A.C. No.
4585 November 12, 2004 On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported9 that respondent was
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having
been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral
turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
charged in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment
and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00)
PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue
Code and costs against the accused.3
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply
with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a
fine of P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to comply
with our previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an
additional P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment
within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until
his compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared
respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid
resolutions.8
arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998
by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at
that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo,
Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided
in respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a
result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of
the family of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present
administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter11 to the First Division Clerk of
Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case
before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case
involving the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court
of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,12 it
appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of
the Doña Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was
issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths
of his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which
was then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife. When plaintiff
asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez
claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and
totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service … he would collect 2/3 of the money
claim," the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of
P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the
suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above
judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite
having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.13
On 16 June 1999, we referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
14
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by him does not
survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called
by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a
lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of
the Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and
imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or
violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of
justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re:
Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA
815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out
from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution16 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although
admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to
adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived
at by the Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various
capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter
President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16
February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of
respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door
to complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until
now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to
herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several
opportunities to present evidence by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he only
has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to
do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his
evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited
for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the
records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP's
findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The
issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving
moral turpitude. 22
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."23 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."24
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring lawyer was indefinitely
suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and
stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of
a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense…26 (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections27 and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final
judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis
supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a
check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment that he
was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect
that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly relates
to and affects the good moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the
issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow
men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino,
A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious
effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405
SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez
v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover
the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may
not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office of attorney."30
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the
practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is "to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil
action where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to
practice them."32 "Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for
any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the
Court."33
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another
chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate length of
time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the
original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a
cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999,
when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years
had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply,
his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to
furnish complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing
medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely
reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer
any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely,
that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and
imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against
him, which argument has already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP
report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the
Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted
for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years
to "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which inaction also unduly
delayed the court's prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which
provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes
that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.36 It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for
willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty for
disobedience thereof. 37
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact that
he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to
a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence,38 and his conduct should be above reproach.39 The fact that
respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to
conduct himself in less honorable – or indeed in a less than honorable – manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege,40 demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly, herein respondent falls short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year's suspension for
non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for various reasons,
none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or
B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,
which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from
the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have
held disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we
disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances
behind his conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude.
The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege
bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.44
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted of the crime of
attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And
since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5
Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent,
is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127."46
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer
acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court
held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice,
honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty.
Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he
was granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was
not absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
 5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of
estafa for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently
disbarred. We held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there
can be no question that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence
and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good
morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now
be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby dISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña,51 the conditional pardon extended to the

erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of
disbarment imposed by this court.

7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and found guilty

of the crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized
a deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an
impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled
that disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification
of public document involves moral turpitude, we ordered respondent's name
stricken off the roll of attorneys.

8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the

recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been
convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was
"totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession."54

9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer was

disbarred for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for
misappropriating the funds of his client.

