Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LEE FRANKLIN
ABSTRACT
Interpretations of recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary inter-
pretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all,
and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A
sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical
understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain
the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4).
Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who
recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I
provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argu-
ment. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which con-
stitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning
which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by
which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must
also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants
to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the
origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection has
ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as
its ultimate explanandum.
wants to show that all human souls pre-exist their location in a body.
Prima facie, if recollection is restricted to a select class of learners, the
argument will show the soul’s pre-existence only for those who recollect.2
For this and other reasons, most scholars believe that recollection in the
Phaedo concerns an ordinary kind of learning, typically related to the
capacity for everyday speech and thought. I’ll call this approach to rec-
ollection in the Phaedo the ordinary interpretation.3
There are significant obstacles to the ordinary interpretation. In partic-
ular, the prominence of philosophical sophistication in the discussion sug-
gests that recollection cannot be an act of learning achieved by all, but
must instead be restricted to philosophers. Socrates conducts the discus-
sion with Simmias and Cebes, young philosophers who have studied with
the Pythagorean Philolaus (61d6-7), and who appear to be familiar with
the Theory of Forms (65d6-8, 74b1-3).4 When Socrates asks whether ‘we’
have come to have a Form in mind, his immediate audience is anything
but ordinary. Moreover, within the argument for recollection, Socrates
says that he is interested in the origin of the knowledge – epistêmê – that
he and Simmias have of Equality (74b2-6). In light of Simmias’ intellec-
tual achievement, it is most reasonable to suppose that Socrates wants to
explain the source of advanced grasp of Equality. Finally, in the process
of introducing recollection, Socrates seems to say that the act of compar-
ing sensible particulars to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection
(74a5-7 ff.). This comparison seems to require familiarity with Forms, as
such. Since only philosophers are familiar with Forms in this way, it
seems that only philosophers can compare sensibles to Forms. Consequently,
only philosophers recollect. These considerations support what I will call
2
But see D. Scott, Recollection and Experience, [R&E] (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 69-71.
3
Adherents of the ordinary interpretation include J.L. Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis in the
Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c’ [‘Anamnesis’] in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and
R. Rorty (edd.), Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1974) 177-195, D. Bostock, Plato’s
Phaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), J. Gosling, ‘Similarity in Phaedo
73b. seq.,’ [‘Similarity’] Phronesis X (1965), 151-161, R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedo,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), S. Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’
in J. Cleary (ed.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy,
16 (2000), 91-120. There are, of course, important differences between these accounts.
4
All citations from the Phaedo are from C.J. Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). Other dialogues are cited from J. Burnet, Platonis
Opera, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907). Unless otherwise noted, translations
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 291
are from J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, [Complete Works] (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1997).
5
The sophisticated interpretation is most thoroughly argued for by Scott, R&E. It
is also endorsed by C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast, [Plato’s Utopia] (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001). J.T. Bedu-Addo, ‘Sense Experience and the Argument
for Recollection in Plato’s Phaedo,’ [‘Sense Experience’] Phronesis, XLVI, (1991)
27-60, is sympathetic with Scott on some points about recollection in the Phaedo, but
not recollection overall. His is what we might call a hybrid account of recollection,
identifying distinct kinds or aspects of recollection in the Phaedo. The same is true of
T. Williams, ‘Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection,’ [‘Two Aspects’] Apeiron, 35
(2002), 131-152.
6
I do not hold the same view about the Meno. There recollection concerns the
learning we undergo in dialectic. Thus, on my view, there are two distinct stages of
recollection. In this paper, I will use ‘recollection’ to refer to the stage of learning
examined in the Phaedo. Where I intend the term to apply to the full scope of Plato’s
theory of learning, I will make that explicit.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 292
7
See Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis’ 184-5, A. Nehamas, ‘Plato on the Imperfection of the
Sensible World,’ [‘Imperfection’] in Virtues of Authenticity, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999) 148, Bostock, Plato: Phaedo, 63-64.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 293
of words for mental states and their objects: a‡syhsiw – perception (73c7);
gign≈skein – to know, be aware of, or perceive (73c7, d7); §p¤stasyai –
to know, and §pistÆmh – knowledge (73c2, 4, 8, d3); §nnoe›n – to have
in mind, and ¶nnoia – conception (73c8, c9); diãnoia – thought (73d7);
and finally e‰dow – image or, in Plato’s technical use, Form (73d8). The
diversity of terms serves to multiply rather than restrict the possibilities
for what recollection might be. The precise significance of these condi-
tions and terms will come to light only once we have established firmer
grasp on what recollection is.8
At this point, one might object that I have left out the most decisive of
Socrates’ introductory remarks: the claim that a person recollecting an
item from things similar to it must also consider whether the latter are
deficient in their similarity to the former (74a5-7). Since this condition is
to be applied to the recollection of Forms from sensible particulars, it appears
to require a comparison of particulars to Forms. Moreover, since such a
comparison requires familiarity with Forms as such, this remark seems to
show by itself that recollection is an act of philosophical learning. I will
address this passage at length in the next section, and argue that it does
not belong to the introduction of recollection, and does not present a nec-
essary condition on recollection of Forms. Instead, Socrates’ remark
effects a transition from the introduction of recollection to the core of the
argument. For now, I leave it aside.
