Property
6 (Possession)
1. Pleasantville Devt Corp v CA; G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996.
[G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996.]
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES,
INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.
Mirano, Mirano & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Abraham D. Caña for Wilson Kee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon
the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving
bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said
lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not
Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise. cdll
2. ID.; AGENCY; PETITIONER, AS PRINCIPAL, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF
ITS AGENT, CTTEI, WHICH ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY. — The rule is that
the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and
should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his
authority is personally liable for the damage. CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real
estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of
authority, it was, however, negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability,
as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
3. ID.; DAMAGES; AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED IS A FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH
SHOULD BE DETERMINED AFTER EVIDENCE IS ADDUCED. — Now, the extent and/or amount
of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is
adduced. However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial
court; hence no damages could now be awarded.
4. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY'S FEES; THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES LIES WITHIN THE
DISCRETION OF THE COURT AND DEPENDS UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE.
— The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and for the recovery of
damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the
owner's agent, a builder in good faith? This is the main issue resolved in this petition for review
on certiorari to reverse the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 11040,
promulgated on August 20, 1987. cda
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved to transfer this
case (along with several others) to the Third Division. After due deliberation and consultation, the
Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located
at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico
bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on
December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who
had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the
Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all
installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and
another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were
paid prior to Kee's taking actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a
copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee's
wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was
Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and
other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to
reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with
damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further
ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to
give notice of his intention to begin construction required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to
Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-sari store without the prior approval of petitioner
required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was
merely to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the lot. 3
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8
for the latter's failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission.
The rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted. The MTCC concluded
that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner.
Property 6 (Possession)
Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot
claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 9,
covered by TCT No. 106367 and to remove all structures and
improvements he introduced thereon;
2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the
rate of P15.00 a day computed from the time this suit was filed on March
12, 1981 until he actually vacates the premises. This amount shall bear
interests (sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Subdivision are ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and P700.00 as cost and litigation
expenses." 4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and
CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that
they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. 5 It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It
further ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was,
nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the
time he was served with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the
order against the defendant to vacate the premises of Lot No. 9 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367 of the land records of Bacolod
City; the removal of all structures and improvements introduced thereon
at his expense and the payment to plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P15.00)
Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from January 30, 1981,
the date of the demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint,
until he had vacated (sic) the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per
annum. This Court further renders judgment against the defendant to pay
the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as attorney's
fees, plus costs of litigation.
"The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville
Development Corporation and C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed.
The order against Third-Party Defendants to pay attorney's fees to plaintiff
and costs of litigation is reversed." 6
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee appealed directly
to the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-
up" when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous
delivery was due to the negligence of CITEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable
to its principal, petitioner herein. The appellate court also ruled that the award of rentals was
without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is
REVERSED, and judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he introduced on Lot 9, and is entitled to the
rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New
Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Development Corporation are solidarily liable under the
following circumstances:
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the
improvements and, thereafter, remove these
structures, the third-party defendants shall
answer for all demolition expenses and the
value of the improvements thus destroyed or
rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-
party defendants shall answer for the amount
representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee
should pay to Jardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Development Corporation are ordered to pay in solidum the
amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as
litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
"Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the
determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property
(Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of
the New Civil Code." 7
Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent Court's
Decision, as follows:
"1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in
accord with law or the the (sic) applicable decisions of the Supreme Court
on third-party complaints, by ordering third-party defendants to pay the
demolition expenses and/or price of the land;
"2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of
judicial proceedings, by granting to private respondent Kee the rights of a
builder in good faith in excess of what the law provides, thus enriching
private respondent Kee at the expense of the petitioner;
Property 6 (Possession)
"3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed
the rights of the parties, it becomes imperative to set aside or at least
modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to harmonize with justice and
the facts;
"4. Private respondent Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the
lower court is clearly a builder in bad faith, having violated several
provisions of the contract to sell on installments;
"5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal,
Pleasantville Development Corporation (liable) for the acts made by the
agent in excess of its authority is clearly in violation of the provision of the
law; cdlex
"6. The award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent
to putting a premium in (sic) court litigation."
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's ruling that Kee was a
builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. We agree with the following observation of the
Court of Appeals:
"The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors
committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee
and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would
knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by another,
deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected
from the land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the
social humiliation that would follow.
"Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man
in ascertaining the identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of land
registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds
of the property with which he is dealing. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his
property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT
No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developer's
agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for the
production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. Upon Kee's receipt
of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's
employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was
pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the
reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification
of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were
reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted ex-
abundantiacautela, such as being present during the geodetic engineer's
relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to
countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their
owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI.
Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact
transpire. Kee's efforts all went to naught." 8
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. 9 And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the
burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. 10
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he
bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus,
Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs
22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a
builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot
9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the
said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee
was a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on
Installment covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before the present action
was instituted. This has no relevance on the liability of petitioner, as such fact does not negate
the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant
only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee. Lex Libris
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was erroneously
pointed out to him" because the latter agreed to the following provision in the Contract of
Sale on Installment, to wit:
"13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract
he/she has personally examined or inspected the property made subject-
matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition
of the lots and from the date hereof whatever consequential change
therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of
the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her." 11
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location,
contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having
examined the property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the
expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his
right to recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be
contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless the waiver
Property 6 (Possession)
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law." 12
The Second Issue: Petitioner's Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was
dismissed by the RTC after ruling that there was no evidence from which fault or negligence
on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can be inferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed and
found CTTEI negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot by Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that
the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which was clearly outside the scope of its
authority, and consequently, CTTEI alone should be liable. It asserts that "while [CTTEI] was
authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was never authorized to deliver
the wrong lot to Kee." 13
Petitioner's contention is without merit. LLpr
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. 14 On the other hand, the agent
who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage. 15
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of
petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was,
however, negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal
of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on
July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico
and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:
"1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled "Jardinico vs. Kee" which is now
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, regardless of the outcome of
the decision shall be mutually disregarded and shall not be pursued by the
parties herein and shall be considered dismissed and without effect
whatsoever;" 16
Kee asserts though that the "terms and conditions in the said deed of sale are
strictly for the parties thereto" and that "(t)here is no waiver made by either of the parties in
said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award the honorable respondent Court of
Appeals may make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville Development
Corporation and/or private respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc." 17
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we
have earlier stated, petitioner's liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent. On the
other hand, what the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico;
it stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
"2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville
Development Corporation are solidarily liable under the following
circumstances:
"a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements
and, thereafter, remove these structures, the third-party
defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and
the value of the improvements thus destroyed or
rendered useless;
"b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party
defendants shall answer for the amount representing the
value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico." 18
Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be
unjustly enriched at its expense. In other words, Kee would be able to own the lot, as buyer,
without having to pay anything on it, because the aforequoted portion of respondent Court's
Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly and solidarily to "answer" or reimburse
Kee therefor.
We agree with petitioner. cda
Petitioner's liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence,
the petitioner should be held liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages
to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is adduced.
However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court;
hence no damages could now be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and
owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e.,Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the
application of such law, on the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and
Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with
regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals' Decision [as reproduced above] holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable.
The Third Issue: Attorney's Fees
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of
P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the
award, consistent with its ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of
Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was
liable for its agent's negligence.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends
upon the circumstances of each case. 19 We shall not interfere with the discretion of the
Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and
for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent. 20
In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of
Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights granted him under the Articles 448, 546 and 548
of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by Kee and
Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. There
is also no further need, as ruled by the appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of
origin "for determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9),
as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code."
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily liable for
Property 6 (Possession)
damages due to negligence; however, since the amount and/or
extent of such damages was proven during the trial, the same
cannot now be quantified and awarded;
(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to pay in solidum the
amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as
litigation expenses; and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pleasantville Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, [February 1, 1996], 323
PHIL 12-29)
2. Kasilag v Rodriguez; G.R. No. 46623. December 7, 1939.
[G.R. No. 46623. December 7, 1939.]
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner, vs. RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO
ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO,respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag; for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon; for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS, INTERPRETATION; MORTGAGE OF IMPROVEMENTS UPON
LAND ACQUIRED AS HOMESTEAD. — The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is
to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their
will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule
and provides, further, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and
if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1' should be interpreted in accordance
with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be
interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting
parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan
in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory
contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties
having, moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words,
the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired
as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ANTICHRESIS. — Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of
contracts, not less important than those indicated is to the effect that the terms, clauses
and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract when such separation can be made because they are independent of the
valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Addressing ourselves now
to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal
contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the
land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contracts is valid
as it is not against the law. The second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly
authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517. It
will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should E. A. fail to
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the
loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of
sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated and owing. This stipulation was
verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense that the
petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on
condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend
to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made by the parties independently, were
calculated to alter the mortgage contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a
contract of antichresis (article 1881 of the Civil Code). The contract of antichresis, being a
real incumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is condemned by section
116 of Act No. 2874, as amended, but the clauses regarding the contract of antichresis
being independent and separable from the contract of mortgage, can be eliminated, thereby
leaving the latter in being because it is legal and valid.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH. — It is a fact that the petitioner
is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that
the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much
importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner
appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel
to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, about which we
have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and
enjoying its fruits.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the
meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the improvements upon the
land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the
respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the
petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value
to be fixed by the court of origin.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J p:
Property 6 (Possession)
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court
of Appeals which modified that rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bataan in civil
case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract, Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void
and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the
disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino
Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner
should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free
from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the defendant-
petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the
decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the
value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also
ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of
the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in
favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners
in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law,
without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the
possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana
Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No.
325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section
122 of Act. No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the
municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to them the
sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received from the land; that
the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to
the respondents; that the petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from
conveying or encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of
Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the
respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint
and by way of special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he
was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him
and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a notary
public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12
per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents
be declared to have a better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to
pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the improvements which he introduced upon the
land.
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the
following public deed: "This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932,
by and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay,
Bataan, P. I., hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of
legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P. I.,
hereinafter called party of the second part.
"WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and
agree to and with each other as follows:
"ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute
registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of Alañgan, municipality
of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by
homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the bureau of Lands on
June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay Cadastre, General
Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and
described as follows:
"Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84° 32' W.
614.82 m. from B. B. M. No. 3, thence N. 66° 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2";
S. 5° 07' W. to point "5"; 6° 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82° 17' W. to
point "5"; S. 28° 63' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71° 09' W. to point "7";
N. 1° 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning,
"Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares.
"Points 1, 2, 6 and 7, B. L.; points 3, 4 and 5, stakes; points 4,
5 and 6 on bank of Alañgan River.
"Bounded on the North, by property claimed by Maria
Ambrocio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alañgan River and
property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property
claimed by Jose del Rosario.
"Bearing true. Declination 0° 51' E.
"Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and
in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by
Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on
February 25, 1931.
"ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described
land consist of the following:
"Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills
of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) bonga trees.
"ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and
the assessed value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax
declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
"ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second
part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,
the party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of
mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of
which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
"ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if
the party of the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to be paid to
the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before
the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (41) years after date
of the execution of this instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 Per cent per annum, then said mortgage
shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall
remain in full force and effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner
and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and
also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.
"ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes
and assessments which are or may become due on the above described
land and improvements during the term of this agreement
Property 6 (Possession)
"ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution
of this agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the
Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation
of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions
of Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
"ARTICLE VIII. It is further agreed that if upon the expiration of
the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor
should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute
sale of the property herein described for the same amount as this
mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum, in favor of the mortgagee.
"ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under
Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of
sale shall automatically become null and void, and the mortgage
stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect. "In
testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the
day and year first hereinbefore written.
( Sgd. ) "MARCIAL KASILAG
( Sgd. ) EMILIANA
AMBROSIO
"Signed in the presence of:
( Sgd. ) "ILLEGIBLE
( Sgd. ) GAVINO
RODRIGUEZ
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS }
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
"Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio
without cedula by reason of her sex, to me known and known to me to be
the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to
me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
"I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages
including this page of the acknowledgment and that each page thereof is
signed by the parties to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence
and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this
instrument consists of only one parcel.
"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
(Sgd.) "NICOLAS
NAVARRO
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31,
1933
"DOC. NO. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book NO. IV"
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to
pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on
the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another
verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition
that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the
land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon.
By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land,
gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the loan, introduced
improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the
tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the
land was in- creased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the
conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in
the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its
improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the entire
Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties,
ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of
P1,000, with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decision. In this first
assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of appeals violated the law in
holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and that
it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention
of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law
between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary
to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract
set out in Exhibit I should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof
are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal
meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show
that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with
interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homesteads the parties having, moreover, agreed
upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a
contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure
the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V
the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half years, or
until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would
Property 6 (Possession)
not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the
land; in clause VII it was covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the
owner of the land would file a motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that
certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause
VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the
stipulated period of four years and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the
land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan of P1,000
including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be
presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
the contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all
its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than
those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law,
morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract when such
separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which
expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the
Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:
"On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or
conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the
question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal
obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added
to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of
juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the
clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an
established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is
inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically
speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion." ( Manresa,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following
words:
"Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration
contains several promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part
only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be
separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality,
may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful
consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made
at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies,
although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless
the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire
contract void. . . " (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co.
v. Gray, 239 U. S., 583; 60 Law. ed., 451; U. S. v. Moran, 97 U. S., 413, 24
Law. ed., 1017: U. S. v. Ilodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law. ed., 520; U. S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9
Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed. 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 15 Ct. Cl.,
428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in
Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of
mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question
that the first of these contracts is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or the
mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
"SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date
of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged
or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations."
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should
Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a
half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the
petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated
and owing. This stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of
one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would
benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest
upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made by
the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage contract clearly entered
into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The
contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void
because it is condemned by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended, but the clauses
regarding the contract of antichresis, being independent of and separable from the contract
of mortgage, can be eliminated, thereby leaving the latter in being because it is legal and
valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment
of error is well-founded and that error was committed in holding that the contract entered
into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that
Exhibit 1 is null and void.
In the second assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he entered
into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to
show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have
already said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited by section 116
of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the
verbal agreement entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been
accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error the same
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad faith in
taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the
denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the
parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon,
provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would assume
payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the
land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void
agreements because, as already stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and as such is
Property 6 (Possession)
expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals
held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew
that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further,
that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code
does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every
person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it
is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides, further, that
"Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith." Article 1950 of the
same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights,
provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the
title thereto." We do not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last
article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a
possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether
the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted
that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found established by the
Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw
in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section
116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding
article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of
good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in
a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed
upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from
final judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of
registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances;
but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant
of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply
it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly
unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2,
and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising
from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting
doctrines.
"But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of
fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to
transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with
certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is
possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines." (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and
102.)
According to this author, gross and inexeusable ignorance of the law may not be
the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting
the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that
the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much
importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner
appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel
to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which
we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and
enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of
the Civil Code and having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the
provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are
entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the value
thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect
to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by the court
of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled
to pay them the sum of P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the
petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court
denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court that
the respondents have not established such damages. Under the verbal contract between
the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former
would take possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged
improvements on condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that
he would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount
to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the
payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements
characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not
possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also applied to the
payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing remained after paying the interest
at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas
the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said amount in view
of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision,
P860. To this should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of
the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these
data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value
of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly
covers the interest earned by the secured indebtedness.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we
hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1,
is valid and binding (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties
is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is null and without effect; (3)
that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have
the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000,
or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are
found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the
parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the
mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without
interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements
which the petitioner received; and in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public
Property 6 (Possession)
sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment
of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So
ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
||| (Kasilag v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 46623, [December 7, 1939], 69 PHIL 217-264)
3. Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson; G.R. No. L-3088. February 6, 1907.
[G.R. No. L-3088. February 6, 1907.]
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JAMES
PETERSON, sheriff of the city of Manila, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde, & Gutierrez, for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; EVIDENCE. — When the findings of fact set
forth in a judgment appealed from are plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence,
taken at the trial, such judgment is contrary to law and should be reversed.
2. CONTRACT OF PLEDGE. — A contract of pledge which unites the requisites
required by articles 1857 and 1865 of the Civil Code is perfectly valid and efficacious, when
in addition the creditor or a third person appointed by common consent of the contracting
parties has taken possession of the goods pledged. (Art. 1863, Civil Code.)
3. POSSESSION, SYMBOLICAL DELIVERY OF. — The symbolical transfer by
means of the delivery of the keys of the premises in which are stored the goods pledged is
sufficient to consider the creditor, or the depositary appointed by common consent of the
parties, in legal possession of the same.
4. CONTRACT; FRAUD. — Where in a suit for the nullification of a contract it has
not been alleged nor proved that in the stipulations entered into there has been any fraud to
the prejudice of third persons, a finding of the court that such contract was entered into in
fraud of third person is erroneous.
DECISION
TORRES, J p:
On the 24th of October, 1905, the Spanish-Filipino Bank, a corporation, through
its attorneys, Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of
Manila and the other defendant, Juan Garcia, praying that judgment be rendered against
the said sheriff, declaring that the execution levied upon the property referred to in the
complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar merchandise, was illegal,
and directing the defendants to return the said goods to the plaintiff corporation, and in case
that he had disposed of the same, to pay the value thereof, amounting to P30,000, Philippine
currency, and further that it be declared that the said plaintiff corporation, under the contract
of pledge referred to in the complaint had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of the
said goods to the payment of the debt of P40,000, Philippine currency, for the security of
which the said merchandise was pledged, with preference over the claim of the other
defendant, Juan Garcia and that both defendants be held jointly liable to the plaintiff for the
sum of P500, Philippine currency, as damages, and the said defendants to pay the costs of
the proceedings, and for such other and further relief as the plaintiff might be entitled to
under the law. Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the
4th of March, 1905, by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the
former, loaned to the latter the sum of P141,702, Philippine currency; that on the same date
Francisco Reyes was already indebted to the bank in the sum of P84,415.38, Philippine
currency, which, added to the amount of the loan, made a total of P226,117.38, Philippine
currency, received by the said Reyes as a loan from the plaintiff bank, the entire sum at an
annual interest of 8 per cent; that to secure the payment of these two sums and the interest
thereon, the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed before a notary on
the aforesaid date mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of property
belonging to him, and pledged to the said bank part of his personal property, specifying the
proportion on which the said real and personal property thus mortgaged and pledged in
favor of the plaintiff corporation would be respectively liable for the payment of the debt;
that the property pledged by the debtor to the bank included a stock or merchandise,
consisting of wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar articles valued at P90,591.75,
Philippine currency, then stored in the warehouses of the debtor, Reyes, No. 12 Plaza
Moraga, in the city of Manila, which said goods and merchandise were liable for the payment
of the said sum of P90,591.75, Philippine currency; that in the aforesaid deed of pledge it
was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes, that the goods should be
delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping, the debtor having actually turned over
to the said Garcia y Planas the goods in question by delivering to him the keys of the
warehouse in which they were kept; that in a subsequent contract entered into by and
between the debtor, Reyes, and the plaintiff bank on the 29th of September, 1905, the said
contract executed on the 4th of March was modified so as to provide that the goods then
(September 29) in possession the depositary should only be liable for the sum of P40,000,
Philippine currency, the said contract of the 4th of March remaining in all other respects in
full force and effect, Luis M.a Sierra having been subsequently appointed by agreement
between the bank and the debtor as depositary of the goods thus pledged in substitution
for the said Ramon Garcia y Planas.