In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4)
children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in
December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot
a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate
of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine
Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as
the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child
with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos
Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would
turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August
11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman
in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got
married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon
her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children.
On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was
connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again
came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged
to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from
her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the
amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the
present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant
in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui
was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part
of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when
she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by
complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to evenprima
facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband
and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a
conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil.
178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the
State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos
Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes
a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of
the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer
and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity
and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred
that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was
in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
 (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of
good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself
in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim
in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties
with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her,
and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a
picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in
an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship
with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui
in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless,
nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed
to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality
by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were
clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly
improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have
been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for
submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was
made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos
Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find
said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents
himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another
woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single
women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off
all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she
 lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only b. a resident thereof;
talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no
time did they live together. c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the d. a person of good moral character;
part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. or pending in court;
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
xxx xxx xxx
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good
follows:
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and has been held —
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching
Phil. 865).
to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
are:
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
 Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent
are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of
our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is
a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers,
as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and
thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead
us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to
ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui
had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child,
a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that
Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as
in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary
to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment
to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
1avv phi1
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the
instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June
and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since
1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as
escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant
first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy
yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was
born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses
by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of
Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in
the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's
motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent
repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay,
Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the
community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him
to take his oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge
of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree." 6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community. 7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a
man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into
sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman.
We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely
and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him. 10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER
RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold
them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to
return to them the amount they have paid him for it.
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in Cannes, France,
together with her minor children, Alexander and Jon Alexander.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment.1 For the
price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and
interests over a townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes,
Quezon City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the
Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19,
1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook to have
Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the
complainants.
Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of
Assignment. The balance was to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly
installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four
postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was able to encash
the first check dated August 17, 1999.2
Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has
not paid in full the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to
Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili
Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on the second check she issued to
respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.
On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent, informing him
that they were still willing to pay the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse on
the condition that respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in their favor. In the alternative, complainants demanded the return of the amount
of P937,500.00, plus legal interest, within ten days.3 The amount of P937,500.00
represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly installment
of P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.
In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants,4 respondent claimed that he
was "working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from
now," and requested for "a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within which to
either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your (complainants’) option."
The period lapsed but respondent did not make good his promise to pay Crown Asia in
full, or return the amount paid by complainants.
On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent respondent a second
letter5 demanding the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for
failing to comply with his promise. The demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan,
to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated
October 9, 2003, she recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No.
XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner
San Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a
lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases7 that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered
into a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over
the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell
short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which
one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not
inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse
unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the
time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the
purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she
paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10)
years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict
standard of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the
trust and respect reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants’
counsel demanding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
complainants, or, in the alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In
reply to said letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, and promised to settle the
same if given sufficient time, thus:
xxx
I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now
but I need a little time to fix some things over. May I please request for a period of 20
days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the
money at your option. (Emphasis supplied)
In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject
townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even
failed to produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over the
subject unit, which would show the extent of his right of ownership, if any, over the
townhouse unit and lot in question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was
only after almost two years had passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or
return to complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a
second letter8 demanding solely the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal
interest. By this time, it was indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform his
end of their agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character.9 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers
must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with
their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension
and disbarment.12
Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that respondent be directed to
return the money he received from them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations
by the court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in
these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money
that should be returned to the complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 6408 August 31, 2004
ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEORO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed,
however, by Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent
issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting
to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-
existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for violation of
B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan;
respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the criminal
charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill
said promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give
complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which were
in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters
located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of Victoria
Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainants checked the
property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole
heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a
transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over
the phone but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.1
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2 of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank
checks amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were
issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had already been paid
and replaced with new checks; Isidra signed a document attesting to the fact that the
subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists;3 she also issued in favor of Olivia several
Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing
obligation; the checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the City
Prosecutor’s Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and
the criminal case filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City Branch 3 was already dismissed; the Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S.
Nos. 01-14090-034 were never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of