Socrates’ appeal to the familiar experience of remembering does not
suffice to identify the more specific act he has in mind. For this, we must
read the introduction of recollection against the broader background of the
dialogue. The least ambiguous feature of Socrates’ introduction is the fol-
lowing pattern. Socrates consistently uses perceptual terms to describe the
way we grasp the items that inspire recollection. Socrates describes the
inspiration of recollection as a moment in which ‘someone seeing, or hear-
ing, or having some other perception is not only aware of that thing . . .’
(73c6-7). Likewise, in each of Socrates’ examples, the object that inspires
recollection is grasped perceptually, usually by sight (73d5, e5, 7, 9, 74b5,
d13-e1). Not all remembering is inspired by perception, but Socrates’ lan-
guage indicates that recollection has such a source.9 In contrast, Socrates
8
For more discussion of Socrates’ introduction, see Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis,’ 181-191,
Gosling, ‘Similarity,’ 151-157, Hackforth, Plato: Phaedo, 65-68, D. Gallop, Plato:
Phaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 115-118, Bostock, Plato’s Phaedo,
63-66, Scott R&E, 55 ff.
9
Twice, Socrates uses the verb gign≈skein to describe the grasp we have of items
inspiring recollection (73c7, d7). We could translate this as ‘recognizing’ to suggest
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 294
uses cognitive terms to describe the way we grasp the item recollected. It
is here that Socrates uses §nnoe›n, to have in mind, think of, or consider
(73c8, 9). Finally, in his examples Socrates says that the recollecting lover
‘takes up in thought (§n tª diãnoi&) the image (e‡dow) of the boy . . .’
(73d7-8). Whatever recollection is, it begins in perception and ends in
thought. This basic structure is confirmed by Socrates’ later remark that
‘as long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it
be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection’ (74c13-d2).
Socrates has not yet revealed that he is interested specifically in the rec-
ollection of Forms from sensible particulars. For this reason, the pattern I
have just pointed out seems unimportant; the items involved in our famil-
iar experience of remembering are objects of both perception and thought,
ordinarily construed. The pattern takes on greater philosophical significance,
however, in light of Socrates’ remarks about the difference between sen-
sibles and Forms elsewhere in the Phaedo. In the next argument (78b4-
80c1), Socrates describes two classes of beings (dÊo e‡dh t«n onÖtvn, 79a6-7).
One contains perceptible, changing, and unintelligible particulars accessi-
ble to us only through the body (78d10-e4, 79c4-5, 80b3-6). The other
contains Forms, which are unchanging, imperceptible, intelligible realities,
grasped only by our souls (79a1-4, c1-8, 80b1-3). Most striking about this
distinction is that it is mutually exclusive; what is intelligible is imper-
ceptible, and what is perceptible is unintelligible – énÒhtow (80b4). Prima
facie, Socrates’ distinction suggests that recollection is a moment in
which, from the mere perception of sensible particulars – perception is the
only apprehension we can have of sensibles – we come to think about
Forms, since Forms are the only items we can think about. But this is too
severe, I think. Given that we do ordinarily think about sensible particu-
lars, and that Socrates appeals to this ordinary experience, we cannot take
Socrates’ distinction between the perceptible and intelligible at face value.
It cannot be his view that the only way we can apprehend particulars is
through unthinking perception, and that the only things we can think about
it in any sense are Forms.
that our grasp of the items that inspire recollection is not merely perceptual. Taken
this way, Socrates seems to require that the recollector have some grasp of the item
inspiring recollection as an item of a particular kind. For instance, we recognize the
lyre as a lyre before thinking of the boy to whom it belongs, see Ackrill ‘Anamnesis,’
182-183, Scott, R&E, 57, esp. n. 2. But we do not need to take gign≈skein to have
this cognitive force. Gign≈skein can mean perceive or be aware of, and Socrates’ use
of it here should be taken along these lines, especially in light of his statement at
74c13-d2.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 295
10
See Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’ 96-97.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 296
11
Since a sophisticated interpretation restricts Forms to the minds of philosophers,
it must claim that ordinary predications make no reference to Forms. This raises ques-
tions about the possibility of communication between philosophers and ordinary speak-
ers. For responses to this problem, see Scott, R&E, 65 and Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia,
309 ff.
