Rule 113 Cases

2B 2D 2E 2F 2G Crimpro
Rule 113
DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993, Inquest Procedure
RA 7438
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 15 November 1988
People v. De Guia, G.R. Nos. 107200-03, 9 November 1993
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, 3 August 2010
Sec. 4
People v. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 18 January 2001
Sec. 5
Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014
In re: Harvey v. Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, 28 June 1988
Ongcoma Hadji Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, 2 September 2015
In Re Umil v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. 81567, 84581-82, 84583-84, 83162, 85727, 86332, 3 October
1991
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 199042, 17 November 2014
Ambre v. People, G.R. No. 191532, 15 August 2012
Comerciante v. People, G.R. No. 205926, 22 July 2015
Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 101837, 11 February 1992
Posadas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492, 29 September 2000
People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, 21 January 2015
People v. Cubcubin, Jr., G.R. No. 136267, 10 July 2001
Sec. 7
Mallari v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, 9 December 1996
Habeas Corpus, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court

In Re Salibo v, Warden, G.R. No. 197597, 8 April 2015
Evidence Needed for an Inquest Proceedings
SECTION 1.Concept .—Inquest is an informal and summary investigation con-ducted by a public

prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a
warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of deter-mining whether or not said persons
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
SEC. 2.Designationof Inquest Officers.—The City or Provincial Prosecutor shall designate the
Prosecutors assigned to inquest duties and shall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a
list of their names and their schedule of assignments. If, however, there is only one Prosecutor in
the area, all inquest cases shall be referred to him for appropriate action. Unless otherwise
directed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, those assigned to inquest duties shall discharge
their functions during the hours of their designated assignments and only at the police
stations/headquarters of the PNP in order to expedite and facilitate the disposition of inquest
cases.
SEC. 3.Commencement and Termination of Inquest.—The inquest proceedings shall be

considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities
of the complaint/referral documents which should include:
a. the affidavit of arrest;

b. the investigation report;
c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the latter’s
investigation of the criminal incident involving the arrested or detained person. The inquest
Officer shall, as far as practicable, cause the affidavit of arrest and statements/affidavits
of the complainant and the witnesses to be subscribed and sworn to before him by the
arresting officer and the affiants. The inquest proceedings must be terminated within the
period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. *
SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases.—The submission, presentation of

the documents listed herein below should as far as practicable, be required in the following cases
by the Inquest Officer.
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)

a. a list/inventory of the articles and items subject of the offense; and
b. statement of their respective value
Illegal Possession of Explosives (PD 1866)
a. chemistry report duly signed by the forensic chemist and
b. photograph of the explosives, if readily available.
Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704)(now RA 8550)

a. photograph of the confiscated fish, if readily available; and
b. certification of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources;
Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705)

a. scale sheets containing the volume and species of the forest products confiscated,
number of pieces and other important details such as estimated value of the products
confiscated;
b. certification of Department of Environment and Natural Resources/Bureau of Forest
Management; and
c. seizure receipt. The submission of the foregoing documents shall no absolutely be
required if there are other forms of evidence submitted which will sufficiently establish the
facts sought to be proved by the foregoing documents.
SEC. 5.Incomplete documents.—When the documents presented are not complete to establish
probable cause, the Inquest Officer shall direct the law enforcement agency to submit the required
evidence within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; otherwise, the Inquest Officer shall order the release of the detained person
and, where the inquest is conducted outside of office hours, direct the law enforcement agency
concerned to file the case with the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
SEC. 6.Presence of the detained person.—The presence of the detained person who is under
custody shall be ensured during the proceedings. However, the production of the detained person
before the Inquest Officer may be dispensed with in the following cases:
a. if he is confined in a hospital;
b. if he is detained in a place under maximum security;
c. if production of the detained person involve security risks; or
d. if the presence of the detained person is not feasible by reason of age, health, sex and
other similar factors.
The absence of the detained person by reason of any of the foregoing factors must be noted by
the Inquest Officer and reflected in the record of the case.
SEC. 7.Charges and counter-charges.—All charges and counter-charges arising from the same
incident shall, as far as practicable, be consolidated and inquested jointly to avoid contradictory
or inconsistent dispositions.
SEC. 8.Initial duty of the inquest officer .—The Inquest Officer must first deter-mine if the arrest
of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provide that
arrests without a warrant may be effected:
a. when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. For this
purpose, the Inquest Officer may summarily examine the arresting officers on the
circumstances surrounding the arrest or apprehension of the detained per-son.
SEC. 9.Where arrest not properly effected.—Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was
not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b. note down the disposition of the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d. forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.
SEC. 10.Where the arrest property effected.—Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest
was properly effected, the detained person should be asked if he desires to avail himself of a
preliminary investigation, if he does, he shall be made to execute a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and, in case
of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. The preliminary investigation
may be conducted by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom
the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, which investigation shall be
terminated within fifteen(15) days from its inception.
SEC. 11.Inquest proper .—Where the detained person does not opt for a preliminary
investigation or otherwise refuses to execute the required waiver, the Inquest Officer shall
proceed with the inquest by examining the sworn statements/affidavits of the complainant and the
witnesses and other supporting evidence submitted to him. If necessary, the Inquest Officer may
require the presence of the complainant and witnesses and subject them to an informal and
summary investigation or examination for purposes of determining the existence of probable
cause.
SEC. 12.Meaning of probable cause.—Probable cause exists when the evidence submitted to
the Inquest Officer engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
arrested or detained person is probably guilty thereof.
SEC. 13.Presence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds that probable cause exists,
he shall forthwith prepare the corresponding complaint/information with the recommendation that
the same be filed in court. The complaint/information shall indicate the offense committed and the
amount of bail recommended, if bailable. Thereafter, the record of the case, together with the
prepared com-plaint/information, shall be forwarded to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action. The complaint/information may be filed by the Inquest Officer himself or by
any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial
Prosecutor.
SEC. 14.Contents of information.—The information shall, among others, contain:
a. a certification by the filing Prosecutor that he is filing the same in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;
b. the full name and alias, if any, and address of the accused;
c. the place where the accused is actually detained;
d. the full names and addresses of the complainant and witnesses;
e. a detailed description of the recovered item, if any;
f. the full name and address of the evidence custodian;
g. the age and date of birth of the complainant or the accused, if eighteen (19)years of
age or below; and
h. the full names and addresses of the parents, custodians or guardians of the minor
complainant or accused, as the case may be.
SEC. 15.Absence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds no probable cause, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person;

b. note down his disposition on the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d. forthwith forward the record of the case to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
If the recommendation of the Inquest Officer for the release of the arrested or detained person is
approved, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of the said detainee.
Should the City or Provincial Prosecutor disapprove the recommendation of release, the arrested
or detained person shall remain under custody, and the correspond-ing complaint/information
shall be filed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor or by any Assistant Prosecutor to whom the
case may be assigned.
SEC. 16.Presence at the crime scene.—Whenever a dead body is found and there is reason to
believe that the death resulted from foul play, or from the unlawful acts or omissions of other
persons and such fact has been brought to his attention, the Inquest Officer shall:
a. forthwith proceed to the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead person;
b. cause an immediate autopsy to be conducted by the appropriate medico-legal officer in
the locality or the PNP medico-legal division or the NBI medico-legal office, as the case
may be;
c. direct the police investigator to cause the taking of photographs of the crime scene or
place of discovery of the dead body;
d. supervise the investigation to be conducted by the police authorities as well as the
recovery of all articles and pieces of evidence found thereat and see to it that the same
are safeguarded and the chain of the custody thereof properly recorded; and
e. submit a written report of his finding to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate
action.
SEC. 17.Sandiganbayan cases.—Should any complaint cognizable by the Sandiganbayan be

referred to an Inquest Officer for investigation, the latter shall, after conducting the corresponding
inquest proceeding, forthwith forward the complete record to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every
human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties

of Public Officers.–
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who
shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested
or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating
officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise,
such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel
or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed
by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and
void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor
or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or
by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall
include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister,
grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to
a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected
by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the
prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay
such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided,
That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the
fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected
person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone
acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a
competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of
his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or
from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may
be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO

L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice,
LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge
of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and
that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of
the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred
freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels
so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of
a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed
to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be
allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as
libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez, supra).
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy
to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels"
of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S
Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the
peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other
formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment
for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument
of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national

commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at
pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects
of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken
instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to
publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel
is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative
words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be
intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will
not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to
narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied
in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a
warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft
of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take
exception. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not
allow any considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public
duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility
of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government
power and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is
that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only
when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred
freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels
so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of
a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed
to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be
allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as
libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy
to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels"
of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S
Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the
peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other
formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment
for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument
of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national

commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at
pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects
of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken
instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to
publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel
is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative
words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be
intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will
not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to
narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied
in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a
warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft
of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take
exception. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not
allow any considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public
duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility
of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government
power and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is
that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only
when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 107200-03 November 9, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL DE GUIA y SAMONTE, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo D. Latorre for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Illegal recruiters constitute one of the worst vultures of our society today. They prey on the
gullible, and often, they victimize the already marginalized Filipinos who will do anything to
improve their economic status. The case before us involves one of their kind.
Accused-appellant Manuel de Guia y Samonte was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XLI,1 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale2 and three (3) counts of
Estafa,3 in violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended and Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively.
The Information in each case reads as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 92-103341:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between

May 23, 1991 and December 11, 1991, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, identity and present
whereabouts are still (unknown) and mutually helping each other,
representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to Cirilo Lising y Mercado,
Monteza (sic) Gazmin y Pascual, Leopoldo Realino y Arceo and
Jesus Sumalinog y Carin, without first having secured the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 4)
That on or about November 24, 1991, in the City of Manila, the

said (accused,) conspiring and confederating with one whose true
name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown, and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Leopoldo Realino y Arceo in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representation which he made to said Leopoldo
Realino y Arceo to the effect that he had the proper (authority) and
capacity to recruit and employ said Leopoldo Realino y Arceo as
factory worker in Japan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said Leopoldo Realino y
Arceo to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing
that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00, which
amount once in his possession, with intent to defraud he, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Leopoldo Realino y Arceo in the aforesaid
amount of P20,000.00 Philippine Currency. (Rollo, pp. 5-6)
That on or about and during the period comprised between

October 3 and December 11, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with
one whose true name, identity and presents whereabouts are still
unknown and mutually helping each other did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jesus Sumalinog y
Carin (in) the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they
made to said Jesus Sumalinog y Carin to the effect that he had
the proper (authority) and capacity to recruit and employ said
Jesus Sumalinog y Carin as . . . contract worker in Japan and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said Jesus Sumalinog y Carin to give and deliver, as in
fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P50,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representation, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he
did obtain the amount of P50,000.00 which amount once in his
possession, with intent to defraud he, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
persona use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Jesus Sumalinog y Carin in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00
Philippine Currency. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
That on May 23, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Monteza (sic) Gazmin y Pascual in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he made to
said Montesa Gazmin y Pascual to the effect that he had the
power and capacity to recruit and employ said Montesa Gazmin y
Pascual as factory worker in Korea and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount
to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
decits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Montesa Gazmin
y Pascual to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P30,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing
that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P30,000.00 which
amount once in his possession, with intent to defraud he, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Montesa Gazmin y Pascual in the aforesaid
amount of P(30,000.00) Philippine Currency. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. The cases were
tried jointly.
The prosecution presented the four (4) private complainants (Cirilo Lisong, Montessa Gasmin,
Leopoldo Realino and Jesus Sumalinog) as witnesses. They testified as follows:
CIRILO LISING, a 41-year old farmer from Gapan, Nueva Ecija testified that in August 1991, he
was summoned by his brother-in-law, Jose (Jhun) Cruz, to fix the septic tank in his
house.4 There, he was introduced to the accused and a certain Loida de Guia who represented
themselves to be husband and wife. The two were boarders in Cruz' house.5 While fixing the
tank, the couple engaged him in a conversation and told him they could facilitate his
employment in Korea. He was informed that the placement fee was forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00). Relying on the couple's representations, he decided to try his luck abroad. The
couple promised him a job as factory worker in Korea with an income of $500.00 per month.
They asked him to prepare an initial amount of nine thousand seven hundred pesos (P9,700.00)
for his plane fare. They told him that he could pay for the balance of the fee when he reach
Korea for upon his arrival, he would receive a two-months cash advance on his salary. He
agreed.6
On August 12, 1991, he submitted to the accused his passport and biodata in their office, ML
Promotions, at Room 102, Marrieta Apt., 1200 J. Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila. He handed the
amount of P9,700.00 to Loida and the latter issued and signed a receipt therefore.7
Lising, however, failed to leave for Korea. He then verified the status of the agency from the
POEA and discovered that the accused and Loida were not licensed recruiters.8 Thus, on
February 13, 1992, he complained to CIS PO3 Romeo M. Cerezo and gave a written
statement.9
On cross-examination, Lising produced two (2) calling cards of ML Promotions: one showed
Loida de Guia as the general manager while the other showed the accused as its travel
consultant.10
MONTESA GASMIN, a 19-year old, high school graduate from San Juan, Tarlac testified that
she learned from her cousin, Joey Lino, that the accused and Loida de Guia were engaged in
job placement overseas. On May 15, 1991, she asked her cousin to accompany her to the
couple's Ermita office where the accused informed her that they deploy workers to Korea.
Relying on said representation, she applied as a factory worker in Korea and accomplished the
corresponding application form. She was told that she would earn $500.00 per month and was
asked to pay thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to cover her traveling expenses.11
She gave the couple the required amount in two (2) installments, viz: P10,000.00 on May 23,
1991 and P20,000.00 on June 4, 1991, as evidence by two (2) receipts of even date. 12 She
gave the money to Loida who signed the receipts in her presence. 13 The couple assured her
that she could leave for Korea by the end of June 1991. The promise proved to be false. On
July 14, 1991, she again went to the couple's office in Ermita to follow-up her departure. Again,
the spouses assured her that she would be allow to leave on the succeeding week. Nothing
came out of the promise. Thus, together with the other private complainants, she reported the
matter to the CIS Camp Crame where she executed her written statement. 14
LEOPOLDO REALINO, a 42 year-old driver, residing at Balibago, Angeles City testified that her
brother, Roger, brought him to the couple's recruitment office in Ermita where he met the
accused. He inquired from the accused whether he could work out his employment in Japan.
The accused replied in the affirmative. Still undecided, he told the accused he would just come
back.15
Sometime in August 1991, he returned to their Ermita office and applied as a contract worker in
Japan. The accused told him to prepare one hundred twenty thousand pesos (P120,000.00). He
was also asked to fill up and sign an application form.16
On November 4, 1991, Leopoldo went to their office and handed the money to the accused. The
accused then ordered Loida, whom Leopoldo met for the first time, to prepare the necessary
receipt.17 The accused failed to employ him in Japan despite repeated promises. He demanded
the return of his money but to no avail. He, together with his companions, went to no avail. He,
together with his companions, went to the POEA where they discovered that the accused was
not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. With the intention of confronting the
accused, they proceeded to their Ermita office but were informed that the accused was already
detained at Camp Crame. Thus, they went to Camp Crame where they gave their statements.18
The last witness for the prosecution was JESUS SUMALINOG, an industrial electrician from
Makati. He testified that he first met the accused in May 1991 in the accused's Ermita office
where the inquired about the possibility of employment of Japan. The accused interviewed him.
The accused told him that the cost of processing his papers would run from P85,000.00 to
P95,000.00. However, when Sumalinog intimated that he could only afford to pay P50,000.00,
the accused conferred with Loida, who was introduced by the accused as his wife. The couple
then agreed to be paid P50,000.00 and he was told to fill up an application form. He was
informed that he could work as a contract worker in a computer firm where he would earn
$1,200.00 per month. The couple asked him to prepare the money.19
Sumalinog gave the money to the accused in four (4) installments, thus: P10,000.00 on October
3, October 30, November 18 and November 21, 1991; P8,000.00 on November 25, 1991; and
finally, P2,000.00 on December 11, 1991. In each instance, the accused instructed Loida to
prepare the receipts and the same were duly issued and signed by Loida.20
The two assured Sumalinog that he could leave after two (2) weeks. Failing to leave as
promised, he was again made to wait for another two (2) weeks. Still, the accused did not make
good with said promise.21
He then went to the POEA where he discovered that the accused was not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment. He sought the accused in his Ermita office but found out that
the accused was already in the custody of the CIS. He talked with the accused in Camp Crame
and the latter asked him not to file any complaint. The accused assured him that his money
would be returned. He did not head said request and filed the complaint at bar.22
The evidence of the accused rests mainly on denial and alibi. He alleged that he was not a
recruiter but a driver by profession from 1970 up to December 1991. He contended that he
could not have participated in the recruitment of complainants since from May to December
1991, he was employed at RTS Trading Associate Corporation where he reported for work from
7:00 o'clock in the morning until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. He was employed as a driver
delivering various merchandise for the corporation. He alleged that after work, he always went
straight home to Montalban, Rizal.23
He further testified that his legal wife is Paula Diones and the he has no illicit relationship with
one Loida de Guia. According to the accused, he first met Loida in the latter's house in Baclaran
in May 1991. He met Loida to secure overseas employment for his son. He again went to
Loida's house in July 1991 to follow-up his son's employment application. Further, the accused
claimed that he met the complainants only while he was already detained in Camp Crame.24
Renato Samonte, owner of RTS Trading and a childhood friend of the accused, corroborated his
alibi. He testified that the accused acted as his part-time driver from May 1991 until December
1991.25
On the basis of the above evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 92-103341, finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and for him to pay a fine of P100,000.00. The said
accused is further hereby ordered to pay the complainant Cirilo Lising the sum of
P9,700.00 as and by way of actual damage;
2. In Crim. Case No. 92-103342, finding the accused Manuel Guia y Samonte
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Estafa and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14)
years Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as maximum
and for the said accused to indemnify the complainant Leopoldo Realino the sum
of P120,000.00 as and by way of actual damage;
3. In Crim. Case No. 92-103343, finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte
Three (3) years Six (6) months and Twenty One (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to Seven (7) years Five (5) months and Eleven (11)
days of prision mayor as maximum and for the said accused to indemnify the
complainant Jesus Sumalinog the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual
damage; and
4. In Crim. case No. 92-103344, finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte
One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty One (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum to Five (5) years Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days
also of prision correccional as maximum and for the said accused to indemnify
the complainant Montesa P. Gazmin the sum of P30,000.00 as and by way of
actual damage.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 20-30)
Accused appealed to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROSECUTE THE REAL

MALEFACTOR, LOIDA DE GUIA, WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS
ONE OF THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING THAT SHE ISSUED AND SIGNED
THE RECEIPTS EVIDENCING THE PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS AND WHICH WERE THE ONLY BASES FOR
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE PAUCITY OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION (receipts of payments) ALTHOUGH THE SAME ARE
INADMISSIBLE IN CHARACTER FOR BEING PURELY HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN (UP) HOLDING THE UNLAWFUL ARREST