desistance; respondent did not send text messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for
deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present any title in exchange for her
bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings were made with
Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated by Isidra only because she had a
misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from respondent.5
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as
follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-
Meteoro filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig
City, Philippines docketed as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
was brought about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the
records of the account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my
co-complainant Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro
and the corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by
Ms. Isidra Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in
pursuing the complaint against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was
brought about by a case of some mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of
desistance and submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of
Cabanatuan City w(h)ere Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22
were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in
court and I have also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to
prove that I have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.6
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to
appear before it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed
to settle their misunderstanding.7
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which
respondent acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a
staggered basis. Another hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed
to appear in said hearing despite due notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with
the order that should respondent fail to appear, the case shall already be submitted for
resolution.8
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant
who was unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was
warned again that should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall
resolve the case. On said date, respondent did not appear despite due notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of
the July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she
had already paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondent’s
father was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital
thus she was not able to settle her remaining balance as planned; and because of said
emergency, respondent was not able to fully settle the balance of her debt up to this
date. Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days from August 1,2002 to
finally settle her debt with complainant.10
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondent’s motion and
setting aside the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that
she already paid complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted
evidencing payment amount only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was then set for May 28,
2003 at which time respondent was directed to present proof of her payments to the
complainant. The hearing was however reset several times until August 20, 2003 at
which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent somebody to ask for a
postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave respondent a last
opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for October 7,
2003 which the commission said was "intransferrable."12
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent
was duly notified and even personally received the notice for that day’s hearing. The
case was thereafter submitted for resolution.13
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan
submitted his report pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has
committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office
holds that she has. More particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently
denying her indebtedness to herein complainant and then subsequently admitting
liability by proposing a staggered settlement has displayed a glaring flaw in her
integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral characters. In her motion
for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the respondent made a
false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the
receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that
while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office respondent has
seemingly ignored the same deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not offered
any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainant’s
charge that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title
(TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to
a transaction which the former had with the Quedancor where respondent was
formerly employed. Based on all the foregoing findings and the deliberate failure
of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities, inspite of
several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend the
scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza
Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a
lawyer but also the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy
member of the Bar must constantly be of good moral character and unsullied
honesty.14
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the
practice of law for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos.15
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that:
she was not able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in
Bicol attending to pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province on
October 25, 2003 and it was only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7;
from the very beginning, respondent never intended to ignore the Commission’s
hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hit
her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expenses
incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by
her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by
the bank; respondent’s husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and
respondent herself had sought medical help on several occasions due to her inability to
conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not for said reasons,
respondent could have already paid the complainant despite respondent’s knowledge
that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely the interest of her debt
since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and she already
paid for those that she was not able to return. Respondent prays that the resolution of
the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said date or until
January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper accounting and
presentation of receipts.16
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
 RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondent’s glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant.17
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged
matter of respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for
the bounced checks that were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that
the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.19 They must at all
times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in
a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards
Isidra Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually
acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only
to pay in a staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to
the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the
lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice.21
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the
payment thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in
most of the hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1,
2002 after the IBP-CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution.
She claimed that she got sick days before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally
settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did not appear before the
Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice. After the case was
submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed another motion for
reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending to personal
matters. Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt. This repeated
failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and moral character.
Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated
pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case
and to make full use of the mechanisms of administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which
prompted Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutor’s office in Cabanatuan
City. Her only excuse is that she was able to replace said checks and make
arrangements for the payment of her debt, which led to the dismissal of the criminal
complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.22 The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.23 It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem.24
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same
were issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary
measures. As we explained in Co vs. Bernardino:25
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his
non-professional or private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of
the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law
confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent’s propensity to issue bad
checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious
doubt…26 (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her
husband also had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She
however did not present any proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear
personally before the complainant and the commission, in spite of the many opportunities
given her, to make arrangements for the payment of her debt considering the
circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited until the case was submitted for
resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any
explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainants’ charge that she tried to
negotiate with them a transfer certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client,
she should be held liable therefor. Basic is the principle that if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is under no obligation
to prove her exception or defense.27 Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent to
prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt. In this case,
complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together
with their letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the title respondent
tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the bounced
checks in their possession.28 No other evidence or sworn statement was submitted in
support of such allegation. Respondent in her answer, meanwhile, denied having any
knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion was made on the matter, not
even in the hearings before the commission.29 For this reason, we hold that respondent
should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to complainants for lack of
sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the issuance of worthless
checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.30
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s misconduct. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six months. In Lao vs. Medel,31 which also involved non-payment of debt and
issuance of worthless checks, the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for
one year was appropriate. Unlike in the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid
a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem
that six months suspension from the practice of law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to
complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her
receipt of this Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount
of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality
of herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
IBP as well as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts
for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to
March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked
about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan,
Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he
saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment,
anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went
to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and
her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words
"I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I
will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness
but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . .
I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on
you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But
more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to
last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in
my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING
MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
 Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B
11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene
was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or
about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the
above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or
about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
"Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase
"flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of
the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far
as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to
Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross
moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar.
He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper."
Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together