12
This raises the vexing question of whether all meaningful terms in our language
correspond to Forms. See n. 34.
13
This is generally recognized to be the most important of Socrates’ examples,
since it is most clearly an example of recollection from similars. See Gosling, ‘Similarity,’
154 ff., Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis,’ 189-90, Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’ 110 ff.,
Bostock, Plato’s Phaedo, 65.
14
See Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’ 96-7, 110-113.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 297
15
This claim is central to an ordinary interpretation which accepts that comparing
sensibles to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection. See Kelsey, ‘Recollection
in the Phaedo,’ 117-118, and Williams, ‘Two Aspects,’ 145.
16
Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’ 117-118. Cf. Gosling, ‘Similarity,’ 159-160.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 298
Most people have no idea that the items of the sensible world are images
of Forms. This is an awareness granted only by philosophical reflection.
Nevertheless, what all people can do is classify sensible particulars by ref-
erence, in most cases unknowing reference, to the Forms. According to
Plato, our ability to do this requires that we are acquainted with the Form
itself, and that we have it in mind whenever we predicate it.
In this way, Forms play a role akin to that of concepts.17 Just as chil-
dren and non-philosophers can possess a concept without giving any
thought to concepts as such, so Plato thinks we can have a Form in mind
without knowing it. Plato’s aim in the argument for recollection is to
explain our capacity to have Forms in mind in this way. Importantly,
although we have a Form in mind whenever we predicate it, this does not
mean that we recollect the Form anew every time we predicate it. In the
argument for recollection, Plato is interested in the way we first come to
have Forms in mind in this life (75a5-8, 75b4). Thus, Plato is interested
in what we might call concept acquisition.18
17
Akin to, but not identical, since Forms are not merely mental entities, and have
metaphysical roles beyond those typically assigned to concepts.
18
This description of recollection will be qualified somewhat below, p. 309.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 299
19
See Gosling, ‘Similarity,’ 152 ff., Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis,’ 190-191, Bostock,
Plato’s Phaedo, 65-66, Nehamas, ‘Imperfection,’ 149. Even Scott, who relies so heav-
ily on this reading, acknowledges its implausibility, R&E, 63 n. 12.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 300
i.e. not just any items similar to what is recollected, but similar pictures
(74a5). Thus, Socrates is not characterizing recollection generally; since
Simmias already seems to understand what Socrates has in mind, further
clarification of what recollection is appears to be unnecessary. Rather,
Socrates is making the following narrow points. First, we can remember
something either from a picture that depicts it, or one that does not.
Second, when we recall an item from a picture that depicts it, we must
compare the picture to the original.
To discern Socrates’ purpose, let’s examine what he does with the com-
parison he has introduced. Here is what Socrates says immediately after
Simmias agrees with the statement introducing NC: ‘Look then (skÒpei
dÆ) if these things hold in this way (oÏtvw). We say, I suppose, that the
Equal is something’ (74a9, my translation). Typically, the adverb oÏtvw
looks backward to something that has already been presented.20 Thus,
Socrates is instructing Simmias to undertake the consideration he has just
introduced, NC. But the discussion that follows is an investigation of the
difference between sensible equals and Equality itself (74a9-d3). Accordingly,
Socrates’ and Simmias’ discussion of Equality and sensible equal partic-
ulars is a special instance of NC applied to sensible particulars and Forms.
Socrates’ concluding remark confirms this: ‘Well then . . . do we experi-
ence (pãsxomen) something like this in the case of equal sticks and the
other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in
the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their
being equal such as the Equal, or is there not?’ (74d4-e4).21 Simmias
agrees that equal particulars are deficient. After comparing sensible equals
to Equality, Socrates and Simmias have answered precisely the question
NC asks; they have discovered that sensible equals are deficient in their
similarity to Equality. Moreover, in describing this discovery, Socrates
echoes the language from his original presentation of NC. There Socrates
said that one must experience in addition (prospãsxein) the considera-
tion. At the end of the discussion of equal particulars and Equality,
Socrates notes that he and Simmias are experiencing (pãsxein) that very
20
The use of dÆ also supports this by framing Socrates’ instruction as a natural
result of Simmias’ agreement that the consideration is necessary, see H.W. Smyth,
Greek Grammar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) §§1245, 2846.
