Ombudsman v.

Castro
G.R. No. 172637
April 22, 2015

Facts:

Mariven Castro, brother of respondent Mary Ann Castro (Assistant City Prosecutor) purchased
on credit a vehicle from KD Surplus and executed a promissory note for which he issued six (6) post-
dated checks. The checks were later dishonored. Mariven inquired from Emily, the owner-manager of
KD Surplus, if it was still possible to just return the vehicle in exchange for the issued checks.

Emily refused to accept the vehicle finding that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty and
dilapidated body when it was returned by Rosephil, Mariven’s wife accompanied by respondent. In the
same occasion, respondent aboard a PNP-SWAT vehicle returned to the KD Surplus, made a photocopy
of the security guard’s logbook, where entry of the inspection and return was made and threatened
Emily that she would file cases against Emily if she does not return the bounced checks and Emily’s staff
as well, with lawsuits if they will not testify in her favor.

Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) against the respondent before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The respondent essentially countered that the case Emily filed was a
harassment suit. She further maintained that the police arrived at the premises of KD Surplus ahead of
her.

The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and imposed on her the penalty of "three (3) months suspension from the service without pay.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the CA where they found the respondent liable for simple
misconduct only.

The respondent and the Ombudsman filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which
the CA denied.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly found the respondent liable for simple misconduct.

Held:

The respondent’s acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT in a matter purely personal
to her and riding on their vehicle in going to and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for: these
were a haughty and an excessive display of the influence that she could wield, ultimately aimed at
helping Mariven and Rosefil to compel Emily to accept the "depreciated" vehicle, and to return the bum
checks issued by Mariven. These send the wrong impression that public officials could use and exploit
the police force for their personal interests. While it may be true that the respondent merely wanted to
ensure the safety of the parties in the event that an untoward incident may happen between Emily and
Rosefil, the calling of the SWAT was clearly an overkill; there was also no justification for her to ride in a
SWAT vehicle. By calling out the SWAT to the premises of KD Surplus and by riding on their vehicle, she
clearly wanted to project an image of power and influence meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat
Emily. How the respondent managed to convince an elite police force like the SWAT to accompany her,
and to allow her to use their vehicle in a matter purely personal to her, does not favorably reflect on her
as well as on the police.

However, the SC did not agree with the CA that the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct.
Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence.

We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be

connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The respondent
in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-
in-law. There was no link between the respondent’s acts and her official functions as a city prosecutor.

In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., the Court explained that:

x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v.

Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning.
By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. x x x It is settled that
misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must
have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of
the office x x x."

The respondent’s actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent’s official
functions. In Pia v. Gervacio, we explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public
office. Additionally and contrary to the CA’s ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules. "Prejudicial" means "detrimental or derogatory
to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing about a wrong result."

In these lights, the SC held that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent’s acts of
seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and not misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and
her official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her
public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
 Respondent was declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is
suspended from service for six (6) months and one (1) day.