again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint regarding his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate
gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the
bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary
Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is
the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively
his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to
a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated
January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the
Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and
Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's
counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-
page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge
against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics
and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section
12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason
therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that
there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the
news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do
not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship
with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent
through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of
their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances
the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there
is indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife,
Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of
the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent
admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that
Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of
the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically
denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with
a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's
daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene
named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent
never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January
29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced
by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed
in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with
Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension
uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances."
Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any
other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with
a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-
marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow
of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
 The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably
unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution andobey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon7 of the same Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the
IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the
criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on
the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab
initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair
with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent
glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to
Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution,
DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense
of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone
calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the
fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself
was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only
served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes
all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where
she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since
Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits
that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was
where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala
and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential
house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that
was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the
girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate
is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after
trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x
criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on
January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records
of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And
let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his
A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children,
filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as
CBD Case No. 00-734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him
despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Detailing the circumstances surrounding respondent's complained act, complainant
averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor;
that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions
administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 19912 in the latter's
Manila office, and the second on December 28, 19913 at the Asian Institute of Tourism
Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to
Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family
and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious
living conditions.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence consisting of the marriage contract
between respondent and Helen Esparza4 and that between her and respondent,5 and
photographs6 of their (complainant and respondent) nuptials and of captured moments in
their life as a couple and a family.
Copy of the complaint could not be immediately served upon respondent owing to the
difficulty of locating him.7
Complainant later filed a Manifestation8 before the IBP, furnishing therein respondent's
address where he supposedly resided with his third wife Jo T. Constantino-Macarubbo.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereupon thrice9 required respondent to file his
Answer. He failed to do so, however, on motion of complainant,10 he was declared in
default.11 Complainant was thus allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner came out with a Report and Recommendation on
January 22, 2001.12
By Resolution of May 26, 2001,13 however, the IBP Board of Governors remanded the
case to the Investigating Commissioner to "ensure proper notice or another opportunity
to serve notice to the respondent." Subsequently or on September 5, 2001, respondent
filed a Manifestation/Ex Parte Motion to Re-Open Proceedings14 which was granted.15
By Comment of October 18, 2001,16 respondent denied employing deception in his
marriage to complainant, insisting instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior
subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a
"sham wedding" to protect her and her family's reputation since she was then three-
months pregnant.
Respondent submitted in evidence the final and executory October 30, 2000 Decision of
Branch IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 5617,
"Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,"17 declaring his marriage to complainant
void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court's findings on the basis of his evidence
which was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed "a sham and make believe"
one, "vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the
existence of a legal impediment" and want of a valid marriage license.
Respondent also submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office that
complainant's name does not appear in the National Index of Marriages for
Bride;18 another certification from the National Statistics Office-Office of Civil Registrar
General that it has no record of the December 28, 1991 marriage of complainant and
respondent;19 and an attestation from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221 which was used in complainant
and respondent's marriage is not on file in its records.20
Admitting having sired complainant's two children, Juris Alexis and Gabriel Enrico,
respondent denied ever abandoning them.
In his Supplemental Comment, respondent claimed that he left complainant and their
21
two children with her consent after explaining to her that the pain and shame of living in
sin and ridicule was unbearable.
To refute the charge that he had abandoned complainant and their two children, he
presented copies of fully paid educational plans22 for the high school and college
education of the children; a Philippine National Bank check dated January 18, 1999 for
P22,556.33 representing his payment of the final amortization of his car which has been
in complainant's possession since 1997;23 a copy of a petition of complainant in a civil
case filed against respondent with the Quezon City RTC, for judicial authorization to sell
certain properties of respondent, wherein she admitted that respondent issued three
postdated checks in the amount of P2,000.00 each for his children's allowance covering
the period October 1999 to December 1999;24 and copy of his August 9, 1999 letter to
complainant demanding custody of his children, he having been barred from seeing
them, as well as the return of his personal properties in complainant's possession.25
To disprove that he is of depraved moral character, respondent submitted certifications
from the Office of the Bar Confidant,26 Office of the Ombudsman,27 Department of
Justice,28 and the Philippine National Police in his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan29 that he
has no cases of any nature pending with them. And he too submitted letters from the
Department of Interior and Local Government30 and the Metro Manila Development
Authority31addressed to him to show that he is a civic-spirited person.
Finally, respondent, in his Supplemental Comment, raised the additional defenses that
the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the
present administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as
mere live-in partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino;32 and that
she resorted to forum-shopping in bringing both this administrative action and the civil
case with the Quezon City RTC.
Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked
the final and executory August 21, 1998 Decision of Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC in
JDRC Case No. 4320, "Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,"33 declaring his first
marriage void on the ground of his wife's psychological incapacity.
After hearing during which both complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation34 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is recommended that respondent Atty.
Edmundo L. Macarrubo be SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.
Moreover, it must likewise be impressed on respondent that he should comply
with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as a father of the
children as a result of his relationship with complainant. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors subsequently passed Resolution No. XV-2003-35135 which
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
It appears that respondent began his legal career in 1986 as Legal Officer of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports after which he became Supervising Civil
Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission.36He later became an Ombudsman
Graft Investigation Officer, then a State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, before
finally bowing out of public service after about 14 years or in July 2000 to engage in
private practice.37
The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court38 bears reiterating.
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his
private affairs which warrant disciplinary action by this Court as the guardian of the purity
and integrity of the legal profession.
The incontrovertible facts show that while respondent had a subsisting marriage with Q: And is it correct for me to say that you did not file any case before the
Helen Esparza with whom he had two children,39 he entered into a second marriage with Prosecutor's Office.
complainant.
A: I reported that matter to the police.
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first
marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage Q: In what way did M[s]. Florence Teves coerce you?
was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage.40 Such conduct is inconsistent with
the good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a
A: She placed me in a place where she could guard me and she treated (sic) to
member of the Philippine bar.41 It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the
sue me, destroy my career. And at the time of the marriage she sent people to
basic social institution of marriage.42
fetch me from my place to be there. And there are a lot of people with strange
faces.
Even assuming arguendo that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the
duress, by his own admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased
ATTY. PAGUIA -
after their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a
second child by her.
Q: How many days or hours did this coercion last?
xxx
A: That's continuing.
ATTY. PAGUIA [Complainant's Counsel]
Q: From what day to what day?
Q: Are you claiming that the complainant coerced you again to marry her?
A: It's started when she said she was pregnant until the date of the alleged
marriage.
A: Yes, I was.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission who got her pregnant at that time?
Q: Did she use a gun to coerce you?
A: Although there was a carnal knowledge once.
A: A lot of people appearing around and a lot of bad mouth from her, threats to
sue me and to even kill me by people around.
Q: Of course you know that the complainant delivered the child after your
marriage, is it not?
Q: So insofar as you are concerned the complainant committed a crime of
coercion against yourself?
A: Yes, six months after because she was already pregnant three months during
that time already.
A: Yes.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission what is the name of the child was Q: When you say intermittently you don't stay there?
(sic)?
A: Not permanently.
A: Juris. I recognized the children. There's no problem about that. I gave them
educational plan, I gave them support. ATTY. PAGUIA -