21
See Scott R&E, 60 and Ackrill, ‘Anamnesis’ 192 on the use of the first person
plural here as a complication for an ordinary interpretation. If NC is part of the argu-
ment for recollection, as I am arguing here, these worries dissolve.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 301
thing (74d4, e6).22 The comparison Socrates and Simmias perform on sen-
sible equals and Equality is NC.
As a result, we may learn about NC, as applied to sensible particulars
and Forms, by investigating the discussion of sensible equals and Equality
from 74a9-e6. But we needn’t go into that discussion in detail – as I will
in the next section – to see that it requires philosophical sophistication.
At the start of the discussion, Socrates introduces the Form of Equality:
‘there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick
or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond
all these, the Equal Itself’ (74a9-12). Simmias’ emphatic response shows
that he is familiar with such entities, and recognizes their distinction from
sensible equals (74b1-3).23 Moreover, most interpreters agree that in this
discussion Socrates articulates a central metaphysical or epistemological
difference between sensible particulars and Forms.24 We needn’t specify
that difference to see that any discussion in which it is put forward involves
advanced philosophical reflection. Since this discussion is NC, when NC
is applied to sensible particulars and Forms, it is a kind of philosophical
reflection, requiring familiarity with Forms as such.
At the same time, the context indicates that NC may be necessary, but
not as a condition on the act of recollection. It is Simmias who performs
NC, and Simmias is not currently experiencing recollection of the sort at
stake in the discussion.25 Within the comparison of sensible equals and
Equality, Socrates asks Simmias if it is from perceiving sensible equals
that he called Equality to mind (74a4-6, c7-9). Socrates is asking whether
22
The use of pãsxein to describe a philosophical consideration is strange. For a
parallel, see 73b7.
23
See 65d6-8, and Scott, R&E, 56. For a contrasting reading see Williams, ‘Two
Aspects,’ 142-3.
24
Nehamas, ‘Imperfection,’ 151 ff., A. Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: Plato’s
Metaphysics, [Dialectic of Essence] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) ch. 3,
especially 51-54, Bostock, Plato’s Phaedo, 72-85. Kelsey, ‘Recollection in the
Phaedo,’ 101-110.
25
This is not to say that Simmias is not recollecting in any way. If philosophical
learning is another kind of recollection, as I think it is, then there is a sense in which
Simmias currently recollects. This is strongly suggested at 73b7. Notice, however, that
if we wish to interpret Simmias’ current learning as recollection, then we must dis-
tinguish two kinds of recollection. For Simmias’ recollection consists in understand-
ing the proofs for the claim that some other moment of learning is recollection. If we
do not make such a distinction, then we must entertain the absurd claim that there is
some moment of learning which consists in realizing that that very learning depends
on recollection.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 302
it was from the perception of sensibles that Simmias recollected the Form.
But Socrates employs aorist and perfect verb forms here, indicating that
Simmias has called Equality to mind prior to the comparison he currently
performs. More generally, Socrates’ argument aims to explain the way we
first come to have Forms in mind in this life. Simmias’ easy familiarity
with Forms at the beginning of the discussion shows that he is beyond
this stage of learning. Instead of experiencing the kind of recollection at
issue, Simmias is inquiring into it as a philosopher. Socrates is giving
the argument for recollection because Simmias asked to see the proofs
(épode¤jeiw) of the theory (73a4-6). The importance of NC is based on its
contribution to Simmias’ philosophical inquiry into recollection. Socrates
has not described a consideration necessarily part of, or subsequent to, the
act of recollection. Instead, NC is a consideration one must take up in
order to reach understanding about the doctrine of recollection; in order
to understand the reasons for the claim that we recollect, Simmias must
compare sensibles to Forms.
NC, and the passage in which it is brought forward, effect a transition
from the introduction of recollection to the argument showing that we
recollect. Socrates introduces familiar examples of remembering some-
thing from its picture, because in these cases a comparison of image to
original comes easily to light. After all, if we did not compare a picture
to its original, and note the deficiency, we would be mistaking it for the
original. Once this comparison has been introduced, Socrates turns imme-
diately to perform it in the specialized case of sensible particulars and
Forms. But, as we noted above,26 there is an important difference between
remembering a person from his picture and recollecting a Form from one
of its participants. For while a comparison of image to original may be
necessary in the former case, Plato does not think such a comparison nec-
essarily accompanies the ordinary recollection or predication of Forms.
Thus, Socrates’ attribution of simultaneity and necessity in the introduc-
tion of NC (˜tan ge . . . énagka›on, 74a5-6) applies only to the familiar
examples he has used to introduce the comparison; it does not apply to
the recollection of Forms from sensible particulars.