OF THE ACCUSED IN A PUBLIC PLACE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT OR
PROCESS ISSUED BY A COMPETENT COURT.
The first (2) assigned errors are interrelated and shall be discussed together.
Appellant's position is that the real perpetrator of the charges imputed against him is Loida de
Guia whose signature appears on all the receipts issued to the complainants. He submits that
his mere presence at the Ermita office everytime the complainants paid the required fees cannot
be made the basis of a finding that he was involved in the illegal recruitment of private
complainants. He contends that Loida de Guia should have been charged as the proper
accused.
Appellant's submission deserves scant consideration. To begin with, appellant did not raise this
argument in the trial court. It is too late to raise it on appeal. More importantly, the Informations
against the appellant show that the appellant was charged with "conspiring and confederating
with one whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown. . . . " From the
evidence, this co-conspirator is Loida de Guia who pretended to be the wife of herein appellant.
There is no obstacle for the State to charge this person who goes by the name of Loida de Guia
as soon as her true identity and address become known to the prosecution. Her non-
prosecution at this state, however, provides no ground for the appellant to fault the decision of
the trial court convicting him.
Appellant also erred in dismissing the receipts issued by Loida de Guia as hearsay evidence.
The records show that Leopoldo Realino and Jesus Sumalinog testified that they personally
handed the money representing the required fees to herein appellant. The latter, in turn,
instructed Loida to prepare the corresponding receipts. This was after private complainants
were made to believe that the accused and Loida, aside from being husband and wife, were
jointly operating the recruitment business, with the former as travel consultant and the latter as
the general manager. The evidence shows that the receipts were signed by Loida in the
presence of the complaining witnesses. Consequently, Realino and Sumalinog had personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of these receipts and their
testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay evidence.
It is not also correct to argue that the guilt of the appellant was based alone on the receipts
issued by Loida de Guia. All the complaining witnesses testified that the accused took an active
and direct part in misrepresenting that he had the authority and the power to facilitate their
employment abroad. Aside from their testimonial evidence, calling cards were presented
showing the accused to be the Travel Consultant of said agency, with Loida as the General
Manager. Moreover, the evidence also showed that it was the accused who asked the
applicants to fill up their applications and to prepare their respective biodata. He also demanded
from them varying amounts of money as processing fees. All these show that the accused and
Loida de Guia, who are not licensed recruiters, adopted a systematic and elaborate scheme to
defraud the complainants through false promises of jobs abroad.
We are not also impressed by the defense of the appellant. Glaring inconsistencies marred his
short testimony. At one time, he testified that he was arrested by the CIS officers at a
department store in Ermita, Manila.26 Later on, however, he stated that he was arrested in
Marrieta Apartment, located at J. Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila.27 He likewise claimed during
the trial that he was not aware that Loida de Guia had an office located in Marrieta Apartment,
Ermita,28 but at the same time, he raises in this appeal the defense that he himself has been at
the Ermita office to follow-up the job placement of his son in Korea.29
This is not all. Initially, appellant claimed during the trial that he could not have possibly been at
the Ermita office and received payments made by the complainants for he was then employed
as a professional driver for RTS Trading. On appeal, however, appellant would have Us believe
that during the period from May to December 1991 when private complainants went to the
Ermita office to file their application and pay the corresponding fees, accused-appellant "just
happened to be there" for he was himself following-up the job application of his son.30
Appellant's corroborating witness, Renato Samonte, was equally unimpressive. In fact,

Samonte's testimony rendered the defense's theory more open to doubt. For one, his testimony
that appellant has been in his employ from May to December 1991 was not corroborated by any
documentary evidence, such as pay slip/pay roll, certification of SSS contributions and, hence,
has little value. Moreover, even assuming that appellant was a part-time driver of Samonte, the
nature of his job would not make it physically impossible for him to operate a recruitment
business on the side. Time and again, We have ruled that alibi, being a weak defense, must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence which should reasonably satisfy the Court of its
veracity.31
The credence of the private complainants is further bolstered by the admission of appellant
himself that he does not know of any ill-motive why they would hurl such serious accusations
against him.32 The private complainants were all previously unknown to him.
Finally, appellant's alleged warrantless arrest will not exculpate him from his guilt as found by
the trial court. To be sure, the plea comes too late in the day. We note that upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the Information and did not raise the alleged illegality of his
arrest. By so pleading, he waived the alleged illegality of his arrest.33 In People v. Briones,34 we
ruled that the illegality of appellant's warrantless arrest cannot render all the other proceedings,
including the appellant's conviction, void. It cannot deprive the State of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo finding the appellant
Manuel de Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale for having engaged in the business of recruiting the four (4) private complainants for
overseas employment without any license or authority from the POEA and three (3) counts of
Estafa, for falsely pretending to possess power and qualification to deploy private complainants
for overseas employment, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 Presided by Judge Domingo D. Panis.
2 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-103341.
3 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-103342, 92-103343 and 92-103344.
4 TSN, April 7, 1992, pp. 3-4, 10.
5 id., pp. 8-9.
6 id., pp. 4-5, 10-12.
7 id., pp. 5, 17-18; Exh. "A".
8 POEA Certification dated April 2, 1992, Exhibit "C", Original Records, p. 67.
9 id., pp. 6 & 15.
10 id., p. 8; Exhibits "D" and "E", respectively.
11 id., pp. 19-21, 31.
12 Exhibits "F" and "G", Original Records, pp. 70-71.
13 id., pp. 22-23, 31.
14 id., pp. 23-25, 32.
15 TSN, April 8, 1991, pp. 2-4.
16 id., pp. 5-6.
17 Exhibit "I", Original Record, p. 74.
18 TSN, April 8, 1991, pp. 6-10, 13.
19 id., pp. 16-19.
20 id., pp. 20-22; Exhibits "K" to "K-5", Original Records, pp. 77-82.
21 id., p. 22.
22 id., pp. 22-24.
23 TSN, April 28, 1992, pp. 7-16.

24 TSN, April 28, 1992, pp. 3-7.
25 TSN, June 9, 1992, pp. 2-5.
26 TSN, April 28, 1992, p. 16.
27 TSN, May 19, 1992, p. 3.
28 TSN, April 28, 1992, p. 20.
29 Appellant's Brief, Rollo, p. 46.
30 Appellant's Brief, supra.
31 People v. Loste, G.R. No. 100198, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA 647.
32 TSN, April 28, 1992, p. 23.
33 People v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. Nos. 983221-24, June 30, 1993.
34 G.R. No. 90319, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 708.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding
appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police
force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his
physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on
board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board
a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying
shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his
pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.5
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated
specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his
initials and with appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said
accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper
authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother
to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false
and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that
the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight;
brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the
police station for investigation.9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article
II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise
avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the
team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that
it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not
a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the
sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although
the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and
search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the
latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1 This
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we
find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of
the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every
accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below,
we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu
seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled
with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which
dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether
or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial

question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught
in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the
apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of
shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an
incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede
the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have
to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.22
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination

of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through
cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to
the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20,
2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out
his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on
said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the
PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team
members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she
handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud
(Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the
area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999,
the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back
later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked
from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects
and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or
less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually
wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While
conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the
accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and
informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the
accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid
to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery
of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then
inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be
marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was
no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the
criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient
to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these
include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v.
Montilla,35 People v. Valdez,36and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the
validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and
Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away
with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise
learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right
to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of
the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as
long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.
2
Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.
3
Penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren; records, pp. 152-157.
4
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, July 31, 2003, pp. 4-6.
5
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
6
Id. at 5-6.
7
Records (Criminal Case No. 3054), p. 1
8
Records (Criminal Case No. 3038), p. 1.
9
Rollo, p. 6.
10
Supra note 3.
11
Supra note 1.
12
CA rollo, pp. 56-69.
13
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611; People v.
Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003, 396 SCRA 657, 664.
14
People v. Chua, supra.
15
Valdez v. People, supra at 622.
16
Id.
17
Section 2 and 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
18
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 475-476
citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 771 (2003).
19
People v. Nuevas, id. at 476.
20
Records, p. 156.
21
People v. Nuevas, supra at 477; People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003).
22
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
23
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
24
People v. Nuevas, supra; People v. Tudtud, supra.
25
Supra note 22.
26
Supra.
27
Supra.
28
People v. Aruta, supra at 875.
29
People v. Tudtud, supra at 765-766.
30
People v. Nuevas, supra at 468-469.
31
G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751.
32
G.R. No. 86218, September 12, 1992, 214 SCRA 63.
33
311 Phil. 290 (1995).
34
341 Phil. 801 (1997).
35
349 Phil. 640 (1998).
36
363 Phil. 481 (1999).
37
417 Phil. 342 (2001).
38
People v. Tudtud, supra at 776.
39
People v. Tudtud, supra at 782; People v. Aruta, supra at 894.
40
People v. Nuevas, supra at 483-484; People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003).
41
Supra.
42
People v. Nuevas, supra at 484-485.
Sec. 4
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132159 January 18, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CESAR GIVERA y GAROTE, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City
finding accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the suit.1âwphi1.nêt
The information in this case, dated April 10, 1995, charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused [CESAR GIVERA], conspiring together, confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON
y GERALDE2 and ARTURO GAYON y GERALDE, and mutually helping one another
who were charged with the same offense at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-44315, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior
strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, and employ personal
violence upon the person of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS, by then and there
stabbing him with a knife hitting him on the different parts of his body, and striking him
with a piece of stone on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996, whereupon he
was tried.
Accused-appellant's companions, namely Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera,
were separately prosecuted and found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104,
Quezon City in a decision, dated June 6, 1994, in Crim. Case No. Q-93-44315. The three were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P100,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal to this Court, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. We instead find accused-

appellants EPIFANIO GAYON, ARTURO GAYON and MAXIMO GIVERA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER committed with grave abuse of superior strength and
imposes upon each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Eusebio Gardon in the amount of P100,000.00. Costs against accused-appellants.4
For the prosecution, the victim's daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda Delfin were
presented as witnesses. On the other hand, only accused-appellant testified in his defense.
The incident took place at about 4 p.m. on May 2, 1993 at Purok IV, Area 5, Laura St., Old
Balara, in Diliman, Quezon City.
Milagros Gardon testified on direct examination:5
Q: Particularly about 4:00 p.m., were you at your residence at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what were you doing there at that time?
A: I was in the house because I was watching my father, sir.
Q: What was your father doing at that time?
A: I let him go to sleep because he was a little bit drunk, and I was watching him so
that he will not go outside.
Q: Why do you say you were watching him so that he would not anymore go out?
A: Because he was warned by [accused-appellant Cesar Givera] that if he goes

outside, he will kill my father.
Q: At that time and place while you were watching your father, what else happened if
any?
....
A: [O)ur house was being stoned.
Q: Who was stoning your house? Could you tell us who was throwing stones to your
house?
....
COURT:
She mentioned that because her father was not coming out of the house, the
accused started stoning the house.
Q: Who was stoning your house?
A: Cesar Givera, sir.
Q: Was he alone at that time?
A: They were in a group, sir, but he was the only one stoning the house. And the
other one, who was already arrested, by the name of Onying went inside the house.
Q: You said a while ago that there was somebody with Cesar who went to your
house, could you recall that somebody?
A: Onying [Epifanio Gayon], sir.
Q: You said he was already "nakakulong"?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, what happened after this person Cesar and the other one Onying went
inside the house?
A: Onying asked my father to go out of the house while Cesar was stoning the
house. Onying led my father out of the house, and when they were already outside,
Cesar was waiting for them. Then Cesar scampered away and my father followed him.
Cesar caused my father to run after him until they reached the place where there was
another person, and that person stabbed my father.
Q: So how many persons in all have you seen?
A: They were four in all, sir.
....
Q: What did these 4 persons do when her father was with them if any?
....
A: Cesar was stoning the house. Then Onying got my father from the house. Turing
[Arturo Gayon] told the other one to stab my father while the one who stabbed my father
was waiting under the bridge.
....
Q: What happened to your father after you said he was stabbed or mauled?
A: After he was stabbed, the person who stabbed him ran away, sir.
On cross-examination, Milagros Gardon said:6
Q: Who else were with you at that time?
A: My brother and sister, sir.
Q: They were Laura Gardon and Leonardo Gardon, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your father inside the house because he was already resting after having
been from a drinking spree, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: And you were watching TV at that time, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then suddenly you heard stones being thrown on the roof of your house, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: This Onying [Epifanio Gayon] suddenly entered your house, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He was alone when he entered your house, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he effect his entrance in your house?
A: He went inside directly, sir.
....
Q: At that time were you in a position so as to see him actually effect his entrance
through the front door?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why? Where were you at that time?
A: I was in the sala, sir.
Q: You were in the sala right next to your father, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And likewise with your two other companions Laura and Leonardo, they were
situated right near to your father, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Now, when this Onying entered the house, did he call out the name of your father
if you can remember?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your father, did he give any response thereto?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his response if any?
A: He asked Onying if he need anything. And Onying asked him to go out with him.
....
Q: And your father stood up and joined Onying in going out of the house?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Then you together with your two other companions got back to watching the
television show is that correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you stayed inside the house, you and your two other companions?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, thereafter you heard stones thrown again towards your house, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But just the same, you did not peep out through any opening of your house for
safety?
A: We were already outside when they were stoning the house. We followed him
outside.
....
Q: Was Onying also hit by any of those stones?
A: No, sir. Only my father and my sister.
....
Q: What is the name of that sister of yours who was also hit?
A: Laura Gardon, sir.
Q: And where was Laura hit?
A: At her left shoulder, sir.
Q: And how many stones if you know hit Laura?
A: Only one, sir, because while they were stoning they were running away.
Q: Who were these people running away?
A: Onying and Cesar, sir.
Q: Are you saying that Onying also stoned your father?
A: No, sir.
Q: Because he was right next by your father at that time, that is why he was not at all
stoning your father, correct?
A: He was boxing him.
....
Q: You saw Cesar Givera actually stoning towards the direction of your father, is that
what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: And your father followed Cesar Givera, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Likewise, with Onying, he followed Cesar Givera?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they ran quite a distance, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you lost sight of them yes or no?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you stayed in the house, correct?
A: No, sir. I was outside the house. When the incident happened, I was already
outside the house.
Q: But because you did not state that you also followed your father as he ran after
Cesar, does that mean that you just stayed in front of your house?
A: We stopped because we already saw the place where my father was stabbed,
that is why we did not follow them.
Q: How far did they get, using as reference the front door of your house? How far did
they get as they ran away?
A: About fifteen meters away, sir.
Q: Did they not turn corners?
A: It is straight, sir. They only made a turn after the stabbing incident, sir.
Q: They turned a corner after your father was stabbed?
A: Yes, sir, because they ran away, sir.
Q: Only one of the accused stabbed your father, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who was this?
A: Bingo Givera [Maximo Givera], sir.
Q: Did you actually see him stab your father?
A: Yes, sir.
On re-direct examination, Milagros said:7
Q: Madam witness, you said a while ago that you saw while your father was stabbed,
and the name of that person is Onying who stabbed your father?
A: Maximo Givera, sir.
....
Q: Now, when you saw Maximo Givera stab your father, where was Cesar at that
time?
....
A: He was also at the same place, sir.
Q: And the other 3 accused Arturo Gayon and Efipanio Gayon, could you tell us
where they were when Maximo was stabbing your father?
A: They were also at that place, sir.
Melinda Delfin, niece of the victim, corroborated the testimony of Milagros Gardon. She said: 8
Q: At about 4:00 p.m. of May 4, 1993, could you tell us where you were at that time?
A: Yes, sir, I was about to reach the house of Eusebio Gardon.
Q: What was your purpose in going there?
A: Eusebio Gardon called me up because he has just come from Bicol and he will
give me rice.
Q: You said you were about to arrive at the residence of Eusebio Gardon at 4:00
p.m. on May 4, 1993, what did you notice or observe when you were about to arrived at
that place of his residence?
A: I saw "Onying" [Epifanio Gayon] with his hand on the shoulder of Eusebio Gardon
going out of their yard.
(Nakita ko si Onying akbay akbay si Eusebio Gardon palabas sa bakuran nila.)

....
Q: What else did you notice?
A: When I came out of the gate I saw Cesar Givera boxed Eusebio Gardon.
(Paglabas ko ng bakuran nakita ko si Cesar na sinalubong ng suntok si Eusebio

Gardon.)
....
Q: What else did you see aside from the fact that you saw Cesar Givera boxing
Eusebio Gardon?
A: Cesar boxed him and also Onying boxed him, they both helped each other in
boxing Eusebio Gardon, and then they back to the house of Eusebio Gardon and my
uncle followed them. Not quite far, Bingo [Maximo Givera] and Turing [Arturo Gayon]
were there.
....
Q: And what happened when you said this Bingo was there?
A: Onying and Cesar gave fistic blows to Eusebio Gardon and he was also stabbed
by Bingo, and they were also kicking Eusebio Gardon.
Q: Eusebio Gardon was boxed by Onying and Cesar Givera?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And stabbed by?
A: Bingo, sir.
Q: Actually, how many persons were there when [Eusebio] Gardon was stabbed and
being boxed?
A: I saw four of them, sir.
Q: Would you made these four (4)?
A: Turing, Bingo, Cesar and Onying.
....
Q: And what happened to Eusebio Gardon, whom you said was boxed, mauled and
then stabbed?
A: He was lying down under the bridge for about thirty (30) minutes, and then his
children arrived.
....
Q: You said earlier that you saw Cesar Givera and Epifanio Givera threw stones
towards the victim's house, is that true?
PROSECUTOR CONCHA:
Excuse me, Your Honor, the witness said she saw that fellow by the name of
Onying and Cesar boxing --?
WITNESS:
"Suntok, bato at sipa."
ATTY. MASCALAS:
Q: Where did you see them doing these acts on Eusebio?
A: Outside the premises, sir.
Q: Whose premises?
A: The premises of Eusebio Gardon, sir.
Q: Did you not say earlier that Onying came out with Eusebio Gardon from the
latter's house?
A: I saw Onying, "akbay-akbay niya.."
Q: You even saw Onying embracing Eusebio Gardon, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Were there stones being hurled to Onying and Eusebio?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see who were throwing those stones?
A: It was Cesar, sir.
....
Q: Did you see if Gardon was hit by any of these stones?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you also saw Onying hit by stones, correct?
A: No, sir.
....
Q: Who boxed your uncle?
A: Cesar, sir.
Q: Are you saying that Cesar while throwing stones to your uncle was so close to
him that he was able to box him?
A: Because they were advancing towards my uncle and Onying. They were going
towards them.
....
Q: And when they were able to come near, how near did Cesar get to your uncle?
A: Maybe three to four meters, sir.
Q: That was when Cesar boxed your uncle?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: When did Cesar box your uncle?
A: When they come near to my uncle.
....
Q: And then Cesar Givera ran away and your uncle gave chase?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon reaching the bridge which is about fifteen (15), meters away from the
victim's house, you saw Bingo stabbed your uncle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There were only — You said that there were only four (4) persons in that place
where your uncle was stabbed and those persons do not include Milagros Gardon?
A: No, sir.
Q: Because Milagros Gardon was still in their house?
A: She was already outside their house.
Q: She was outside their house -- although outside their house she was still inside
the premises of their lot?
A: She was still inside, but she saw the incident.
Q: And that premises of the victim was about 15 meters away from the bridge where
the alleged incident took place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you also with Milagros Gardon at the time that stabbing was done?
A: We were not together but I was approaching their house.
....
Q: So you were also about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged
incident took place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is your distance when you were claiming that you saw this incident?
A: It was just a little less.
(Makalampas lang ng konti).
....
Q: It was Turing Gayon [Arturo Gayon] whom you heard shout: "Sige, todasin na
yan!"
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it was Bingo [Maximo Givera] whom you saw stabbed your uncle?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: You said that it was Bingo who stabbed the victim Eusebio Gardon. You said that
you saw it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was Cesar Givera doing when the victim was stabbed by Bingo?
A: They were kicking and boxing my uncle.
Q: Givera was doing that? I was asking you about Cesar Givera?
A: He was boxing and kicking my uncle.
Q: Who, Eusebio Gardon, the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
To prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence
the testimony9 of medico-legal officer, P/Maj. Florante Baltazar, given in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-44315. The testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused
by a single bladed weapon.10 In addition, he sustained abrasions in his lower chin, possibly
hitting a rough surface, as well as an incised wound caused by a bladed weapon, on his
posterior middle left arm.11 The stab wound appears to be fatal because it pierced the
pericardium and left ventricle of the heart, which could be the immediate effect of hemorrhage,
shock and eventual death of the victim.12 A death certificate13 evidencing the death of the victim
was presented by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He was a resident of Laura St., Old Balara, Quezon
City at the time of the incident. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victim who was
his relative by affinity.14
Accused-appellant claimed that at the time of the incident on May 2, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m.,
he was having a drink in his cousin's house, some 30 meters away from the victim's house. On
the other hand, Maximo Givera and Arturo Gayon were in the victim's house also having drinks.
Accused-appellant said he was fetched by his cousin, Recto Gardon, because Maximo and the
victim Eusebio Gardon were having an altercation. He went to pacify the protagonists and then
led the victim to his house. Without his knowledge, however, Eusebio went back and again
engaged Maximo in a fist fight, as a result of which the victim Eusebio was knocked down.
Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up, but he saw the victim's son,
Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo. He, therefore, ran away and left the victim behind. He
added, that he did not see if his three companions did anything more than box the
victim.15 Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim had died only two days after the
incident.16
Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4, 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center. He stated
that the children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he
was present when the incident happened.17
On August 29, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:18
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cesar Givera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged.
The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant's sole assignment of error is that-
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO HAS

