Republic of the Philippines b. Confinement must be in a hospital designated by the COMPANY.
For this
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175773 June 17, 2013
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION
(MMPSEU), Petitioner,
vs.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties in this case provides that the
company shoulder the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of covered employees
subject to certain limitations and restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction while the company,
upon hospitalization of the covered employees' dependents, shall pay the hospitalization
expenses incurred for the same. The conflict arose when a portion of the hospitalization
expenses of the covered employees' dependents were paid/shouldered by the dependent's
own health insurance. While the company refused to pay the portion of the hospital
expenses already shouldered by the dependents' own health insurance, the union insists
that the covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said
hospital expenses.
By this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioner Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried
Employees Union (MMPSEU) assails the March 31, 2006 Decision 2 and December 5, 2006
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630, which reversed and set
aside the Voluntary Arbitrator’s December 3, 2002 Decision 4 and declared respondent
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) to be under no legal obligation to pay its
covered employees’ dependents’ hospitalization expenses which were already shouldered
by other health insurance companies.
Factual Antecedents
The parties’ CBA5 covering the period August 1, 1996 to July 31, 1999 provides for the
hospitalization insurance benefits for the covered dependents, thus:
SECTION 4. DEPENDENTS’ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE – The COMPANY
shall obtain group hospitalization insurance coverage or assume under a self-insurance
basis hospitalization for the dependents of regular employees up to a maximum amount of
forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00) per confinement subject to the following:
a. The room and board must not exceed three hundred pesos (₱300.00) per day up
to a maximum of thirty-one (31) days. Similarly, Doctor’s Call fees must not exceed
three hundred pesos (₱300.00) per day for a maximum of thirty-one (31) days. Any
excess of this amount shall be borne by the employee.
purpose, the COMPANY shall designate hospitals in different convenient places to
be availed of by the dependents of employees. In cases of emergency where the
dependent is confined without the recommendation of the company doctor or in a
hospital not designated by the COMPANY, the COMPANY shall look into the
circumstances of such confinement and arrange for the payment of the amount to
the extent of the hospitalization benefit.
c. The limitations and restrictions listed in Annex "B" must be observed.
d. Payment shall be direct to the hospital and doctor and must be covered by actual
billings.
Each employee shall pay one hundred pesos (₱100.00) per month through salary deduction
as his share in the payment of the insurance premium for the above coverage with the
balance of the premium to be paid by the COMPANY. If the COMPANY is self-insured the
one hundred pesos (₱100.00) per employee monthly contribution shall be given to the
COMPANY which shall shoulder the expenses subject to the above level of benefits and
subject to the same limitations and restrictions provided for in Annex "B" hereof.
The hospitalization expenses must be covered by actual hospital and doctor’s bills and any
amount in excess of the above mentioned level of benefits will be for the account of the
employee.
For purposes of this provision, eligible dependents are the covered employees’ natural
parents, legal spouse and legitimate or legally adopted or step children who are unmarried,
unemployed who have not attained twenty-one (21) years of age and wholly dependent
upon the employee for support.
This provision applies only in cases of actual confinement in the hospital for at least six (6)
hours.
Maternity cases are not covered by this section but will be under the next succeeding
section on maternity benefits.6
When the CBA expired on July 31, 1999, the parties executed another CBA 7 effective
August 1, 1999 to July 31, 2002 incorporating the same provisions on dependents’
hospitalization insurance benefits but in the increased amount of ₱50,000.00. The room and
board expenses, as well as the doctor’s call fees, were also increased to ₱375.00.
On separate occasions, three members of MMPSEU, namely, Ernesto Calida (Calida),
Hermie Juan Oabel (Oabel) and Jocelyn Martin (Martin), filed claims for reimbursement of
hospitalization expenses of their dependents.
MMPC paid only a portion of their hospitalization insurance claims, not the full amount. In
the case of Calida, his wife, Lanie, was confined at Sto. Tomas University Hospital from
September 4 to 9, 1998 due to Thyroidectomy. The medical expenses incurred totalled
₱29,967.10. Of this amount, ₱9,000.00 representing professional fees was paid by
MEDICard Philippines, Inc. (MEDICard) which provides health maintenance to
Lanie.8 MMPC only paid ₱12,148.63.9 It did not pay the ₱9,000.00 already paid by
MEDICard and the ₱6,278.47 not covered by official receipts. It refused to give to Calida the
difference between the amount of medical expenses of ₱27,427.10 10 which he claimed to be
entitled to under the CBA and the ₱12,148.63 which MMPC directly paid to the hospital.