Q: After the first child you continued living with the complainant, is it not? Q: How often did you come home to the residence of the complainant?

A: Intermittently I get out and then she would call pagka't may sakit yong
bata so I have to go back.
Q: Of course it was your responsibility as father to the child to see the condition
of the child?
A: Whenever she call that the child is sick.
Q: So you live (sic) with her up to what year?
A: Intermittently 1995.

A: Yes, that's why whenever she comes and tells me that the child is sick I go Q: You mentioned that you have two children with the complainant?
there.
A: Yes.
Q: After your wedding with the complainant can you tell the Honorable
Commission where you resided?
Q: Can you remember when your second child with the complainant was born?
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
A: I cannot remember.
Q: When you say where you resided, both of them?
Q: Do you know how old the second child with the complainant is?
ATTY. PAGUIA: Yes, Your Honor.
A: I guess six or seven.
A: In the residence of Florence.
Q: What is his name?
ATTY. PAGUIA -
A: Mico.
Q: How long did you live with the complainant after your wedding?
Q: Who provided the support for these children from the time they were born up
to the present?
A: Intermittently again few months then I get out then when the child is sick
I have to visit.
A: When I was there I gave for their subsistence.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
Q: Will you please tell the Commission how much was that?
A: I buy groceries for them and I gave also for their leisure and for their disbarment case does not affect its course,46 then the judgment of annulment of
education. respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence -
Q: When you gave this support during the intermittently that you had with them? in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability
attaches.47
A: Intermittently also.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first
A: Roughly, Compañero, can you tell the Honorable Commission from that time two marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears
they were born to this time how much you were giving them? noting. Contrary to the finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by
his own admission, contracted a third marriage:
A: I cannot compute.
xxx
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
ATTY. PAGUIA -
Q: What about on a monthly basis, do you recall?
Q: After getting married to the complainant is it a fact that you entered into a third
marriage to one Josephine Constantino?
A: I cannot compute although when I left with her consent in 1997 I left valuables
in the amount of P400,000.00.
A: I think that is . . .
Q: When you say with her consent, did you tell her that you are leaving?
Q: I will reform, Your Honor. Do you know a person by the name of Josephine
Constantino?
A: Yes, Your Honor, she agreed because I said I can no longer bear living with
sin.
A: Yes
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
43
Q: What relation if any do you have with her?
The saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted
in evidence by complainant which show a typical happy family with respondent A: I am separated to her since 2000.
essaying out his role as a husband to complainant and a father to their two kids.
Respondent cannot thus take refuge in the earlier mentioned finding in the COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
decision of Tuguegarao City trial court in the annulment case he filed against
complainant. The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve Q: Were you married to Josephine Constantino?
as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In
re Almacen,44 a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor A: Yes, but it's in the process of annulment.
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative x x x48 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
of an administrative case against him,45 or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
In both his marriages to his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed that he was
made to enter into the marital union against his will. That claim is an affront to the
intelligence of the members of this Court to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from
fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to
enter into any marriage. One incident of a "shotgun marriage" is believable, but two such
in succession would tax one's credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine
T. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment case. It would not come
as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again put blame on his third wife in order
to send the marriage to oblivion.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
leaving them behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.52 The
The impact of respondent's conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as well as the penalty of 3 months suspension recommended by the IBP is, not commensurate to the
children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall. gravity of his conduct.