COMMITTED AN ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED
The appeal has no merit.
First. The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant and his companions (Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera), all
of whom were convicted of murder in another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio
Gardon on May 2, 1993. Milagros Gardon's testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the
beginning of this opinion, is spontaneous, detailed, arid consistent. The defense tried to
discredit it through cross examination, but, as shown earlier, the defense only succeeded in
enabling her to give further details of her testimony in chief. There are apparent lapses in the
testimony of Milagros, as when she testified that she knew at the very beginning, that it was
accused-appellant who was stoning their house when in fact, as she admitted, she only knew
this because the victim said so. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the victim's other
daughter, Laura, was hit by the stones hurled by accused-appellant as she came out of their
house, since the door of the house was so narrow that only one person at a time could pass
through it. Nonetheless, a close reading of the records will show that indeed it was accused-
appellant who was stoning the house because when the witness followed the victim outside, she
saw accused-appellant throwing stones at their house. She then saw accused-appellant hitting
the victim with stones. In the process, Laura was also hit.
In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not detract from the
substance of her testimony. This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality
touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead
of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because
they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.19
Thus, according to Milagros Gardon, accused-appellant taunted the victim and challenged him
to come out of the house. After succeeding in drawing the victim out of his house, accused-
appellant and his companions ganged up on him, kicking and pummelling him and finally
stabbing him.
Milagros' testimony belies accused-appellant's claim that he was merely trying to pacify the
victim and Maximo Givera and that he ran away because the victim's son, armed with a bolo,
charged at him (accused-appellant). There was no reason for the victim's son to want to attack
accused-appellant, if the latter was merely trying to help the victim.
Nor is it probable that accused-appellant did not see what his companions did to the victim
aside from giving him fist blows and kicks, because according to accused-appellant, he ran
away shortly after they had attacked the victim. As accused-appellant said he saw the
assailants run way, this could only be after they had been done with their victim.
The defense also tries to discredit the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Melinda
Delfin. It is contended that, contrary to her claim, she was not really present at the incident. For
this purpose, it is pointed out that she failed to give a sworn statement regarding said incident to
the police.
The contention has no merit. As Melinda explained, she did not give a statement to the police
because she was told they would call on her later for her statement. Melinda testified: 20
Q: The police did not get your statement because you did not tell them that you were
an eyewitness and if it is true, correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: You were only asked by your relatives - -You testified in this case in the sala of
Judge Asuncion after the children of the victim asked you to? Correct?
A: They did not tell me. I voluntarily testified, sir, because I saw the incident.
Q: What do you mean by saying that you voluntarily testified? Did you just come to
court and asked the court to take you as witness in this case?
A: No, sir, because in the police station the police told me that they will not take my
statement. They will just "ihahabol na lang ako."
Q: Did you not inquire from them why your statement will not longer be taken and
what do you mean by that "ihahabol na lang ikaw"?
A: I did not ask because I do not know anything about that. That was the first time
that incident happened to my life.
It is noteworthy that both Milagros Gardon and Melinda Delfin knew accused-appellant and the
other assailants, and that in fact some of them are related to the witnesses. Accused-appellant
has not shown that these witnesses were motivated by ill will against him. As correctly observed
by the trial court:21
[T]he court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
In the first place, accused Cesar Givera has not shown any motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify as they did against said accused.
Second, accused Cesar Givera and the other accused in this case are all residing within
the vicinity where the crime was committed, and are even related by affinity to the
deceased. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt their identification by the prosecution
witnesses."
All things considered, we think the trial court correctly dismissed accused-appellant's claim and
gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. From the fact that the victim
died and that accused-appellant and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim
before he died, it can be concluded that they are responsible for the victim's death.
Second. The allegations of conspiracy in the information have been established. The victim was
at home sleeping after coming from a drinking session, when the accused-appellant and his
companions stoned his house to force him to come out. When they failed, one of them, Epifanio
(Onying) Gayon, went inside the victim's house and told him to come out. Disoriented because
he was drunk, the victim went with Onying. Once the victim was outside, accused-appellant
pelted him with stones, while Onying started raining fistic blows on him. Then Onying and
accused-appellant ran away to lure him to go toward the bridge where the other two, Arturo
Gayon and Maximo Givera, were waiting. When the victim reached the place, he was attacked
by the gang. He was kicked and boxed by Onying and when Arturo shouted "Sige todasin na
yan!," Maximo stabbed the victim.
The evidence thus clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated action by the group in the
execution of the crime. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators
actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts
with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design
to bring about the death of the victim. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common
purpose is in contemplation of law the act of all. Consonant with this legal principle, accused-
appellant is guilty of the crime of murder as if he himself dealt the deathblow that sent the victim
to his grave.22
Third. However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case. Where conspiracy is
directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time
and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be
appreciated.23 But in an implied conspiracy, such as in this case, evident premeditation cannot
be appreciated in the absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was
hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it cannot be determined if the
accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider
and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the
opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design which the prosecution
failed to establish in the case at bar.24
Nor can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be taken into account. The trial court held:25
...[T]reachery will also be deduced from the evidence on record. The deceased was
unarmed when he was stabbed by on Maximo Givera and boxed and kicked by accused
Cesar Givera and two other accused.
. . . From the evidence adduced, accused Givera and Epifanio Gayon taunted and
provoked the deceased by throwing stones at him and then lured him to run after them
towards the bridge where the other accused were lying in wait ready to pounce on the
deceased without risk to themselves as the deceased was then defenseless."
Treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and
without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery to
be appreciated, it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack, otherwise, even if
present at a subsequent stage, it cannot be considered.26In the instant case, the victim cannot
be said to have been totally oblivious of the impending attack by all the group of accused-
appellant. He thus had every opportunity to escape from the attack. In fact, his daughter
Milagros testified that prior to the stoning incident, the victim had been threatened with harm by
accused-appellant the moment he went out of his house, which is why she stayed beside her
father to make sure he did not go out of the house. Indeed, the victim had been forewarned of
the danger posed by accused-appellant and his group.
Moreover, by coming out of his house and running after two of the assailants, the victim showed
that he was prepared for the attack by accused-appellant and his gang and could have been
hardly surprised when he was actually attacked. Treachery must be proven by convincing
evidence. The fact that the victim may have been surprised because he had not expected that
he would be outnumbered when he saw two other attackers waiting for him under the bridge is
not sufficient to show that the victim was completely unaware of the attack that might come from
his assailants.27
However, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority was correctly
appreciated in this case. The victim was unarmed and was clearly outnumbered by the four
assailants, with one of them armed with a knife.28
Fourth. Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4,
1996 was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was
returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be
found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to
make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until
it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, §4 is only a
directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court.29
At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto
because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a
plea of not guilty and participated in the trial.30 As this Court has held, any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.31
On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legal taken in the first case,
involving the three other accused for the death of the same victim, offered in evidence in the
case at bar, this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As correctly contended by the
defense, because they did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Baltazar, his testimony
cannot be used in evidence against accused-appellant. Indeed, where the opposing party failed
to cross-examine a witness, this Court in several cases held:32
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness
has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is
lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is
not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the
witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
Still and all the fact and cause of death of the victim had been sufficiently proved by the
accounts of the two eyewitnesses, corroborated by the offer in evidence of the death certificate
of the victim.
Fifth. The award of damages by the trial court, in favor of the victim should be modified. Aside
from the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity, the heirs of Eusebio Gardon are entitled to an
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages irrespective of proof thereof.33
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding
accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote, guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition to the amount of
P50,000.00 to be paid as indemnity, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of
Eusebio Gardon amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of the
suit. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes:
1 Per Judge Perlita J. Tria Tirona.
2 Also referred in the Records as Efipanio Gayon.
3 Rollo, p. 9.
4 People v. Gayon, 269 SCRA 589 (1997).
5 TSN, pp. 4-9, 11, Aug. 9, 1996.
6 TSN, pp. 12-16, 18-20, 22-24, Aug. 9, 1996.
7 TSN (Milagros Gardon), pp. 26-27, Aug. 9, 1996.
8 TSN (Melinda Delfin), pp. 5-9, 14-15, 18-19, 21-24, Aug. 12, 1996.
9 RTC Records, pp. 107-126; Exh. E.
10 RTC Records, pp. 117-118.
11 Id., pp. 113, 115, 120-121.
12 Id., p. 119.
13 Exh. B.
14 TSN (Cesar Givera), p. 4, Oct. 17, 1996.
15 Id., pp. 5-9; TSN (Cesar Givera), pp. 3-7, 9, Oct. 22, 1996.
16 TSN (Cesar Givera), p. 10, Oct. 17, 1996.
17 Id., pp. 11-13.
18 Rollo, p. 23.
19 People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63 (1996); See People v. Claveria, 221 SCRA 34 (1993).
20 TSN, pp. 13-14, Aug. 12, 1996.
21 Rollo, p. 66.
22 People v. Alib, G.R. No. 130944, Jan. 18, 2000.
23 People v. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 475 (1914); People v. Larion, 2 Phil. 476 (1903); People v. Maquiraya, 14 Phil. 243 (1909); People v.
Camias, L-4617, May 29, 1953; People v. Timbang and Mallari, 74 Phil. 295 (1943).
24 People v. Custodio, 91 Phil. 698 (1955) People v. Mendoza and Sinuag, 91 Phil. 58 (1952); People v. Yturiaga, 86 Phil. 534 (1950);
People v. Lazada, 70 Phil. 525 (1940); People v. Upao Moro, 101 Phil. 1226 (1957); People v. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27 (1934); People v.
Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968); People v. Pareja, 30 SCRA 693 (1969).
25 Rollo, p. 67.
26 People v. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 (1997).
27 See People v. Ramiscal, 49 Phil 103 (1926).
28 See People v. Magnayon, 122 SCRA 23 (1983).
29 2 F. D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 335 (2000).
30 People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761 (1998).
31 People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998).
32 Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. CIR, 86 SCRA 27,32 (1978). See also Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610 (1975).
33 People v. Tolentino, 308 SCRA 485 (1999) citing People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998).
Sec. 5

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and

RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging
the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces,
Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to
report the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ
Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime
and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce,
A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At
the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed
Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime
of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y
FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the
attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were
the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police
station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The
CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the
meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer
for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus,
the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon
which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found
that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A

WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN

THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW
UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever
issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation.
They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule
112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the
police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken
a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the
authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the
proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining
in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper
interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved
over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins,
development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed
under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15,
1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the
Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free

Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him,
nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only
those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must
also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless
arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that,
according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise
justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the
Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least
insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions
under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the
officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to
arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were
based on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support
under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance
in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the
Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule
113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the
present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its
phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and
Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law
principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In
Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons
whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the
authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that
of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the
presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives
sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may
reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to
try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested,
although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances
are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which
provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law,
pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest
persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause
for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a
reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion,
action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace
officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not
necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed.
What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence
of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that
the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the
old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause
without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held
liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because
the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the
particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be
arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on
the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the
1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity
of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or
reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the
person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the
person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of
Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule
113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was
re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification
that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have
been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an
investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination
on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was
qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a
person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize
arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the
element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed,
and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable
cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge,
for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be
reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was
discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth
Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The
necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but
whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is
synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation
than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer
possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a
pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and
the particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his
possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not
meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a
mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well
as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a
witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify
such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and
should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the
existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an
actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is
the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use
the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or
circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge
must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable
cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The
Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed
to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make
proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the
criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence
shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the
warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It

was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On
the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this
set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the
NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP
units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was
invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest
was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was
certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been
committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the
offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because
he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter.
Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the
getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and
only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held
invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime
was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting"
officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who
had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal
knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held
valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in
the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente
and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of
the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who
pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who
were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the
accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting
officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking
towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The
Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch
was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity
of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who
initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in
conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on
the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the
offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of
Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the
incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the
incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as
he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to
run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita
III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers
confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying
to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under
Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the
police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could
determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is
the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have
gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on
facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand,
with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following
must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed;
and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause
to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied
with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person
believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule
in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts
in its decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause
in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the
determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on
the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the
alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan
Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m.
on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less
than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest
took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the
scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed
suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they
asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was
issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical
check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed
the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of
right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest
wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician,
Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less
than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by
the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the
persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but
voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even
admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another
version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the
police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the
victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and
had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot
investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were
proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners'
second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not
need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to
the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force
would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired
personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest
of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but
was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the
petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan
Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the
petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued
in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by
the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of
clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is
legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case.
Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the
case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court
is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold
the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners'
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the
resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Noel
G. Tijam; rollo, pp. 36-46.
2
Id. at 48.
3
According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt
of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page
No. 250; RTC records, attached to the CA records, p. 72.
4
Id. at 5.
5
Affidavit of Arrest, id. at 6.
6
As shown by the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt
of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page
No. 250; id. at 72.
7
Rollo, p. 37.
8
RTC records, p. 6.
9
Rollo, p. 75.
10
Id. at 37.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 37-38.
14
The pertinent matters state:
Considering the opposition and issues raised by the prosecution, the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation filed by

the accused is DENIED.
15
Rollo, p. 38.
16
Id.
17
Supra note I.
18
Supra note 2.
19
Section 5 of The Philippine Bill of 1902. That no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
20
Section 1(3), Article III -The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
21
Section 3, Article IV - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
22
Section 2, Article III - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
23
Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.
24
Entitled THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, cited generally by
Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process, University
of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April 23, 2008.
25
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna Carta, last accessed October 10, 2014.
26
Id.
27
homas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process, University
of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April 23, 2008.
28
Id at 45.
29
Wrongfully dispossessed.
30
Supra note 27.
31
278 Fed. 650.
32
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Malasugui, G.R. No. L-44335, 63 Phil. 221,
226 (1936).
33
Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.
34
The United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853, 856 (1917).
35
The United States v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472, 474-480 (1909).
36
4 Phil. 317, 323-324 (1905).
37
In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court cited Section 37 ctf Act No. 183 (Charter
of Manila), which designates certain officials, including police officers, as "peace officers"
expressly provides that within the territory defined in the Act they "may pursue and arrest
without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about
to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without
warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer
or within his view."
38
11 Phil. 193, 197 (1908).
39
Supra note 34, at 856.
40
Id. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just
as commendatory as the capture of criminals and the officer should not wait the
commission of the crime.
This rule is supported by the necessities of life.
41
Sec. 2204, 1916 ed.; Sec. 2258, 1917 ed.
42
Supra note 35, at 477-479.
43
Section 37 (a) If the number of barrios in a municipality is less than or equal to the
number of councilors the council shall put each of its members in immediate charge of a
barrio or part of a barrio, so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more
councilors.
(b) If the number of barrios exceeds the number of councilors, including the vice-
president, the council shall group the barrios into as many districts as there are
councilors, and shall place each councilor in charge of one such district. Each
councilor shall be empowered to appoint one lieutenant in each barrio or part of
barrio which comes under his immediate supervision. A lieutenant of barrio shall
serve without compensation and shall report directly to the councilor appointing
him.
Sec. 38. (a) Each councilor shall keep the people of his barrio or barrios informed
as to the acts of the council, or other governmental measures which directly
concern them, by means of suitable notices posted in a public and conspicuous
place in each barrio. He shall serve in the council as the representative of the
people of his barrio or barrios and shall bring their special needs to the attention
of that body.
(b) He shall further promptly inform the president of any unusual or untoward
event occurring within the barrios assigned to him.
(c) He is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cane with silver head, plated
ferule and black cord and tassels.
44
Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 479 (1997).
45
46
47
60 Ill. 361 (1871].
48
49
G.R. No. L-6909, 21 Phil. 514-516 (1912).
50
Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration in Sayo v. The Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859,
875 (1948).
51
Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Book IV, 2007 Edition, citing Feria, Philippine Legal
Studies, Series No. 2, p. 375.
52
5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S
Ct. 1371.
53
111SC174,97, SE 62, 3 ALR 1500, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 689.
54
361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80 S Ct. 168, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688.
55
5 Am Jur 2d, p. 690, citing United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937)
and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
56
5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 691-692, citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F. 2d
1336; Be Vier v. Hucal, (CA? Ill) 806 F. 2d 123; Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560; Martin v. Eaton, 140 Vt 134, 436 A. 2d 751; Warren v.
Dwyer, 906 F. 2d 70; State v. Kendall, 794 P. 2d 114; People v. Villiard, 679 P. 2d 593;
State v. Tarica, 59 Wash App 368, 798 P. 2d 296; Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797; United
States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d 700.
57
5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L Ed 2d 484, 91 S Ct
1106;
United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; People v. Exum, 382 Ill 204, 47 N. E. 2d 56;
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W. 2d 705; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d
700.
58
5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Thompson v. State (Del Sup) 539 A. 2d 1052; Ricks v
State, 82 Md. App. 369, 571 A. 2d 887, cert gr 320 Md 3505, 578 A. 2d 778 and affd 322
Md 183, 586 A. 2d 740; People v. Tracy, 186 Mich App 171, 46. N.W. 2d 457; State v.
Leonard (Utah App) 825 P. 2d 664, 177 Utah Adv Rep 49, cert den (Utah) 843 P. 2d
1042.
59
G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 227.
60
Paderanga v. Drilon et al., 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991).
61
32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915).
62
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
63
People v. CA, 361Phil.401, 413 (1999).
64
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 642.
65
Supra note 59.
66
Supra note 34.
67
Id.
68
G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 388.
69
G.R. L-68995, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
70
365 Phil. 292, 312 (1999).
71
268 Phil. 571, 576 (1990).
72
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 150.
73
G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772, 775, 778.
74
G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993, 219 SCRA 756, 761.
75
341 Phil. 526, 534, 543 (1997).
76
346 Phil. 847, 853-854 (1997).
77
232 Phil. 406 (1994).
78
G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, 232 SCRA 412-413.
79
Supra note 59.
80
Fifth Edition, p. 220.
81
New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005).
82
According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the
excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No.
324, Page No. 250; RTC records, p. 72.
83
Rollo, pp. 73-74.
84
Issued by the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Charlton S. Sibal, M.D.; RTC records, p. 7.
85
Joey Pestilos then resided at Block 1, Lot 6, Don Primitivo Extension, Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City; Dwight Macapanas then resided at No. 24 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City; Miguel Gaces then resided at No. 13, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City; Jerry Fernandez resided at No. 16, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit,
Quezon City; Ronald Mufioz then resided at No. 15, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit,
Quezon City; RTC records, p. 4.
86
Atty. Generoso then resided at No. 16 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City
per the referral letter of the Police Inspector to the City Prosecutor, dated February 20,
2005; id.
87
Rollo, p. 75.
88
Supra note 76.
89
G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139.
90
Rollo, p. 40.
91
Rule 113, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.
92
Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627,
637-638; see also People v. Mi/ado, 462 Phil. 411, 417 (2003).
93
The pertinent portion of the Affidavit of Arrest states:
That, immediately we proceeded at the said place and upon arrival complainant
appeared complained and pointed to the undersigned to suspects [Joey]
Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces[,] Jerry Fernandez and Ronald
Munoz at (sic) those who mauled him.
That, I informed all the suspects of the charges imputed [against] them by
complainant Atty. Generoso then invited them to Batasan Police Station for
Investigation x x x" (Emphasis ours)
94
Rollo, p. 41.
95
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall
be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
96
SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or
claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY,
JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both
American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is
a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective
residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.
Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days
after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested
aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of
evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working
visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face
deportation.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the
sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.
RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room.
In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part:
Noted:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily
accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime.
On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being
undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No.
88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia:
Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable

aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health
and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation
of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that
their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation
of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor
to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid
congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio,
but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from
the CID where trial was on-going.
On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had
"finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least
15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country."
On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days
only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid
Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present
petition.
On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on
oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a
Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to
arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading
to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest,
search and seizure as required by the said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected
pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in
the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is
it a crime to be a pedophile.
We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the
Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including
aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of
the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be
based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to
induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64
Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected
by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has,
in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22
SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA
86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an
incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985
Rules on criminal Procedure).
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable
aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for
violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative
Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint
against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The
process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA
543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes
moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a
fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director
of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were
found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked.
Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners
had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-
Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are
the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665)
[Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal
Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II,
Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as
a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity
(Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza,
L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section
37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and
indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation
proceeding would be defeated.
Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are
substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a

criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby,
264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken
the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S.
vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative
in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need
not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings
(Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of
arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him,
relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that
he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before
unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew
You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing
judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental
and essential like the right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d],
14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted,
provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker,
270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81
Phil. 682 [1948]).
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the
issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of
investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section
I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein.
Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners
to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for
violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them
as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible
deportation.
Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of

Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional.
The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated
the condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the
detriment of the State.
The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives
authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds
required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.
xxx xxx xxx
... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground
for his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.
(Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to

deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra).
There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single
deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R.
No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that
"under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist
before the warrants of arrest were issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be
arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of
counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides:
Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power

residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the
person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he
shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall
also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by

them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right
but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under
arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions
as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said
provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the
Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens
facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs. Deportation Board, 104
Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee
Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such
grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs.
Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to
be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco
Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly
committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of
the State.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Art. III).
2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be search and the persons
or things to be seized." (Section 2, Art. III).
3 Reiterated in Neria vs. Vivo (L-26611-12, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 701);
Tiu vs. Vivo, L- 21425, September 15, 1972, 47 SCRA 23; and Ang Ngo Chiong
vs. Galang, L-21426, October 22, 1975, 67 SCRA 338).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182534, September 02, 2015
ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji Homar (petitioner)
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2008, and
its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. These assailed CA rulings
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 259 in
Criminal Case No. 02-0986 which convicted the petitioner for violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165. The Information
states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.3
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in the RTC decision, he
testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt.
Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the
South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw
the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately
accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in
the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner's
body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu.
Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.4
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.5 He testified that on August 20, 2002, he
was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at
the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped
and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being a holdupper,
and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut
cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day.
He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for
the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted.6
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to
have performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner. The
RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not
show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner.7
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial and ruled that it is a common
and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. This defense is
weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence as in this case.8
The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA's ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's findings.
According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is legal, valid, and proper.
One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person. In the
present case, the petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A
Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful.9
Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner's body which
produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.10
The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan11 clearly showed that the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delictoin possession of shabu.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA.13 Hence, this
appeal.
The Petitioner's Position
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as evidence
because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioner has not committed, was not committing and
was not attempting to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no report or criminal
charge was filed against him for the alleged jaywalking.14
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest, Section 13, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed only upon
dangerous weapons or "anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a warrant." In the present case, the offense, for which the
petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, is jaywalking. The alleged confiscated drug
has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking.15
Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered the shabu from the petitioner,
renders the prosecution's evidence weak and uncorroborated. Consequently, the sole testimony
of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner's conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Respondent's Position
In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was conclusively
established beyond reasonable doubt.16 He reiterates that the warrantless frisking and search
on the petitioner's body was an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking.17 The non-
filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against the petitioner does not render his arrest invalid. 18
The respondent also assails the petitioner's defense that the shabu is inadmissible as evidence.
According to the respondent, the petitioner can no longer question his arrest after voluntarily
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea of not guilty and
when he testified in court.19
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted
on the petitioner's body.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of this
power and the implementation of the law should not violate the constitutional rights of the
citizens.20
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain

whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.21 There must be a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must
precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.22
Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions
when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present case, the respondent
alleged that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in
flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within
the view of the arresting officer.24
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which
the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu - was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the
alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's body is
surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its
decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for a
valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove
that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.
Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place
not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that the
portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area.
The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have
supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and
therefore, the subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a
valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution
is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest
preceding the warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the
prosecution's lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This presumption
cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused
the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.25cralawred
It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as regards the
findings of the RTC when it held, rather hastily, that in the process of accosting the petitioner for
jaywalking, Tangcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a small plastic sachet
containing shabu26 The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the findings of the
RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to arrest the petitioner for jaywalking.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 27
The pertinent testimony28 of Tan, as quoted by the CA, is as follows:

Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior?
A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20, 2002, we saw a male person crossed the street of
Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing.
Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a
place not designated for crossing?
A: We accosted him.
Q: How did you accost that person?

A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. Pero napansin
namin siya na parang may kinukuha, so he was frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a
knife was recovered from his possession.
Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person who allegedly
crossed the wrong side of the street, what happened after that?
A: After recovering the knife, nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked again by Tangcoy and
a plastic sachet was recovered from his possession.
Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion recovered from that
person who crossed the wrong side of the street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the contents?
A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man, what did you do?
A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the Parañaque Community Hospital and the suspected shabu or
methylamphetamine was brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio.
Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the morning of
August 20, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar, sir.
Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy
allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to
him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy "immediately
accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated area."29
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty.
This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that
was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.
From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his constitutional rights
and brought him to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held that
the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the
police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the
Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for violating
an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent's argument that there was a lawful search
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to
justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the
search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the
alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of
the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of
the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to
be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police
officers.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in
the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.32
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes
conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 29364. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo
V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, rollo, pp. 45-63.
2
Article II - Unlawful Acts and Penalties: Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof: (1) 10 grams or more of opium; (2) 10 grams or more
of morphine; (3) 10 grams or more of heroin; (4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride; (5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"; (6) 10
grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil; (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana;
and (8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine
(GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value, or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance with Section 93,
Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows: (1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50)
grams; (2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten
(10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such
as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed
or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or
more but less than five (hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA,
LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
3
Rollo, p. 46.
4
Id. at 24, 49.
5
Id. at 50.
6
Id. at 50-51.
7
Id. at 52.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 59.
10
Id.
11
Based on the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the hearing on April 21,
2003. Id. at 56-57.
12
Id. at 58.
13
Id. at 73-74.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Id. at 122.
16
Id. at 96.
17
Id. at 99-100.
18
Id. at 101.
19
Id. at 103-104.
20
563 Phil. 934, 941 (2007).
21
Id.
22
People v. Delos Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 174774, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 417, 450.
23
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
24
25
26
Rollo, p. 43.
27
Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421, 429.
28
Rollo, pp. 56-58.
29
Id. at 42.
30
31
Rollo, p. 56.
32
640 Phil. 669, 681 (2010).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA

AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD,
and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in
the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is
elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the
people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that
should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial
admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3
The
writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked
into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would
follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except
in those cases express authorized by law. 6
The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without
warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense,
thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to
verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital
with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot
wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third
— as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man
was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true.
Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13
believe that the confidential information of the arresting
officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually
received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives
of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in
view of this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house
was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other
communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading
to the whereabouts of Roque;17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and
she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said
house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were
found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one
Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the
court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make
the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the
other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of
the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the
safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by
the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That
would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
An
arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without
warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24
But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu
spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu
called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail
for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14
days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events
surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein
as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering
said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case
and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests
of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section
5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the
case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not
to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with
the, majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and
petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang
sa magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers,
inciting to sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed
possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless
supports the authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions
warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu
mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered
seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The
second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same
afternoon (Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had
time, short though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may
not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless
arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed."
The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14
days after the commission of the crime imputed to him.
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what
particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law
en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous
perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the
violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right
to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a
right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person
should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his
action.
Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested
without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others
to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to
hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism
and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be
remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental
freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing
interests; those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of
judicial intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the
determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Hence, while the police should act
swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the
government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for
such arrests.
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be

underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator
is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People
vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be
arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing
of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable
cause to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon
the accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll
without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.
It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent
application. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an
offense "has in fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes
cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee]
has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it'
under the old rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985,
139 SCRA 349, 408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall
within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was
provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to
the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid
out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part
shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and
civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary
citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in
the community.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with
a political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the
difficulty in finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police
officers usually have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly
administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith
should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to
hold any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the
performance of their duties. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their
grievances.
If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be
exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the
Constitution to uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit
behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases
coming before us.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages
freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that
enhancing order through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty
corrode the very values Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the
people of the world who are fast liberating themselves.
I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
xxx xxx xxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt,
the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia
Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are
concerned, the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of
illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I
concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground
that that was inciting to sedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of

speech. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ
when applied to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole
country who would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's
interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and
the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security
and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would
go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define, among
other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of
rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation.
or illegal method; (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a
scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply
because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of
government policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need
to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of expression. At the very least, a
warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of offense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing
offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion,
insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple
advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of
rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved
guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a
rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority
opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not
this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are
critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms
against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate
warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await
the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead
of securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person
arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest.
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that
Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on
December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been
committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into
ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for
reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is
not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was
seized. A government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:
(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R.
No. 83162;
(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;
(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and
(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who
were arrested inflagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the
military, or voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that
under the applicable circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being
unlawfully detained.
But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,
121 SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the
ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied
crimes.
We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with
approval in the originalponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements,
or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable. Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against govenment forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. (Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a
recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in
the application of the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then
considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke
the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that
the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection
of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the
government.
But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat
the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided
thereunder, including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among
these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those
guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and
presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the
suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an
intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in
the present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own
laws. Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels
are by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the
unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says
that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the
absence of a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by
the authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes.
International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic
with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter.
As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which
this Court has also adopted as its own:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenseswhich set them apart
from the common offenses, aside front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by
simply placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension.
Once so placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he
is in the process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly
doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act.
In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous
act of undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay
supine in his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further
justification, the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he
was in the hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated
the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a
warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance
of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge
issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were
supposed to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as
having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court)
despite the considerable time lapse.
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the
day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the
validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but
from the time of the Identification of the suspect.
Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the
latter "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an
offense "has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the
word "just," which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be
made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the
arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not
be the start of another dangerous doctrine:
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as
revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon
wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of
certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs.
Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was
probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it
was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated
the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree
itself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal
arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights
were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have
short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the
ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who,
out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security.
Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That
is what democracy is all about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the
majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the
problem of arrests without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta,
since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority
Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result
reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments
in several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution,
make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble
expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless
arrests. Although the above statements are obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to
be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with
constitutional rights explored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures
of persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphais
supplied)
Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest,
the rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2.
Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional
procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III
Section 2.
2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests
are unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in
Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the
situations where an officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a
person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall
that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for
what they are: they are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Exceptions to such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless
the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be
lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is
that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which
they are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision,
rather than the exception. 1This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we
deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to
such a guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of
their language so to keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless
arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this Court, stressing that:
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one
of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should
be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by
them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237
Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose
vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14
Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis supplied)
held that:
. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable. 4
In People vs. Burgos, 5

this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed
by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the
rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)
4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the
occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the
circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part
of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to
refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and
restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7
If no overt,
recognizably criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting
officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is being committed or
attempted to be committed in his presence. 8It is elementary that purely mental or psychological
phenomena, not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a
crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be
shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the
presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be
ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words,
not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the
crime being committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which
serves as the justification in law of warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).
5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may
be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the
arresting officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms,
the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been
committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a
person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not
ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to
have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part
of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly
from sense perception the arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion
conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for, truth and reliability might
be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a
person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal
knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the
criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses some
act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime
which has "just been committed."
6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the
time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer
must be brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b)
by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being
made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed"
would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been
committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest
of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along
with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567,
Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of
the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be
substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the time Dural was
arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far away from the
St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have been just committed.
There was no showing, nor did the Court require it, that the arresting officers had been in "hot
pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer
who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting
than the standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his
chambers, ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The
arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the
personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In
the present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge"
in Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief
and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable
to the officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a
constitutional right. That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to
be guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point.
Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from
warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the
presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the arresting officer burst
upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"
shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a)
that the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather
because the person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The
pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads:
. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)
9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found
in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that
doctrine, in my submission, does notdispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably
criminal in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just
been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The
"continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does
not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between
specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.
Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to
two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of
determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of
double jeopardy is raised.
10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients
or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some
other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g.,
estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all
of the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of
he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing,"
then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has
jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed
to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within
jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of
sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or
city where the defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed
constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.
11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of
whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts
actually alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and
the same crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information
is filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused
constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the
double jeopardy defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon
the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts of the accused
constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and
dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts
comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been
committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be
used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be
committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the
crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end
in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal
dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with
or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the
overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following
acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:" 13
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other document of the
organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;
xxx xxx xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such
association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police
agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces
but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce
the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or
excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.
REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:
While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some
reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a
warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.
Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28
December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."
Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has
emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the
complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the
practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely
professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth.
Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from imputations based on dubious
motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless
arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person
making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests
could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the
consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or
reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are
the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen
(14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to
acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.
It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this
instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons
above elucidated, I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. It is true that
the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the
rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into
civil liberties.
SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1

the majority has not shown why the arrests in
question should after all be sustained.
According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a
warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph
(b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all
committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military
did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the
majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and
suspicion is supposedly reasonable:
. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 2
As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic
Act No. 1700, 3
is made up of "overt acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as
follows:
. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal
means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has
taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive
organization to make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without
a warrant, that above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is
possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made
"subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that
mere membership.
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would
interpret it, as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based
on actual facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that
personal knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the
accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a subversive organization with
intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules
(then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably
encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority.
Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that
to give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the
amendment as useless exercise.
What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man"
had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando
Dural. Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to
say, not personal knowledge.
I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar
arrest because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by
[another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here.
I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken.
Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest
without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the
peace officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer,
was acting in good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the
arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the
part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.
As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information,
and that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the
hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing
laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species of information because of
the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.
The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential
Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to
"government health authorities" — not to the military.
I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for
the military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue
warrants. As People vs. Burgos held:
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through
the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there
was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise,
there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-
82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the
military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority can say that since
Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that
Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this
Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the
petitioner's arrests.
More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-
so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be
abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."
According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the
majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."
It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be
established, since meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the
majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure").
I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked
up for inciting to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13
Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is
not saying that it is either, but that:
. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no
moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled
in favor of authority," 15
and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind,
it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the
Court's constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting
words" recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Court—
whether or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless
arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it.
What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of
course, the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to
make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following
day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make
warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the
Rules of Court.
As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or
escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as
there was none in the case of Burgos.
In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to
be committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a
moving vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justified.
"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case,
titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange
declaration, first, because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side
of Government), and second, because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty
— as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.
I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not
understand why these cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not
telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases involved,
incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.
The majority goes on:
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
Bunye II. 23
With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory
construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues
and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge."
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities
be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a
crime that had "just been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks
before.
In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules.
I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling
criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military
should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.
As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to
the general rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given
— today it is fourteen days, tomorrow,

the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24
one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact
unreasonable, following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it
"found out only later," as the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to
claim that it"came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye
II" 25—and none of us can possibly dispute it.
I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure"
alone—we are talking of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of
whether or not people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the
point, I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners'
predicament.
With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I
respectfully submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed,
because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am
not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be
presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the
military that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.
I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better
days. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and
stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist
rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in
fact dealing with "Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves
subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own
excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old
excuses. Third, Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified
in a regime that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a
valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest
(Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security"
are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no
longer be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own
peers in the bar.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its
legality, via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to
patronize the petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is
validating their continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which
the public should be elated.
A Final Word
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate
one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against
arbitrary State action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter likewise states,
"values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." 32 The
Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule, and the
rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.
I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information
with which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal,
information. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not
justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the
applicable rule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was
arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen
days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions
nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority has
read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what
is important is that the Court be right." 33
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or
not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of
whether or not this Court, in approving the military's actions, is right.
In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture, hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and
various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;
Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;
Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were wounded;
The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;
Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;
From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;
One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by
the military since 1988. 34
It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am
soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too late.
Motions denied.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 61388, April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.
2 G.R. No. 70748, October 21,1985,139 SCRA 349.
3 Section 1, Rule 102: "To what habeas corpus extends. — Except otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
4 Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778.
5 Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
6 Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948).
7 Republic Act No. 1700 known as the "Anti-Subversion Act" titled "An Act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations, penalize
membership therein and for other purposes." (1957); and the subsequent related decrees such as Presidential Decree No. 885, entitled
"Outlawing subversive organizations, penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes." (1976); and Presidential Decree No. 1835
entitled "Codifying the various laws on anti-subversion and increasing the penalties for membership in subversive organizations."
8 G.R. No. 61388. April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.
9 US vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 (1917).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Records of G.R. No. 81567, affidavit dated 4 February 1988.
13 Rollo, pp. 311-312 (G.R. No. 81567).
14 Presidential Decree No. 169 requires attending physicians and/or persons treating injuries from any form of violence, to report such fact
to the Philippine Constabulary and prescribing penalties for any violation thereof.
15 Decision dated 9 July 1990, pp. 19-20.
16 Decision, pp. 10-11.
17 Ibid., p. 12.
18 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
19 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
20 Decision, p. 18.
21 United States vs. Sanchez, No. 9294, March 30,1914, 27 Phil, 442.
22 Ibid: "The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent
purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
"In People vs. Ancheta, it was held that "the legality of detention made by a person in authority or an agent thereof ... does not depend
upon the juridical and much less the judicial fact of crime which, at the time of its commission, is not and cannot definitively be determined
for the lack of necessary data and for jurisdiction but upon the nature of the deed. . . . ."
23 United States vs. Santos, supra.
24 Ibid.
25 Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ART. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds. detains a person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its maximum period, if the detention has not exceeded
three
days. . . .
26 Damages for the impairment of rights and liberties of another person.
27 Affidavit of Avelino Faustino dated 23 November 1988; Return of the Writ dated 25 November 1988; Decision dated 9 July 1990, pp. 23-
24.
28 Joint Affidavit of 5 police agents, dated 23 November 1988; Decision, supra.
29 Affidavit of police agents, dated 28 December 1988, marked Exhibit "A" at the RTC, Biñan, Branch 24.
30 Decision of 9 July 1990, pp. 9 and 12.
31 Decision of 9 July 1990. p. 13.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Salaysay vs. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956).
2 Realty Investments Inc. vs. Pastrana. 84 Phil. 842 (1949)-l Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 (1948)
3 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
4 64 Phil. at 44.
5 144 SCRA 1 (1986).
6 144 SCRA at 14.
7 See e.g., U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 (1910).
8 In People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988), the Court, in nullifying a warrantless arrest, said, through Mr. Justice Cruz:
"In the many cases where tills Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators on the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been
shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113
was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was
the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him." (163 SCRA at 409-410) (emphasis supplied)
9 People vs. Burgos, 114 SCRA 1 (1986).

10 121 SCRA 472 (1983).
11 Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, 22 SCRA 638 (1968); U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913); U.S. vs. Santiago, 27 Phil. 408 (1914);
U.S. vs. Laureaga, 2 Phil. 71 (1903).
12 E.g. People vs. Zapanta and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 688 (1951) where the Court held that each instance of sexual intercourse constitute a
separate crime of adultery, though the same persons and the same offended spouse are involved, and that a second information may be
filed against the same accused for later acts of sexual intercourse.
13 Section 6, P.D. 1835, 16 January 1981.
Sarmiento, J.: dissenting:
1 Resolution, 1.
2 Supra; emphasis in the original.
3 The majority cites Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 1835 and "related decrees;" both Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 1835 have
been repealed by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 267.
4 Please note that under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1835, "[t]the following acts shall constituteprima facie evidence of
membership in any subversive organization: (a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization; (b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in
any form whatsoever; (c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other
forms; (d) Executing orders, plans, or directives of any kind of such association or organization; (e) Acting as an agent, courier, messenger,
correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity, on behalf of such association or organization; (f) Conferring with officers or other
members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof; (g) Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of
such association or organization orally or in writing or any other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign or code; (h)
Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such
association or organization; (i) Mailing, shipping, circulating, distributing, or delivering to other persons any material or propaganda of any
kind on behalf of such association or organization; (j) Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information, suggestions, or
recommendations to officers, or members or to any other person to further the objectives of such association or organization; and (k)
Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or organization." Please note that
none of these are alleged by the military in this case, assuming that the Decree still exists.
5 Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382; emphasis supplied. In Taruc vs. Ericta (No. L-34856, Nov. 29, 1989, 168 SCRA 63,
66-67), I held that People vs. Ferrer is no longer a good basis for sustaining the Anti-Subversion Act. I am not here invoking Ferrer to
sustain it, but to discuss its elaboration of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700.
6 Resolution, supra.
7 G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
8 Supra, 14.
9 36 Phil. 853 (1917).
10 Resolution, supra, 10.

11 People vs. Burgos, supra, 15.
12 Supra.
14 Supra, 16.
15 Supra.
16 See United States vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 (1907).
17 Resolution, supra; emphasis supplied.
18 Supra.
19 At 15.
20 G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988, 163 SCRA 402.
22 Supra, 17.
23 Supra.
24 See RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 112, sec. 5, on the number of days a judge may act.
26 G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.
27 G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
28 Resolution, supra, 18-19.
30 Except for Rolando Dural, the rest of the petitioners have been acquitted by the lower courts trying their cases.
31 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
32 Supra, art. II, sec. 11.
34 Manila Chronicle, October, 1990.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision2 dated 4 May
2011 and Resolution3dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without being authorized by law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the
same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.5
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2)
Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6 Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian
Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas
City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de
Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the
house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. They
invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process,
a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked
the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the
National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for
examination.7DEFENSE’S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3
Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that
he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and
detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision9 dated 6 April
2009, convicted petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused DANILO

VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of
Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17)
years and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT’S WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which the CA denied in a
Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF
THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests,
since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the
precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment16 stating that the shabu
confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted
on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending officers’ non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace
officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show
none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal
that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search.18 Records have
established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused
has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be

conducted.1âwphi1 These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving
vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a
seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-
appellant’s pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall
under the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence."20
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.21 In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket.
The testimony of the police officer on the matter is clear:
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the contents of his
pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing shabu.22
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article
III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the
seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained. This being the
case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the
confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with · deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution
dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin per S.O. No. 1870.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-33.
2
Id. at 35-52; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and concurred in
by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Agnes Reyes Carpio.
3
Id. at 53-54.
4
Records, p. 2.
5
Id. at 32.
6
Rollo, p. 36.
7
Id. at 36-37.
8
Id. at 38.
9
Records, pp. 165-171; penned by Judge Victoriano B. Cabanos.
10
Id. at 171.
11
Rollo, p. 39.
12
Id. at 51.
13
Id. at 100-104.
14
Id. at 53-54.
15
Id. at 15.
16
Rollo, pp. 217-248.
17
People vs. Rabang, G.R. No. 73403, 23 July 1990, 187 SCRA 682.
18
Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934 (2000).
19
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, 3 August 2010, 626 SCRA 633.
20
Caballes v. CA,424 Phil. 263 (2002).
21
Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012, 667 SCRA 421.
22
TSN, 8 November 2004, p. 8.
23
People v. Racho, supra note 15.
24
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, 22 February 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 484-485.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012
MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
PEREZ,*
REYES,**
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26,
2009 Decision 1 and the March 9, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31957, which affirmed the September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
123, Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No .. C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y
Cayuni (Ambre) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
THE FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie
Castro (Castro) and Kaycee Mendoza (Mendoza), before the RTC charging them with illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-73029. The Informations indicting the accused read:
Criminal Case No. C-73028
That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline
substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip
containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) folded aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline
substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic
lighters, knowing the same are paraphernalias instruments apparatus fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous drug
(METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into the body.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. C-73029
That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
with one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use and sniff Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.5
When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were
meted the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight
(8) months and a fine of ₱25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-73028. For their conviction in
Criminal Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered their confinement at the Center for the Ultimate
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six (6) months.6
Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the merits
ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1
Ronald Allan Mateo (PO1 Mateo), PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie
dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared that on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station
Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a
police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp (Aderp) were
engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao);
that Sultan ran away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi
and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers
to his house; that inside the house, the police operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza
having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be
shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and
PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory
examination. Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine
samples taken from Ambre and her coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu while
Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the items seized from them were all found
positive for traces of shabu.8
The Version of the Defense
Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Through the testimonies of Ambre,
Mendoza and Lily Rosete (Rosete), the defense claimed that on the afternoon of April 20, 2005,
Ambre was inside the residential compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that her mother asked
Rosete to accompany her because Rosete’s daughter-in-law, Nancy Buban (Buban), was a
resident of Phase 12, Caloocan City, an area inhabited by Muslims; that when they failed to buy
malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look for other vendors;
that ten minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her; that she
was detained at the Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro, Mendoza and Tagoranao; and
that she was not brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug
testing.
Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong
vendors, she returned fifteen minutes later and learned that the policemen had arrested people
inside the compound including Ambre.
Mendoza, who was convicted in Criminal Case No. C-73029, claimed that no pot session took
place on the afternoon of April 20, 2005. She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside
the residential compound, when policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at them.9
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able
to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted her of the
crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove
with particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her possession. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. C- 73028, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of
the crime of Violation of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165;
2)In Crim. Case No. C-73029, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her
to be confined and rehabilitated at the government rehabilitation center in Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. The six (6) month period of rehabilitation shall
commence only from the time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation center and its
promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified.
The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with the rules governing the same.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her
innocence of the crime. On November 26, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
September 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, she filed this petition
THE ISSUES
Ambre raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER ON APRIL 20, 2005 (THAT YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA)
CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL PROCEDURES IN CONDUCTING A BUY-
BUST OPERATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER WERE PART AND PARCEL OF THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-
BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR "FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AND
HENCE, WERE ILLEGAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING

THE ILLEGAL BUY-BUST OPERATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE

TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER'S WITNESS, HER CO-ACCUSED, KAYCEE MENDOZA, ON
THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO SUCH ILLEGAL USE, HAD
VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS

REHABILITATION IN A GOVERNMENT CENTER IS A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF
CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER R.A. 9165 ("COMPREHENSIVE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002").12
A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves
on the following core issues:
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.
Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal
because no offense was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not
authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged "hot
pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were
supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. In this regard, Ambre
cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City dismissing the
case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust
operation was highly suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the items allegedly seized from
her were inadmissible in evidence being fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that the omission
of the apprehending team to observe the procedure outlined in R.A. No. 9165 for the seizure of
evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the prosecution’s case. Lastly, Ambre maintains
that she was not subjected to a confirmatory test and, hence, the imposition of the penalty of six
months rehabilitation was not justified.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged
decision for failure of Ambre to show that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of
illegal use of shabu. The OSG insists that Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It is of the opinion that the credible and compelling
evidence of the prosecution could not be displaced by the empty denial offered by Ambre.
THE COURT'S RULING
The conviction of Ambre stands.
Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit
of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.14
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In this exception,
the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. As
a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator
of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing
or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.16
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the
act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively
identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre,
however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of
Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of
an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had
no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of
Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police
officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-
bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds
that Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before
entering her plea.18
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure
done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.19
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
Ambre, together with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken
from them were found positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science
Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05. It was likewise found that the items seized from the three
were all positive for traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science Report No. D-149-05
dated April 21, 2005. These findings were unrebutted.
Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect, because the evidence against her was
obtained in violation of the procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165, is untenable.
While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it
is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.20 This Court, however, has
consistently held that the most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items.21 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been
compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical
inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render
Ambre's arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible.
Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following items
were confiscated from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1)
strip of rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of aluminum
foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow
disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned over the seized items
to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former. All the pieces of
evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-
05." With the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items
to the PNP Crime Laboratory and delivered them to P/Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who
found all the items, except the disposable lighters, positive for traces of shabu. Verily, the
prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in the chain of custody
of the seized items.
Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as
inadmissible, Ambre will not be exculpated from criminal liability. First, let it be underscored that
proof of the existence and possession by the accused of drug paraphernalia is not a
condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous drugs. The law merely
considers possession of drug paraphernalia as prima facie evidence that the possessor has
smoked, ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has violated
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165.22
Secondly, the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty
the commission of the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the
perpetrator. At this juncture, the Court affirms the RTC's finding that the police officers'
testimonies deserve full faith and credit. Appellate courts, generally, will not disturb the trial
court's assessment of a witness' credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have
been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.23 The Court finds no reason to deviate from this rule
in this case.
Likewise, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no showing that PO3 Moran,
PO1 Mateo, PO2 Hipolito, and P/Insp. dela Rosa were impelled with improper motive to falsely
impute such offense against Ambre.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of denial offered
by Ambre must simply fail. Bare denials cannot prevail over positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses.24 Besides, this Court has held in a catena of cases that the defense of
denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.25
Finally, Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center
imposed on her was a nullity, in view of the alleged lack of confirmatory test. The Court is not
persuaded.
It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge, at the RTC, the supposed
absence of confirmatory drug test conducted on her. Ambre only questioned the alleged
omission when she appealed he·r conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day for her to
do so. Wellentrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal
as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 26, 2009 Decision and the
March 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Señior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Footnotes
* Designated additional member in lieu or Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per
Raffle dated September 19, 2011.
** Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,

per Special Order No. 1283 dated August 6, 2012.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia v. ith Associate Justice Portia Alii'lo-
Hormachuelos and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp.
31-50.
2
ld. at 64-65.
3
Penned by Judge Edmundo T. Acuna; id. at 66-76.
4
Id. at 66.
5
Id. at 66-67.
6
Id. at 34.
7
Id. at 67.
8
Id. at 137-140.
9
Id. at 13-14.
10
Id. at 75-76.
11
Id. at 50.
12
Id. at 16.
13
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
14
Sec.3 (2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
15
People v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 174774, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 417, 449.
16
People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757, 770 (2003).
17
Rollo, p. 68.
18
People v. Ng Yik Bun, G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 88, 103-104.
19
Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
20
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012.
21
People v. Manlangit, G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 455, 469.
22
Section 12, par. 2, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165.
23
People v. Gregorio, Jr., G.R. No. 174474, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 216, 227.
24
People v. Unisa, G.R. No. 185721, September 28, 2011.
25
People v. Astudillo, 440 Phil. 203, 224 (2002).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and
the Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner
Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white
crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LA W. 6
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag)
were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private
Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as
Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that
the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and
Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 8
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by
the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to
evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his
evidence.9
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was
a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in
front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the
police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to
another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. 10
The RTC Ruling
In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and
ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which
yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was
probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view,
that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend
the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by
any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he
arrested Comerciante.13
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that
P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the
latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter
exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a
reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason
to inquire on the matter right then and there.15
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18
The Issue before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid
warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal
warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible,
necessarily resulting in his acquittal. 19
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the
Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the
"stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of illegal drugs. 20
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides an
exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. 23
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the
process cannot be reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be
lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 26
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires
for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and
the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.28
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in
Section (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no
lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard
a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante
and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an
arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory:
Pros. Silao:
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were
you?
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am.
xxxx
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am.
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that
happened if any?
A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.
xxxx
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already
identified?
A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?
A: They were quite facing me then.
0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo,
Mandaluyong City?
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?
A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do?
A: We stopped ma'am.
Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?
A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.
Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two
male persons?
A: They were surprised, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?
A: They were surprised.
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?
A: They were stunned.
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple Lang ng tanong
ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything?
Court:
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.
Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa kanila?
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
Witness: Wala po.
xxxx
Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic
sachet?
A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: Left or right hand?
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan, no
problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy -
especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a
speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two
(2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that
the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts
of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any
way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing
"improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been
sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact
that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings
and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to
create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b),
Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag
had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily,
it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain
in this case. 33
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity
to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves
observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a
judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases
adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the
suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it
was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of
the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity." The Constitution prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on
only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. [35]]
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.1âwphi1 These
circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former.
In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011
and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he
is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
LUCAS P.BERSAMIN** JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN***

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
LUCAS P.BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson's
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2103 dated July 13, 2015.
**
Per Special Order No. 2102 dated July 13, 2015.
***
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2108 dated July 13, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-30.
2
Id. at 34-49. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices
Ricardo R.Rosario and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring.
3
Id. at 69-72.
4
Promulgated on September 4, 2009 and penned by Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela; id. at
81-94.
5
Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (approved June 7, 2002).
6
Rollo, p. 78.
7
Varies throughout the records. The variations are "Erick Dasillo" and "Erick Dacillo."
See rol/o, pp. 13, 84, 85, 86, 129, and 130.
8
Id. at 36-37.
9
Id. at 37.
10
Id. at 38. See also id. at 85-87.
11
Id. at 81-94.
12
Id. at 93.
13
Id. at 87-93.
14
Id. at 34-49.
15
Id. at 40-48.
16
See Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated November 10, 2011; id. at 50-67.
17
Id. at 69-72.
18
Id. at 9-32.
19
See Petition; id. at 16-29.
20
See Comment; id. at 133-137.
21
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
22
Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 3. xx xx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
23
See Ambre v. People, 692 Phil. 681, 693 (2012).
24
Id., citing People v. Delos Reyes, 672 Phil. 77, 108-109 (2011).
25
Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 480 (1997); citations omitted.
26
See id. at 479.
27
People v. Villareal, G.R.No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549, 556, citing
Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934, 947 (2007).
28
Id. at 556, citing People v. Cuizon, 326 Phil. 345 (1996).
29
Id. at 557.
30
Rollo, pp. 17-20.
31
See People v. Villareal, supra note, 27. See also Malacat v. CA, supra note, 25, where
the Court invalidated a warrantless arrest made to the accused who, according to police
officers, "were acting suspiciously with '[t]heir eyes ... moving very fast."'
32
See id.
33
See id. at 558-559.
34
See G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014.
35
See id.; citations omitted.
Read Go v. CA – Found in 112

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V.
DIZON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a
rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated
December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City,
asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the
persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon,
Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12
and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro
Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo
Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It
appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk
between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty.
Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of
arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the
next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI
agents on that day.1 However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student
suspects.2
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P.
Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice
Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO — Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO
BENTAIN — Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective official
functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY.
VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and
frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG,
both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P.
graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student
Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by
harboring and concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of
suspects Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above
acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge
that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus
preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of
the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8,
1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the
prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT
WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT
WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS
AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED
THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT
PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO
PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student
suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was
probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these
questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are
provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting
officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in
the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the
perpetrators of the crime.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended
Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b),
Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of
his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed
the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the
accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in
that case involved the admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear
that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the
police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants
of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the
crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the
same day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the crime had "just been
committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after
the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate
that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest
without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting
officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule
113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.8
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of
the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the
latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion
that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the
supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the
violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to
supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be
arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or
even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just
committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom
to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the
requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we
hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c), the
Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to
suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of
Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered that
these SJ members were positively identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent
mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute
the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from
arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be
effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting,
what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While this justification may, at best, show
their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable ground to
suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime of
murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the
reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents'
part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and
investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless
arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their
opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-
judicial authority to rule on this matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the
law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to secure the
liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice to any criminal
or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI agents.
However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that
obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency
like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by
eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.9
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects
were guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a
warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not
fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners
could not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected
the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the
students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his
memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against
petitioners:
All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994,
the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the
U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being
sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to
prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829.
Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an
arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to
believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to
attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the
accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused,
in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.10
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or
wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or
has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.11 But as has been held,
"[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also
from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v.
Desierto:13
Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained
either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily
does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as
those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.

Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression

or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981,
104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs.
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs.
Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young

vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia,
109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo,

CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA
G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033,
April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524,
February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August
1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a
violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to
prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.
Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact
petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On
the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize
respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in
the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their
undertaking to surrender the students the following day.14 Hence, the information against them
charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and
Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students and another principal suspect, a
certain Joel Carlo Denosta.15 The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May
18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose
arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or
not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is
immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly
arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that
time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan
and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the
NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the
law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for
lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to
bring to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law
enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary
delay. But it must be remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by
sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for the filing of an information
against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot be indicted because they dared to
uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners'
challenge to P.D. No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if
the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or
general law.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby
prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §1(c) as a result of the
incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to
dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes:
1
Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
2
Resolution dated Aug. 4, 1997, p. 5; Rollo, p. 52.
3
Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 1; Rollo, p. 37.
4
Annex C; Rollo, pp. 45-46.
5
Petition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 9-10.
6
Comment, p. 12; Rollo, p. 81.
7
205 SCRA 772, 778 (1992).
8
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1991).
9
Annex B; Memorandum dated September 8, 1997, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
10
Resolution dated August 4, 1997, pp. 6-9; Rollo, pp. 53-56.
11
Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
12
Id., p. 448.
13
298 SCRA 196, 214-215 (1998).
14
Resolution dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
15
Rollo, pp. 45-46.
16
Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189272 January 21, 2015

vs.
CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE
SENGLAO, Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution2 dated
April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CR HC No. 00657 affirming the
Decision3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
7659.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the
officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro,
received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza,
that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said
island.4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified location
wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing
boat and the other, a speed boat. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and
two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo fromthe former to the latter. As
they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves,
the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed
boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers
found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. ChanQue and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao
with several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly
suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed
to do so.5 Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and
thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc,
Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu
repeatedly offered them "big, big amount of money" which they ignored.6
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags
containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and
Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were
forty five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each.7 Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper
documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in
the Philippine territory.8 However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s
questions.9Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors, PNP
Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised
them to await his arrival the following day.10
On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a helicopter.
They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with
the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further
investigation.11 There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were turned over to
Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP, Regional
Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using "broken" English. According
to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase "call China, big money,"
giving him a certain cellular phone number.12 He allowed appellants to call said number in which
they spoke with someone using their native language, which he could not
understand.13 Because of this difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector
Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either Fookien or Cantonese.
On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector
Culili informed and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the
right to remain silent, the right to counsel, as well as the right tobe informed of the charges
against them, and the consequences thereof.14 Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to
ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said constitutional rights. However,
appellants only kept repeating the phrase "big money, call China." Apart from their names,
aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants did notdivulge any other
information.15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance of the arresting officers, then prepared the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellants, requested for their physical and medical
examination, as well as the laboratory examination of the white, crystalline substance inthe bags
seized from them.16 He also assisted the arresting officers in the preparation of their
affidavits.17 According to Inspector Culili, moreover,he was able to confirm that the appellants
are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that
foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province.18
Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic Chemist/Physical
Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim,
Laguna conducted an examination of the white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags
seized from the appellants.19 After performing three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in
her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as "shabu."20
On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an
Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of
Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA
No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at the coast of Brgy.
Tambo, Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then the
persons not authorized by law conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through the use of sea vessel into the above-
mentioned place, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu contained in forty-five (45)
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total weight of 46,600 grams (46.60 kilograms)
placed inside another forty-five(45) separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags which is
prohibited by law, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution,
specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and Police Inspector
Geronimo.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando Oliva,
both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime
Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal
Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the
apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not
actually from the speed boat the appellants were on.22
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision dated June 21,
2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN QUE" AND HIU LAO CHUNG
@ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV as amended by R. A. 7659 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer
the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA and to each pay the FINE of One
Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos Philippine Currency, with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.23
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated January 9,
2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision, amendment, or reversal of its
assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF

REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14, ARTCILE III, IN RELATION TO
SECTION 21 (A), ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT
SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS IS VALID.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.24
Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant case since the
elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1) the importation or bringing into the Philippines
of any regulated or prohibited drug; and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of
said drugs was without authority of law, were not established herein. Appellants assert that
unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal drugs came from a foreign country, the offense
does not fall within the ambit of illegal importation of said drugs. Thus, considering the
prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin of the boat on which appellants were
apprehended, appellants cannot be convicted of the crime charged herein.
Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the
corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs subject of this
case was not sufficiently established. In addition, they emphasize the irregularities attendant in
their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their constitutionally protected rights.
Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their arraignment for they were not
represented by a counsel of their choice.
This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument.
The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with violation of
Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659, which provide:
ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs
Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any
regulated drug into the Philippines.
xxxx
ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized
under Articles II and III
xxxx
Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the
same in the following cases:
a) importation of dangerous drugs;
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is
committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. According to appellants, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are
brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no importation. In support of this, they
cite our ruling in United States v. Jose,25 wherein We said that:
There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is alleged to have been illegally
imported comes from a foreign country, there is no importation. If the ship came to Olongapo
from Zamboanga, for example, the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port
of Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be sustained no matter how much opium
she had on board or how much was discharged. In order to establish the crime of importation as
defined by the Opium Law, it must be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or
on which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. Section 4 of Act No. 2381
provides that:
Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
or assist in so doing, shall be punished . . . .
It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of opium into the Philippine Islands
from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a prime essential of the crime defined by that section.
Without it, no crime under that section can be established.26
Moreover, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of bringing goods and
merchandise intoa country from a foreign country."27 As used in our tariff and customs laws,
imported articles, those which are brought into the Philippines from any foreign country, are
subject to duty upon each importation.28 Similarly, in a statute controlling the entry of toxic
substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation was construed as the entry of
products or substances into the Philippines through the seaports or airports of
entry.29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of something into a certain
territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article merely came from the same
territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.
The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were, indeed, guilty
of importing regulated drugs into the country in violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were
caught by police authorities in flagrante delictoon board a speedboat carrying forty-five (45)
plastic bags of shabu. The drugsseized were properly presented and identified in court.
Appellants’ admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant for making reference
during custodial investigation to China where they could obtain money to bribe the police
officers lead this Court to no other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin
of the confiscated drugs. All elements of the crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being
present in this case, conviction thereof is in order.30
We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their
penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the
apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came
from China. The records only bear the fact that the speedboat on which the appellants were
apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some other locality within the country, and not
necessarily from China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel
which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to
the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants
herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. This,
notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court
that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines, the importation
contention could have been sustained. Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of
regulated drugs under Section 14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from
all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident.
At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v.
Jose,31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they
cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:
Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the question whether, in case the
charge of illegal importation fails, the accused may still be convicted, under the information, of
the crime of illegal possession of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of
this proposition; but, believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an
acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it up and decided it. Section 29 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense,
the commission of which is necessarily included inthe charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included in the charge in the
information it is not sufficient that the crime maybe included, but it must necessarily be included.
While, the case before us, the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond
question and they might have been convicted of that offense if they have been charged
therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an essential element of the crime of illegal
importation and was not necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say the
least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the
waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently
anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo. That being the
case it is clear that possession, either actual or constructive, is not a necessary element of the
crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily included therein. Therefore, in acquitting the
appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot legally convict them of the crime of
illegal possession.32
However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish,33 this Court held that possession is
inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of being the owner of
sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked
inside Philippine territory, was charged with illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702
of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1
of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of
the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court affirmed the dismissal
of the information on illegal importation, in the following wise:
Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it seems plain beyond
argument that the latter is inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. There
can hardly be importation without possession. When one brings something or causes something
to be brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of it. The possession ensuing
from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive, but whatever its character, the
importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal
prosecution.If he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine
territory, he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he
is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the
merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He who puts
merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it is in transit does not incur
criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high
seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).34
As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy therein since
the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included in the information
on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the latter. Thus, this Court
sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which charged the accused with
importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for possession is necessarily included in
the charge of importation.
Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be held liable for
the offense of illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal liability for illegal
possession, if proven beyond reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. As previously
mentioned, the crime of importation of regulateddrugs is committed by importing or bringing any
regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings
something or causes something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has possession
of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation can never beproven without first establishing
possession, affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua nonfor it would rather be
unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in
possession thereof.
At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when the
information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged.35 An offense charged necessarily includes thatwhich is
proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter.36
Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged with the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In those cases, this Court
upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal
possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of
another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the
other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the
accused.37Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily
included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right
to be informed of the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.
In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and is

necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of the
former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused
is charged witha specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of
lesser crimes or offenses included therein.38
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in
the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under
Section 16,39 Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug; (b) such possession
isnot authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated
drug.40
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags
containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned previously, on the
date of appellants’ arrest, the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast
of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the
Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long
after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the persons on which were transferring
cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they moved closer to the area, one of the boats
hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with
several transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly
exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of the
subject regulated drugs.
Moreover, this Court is not legallyprepared to accept the version of the appellants that they had
nothing todo with the incident and that they were being framed up as the drugs seized from
them were merely planted by the apprehending officers. At the outset, this Court observes that
appellants did not provide any explanation as tohow the apprehending officers were actually
able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated drugs weighing about one (1) kilo each in the
speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean without their knowledge. Also, as the trial
court noted, they did not even give any explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the
coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the
confiscated bags of regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not
provide the court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower
court:
Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo
Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the police authority from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only one’s credulity. Their testimonies appear to be
merely a product of an [afterthought]. They have not executed any prior affidavit on the matters
concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2
Paglicawan who executed their joint affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. It is so
apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses that they [did
not] know anything about the case. What is even worse is that Atty. Evasco, the former counsel
of the accused, procured the testimonies of Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo
Reyes. Clear enough their intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the
monetary consideration in exchange of their testimony.41
This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has been invariably
viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the defense of denial
and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.42 Without proof of any intent
on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to appellants the commission of a crime, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over
the bare denials and self-serving claims of frame up by appellants.43
Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated by certain irregularities
in the proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allegea violation of their
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of
probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons
and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of regulated drugs therefrom are
inadmissible against them.
Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
besearched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant, under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private person may, without a
attempting to commit an offense;
This Court has ruled that for anarrest to fall under the above exception, two (2) elements must
be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.44
In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending
officers in flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their
arrest, the apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted
appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another. However, one of the boats hastily sped
away when they drew closer to the appellants, naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers.
Soon after, the police officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of
the officers. When they requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity
as well as their purpose for being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less
respond to any of their questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting appellants and the
illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting
officers "big, big amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the
arrest of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a
crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted
on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were
in plain view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the
requirement of obtaining a search warrant.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.46
In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of ascertaining
whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place reported by the
Barangay Captain. In broad daylight, appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of
illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in possession of the same, which
became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of view of the arresting officers.
It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls
within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are
admissible as evidence against appellants.
As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to substantiate beyond

reasonable doubt the corpus delictiof the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal
drugs was not sufficiently established, the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records
of the case provides otherwise. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated
drugs were properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the
presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the
confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters.47 There, the evidence
was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination which yielded
positive results. The laboratory report, photographs, and receipts were all made part of the
records of this case. In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented
before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3
Yuson, the officer who confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an Information
on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-
six (36)-hour period in Article 12548 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the law subjects such
public officers who detain persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability, it must be
remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained persons for the act they committed
remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate.49 This Court is nevertheless
mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officersin this case, such as the
language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a
Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even
assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information, appellants
should havetaken steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot
now rely on administrative short comings ofpolice officers to get a judgment of acquittal for
these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants’ possession.50
Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during custodial
investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one, this
deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction.51 In
this case, neither one of the appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the
records clearly show, appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call
China, big money." The trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during
custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel
during custodial investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying that during
their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely
represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial court
likewise appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little Chinese language. As
such, considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter was able to explain to
appellants the charges against them in the language they understood, appellants therefore did
not validly enter their plea.
The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention of the
appellants.1âwphi1 This Court does not find a violation of appellants’ right to counsel for evenin
their own narration of facts, appellants stated that when they appeared without counsel when
the case was called for arraignment on January19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time to
secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when appellants again appeared
without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public
Attorney’s Office.52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample opportunity to secure the
services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot now assign error in the proceedings
conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full
compliance with the law.
In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a Chinese
interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by the CA, the trial
court gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s
assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter.53Appellants were even given time,
through several postponements,to properly secure the services of one. If appellants were
unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed interpreter, it should have taken the
opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation, the trial court’s observations are worth
mentioning, to wit:
Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify on their own behalf, the
defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter. The instant case has been filed in
Court since December 8, 1998 or six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that
for such period oftime that this case has been pending in court, accused could not still secure
the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the records, they were able to
secure the services of several lawyers one after the other. The accused on two (2) occasions
have even submitted written requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O")which were granted
by the Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the services of an
interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also understand English as proven by their
letters. x x x54
Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to
appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when such findings are
adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of
this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in
criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence
before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’
deportment during the trial.55
Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, as
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both
courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case, this
Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings.56 It is clear, therefore, that
based on the findings of the courts below, appellants were, in fact, in possession of regulated
drugs without the requisite authority.
As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659, amending RA No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide:
Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous DrugsAct of 1972, is amended to read as follows:
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetuato death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
xxxx
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Crime. -The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:
xxxx
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed forty-five (45)
kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the two hundred (200)
grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A.
No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines." As regards the fine, We find that the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00)
for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the quantity seized from them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00657 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are found GUILTY of the
crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
enned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-18.
2
CA rollo, p. 281.
3
Penned by Presiding Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, id. at 8-19.
4
Rollo, p. 4.
5
CA rollo, p. 9.
6
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 2-12; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 12-24.
7
CA rollo, p. 10.
8
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 13.
9
Id.
10
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 12-14; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 24-26,
28.
11
Id., citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 14-15; 26-29.
12
Id.,citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 5-14.
13
CA rollo, p. 11.
14
Id.
15
Rollo p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 14-17.
16
Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-25.
17
CA rollo, p. 12.
18
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, p. 36.
19
Id. at 6, citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 7-28.
20
Id., citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 38-73.
21
CA rollo, p. 6.
22
Id. at 16.
23
Id. at 19.
24
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
25
G.R. No. L-11737, August 25, 1916.
26
United States v. Jose, supra. (Emphasis ours)
27
http://thelawdictionary.org/importation/ (last accessed November 11, 2014).
28
Section 101, Title 1 of Book 1, Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as "An Act to
Revise and Codify the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines."
29
Section 5(d)Republic Act No. 6969, otherwise known as "An Act to Control Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for Other Purposes," October 26, 1990.
30
Rollo, pp. 13-14. (Emphasis ours)
31
United States v. Jose, supra note 23.
32
Id. (Emphasis ours)
33
People v. Elkanish, G.R. No. L-2666, September 26, 1951.
34
Id. (Emphasis ours)
35
Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 4.
36
37
People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 and People v. Hong Yeng E, G.
R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013, citing People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September
5, 1997, 278 SCRA 561.
38
People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010, citing People v. Villamar, 358
Phil. 886, 894 (1998).
39
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred
to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription.
40
People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997).
41
CArollo, p. 18.
42
People v. Amansec, G. R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 574, citing
People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.
43
People v. Cruz,G.R. No. 187047, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 286, citing People v.
Chua, 416 Phil. 33, 56 (2001).
44
Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539, 550, citing
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
45
Fajardo v. People, G. R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 194, 209, citing
People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January
27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610 and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231
(1927)
46
Id., at 209-210, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).
47
CA rollo, p. 11.
48
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. —
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen
(18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
49
People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 528 (2004), citing People v. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069,
1071 (1957).
50
Id., citing People v. Tejada, 252 Phil. 515, 525-526 (1989).
51
Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 624, and
People v. Vinecario, G. R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004, citing People v. Buluran, 382
Phil. 364, 372 (2000).
52
Rollo, p. 59.
53
Id. at 15.
54
CA rollo, p. 18. (Emphasis ours)
55
Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011, citing People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394,
407 (2007).
56
Id. at 439.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136267 July 10, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision,1 dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with an
unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with no serial
number, with intent to kill, acting with treachery and evident premeditation and taking
advantage of the darkness of [the] night, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain
HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE, hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the
head which caused the latter's instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.,
Enrico A. Rosal, Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of whom belong to the Cavite
City Police Department; National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr.;
NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City Health Officer II
and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite City; and Danet D.
Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite City. The testimony of Police
Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records, Firearms and Explosives Division of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with in view
of his certification, dated October 7, 1997 (Exh. N),3 that accused-appellant is not a
licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.
The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:

At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along
Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed
of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded
to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on
the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. A, A-1, A-2,
and A-3)4showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle.5 PO3 Rosal testified that a
tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the victim
were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of
Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith,
PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food
server/waitress in Sting Cafe.6 The other policemen at the police station called up City
Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told the police
investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight
and drink beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant; that the
two stayed in the cafe until 3:30 a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she was
serving other customers. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-
complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants.7
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's
description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew where
accused-appellant lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to accused-
appellant's house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the door for
about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description given by
Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives identified
themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the
cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house.8
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the
brand name "Hanes" (Exh. H)9 and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the
shirt's hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he
found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it.
PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They then took the t-
shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with them
to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively identified by
Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion. The police investigators asked accused-appellant
where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accused-appellant refused to tell him where he
hid the gun so he sought his (accused-appellant's) permission to go back to his house to
conduct a further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3
Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto.10 Inside the house,
they saw accused-appellant's 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic
water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38
revolver (six shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the gun loaded with five live
bullets (Exhs. M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials
"RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While
PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with
accused-appellant in the sala.11 The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1),12 the white "Hanes" t-shirt
(Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B),13 and the two spent .38 caliber shells (Exhs. B-2, B-2-B)14 were all
photographed. Accused-appellant was then taken to the police station, where he was
photographed (Exh. B-3)15 along with the things seized from him.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that on
August 26, 1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to him
by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white "Hanes" t-shirt, a
.38 revolver with five live ammunitions, and two deformed slugs. After an evaluation of the
evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant. He took
blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory examination.16
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of
Health in Cavite City, conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an
autopsy report (Exh. O)17 which showed the following findings:
AUTOPSY REPORT
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state
with gunshot wounds . . . described as follows:
= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns more on
top of the wound to 2.5 cms. elevation/height located at the angle of the right jaw
and/or 5 cms. below the inferior level of the right ear. The wound has irregular
and inverted borders. It is directed inwards fracturing the lower edge of the angle
of the right mandible and the lead slug is embedded at the right lateral portion of
the first (1st) cervical vertebrae hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at

the left frontal region 5 cms. above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. It is
directed inwards and downwards fracturing the bone (frontal) underneath into
[the] intracranial cavity.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
= Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left frontal
region.
= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped
with liquid and clotted blood.
= The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.
= The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area
is severely hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st
cervical vertebrae at the right side.
= Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.
= Other internal organs are significantly normal.
Slugs extracted:
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The length
of the slug is 1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end.
The length of the slug is 1.8 cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R),18 the first one located
on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side above
the left eyebrow. The slug from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the neck, near
the spinal column. There were powder burns, called "tatooing," surrounding the first wound
which showed that the victim was shot point-blank. The second slug was also embedded at the
front lobe of the brain.19 Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh. Q) that the victim
died of "shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds."20
Upon written request (Exh. C)21 of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics examination to
determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the firearm
recovered from accused-appellant.
Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a comparative
examination of the two "evidence bullets," marked as "HPP-1" (Exh. E) and "HPP-2" (Exh. E-1),
which had been recovered from the victim's head and the three "test bullets" (Exhs. G, G-1, G-
2) fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm. The tests showed that the "evidence bullets" were
fired from the subject firearm.22 The empty shells from the three "test bullets" fired were duly
marked (Exhs. G-3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were taken. Silvestre's findings were confirmed
by four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar, Supervising Ballistician Ernie
Magtibay, Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho, another ballistician. The two .38
caliber empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer examined.23
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J)24 for a laboratory examination of the
bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were
identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26, 1997, she
conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a) benzidine test, to determine the
presence of blood; (b) precipitin test, to determine if the bloodstains came from human or animal
blood; and (c) ABO grouping test, to determine the blood group. When tested and matched
together, the bloodstained white "Hanes" t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim yielded
positive results for human blood belonging to blood type "O" (Exh. K).25
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar, and his sister
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine
Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being AWOL. He said he left
for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came back in 1979. He was later employed
as a driver by a friend, who owned a junk shop in Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim
whom he addressed as "Kuya." Accused-appellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game called "tong-its" on
Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some
drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle driver, arrived and had
drinks with him. After a while, the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride. The
victim came back to the restaurant before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with
accused-appellant. At about 1:30 a.m., the victim again left to transport another passenger.
After that, the victim did not come back anymore.26
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle home to 1151
Garcia Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when
he was awakened by the arrival of three policemen, two of them he recognized as SPO1
Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down. He
said he was handcuffed while the policemen searched his room, turning the sala set upside
down and opening the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside him. Before leaving, the
policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. Accused-
appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid they
would maltreat him. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood stains.
He claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when
they took him into custody. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and
to be assisted by counsel. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car for
almost two hours before he was brought inside the police station. He denied owning the .38
caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil or that the same had been
recovered from his house. He also denied the prosecution's claim that he was taken to the Sting
Cafe where he was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with the
victim before the latter was killed.27
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of
August 26, 1997, he was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from
his sleep by loud knocks on the door. When he opened the door, he saw three policemen who
were looking for his father. He told them that his father was not around, but he was shoved
away. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes stand
a white "Hanes" t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in a police patrol car
waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, and reported
to her what had happened. He went back to the house and saw some policemen still conducting
a search. As the policemen were about to leave, a van with some other policemen on board
arrived. They asked him where the water container was located. They went inside the house
and, when they came out, one of them announced that he had found a gun, which was then
photographed. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police patrol car, his aunt was
arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. spread the t-shirt and told
Jhumar's aunt "Eto, puro dugo damit niya," although the t-shirt had no bloodstains. He said that
he and his father never gave permission to the policemen to search their house.28
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellant's sister, testified that at about 5:30 in the morning
of August 26, 1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that accused-appellant had been
apprehended by some policemen. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car where she
saw her brother in handcuffs. She said she protested to the policemen that there was no
evidence that accused-appellant had killed the victim. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated
white Hanes t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it. She went back
to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what had happened. She
then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who told her that some policemen
were searching accused-appellant's house and found a gun.29
On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano, a
waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25,
1997 and drink beer, while the victim arrived at about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined
accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that she served them beer and they
stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accused-appellant wanted to
have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and that at about 3:30 a.m., the victim
and accused-appellant left and boarded the victim's tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his
head, slumped on the handle of his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away
from the house of accused-appellant, and that when they were told by an unidentified tricycle
driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting Cafe together, they
went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the appearance of the
victim's companion. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as the
person being described by Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-
appellant; (3) That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a white
"Hanes" t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber shells; (4) That
when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe, he was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victim's companion moments prior to his death; (5) That when the
investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber
revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That
laboratory examination conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed that
the bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt were human blood, type "O," which matched the
blood type of the victim; and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI ballistician, Isabelo D.
Silvestre, Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the victim were fired from the .38 caliber
revolver seized from accused-appellant's house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's alibi, giving full credence to the testimonies of Danet
Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely implicate
accused-appellant. It admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white "Hanes" t-shirt,
two spent shells, and the .38 caliber revolver, on the ground that these items had been seized
as incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr. Sosa testified that the victim was shot point-
blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the assailant, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention that the victim was unarmed and thus
totally defenseless. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his tricycle, the
assailant went around and shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an unlicensed
firearm in killing the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the penalty of death.
Hence, this appeal.
On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000,30 from Victoria Abrenica
Dulce, mother of accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit of desistance entitled
"Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong," dated November 14, 1997,31 executed by Marilou B.
Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified as
the assailant, and, by reason thereof, sought the dismissal of the criminal case against him. In
her letter, Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be submitted to the trial
court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for unknown reasons, the
same was not done by accused-appellant's counsel. This affidavit of desistance, however, not
being formally offered before the trial court, has no probative value.
We now consider accused-appellant's assignment of errors.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a
warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, §5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
another."
Under §5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender
has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that "'personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."32
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The
question, therefore, is whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao,
Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that
there was none. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-
appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they
allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite
City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed
along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant
and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe,
who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and
was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando
Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant,
alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them
to accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on
information given to them by others.
In an analogous case,33 the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive
activities. On the basis of this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the course of
the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the
latter. This Court held that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their
information came entirely from an informant. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest, the
accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities. His arrest
without a warrant could not be justified under §5(b).
In another case,34 the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested solely on the basis
of the identification given by one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for lack of
personal knowledge of the arresting officers. More recently, in Posadas v. Ombudsman,35 this
Court, in declaring the arrest without warrant of two University of the Philippines students to be
illegal, held:
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The
arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the
students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The
question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and
the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the students] were
probably guilty.
....
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might
indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the
supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to
justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere near the
scene of the crime. When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students], the latter
were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the
suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, [they], under the
supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the
violence on the campus.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant
to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber
revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was
arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came
after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on
November 11, 1997. It is true that on August 28, 1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in
which he alleged that he had been illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. In
its order, dated September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within thirty (30) days
thereof.36 On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu moved for the resetting of
accused-appellant's arraignment from October 8, 1997 to the first week of November, 1997 on
the ground that the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been
received from the NBI.37 Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. The City
Prosecutor's request was, therefore, granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11,
1997.38 Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground that his arrest
was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. Instead, on
November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.39 On the same day, the trial court issued an order
stating that, as a result of accused-appellant's arraignment, his motion for preliminary
investigation had become moot and academic and, accordingly, set the case for
trial.40 Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest.41
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the
arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent
slugs, and the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence.
The prosecution, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of
his house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must
be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. A mere failure on the part of
the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For as
Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. Locsin,42 "As the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law."
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who

conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the
testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search
show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his
house. At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the search was made
with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, "the lady doth protest too much,
methinks." Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented to the
search of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good reason why accused-
appellant might have agreed to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming
the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid
arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is
to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon
against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this
ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellant's immediate
control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after going back to
the house of accused-appellant.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine. As this
Court held in People v. Musa:43
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29
L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
Here, the search of accused-appellant's house was illegal and, consequently, the things
obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and the
.38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber
gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing accused-appellant to the Sting Cafe
where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid the gun used
in killing the victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant refused to answer,
he sought accused-appellant's permission to go back to his house and there found the .38
caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was
purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.
Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed on top of the
divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed his attention to
take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. B-2), it is not visible that there
were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small specks of blood at its lower
portion.
Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet Garcellano
said that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25, 1997; that the victim joined
him at about 2:30 a.m.; and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m., she really
did not know if they left together. Thus, Danet testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:
....
Q Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?
A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they
talked and afterwards, I already left them and I served the other customers.
Q Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?
A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already bringing
with them the two bottles of beer, Sir.
Q But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?
A When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.
Q How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?
A He followed Henry, Sir.
Q How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers inside.44
....
On cross-examination, Danet said:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q When he left, he left alone?
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside.
Q Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left?
A No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two
bottles of beer which were paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.
....
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at
that time?
A That is only my estimation, Sir.

Q You only estimated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, what was the basis of your estimation?
A Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.
Q So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You also did not see him leave?
A No, Sir.45
In People v. Gallarde,46 it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof of
identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime.
This constitutes direct evidence. Or, he may not have actually seen the crime committed, but is
nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the crime, as when the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.
This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not
actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. There is thus
serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim.
Her testimony is insufficient to place accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form
part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt.47
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his
friend whom he considered his "kuya" or elder brother.48 There is no showing that the killing of
the victim was by reason of a supposed altercation they had as to who would pay for the two
bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting Cafe. The beer was later paid for by the
victim. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express the motive or from which
his reason for committing the offense may be inferred.49
Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in
order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by accused-
appellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated, Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the
Sting Cafe, did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at
about 3:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997; (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that when
they arrived at the scene of the crime, they were informed by a tricycle driver that the victim and
the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the tricycle driver was not
presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that the white "Hanes" t-shirt was
"bloodied," but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its lower portion (Exh.
H), while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), supposedly taken at the time of
the search, shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained by SPO1
Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested positive for type "O" blood does not
necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the victim who also had a type "O" blood; (5)
Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to determine if he was positive for gunpowder
nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun allegedly found in his house was not examined for the possible
presence of accused-appellant's fingerprints; and (9) The allegation that the gun was placed on
top of a water container in accused-appellant's house is unbelievable as it is improbable that
accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal weapon there when he could have
hidden it or thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecution's claim as to where the two empty shells and the t-shirt
were allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were placed beside the white
"Hanes" t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. On direct examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?
A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the house,
then after entering the same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen we saw the
white Hanes t-shirt there, Sir, that was near the kitchen.
Q Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the same?
A Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house and
there is a table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.
Q Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
A Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-
shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the t-shirt
there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains.
Q This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt?
A Hanes, Sir.
Q How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you can
remember?
A We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were blood
stains on the t-shirt, Sir.
Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you
describe to us these 2 empty shells?
A Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir.
Q What did you do with the empty shells?
A I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him, Sir.50
However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet (tokador)
in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he testified:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?
A In the kitchen area, Sir.
Q Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?
A It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider anymore,
Sir.
Q And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?
A I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.
Q And you said, you looked at it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?
A I spread it out in front of him, Sir.
Q And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is it?
A I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir.

Q What did he say?
A According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir.
Q You also testified that you found two empty shells?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where did you find these two empty shells?
A From the bedroom upstairs, Sir.
Q Bedroom upstairs?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You mean, it is a two-storey house?
A Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs.
Q You found it when you went up?
A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I was
asking him also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had.
Q And he allowed you?
A He allowed me, sir.
Q And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?
A Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain.
Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you stated
that you got the t-shirt and when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell off?
A After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them together with
the t-shirt.
Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty shells
and you put them together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us now?
A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place where it
was, Sir, and after finding the two empty shells, it so happened that the investigator was
behind me so after that, I showed to him the t-shirt as well as the empty shells.51
....
Q Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the permission
to get the t-shirt, after getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells which fell. The
question is, do you remember that this happened?
A These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on top of the
t-shirt.
Q You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?
A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it out and
nothing fell yet at that time, then I asked him about the firearm that he used.
....
Q Do you remember having been asked this particular question:
"Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able to get
the t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting
the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was
with blood stains."
A Yes, Sir, I remember it.
Q I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?
A Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of the t-
shirt because I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.
Q You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front door of
the house, is that true?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got it?
A What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it on its
original place, Sir, and I asked him about the firearm but he was not commenting
anything on that, so I asked permission from him to go upstairs to look around.
Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did you put
it on the place where you found it?
A I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed there, Sir,
because I was planning to bring the t-shirt.52
Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the process
committed more contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador on the
second floor of the house, brought them downstairs, and then placed them on the t-shirt. When
he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells from
the second floor if, according to him, he found them by accident when they fell from the t-shirt
which he found immediately after entering accused-appellant's house and before going up to
the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said he found
the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he found it on the floor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding
accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED
and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to the Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad on official business.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1
Per Judge Christopher O. Lock.
2
Rollo, p. 10.
3
Records, p. 96.
4
Id., pp. 85-86.
5
TSN (SPO1 Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.), pp. 13-33, Dec. 10, 1997.
6
TSN (PO3 Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr.), pp. 37-44, Jan. 30, 1998; TSN (SPO1 Florentino
M. Malinao, Jr.), pp. 34-36, Dec.10, 1997; TSN (PO3 Enrico A. Rosal), pp. 6-19, March
18, 1998.
7
TSN (Danet Garcellano), pp. 4-29, April 20, 1998; Sinumpaang Salaysay of Danet D.
Garcellano, dated August 26, 1997 (Exh. S), Records, p. 103.
8
TSN (PO3 Enrico A. Rosal), pp. 19-22, 37, March 18, 1998.
9
Contained in a separate envelope. Other exhibits, to wit: Exhs. E, E-1, F, G, G-1, G-2,
G-3, G-4, and G-5, M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4 were also placed in separate envelopes.
10
TSN (PO3 Enrico A. Rosal), pp. 23-25, 46-53, March 18, 1998.
11
TSN (SPO1 Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.), pp. 36-48, 51-58, Dec. 10, 1997; TSN (PO3
Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr.), pp. 44-76, Jan. 30, 1998; TSN (PO3 Enrico A. Rosal), pp. 25-
30, March 18, 1998; Sinumpaang Salaysay of SPO1 Florentino M. Malinao, Jr., dated
August 26, 1997 (Exh. I), Records, p. 92; Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO3 Raymundo D.
Estoy, Jr., dated August 26, 1997 (Exh. L), Records, p. 95.
12
Records, p. 87.
13
Id., p. 88.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
TSN, pp. 3-14, April 7, 1998.
17
Records, pp. 98-99.
18
Id., p. 102.
19
TSN, pp. 6-22, Feb. 6, 1998.
20
Records, p. 101.
21
Id., p. 90.
22
Id., p. 91.
23
TSN, pp. 4-5, 11-23, 34-36, 42-44, Jan. 23. 1998; TSN, pp. 75-77, Jan. 30, 1998.
24
Records, p. 93.
25
Id., p. 94; TSN, pp. 8-16, Jan. 30, 1998.
26
TSN, pp. 65-75, June 23, 1998.
27
Id., pp. 39-64, 75-77.
28
TSN, pp. 4-35, June 9, 1998.
29
TSN, pp. 3-20, June 23, 1998.
30
Rollo, p. 139.
31
Id., p. 141.
32
People v. Mahusay, 282 SCRA 80 (1997); See also Posadas v. Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 131492, September 29, 2000; Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 703 (1999);
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999).
33
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986).
34
People v. Mahusay, supra.
35
Supra at 5-7.
36
Records, p. 11
37
Id., p. 12.
38
Id., p. 14.
39
Id., p. 17.
40
Id., p. 18.
41
People v. Meris, G.R. Nos. 117145-50 and 117447, March 28, 2000; People v. Ereño,
326 SCRA 157 (2000); People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (2000).
42
65 Phil. 689, 695 (1938).
43
217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993).
44
TSN, pp. 15-17, April 20, 1998 (emphasis added).
45
Id., pp. 28, 32 (emphasis added).
46
325 SCRA 835 (2000).
47
People v. Gargar, 300 SCRA 542 (1998).
48
TSN, p. 58, June 23, 1998.
49
People v. Melchor, 307 SCRA 177 (1999).
50
TSN, pp. 39-41, Dec. 10, 1997 (emphasis added).
51
TSN, pp. 77-80, Jan. 23, 1998 (emphasis added).
52
Id., pp. 86-90 (emphasis added).
Sec. 7

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189272 January 21, 2015

vs.
CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE
SENGLAO, Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution2 dated
April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CR HC No. 00657 affirming the
Decision3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
7659.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the
officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro,
received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza,
that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said
island.4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified location
wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing
boat and the other, a speed boat. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and
two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo fromthe former to the latter. As
they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves,
the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed
boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers
found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. ChanQue and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao
with several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly
suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed
to do so.5 Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and
thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc,
Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu
repeatedly offered them "big, big amount of money" which they ignored.6
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags
containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and
Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were
forty five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each.7 Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper
documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in
the Philippine territory.8 However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s
questions.9Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors, PNP
Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised
them to await his arrival the following day.10
On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a helicopter.
They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with
the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further
investigation.11 There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were turned over to
Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP, Regional
Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using "broken" English. According
to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase "call China, big money,"
giving him a certain cellular phone number.12 He allowed appellants to call said number in which
they spoke with someone using their native language, which he could not
understand.13 Because of this difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector
Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either Fookien or Cantonese.
On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector
Culili informed and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the
right to remain silent, the right to counsel, as well as the right tobe informed of the charges
against them, and the consequences thereof.14 Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to
ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said constitutional rights. However,
appellants only kept repeating the phrase "big money, call China." Apart from their names,
aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants did notdivulge any other
information.15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance of the arresting officers, then prepared the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellants, requested for their physical and medical
examination, as well as the laboratory examination of the white, crystalline substance inthe bags
seized from them.16 He also assisted the arresting officers in the preparation of their
affidavits.17 According to Inspector Culili, moreover,he was able to confirm that the appellants
are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province.18
Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic Chemist/Physical
Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim,
Laguna conducted an examination of the white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags
seized from the appellants.19 After performing three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in
her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as "shabu."20
On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an
Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of
Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA
No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at the coast of Brgy.
Tambo, Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then the
persons not authorized by law conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through the use of sea vessel into the above-
mentioned place, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu contained in forty-five (45)
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total weight of 46,600 grams (46.60 kilograms)
placed inside another forty-five(45) separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags which is
prohibited by law, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution,
specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and Police Inspector
Geronimo.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando Oliva,
both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime
Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal
Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the
apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not
actually from the speed boat the appellants were on.22
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision dated June 21,
2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN QUE" AND HIU LAO CHUNG
@ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV as amended by R. A. 7659 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer
the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA and to each pay the FINE of One
Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos Philippine Currency, with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.23
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated January 9,
2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision, amendment, or reversal of its
assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF

REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14, ARTCILE III, IN RELATION TO
SECTION 21 (A), ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF

OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT
SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS IS VALID.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.24
Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant case since the
elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1) the importation or bringing into the Philippines
of any regulated or prohibited drug; and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of
said drugs was without authority of law, were not established herein. Appellants assert that
unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal drugs came from a foreign country, the offense
does not fall within the ambit of illegal importation of said drugs. Thus, considering the
prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin of the boat on which appellants were
apprehended, appellants cannot be convicted of the crime charged herein.
Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the
corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs subject of this
case was not sufficiently established. In addition, they emphasize the irregularities attendant in
their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their constitutionally protected rights.
Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their arraignment for they were not
represented by a counsel of their choice.
This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument.
The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with violation of
Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659, which provide:
ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs
Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any
regulated drug into the Philippines.
xxxx
ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized

under Articles II and III
xxxx
Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the
same in the following cases:
a) importation of dangerous drugs;
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is
committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. According to appellants, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are
brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no importation. In support of this, they
cite our ruling in United States v. Jose,25 wherein We said that:
There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is alleged to have been illegally
imported comes from a foreign country, there is no importation. If the ship came to Olongapo
from Zamboanga, for example, the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port
of Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be sustained no matter how much opium
she had on board or how much was discharged. In order to establish the crime of importation as
defined by the Opium Law, it must be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or
on which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. Section 4 of Act No. 2381
provides that:
Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
or assist in so doing, shall be punished . . . .
It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of opium into the Philippine Islands
from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a prime essential of the crime defined by that section.
Without it, no crime under that section can be established.26
Moreover, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of bringing goods and
merchandise intoa country from a foreign country."27 As used in our tariff and customs laws,
imported articles, those which are brought into the Philippines from any foreign country, are
subject to duty upon each importation.28 Similarly, in a statute controlling the entry of toxic
substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation was construed as the entry of
products or substances into the Philippines through the seaports or airports of
entry.29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of something into a certain
territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article merely came from the same
territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.
The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were, indeed, guilty
of importing regulated drugs into the country in violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were
caught by police authorities in flagrante delictoon board a speedboat carrying forty-five (45)
plastic bags of shabu. The drugsseized were properly presented and identified in court.
Appellants’ admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant for making reference
during custodial investigation to China where they could obtain money to bribe the police
officers lead this Court to no other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin
of the confiscated drugs. All elements of the crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being
present in this case, conviction thereof is in order.30
We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their
penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the
apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came
from China. The records only bear the fact that the speedboat on which the appellants were
apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some other locality within the country, and not
necessarily from China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel
which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to
the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants
herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. This,
notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court
that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines, the importation
contention could have been sustained. Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of
regulated drugs under Section 14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from
all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident.
At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v.
Jose,31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they
cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:
Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the question whether, in case the
charge of illegal importation fails, the accused may still be convicted, under the information, of
the crime of illegal possession of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of
this proposition; but, believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an
acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it up and decided it. Section 29 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense,
the commission of which is necessarily included inthe charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included in the charge in the
information it is not sufficient that the crime maybe included, but it must necessarily be included.
While, the case before us, the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond
question and they might have been convicted of that offense if they have been charged
therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an essential element of the crime of illegal
importation and was not necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say the
least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the
waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently
anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo. That being the
case it is clear that possession, either actual or constructive, is not a necessary element of the
crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily included therein. Therefore, in acquitting the
appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot legally convict them of the crime of
illegal possession.32
However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish,33 this Court held that possession is
inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of being the owner of
sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked
inside Philippine territory, was charged with illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702
of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1
of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of
the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court affirmed the dismissal
of the information on illegal importation, in the following wise:
Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it seems plain beyond
argument that the latter is inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. There
can hardly be importation without possession. When one brings something or causes something
to be brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of it. The possession ensuing
from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive, but whatever its character, the
importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal
prosecution.If he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine
territory, he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he
is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the
merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He who puts
merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it is in transit does not incur
criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high
seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).34
As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy therein since
the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included in the information
on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the latter. Thus, this Court
sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which charged the accused with
importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for possession is necessarily included in
the charge of importation.
Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be held liable for
the offense of illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal liability for illegal
possession, if proven beyond reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. As previously
mentioned, the crime of importation of regulateddrugs is committed by importing or bringing any
regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings
something or causes something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has possession
of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation can never beproven without first establishing
possession, affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua nonfor it would rather be
unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in
possession thereof.
At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when the
information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged.35 An offense charged necessarily includes thatwhich is
proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter.36
Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged with the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In those cases, this Court
upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal
possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of
another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the
other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the
accused.37Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily
included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right
to be informed of the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.
In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and is

necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of the
former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused
is charged witha specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of
lesser crimes or offenses included therein.38
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in
the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under
Section 16,39 Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug; (b) such possession
isnot authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated
drug.40
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags
containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned previously, on the
date of appellants’ arrest, the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast
of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the
Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long
after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the persons on which were transferring
cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they moved closer to the area, one of the boats
hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with
several transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly
exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of the
subject regulated drugs.
Moreover, this Court is not legallyprepared to accept the version of the appellants that they had
nothing todo with the incident and that they were being framed up as the drugs seized from
them were merely planted by the apprehending officers. At the outset, this Court observes that
appellants did not provide any explanation as tohow the apprehending officers were actually
able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated drugs weighing about one (1) kilo each in the
speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean without their knowledge. Also, as the trial
court noted, they did not even give any explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the
coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the
confiscated bags of regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not
provide the court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower
court:
Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo
Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the police authority from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only one’s credulity. Their testimonies appear to be
merely a product of an [afterthought]. They have not executed any prior affidavit on the matters
concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2
Paglicawan who executed their joint affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. It is so
apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses that they [did
not] know anything about the case. What is even worse is that Atty. Evasco, the former counsel
of the accused, procured the testimonies of Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo
Reyes. Clear enough their intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the
monetary consideration in exchange of their testimony.41
This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has been invariably
viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the defense of denial
and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.42 Without proof of any intent
on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to appellants the commission of a crime, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over
the bare denials and self-serving claims of frame up by appellants.43
Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated by certain irregularities
in the proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allegea violation of their
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of
probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons
and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of regulated drugs therefrom are
inadmissible against them.
Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
besearched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant, under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private person may, without a
attempting to commit an offense;
This Court has ruled that for anarrest to fall under the above exception, two (2) elements must
be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.44
In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending
officers in flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their
arrest, the apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted
appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another. However, one of the boats hastily sped
away when they drew closer to the appellants, naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers.
Soon after, the police officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of
the officers. When they requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity
as well as their purpose for being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less
respond to any of their questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting appellants and the
illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting
officers "big, big amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the
arrest of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a
crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted
on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were
in plain view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the
requirement of obtaining a search warrant.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.46
In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of ascertaining
whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place reported by the
Barangay Captain. In broad daylight, appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of
illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in possession of the same, which
became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of view of the arresting officers.
It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls
within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are
admissible as evidence against appellants.
As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to substantiate beyond

reasonable doubt the corpus delictiof the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal
drugs was not sufficiently established, the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records
of the case provides otherwise. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated
drugs were properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the
presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the
confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters.47 There, the evidence
was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination which yielded
positive results. The laboratory report, photographs, and receipts were all made part of the
records of this case. In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented
before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3
Yuson, the officer who confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an Information
on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-
six (36)-hour period in Article 12548 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the law subjects such
public officers who detain persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability, it must be
remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained persons for the act they committed
remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate.49 This Court is nevertheless
mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officersin this case, such as the
language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a
Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even
assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information, appellants
should havetaken steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot
now rely on administrative short comings ofpolice officers to get a judgment of acquittal for
these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants’ possession.50
Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during custodial
investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one, this
deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction.51 In
this case, neither one of the appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the
records clearly show, appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call
China, big money." The trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during
custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel
during custodial investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying that during
their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely
represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial court
likewise appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little Chinese language. As
such, considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter was able to explain to
appellants the charges against them in the language they understood, appellants therefore did
not validly enter their plea.
The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention of the
appellants.1âwphi1 This Court does not find a violation of appellants’ right to counsel for evenin
their own narration of facts, appellants stated that when they appeared without counsel when
the case was called for arraignment on January19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time to
secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when appellants again appeared
without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public
Attorney’s Office.52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample opportunity to secure the
services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot now assign error in the proceedings
conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full
compliance with the law.
In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a Chinese
interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by the CA, the trial
court gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s
assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter.53Appellants were even given time,
through several postponements,to properly secure the services of one. If appellants were
unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed interpreter, it should have taken the
opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation, the trial court’s observations are worth
mentioning, to wit:
Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify on their own behalf, the
defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter. The instant case has been filed in
Court since December 8, 1998 or six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that
for such period oftime that this case has been pending in court, accused could not still secure
the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the records, they were able to
secure the services of several lawyers one after the other. The accused on two (2) occasions
have even submitted written requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O")which were granted
by the Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the services of an
interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also understand English as proven by their
letters. x x x54
Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to
appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when such findings are
adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of
this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in
criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence
before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’
deportment during the trial.55
Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, as
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both
courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case, this
Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings.56 It is clear, therefore, that
based on the findings of the courts below, appellants were, in fact, in possession of regulated
drugs without the requisite authority.
As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659, amending RA No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide:
Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous DrugsAct of 1972, is amended to read as follows:
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetuato death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
xxxx
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Crime. -The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:
xxxx
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed forty-five (45)
kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the two hundred (200)
grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A.
No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines." As regards the fine, We find that the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00)
for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the quantity seized from them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00657 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are found GUILTY of the
crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
enned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-18.
2
CA rollo, p. 281.
3
Penned by Presiding Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, id. at 8-19.
4
Rollo, p. 4.
5
CA rollo, p. 9.
6
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 2-12; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 12-24.
7
CA rollo, p. 10.
8
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 13.
9
Id.
10
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 12-14; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 24-26,
28.
11
Id., citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 14-15; 26-29.
12
Id.,citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 5-14.
13
CA rollo, p. 11.
14
Id.
15
Rollo p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 14-17.
16
Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-25.
17
CA rollo, p. 12.
18
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, p. 36.
19
Id. at 6, citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 7-28.
20
Id., citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 38-73.
21
CA rollo, p. 6.
22
Id. at 16.
23
Id. at 19.
24
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
25
G.R. No. L-11737, August 25, 1916.
26
United States v. Jose, supra. (Emphasis ours)
27
http://thelawdictionary.org/importation/ (last accessed November 11, 2014).
28
Section 101, Title 1 of Book 1, Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as "An Act to
Revise and Codify the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines."
29
Section 5(d)Republic Act No. 6969, otherwise known as "An Act to Control Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for Other Purposes," October 26, 1990.
30
Rollo, pp. 13-14. (Emphasis ours)
31
United States v. Jose, supra note 23.
32
Id. (Emphasis ours)
33
People v. Elkanish, G.R. No. L-2666, September 26, 1951.
34
Id. (Emphasis ours)
35
36
37
People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 and People v. Hong Yeng E, G.
R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013, citing People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September
5, 1997, 278 SCRA 561.
38
People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010, citing People v. Villamar, 358
Phil. 886, 894 (1998).
39
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred
to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription.
40
People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997).
41
CArollo, p. 18.
42
People v. Amansec, G. R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 574, citing
People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.
43
People v. Cruz,G.R. No. 187047, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 286, citing People v.
Chua, 416 Phil. 33, 56 (2001).
44
Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539, 550, citing
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
45
Fajardo v. People, G. R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 194, 209, citing
People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January
27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610 and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231
(1927)
46
Id., at 209-210, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).
47
CA rollo, p. 11.
48
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. —
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen
(18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
49
People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 528 (2004), citing People v. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069,
1071 (1957).
50
Id., citing People v. Tejada, 252 Phil. 515, 525-526 (1989).
51
Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 624, and
People v. Vinecario, G. R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004, citing People v. Buluran, 382
Phil. 364, 372 (2000).
52
Rollo, p. 59.
53
Id. at 15.
54
CA rollo, p. 18. (Emphasis ours)
55
Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011, citing People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394,
407 (2007).
56
Id. at 439.
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
This is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision[2] reversing the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting
Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.[4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo
visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."[5] He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009.[6]
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.[7]
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.[8]
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia
at that time.[9]
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents"[10]tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.[11]
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang.[12]
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his
passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then
detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.[13]
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in
Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.[14]
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained.[15]
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.[17] He
maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.[18]
In the Resolution[19] dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).[20] The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the
Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and
produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.[21]
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the
trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also
appeared without counsel during the hearing.[22]
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.[23]
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the
September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante,
Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.[24]
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and
argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.[25]
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on
the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.[26]
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito
appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."[27]
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias
Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi
Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his
release from detention.[28]
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under any resolution, information,
or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in
court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo.
Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.[30]
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with
murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of
the date of the certificate.[31] A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name
"Datukan Malang Salibo."[32]
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"[33] from
November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification[34] from
Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its
flights.[35] A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines
Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.[36]
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal[37] by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court's Decision.[38] Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and
subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.[39] Even
assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the
Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"[40] According to the Court of
Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest.[41]
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution[43] dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,[44] petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent
Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,[45] after which petitioner Salibo
filed a Reply.[46]
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of
murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of
Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally
deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.[47]
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals
delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial
court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent
Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.[48]
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even
assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner
Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.[49]
The issues for our resolution are:

First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second,
whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court
or any of its members,[50] the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by
law,[51] or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.[52] The court or judge grants the
writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty to file a return of the writ.[53] A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.[54]
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. [55] Should
the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower
court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the
lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for
habeas corpus.]"[56]Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court
that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.[57]
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,[58] "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court [o]n
behalf of Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."[59]This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ.
This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.[60]
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied
Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.[61]
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for
Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely
delegation[.]"[62] Consequently, "this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised
in the petition, and only [this court's decision] should be regarded as operative."[63]
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real."[64] It
ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves
whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in
whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her
liberty.[65] However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as
allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"[66] The decision
on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,[67] Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted
Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention.[68]
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.[69]
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the
Motion.[70]
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal
to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.[71] The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine
the merits of the case[.]"[72] Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on
Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.[73]
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and
decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the
Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts,[75] respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"[76] the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom."[77] The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary[78] and summary[79] in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal
liberty."[80]
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." [81] The
primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."[82] "Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."[83]
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person
to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy[84] or
when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.[85] In other words, habeas corpus
effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to
liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.[86] Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. [87]
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[88] Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias
Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno
Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They
commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.[89]
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this
court promulgated People v. Hernandez[90] in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion
with murder does not exist.[91]
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that
the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them.[92]
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a
petition for habeas corpus.[93] Citing Harris v. Nelson,[94] this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to
reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The
very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential
to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.[95]
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,[96] the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No.
25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and
compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the
Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were
imprisoned.[97]
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other
Mangyans being held in the reservation.[98] Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.[99]
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.[100] "[T]o exterminate
vice,"[101] Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex
workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for
Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.[102]
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ
of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the
Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have
custody of the women.[103]
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the
Writ.[104] As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived
the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of
domicile.[105] It said that the women, "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties
as are other citizens[.]"[106] The women had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality."[107]
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of
the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the
issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial
inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas
corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"[108] Although the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,[109] the writ itself may not be suspended.[110]
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.[111] The restraint then has
become legal,[112] and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.[113] Rule
102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,[114] elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of
Atty. Ilagan's arrest, 15 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty.
Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.[115]
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however,
no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned
Mission Order.[116]
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty.
Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano,
the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order
signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.[117]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.[118]
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the
Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General
Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.[119] This court set the
hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.[120]
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar
by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.[121] The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly
"played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the National Democratic Front."[122]
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.[123]
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General
Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[124] They filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
being moot and academic.[125]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no
preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information
was void.[126]
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic
with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court: [127]
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The
function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its
purpose.[128] (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.[129] Roberto
Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno
were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army.[130]
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them
were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the
Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus:[131]
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.[132] (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for
habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the
orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.[133] This ordinary remedy is to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.[134]
At any time before a plea is entered,[135] the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or
information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
(f)
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
(h)
and
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
(i)
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the information."[136] If the accused avails himself or herself of
a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."[137] "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."[138]
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or
information]."[139] If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution
"an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."[140] If after amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.[141]
IV
However, Ilagan[142] and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by
virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process
or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed
himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and
accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection
with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
(a)
is attempting to commit an offense;
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on-
(b) personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it;
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
(c) or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge
of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition
for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing"[143] case
of Ilagan.[144] Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest
any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In
his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,[145] Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of
preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his
right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:[146]
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation
falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the
cited rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal
could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would
be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim
and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and
necessity as declared by the President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113,
Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed
the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the
arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In
fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made
the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been
committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule
where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor
must have "personal knowledge of factsindicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead
of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule).
Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process
and preliminary investigation.[147] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner
Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and
Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person
detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named
Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,[148] his identification card from
the Office on Muslim Affairs,[149] his Tax Identification Number card,[150] and clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation[151] all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan
Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo
used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009
when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification[152] from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for
Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A
Certification[153] from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi
Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived
in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case
pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims[154] and 197 accused, two (2) of which have
become state witnesses.[155] As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been
arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.[156] To
require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty.
Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not
Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence.
However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without
due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its]
command"[157] to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is
illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon
City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is
hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-60.
[2]
Id. at 65-82. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred
in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (Chair) and Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Ninth
Division.
[3]
Id. at 129-138. The Decision was penned by Judge Briccio C. Ygana of Branch 153 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
[4]
Id. at 183.
[5]
Id. at 184.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Crim. Case Nos. Q-09-16214872, Q-09-162216-31, and Q-10-162662-66. The cases are
currently pending in the sala of Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes. See Re: Petition for Radio and
Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Mindanao Governor Ampatuan, et
al., 667 Phil. 128, 131 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
[9]
Rollo, pp. 184-185.
[10]
Id. at 185.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id. at 185-186.
[16]
Id. at 182-197.
[17]
Id. at 190.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id. at 199-201.
[20]
Id. at 200.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id. at 132.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id. at 132-133.
[26]
Id. at 133.
[27]
Id.
[28]
Id. at 133-135.
[29]
Id. at 137.
[30]
Id. at 137-138.
[31]
Id. at 136-137 and 175.
[32]
Id. at 136 and 164.
[33]
Id. at 135.
[34]
Id. at 140.
[35]
Id. at 136.
[36]
Id. at 131 and 136.
[37]
Id. at 204-206.
[38]
Id. at 81.
[39]
Id. at 76-77.
[40]
Id. at 79.
[41]
Id. at 77.
[42]
Id. at 87-124.
[43]
Id. at 84-86. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (Chair) and Samuel H. Gaerlan of
the Ninth Division.
[44]
Id. at 3.
[45]
Id. at 277-298.
[46]
Id. at 327-346.
[47]
Id. at 16-42.
[48]
Id. at 42-50.
[49]
Id. at 291-292.
[50]
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(1); RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 2.
[51]
Batas Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 9(1); RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 2.
[52]
Batas Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 21(1); RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 2.
[53]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 6.
[54]
[55]
RULES OF COURT, rule 102, sec. 6; See Medina v. Gen. Yan, 158 Phil. 286, 296 (1974)
[Per J. Fernandez, En Banc]; See also Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc., 109 Phil. 378, 382 (1960)
[Per J. J. B. L. Reyes, En Banc].
[56]
Medina v. Gen. Yan, 158 Phil. 286, 298 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, En Banc].
[57]
See Medina v. Gen. Yan, 158 Phil. 286, 298-299 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, En Banc]. See
also Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc., 109 Phil. 378, 382 (1960) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
[58]
109 Phil. 378 (1960) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
[59]
Id. at 379.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id. at 380-381.
[62]
Id. at 382.
[63]
Id.
[64]
Id.
[65]
Id.
[66]
Id.
[67]
158 Phil. 286 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, En Banc].
[68]
Id. at 290.
[69]
Id.
[70]
Id.
[71]
Id. at 294-297.
[72]
Id. at 298.
[73]
Id. at 298299.
[74]
Medina v. Gen. Yan, 158 Phil. 286, 298 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, En Banc].
[75]
Batas Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 9(3).
[76]
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 466, 495 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr., En Banc].
[77]
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[78]
De Villa v. Director, New Bililbid Prisons, 485 Phil. 368, 381 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
En Banc]; Calvan v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 133, 144 (2000) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
[79]
Mangila v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 355, 360 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division], citing Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 422 (2005) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc., 105 Phil. 315, 320-321 (1959) [Per
J. Concepcion, En Banc], citing 25 Am. Jur., p. 245.
[80]
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778,789 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[81]
[82]
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 790 (1919) [Per J, Malcolm, En Banc].
[83]
Id.
[84]
See Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc], Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 6.50 (1924) [Per J. Malcolm, En
Banc], and Ganaway v. Quillen, 42 Phil. 805 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[85]
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[86]
CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[87]
See Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, A1 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc].
[88]
147 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[89]
Id. at 364.
[90]
99 Phil. 515 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
[91]
Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362, 364 (1971) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc].
[92]
Id. at 364-365.
[93]
Id. at 372.
[94]
22 L Ed 2d 281 (1969).
[95]
Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362, 367-368 (1971) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc].
[96]
39 Phil. 660 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[97]
Id. at 667-668.
[98]
Id. at 666.
[99]
Id. at 720. This court, however, denied the Petition for Habeas Corpus. It ruled that
Resolution No. 25 validly displaced the Mangyans from their native habitat in order to "begin the
process of civilization" (Id. at 712).
[100]
39 Phil. 778, 782 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[101]
Id. at 780.
[102]
Id. at 780-781.
[103]
Id. at 782.
[104]
Id. at 799.
[105]
Id. at 785-786.
[106]
Id. at 786.
[107]
Id.
[108]
Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362, 367 (1971) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc], citing Ganaway v. Quillen, 42 Phil. 805 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[109]
CONST., art. III, sec. 15 provides:
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
[110]
Morales, Jr. v. Minister Enrile, et al., 206 Phil. 466, 495 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr., En
Banc].
[111]
See In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Villar v. Director Bugarin, 224 Phil. 161, 170
(1985) [Per C.J. Makasiar, En Banc], Celeste v. People, 142 Phil. 308, 312 (1970) [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc], Santiago v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 927, 930-931 (1947) [Per J.
Tuason, En Banc], Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304, 306 (1930) [Per J. Malcolm, En
Banc], and Carrihgton v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134, 138 (1905) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
[112]
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey v. Hon. Santiago, 245 Phil. 809,
816 (1988) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division], citing Cruz v. Gen. Montoya, 159 Phil.
601, 604-605 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
[113]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, 223 Phil. 561, 580 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, En Banc]; In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey v. Hon.
Santiago, 245 Phil. 809, 816 (1988) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division], citing Beltran v.
P.C. Capt. Garcia, 178 Phil. 590, 594 (1979) [Per Acting C.J. Fernando, En Banc].
[114]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, 223 Phil. 561 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
[115]
Id. at 573.
[116]
Id.
[117]
Id.
[118]
Id. at 572.
[119]
Id. at 561 and 573.
[120]
Id. at 573.
[121]
Id.
[122]
Id.
[123]
Id. at 574.
[124]
Id.
[125]
Id. at 575.
[126]
Id.
[127]
Id. at 576.
[128]
Id.
[129]
G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990, 187 SCRA 311 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[130]
Id. at 317-331.
[131]
Id. at 332.
[132]
Id.
[133]
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 422 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division].
[134]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, 223 Phil. 561, 577 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio- Herrera, En Banc]; Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 643, 657 (1996) [Per J.
Romero, Second Division].
[135]
[136]
People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 506, 512 [Per J. Peralta;
Third Division].
[137]
Id.
[138]
Id.
[139]
[140]
[141]
[142]
[143]
ISAGANI A. CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2007 ed.).
[144]
[145]
[146]
J. Teehankee, Dissenting Opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,
223 Phil. 561, 622 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
[147]
Id.
[148]
Rollo, pp. 164-166.
[149]
Id. at 168.
[150]
Id. at 175.
[151]
Id.
[152]
Id. at 139.
[153]
Id. at 140.
[154]
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Mindanao Governor Ampatuan, et al., 667 Phil. 128, 131 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En
Banc].
[155]
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, SERENO SPEECH / On Maguindanao Massacre:
The culture of impunity and the counter-culture of hope <<ax
xx"http://http://www.interaksyon.com/article/99760/sereno-
speech%C3%A2%C2%80%C2%94on-maguindanao-massacre-the-culture-of-%20impunity-
and-the-counter-culture-of-hope">http://www.interaksyon.com/article/99760/sereno-speech—
on-maguindanao-massacre-the-culture-of- impunity-and-the-counter-culture-of-hope> (visited
March 11, 2015).
[156]
Id.
[157]
J. Teehankee, Dissenting Opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,
223 Phil. 561, 616 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Henrera, En Banc].

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2B 2D 2E 2F 2G Crimpro

Habeas Corpus, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court

SECTION 1.Concept .—Inquest is an informal and summary investigation con-ducted by a public

SEC. 3.Commencement and Termination of Inquest.—The inquest proceedings shall be

a. the affidavit of arrest;

SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases.—The submission, presentation of

Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)

Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704)(now RA 8550)

Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705)

a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

SEC. 14.Contents of information.—The information shall, among others, contain:

a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person;

SEC. 17.Sandiganbayan cases.—Should any complaint cognizable by the Sandiganbayan be

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties

Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national

G.R. Nos. 107200-03 November 9, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ricardo D. Latorre for accused-appellant.

The Information in each case reads as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 92-103341:

That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between

2. Criminal Case No. 92-103342:

That on or about November 24, 1991, in the City of Manila, the

3. Criminal Case No. 92-103343:

That on or about and during the period comprised between

4. Criminal Case No. 92-103344:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 20-30)

Accused appealed to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROSECUTE THE REAL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BEYOND

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN (UP) HOLDING THE UNLAWFUL ARREST

Appellant's corroborating witness, Renato Samonte, was equally unimpressive. In fact,

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

1 Presided by Judge Domingo D. Panis.

2 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-103341.

3 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-103342, 92-103343 and 92-103344.

4 TSN, April 7, 1992, pp. 3-4, 10.

5 id., pp. 8-9.

6 id., pp. 4-5, 10-12.