In the case of Martin, his father, Jose, was admitted at The Medical City from March 26 to
27, 2000 due to Acid Peptic Disease and incurred medical expenses amounting to
₱9,101.30.14 MEDICard paid ₱8,496.00.15Consequently, MMPC only paid ₱288.40,16 after
deducting from the total medical expenses the amount paid by MEDICard and the ₱316.90
discount given by the hospital.
Claiming that under the CBA, they are entitled to hospital benefits amounting to ₱27,427.10,
₱6,769.35 and ₱8,123.80, respectively, which should not be reduced by the amounts paid
by MEDICard and by Prosper, Calida, Oabel and Martin asked for reimbursement from
MMPC. However, MMPC denied the claims contending that double insurance would result if
the said employees would receive from the company the full amount of hospitalization
expenses despite having already received payment of portions thereof from other health
insurance providers.
This prompted the MMPSEU President to write the MMPC President17 demanding full
payment of the hospitalization benefits. Alleging discrimination against MMPSEU union
members, she pointed out that full reimbursement was given in a similar claim filed by
Luisito Cruz (Cruz), a member of the Hourly Union. In a letter-reply,18 MMPC, through its
Vice-President for Industrial Relations Division, clarified that the claims of the said MMPSEU
members have already been paid on the basis of official receipts submitted. It also denied
the charge of discrimination and explained that the case of Cruz involved an entirely
different matter since it concerned the admissibility of certified true copies of documents for
reimbursement purposes, which case had been settled through voluntary arbitration.
On August 28, 2000, MMPSEU referred the dispute to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board and requested for preventive mediation. 19
Proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator
On October 3, 2000, the case was referred to Voluntary Arbitrator Rolando Capocyan for
resolution of the issue involving the interpretation of the subject CBA provision. 20
MMPSEU alleged that there is nothing in the CBA which prohibits an employee from
obtaining other insurance or declares that medical expenses can be reimbursed only upon
presentation of original official receipts. It stressed that the hospitalization benefits should be
computed based on the formula indicated in the CBA without deducting the benefits derived
from other insurance providers. Besides, if reduction is permitted, MMPC would be unjustly
benefited from the monthly premium contributed by the employees through salary deduction.
MMPSEU added that its members had legitimate claims under the CBA and that any doubt
as to any of its provisions should be resolved in favor of its members. Moreover, any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of labor.21
On the other hand, MMPC argued that the reimbursement of the entire amounts being
claimed by the covered employees, including those already paid by other insurance
companies, would constitute double indemnity or double insurance, which is circumscribed
under the Insurance Code. Moreover, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity and
the employees cannot be allowed to profit from their dependents’ loss. 22
Meanwhile, the parties separately sought for a legal opinion from the Insurance Commission
relative to the issue at hand. In its letter23 to the Insurance Commission, MMPC requested
for confirmation of its position that the covered employees cannot claim insurance benefits
for a loss that had already been covered or paid by another insurance company. However,
the Office of the Insurance Commission opted not to render an opinion on the matter as the
same may become the subject of a formal complaint before it. 24 On the other hand, when
queried by MMPSEU,25the Insurance Commission, through Atty. Richard David C. Funk II
(Atty. Funk) of the Claims Adjudication Division, rendered an opinion contained in a
letter,26 viz:
Ms. Cecilia L. ParasPresident
Mitsubishi Motors Phils.
[Salaried] Employees Union
Ortigas Avenue Extension,
Cainta, Rizal
Madam:
We acknowledge receipt of your letter which, to our impression, basically poses the question
of whether or not recovery of medical expenses from a Health Maintenance Organization
bars recovery of the same reimbursable amount of medical expenses under a contract of
health or medical insurance.
We wish to opine that in cases of claims for reimbursement of medical expenses where
there are two contracts providing benefits to that effect, recovery may be had on both
simultaneously. In the absence of an Other Insurance provision in these coverages, the
courts have uniformly held that an insured is entitled to receive the insurance benefits
without regard to the amount of total benefits provided by other insurance. (INSURANCE
LAW, A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices;
Robert E. Keeton, Alau I. Widiss, p. 261). The result is consistent with the public policy
underlying the collateral source rule – that is, x x x the courts have usually concluded that
the liability of a health or accident insurer is not reduced by other possible sources of
indemnification or compensation. (ibid).
Very truly yours,
RICHARD DAVID C. FUNK II
Officer-in-Charge
Claims Adjudication Division
(SGD.)
Attorney IV
On December 3, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision27 finding MMPC liable to
pay or reimburse the amount of hospitalization expenses already paid by other health
insurance companies. The Voluntary Arbitrator held that the employees may demand
simultaneous payment from both the CBA and their dependents’ separate health insurance
without resulting to double insurance, since separate premiums were paid for each contract.
He also noted that the CBA does not prohibit reimbursement in case there are other health
insurers.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
MMPC filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction28 before the CA. It claimed that the Voluntary
Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding that recovery under both
insurance policies constitutes double insurance as both had the same subject matter,
interest insured and risk or peril insured against; in relying solely on the unauthorized legal
opinion of Atty. Funk; and in not finding that the employees will be benefited twice for the
same loss. In its Comment,29 MMPSEU countered that MMPC will unjustly enrich itself and
profit from the monthly premiums paid if full reimbursement is not made.
On March 31, 2006, the CA found merit in MMPC’s Petition. It ruled that despite the lack of a
provision which bars recovery in case of payment by other insurers, the wordings of the
subject provision of the CBA showed that the parties intended to make MMPC liable only for
expenses actually incurred by an employee’s qualified dependent. In particular, the provision
stipulates that payment should be made directly to the hospital and that the claim should be
supported by actual hospital and doctor’s bills. These mean that the employees shall only be
paid amounts not covered by other health insurance and is more in keeping with the
principle of indemnity in insurance contracts. Besides, a contrary interpretation would "allow
unscrupulous employees to unduly profit from the x x x benefits" and shall "open the
floodgates to questionable claims x x x."30
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision31 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the voluntary arbitrator
dated December 3, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered
declaring that under Art. XI, Sec. 4 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
petitioner and respondent effective August 1, 1999 to July 31, 2002, the former’s obligation
to reimburse the Union members for the hospitalization expenses incurred by their
dependents is exclusive of those paid by the Union members to the hospital.
SO ORDERED.32
In its Motion for Reconsideration,33 MMPSEU pointed out that the alleged oppression that
may be committed by abusive employees is a mere possibility whereas the resulting losses
to the employees are real. MMPSEU cited Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co.,34 wherein the
Arizona Supreme Court explicitly ruled that an insured may recover from separate health
insurance providers, regardless of whether one of them has already paid the medical
expenses incurred. On the other hand, MMPC argued in its Comment 35 that the cited foreign
case involves a different set of facts.
The CA, in its Resolution36 dated December 5, 2006, denied MMPSEU’s motion.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
MMPSEU presented the following grounds in support of its Petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION
DATED 03 [DECEMBER] 2002 OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BELOW WHEN THE
SAME WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE OPINION OF
THE INSURANCE COMMISSION THAT RECOVERY FROM BOTH THE CBA AND
SEPARATE HEALTH CARDS IS NOT PROHIBITED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC
PROVISION IN THE CBA.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERTURNING THE
DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR WITHOUT EVEN GIVING ANY LEGAL
OR JUSTIFIABLE BASIS FOR SUCH REVERSAL.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER
OR EVEN MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES CITED IN THE
RECORDS THAT DO NOT PROHIBIT, BUT IN FACT ALLOW, RECOVERY FROM TWO
SEPARATE HEALTH PLANS.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE IMPORTANCE TO A
POSSIBLE, HENCE MERELY SPECULATIVE, ABUSE BY EMPLOYEES OF THE
BENEFITS IF DOUBLE RECOVERY WERE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF THE REAL INJURY
TO THE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PAYING FOR THE CBA HOSPITALIZATION BENEFITS
THROUGH MONTHLY SALARY DEDUCTIONS BUT WHO MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AVAIL
OF THE SAME IF THEY OR THEIR DEPENDENTS HAVE OTHER HEALTH
INSURANCE.37
MMPSEU avers that the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator deserves utmost respect and
finality because it is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with the opinion
rendered by the Insurance Commission, an agency equipped with vast knowledge
concerning insurance contracts. It maintains that under the CBA, member-employees are
entitled to full reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by their dependents regardless
of any amounts paid by the latter’s health insurance provider. Otherwise, non-recovery will
constitute unjust enrichment on the part of MMPC. It avers that recovery from both the CBA
and other insurance companies is allowed under their CBA and not prohibited by law nor by
jurisprudence.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Atty. Funk erred in applying the
collateral source rule.
The Voluntary Arbitrator based his ruling on the opinion of Atty. Funk that the employees
may recover benefits from different insurance providers without regard to the amount of
benefits paid by each. According to him, this view is consistent with the theory of the
collateral source rule.
