grant a motion for reconsideration or a new trial is implied from the inherent power of
the court to correct its own error before its decision becomes final; and what is implied need not be
expressed.
 Such authority is clearly deduced by implication from the provision of section 6 of Rule 119 of the new
Rules of Court, referring to appeals from judgments of the justice of the peace or municipal court in
criminal cases, which says that the period of appeal shall be interrupted from the date a motion for new
trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or
his attorney.
 The granting of a new trial is practically a revision of the case, which pertains to the appellate court and
not to the respondent Justice of the Peace.
 There is no provision in General Orders No. 58 authorizing justices of the peace to grant a new trial in
criminal cases. Neither is there any provision in Rule 119 of the new Rules of Court for such authorization.
 It is only in civil cases that a justice of the peace may grant a new trial.
 A justice of the peace, according to the trial court, may grant a motion for reconsideration but not a new
trial.

The decision appealed from is reversed, with costs.

25. Ceferino E. Paredes v. Felix Borja and Cresencio Catalan
G.R. No. L-15559, November 29, 1961, EN BANC (Padilla, J.)

Facts:
- Private Respondent Cresencio Catalan was charged with Malicious Mischief for pulling and
destroying the corn plants of Josefa Lapora, a tenant of Exaltacion Jagonia de Amparado
- Catalan entered a plea of guilty and the other respondent Felix Borja (Justice of the Peace
Court) sentenced him to indemnify the offended party and to suffer ten days imprisonment.
- Catalan thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that he had a legitimate
claim on the land upon which he uprooted the corn plants. This was based on a judgment
by the CFI of Misamis Occidental in a separate civil case ordering Exaltacion Jagonia de
Amparado to return possession to Catalan half of the land in litigation.
- On June 12, 1958, Justice of the Peace Court Felix Borja set aside his judgment and ordered
that Catalans guilty plea be substituted with a not guilty plea.
- The Petitioner thereafter filed an Urgent MR of the June 12, 1958 order on the ground that
the respondent’s MR, which were in the nature of motions for rehearing were not verified
and not supported by affidavits of merit.
- Petitioner contends that the Justice of the Peace Court should not have entertained the
Catalan’s MR because they were not verified and not supported by affidavits. It further
contends that after a judgment of conviction has been entered in a criminal case, the motion
filed for the purpose of substituting a plea of guilty by one of not guilty is equivalent to a
petition for reopening the case, and must not only be verified but accompanied by an
affidavit of merit.

Issue: Whether or not Catalan’s MR should have been verified and supported by affidavits of
merit.

Ruling: Justice of the Peace affirmed.

- The contention of petition is based on the law on criminal procedure in General Order No.
58, which is no longer controlling.
- The (present) rules on criminal procedure under the Rules of Court do not require that a
motion for new trial be verified.
- While the Rules of Court and General Order 58 similarly require that an affidavit of merit
be attached to support a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defect
of lack of it in Catalan’s MR was cured by his testimony under oath at the hearing of the
MR. It was petitioner himself who presented in evidence the judgment (in the separate civil
case), which is the basis of Catalan’s MR.
-
Dispositive Portion:
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ prayed for by the appellee is denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.