Respondent's assertion that he has not failed to support his children by complainant is WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality
not totally supported by the evidence on record. He may have secured educational plans and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
for them and doled out some sums of money in the past, but it appears that he has failed satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he
to provide them regular, monthly support. In fact, he admitted that even before he left is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant's residence in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support to his children complainant.53
with her.49
Let respondent's name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and
for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community.50The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,51 outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.

In sum, respondent has breached the following precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A.C. No. 7022 June 18, 2008
MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against respondent Atty.
Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to their
daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD
Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty.
Ferrer agreed to handle her cases1 and soon their lawyer-client relationship became
intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love with him.2 He
said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her temptations.3 Thereafter, they lived
together as "husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997,4 and on March 12, 1997, their
daughter was born.5 The affair ended in 20006 and since then he failed to give support to
their daughter.7
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented their
daughter's birth and baptismal certificates, and the photographs taken during the
baptism. She testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not
think he was already married. She also testified that she was willing to compromise, but
he failed to pay for their daughter's education as agreed upon.8 Atty. Ferrer refused to
appear during the hearing since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego.9
In his position paper,10 Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter.
He also admitted his indiscretion; however, he prayed that the IBP consider Ms.
Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with his wife and children. He further
reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit
with Ms. Samaniego.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-13811 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice
of law for his refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP also
admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar and to keep in mind his
duties as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 with prayer for us
to reduce the penalty, to wit:
Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the disposition
of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline, herein respondent most humbly
and respectfully begs the compassion of the Honorable Court and states that the
gravity of the penalty imposed and meted out, depriving herein respondent to
earn a modest living for a period of six (6) months, will further cause extreme
hardship to his family of ten (10) children.13
We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding
that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar for his
illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he was lawfully married
and with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that we affirm
Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and deny the prayer for reduced penalty.14
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his daughter with Ms.
Samaniego. We also agree with the Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair
with Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of good moral character as a member of the bar.
We dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniego's charge of abandonment since Atty. Ferrer did
not abandon them. He returned to his family.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his indiscretion which ended in
2000. We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct
subject to disciplinary action.15 The penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment,16 or
indefinite17 or definite18 suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,19 we ruled that suspension from the practice of
law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty
of gross immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of aggravating
circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his
family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the subsistence
of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with other women.20
In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant as adequate sanction for the
grossly immoral conduct of respondent.
On another point, we may agree with respondent's contention that complainant was not
entirely blameless. She knew about his wife but blindly believed him to be unmarried.
However, that one complicit in the affair complained of immorality against her co-
principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms.
Samaniego is in pari delicto.21 We must emphasize that this Court's investigation is not
about Ms. Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct as one of its officers and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.22
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following
norms under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a
father to all his children. If there be a resultant hardship on them because of this case, let
it be impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his own misconduct.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality
and, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon
notice hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent
is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

xxxx

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

xxxx
G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903 The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law. attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or
W. A. Kincaid for defendant. the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.