On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila by Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat,
judgment was rendered against the last-mentioned two for the sum of P15,000, Philippine
currency, to be paid by them severally or jointly, upon which judgment execution was issued
against the property of the defendants, Reyes and Agtarap. On the aforesaid 19th day of
October, for the purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at the
request of Garcia, the plaintiff in that case, entered the warehouse where the goods pledged
to the plaintiff bank were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra, and levied upon
them as per list attached to the complaint marked "Exhibit A." The sheriff seized the goods
which had been pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of the possession of the same, to
which said contract executed on the 4th of March, 1905. Without the authority of the bank,
Reyes could not dispose of the said goods. The value of the goods seized by the sheriff was
P30,000, Philippine currency, the said sheriff, having refused, and still refusing, to return to
Property 6 (Possession)
the same to the bank, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him to this effect, and
it being alleged in the complaint that unless prohibited by the court the sheriff would proceed
to sell the said goods at public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the
judgment rendered in favor of the Juan Garcia y Planas, while the other debtor Reyes had
not paid to the bank the P40,000, Philippine currency, to secure the payment of which the
goods mentioned in Exhibit A had been pledged to the bank, that is, to secure the payment
of a sum in excess of the actual value of the goods in the hands of the sheriff.
The defendant sheriff, James J. Peterson, and Juan Garcia, his codefendant,
through their attorneys, Hartigan, Marple, Rohde and Gutierrez, answering the complaint,
stated that they admitted the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, and 17 of
the complaint, but denied the allegations contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16,
and 18. They further denied the allegations contained in paragraph 12, with the exception
that the defendant sheriff levied upon the goods mentioned in Exhibit A attached to the
complaint for the purpose of satisfying the judgment referred to therein; and also the
allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint, with the exception that the sheriff
seized the property mentioned in Exhibit A under the execution referred to therein; and finally
defendants denied the allegation contained in paragraph 15 of the complaint, with the
exception of the allegation that the value of the property seized is P30,000. They accordingly
asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that the plaintiff had no interest
whatever in the property described in the complaint, and that the plaintiff be taxed with the
costs of these proceedings.
The testimony introduced by the parties having been received, and the exhibits
having been attached to the record, the court below entered judgment on the 4th of January,
1906, dismissing plaintiff's action and directing that the defendant recover from the
Spanish-Filipino Bank the costs of this action, for which execution was duly issued. To this
judgment counsel for plaintiff excepted and announced his intention of prosecuting a bill of
exceptions, and further made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the judgment of
the court below was contrary to law and that the findings of fact were plainly and manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The decision of this case depends mainly upon the question as to whether the
contract of pledge entered into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco
Reyes to secure a loan made by the former to the latter was valid, all the requisites
prescribed by the Civil Code having been complied with.
If so, the bank's claim had preference over the claim of a third person not secured,
as was the bank's, by a pledge, with reference to the property pledged to the extent of its
value, and therefore such property could not have been legally levied upon by the sheriff at
the request of the defendant, Juan Garcia. (Arts. 1921, 1922, Civil Code.)
The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857
of the Civil Code, such as that the property was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the
execution, the terms of the pledge, and the property pledged, all of which appears in a
public document, and the property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person by
common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of the bank.
(Arts. 1863, 1865, 1866, 1869, 1871, Civil Code.) The defect alleged to exist in the said
contract is that the debtor, Reyes, continued in possession of the property pledged; that he
never parted with the said property, and that neither the creditor nor the depositary
appointed by common consent of the parties were ever in possession of the property
pledged, and for this reason, and upon the further ground that the contract was fraudulent,
the court below dismissed the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff.
In the motion for a new trial it was alleged by the plaintiff that the judgment of the
court below was contrary to law, and that the findings of fact contained therein were plainly
and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. If plaintiffs contention is correct, then the
judgment of the court below should be reversed.
From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears
that a third person, appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in
possession of the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an
agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose, and it has not been shown that the
said Reyes continued in the possession of the goods after they had been pledged to the
plaintiff bank.
Exhibit C and the testimony of Francisco Reyes, Luis M.a Sierra, and Mariano
Rodriguez corroborate the existence and authenticity of the contract of pledge recorded in
a public instrument and conclusively and satisfactorily show that the debtor, after the pledge
of the property, parted with the possession of the same, and that it was delivered to a third
person designated by common consent of the parties. For the purpose of giving this
possession greater effect, the pledgee appointed a person to examine daily the property in
the warehouse where the same was kept.
The witness Matias Garcia also testified as to the status of these goods, and
informed Juan Garcia of such status before the same were levied upon.
The sheriff's testimony supports the allegation that the depositary, Sierra, was
present at the place where the goods were kept, as well as the representative of the bank,
Rodriguez, when he, the sheriff, went there for the purpose of levying upon the said property.
He further testified that Rodriguez, the representative of the bank, then protested and
notified him that the property in question was pledged to the Spanish-Filipino Bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles
1857 and 1863 of the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took
charge and possession of the goods pledged through a depository and a special agent
appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods
were stored, and that the pledgee, itself, received and collected the proceeds of the goods
as they were sold.
The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which was formerly
rented by the pledgor, Reyes, does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge, it having
been demonstrated that after the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository
appointed with the common consent of the parties had taken possession of the said
property, the owner, the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee being
the only one authorized to do so through the depositary and special agent who represented
it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse
where the goods were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary appointed by the
common consent of the parties was legally placed in possession of the goods. (Articles 438,
1463, Civil Code.)
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for
the sale of the goods pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him
does not affect the validity of the contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner
of the goods, (art. 1869, Civil Code), he being the one principally interested in the sale of the
property on the best possible terms.
As to the reservation stipulated in paragraph 13 of the contract executed on the
4th of March, 1905, it could not affect the contract in question for the reason that reservation
referred to the rent from the property mortgaged, to the bank and the dividends from the
shares of stock also pledged to the bank, and not the merchandise so pledged, and such
reservation could not have rendered the contract of pledge null.
Property 6 (Possession)
If the case is to be decided in accordance with the facts alleged and established,
the defendant not having introduced any evidence to show that the said contract of pledge
was fraudulent as to other creditors, there was no legal ground upon which the court below
could have held that the contract evidenced by the instrument in question was entered into
to defraud other creditors of the pledgor.
For the reason hereinbefore set out, and the judgment of the court below being
contrary to the evidence, the said judgment is hereby reversed, and it is hereby adjudged
that the plaintiff corporation, under and by virtue of the contract of pledge in question, had
a preferential right over that of the defendant, Juan Garcia, to the goods pledged or the
value thereof, the value to be applied to the payment of the debt of P40,000, Philippine
currency, for the security of which the said property was pledged, and the defendants are
accordingly hereby ordered to return to the plaintiff corporation the property improperly
levied upon, or to pay its value, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, without special
provision as to costs. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the case be remanded to the court below for
execution. So ordered.
||| (El Banco Español-Filipino v. Peterson, G.R. No. L-3088, [February 6, 1907], 7 PHIL 409-416)
4. Macasaet v Macasaet; G.R. Nos. 154391-92. September 30, 2004.
[G.R. Nos. 154391-92. September 30, 2004.]
Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners, vs. Spouses
VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. The children were invited by
the parents to occupy the latter's two lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family
solidarity. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the
parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the
property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they
constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the
Civil Code applies.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 22,
2002 Decision 2 and the June 26, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
Nos. 56205 & 56467. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
'1. Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita
one-half of the value of the useful improvements introduced in
the premises prior to demand, which is equivalent to
P475,000.00. In case the former refuse to reimburse the said
amount, the latter may remove the improvements, even though
the land may suffer damage thereby. They shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
'2. The award of attorney's fees is DELETED.
'3. The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to
the Court of origin for further proceedings to determine the
option to be taken by Vicente and Rosario and to implement the
same with dispatch." 4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. aAIcEH
The Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita 5 Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are
first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife. 6
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa
City an ejectment suit against the children. 7Respondents alleged that they were the owners of
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141,
situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita
occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their
construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed
rental of P500 per week. 8
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that
respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in
order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in
resolving the problems of the family. 9 They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot
the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to
petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents'
house. 10
The MTCC 11 ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It
opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement,
but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. 12 As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were
necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand. 13 The MTCC
dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the
ground that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it disbelieved petitioners' allegation
that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction materials. 14
On appeal, the regional trial court 15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC
allowed respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by
petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546
and 548 of the Civil Code. 16 It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase the
land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter situation, petitioners
should pay rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate the building. 17
Property 6 (Possession)
Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA separate
Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated. 18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying
the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. 19 Thus, possession of the subject
lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of respondents' letter to vacate it. 20
Citing Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 the CA further ruled that petitioners' status was analogous to
that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued
by tolerance of the owner. 22 Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be
reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on respondents' properties, 23 the
appellate court applied the Civil Code's provisions on lease. The CA modified the RTC Decision
by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article
1678 of the same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the
value of the improvements made. 24
Not satisfied with the CA's ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court. 25
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1.a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on
Judgment should apply in the rendition of the decision in this case;
b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;
c) Whether or not damages including attorney's fees should have been
awarded to herein petitioners;
"2.a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial
should apply on appearance of parties during Preliminary Conference in
an unlawful detainer suit;
b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals (230 SCRA 164) is applicable to appearance of
parties in an unlawful detainer suit;
"3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case
on the matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in
relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to
apply the Civil Code;
"4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by
evidence, appropriate laws, rules and jurisprudence;
"5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa
City should be held accountable in rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;
"6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the
same [l]aw office should be held accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment
case[.]" 26
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Ejectment
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At the outset, we stress
that this is the main issue in ejectment proceedings. 27 In the present case, petitioners failed to
justify their right to retain possession of the subject lots, which respondents own. Since
possession is one of the attributes of ownership, 28 respondents clearly are entitled to physical
or material possession.
Allegations of the Complaint
Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because respondents based their
Complaint regarding the nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter
failed to prove. 29 Petitioners contend that the lower courts erred in using another ground
(tolerance of possession) to eject them.
In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the
expiration or termination of the defendant's right to possess, arising from an express or implied
contract. 30 In other words, the plaintiff's cause of action comes from the expiration or
termination of the defendant's right to continue possession. 31 The case resulting therefrom must
be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally
withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if it does not
employ the terminology of the law, provided the said pleading is couched in a language
adequately stating that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become
unlawful. 32 It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, is determined from the averments of the complaint. 33
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands, petitioners "refused to pay the
accrued rentals and [to] vacate the leased premises." 34 It prayed that judgment be rendered
"[o]rdering [petitioners] and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties . . . and
remove the structures . . . constructed thereon." 35 Effectively then, respondents averred that
petitioners' original lawful occupation of the subject lots had become unlawful. CSDcTH
The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners. While it disbelieved the existence of a
verbal lease agreement, it nevertheless concluded that petitioners' occupation of the subject lots
was by mere tolerance of respondents. Basing its conclusion on the fact that the parties were
close relatives, the MTCC ruled thus:
". . . [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives. Because of this
relationship, this Court takes judicial notice of the love, care, concern and
protection imbued upon the parents towards their [children], i.e., in the
instant case, the love, care, concern and protection of the [respondents]
to the [petitioners]. With this in mind, this Court is inclined to believe the
position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease agreement
between the parties herein that took place in 1992. . . .
"From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their
stay and occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of the
[respondents], and not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement between
them." 36
Property 6 (Possession)
Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and the CA)
did not err in ordering the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents. There was no
violation of Section 17 of Rule 70 37 of the Rules of Court. As earlier explained, unlawful detainer
was sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the trial. Significantly, the issue
of whether there was enough ground to eject petitioners was raised during the preliminary
conference. 38
Not Merely Tolerated Possession
Petitioners dispute the lower courts' finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis of
mere tolerance. They argue that their occupation was not under such condition, since
respondents had invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties. 39
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied
promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. 40 A summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation. 41 The unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 42
Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of." 43 Sarona v. Villegas 44 described what tolerated acts means, in this language:
"Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are 'those
which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they
are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property
can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner,
who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.' . . . And, Tolentino
continues, even though 'this is continued for a long time, no right will be
acquired by prescription." . . . Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: 'There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which
are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on
the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license,
acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself
to the existence or non-existence of the permission." 45
We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance.
Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots
in order that they could all live near one other and help in resolving family problems. 46 By
occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there
was a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose
between the parties.
The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely "something not wholly approved
of" by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as "neighborliness or
familiarity." In point of fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the complete
approval of respondents, who desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose
from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.
Right to Use the Lots Terminated
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the duration
of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows
the courts to fix the duration or the period.
"Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature
and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
courts may fix the duration thereof.
"The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon
the will of the debtor.
"In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the
circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once
fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them."
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such
qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of
parental love and a desire for solidarity expected from Filipino parents. No period was intended
by the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify
or authorize the courts to do so. 47
Based on respondents' reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use the lots, it can be
safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually
benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an
agreement. 48 Thus, when a change in the condition existing between the parties occurs — like
a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or animosity — the
agreement may be deemed terminated. Having been based on parental love, the agreement
would end upon the dissipation of the affection. ICTacD
When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and
the children, the purpose of the agreement ceased. 49 Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause
for continued possession of the lots. Their right to use the properties became untenable. It ceased
upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to heed the demand,
ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession, which was originally lawful,
became unlawful when the reason therefor — love and solidarity — ceased to exist between
them.
No Right to Retain Possession
Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts' dismissal of
their contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as
part of their inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon
the latters' demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of
death of the decedent. 50 Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership
nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons
in the future is not inconsistent with the owners' taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. 51 Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits,
petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance
"allocation."
We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a
dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents'
debts. 52 The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the
parents arising from the latter's purported purchases and advances. 53 There was no sufficient
proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners
Property 6 (Possession)
even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt, 54 a fact that
disproves a meeting of the minds with the parents.
Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collection
case against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96). 55Thus, the former's allegation that the
indebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is with
their action to recover the same debt.
Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the premises
when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents had a title to
the lots.
"The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs,
the [petitioners] do not object but what is due the [petitioners] including
the reparation for the tarnish of their dignity and honor must be given the
[petitioners] for the benefits of their children before the premises will be
turned over." 56
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.
Second Issue:
Appearance at the Preliminary Conference
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the
defendant during the preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that
the MTCC should have dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the
conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written
authorization from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference. 57 The issue then
is whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a party's personal
appearance.
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary
conference. 58 Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by
the showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. 59
Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception
to personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If
there are valid reasons or if a representative has a "special authority," a party's appearance may
be waived. As petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule
on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can indeed be readily
considered as a "special authorization."
Third Issue:
Rights of a Builder in Good Faith
As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is
incorporated or attached to the property. 60 Accession industrial — building, planting and sowing
on an immovable — is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code. DTESIA
Articles 447 and 1678 of the
Civil Code Inapplicable
To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced on the property,
petitioners cite Article 447. 61 They allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they
had no lease agreement with respondents.
We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner
of the property uses the materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor
builds on the property of another, which is the factual milieu here.
In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of petitioners regarding
the inapplicability of Article 1678 deserves attention. The CA applied the provisions on lease,
because it found their possession by mere tolerance comparable with that of a lessee, per the
pronouncement in Calubayan v. Pascual, 62 from which we quote:
". . . It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of
the demand to vacate." 63 (Emphasis in the original.)
As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresita's possession of the two lots was not by mere
tolerance, a circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan.
Article 448 Applicable
On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable
provision is Article 448, which reads: 64
"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if
its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. 65 It does
not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. 66 From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land
is owned; or that — by some title — one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon. 67
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v.Abesia, 68 this provision was applied to one
whose house — despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner — overlapped with
the land of another. 69 This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to
be in good faith. 70 In Sarmiento v. Agana, 71 the builders were found to be in good faith despite
Property 6 (Possession)
their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of
the land. 72
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The
established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation,
the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon. 73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the
structures on those lots. DcICEa
The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier. 74 In that case, this Court deemed the son
to be in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent of
his father, to whom belonged the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448 75 was applied.
Rule on Useful Expenses
The structures built by petitioners were "useful" improvements, because they augmented the
value or income of the bare lots. 76 Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article
448 is provided for by Article 546, which we quote:
"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but
only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor.
"Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or
of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof."
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate — as their own — the building and other
improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2)
paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option
to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the structures — in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, 77 this case must be remanded to the trial court to
determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546.
Such matters include the option that respondents would take and the amount of indemnity that
they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. We disagree
with the CA's computation of useful expenses, which were based only on petitioners' bare
allegations in their Answer. 78
Ruling on Improvement Justified
While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the issue of
physical or material possession of the property in question, this Court finds it necessary to
abbreviate the issue on the improvements in relation to Article 448. First, the determination of the
parties' right to those improvements is intimately connected with the MTCC proceedings in the
light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no dispute that while they constructed the
improvements, respondents owned the land. Third, both parties raised no objection when the
RTC and the CA ruled accordingly on this matter.
Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid
needless delay. Both parties have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or equivocate
would not serve the cause of substantial justice.
Other Issues Raised
Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners' allegation that the
MTCC judge and respondents' lawyers should be respectively held personally accountable for
the Decision and for filing the case. 79 The insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated
the issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing. 80 Their contention that respondents
did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was based solely on hearsay, which has
little or no probative value. 81
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the
value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and
Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts
essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, specifically to the
following matters:
a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet's option to appropriate — as
their own — the improvements on the lots, after paying the
indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in relation to Article
448 of the Civil Code; or in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita
Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is
considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case
petitioners shall pay reasonable rent based upon the terms
provided under the Civil Code
b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and
Rosita Macasaet in the construction of the improvements on the
lots
c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful
improvements
d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet's choice of type of indemnity
to be paid (whether b or c)
e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the
improvements built thereon
No pronouncement as to costs. aTEACS
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, [September 30, 2004], 482
PHIL 853-876)
Property 6 (Possession)
5. Cuaycong v Benedicto; G.R. No. 9989. March 13, 1918.
[G.R. No. 9989. March 13, 1918.]
EDUARDO CUAYCONG ET AL., plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMONA
BENEDICTO ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ruperto Montinola and Aurelio Montinola for appellants.
No appearance for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. ROADS AND STREETS; EASEMENTS; REGISTRATION OF LAND; TORRENTS
TITLE. — Unless is made to appear upon the certificate of title that the boundaries of any
given highway, way, or private way upon the land have been determined, the right to such
highway, way, or private way is unaffected by the registration of the title.
2. REALTY; ENCUMBRANCES; PRESUMPTIONS. — Real property is presumed
to be free from liens and encumbrances.
3. ROADS AND STREETS; UPKEEP BY GOVERNMENT; PRESUMPTION. —
Where it appears that a road has been kept in repair by private enterprise and that the
Government has not contributed to the cost of its construction or maintenance, such road
will be presumed to be private.
4. ID; PRESUMPTION; USER; TOLERANCE; PUBLIC USE. — The mere fact that
a tract of land has been used for a long time as a road will not warrant the presumption that
it has been dedicated to the public.
5. REALITY; PRESCRIPTION; POSSESSION; TOLERANCE . — Possession, to
constitute the foundation of a perspective right, must be possession under claim of title.
Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by the mere tolerance of the
owner cannot be made the basis of the perspective acquisition of rights.
6. IMMEMORIAL POSSESSION; EVIDENCE. — Under the Spanish law the proof
of immemorial possession required something more than the memory of living witnesses.
7. EASEMENTS OF WAY; USER; TOLERANCE; PRESCRIPTION. — The
permissive use by an adjacent proprietor of a road or path over the land of another no matter
how long continued, will not create an easement of way prescription.
DECISION
FISHER, J p:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiff to make use of two roads
existing on the Hacienda Torena, a tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto. One
of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other
as the Dacuman-Toreno road. The court of First Instance held that those of the plaintiffs
who claimed to be entitled to make use of the Dacuman-Toreno road had failed to establish
the asserted right, and dismissed the action as to them. From this decision they appealed
to this court but, their brief not having been filed within the time prescribed by the rules,
their appeal was dismissed, on motion of defendants, by resolution dated February 14,
1916. Consequently, the issues presented on this appeal are limited to those which relate
to the rights of the parties with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, and the determination
of the correctness of the decision of the court concerning that part of the controversy
submitted to its decision.
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that
the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a
group of hacienda situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the
barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that the appellees Silverio Ginoo,
Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said hacienda; that for more
than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the
Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and
continuously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the purpose of
conveying the products of their hacienda to the town of Victorias and to the landing place
there situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their
haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means
of transportation; that there is no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by
these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property can
be taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being across the Hacienda
Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the fifteenth day
of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question at the point at which it
crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it; that
plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and that, if prevented
from transporting their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarcation,
would suffer damages difficult to estimate. Upon these averments of fact plaintiffs prayed
for a judgment that they are entitled to use the road in question as they have been using in
the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them from
impeding such use. Upon the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs moved the court to issue a
preliminary injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the use of the road during
the pendency of the suit, which motion was granted by the court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments of the complaint,
as above set forth, and by way of counterclaim and special defense, averred that the road
crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private
property of defendants; and, further, that they have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass
over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so. Defendants
also claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit,
alleging that the preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued upon false statements
contained in the verified complaint filed by plaintiffs.
The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8, 1913, rendered
judgment, dismissing the complaint with respect to the plaintiffs Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza,
Enrique Azcona, and Melecio Pido, these being the plaintiffs who claimed the right to use
the Dacuman-Toreno road. With respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, the court held that it
was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use of immemorial
Property 6 (Possession)
prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against plaintiffs, restraining
them from interfering in any manner with the use of the said road.
The conclusion of the court with respect to the facts affecting the Nanca-Victorias
road are as follows:
"Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the
Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof that it has been in
existence for at least forty years. That the hacenderos located in the
southwestern section of Victorias and the public generally passed over it
freely and that it was used for all purposes of transportation of farm
produce, animals, etc. and by pedestrians as well as carromatas and other
conveyances without break or interruption until two or three years ago
when the defendants announced that the road was private and that those
who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged to pay as
toll of ten centavos-all-other vehicles, it appears, were permitted to pass
free of charge. This arrangement seems to have existed during the years
of 1911 and 1912 and part of 1913, the money being collected apparently
from some hacenderos and not from others. There is some reason to
believe from the evidence presented by defendants themselves that the
practice of making these payments to hacienda 'Toreno' originated in an
attempt to raise a fund for the repair of the road. There is no evidence that
any other hacenderos between Nanca and Victorias or any other person
made any attempt to close the road or to collect toll. On the contrary the
road appears to have been repaired by the hacederos when it needed
repairing and everyone used it on equal terms until the defendants in 1910
or 1911 interposed the objection that the road in dispute was private. This
we think is a fair deduction from the evidence and although it is asserted
that toll was collected at an earlier date by the late Leon Montinola, brother
of the defendant Ruperto Montinola, there is no tangible evidence that this
was so and all the circumstances are strongly indicative of the fact that
toll has been paid only during the years of 1911, 1912, and part of 1913."
The request presented by the assignment of error are in effect:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road at the point at which it traverses the Hacienda
Toreno a public highway or not?
(b) If it be held that the road in question is not a public highway, have plaintiff
proven their acquisition of an easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point
traversed by the road in question?
The trial judge, in holding that the road in question is public, bases his conclusion
upon the fact, which he deems to have been proven, that the road has been in existence
"from time immemorial," and had been "continuously used as a public road . . . and open to
public as such for thirty or forty years . . . until . . . the defendants undertook to claim it as
private and to collect toll for the passage of carts." (Bill of Exceptions, p. 56.) There is no
doubt that for he past thirty or forty years a road has existed between the former site of the
town of Victorias and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that road
crosses defendants' hacienda. It is also true that during this period the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in the ownership of the hacienda now held by them have made use of this
road for the purpose of going and coming from their haciendas to the town of Victorias; but
the question is whether this use was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and
employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use enjoyed by the public in
general. Plaintiffs produced only two witnesses, Segundo de Leon (stet. notes, pp. 21-22)
and Eduardo Cuaycong, (stet. notes, pp. 27-33) to testify as regards the use of the Nanca-
Victorias road. Several other witnesses testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but their testimony
relates to the Dacuman-Toreno road, which is not involved in this appeal. We have carefully
read the testimony of the witnesses Leon and Cuaycong, given upon their direct and cross
examination, but we have been unable to find that either of them has testified that the road
in question was ever used by the public in general. These witnesses testified with regard to
the use of the road by the present and former owners and occupants of the estates of
Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the products
of these estates to the town of Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements from
Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of them testified expressly that any other use had
been made of said road. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably inferred from the testimony of
these witnesses that all persons having occasion to travel between Victorias and the
haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores, whether or not they were
owners, tenants, or employees of said estates, made use of the road now in dispute,
crossing the Hacienda Toreno, and to this limited extent it may be said that the public made
use of the road, but there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the so-called public use
extended beyond this.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the
court concerning the general public use of the road in dispute, the record contains data
strongly tending to show that when the complaint was filed plaintiffs did content that the
road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by prescription an
easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno. For example, the action is entitled an "action
concerning a right of way." (Bill of Exceptions, pp. 64 and 65.) It is not averred in the
complaint averred in the complaint that the road in question was used by the public. On the
contrary, it is averred that it was used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors. The averment
in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the plaintiff have no other "outlet to a public road" than
that which they have been accustomed to use by going to the town of Victorias also shows
that when they commenced this action they had in mind the provisions of articles 564, et
seq. of the Civil Code, which relate to the method of establishing the compulsory easement
of way. The owners of an existing easement, as well as those whose properties are adjacent
with a public road, have no occasion to invoke these provisions of the Code, which relate
to the creation of new rights, and not the enforcement of rights already in existence.
It is true that in the opening statement made to the court, counsel for plaintiffs,
who was not the same attorney by whom the complaint was signed, stated that plaintiffs
contend that the road in question is public, but as no evidence was introduced tending to
establish this contention concerning the Nanca-Victorias road, counsel for defendants had
no occasion to object upon the ground that such testimony was not relevant to the
averments of the complaint. No evidence was taken to indicate that at any time since the
road in question has been in existence any part of the expense of its upkeep has been
defrayed by the general government, the province, or the municipality. The trial judge said
upon this subject:
"It is also true whatever repairs were made on the road were
made irregularly. The municipality of Victorias had no funds to devote to
the construction and repair of road, and the upkeep of the road depending
entirely therefore on the initiative of the persons who used it, was attended
to only at such times as repairs were absolutely necessary." (Bill of
Exceptions, p. 49.)
The court also held that appears from the government grant issued in 1885 to the
original owner of the hacienda adjacent to the Hacienda Toreno on its western boundary,
that the Nanca-Victorias road at that time separated that estate from the Jalbuena Hacienda,
and that these facts constitute "circumstantial evidence that the document to which the
Property 6 (Possession)
court refers, and we agree that the road in question existed in 1885; but we do not believe
that the document in question proves that the said road was a public highway.
Another circumstance established by the evidence, and which is of some
importance in the determination of this issue, is that although the defendants closed the
Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911, and since that time have collected toll
from persons passing over it with carts loaded with sugar, including those belonging to
several of the plaintiffs, nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this
commenced. It is natural to assume that if plaintiffs and considered that the road in question
was public, they would have protested immediately against the action of the defendants,
and would have either commenced a civil action, as they subsequently did, or would have
brought about a prosecution under section 16 of Act No. 1511.
Upon the evidence taken and admission contained in the pleadings and those
made during the course of the trial we consider that the following findings are warranted:
1. The town of Victorias has always been the shipping point of the products of the
Hacienda Toreno, and of the haciendas of appellees, as we place from which supplies were
brought to those properties.
2. For thirty or forty years before the commencement of the suit a wagon road,
herein called the Nanca-Victorias road, has been in existence, connecting the haciendas of
appellees with the town of Victorias, and this road traverses the property of defendants.
Since the removal of the town of Victorias to a new site the Nanca-Victorias road has been
used by appellees in travelling between their properties and the provincial road which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
3. No public funds have at any time been expanded on the construction or upkeep
of the Nanca-Victorias road, but from time to time work has been done on it by the laborers
employed by the present and former owners of the Hacienda Toreno and the haciendas
owned by the appellees and their predecessors in title.
4. The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the
Hacienda Toreno, has for thirty-five or forty years been used by the appellees and their
predecessors in title for the transportation, by the usual means, of the products of their
estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias, and the transportation to
their estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons having
occasion to travel to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees.
5. The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the persons above
mentioned was permitted without objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the
year 1911, when they closed it, and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart which
passed over the road, including carts belonging to the appellants, until restrained from
continuing to do so by the preliminary injunction granted in this case.
6. The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of
appellants to the nearest public road which is the provincial road which crosses the
Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
Upon these facts the questions of law to be decided are:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway?
(b) If the Nanca-Victorias road, or that part of it which crosses the Hacienda
Toreno, is not a public highway, is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of the
appellees?
The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title
issued in accordance with the Land Registration Act, conferring to them its absolute
ownership, subject only to the limitations of paragraph four of section 39 of said Act. It is
admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here in
question, either as a "public road" or a a "private way established by law" and, therefore,
the questions presented by this appeal are to be determined precisely as they would be had
the Hacienda Toreno not been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act.
The plaintiffs being the owners of the property in question, the presumption of law is that it
is free from any lien or encumbrance whatever, and the burden therefore rests upon plaintiffs
to establish the contrary. As this court said in the case of Fabie vs. Lichauco and the children
of Francisco L. Roxas (11 Phil. Rep., 14):
"It is a settled doctrine of law that a property is assumed to be
free from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved."
There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here
in question was at any time conveyed to the general government or any of its political
subdivisions by the presents or any of the former owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is
no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when
the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private
ownership. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the
Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road,
or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The Civil Code
defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and a provincial
and town roads those " the expense of which is borne by such towns or provinces." (Civil
Code, art. 344.) While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show that
during the Spanish regime, under normal conditions, roads which were public were
maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any expense incurred
by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends strongly to support the
contention of the defendants that it is private way.
During the Spanish regime, the law required each able bodied citizen not within
one of the exempted classes to work a certain number of days in each year, his labor to be
devoted to "services of general utility" to the municipality of his residence. (Royal Decree of
July 11, 1883, Art. 5.) Under this Decree and the Regulations for its enforcement (Berriz, vol.
11, 258) the greater part of the work on the public roads of the Islands was accomplished.
Had the road here in question been a public way, it is reasonable to assume that
the polistas of the town of Victorias would have been employed in maintaining it. It is most
significant that no mention is made in the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses of any work
of this character having been done on the road at any time, particularly in view of the fact
that their attention was drawn to this point. (Stet. notes, pp. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.)
The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates
benefited by the road, and by their laborers, as a purely voluntary act for their own
convenience and interest. There being no evidence of a direct grant to the government of
the land occupied by the road in question or that any Government funds or labor were
expended upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the road has been
put was such as to justify the conclusion of the lower court that it has become public
property. There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs'
predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement
of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be
that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates
affected.
This being so, has that merely permissive use been converted into a title vested
in the public at large, or in the plaintiffs by reason of their ownership of the land beneficially
affected by the use?
Property 6 (Possession)
Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense, with
the acquiescence of the owners of the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such
adverse possession by the government as in course of time would ripen into title or warrant
the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in this case there is no such evidence,
and the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to
use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of
another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user.
If the owner of a tract of land, to accommodate his neighbors or the public in
general, permits them to across his property, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not his
intention, in so doing, to divest himself of the ownership of the land so used, or to establish
an easement upon it, and that the persons to whom such permission, tacit or express, is
granted, do not regard their privilege of use as being based upon anything more than the
mere tolerance of the owner. Clearly, such permissive use is in its inception based upon an
essentially revocable license. If the use continues for a long period of time, no change being
made in the relations of the parties by any express or implied agreement, does the owner of
the property affected lose his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in another
form, does the mere permissive use ripen into title by prescription?
It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the
possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory
character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license
(Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not only with respect to the
prescription of the dominium as a whole, but, to the prescription of right in rem. In the case
of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu-Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38), the Court said:
"The provision of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that
acts which are merely tolerated produce no effect with respect to
possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to
the prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm
the contrary, as does the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is
possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere
tolerance produce no effect respect to possession, at that article provides,
in conformity with article 444 of the same Code, it is evident that they can
produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether the prescriptive
acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in one
and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the
legal sense of the word." (See also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil.
Rep., 745; Municipality of Caceres vs. Director of Lands and Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep., 485.)
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive
right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño), to use the common
law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by
one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño, and
such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the
period of prescription.
A similar question was presented in the case of the Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil. Rep., 450), in which case it appeared that Roxas, the owner of
the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, claimed a right of way across the property of the church
to Calle Tejeron, a public street of the town of San Pedro Macati. The proof showed that the
road in question had been used by the tenants of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati for the
passage of carts in coming and leaving the hacienda "from time immemorial," and further
that the road had been used for time out of mind, not only by the tenants of the hacienda
but by many other people in going and coming from a church half-way between the
boundary line of the hacienda and Calle Tejeron. The court held that the facts did not give
rise to a perspective right of easement in favor of the owner of the hacienda, upon the
ground that such use "is to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license, and
not adverse. Such a use is not inconsistent with the only use which the proprietor thought
fit to make of the land, and until the appellee thinks proper to enclose it, such use is not
adverse and will not preclude it from enclosing the land when other views of its interest
render it proper to do so. And though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open
land more frequently than another, yet the same rule will apply unless there be some decisive
act indicating a separate and exclusive use under a claim of right. A different doctrine would
have a tendency to destroy all neighborhood accommodations in the way of travel; for if it
were once understood that a man, by allowing his neighbor to pass through his farm without
objection over the pass-away which he used himself, would thereby, after the lapse of time,
confer a right on such neighbor to require the pass-way to be kept open for his benefit and
enjoyment, a prohibition against all such travel would immediately ensue."
The decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana, a State whose jurisdiction is
based, as is our own, upon the Roman Law, and whose Civil Code is taken, as is our own,
very largely from the Code of Napoleon, are particularly persuasive in matters of this
character. In the case of Torres vs. Fargoust (37 La. Ann., 497), cited by appellants in their
brief, in which the issues were very similar to those of the present case, the court held that
—
"The mere fact that for thirty or forty years the public was
permitted to pass over this ground would not of itself constitute the place
a locus publicus . . . dedication must be shown by evidence so conclusive
as to exclude all idea of private ownership; . . . such dedication can not be
inferred from mere user alone; . . . no one is presumed to give away his
property. The burden is on him who avers a divestiture of ownership to
prove it clearly.'
We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by
the evidence it does not appear that the road in question is a public road or way. We are
also of the opinion that plaintiff have failed to show that they have acquired by prescription
a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The supreme court of Spain has
decided that under the law in force before the enactment of decided that under the law in
force before the enactment of the Civil Code, the easement of way was discontinuous, and
that while such an easement might be acquired by prescription, it must be used in good
faith, in the belief of the existence of the right, and such user must have been continuous
from time immemorial. (Judgment of December 15, 1882.) In the appealed decision the court
below says that the plaintiff and their predecessors made use of the road in question "from
time immemorial," but there is no evidence whatever in the record to support this finding,
although it is true that the evidence shows the existence of the road and its use by the
plaintiffs and their predecessors for thirty-five or forty years. Speaking of the evidence
required under the present Code of Civil Procedure to show immemorial use of an easement,
this court said in the case of Ayala de Roxas vs. Case (8 Phil. Rep., 197, 198):
"The third Partida in title 31, law 15 . . . says that discontinuous
servitudes . . . must be proved by usage or a term so long that men can
not remember its commencement. . . . In many judgments the supreme
court of Spain has refused to accept proof of any definite number of years
as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law . . . We are of the opinion
that in order to establish a right of prescription [title of prescription based
upon use from time immemorial] something more is required than the
memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the
declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as
Property 6 (Possession)
exacted by the Spanish law, or should be the common reputation of
ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us
to decide. On either theory the appellant has filed in this proof . . . "
The same thing may be said in this case. Witnesses has testified that they have
known the road for a certain period of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of
the Civil Code, but no evidence has been made to prove immemorial use by either of the
means of proof mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial user averred in the
complaint as the basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from
immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that
Code (art. 539) no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event.
Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the present
Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous
easement may be acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not avail plaintiffs. The
Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for
the acquisition of rights in real estate is fixed by the Code (sec. 41) at ten years. The evidence
shows that in February, 1911, before the expiration of the term of ten years since the time
the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the defendants interrupted the use of the road by
plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it and collecting toll from persons
making use of it with carts and continued preliminary injunction by the trial court in
December, 1912. Our conclusion is, therefore, that plaintiffs have not acquired by
prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendants' property; that their use of
the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license
and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title; that the license was
essentially revocable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their rights when they
closed the road in 1911.
While in the allegation from plaintiffs' complaint it might be inferred that it was
their purpose to seek to impose upon defendants the easement to which arts. 564 et seq.
of the Civil Code relate, that purpose was evidently abandoned, and the case was tried upon
a wholly different theory. Proof was offered to show that the right of passage across
defendants' land is necessary to enable plaintiffs to get their products to market, but there
was no offer on their part to pay defendants the indemnity required by section 564.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the court below is reversed, the injunction
issued against defendants is dissolved, and the action is dismissed. No costs will be allowed
on this appeal. So ordered.
||| (Cuaycong v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 9989, [March 13, 1918], 37 PHIL 781-797)
6. Astudillo v PHHC; G.R. No. L-28066. September 22, 1976.
[G.R. No. L-28066. September 22, 1976.]
PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING
CORPORATION, RAMON P. MITRA, SALUD O. MITRA, and REGISTER
OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents-appellees.
Jose Villa Agustin for petitioner-appellant.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for appellees Mitras.
Manuel L. Lazaro & Leonardo A. Reyes, Gov't. Corp. Counsel's Office for appellee
Board of Director of the PHHC.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
Peregrina Astudillo appealed from the "resolution" dated April 18, 1967 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by
Ramon P. Mitra and dismissing her petition for certiorari and mandamus (Civil Case No. Q-
8741). LibLex
According to the pleadings of respondents Mitra and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) * , Mitra on December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon
Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the
PHHC in Piñahan, Quezon City.
His application was approved on January 3, 1958. He made a downpayment of P840, an amount
equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra
executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more
than nine thousand pesos, a final deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965.
The lot in question is actually in the possession of Peregrina Astudillo. She constructed thereon
a residential house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the
said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present" (p. 52, Record). She filed with the
administrative investigating committee of the PHHC a request dated February 24, 1963, praying
for the cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking the committee to
recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No action was taken on that request.
On May 3, 1965 Peregrina filed in the lower court her aforementioned petition against the PHHC
board of directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City and the spouses Ramon P. Mitra and
Salud O. Mitra. She questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot
16 be sold to her.
After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses filed a verified motion for
summary judgment. They assumed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Peregrina Astudillo opposed the motion. The parties submitted memoranda.
The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. It dismissed
Peregrina's petition on the grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to
Mitra cannot be assailed by means of certiorari and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to this Court.
Her four assignments of error raise questions of law. She contends that the lower court erred in
holding that certiorari and mandamus do not lie in this case and that she has no right to question
the award to Mitra, and in not holding that the award of Lot 16 to him was in contravention of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Law and of the constitutional provision that a Senator or
Property 6 (Possession)
Representative should not directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the
government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof during his term of office.
In the ultimate analysis the issue is whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul
the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her.
We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and to require that she be
allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes
of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the
said lot which could have been impaired by that award (Bañez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351,
September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22).
The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the Piñahan
Homeowners Association some of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs.
Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439).
In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not
commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right
to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and
the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code).
Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act
No. 648) which provides that the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent
housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it
should acquire large estates for their resale to bona fide occupants.
Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify her act of squatting
on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold to her because she does
not yet own a residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16.
The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the
field of housing (Secs. 6 and 7, Art. 11, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude for the
destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public
or private.
"In carrying out its social readjustment' policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral
standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and
unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts
instead of attaining their just solution" (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202, 206).
Indeed, the government has enunciated a militant policy against squatters. Thus, Letter of
Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972 orders city and district engineers "to remove all Illegal
constructions, including buildings . . . and those built without permits on public or private
property" and provides for the relocation of squatters (68 O.G. 7962. See Letter of Instruction No.
19-A). As noted by Justice Sanchez, "since the last global war, squatting on another's property
in this country has become a widespread vice" (City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21,
1967, 19 SCRA 413, 418).
The lower court did not err in holding that Peregrina Astudillo cannot use the special civil actions
of certiorari and mandamus to secure a judicial review of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such
tribunal, board or officer.
"The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto."
"SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant."
Respondent PHHC board is not the board contemplated in section 1 of Rule 65. It does not
exercise judicial functions. The award being questioned was a routinary corporate act that was
within the board's competence. No jurisdictional issue was involved in that award. Certiorari lies
only for the correction of jurisdictional errors (Gov't. of the P.I. vs. Judge of 1st Instance of Iloilo,
34 Phil. 157, 159).
Nor is the relief sought by Peregrina Astudillo, which is to compel the PHHC board to cancel the
award of Lot 16 to Mitra and to resell it to her, a right that can be enforced by mandamus. What
she wants is to force the PHHC to execute a contract of sale in her favor. That is not within the
purview of the writ of mandamus.
Thus, it was held that "the writ of mandamus is not an appropriate or even admissible remedy to
enforce the performance of a private contract which has not been fully performed by either party"
(Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337). In Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853, a petition
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance for
certain lots in favor of the petitioner was denied. Generally, title to property cannot be litigated in
a mandamus proceeding (City of Manila vs. Posadas, 48 Phil. 309, 337).
It is not a ministerial duty of the PHHC board to award Lot 16 to Peregrina. Anyway, it has already
been shown that as a squatter she is not clothed with any right to Lot 16 that may be enforced
in a court of justice.
The PHHC board completely ignored the alleged demands of Peregrina for the purchase of Lot
16. It did not render any decision against her. Its inaction cannot be assailed
by certiorari or mandamus.
Peregrina's other assignment of error is that the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra was a
violation of section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and of section 17, Article VI
of the 1935 Constitution, now section 11, Article VIII of the new Constitution.
Property 6 (Possession)
On the other hand, Mitra contends that the PHHC performs proprietary functions. He observed
that the following highranking officials were awarded PHHC lots: Felixberto Serrano, Dominador
Aytona, Manuel Lim, Fernando Lopez, Pacita M. Gonzales, Genaro Magsaysay, Daniel
Romualdez, Felipe A. Abrigo, Bartolome Cabangbang, Juan Duran, Manuel Enverga, Angel
Fernandez, Jose Nuguid, Antonio de Pio, Lorenzo Teves, Faustino Tobia, Pedro Trono, Marcelino
Veloso and Valeriano Yancha.
We are of the opinion that assignment of error need not be resolved in this case. Having shown
that Peregrina has no cause of action to assail the award of Lot 16 to Mitra, it follows that in this
particular case she cannot assail that award by invoking the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law and the Constitution. This is not the proper forum for the ventilation of that
question. (See Commonwealth Act No. 626; Hernandez vs. Albano, 112 Phil. 506; Solidum and
Concepcion, Jr. vs. Hernandez, 117 Phil. 335). cdphil
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Astudillo v. Board of Directors of People's Homesite and Housing Corp., G.R. No. L-28066,
[September 22, 1976], 165 PHIL 19-26)
7. Peran v CFI; G.R. No. L-57259. October 13, 1983.
[G.R. No. L-57259. October 13, 1983.]
ANGEL P. PERAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON,
10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RAMON ESPERA and ENCARNACION
EVASCO, as private-respondents, respondents.
Irene P. Escandor for petitioner.
Esteban Escalante, Jr. for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; PROOF OF TITLE OR LAWFUL RIGHT THERETO, A
PRE-REQUISITE; CASE AT BAR. — Private respondents admit that the land in question was
originally owned by Jose Evasco. The tax declarations covering their house clearly state "house
built on land owned by Jose Evasco under Tax No. 1599." Since the land had been partitioned
to Alejandro Evasco by his father, Jose Evasco, respondent Encarnacion can lay no claim to the
property even as a grand-daughter of Jose Evasco. Respondents may have been in possession
of the portion they occupy prior to petitioner but they have not proved their title thereto, nor their
right to possess the same. As the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona found, no
concrete evidence was introduced by respondents on this point. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
the validity of the "Repartition Extra-judicial" whereby said lot was adjudicated to Mejandro
Evasco by his father Jose Evasco, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner, had never been
challenged.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION BY MERE TOLERANCE; BECOMES ILLEGAL UPON REFUSAL TO
VACATE ON DEMAND BY THE OWNER. — If at all, private respondents` possession of their
portion of the property was by mere tolerance of petitioner's predecessors- in-interest, which,
however, does not vest in them a right which they can assert against petitioner. Possession by
tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the
possessor refuses to comply with such demand.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY THEREFOR. — A possessor by tolerance is necessarily bound
by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him. It is not necessary that there be a formal agreement or contract
of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a possessor by tolerance. Neither
is prior physical possession of the property by petitioner an indispensable requisite. The ruling of
respondent Court, therefore, that since the only issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action
is the physical possession of real property — possession de facto and not possession de jure —
whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law, is erroneous
under the factual millieu herein.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EJECTMENT CASE; ONE-YEAR PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH TO FILE COMMENCES FROM THE TIME OF DEMAND TO VACATE. — A Forcible Entry
and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. The one-year period of limitation commences from the time of
demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from the last letter
of demand. Demand may either be personal or in writing. The demand to vacate having been
made by petitioner in January, 1979 and the enjectment suit having been instituted on February
8, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well within its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the case.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
The decision of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, Gubat, Sorsogon,
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, dismissing Civil Case No. 1277, entitled
"Angel P. Peran vs. Encarnacion Evasco, et al.", for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer, is being
assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari on a question of law. Said Decision reversed the
judgment of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, Sorsogon, for Forcible Entry
& Illegal Detainer.
The antecedent facts follow:
The property in question, an unregistered residential land, with an area of 1,225 square meters
more or less, situated at Tagdon, Barcelona, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Jose Evasco.
On December 29, 1950, Jose Evasco executed a 'Reparticion Extrajudicial' whereby he
partitioned his properties among his five heirs. 1 Subject property was one of those alloted to his
son, Alejandro Evasco, who had it surveyed in 1956 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"), and who had it
declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1900. The other heirs received their own shares,
one of them, the deceased Anacleto Evasco, one of whose children was listed as Encarnacion,
possibly, the principal private respondent herein.
Property 6 (Possession)
Alejandro Evasco sold his property to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972, 2 who declared it
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 5157. 3 On July 10, 1977, Jose E. Torella, in
turn, sold the land to Jose Enriquez Sabater, 4 and the latter also declared the property in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 7127. 5 Petitioner Angel P. Peran acquired the land by purchase
from Jose Enriquez Sabater on December 27, 1978, 6 and subsequently declared it, too, in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 7310. 7 The sale was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds'
Office of the province of Sorsogon on January 3, 1979 in accordance with the provisions of Sec.
194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.
Sometime in January 1979, petitioner personally asked private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco
and her common-law husband Ramon Espera, whose house is erected on a 440 square meter
portion (44 sq. ms. according to petitioner) of the lot in question, to remove the same and vacate
the premises. Respondents refused, and consequently, a confrontation between the parties was
had before the Municipal Mayor of Barcelona and later before the Municipal Judge of Bulusan-
Barcelona to settle the dispute, but to no avail.
On February 8, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer against
private respondents before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, seeking the
ejectment of the latter from the portion in question contending that respondents are mere
squatters thereon; that they had prevented plaintiff from entering the property and deprived him
of possession; and that they were tolerating persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual
erosion of the land to his extreme prejudice.
Private respondents answered denying the material allegations of the Complaint, and alleging
that they are the lawful possessors for more than twenty (20) years of the said portion, which
formerly belonged to Jose Evasco, grandfather of Encarnacion Evasco; and that petitioner has
no right to eject them therefrom.
On September 1, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona rendered its
Decision ordering private respondents to vacate the lot in question, return its possession to
petitioner, reimburse him attorney's fees of P300.00 and litigation expenses, and to pay the costs.
Reconsideration of the said decision filed by private respondents was denied by said Court on
November 12, 1979. Private respondents appealed to respondent Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, Branch II. llcd
Respondent Court reversed the Municipal Circuit Court and dismissed the case on March 28,
1980, ruling that said Court had no jurisdiction over the case as the same was filed only on
February 4, (8), 1979, which was well beyond the one-year-period of limitation, the cause of action
having accrued from the sale of the property by Alejandro Evasco to Jose E. Torella on December
31, 1972; and that since the only issue in an illegal detainer case is physical possession, "whoever
has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law." Reconsideration of the
said Decision sought by petitioner was denied by respondent Court.
Petitioner appealed said judgment directly to this Tribunal on a question of law, raising as the
lone issue:
. . . "whether the respondent court was in error when for purposes of
determining the jurisdiction of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-
Barcelona, to try Civil Case No. 1227, for Illegal Detainer:
(a) it reckoned the counting of one-year period within which to file the
action from the sale of the property in question by Alejandro Evasco to
Jose Torella on December 31, 1972 and not from the date of demand
made by the petitioner upon the respondents; and
(b) by assuming that `prior possession in whatever character is protected
by law'."
We rule for petitioner.
Private respondents admit that the land in question was originally owned by Jose Evasco. The
tax declarations covering their house clearly state "house built on land owned by Jose Evasco
under Tax No. 1599", 8 Since the land had been partitioned to Alejandro Evasco by his father,
Jose Evasco, respondent Encarnacion can lay no claim to the property even as a grand-daughter
of Jose Evasco. Respondents may have been in possession of the portion they occupy prior to
petitioner but they have not proved their title thereto, nor their right to possess the same. As the
2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona found, no concrete evidence was introduced
by respondents on this point. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the validity of the `Reparticion
Extrajudicial" whereby said lot was adjudicated to Alejandro Evasco by his father Jose Evasco,
predecessors-in-interest of petitioner, had never been challenged.
If at all, private respondents' possession of their portion of the property was by mere tolerance
of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, which, however, does not vest in them a right which they
can assert against petitioner. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal when,
upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. 9 A
possessor by tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 10 It is not
necessary that there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit
may be filed against a possessor by tolerance. 11 Neither is prior physical possession of the
property by petitioner an indispensable requisite. 12 The ruling of respondent Court, therefore,
that "since the only issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action is the physical possession of
real property — possession de facto and not possession de jure — whoever has prior possession,
no matter in what character, is protected by law," is erroneous under the factual milieu herein.
A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession. 13 The one-year-period of limitation commences from
the time of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from
the last letter of demand. 14 Demand may either be personal or in writing. 15 The demand to
vacate having been made by petitioner in January 1979, and the ejectment suit having been
instituted on February 8, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well
within its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. prLL
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch
II, in Civil Case No. 1227, is SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of
Bulusan-Barcelona is hereby reinstated.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Peran v. Presiding Judge, Branch II, Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, G.R. No. L-57259,
[October 13, 1983], 210 PHIL 60-66)
8. Yu v Honrado; G.R. No. L-50025. August 21, 1980.
[G.R. No. L-50025. August 21, 1980.]
Property 6 (Possession)
ALFONSO YU and SOLEDAD YU, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE
REYNALDO P. HONRADO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV-Pasig, MARCELO STEEL
CORPORATION, Detective CARLOS C. NUESTRO and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
For adjudication in this certiorari prohibition and mandamus case is the possession of about
forty-two metric tons of scrap engine blocks (valued at more than forty thousand pesos), part of
a stock which Marcelo Steel Corporation sold to an alleged swindler and which scrap iron was
allegedly purchased in good faith by the Yu spouses from the swindler but retrieved from the
purchasers by Marcelo Steel Corporation by means of a search warrant.
The record shows that on June 27, 1978, Detective Carlos C. Nuestro of the police department
of Makati, Metro Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch XXV an
application for a search warrant, entitled "People vs. Alfonso Yu, Proprietor, Soledad Junk Shop,
171-173 Maria Clara Street, Corner 8th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan, Metro Manila."
In that application, Nuestro alleged that he "has been informed and verily believes that Alfonso
Yu" was in possession of "about 55 metric tons of unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks
embezzled" and that he "has verified the report and found (it) to be a fact" (p. 41, Rollo).
In his testimony before respondent Judge, Nuestro declared that he had personal knowledge that
Alfonso Yu kept the said engine blocks, which were "embezzled"; that the said goods were
purchased by Carlito Refuerzo on June 10, 1978 from Marcelo Steel Corporation; that Refuerzo
paid for the goods with a check in the sum of P61,808.25, which check was dishonored for
insufficient funds; that Refuerzo sold the engine blocks on June 12, 1978 to the Soledad Junk
Shop and that Refuerzo was later apprehended and detained in the municipal jail of Makati (pp.
5-8 and 44-47, Rollo).
On that same day, June 27, or after the taking of Nuestro's testimony, respondent Judge issued
a search warrant, commanding any peace officer to search the premises of the Soledad Junk
Shop, to seize therefrom "55 metric tons of unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks" and
bring them to the court "to be dealt with as the law directs" (pp. 43, 47-48, Rollo).
Nuestro and four policemen implemented the search warrant on the following day, June 28. They
seized from the Soledad Junk Shop 42.8 metric tons of engine blocks, which were loaded in six
trucks and brought for safekeeping to the premises of Marcelo Steel Corporation, Punta, Sta.
Ana, Manila with the understanding that they were in custodia legis (pp. 102-107, Rollo).
On July 12, 1978, the spouses Alfonso Yu and Soledad Yu filed with respondent Judge a motion
to set aside the search warrant and for the return of the engine blocks. Marcelo Steel Corporation
opposed the motion.
After hearing, respondent Judge denied the motion in his order of November 9, 1978. The Yus'
motion for the reconsideration of that order was also denied. On March 1, 1979, they filed in this
Court the instant petition.
Parallel to or contemporaneously with the search warrant proceeding was the complaint for
estafa filed by Marcelo Steel Corporation against Refuerzo, Soledad Yu and Refuerzo's
confederates in the office of the provincial fiscal of Rizal (I. S. No. 78-6734).
Assistant Fiscal Ricardo S. Sumaway in a resolution dated October 22, 1979 in the case of
Marcelo Steel Corporation vs. Refuerzo, et al. found that Refuerzo, Ernesto Dumlao, Jose Alla
and two other persons named Larry and Boy defrauded Marcelo Steel Corporation in the sum of
P95,434.50 as the value of 90,890 kilos of scrap materials delivered to Refuerzo which were not
paid for and that the Soledad Junk Shop paid Refuerzo P44,000 for 50,000 kilos of scrap
materials (p. 306-310, Rollo). LibLex
Fiscal Sumaway found that Soledad Yu was not a co-conspirator of Refuerzo and that she was
an innocent purchaser for value (p. 309, Rollo).
The fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an information for estafa also dated October
22, 1979 charging Refuerzo, Dumlao, and Alla with having obtained through false pretenses from
Marcela Steel Corporation 90,890 kilos of scrap cast iron engine blocks valued at P95,434.50
(Criminal Case No. 32394, p. 311, Rollo).
However, because the accused in that case have not been arrested, the trial court in its order of
April 30, 1980 temporarily archived the case. Thus, there is no movement in that case.
On the other hand, it is imperative that a resolution be rendered as to the conflicting claims of the
Yu spouses and Marcelo Steel Corporation with respect to the scrap engine blocks.
Considering the present situation of the parties and the absence of any final judgment in the
estafa case as to the civil liability of the accused to make restitution, we hold that the Yu spouses
are entitled to retain possession of the scrap engine blocks.
This case is governed by the ruling in Chua Hai vs. Kapunan, Jr.; etc. and Ong Shu, 104 Phil. 110
"that the acquirer and possessor in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a competent
court rules otherwise".
It was further ruled in the Chua Hai case that "the filing of an information charging that the chattel
was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona
fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor".
In the Chua Hai case, it appears that Roberto Soto purchased on January 31, 1956 for P6,137.70
from Ong Shu's hardware store 700 sheets of corrugated galvanized iron and 249 pieces of round
iron bar. Soto issued a bouncing check in payment for the GI sheets.
He sold in Pangasinan 165 GI sheets of which 100 were sold to Chua Hai. Soto was charged with
estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In that case, Ong Shu, the seller and complainant,
filed a petition asking that the 700 GI sheets, which were deposited with the Manila Police
Department, be returned to him.
Chua Hai opposed the petition as to the 100 GI sheets. The trial court ordered the return of the
GI sheets to Ong Shu on condition that, as to the 100 sheets, he should post in favor of Chua Hai
a bond for twice the value of the 100 GI sheets.
This Court reversed that order because "the possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title" and "every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession"
(Arts. 539 and 559, Civil Code).
Property 6 (Possession)
The instant case is similar to the Chua Hai case. The Yu spouses bought the scrap engine blocks
in good faith for P44,000 from the alleged swindler without any notice that the same were
obtained under false pretenses or by means of a bouncing check. The purchase by the Yu
spouses of the scrap engine blocks from Refuerzo, doing business under the tradename C. C.
Varried Corporation, was covered by a sales invoice and seemed to have been made in the
ordinary course of business (p. 223, Rollo).
Marcelo Steel Corporation contends, that it recovered the scrap engine blocks by means of a
valid warrant. The Yu spouses counter that the search warrant was void because it was issued
without probable cause on the basis of Nuestro's hearsay testimony.
We hold that the search warrant was lawfully issued. Respondent Judge complied with the
requirements for its issuance as prescribed in section 3, Article IV of the Constitution and in
sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. LibLex
While Nuestro's knowledge of the alleged estafa was initially hearsay, yet his comprehensive
investigation of the case enabled him to have direct knowledge of the sale made by Pablo
Tiangco of Marcelo Steel Corporation to Refuerzo and the sale made by Refuerzo and his
confederates to the Yu spouses.
Nuestro's testimony was a sufficient justification for an examining magistrate to conclude that
the scrap engine blocks were the subject of estafa. That conclusion was confirmed by the filing
of the information for estafa.
But from the fact that the search warrant was validly issued, it does not follow that Marcelo Steel
Corporation is entitled to retain the same. There is as yet no decree of restitution in the criminal
case entitling Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover the scrap iron from the third person who
bought it in good faith and for value.
Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the restitution of the thing itself must be
made whenever possible "even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has
acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person who may be
liable to him". However, there is no restitution in case "the thing has been acquired by the third
person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery".
Hence, in the absence of any adjudication as to the civil liability, there is no legal basis for allowing
Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover possession of the scrap engine blocks. Indeed, there is
cogency in the view of Justice Felix in his concurring opinion in the Chua Hai case that restitution
should not be required in a case where the offended party voluntarily delivered the thing to the
offender-purchaser in the expectation of being paid the price and where, thereafter, the offender
sold the thing to an innocent third party. That situation should be distinguished from the cases of
theft and robbery where the offended party was involuntarily deprived of his property (104 Phil.
110, 120). LLphil
The case may be viewed from another angle. Since Marcelo Steel Corporation and the Yu
spouses acted in good faith, the question is which of them should suffer the loss occasioned by
the acts of the alleged swindler?
The answer is found in the rule, enunciated by Justice Holmes in Eliason vs. Wilborn, 281 U. S.
457 (applied here by analogy), that, "as between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer
the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence
must bear the loss".
WHEREFORE, respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation is ordered to return and deliver to the Yu
spouses within ten days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case the 42.8 tons of scrap
engine blocks in question. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ ., concur.
Justices Guerrero and De Castro were designated to sit in the Second Division.
||| (Yu v. Honrado, G.R. No. L-50025, [August 21, 1980], 187 PHIL 669-675)
9. Cordero v Cabral; G.R. No. L-36789. July 25, 1983.
[G.R. No. L-36789. July 25, 1983.]
FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO, CASIMIRO
OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. VICTORIA P.
CABRAL, ALEJANDRO BERBOSO, DALMACIO MONTAOS and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
San Juan, Africa & Associates for petitioner.
Bengzon & Associates for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; SCOPE; ONLY QUESTIONS RAISED WITHIN THE ISSUES MADE
BY THE PARTIES IN THE PLEADINGS IN THE COURT BELOW; ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. —
It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties
in their pleadings.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT OF APPELLATE COURT BASED ON A GROUND NOT LITIGATED IN THE
TRIAL COURT; CASE AT BAR. — In this, case, the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered a
decision based on a ground which was not litigated in the trial court and which could not have
been raised on appeal. The ground to be sure, is the supposed oral contract of sale made to the
predecessors of the defendants covering the disputed piece of land. The supposed oral contract
of sale was never an issue.
3. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; GOOD FAITH CEASES AND BAD FAITH BEGINS
UPON SERVICES OF SUMMONS. — The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession
of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their
good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complainant. (Art. 528,
Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 [1929]). As possessors in bad faith from the service of
the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received . . ." (Art. 549, Civil Code)
Property 6 (Possession)
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
Petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals.
In Civil Case No. 2323 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Felipa Cordero and her
children Mauro, Casimiro and Elisea all surnamed Ocampo sued Victoria Cabral, Alejandro
Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos in a Complaint which reads as follows: LibLex
"1. That the plaintiffs are all of legal age, all residing and with postal
address at Meycauayan, Bulacan; Felipa Cordero is a widow while Elisea
Ocampo is single; and the defendants are all of legal age, Victoria P.
Cabral is married but she is living apart and separate from her husband so
the latter is not included herein as party defendant, and all of them are
residing and with postal address at Meycauayan, Bulacan, where they
may be served with summons;
2. That Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan, husband of the
plaintiff Felipa Cordero and father of the other plaintiffs surnamed
Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958, and that said deceased left several
properties, which were inherited by the plaintiffs, one of which is a parcel
of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5, plan Psu. 43302), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Saluysoy, Municipality of Meycauayan.
Bounded on the N. by Sapa and properties of Pedro Dazo and Catalino
Exaltacion; on the NE. by property of Trinidad Rodriguez & Mateo Mistica;
on the SE. by properties of Vicente Mistica, Antonio Rodriguez,
Hermogenes Blanco, Lucio Sulbera and Pablo Francia; on the SW. by
properties of Concepcion Rodriguez and Alejandro de la Cruz; and on NW.
by a Sapa . . .; containing an area of Seventy-eight thousand one hundred
and eighty-one square meters (78,181), more or less. With TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 14513 in the name of Gregorio Z. Ocampo
and has Tax Declaration No. 2819 and is assessed at P4,290.00.
which parcel of land was originally registered in accordance with
the Land Registration Act on December 14, 1933, and was
registered and/or transferred in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z.
Ocampo on July 31, 1934;
3. That after the death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo the plaintiffs
herein took possession of the properties left by him, among others is the
afore-described parcel of land which is a riceland, but they found out that
the southern portion of the same with an area 4,303 square meters, more
or less, upon verification, was possessed by the defendants herein,
Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos; and that the
defendant Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while
her co-defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants;
4. That the plaintiffs demanded of the defendants to surrender to the
former possession of the afore-mentioned portion of land and/or vacate it
but they refused and failed to do so, and the defendant Victoria P. Cabral
continued claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants
continued recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs;
that the plaintiffs had the afore-described parcel of land (with T.C.T. No.
14513) relocated in the presence of the defendants' representatives and
it was found and/or determined that the afore-said portion of land with the
area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, was a part of the plaintiffs' land
with T.C.T. No. 14513; that even after the said relocation the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral persisted and still persist in her claim of ownership over
the said portion and her co-defendants persisted and still persist in
recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs; that the
defendants continue in possession of the same; and that the defendants
still refuse and fail to surrender and/or vacate said portion of land inspite
of demands made on them by the plaintiffs;
5. That because of the defendants' occupancy of the afore-mentioned
plaintiffs' portion of land with the area of 4,303 square meters, more or
less, to the exclusion of the latter, the said plaintiffs failed to realize a yearly
harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan,
from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present;
6. That because of the defendants' refusal to recognize plaintiffs'
ownership over the afore-mentioned portion of land and also because of
their refusal and failure to surrender and/or vacate the same the plaintiffs
were forced to employ the services of the undersigned counsel to institute
this action at an agreed fees of P500.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs herein respectfully pray
of this Hon. Court to render judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants thus ordering them:
a) To recognize the ownership of the plaintiffs over the afore-mentioned
portion of land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, and to
surrender it to the plaintiffs or vacate the same;
b) To deliver, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs palay in the amount of
ten (10) cavanes or pay their market price at the rate of P10.00 per cavan
per harvest-time beginning the year 1958 up to the time of their delivery
or payment.
c) To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs' lawyer's fees in the amount
of P500.00; and
d) To pay the costs of this suit.
And to grant any remedy and relief just and equitable in the premises."
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-6.).
The Answer of the defendants contains the following allegations:
"I. That defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
II. That defendants admit being in possession of the portion of land alleged
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, as said portion of land belongs to
defendant Victoria P. Cabral;
Property 6 (Possession)
III. That defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 4 of the complaint to
the effect that the said portion of 4,303 square meters, more or less, is a
part of the plaintiffs' land;
IV. That defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint;
V. That defendants likewise have no knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the
complaint;
And by way of SPECIAL DEFENSE, defendants allege: prcd
VI. That defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in interest
before her are the real owners, and have been in actual, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession, of that portion of land claimed by the plaintiffs
in their complaint, which portion is more particularly described as Lot 5-B
of plan Psd-11496, duly approved by the Director of Lands on December
21, 1935;
VII. That the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs, the herein
plaintiffs, have admitted, acknowledged and recognized the defendant
Cabral and her predecessors in said portion of land, as the real owners
thereof;
VIII. That the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and his predecessors in
interest, as well as the defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest,
have always recognized as the boundary between their respective
properties, a barrio road which has existed since the Spanish regime and
has continued to exist up to the present time; and all the residents of the
rural areas using said barrio road know for a fact that, with respect to the
respective properties of the parties hereto, said road is the boundary
between said properties;
IX. That the inclusion of that portion claimed by the plaintiffs in their
complaint in the original registration of their property was obtained thru
error or fraud by the original applicant, but was never possessed by him
nor by his successors in interest, as they have always openly recognized
the ownership of said portion as belonging to defendant Cabral and her
predecessors in interest before her;
And by way of COUNTER CLAIM, defendants allege:
X. That all the foregoing paragraphs are pleaded herein and made parts
hereof;
XI. That the defendant Victoria P. Cabral is the real owner of Lot No. 5-B,
plan Psd-11496, with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less,
erroneously or fraudulently included in the property described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14513 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Bulacan, registered in the name of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and
now claimed by the herein plaintiffs;
XII. That defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest have been in
possession of said portion of land for more than fifty years, their
possession being actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous, as owners
thereof;
XIII. That said deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs, and their
predecessors in interest have openly admitted, acknowledged and
recognized the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in
interest as the real owners of said portion of land, Lot 5-B plan Psd-11496,
and said Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs and their predecessors in
interest have never been in possession of said portion of land;
XIV. That the plaintiffs, claiming to be the heirs of the deceased Gregorio
Z. Ocampo, are therefore under obligation to execute a deed of transfer
of said portion of land in favor of the true owner thereof, the herein
defendant Victoria P. Cabral, in accordance with law;
XV. That because of the present action filed by the plaintiffs, the
defendants have suffered damages in the amount of P1,000.00;
WHEREFORE:, defendants pray that judgment be rendered:
(a) dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs;
(b) declaring the defendant Victoria P. Cabral as the owner of Lot-5-B, plan
Psd-11496, which has been erroneously included in the property of the
deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14513, Bulacan, and ordering the herein plaintiffs to execute a deed of
transfer of said Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496 in favor of the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral; and
(c) ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the sum of P1,000.00.
Defendants further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which may be
proper and just under the premises." (R.A., pp. 8-13.)
The plaintiffs filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim as follows:
"1. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph II of the Answer that
the portion of land now under litigation belongs to the defendant Victoria
P. Cabral, and likewise deny the allegations in paragraphs VI and XI of the
same that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in
interest are the real owners of this portion (under litigation) with an area of
4,303 square meters, Lot 5-B of plan Psd-11496 with Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 14513 in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, because the
truth is that the said Mr. Ocampo and his successors in interest, the
plaintiffs herein, are the real owners thereof; and that said portion is a part
and is included in the plaintiffs' big parcel of land known as Lot 5, Psu-
43302, and covered by the afore-mentioned Certificate;
That the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in interest
were never the owners of the said portion of land and in fact none of them,
much less Victoria P. Cabral, has been in possession or in possession of
any title or any document either public or private, showing his or her
ownership, and not even a Tax Declaration for taxation purposes; the truth
is that when the late Mr. Antonio Rodriguez, original owner of the land with
Property 6 (Possession)
plan Psu-100536, adjacent to that of the plaintiffs, sold said land to his
successor Segunda Prodon he did not include in the said sale this portion,
under litigation, Lot 5-B, of plan Psd-11496 with an area of 4,303 square
meters, more or less, knowing that it did not belong to him; and because
of Segunda Prodon has not acquired this portion of land with an area of
4,303 square meters, more or less, it is clear, therefore, that she could not
have transmitted it to her successors including the herein defendant,
Victoria P. Cabral;
2. That the plaintiffs deny the defendants' allegations in paragraphs VI and
XII of their Answer that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her
predecessors in interest have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of this portion of land for a period of more than 50
years because the truth is that, if they were ever in possession of the same,
their possession was 'not adverse' and 'not continuous'. When Mr.
Gregorio Z. Ocampo bought the parcel of land known as Lot 5, Psu-43302
with an area of 78,181 square meters, more or less, in 1934, (wherein this
portion under litigation is included) the said Mr. Ocampo took possession
of this whole land. In the year 1935 the adjoining owner of the said
property, the late Mr. Antonio Rodriguez and predecessor of the
defendant Victoria P. Cabral, requested Mr. Ocampo to sell to him a
portion of said land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to
which Mr. Ocampo agreed. As there was already a meeting of the mind
Mr. Rodriguez requested Mr. Ocampo that he be allowed to possess the
said portion as they were going to make the formal deed of sale, to which
proposition Mr. Ocampo likewise agreed. This proposed sale never
materialized so if Mr. Rodriguez ever possessed the said portion of land,
now under litigation, he did not possess it as owner but only as a
'prospective owner'. His possession cannot, therefore, be termed
'adverse'. Such possession cannot also be termed 'continuous' for 50
years because Mr. Ocampo was in possession of the same in 1934 before
Mr. Rodriguez came in possession of the same, first, with the consent and
later by toleration of Mr. Ocampo.
Granting but without admitting, that the defendant Cabral and her
predecessors in interest have been in possession of this portion of land
with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less for more than 50 years,
does she mean to imply now that she acquires ownership over the same
by virtue of 'prescription'? She must remember that this property is titled
under Act 496 and, therefore, 'imprescriptible',
3. That the plaintiffs deny the defendants' allegations in paragraphs VI and
IX of their Answer that the plaintiffs have admitted, acknowledged and
recognized the defendant Cabral and her predecessors in said land as the
real owners thereof, because the truth is that the plaintiffs are the real
owners of the same, and that they have never admitted, acknowledged
nor recognized the defendant Cabral nor any of her predecessors in
interest as the owners of said portion of land;
4. That the plaintiffs admit the allegation in paragraph VIII of the Answer
that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral owns an adjoining property which is
described in her plan Psu-100536 but they deny there is a 'barrio road'
between her land and that of the plaintiffs which serves as the boundary
and that there has never been any road much less a barrio road between
their properties.
That, if the defendants are referring to Lot 5-B, plan Psd-11496, and the
rest of the land of the plaintiffs Lot No. 5, Psu-43302, which said Lot 5-B
is a part, the plaintiffs deny the existence of such road much less a barrio
road, and that there has never been a road therein. With the permission of
the Hon. Court the existence or non-existence of a road can be verified by
an ocular inspection and if need be with the aid of a licensed surveyor;
5. That the plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraphs IX and XIII of the
Answer that Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo and his successors in interest have
never been in possession of this portion of land now under litigation. Mr.
Gregorio Z. Ocampo took possession of said property after he bought it
in 1934 and if the predecessors in interest of the defendant Cabral
happened to be in its possession it was, first, with the consent of Mr.
Ocampo and later by his toleration as we have already explained in
paragraph 2 of this Reply;
6. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph IX of the Answer that
the inclusion of this portion of property under litigation was 'obtained thru
error or fraud' by the original applicant, and they likewise deny the
allegation in paragraph XI of the Answer that this portion with an area of
4,303 square meters, more or less, was erroneously and fraudulently
included in the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan, because in truth and
in fact there was no such error or fraud. The title of this property was
granted and obtained in a regular proceeding. If there was any error or
fraud the predecessor in interest of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral would
have filed a petition for review or would have sued for damages. Or the
said defendant or any of her predecessors in interest would have resorted
to some legal remedy.
The fact is that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral or any of her predecessors
in interest did not sincerely and honestly believe that they were the owners
of this portion of property. In fact they did not have and do not have any
kind of title or any kind of document, either public or private, over this
property and they did not even have this property declared in their names
for taxation purposes. LibLex
Granting, but without admitting, that the title to this property was obtained
either by error or fraud yet the defendant Victoria P. Cabral can have no
valid claim against the plaintiffs because she has never been the owner of
said property and also because the plaintiffs' predecessor, Mr. Gregorio
Z. Ocampo, acquired this property as 'an innocent purchaser, in good faith
and for value.'
7. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph XIV of the Answer
that the plaintiffs are under obligation to execute a deed of transfer of the
portion of land in favor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral because, first,
the title to this land was obtained in a regular proceeding where there was
neither error nor fraud; second, said defendant or her predecessors in
interest are not the owners of said land much less said defendant Cabral
who has nothing at all in her possession to show any kind of right over
said portion of land, and third, Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the predecessor
in interest of the plaintiffs, acquire this property as an 'innocent purchaser,
in good faith and for value', and
Property 6 (Possession)
8. That the plaintiffs have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation in paragraph XV of the defendants'
Answer (Counterclaim).
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court to grant the
plaintiffs' Petition in their Complaint." (R.A., pp. 14-21.)
It can be seen that the thrust of the Complaint is that a piece of land covered by T.C.T. No. 14513
in the name of Gregorio Z. Ocampo was illegally possessed by the defendants. Upon the other
hand, the thrust of the Answer is that "the defendant Victoria P. Cabral is the real owner of Lot
No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496, with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, erroneously or
fraudulently included in the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan, registered in the name of the deceased Gregorio
Z. Ocampo and now claimed by the herein plaintiffs." (Answer, par. XI.)
The decision of the trial court is not clear as to whether or not the disputed lot is included in
T.C.T. No. 14513. However, the decision contains the following statement: "if it is included in
their title, such title is void insofar as the portion of the Pandayan road is concerned." (R.A., p.
30.). cdll
The trial court gave the following judgment:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiffs' complaint is hereby DISMISSED, without costs.
For lack of proof that plaintiffs were in bad faith in the filing of the present
action, defendants' counter-claim is likewise dismissed." (R.A., p. 30.)
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PANDAYAN
ROAD IS LOCATED INSIDE THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN T.C.T. NO.
14513 AND INCONSEQUENTLY HOLDING THAT THE SAME
CONSTITUTES THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE PROPERTIES OF
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND DEFENDANT-APPELLEE VICTORIA
CABRAL.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT T.C.T. NO. 14513 IS
'VOID INSOFAR AS THE PORTION FROM THE PANDAYAN ROAD IS
CONCERNED', AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT SAID T.C.T. IS
INCONTROVERTIBLE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING IMPORTANCE TO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' ALLEGED 'OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND
ADVERSE POSSESSION' AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT." (Brief, pp. a-b.)
The Court of Appeals found as a fact: "That disputed portion Lot 5-a is admittedly part of the land
originally registered in the name of plaintiff's predecessor in interest, there should be no question
that that title had become imprescriptible and original registrant as well as his successors had the
right to vindicate their ownership against any body else." (Rollo, p. 54.) 06cdasia
But the Court of Appeals went further. Seizing a statement in the Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim filed by the plaintiffs, it held that Gregorio Z. Ocampo had by an oral contract sold
the disputed land to Antonio Rodriguez the defendant's predecessor in interest. The Court of
Appeals further said "that agreement oral albeit, became binding upon Ocampo, it was even
executed in part by the actual delivery of possession, it amounted to a supervening fact, posterior
to the title, and the fact that Ocampo's title was not afterwards cancelled can not at all mean that
the title could be used as a weapon to annul that posterior agreement by Ocampo voluntarily
entered into and by reason of which he had delivered possession unto defendant's predecessor;
of course, no deed of sale was formalized for a reason not clear in the evidence, but whether or
not formalized, it was a binding personal agreement upon Ocampo." (Rollo, pp. 56-57.)
The statement upon which the Court of Appeals built its decision is as follows:
"When Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo bought the parcel of land known as Lot
5, Psu-43302 with an area of 78,181 square meters, more or less, in 1934,
(wherein this portion under litigation is included), the said Mr. Ocampo
took possession of this whole land. In the year 1935 the adjoining owner
of the said property, the late Mr. Antonio Rodriguez and predecessor of
the defendant Victoria P. Cabral, requested Mr. Ocampo to sell to him a
portion of said land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to
which Mr. Ocampo agreed. As there was already a meeting of the mind
Mr. Rodriguez requested Mr. Ocampo that he be allowed to possess the
said portion as they were going to make the formal deed of sale, to which
proposition Mr. Ocampo likewise agreed. This proposed sale never
materialized so if Mr. Rodriguez ever possessed the said portion of land,
now under litigation, he did not possess it as owner but only as a
'prospective owner'. His possession cannot, therefore, be termed
'adverse'. Such possession cannot also be termed 'continuous' for 50
years because Mr. Ocampo was in possession of the same in 1934 before
Mr. Rodriguez came to possession of the same, first, with the consent and
later by toleration of Mr. Ocampo." (R.A. pp. 15-16.)
It passes understanding why the plaintiffs mentioned a non-consummated transaction between
Gregorio Z. Ocampo and Antonio Rodriguez when the defendants made no claim of such
transaction nor was the name of Antonio Rodriguez even mentioned in their Answer. Cdpr
Even as the Court of Appeals found that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of
the plaintiffs but because of the supposed oral sale of the same to the predecessors of the
defendants, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery
of the land.
The instant petition assails the Court of Appeals for rendering a decision based on a ground
which was never raised nor discussed whether in the trial court or before it by any of the parties.
The ground to be sure, is the supposed oral contract of sale made to the predecessors of the
defendants covering the disputed piece of land.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties
in their pleadings. (See cases cited in II Moran, Rules of Court, pp. 504-505 [1970].)
In this case, the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered a decision based on a ground which
was not litigated in the trial court and which could not have been raised on appeal. That the
supposed oral contract of sale was never an issue is demonstrated by the following:
1. The pleadings of the parties have been purposely reproduced in full above. It can be seen
therefrom that no issue in respect of the supposed oral sale actually emerged.
2. The decision of the trial court is absolutely silent on the supposed oral contract of sale.
Property 6 (Possession)
3. The plaintiffs who appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals did not make
an assignment of error in respect of the supposed oral sale.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of
the plaintiffs' predecessor.
The defendants claimed in their answer that they and their predecessors are the owners of the
land in dispute but that the plaintiffs' predecessor was able to register the same in his name
through error or fraud.
However, the trial court made no categorical finding on this claim of the defendants otherwise it
would have granted the affirmative relief which they asked, namely: "(b) declaring the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral as the owner of Lot 5-B, plan Psd-11496, which has been erroneously included
in the property of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14513, Bulacan, and ordering the herein plaintiffs to execute a deed of transfer of said Lot No. 5-
B, plan Psd-11496 in favor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral." The Court of Appeals did not
deal with this issue because there was no appeal made by the defendants. cdll
The following conclusions have to be made.
1. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
predecessor of the plaintiffs.
2. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud.
3. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Gregorio Z. Ocampo had orally sold the disputed
land to the predecessors of the defendants.
4. The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no
evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they
were served with summons to answer the complaint. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53
Phil. 356 [1929].) As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall
reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received, . .
." (Art. 549, Civil Code.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and another one rendered
in that the defendants shall vacate and surrender the land in question to the plaintiffs; and the
defendants shall also account for the fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the Civil Code from
the service of the summons. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. L-36789, [July 25, 1983], 208 PHIL 452-468)
10. Lasam v Director; G.R. No. 42859. March 17, 1938.
[G.R. No. 42859. March 17, 1938.]
GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
and JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.
Alfredo Catolico for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; GENUINENESS OF TITLE AND IDENTITY OF LAND;
NECESSARY EVIDENCE. — An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document
evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity
of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for
registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his
title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title.
2. ID.; POSSESSION UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT; CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION. — While "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere
planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion
over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a total area of
24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan,
described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the application. These 152 parcels include the
parcel No. 9 here involved.
According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which were
opposed during the time of survey were delimited and marked on its plan Psu-67516
attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA to HH, MM to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAA to ZZZZ,
AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to 38, and 111 to 143, all inclusive. (Decision of the lower
court, Bill of Exceptions of the Government, p. 35.)
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it is not
supported by any title fit for registration and that the land sought to be registered is public
land. The brothers Felipe, Jose, and Salvador, all surnamed Narag, who are first cousins to
the applicant Lasam, also filed opposition on the ground that they are the owners of parcel
No. 9. Oppositions were also filed by Tomas Furigay and 35 other persons as homesteaders;
by the provincial fiscal, representing the Director of Forestry, on the ground that portions
thereof are public forests; by Francisco Caronan and some 71 other parties, claiming the
parcels occupied by them as their exclusive properties; by Jose Chan Hong Hin, on the
ground that the application includes his property of about 22 hectares and 50 ares; and by
Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the application includes the portion occupied by him and
belonging to him. Pablo Soriano succeeded in having the order of general default set aside
Property 6 (Possession)
as to him and was allowed to register his opposition at a later date. Amended applications
and oppositions by the parties were subsequently permitted to be filed.
After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected all the oppositions filed,
declared the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9, as indicated in the plan
Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in his favor.
On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after excepting to the
decision, filed a motion for new trial which was denied, and the case was brought before
this court by bill of exceptions.
The Narag brothers and the Director of Forestry appear to have abandoned their
opposition. They made no attempt to substantiate their claims at the trial.
Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al. make
various assignments of error in their respective briefs. It is not believed necessary however,
to consider each and every assignment made as the questions presented may, in our
opinion, be reduced to the following propositions: (a) Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel
Lasam, is entitled to the registration of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented
as Exhibit L, hereinafter to be referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled
to registration on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of
ownership during the time prescribed by law (par. 9, application); and in the negative, (b)
whether or not the numerous oppositors — excluding the homesteaders — are entitled to
the parcels which they allege are included in the controverted parcel No. 9. The rights of the
homesteaders necessarily depend on the resolution of these two propositions.
Exhibit L purports to be an application, dated June 27, 1873, addressed by
Domingo Narag 1.° to the Alcalde Mayor, in which the former stated that he had been in
possession of the land above described and asked that informacion testifical be admitted.
The informacion testifical was had before the Alcalde Mayor and appears to have been
approved by the Judge of the Court of First Instance without objection on the part of the
fiscal. It is the theory of the applicant that Domingo Narag 1.°, the original owner of parcel
No. 5, described in Exhibit L, owed P1,000 from the applicant's father, which amount Narag
needed for his candidacy as gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880; that the
original of Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his lawyer, Vicente Marasigan, who
lost it, and for this reason, only a certified copy of the document marked Exhibit L was
presented; and that the fifth parcel mentioned in the document, Exhibit L, is the same parcel
No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K. The Government contends that Exhibit L is not a valid
title and does not confer ownership and that even if it were valid, it does not cover so
extensive an area as that appearing on the plan, Exhibit K.
The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as follows:
"5.a Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Maguirig
o Cagguban que linda al poniente con el estero Pangul, al oriente con el
pueblo de la Solana al norte con el sitio llamado Maasim y Calabbacao y
al sur con el sitio llamado Atayao el cual tiene un cabida de siete mil brazas
y herede de mis Padres hace veinte y dos años y en la actualidad es donde
posee mis ganados de procreacion."
Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these proceedings, is
described thus (brief of claimant appellee, p. 61):
"Por el norte con los barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag;
"Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y
Lanna;
"Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y.
"Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul."
We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in receiving Exhibit
L as evidence for the claimant, but its admission by the court below does not necessarily
entitle the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, to the registration of the parcel claimed by him in these
proceedings. It is apparent that parcel No. 9, as indicated in the plan, Exhibit K, is not the
same parcel No. 5 described in document Exhibit L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries
on the north the sitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of Iraga, Bauan,
and Bangag; on the east Exhibit L gives the pueblo of Solana, whereas Exhibit K gives "el
Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natappian y Lanna"; on the west Exhibit L gives estero Pangul,
whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of Maguirig, Cagguban and estero Pangul; on the south
Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao, whereas Exhibit K gives the carretera provincial. While
there may be partial identity as to boundaries on the east and west, such identity is lacking
as to the boundaries on the north and south. This discrepancy is accentuated by the
admission of the applicant that the parcel whose registration is sought is much smaller than
that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation given by the surveyor, Jose
Mallanao, presented as witness by the claimant, is as follows:
"Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I
asked for the barrios of Maasin and Calabbacao, the applicant pointed to
me a place very far from where he was at the time and where he actually
occupied the land, and on the south side he indicated to me the provincial
road. I asked why he should not take the actual land indicated by this title
and he told me that he was not occupying that portion. That is the reason
why I took up the boundary on the south as provincial road. On the east
side he indicated to me the center of the municipality of Solana, barrios of
Basi, Nangalisan and Lanna, and on the west is a public land partly
bounded by the barrios of Maguirig, and Cagguban and estero Pangul."
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein
referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not
at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must
clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. The surveyor,
Jose Mallannao, did not actually check up the boundaries of parcel No. 5 as described in
Exhibit L, and in testifying that parcel No. 9, in Exhibit K, is smaller than that described as
parcel No. 5 in Exhibit L, he relied mostly on hearsay. For instance, when asked whether
north of barrios Iraga, Bauan, and Bangag of the land described in plan Exhibit K he would
locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, he replied: "They said that Calabbacao is north
of that barrio Iraga yet." (Italics ours.)
Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepancies in the boundaries,
we cannot overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is vaguely given as 7,000 brazas. The
surveyor for the applicant, Jose Mallannao, calculated the area of the property described in
paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the basis of 7,000 square brazas or 49,000,000 square brazas as
15,695,500 hectares more or less (s. n. pp. 820-822). The area claimed here according to
the amended application of February 26, 1930, and plan Exhibit K is 24,723,437 square
meters. According to the applicant, before his occupation of the land ceded by Domingo
Narag 1.°, only about 2 hectares were cultivated. (s. n. p. 56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, with
reference to the payment of land tax, the Solicitor-General in his brief (p. 12) makes the
following observation:
"The property appears to have been declared for taxation
purposes as evidenced by revisions of tax declarations, Exhibits G-20 and
G-21 (pp. 136, 137, record). There had been previous declarations with an
Property 6 (Possession)

area of about 294 hectares (id.) but, according to Exhibit G-22 (p. 138, be registered in these proceedings — "although acquired during the existence of the
record), the area which was not previously declared contains 1,685 conjugal partnership, was proven to be the exclusive property of the husband Gabriel
hectares: Lasam". This court could not have passed upon the question whether parcel No. 7 was the
same parcel No. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have passed upon the conflicting
"With the exception of a statement in which it appears that land
claims with reference to parcel No. 9, now sought to be registered. Whatever was said in
tax was paid in 1902 (p. 140, id.) there appears in the record no tax
that case could not bind the oppositors in the present case, who were not parties thereto.
receipts evidencing the payment of taxes continuously from 1902 up to
this time." The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent and are based
on (a) possession from time immemorial; (b) acquisition by inheritance, purchase and
It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor- General that
donations propter nuptias and inter vivos; (c) payment of land taxes from 1906, 1915, and
the informacion testifical (Exhibit L) is of no legal effect because of failure subsequently to
1918 up to the filing of oppositions; and (d) acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the
solicit composition title pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880 (Fuster vs. Director
State. These oppositors denied being tenants of the applicant Lasam. After perusal of the
of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934), or to convert possession into a registration of
evidence presented by them, we are constrained to accept the conclusion of the lower court
ownership in accordance with article 393 of the Mortgage Law (Fernandez
that none of the portions or lots claimed by them or any one of them has been sufficiently
Hermanos vs. Director of Lands (57 Phil., 929), for even if we were to accord all the legal
identified, either by the oral or documentary evidence which they presented. In view thereof,
force to this document (Exhibit L), it would not serve as a basis for the registration of
and because of the insufficiency of the evidence presented, we are of the opinion that the
24,723,437 square meters.
lower court committed no error in dismissing their oppositions.
Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant entitled to
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, without
registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by law? We have
prejudice to the filing by the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, of a new application and plan
examined the evidence on this point both testimonial and documentary, and while there is
covering the portion of the land actually occupied by him since July 25, 1894. Upon the
evidence showing that the claimant might have possessed a portion of the parcel claimed
determination of that portion by the lower court, let judgment be rendered accordingly. The
by him and the registration of which is sought, we find the evidence lacking in certainty as
remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9 as indicated on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are
to the particular portion occupied and the extent thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes
hereby declared public lands, to be disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with
the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175, 180). (See
law. Without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304.) But it should be observed that the
application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain ||| (Lasam v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 42859, [March 17, 1938], 65 PHIL 367-375)
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is "one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion
actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law 11. People v Estoista; G.R. No. L-5793. August 27, 1953.
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act [G.R. No. L-5793. August 27, 1953.]
No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO
of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. In the present ESTOISTA, defendant-appellant.
case, upon the description of 7,000 brazas as the area of the land said to have been originally
possessed by Domingo Narag 1.° and conveyed to the applicant, only two hectares of which
were according to the applicant himself cultivated at the time of such transfer, the applicant
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellant.
would, on the basis of the computation hereinabove referred to and given at the trial by
surveyor Jose Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 13,000 hectares, although First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan Jr. and Acting Solicitor Antonio
only 2,432 odd hectares are now being sought for registration in these proceedings. The Consing for appellee.
fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him to be included in
his title, the further fact that according to his own testimony he has given up more than
1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax
declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant SYLLABUS
and tend to show that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be
registered is not "such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was
for his enjoyment". (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra.) 1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. — It being
established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the plantation where he was
Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court in Pamittan vs. Lasam to hunt with the rifle of his father, in whose name the firearm was licensed, and that the son,
and Mallonga (60 Phil., 908) which, according to counsel for the claimant Lasam, is away from his father's sight and control, carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as
determinative of the ownership of the property now sought to be registered. Said case refers in fact he did with fatal consequences, the evidence support the son's conviction for the
to an action for partition between the heirs of Sofia Pamittan, wife of Gabriel Lasam, offense of illegal possession of firearm which was in accordance with law.
originally brought in the Court of First Instance and appealed to this court. The trial court in
that case found that parcel No. 7 — which is said to correspond to parcel No. 9 sought to
Property 6 (Possession)
2. ID.; ID.; U. S. vs. SAMSON (16 Phil., 323), EXPLAINED. — The implied holding
in U. S. vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323) that the intention to possess is an essential element of a
violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the weapon to the
exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention to own but also intention
to use. From the very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition, control or dominion of
the use of the weapon by the holder regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential
factor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING OF THE TERMS "CONTROL" AND "DOMINION." — The
terms "control" and "dominion" are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and
opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a
violation vary. The rule laid down by United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is
that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not
violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical
example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another
to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W.,
138; 68 C. J., 22.)
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; PENALTY
PROVIDED FOR IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4 DEEMED CONSTITUTIONAL. — Without
deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment,
confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual,
having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to curb.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM. —
As Republic Act No. 4 provides a penalty of from 5 to 10 years imprisonment for illegal
possession of a firearm, the court can not but impose upon the offender the minimum at
least of the penalty provided. In this case, however, considering the degree of malice of the
defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh, and a recommendation
is made to the President to reduce to fix months the penalty imposed upon this defendant.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; FIVE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT, NOT CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL. — To come under the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual
punishment, the penalty imposed must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."
(24 C. J. S., 1187-1188.) Five years' confinement for possessing firearms can not be said to
be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public
conscience.
7. ID.; ID.; CONFISCATION OF FIREARMS BELONGING TO A PERSON OTHER
THAN THE DEFENDANT. — Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4does not say that firearms
unlawfully possessed or carried are to be confiscated only if they belong to the defendant,
nor is such intention deducible from the language of the Act. Except perhaps where the
lawful owner was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his property by another,
confiscation accords with the legislative intent. Ownership or possession of firearms is not
a natural right protected by the constitutional prohibition against depriving one of his
property without due process of law. Above the right to own property is the inherent attribute
of sovereignty — the police power of the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the
safety and good order of society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.) Pursuant to the exercise of police
power, the right to private property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so as to promote
the general welfare, public order and safety. (Id., 611). The power of the legislature to prohibit
the possession of deadly weapon carries with it the power to provide for the confiscation or
forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.
DECISION
TUASON, J p:
Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through
reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the
appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which
he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence
raising factual, legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set
up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty
— from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines — provided by Republic Act No.
4 is cruel and unusual.
As to the facts. The firearm with which the appellant was charged with
having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who
held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance
from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with
cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100
to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and
whose presence was not perceived by the accused.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle
was with the accused at the time of the accidental killing.
Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the accident, February 10,
1949, his son told him that there were wild chickens on the plantation "scratching
palay and corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them; that Bruno told his son to
wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over to Alberto who is a "sharp-
shooter" and "shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the young man;
that Bruno was that far from Alberto when the latter fired and accidentally wounded
their servant.
The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I
told my father about the said wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me
to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it."
Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son's
statements at the Constabulary headquarters on the same morning of the shooting,
and sworn to by them before the justice of the peace soon after.
Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went to hunt for wild
roosters;" that "later on my son Alberto came to inform me that he had accidentally
hit our laborer;" that thereupon he "went with my son to see what happened."
Queried "who was with Alberto when he went out hunting," Bruno replied, "He was
alone."
On his part, the defendant declared on the same occasion that Diragon
Dima, after being shot, requested to be taken to his (Dima's) house; that as the
accused was able to carry the wounded man on]y about 50 meters, Dima asked the
defendant to call Bruno "who was in the house" — which Alberto did. To the
question who his companion was when he shot at a rooster, Alberto said, "I was
alone."
Property 6 (Possession)
There is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained
anything but the truth, especially that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts when the
defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent, the affidavits were
executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary headquarters, there is
no hint of any undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and, above all,
they stood to gain nothing from the statement that the accused was
unaccompanied. In contrast, Bruno's testimony in court was interested, given with
his son's acquittal in view. And especially is the father's veracity in court to be
distrusted because by Alberto's unsolicited admission, he had been in the habit of
going out hunting in other places and for target practices, and because by Bruno's
unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of his own, is a sharpshooter and
shoots better.
It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the
plantation with his father's gun, the next question that presents itself is: Does this
evidence support conviction as a matter of law?
In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by defense counsel, it
was held that carrying a gun by order of the owner does not constitute illegal
possession of firearm. The facts in that case were that a shotgun and nine cartridges
which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to possess them,
were seized by the police from Samson while walking in the town of Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the shotgun in hunting that day and, as he was
coming along on horseback, sent Samson on ahead.
Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, in its pertinent provision is directed against any person who possesses any
firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this connection is the
meaning of the word "possesses. "It goes without saying that this word was
employed in its broad sense so as to include "carries" and "holds." This has to be
so if the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils
to public security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law
the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatever.
"Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend to
establish the guilt or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in the United
States, where the right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the federal and many
state constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely restricting
the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so has
been upheld.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to United
States vs. Samson, supra, as authority for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The
implied holding in that case that the intention to possess is an essential element of
a violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the weapon
to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention to own but
also intention to use. From the very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition
control or dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder regardless of ownership
is, of necessity, the essential factor.
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not
susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control
or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down by United
States courts — rule which we here adopt — is that temporary, incidental, casual
or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of
such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to
examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5
S.W., 138; 68 C.J., 22)
Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or carrying of
his father's gun was not incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his
father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as in
fact he did, with fatal consequences.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the case at bar
and the Samson case. Although Samson had physical control of his employer's
shotgun and cartridges, his possession thereof was undoubtedly harmless and
innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full view of the
people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson carried
the gun solely in obedience to its owners order or request without any inferable
intention to use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in the United States
where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed,
possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a
violation of similar statutes.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty
and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 6 to 10
years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard
to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The
rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use
of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might
appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the
present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is
not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the
heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to
meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to
the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906.)
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty
authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to
sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering the
degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be
too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to
the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the
imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. The appellant will pay the
costs of both instances.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
December 3, 1953
TUASON, J.:
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the penalty
therein provided, was carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for five years
Property 6 (Possession)

too harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in mind that six months was thousand pesos, in the discretion of the court. If the article illegally
commensurate and just for the appellant's offense, taking into consideration his possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun,
intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or
prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. ammunition exclusively intended for such weapons, such period
of imprisonment shall be not less than five years nor more than ten
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
years. A conviction under this section shall carry with it the
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the
forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles to the Philippine
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual."
Government.
(24 C. J. S., 1187- 1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly "The possession of any instrument or implement which
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the is directly useful in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition on
community."(Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the the part of any person whose business or employment does not
public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for deal with such instrument or implement shall be prima facie proof
possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be said that such article is intended to be used in the manufacture of
to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to firearms or ammunition."
public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds
This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or carried
of the Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed
are to be confiscated only if they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention
brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral
deducible from the language of the act. We are inclined to, and do, believe that,
argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular
except perhaps where the lawful owner was innocent of, or without fault in, the use
and judicial reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute,
of his property by another, confiscation accords with the legislative intent.
that some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any
recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he We can foresee the objection that such legislation deprives one of his
deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range. property without due process of law. The answer to this is that ownership or
possession of firearms is not a natural right protected by the Constitution. Above
The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's conviction under Republic
the right to own property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty - the police power
Act No. 4 likewise had received close attention and study. There is no need on our
of the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the safety and good order of
part to add anything to what has been said, except to point out for clarification that
society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.) Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right
the references to defendant's previous uses of his father's gun and the fatal
to private property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so as to promote the
consequences of his last use of it, were made simply to emphasize that his
general welfare, public order and safety. (Id., 611.) The power of the legislature to
possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual, incidental, or harmless. His
prohibit the possession of deadly weapon carries with it the power to provide for
previous conduct was relevant in determining his motive and intention, and to
the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed
disprove the claim that his father followed his son so as not to lose control of the
owner to be used.
firearm. It was far from the thought of the court to condemn the appellant for acts
with which he had not been charged or of which he had been pronounced innocent. ||| (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, [August 27, 1953], 93 PHIL 647-657)
The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance with section
1 of Republic Act No. 4, which reads:
12. Tan Queto v CA; G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.
"SECTION 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-
two of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.]
Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-six, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
PERSHING TAN QUETO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN
"SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in,
POMBUENA and RESTITUTA TACALINAR GUANGCO DE
acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument used or intended to be used in the POMBUENA,respondents.
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — Any person who
manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses, any
firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument or SYLLABUS
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition in violation of any provision of sections
eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and six, 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS
inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be NOT BINDING WHEN BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFERENCES. — The finding by both the Court
punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than one year of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, that the disputed lot is paraphernal and that TAN
and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment QUETO is a builder in bad faith were regarded by Us in our assailed decision as findings of facts
and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five
Property 6 (Possession)
and thus ordinarily conclusive on Us. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are erroneous
inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind this court.
2. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY BOTH
SPOUSES THROUGH ONEROUS TITLE, CONJUGAL. — The land is conjugal, not paraphernal.
How was ownership transferred, if at all, from her mother to RESTITUTA? The fact is ownership
was acquired by bothJUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the
contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause
or consideration of the transaction. The lot is thereof conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal, there being no proof that
RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own).
3. ID.; CONTRACTS; DONATION; VOID FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH FORMALITIES OF LAW.
— The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed
in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as valid donation mortis causa for the formalities
of a will were not complied with.
4. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTUAL TRANSMISSION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE, PROHIBITED. — The
allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate
of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission
of futureinheritance is generally prohibited.
5. ID.; ID.; SALE; NOT FICTITIOUS; PRESENCE OF VALID CONSIDERATION. — The contention
that the sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) is bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid
consideration thereof. Secondly, assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties
thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner
herein).
6. ID.; POSSESSION; BUILDER IS BAD FAITH ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT WHERE
OWNER OF THE LAND FAILED TO PROHIBIT CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDING. — Was Tan
Queto a possessor and builder in good faith or in bad faith Even assuming that despite
registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually
RESTITUTA's (making him in bad faith ), still RESTITUTA's failure to prohibit him from building
despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith.
The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle TAN QUETO to the rights of a builder in good
faith (Art. 448, Civil code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if RESTITUTA decides to
appropriates that building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).
7. ID.; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; BARTER; CASE AT BAR. — TAN
QUETO having bartered his own and small house with the questioned lot with JUAN (who has
been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the
OWNER-POSSESSOR of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good
faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is
a builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the OWNER himself. Please note that the
Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidenti) in the Civil Code refers to a
possessor other than the owner. Please note further that the difference between a builder (or
possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is NOT AWARE of the defect or
flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is AWARE of such defect or flaw (Art. 526,
Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the case of TAN QUETO there is no
such flaw or defect because it is he himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the
property. Our decision promulgated on May 16, 1983 is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is
hereby rendered declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as TAN QUETO's
exclusive property.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J p:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision dated May 16, 1983 of this Court * in the
above-entitled case, asking for the reversal of said decision on the following grounds: cdphil
1. Decision erred in disregarding the fact that Lot No. 304-B was
registered in the name of the husband, Juan Pombuena, as per OCT No.
0-1160 issued pursuant to the November 22, 1938 Decision (Exh. 3) of the
Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 12, G.L.R.O. Cad. Rec. No. 1638,
and that petitioner had the right to rely on said OCT;
2. The Decision erred in misinterpreting the admission in the Answer of
petitioner to the complaint in the unlawful detainer Case No. 448 (City
Court of Ozamiz City) as his admission that Lot 304-B is the paraphernal
property of the wife, Restituta Tacalinar;
3. The Decision erred in reforming the Contract of Sale (Exh. B) of Lot 304-
B from Basilides Tacalinar (mother) to the respondent, Restituta Tacalinar
Guangco de Pombuena, from a sale to a conveyance of the share of the
wife Restituta Tacalinar (daughter) in the future hereditary estate of her
parents;
4. The Decision erred in over-looking that the barter agreement is an
onerous contract of exchange, whereby private respondents-spouses
received valuable consideration, concessions and other benefits therefor
and in concluding that `the barter agreement has no effect;'
5. The Decision erred in disregarding the fact that petitioner constructed
his concrete building on Lot No. 304-B in good faith relying OCT No. 0-
1160, after the dismissal of the ejectment case and only after the execution
of said barter agreement;
6. The Decision erred in confusing the conclusion of law that petitioner is
a builder in bad faith with a finding of fact. The rule is that questions of law
are reviewable on appeal or by certiorari. Moreover, the rule on finding of
fact is subject to well-settled exceptions. (pp. 257-258, Rollo).
It will be recalled that the undisputed relevant facts indicate:
(1) that Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena (RESTITUTA, for short)
received the questioned lot (no. 304-B), of the Cadastre Survey of the
Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental either as a purported donation
or by way of purchase on (February 11, 1927) (with P50.00) as the alleged
consideration thereof;
(2) that the transaction took place during her mother's lifetime, her father
having predeceased the mother;
(3) that the donation or sale was consummated while RESTITUTA was
already married to her husband Juan Pombuena (JUAN, for short);
Property 6 (Possession)
(4) that on January 22, 1935, JUAN filed for himself and his supposed co-
owner RESTITUTA an application for a Torrens Title over the land;
(5) that under date of November 22, 1938 a decision was promulgated in
G.L.R.C. No. 1638 (Cadastral Case No. 12) pronouncing JUAN (`married
to RESTITUTA') as the owner of the land;
(6) that on September 22, 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered
into between Pershing Tan Queto (TAN QUETO, for short, the herein
petitioner) and RESTITUTA (with the consent of her husband JUAN) for a
period of ten (10) years;
(7) that on December 27, 1960 RESTITUTA sued TAN QUETO for unlawful
detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of
Ozamis City;
(8) that as a consequence of the cadastral case, an Original Certificate of
Title (Exh. 10) was issued in JUAN's name ("married to RESTITUTA") on
April 22, 1962;
(9) that the unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the
Municipal Court; but on appeal in the Court of First Instance, the entire
case was DISMISSED because of an understanding (barter) whereby TAN
QUETO became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses
RESTITUTA and JUAN in turn became the owners of a parcel of land (with
the house constructed thereon) previously owned (that is, before the
barter) by TAN QUETO;
(10) that after the barter agreement dated October 10, 1962 between
JUAN and TAN QUETO, the latter constructed (See p. 257, Rollo, Vol. II)
on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part
of RESTITUTA;
(11) that later, RESTITUTA sued both JUAN and TAN QUETO for
reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for
annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.
The two principal issues are clearly the following: LibLex
(1) Is the questioned lot paraphernal or conjugal?
(2) In having constructed the building on the lot, should TAN QUETO be regarded
as a builder in good faith (and hence entitled to reimbursement) or a builder in bad faith (with
no right to reimbursement)?
The finding by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot is
paraphernal and that TAN QUETO is a builder in bad faith were regarded by Us in Our assailed
decision as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive on Us. Assuming they are factual
findings, still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind this Court.
A second hard look at the circumstances of the case has constrained Us to rule as follows:
(1) The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. How was ownership transferred, if at all, from her mother
to RESTITUTA? The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was
not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causafor
the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance
to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained
for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a
consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable
amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having
been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal,
there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own). The contention that the
sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) is bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid
consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties
thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner
herein).
One nagging question has been posed. But did not TAN QUETO admit in his Answer that
RESTITUTA was the owner of the lot. This is not so. He admitted RESTITUTA was "an owner"
(not the owner) of the lot, and this is true, for she was a co-owner (with JUAN, and therefore
"an owner." Surely, there is no admission of RESTITUTA's exclusive ownership. And yet this is
the basis of the trial court's conclusion that the lot was indeed paraphernal.
(2) Was Tan Queto a possessor and builder in good faith or in bad faith?.
Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that
the lot was actually RESTITUTA's (making him in bad faith), still RESTITUTA's failure to prohibit
him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her
also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle TAN QUETO to the rights of
a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if
RESTITUTA decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code). prLL
However, as already previously intimated, TAN QUETO having bartered his own lot and small
house with the questioned lot with JUAN (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by
the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the OWNER-POSSESSOR of the lot. Certainly he
is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another);
much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is
the OWNER himself. Please note that the Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus
possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. Please note further that
the difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former
is NOT AWARE of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is AWARE
of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the case
of TAN QUETO there is no such flaw or defect because it is he himself (not somebody else) who
is the owner of the property.
WHEREFORE, Our decision promulgated on May 16, 1983 is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one
is hereby rendered declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as TAN
QUETO's exclusive property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35648 (Resolution), [February 27, 1987], 232 PHIL
57-64)
13. Edca Publishing v Santos; G.R. No. 80298. April 26, 1990.
[G.R. No. 80298. April 26, 1990.]
Property 6 (Possession)
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES
LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style
of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner.
Cendaña, Santos, Delmundo & Cendaña for private respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the
particular question of when a person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of
movable property in the hands of another. The article runs in full as follows:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner by
an impostor who sold it to the private respondents. Ownership of the books was recognized in
the private respondents by the Municipal Trial Court, 1 which was sustained by the Regional Trial
Court, 2which was in turn sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The petitioner asks us to declare
that all these courts have erred and should be reversed.
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as
Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for
406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and
delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering
the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books
to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from
the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to
be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification
revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against
which he had drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and
arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña
and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. 8
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN
Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor
Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant,
loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. 9
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and
the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. 10 As
previously stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three courts below and now
hopes to secure relief from us.
To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in taking
the law into its own hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private
respondents. The circumstance that it did so with the assistance of the police, which should have
been the first to uphold legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the wrong even more
deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen but by judges and with
the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Now to the merits.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they
had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides
that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus
dispensing with further proof.
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been
dismissed by the lower courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership of
the books from the EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was
selling them for a discount because he was in financial need. Private respondents are in the
business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to
part with their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the
many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for any one in the
business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and resell them for a profit.
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been
unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where the property
was purchased at a public sale, in which event its return is subject to reimbursement of the
purchase price. The petitioner is begging the question. It is putting the cart before the horse.
Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that EDCA has been
unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he
could have validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check
bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale
between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the
parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code: cdll
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
Property 6 (Possession)
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1477. The owner ship of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not
pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing
sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation
to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet
been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of
the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang, 11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang,
who in turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for the recovery
of the articles from Tan, who claimed he had validly bought them from Ang, paying for the same
in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to deceive Asiatic, the Court
of Appeals declared:
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing,
among other things that "one who has been unlawfully deprived of
personal property may recover it from any person possessing it." We do
not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the cartons of
Gloco Tonic within the scope of this legal provision. It has voluntarily
parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale. The
circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not render
illegal a transaction which was valid and legal at the beginning. LLjur
In Tagatac v. Jimenez, 13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to
Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff sued
to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by
reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has
been unlawfully deprived of her car. At first blush, it would seem that she
was unlawfully deprived thereof, considering that she was induced to part
with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist.
Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of
property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant was "illegally
deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to
part with it is illegal and is punished by law. But does this "unlawful
deprivation" come within the scope of Article 559 of the New Civil Code?
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale
as a voidable contract (Article 1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it
is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If the contract is ratified,
the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract
is cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract is
annulled, the contracting parties are restored to their respective situations
before the contract and mutual restitution follows as a consequence
(Article 1398, N.C.C.).
However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of
annulment or of ratification, the contract of sale remains valid and binding.
When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car to Feist by
virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist.
Of course, the title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable.
Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his title thereto
had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter,
provided he bought the car in good faith, for value and without notice of
the defect in Feist's title (Article 1506, N.C.C.). There being no proof on
record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe to assume that he
acted in good faith.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as applied
to the case before us.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be
interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who
buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be
the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second
sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing
bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid
for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the
books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed
her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than
cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted
with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily
accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough
to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the
sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on
delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer. Cdpr
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the
books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was
presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property,
Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by
EDCA as a result of its own negligence. We cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to
the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books
from Cruz.
Property 6 (Possession)
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the
private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all this trouble.
The private respondents have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely
transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and not EDCA
who have a right to complain.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
||| (EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 80298, [April 26, 1990], 263
PHIL 560-568)
14. Ledesma v CA; G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992.
[G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992.]
JAIME LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and CITIWIDE MOTORS, INC., respondents.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioner.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; POSSESSION; REQUISITES TO MAKE POSSESSION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY
EQUIVALENT TO TITLE. — It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has
been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor even if the
latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the first sentence of Article
559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good
faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is
in the concept of owner. (TOLENTINO, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 ed., 275-
276, citing 2-II Colin and Capitant 942; De Buen: Ibid., 1009, 2 Salvat 165; 4 Manresa 339).
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be
said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the
exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.
2. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; CONTRACT OF SALE; ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION;
EFFECT THEREOF. — There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private
respondent and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate
of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was
represented by someone who used a fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars
and the certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged representative. Title thereto was
forthwith transferred to the vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of the
alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration which does not render the contract of
sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of
the contract, and to prosecute the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Petitioner impugns the Decision of 22 September 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals 1 in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 05955 2 reversing the decision of then Branch XVIII-B (Quezon City) of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in a replevin case, Civil Case No. Q-
24200, the dispositive portion of which reads: cdll
"Accordingly, the Court orders the plaintiff to return the repossessed Isuzu
Gemini, 1977 Model vehicle, subject of this case to the defendant
Ledesma. The incidental claim (sic) for damages professed by the plaintiff
are dismissed for lack of merit. On defendant's counterclaim, Court (sic)
makes no pronouncement as to any form of damages, particularly, moral,
exemplary and nominal in view of the fact that Citiwide has a perfect right
to litigate its claim, albeit by this pronouncement, it did not succeed." 3
which was supplemented by a Final Order dated 26 June 1980, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court grants defendant Ledesma the
sum of P35,000.00 by way of actual damages recoverable upon plaintiff's
replevin bond. Plaintiff and its surety, the Rizal Surety and Insurance Co.,
are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay defendant Jaime Ledesma
the sum of P10,000.00 as damages for the wrongful issue of the writ of
seizure, in line with Rule 57, Sec. 20, incorporated in Rule 60, Sec. 10.
In conformity with the rules adverted to, this final order shall form part of
the judgment of this Court on September 5, 1979.
The motion for reconsideration of the judgment filed by the plaintiff is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No costs at this instance." 4
The decision of the trial court is anchored on its findings that (a) the proof on record is not
persuasive enough to show that defendant, petitioner herein, knew that the vehicle in question
was the object of a fraud and a swindle 5 and (b) that plaintiff, private respondent herein, did not
rebut or contradict Ledesma's evidence that valuable consideration was paid for it.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the respondent Court of Appeals are as follows:
"On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself to be Jojo
Consunji, purchased purportedly for his father, a certain Rustico T.
Consunji, two (2) brand new motor vehicles from plaintiff-appellant
Citiwide Motors, Inc., more particularly described as follows: llcd
a) One (1) 1977 Isuzu Gemini, 2-door Model PF 50ZIK,
with Engine No. 751214 valued at P42,200.00; and
Property 6 (Possession)
b) One (1) 1977 Holden Premier Model 8V41X with
Engine No. 198-1251493, valued at P58,800.00.
Said purchases are evidenced by Invoices Nos. 3054 and 3055,
respectively. (See Annexes A and B).
On September 28, 1977, plaintiff-appellant delivered the two-above
described motor vehicles to the person who represented himself as Jojo
Consunji, allegedly the son of the purported buyers Rustico T. Consunji,
and said person in turn issued to plaintiff-appellant Manager's Check No.
066-110-0638 of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank dated
September 28, 1977 for the amount of P101,000.00 as full payment of the
value of the two (2) motor vehicles.
However, when plaintiff-appellant deposited the said check, it was
dishonored by the bank on the ground that it was tampered with, the
correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000.00 per the
bank's notice of dishonor (Annexes F and G).
On September 30, 1977, plaintiff-appellant reported to the Philippine
Constabulary the criminal act perpetrated by the person who
misrepresented himself as Jojo Consunji and in the course of the
investigation, plaintiff-appellant learned that the real identity of the
wrongdoer/impostor is Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal
cases against him for estafa using this similar modus operandi.
On October 17, 1977, plaintiff-appellant was able to recover the Holden
Premier vehicle which was found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City.
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellant learned that the 1977 Isuzu Gemini
was transferred by Armando Suarez to third persons and was in the
possession of one Jaime Ledesma at the time plaintiff-appellant instituted
this action for replevin on November 16, 1977.
In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he purchases (sic) and paid for
the subject vehicle in good faith from its registered owner, one Pedro
Neyra, as evidenced by the Land Transportation Commission Registration
Certificate No. RCO1427249. prLL
After posting the necessary bond in the amount double the value of the
subject motor vehicle, plaintiff-appellant was able to recover possession
of the 1977 Isuzu Gemini as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return dated
January 23, 1978." 6
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the decision and subsequently issued the Final
Order both earlier adverted to, which plaintiff (private respondent herein) appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals; it submitted the following assignment of errors:
"The trial court erred.
I In the case of Dizon vs. Suntay, 47 SCRA 160, the Supreme Court had
IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION OF THE CAR;
II
IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE;
III
IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD RETURN THE CAR TO
DEFENDANT, DISMISSING ITS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES, AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT P35,000.00 DAMAGES RECOVERABLE AGAINST THE
REPLEVIN BOND AND P101,000.00 DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED
WRONGFUL SEIZURE;
IV
IN RENDERING THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1979 AND THE
FINAL ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1980." 7
In support of its first and second assigned errors, private respondent cites Article 559 of the Civil
Code which provides:
"ARTICLE 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor."
Without in any way reversing the findings of the trial court that herein petitioner was a buyer
in good faith and for valuable consideration, the respondent Court ruled that: cdll
"'Under Article 559, Civil Code, the rule is to the effect that if the owner
has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right
to recover it not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third
persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
robber. The said article establishes two (2) exceptions to the general rule
of irrevendicability (sic), to wit: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2)
has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor
cannot retain the thing as against the owner who may recover it without
paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.' (Aznar vs. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486).
Put differently, where the owner has lost the thing or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, the good faith of the possessor is not a bar to recovery
of the movable unless the possessor acquired it in a public sale of which
there is no pretense in this case. Contrary to the court's assumption, the
issue is not primarily the good faith of Ledesma for even if this were true,
this may not be invoked as a valid defense, if it be shown that Citiwide
was unlawfully deprived of the vehicle.
occasion to define the phrase unlawfully deprived, to wit:
'. . . it extends to all cases where there has been no
valid transmission of ownership including depositary or lessee
who has sold the same. It is believed that the owner in such a
Property 6 (Possession)
case is undoubtedly unlawfully deprived of his property and may
recover the same from a possessor in good faith.'
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the person who misrepresented himself to be the son
of the purported buyer, Rustico T. Consunji, paid for the two (2) vehicles
using a check whose amount has been altered from P101.00 to
P101,000.00. There is here a case of estafa. Plaintiff was unlawfully
deprived of the vehicle by false pretenses executed simultaneously with
the commission of fraud (Art. 315 2(a) R.P.C.). Clearly, Citiwide would not
have parted with the two (2) vehicles were it not for the false representation
that the check issued in payment thereupon (sic) is in the amount of
P101,000.00, the actual value of the two (2) vehicles." 8
In short, said buyer never acquired title to the property; hence, the Court rejected the claim of
herein petitioner that at least, Armando Suarez had a voidable title to the property.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of the respondent Court of
12 December 1988, 9 petitioner filed this petition alleging therein that: LLjur
"A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE
559 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CITIWIDE MOTORS, INC. WAS NOT
UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED OF THE SUBJECT CAR, AS IN FACT CITIWIDE
VOLUNTARILY PARTED WITH THE TITLE AND POSSESSION OR (sic)
THE SAME IN FAVOR OF ITS IMMEDIATE TRANSFEREE.
B materially and substantially differ from those obtaining in the instant case. In said case, a person
THE FACTUAL MILIEU OF THE INSTANT CASE FALLS WITHIN THE
OPERATIVE EFFECTS OF ARTICLES 1505 AND 1506 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE CONSIDERING THAT THE IMMEDIATE TRANSFEREE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CITIWIDE MOTORS, INC., ACQUIRED A
VOIDABLE TITLE OVER THE CAR IN QUESTION WHICH TITLE WAS NOT
DECLARED VOID BY A COMPETENT COURT PRIOR TO THE
ACQUISITION BY THE PETITIONER OF THE SUBJECT CAR AND ALSO
BECAUSE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BY ITS OWN CONDUCT, IS NOW
PRECLUDED FROM ASSAILING THE TITLE AND POSSESSION BY THE
PETITIONER OF THE SAID CAR." 10
There is merit in the petition. The assailed decision must be reversed.
The petitioner successfully proved that he acquired the car in question from his vendor in good
faith and for valuable consideration. According to the trial court, the private respondent's
evidence was not persuasive enough to establish that petitioner had knowledge that the car was
the object of a fraud and a swindle and that it did not rebut or contradict petitioner's evidence of
acquisition for valuable consideration. The respondent Court concedes to such findings but
postulates that the issue here is not whether petitioner acquired the vehicle in that concept but
rather, whether private respondent was unlawfully deprived of it so as to make Article 559 of the
Civil Code apply.
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived
thereof can recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good
faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of
acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make possession of movable
property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of
owner. 11
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be
said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the
exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.
The basic issue then in this case is whether private respondent was unlawfully deprived of the
cars when it sold the same to Rustico Consunji, through a person who claimed to be Jojo
Consunji, allegedly the latter's son, but who nevertheless turned out to be Armando Suarez, on
the faith of a Manager's Check with a face value of P101,000.00, dishonored for being altered,
the correct amount being only P101.00. Cdpr
Under this factual milieu, the respondent Court was of the opinion, and thus held, that private
respondent was unlawfully deprived of the car by false pretenses.
We disagree. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent
and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration
of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by
someone who used a fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the
certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged representative. Title thereto was forthwith
transferred to the vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely
amounted to a failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely
allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to
prosecute the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This is the rule
enunciated in EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 12 the facts of which do not
identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz, dean of the De la Salle College, placed an order by
telephone with petitioner for 406 books, payable upon delivery. Petitioner agreed, prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal
check covering the purchase price. Two (2) days later, Cruz sold 120 books to private respondent
Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice the former had shown
her, paid the purchase price of P1,700.00. Petitioner became suspicious over a second order
placed by Cruz even before his first check had cleared, hence, it made inquiries with the De la
Salle College. The latter informed the petitioner that Cruz was not in its employ. Further
verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the bank against which he
drew the check. Petitioner sought the assistance of the police which then set a trap and arrested
Cruz. Investigation disclosed his real name, Tomas de la Peña, and his sale of 120 of the books
to Leonor Santos. On the night of the arrest; the policemen whose assistance the petitioner
sought, forced their way into the store of Leonor and her husband, threatened her with
prosecution for the buying of stolen property, seized the 120 books without a warrant and
thereafter turned said books over to the petitioner. The Santoses then sued for recovery of the
books in the Municipal Trial Court which decided in their favor; this decision was subsequently
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner
came to this Court by way of a petition for review wherein it insists that it was unlawfully deprived
of the books because as the check bounced for lack of funds, there was failure of consideration
that nullified the contract of sale between it and the impostor who then acquired no title over the
books. We rejected said claim in this wise:
Property 6 (Possession)
"The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is
reached between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration.
According to the Civil Code:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts. prcd
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership
in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid
the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that
ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise,
the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to
another." 13
In the early case of Chua Hai vs. Hon. Kapunan, 14 one Roberto Soto purchased from the
Youngstown Hardware, owned by private respondent, corrugated galvanized iron sheets and
round iron bars for P6,137.70, in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against the Security
Bank and Trust Co. without informing Ong Shu that he (Soto) had no sufficient funds in said bank
to answer for the same. In the meantime, however, Soto sold the sheets to, among others,
petitioner Chua Hai. In the criminal case filed against Soto, upon motion of the offended party,
the respondent Judge ordered petitioner to return the sheets which were purchased from Soto.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he came to this Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. In answer to the petition, it is claimed that inter
alia, even if the property was acquired in good faith, the owner who has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same unless the property was
acquired in good faith at a public sale. 15 Resolving this specific issue, this Court ruled that Ong
Shu was not illegally deprived of the possession of the property:
". . . It is not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets to Soto upon a
perfected contract of sale, and such delivery transferred title or ownership
to the purchaser. Says Art. 1496:
'Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired
by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of
the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.' (C.C.)
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the
ownership to revest in the seller until and unless the bilateral contract of
sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the new Civil
Code. llcd
And, assuming that the consent of Ong Shu to the sale in favor of Soto
was obtained by the latter through fraud or deceit, the contract was not
thereby rendered void ab initio, but only voidable by reason of the fraud,
and Article 1390 expressly provides that:
'ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled
by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.'
Agreeably to this provision, Article 1506 prescribes:
'ARTICLE 1506. Where the seller of goods has a
voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the
time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods,
provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without
notice of the seller's defect of title.' (C.C.)
Hence, until the contract of Ong Shu with Soto is set aside by a competent
court (assuming that the fraud is established to its satisfaction), the validity
of appellant's claim to the property in question can not be disputed, and
his right to the possession thereof should be respected." 16
It was therefore erroneous for the respondent Court to declare that the private respondent was
illegally deprived of the car simply because the check in payment therefor was subsequently
dishonored; said Court also erred when it divested the petitioner, a buyer in good faith who paid
valuable consideration therefor, of his possession thereof. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 22 September 1988
and its Resolution of 12 December 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 05955 are hereby SET ASIDE and
the Decision of the trial court of 3 September 1979 and its Final Order of 26 June 1980 in Civil
Case No. Q-24200 are hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private respondent Citiwide
Motors, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86051, [September 1, 1992], 288 PHIL 52-64)
Property 6 (Possession)
15. Suobiron v CA; G.R. No. 109903. November 20, 1995.
[G.R. No. 109903. November 20, 1995.]
SPOUSES ANDRES SUOBIRON and SOCORRO SUOBIRON, JOSE
SULLANO JR. and IRENEO FERRARIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, REGISTER OF
DEEDS of the PROVINCE OF ILOILO, FORTUNATA PONCE VDA. DE
ADELANTAR, REMEDIOS ADELANTAR, CARIDAD A. CHANCO,
FLORECITA A. MONTILLA, EVANGELINA A. COSCOLLUELA, LYNDE
ADELANTAR, DOUGLAS M. ADELANTAR, PROTACIO ADELANTAR
himself and as Administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE of the late
LUIS ADELANTAR, respondents.
Tranquilino R. Gale and Hector P. Teodosio for petitioners.
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Salvador A. Cabaluna, Jr. for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; ACT NO. 3110; RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR
DESTROYED COURT RECORD, REQUIREMENTS; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR.
— In the case at bench, the requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court record
were fulfilled. The clerk of court, soon after liberation, sent a notice to the then presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo informing him of the destruction of all court
records in the province. Acting thereon the judge immediately issued an order for their
reconstitution which was published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Province and City of Iloilo once a week for six (6) months. Copies of the motion for
reconstitution were served by the movant (the now deceased Luis Adelantar) on the
oppositors through their respective counsel. It appearing that Atty. Felix Evidente was not
the oppositors' counsel of record the allegation that no notice was served on him may no
longer be relevant. The Adelantar spouses might have failed to submit in the reconstitution
proceedings an authentic copy of respondent court's resolution of 23 March 1943 as what
they submitted instead was the order dated 10 June 1944 of the CFI in LRC Case No. 673
directing compliance with and execution of the resolution quoted in the order. But we find
that this is another instance of substantial compliance with Act 3110, particularly Sec. 3
thereof, regarding presentation by the interested parties of all copies of motions, decrees,
orders and other documents in their possession relative to the record or records to be
reconstituted.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring
the Adelantar spouses owners of the two (2) parcels of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel
Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their successors-
in-interest, the parties therein, under the doctrine of res judicata.
3. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH LIABLE
TO PROPERTY OWNER FOR THE NET PRODUCE FROM THE TIME FORMER’S
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH IS LEGALLY INTERRUPTED BY THE SERVICE OF
SUMMONS. — The trial court held petitioners liable to private respondents for the net
produce of the properties in question from the time the former's possession in good faith
was legally interrupted when they were served summons in connection with private
respondents' complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed 22 July 1970,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8283, at the rate of P1,500.00 per hectare or P39,750.00 for 26.5
hectares annually until possession was restored. It may be that petitioners acquired the
disputed properties in good faith and had since then occupied the same but such bona
fidecharacter of possession ceased when they were served summons. Possession acquired
in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully, conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code. cda
DECISION
Petitioner-spouses Andres Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron, Jose Sullano Jr. and
Ireneo Ferraris instituted on 2 December 1980 an action to annul the orders dated 25 August
1945 and 28 January 1946 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo in LRC Case No.
673, GLRO Record No. 54404, as well as OCT Nos. 69237 and 69238 and the corresponding
decrees issued by the Land Registration Commission. Public respondents Land Registration
Commission and Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo, and private respondents
Fortunata Ponce Vda. de Adelantar, Caridad A. Chanco, Florecita A. Montilla, Evangelina A.
Coscolluela, and Remedios, Lynde, Douglas and Protacio, all surnamed Adelantar, were
named defendants.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that the land registration court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing both orders because the requirements of the law on
reconstitution of court records were not complied with thus rendering void not only the
orders but also the decrees and certificates of title issued thereunder.
Private respondents denied the allegations for the annulment of the orders and
decrees. They counterclaimed for the delivery to them of the property in litigation consisting
of 26.5 hectares of sugarland and for the payment of the net produce which they could have
received had they not been deprived of possession thereof.
From the evidence and the admission of the parties the trial court found that the
two (2) parcels of land were previously subject of LRC Case No. 673, GLRO Record No.
54404, before the CFI of Iloilo and that aside from the Director of Lands, the other oppositors
who appeared therein were Doroteo Legarde and Bernabe, Basilia, Quintin and Fortunato,
all surnamed Lorezo. LLcd
On 1 September 1941, after due notice, publication and hearing, the CFI rendered
judgment adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata
Ponce. The oppositors elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals. On 23 March 1943,
however, for failure of the oppositors to pay the docket fees and to deposit the estimated
cost of printing the record on appeal within the reglementary period, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal.
On 22 March 1945, four days after the American forces liberated Panay Island,
the CFI was reorganized. Pursuant to Act 3110, 1 the clerk of court submitted a report
Property 6 (Possession)
stating that all court records were destroyed or burned as a result of the battle for liberation.
Thereafter, on 7 June 1945 the court issued an order directing the reconstitution of the
records. The order was published in two (2) leading newspapers in Iloilo City, namely, "Ang
Tigbatas" and "The Times," once a week for six (6) months.
On 18 August 1945 Luis Adelantar filed a motion for reconstitution of the records
of LRC Case No. 673 furnishing copies thereof to oppositors Sabas, Ireneo, Pilar and
Preciosa, all surnamed Lucero, and Bernabe, Basilia, Quintin and Fortunato, all surnamed
Lorezo, through their respective counsel, as well as the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo
representing the Director of Lands. The oppositors did not however appear when the motion
was heard on 25 August 1945. Thus on the same day the CFI gave due course to the motion
for reconstitution.
On 28 January 1946, on motion of the Adelantar spouses, the CFI directed the
issuance of decrees covering the property in litigation after which Decrees Nos. 766623 and
766624 were issued by the Land Registration Commission. On the basis of these decrees
OCT Nos. 69237 and 69238 were issued in the name of the spouses Luis Adelantar and
Fortunata Ponce.
Taking advantage in the meantime of the chaotic conditions during the war,
Quintin Lorezo and Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property and appropriated the
produce thereof to the damage and prejudice of the registered owners. Consequently, on
26 August 1947 the Adelantars filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo against the Lorezos for
recovery of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 938. Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and
Canuto Lucero intervened and were allowed to file their answers.
On 3 September 1953 the CFI rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar
spouses owners of the property and ordering the receiver earlier appointed by the court to
deliver to them the possession thereof as well as the produce received by the receiver since
his appointment.
The decision having become final and executory the trial court issued a writ of
execution which was implemented by the Provincial Sheriff on 27 February 1954 by
delivering to the spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce the possession of the two (2)
parcels of land. On the same occasion Luis Adelantar accepted from the receiver the
produce consisting of five (5) bultos of palay. However, after the delivery of the property by
the Provincial Sheriff to the Adelantars, Quintin, Basilia, Bernabe and Fortunato Lorezo re-
entered the premises. Other persons followed suit.
The property soon became the subject of a cadastral survey. Fortunata Ponce,
who was already a widow, filed an answer claiming ownership. The spouses Andres
Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron also filed an answer claiming ownership of portions thereof
by purchases from Quintin in 1960, from Basilia and Isabel Lorezo in 1961, and from Canuto
Lucero in 1969 thus prompting the cadastral court to advise the parties to file the proper
action and to litigate the question of ownership.
Accordingly, on 22 July 1970 Fortunata Ponce and the other private respondents,
as heirs of Luis Adelantar, filed an action for quieting of title and for recovery of possession
with damages before the CFI of Iloilo, docketed as Civil Case No. 8283. The complaint
however was dismissed without prejudice.
On 21 December 1972 petitioners sought annulment of the certificates of title of
the Adelantars but their action was also dismissed without prejudice on 22 February 1980.
Thus petitioners filed their complaint alleging co-ownership of the property.
On 29 August 1986, finding no factual nor legal basis to grant petitioners' prayer,
the trial court dismissed the complaint and directed them to vacate the property and deliver
possession thereof to private respondents and to pay them jointly and severally P39,750.00
annually as net produce from 1970 until possession was restored to the latter, P10,000.00
as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. 2
On 19 January 1993 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court except with respect to the award of attorney's fees which was deleted as no reason
was given therefor. 3 On 15 March 1993 the motion for reconsideration was denied. 4
Petitioners raise these issues before us: whether the provisions of Act 3110 have
been complied with; whether the decision in Civil Case No. 938 is conclusive upon them;
and, whether they are liable to private respondents for damages.
Petitioners allege that Act 3110 was violated since (a) the general notice of loss
required to be served by registered mail to interested parties and its publication in the
Official Gazette were not complied with; (b) no notice of loss was sent to counsel of record
of their predecessors-in-interest; and, (c) no duly certified or authentic copy of the Court of
Appeals' resolution of 23 March 1943 was produced in the reconstitution proceedings. They
also claim that the decision in Civil Case No. 938 is not conclusive upon them because the
subject matter thereof does not involve the legality of the reconstitution of LRC Case No.
673, and that damages should not have been awarded against them as their possession of
the parcels of land was lawful.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as we find no reversible error
therein. Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Act 3110 provide:
SECTION 1. As soon as practicable after the occurrence of any
fire or other public calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the records
of judicial proceedings on file in the office of the clerk of a Court of First
Instance, said officer shall send a notice by registered mail to the
Secretary of Justice, the Attorney-General, 5 the Director of Lands, the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, 6 the clerk of the Supreme
Court, the judge of the province, the register of deeds of the province, the
provincial fiscal; and all lawyers who may be interested, stating the date
on which such fire or public calamity occurred and whether the loss or
destruction was total or partial, and giving a brief list of the proceedings
not affected in case the loss or destruction was partial.
SECTION 2. Upon receipt of the notice mentioned in the preceding
section, the court shall issue or cause to be issued a general notice which
shall be addressed and sent by registered mail to the lawyers and officers
mentioned in the preceding section, and to such other persons as might
be interested, advising them of the destruction of the records, with a brief
list of the proceedings not affected in case the destruction was partial,
and of the time fixed by this Act for the reconstitution of the destroyed
records.
This notice shall also be published in the Official Gazette and in one of the
newspaper most widely read in the province, once a week, for four
consecutive weeks.
SECTION 3. The parties to civil cases, or their counsels, shall appear and
file, within thirty days after having been notified in accordance with the
next preceding section, an application for the reconstitution of the records
in which they are interested, and the clerk of the court, upon receiving
such application, shall send notice to all parties interested, or their
counsels, of the day, hour, and place when the Court will proceed to the
reconstitution, requesting them to present, on said day and hour, and at
Property 6 (Possession)
said place, all copies of motions, decrees, orders, and other documents
in their possession, having reference to the record or records to be
reconstituted. cdtai
As may be gleaned from the above, the Act provides that after the occurrence of
any fire or other public calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the records of judicial
proceedings, the clerk of court shall send a notice by registered mail, among other officers,
to the judge of the province and all lawyers who may be interested in the proceedings (Sec.
1) and upon receipt of such notice, the court shall issue a general notice which shall be
addressed and sent by registered mail to said lawyers and offices, and to such other persons
as might be interested, advising them of the destruction of the records. This notice shall be
published in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers of wide circulation in the
province once a week for four consecutive weeks (Sec. 2). The Act likewise provides that
any interested party or his counsel shall appear and file within thirty days after having been
notified of the destruction as above stated an application for the reconstitution of the records
of the case, and the clerk of court upon receiving such application shall send notice to other
parties interested or their counsel of the day, hour and place when the court will proceed
with the reconstitution (Sec. 3).
This briefly is the procedure laid down by Act 3110 for the reconstitution of a court
record in case of loss or destruction.
In Paluay v. Bacudao 7 we held that there was substantial compliance with the
law if the clerk of court sent a notice to the judge of the province informing him of the
destruction of all court records in the province and that acting thereon the judge immediately
issued an order for their reconstitution which was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province once a week for six (6) months. The law was considered
substantially complied with even if it did not appear that notice of the destruction was ever
served by registered mail to all lawyers or persons who appeared to be interested in the
cases affected. It was enough that the applicant sent a copy of his petition for reconstitution
to the oppositors or their counsel in order that they may be notified of the date and place of
the hearing thereof. 8
In the case at bench, the requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court
record were fulfilled. The clerk of court, soon after liberation, sent a notice to the then
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo informing him of the destruction of all
court records in the province. Acting thereon the judge immediately issued an order for their
reconstitution which was published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Province and City of Iloilo once a week for six (6) months. Copies of the motion for
reconstitution were served by the movant (the now deceased Luis Adelantar) on the
oppositors through their respective counsel. It appearing that Atty. Felix Evidente was not
the oppositors' counsel of record the allegation that no notice was served on him may no
longer be relevant.
The Adelantar spouses might have failed to submit in the reconstitution
proceedings an authentic copy of respondent court's resolution of 23 March 1943 as what
they submitted instead was the order dated 10 June 1994 of the CFI in LRC Case No. 673
directing compliance with and execution of the resolution quoted in the order. 9 But we find
that this is another instance of substantial compliance with Act 3110, particularly Sec. 3
thereof, regarding presentation by the interested parties of all copies of motions, decrees,
orders and other documents in their possession relative to the record or records to be
reconstituted.
The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the
two (2) parcels of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is
conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their successors-in-interest, the parties herein,
under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court held petitioners liable to private
respondents for the net produce of the properties in question from the time the former's
possession in good faith was legally interrupted when they were served summons in
connection with private respondents' complaint for recovery of possession with damages
filed 22 July 1970, docketed as Civil Case No. 8283, at the rate of P1,500.00 per hectare or
P39,750.00 for 26.5 hectares annually until possession was restored. It may be that
petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith and had since then occupied the
same but such bona fide character of possession ceased when they were served summons.
Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from
the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully, conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code. CDTInc
As early as Rodriguez v. Francisco, 10 this Court already ruled that —
. . . on the date of the service of summons upon appellee in this
case considering that (appellant) was thereafter declared owner by final
judgment (G.R. No. L-12039), appellee's possession in good faith was
interrupted and hence from that time he lost the right to the fruits. 11
In turn, that decision was based on Tacas v. Tobon 12 where this Court, citing
Manresa, 13 stated —
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is
considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a
better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken
for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support
of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still
believe that his right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with
difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes; but when the final judgment
of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily
disappears. Although he may not have been convinced of it before, the
possessor becomes aware that his possession is unlawful from the time
he learns of the complaint, from the time he is summoned to the trial. It is
at this time that his possession is interrupted, according to Article 1945,
and that he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first paragraph
of Article 451. The ruling of the court retroacts to that time; but shall good
faith be deemed to cease then? Although there is a great difference
between requiring the possessor in good faith to return the fruits he
received from the time when his possession was legally interrupted, and
considering him a possessor in bad faith for all legal purposes from that
time, the law had to establish a definite rule on the matter, which is none
other than that deducible from a combination of Articles 452, 1945 and
435. Whether or not the defendant be a possessor in good faith, for there
is no doubt that he can be, and the law makes no attempt to deny it, from
the service of judicial summons, there exists an act that this possessor
knows that his right is not secure, that someone disputes it, and that he
may yet lose it; and if the court holds that restitution be made, that time
determines all the legal consequences of the interruption, the time when
the possession in good faith ceased to be so before the law . . . .
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 19 January 1993 and its resolution of 15 March 1993 are MODIFIED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. LexLibris