As part of American personal injury law, the collateral source rule was originally applied to
tort cases wherein the defendant is prevented from benefiting from the plaintiff’s receipt of
money from other sources.38 Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for
his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be
deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. 39 In a
recent Decision40 by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rule has been described as "an
established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be
compensatory." The Court went on to explain that although the rule appears to allow a
double recovery, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation right to prevent such a
double recovery.41 In Mitchell v. Haldar,42 the collateral source rule was rationalized by the
Supreme Court of Delaware:
The collateral source rule is ‘predicated on the theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and
therefore no right to benefit from monies received by the injured person from sources
unconnected with the defendant’. According to the collateral source rule, ‘a tortfeasor has no
right to any mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation received by the
injured person from an independent source.’ The rationale for the collateral source rule is
based upon the quasi-punitive nature of tort law liability. It has been explained as follows:
The collateral source rule is designed to strike a balance between two competing principles
of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no
more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong. A
plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a windfall; a defendant who
escapes, in whole or in part, liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must
sanction one windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the
wrongdoer.
Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost for the full value of his or her negligent
conduct even if it results in a windfall for the innocent plaintiff. (Citations omitted)
As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to place the responsibility for losses on
the party causing them.43Its application is justified so that "'the wrongdoer should not benefit
from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other
relations that may exist between the injured party and third persons."44Thus, it finds no
application to cases involving no-fault insurances under which the insured is indemnified for
losses by insurance companies, regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the
losses.45 Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay
the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees which had already been
paid by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.
The Voluntary Arbitrator therefore erred in adopting Atty. Funk’s view that the covered
employees are entitled to full payment of the hospital expenses incurred by their
dependents, including the amounts already paid by other health insurance companies based
on the theory of collateral source rule.
The conditions set forth in the CBA provision indicate an intention to limit MMPC’s liability
only to actual expenses incurred by the employees’ dependents, that is, excluding the
amounts paid by dependents’ other health insurance providers.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the CBA has no express provision barring claims for
hospitalization expenses already paid by other insurers. Hence, the covered employees can
recover from both. The CA did not agree, saying that the conditions set forth in the CBA
implied an intention of the parties to limit MMPC’s liability only to the extent of the expenses
actually incurred by their dependents which excludes the amounts shouldered by other
health insurance companies.
We agree with the CA. The condition that payment should be direct to the hospital and
doctor implies that MMPC is only liable to pay medical expenses actually shouldered by the
employees’ dependents. It follows that MMPC’s liability is limited, that is, it does not include
the amounts paid by other health insurance providers. This condition is obviously intended
to thwart not only fraudulent claims but also double claims for the same loss of the
dependents of covered employees.
It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties and as
such, it should be strictly construed for the purpose of limiting the amount of the employer’s
liability.46 The terms of the subject provision are clear and provide no room for any other
interpretation. As there is no ambiguity, the terms must be taken in their plain, ordinary and
popular sense.47 Consequently, MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule that a contract of
insurance is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Neither can it rely on the theory
that any doubt must be resolved in favor of labor.
Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. is not
on all fours with the case at bar.
MMPSEU cannot rely on Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. where the Supreme Court of
Arizona allowed the insured to enjoy medical benefits under an automobile policy insurance
despite being able to also recover from a separate health insurer. In that case, the Allstate
automobile policy does not contain any clause restricting medical payment coverage to
expenses actually paid by the insured nor does it specifically provide for reduction of
medical payments benefits by a coordination of benefits. 48 However, in the case before us,
the dependents’ group hospitalization insurance provision in the CBA specifically contains a
condition which limits MMPC’s liability only up to the extent of the expenses that should be
paid by the covered employee’s dependent to the hospital and doctor. This is evident from
the portion which states that "payment by MMPC shall be direct to the hospital and
doctor."49 In contrast, the Allstate automobile policy expressly gives Allstate the authority to
pay directly to the insured person or on the latter’s behalf all reasonable expenses actually
incurred. Therefore, reliance on Samsel is unavailing because the facts therein are different
and not decisive of the issues in the present case.
To allow reimbursement of amounts paid
under other insurance policies shall
constitute double recovery which is not
sanctioned by law.
MMPSEU insists that MMPC is also liable for the amounts covered under other insurance
policies; otherwise, MMPC will unjustly profit from the premiums the employees contribute
through monthly salary deductions.
This contention is unmeritorious.
To constitute unjust enrichment, it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.50 A claim for unjust
enrichment fails when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. 51
The CBA has provided for MMPC’s limited liability which extends only up to the amount to
be paid to the hospital and doctor by the employees’ dependents, excluding those paid by
other insurers. Consequently, the covered employees will not receive more than what is due
them; neither is MMPC under any obligation to give more than what is due under the CBA.