PER CURIAM: In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the
7th day of February, 1903.
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of
then in force in said city; and,
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after
its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of
evading the law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After
reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H.
D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in
his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that
the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made
an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and
directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes"
Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries
(civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago
to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30,
1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand,
the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87.
Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on
Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for
auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save
his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and
lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago
failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his
co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-
7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house
and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for
the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was
not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution
was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit
and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon
City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents'
certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ
of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be
done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter
court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds
of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in
favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as
the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but
then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was
being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession.
This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June
3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on
August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We 1äwphï1.ñët
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The
said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ
of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-
7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-
equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which
issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had
previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is
the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at
par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that
their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property
is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously
wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is
not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution,
a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless
in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the
rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is
clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the
ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution
was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife
is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted
that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house
and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he
and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the
wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a
party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had
every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed
but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-
half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is
not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither
legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the
well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement.
The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By
the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision
under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not
stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living
together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have
tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer
of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath
to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to
seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which
might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We
find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the
merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-
defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension
to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint
and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder
stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties
of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only
to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here,
which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is
the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the
decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of
which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of
the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to
state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or
illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties
was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda
spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of
the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of
P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered
P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of
the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if
it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas
but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to
the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of
the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause
of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel
for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they
were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of
such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court
to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the
defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that
the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the
two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants'
lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial
Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by
the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice
to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they
had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while
Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan
Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by
the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal
properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the
Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also
barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil
case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action.
Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which
shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a
part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a
motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar
by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of
the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the
conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was
likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously
counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his
new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure
to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to
counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases,
it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio.
Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The
petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and
there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw
as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the
policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6,
1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted
this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was
allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the
municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused
cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission
on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for
postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be
resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel
for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense
obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26,
1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February
11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation
of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The
defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8)
times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After
which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of
petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election
registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by
allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution
has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed
a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable
then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this
disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar
carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a
trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of
the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel
de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing
matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he
cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in
the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated
such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that
as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective
assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to
have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill
his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could
in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice
Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more
emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of
an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for
the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility
as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member
of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to
court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
March 23, 1929 your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague,
to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my
Duran & Lim for respondent. residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government. will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with
you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the
MALCOLM, J.: Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary
public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that
you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial
receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and
board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people
LUIS B. TAGORDA
are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and
Attorney
that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as
Notary Public
notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Province of Isabela
Echague.
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of
any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my
your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead;
desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If
and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your
the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other
loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come
lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to
or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
willing to help and serve the poor.)
registration.
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant
Yours respectfully,
of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as
follows:
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
Notary Public.
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments
next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following:
"The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association
in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced
by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring
up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common
law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or
runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek
his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves
upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part
of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may
be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is
not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of
cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those
canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which
should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that
the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this
if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of
the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to
commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that
future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an
attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929, Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having

published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as
follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to
repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical
rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement
was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid vs.
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts R E SO L U T I O N
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but REGALADO, J.:
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court
is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, Annex A
reprimanded.
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30
am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON
 an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue
with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has
made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
 xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which
all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or
services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as
any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance
of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage
as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such
as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence
is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who
by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection
of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform
all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively
to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to
the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services
ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters,
it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit,
without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held
that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another
(See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but
also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish
the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims
that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside
of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case,
the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may
be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid
to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that
at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant
case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an
entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems
to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above
cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility
of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the
Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the
law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that
secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when
in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be
done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by
lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the
law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed
that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad features of
the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or
inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess
rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and
fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a
fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his
land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
this is not the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility
in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as
a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to
his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by
law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations
of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or
not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a question
of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and
his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract,
or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here,
since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'
here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative'
one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of
the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular
client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal
Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,
absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.
The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines
by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the
situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale
did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of
the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material
or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his
having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited
in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
 marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then
takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of
another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law,
or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp.
665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration
to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and
so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled
"Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various
fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we
start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you
how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature,
they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one
of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-
up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine.
It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required
by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection
of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their
legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law
in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising
or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
 It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable
to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case
explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide
for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant
of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from
the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary

action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical