(1) Ma. Estela Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan (G.R. No.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same
131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6)
FACTS:
Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of
Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion
of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of
donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995,
bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for
two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:"That for and in
consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR
does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the
present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and
effect."
Conchita died and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds of donation the deeds of donation are
void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners
deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly
and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. RTC and CA: Deeds of
Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure
to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code
ISSUE:
Whether the donations are valid
HELD:
No. Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made
by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the
donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the
donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.
The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the
Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation. That the donations were
made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the
donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be
executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments
under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
“ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be Vsubscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be requiredto retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)”
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and
the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the
above-quoted provisions of law.
(2) Rioferio v. CA. G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and
Kalookan City.He also left a widow, Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July
11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning
his paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada, legitimate
children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
Dagupan City.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of
Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate
Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles. Petitioners filed their
Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of
the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally
belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles thereof were delivered
to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name.
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as
where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or
is one of the guilty parties himself. The rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue
for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration
proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with
the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the Rules of
Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized the legal
standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under
administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus: The above-quoted
rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased.
These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already
been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the mean-time do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions:

(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and
he is made a party defendant.