Moreover, since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract, the rights and
obligations of the parties must be determined in accordance with the general principles of
insurance law.52 Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a
contract of indemnity, the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered
employees’ medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only up to the extent of the
expenses actually incurred.53 This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which
proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss.54 Indeed, to profit from a loss
will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. As aptly ruled by
the CA, to grant the claims of MMPSEU will permit possible abuse by employees.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2006 and Resolution
dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The
court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus
legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility,
the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22,
appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding
(Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs
under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In
other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of
the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book
IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a
crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable
only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article
1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of
his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must
cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be
lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we
are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown
jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording
and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers
may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from
acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject
to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed
by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery
or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed
by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093
limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365
of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However,
a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable.
This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in
the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to
as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI
of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted
to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
(See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and
the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española"
(Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no
case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-
513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no
puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera
exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que
motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o
falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo
vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta
via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el
ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra
la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga
culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal,
atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos
separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa
civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea,
segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No
coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone
el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por
los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la
enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus
funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas,
despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta,
al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido
de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente
reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni
responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion
aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications
which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this
means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to
seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in
which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every
day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and
the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of
civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common
law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent
of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are
the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts
during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
 Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so
that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has
abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to
exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the
losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before
the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact
when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that
of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the
non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from
the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it
becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res
judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of
the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory
in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after
the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp.
734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares
that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad
por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son
personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero
no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o
de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del
maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado
(menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la
ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No
hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad
la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice
and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable
for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but
because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility
for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The
idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva
o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En
el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y
los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda
(articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de
entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one
is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives
rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of
the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated
persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the
responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary
(articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that
articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for
whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that
case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by
the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or
negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña
al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce
el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal
que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido
las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao
dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era
constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que
no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la
culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al
conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos
de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones
ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la
causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in
the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two
jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as
the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or
negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-
existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with
article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises
by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is
manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter
aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the
damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in
relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the
same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without
in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if
he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for
the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because
of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus,
there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights.
It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by
the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article
1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas
por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en
su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes
con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se
quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo
justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez
que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa
el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
 reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery
to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they
were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the
consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-
fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the
delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed
from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified
and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff
as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because
the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off
while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court
held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to
him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him
and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable
for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to
point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure
to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is
one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal
jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant,
under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such
as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect,
would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the
assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by
the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the
penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the
penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it
had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a
crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
 An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the
law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not
required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the
civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the
election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been
instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code
can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears
from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of
article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and
1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street,
had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles
which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction
along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto
across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he
should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had
fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana
Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of
Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running
at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen
the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that
on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile
had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched
out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters,
this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from
Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which
caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even
with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal
and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of
the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On
the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality
to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The
trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But
this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was
the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the
court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a
perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when
the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child
to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and
falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much
debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still
rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for
the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was
a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of
Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the
plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in
their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had
been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence,
but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection,
or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison
Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were
sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30
Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as
a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that
the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain
Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited
above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a
truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8,
1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman,
was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City
of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to
collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila
Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The
main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This
Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that
the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The
 conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the
Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with
the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the
Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction.
This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case
of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction
for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded
and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the
Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary
liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore
claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary
liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates
the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code,
and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need
not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from
a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal
Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is
primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle
of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is,
to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True,
there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is
based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually
do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be Republic of the Philippines
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless SUPREME COURT
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the Manila
pathways of right and justice.
SECOND DIVISION
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor vs.
selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have minor, defendants-appellees.
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the
employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, BARREDO, J.:
and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor
vehicles.
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965
in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high
time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full 1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under
the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that in res-adjudicata;
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
secure adequate and efficacious redress.
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
 Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record
on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF
THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty.
Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for
Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault,
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there
is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor.
It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to
flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code
of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it
is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil
Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept
of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal
law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in
the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-
delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura,
an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the
new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed
in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the Separate Opinions
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
guardian."
Separate Opinions
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough
at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-
appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving
his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a
criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At
the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension
of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on
August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the
civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the
resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the
Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an
Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on
February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY,
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189
FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED
UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID
DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
 Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the
collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant,
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-
delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which
is readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been
expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any
degree of negligence — even the slightest would have to be indemnified
only through the principle of civil hability arising from crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation
so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate
remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant
is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility
of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
(Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the
agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la
emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to
motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that
 there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor.
It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to
flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in
the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the
criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action
referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of
the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept
of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction
between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other.
Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact,
examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article
2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by
excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is
finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors
assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189
of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.