We do not need to strain to come up with interpretations of what seems
to be an implausible condition on remembering something from items sim-
ilar to it. Socrates’ statement at 74a5-7 is a plausible condition on remem-
bering something from its picture, and no more. This reading explains two
other features of the argument as well. The first is the following sequence.
26
Pp. 297-8.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 303
27
The reading I present here has been greatly influenced by Silverman, Dialectic
of Essence, especially ch. 3. For opposing views, see Nehamas, ‘Imperfection,’ Kelsey
‘Recollection in the Phaedo,’ and T. Irwin, ‘The Theory of Forms,’ in G. Fine (ed.),
Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 145-172.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 305
28
See Silverman, Dialectic of Essence, 90 ff.
29
One question that comes up in accounts of Plato’s metaphysics is whether self-
predication statements like ‘The Equal itself is equal,’ should be read as identity state-
ments, or whether the copula expresses some other predication relation. Since the
considerations that distinguish these accounts do not arise within the argument for
recollection, I take no stand on such questions here. See Silverman, Dialectic of
Essence, 93 ff.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 306
30
Pp. 295-6.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 308
31
An alternative to saying that we grasp Forms completely but inchoately is that
we grasp them partially. There are two main problems with this alternative. First, in
the Phaedo we’re told that Forms are uniform, monoe¤dhw, (78d5, 80b2), and non com-
posite, ésÊnyeton (78c3), i.e. that they do not have parts at all. Second, if our grasp
of a Form enables us to predicate it in speech and thought, then what we grasp must
be the Form entire, if we are to predicate it entire, and not just a part of it.
32
L. Franklin, ‘The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno,’ Phronesis XLVI (2001),
413-439.
33
This issue contains a very serious problem for a sophisticated interpretation,
according to which ordinary concepts and beliefs have no basis in Forms. (See Scott,
R&E, 18-23, 38-52, 68-69.) For, if genuine learning is an improvement in our under-
standing of Forms, reflection on our ordinary statements and beliefs could never pro-
mote genuine learning. It then becomes hard to see how, on such a view, a non-philosopher
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 309
could ever begin to engage in inquiry that promotes understanding of Forms. What
are the terms in which this inquiry is conducted, and how are they introduced to our
discourse?
34
This naturally raises the question whether Plato also believes that we have a Form
in mind for every ordinary concept. On one hand, it seems he must if he intends the
Theory of Recollection to provide a general account of ordinary concepts and ordi-
nary discourse. On the other, it would be foolish to suppose that every ordinary con-
cept will yield a successful philosophical inquiry. There is tension, then, between the
role of Forms as the objects of the ‘What is F?’ question and philosophical under-
standing, and their role as the grounding for ordinary speech and thought. In the mid-
dle period, Plato displays little awareness of this problem. I believe that when he
recognizes this problem in his later writings (Phaedrus 265e1-266c5, Statesman
262c10-263b11) he abandons the Theory of Recollection as a model of learning, even
as he retains the insights about philosophical reflection that inspire it.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 310
35
Socrates attributes a similar realization to the senses at Republic 523b9-524a4.
36
Adapted from G.M.A. Grube in J. Cooper (ed.), Complete Works.
37
Grube’s translation from J. Cooper (ed.), ‘Complete Works,’ 66.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 313
38
Scott, R&E, 62-63, Rowe, Plato: Phaedo 172-73. For similar reasons, it is also
essential for any ordinary interpretation which takes a comparison of sensibles to
Forms to be implicit in ordinary predications, such as Williams, ‘Two Aspects,’ and
Kelsey, ‘Platonic Recollection.’
39
Indeed, 74d9-e4 contradicts such a claim.
40
See Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, 173, Hackforth Phaedo, 70, J. Burnet, Plato: Phaedo,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911) 75, Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 22, 229-30. Only
R.S. Bluck, Plato: Phaedo, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955) translates
in a way that might assign a causal role to the ˜ti clause: ‘on the ground that they
all do their best to be like [the Equal] although they are inferior,’ 69. Bluck’s com-
mentary, however, indicates that he does not confront the possibility of my reading, 63.
41
See H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, §2240. This is not the most common use of
˜ti for Plato, but a survey limited to Platonis Opera I discovers numerous parallels:
Phaedo 102c4, 7, Euthyphro 10c2-4, 11 (note the proximity here to another ˜ti intro-
ducing a ‘that’ clause), Theaetetus 185b2, Sophist 252d.
Phronesis 50,4_165_289-314I 9/14/05 2:33 PM Page 314
Department of Philosophy
The University at Albany
State University of New York